Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns: a Reply to Salis

Arvid Båve

doi:10.1007/s11406-019-00081-9

Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns: a Reply to Salis

Arvid Båve

Stockholm University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

I here respond to Pietro Salis’s objections against my original critique of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT). In addition, I clarify some points regarding the relationship between anaphoric relationships and “general semantic notions” like “equivalence”, “consequence”, and “sameness of content”, and make some further points about (PT)’s ability gto explain pragmatic and expressive features of “true”.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1421-1429
Journal	Philosophia
Volume	47
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00081-9
Publication status	Published - 2019 Nov 1
Externally published	Yes

Subject classification (UKÄ)

Philosophy

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10.1007/s11406-019-00081-9Licence: CC BY

Cite this

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Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns: a Reply to Salis

Abstract

Subject classification (UKÄ)

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