Two Countermeasures Against Hardware Trojans Exploiting Non-Zero Aliasing Probability of BIST

Elena Dubrova, Mats Näslund, Gunnar Carlsson, John Fornehed, Ben Smeets

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The threat of hardware Trojans has been widely recognized by academia, industry, and government agencies. A Trojan can compromise security of a system in spite of cryptographic protection. The damage caused by a Trojan may not be limited to a business or reputation, but could have a severe impact on public safety, national economy, or national security. An extremely stealthy way of implementing hardware Trojans has been presented by Becker et al. at CHES’2012. Their work have shown that it is possible to inject a Trojan in a random number generator compliant with FIPS 140-2 and NIST SP800-90 standards by exploiting non-zero aliasing probability of Logic Built-In-Self-Test (LBIST). In this paper, we present two methods for modifying LBIST to prevent such an attack. The first method makes test patterns dependent on a configurable key which is programed into a chip after the manufacturing stage. The second method uses a remote test management system which can execute LBIST using a different set of test patterns at each test cycle.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)371-381
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Signal Processing Systems
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Jun 1
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The first author was supported in part by the research grant No SM14-0016 from the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016, Springer Science+Business Media New York.

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Computer Science


  • Countermeasure
  • Hardware Trojan
  • Logic BIST
  • Malicious hardware


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