Two General Attacks on Pomaranch-like Keystream Generators

Håkan Englund, Thomas Johansson, Martin Hell

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingPaper in conference proceedingpeer-review

Abstract

Two general attacks that can be applied to all versions and variants of the Pomaranch stream cipher are presented. The attacks are demonstrated on all versions and succeed with complexity less than exhaustive keysearch. The first attack is a distinguisher which needs keystream from only one or a few IVs to succeed. The attack is not only successful on Pomaranch Version 3 but has also less computational complexity than all previously known distinguishers for the first two versions of the cipher. The second attack is an attack which requires keystream from an amount of IVs exponential in the state size. It can be used as a distinguisher but it can also be used to predict future keystream bits corresponding to an IV if the first few bits are known. The attack will succeed on all versions of Pomaranch with complexities much lower than previously known attacks.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFast Software Encryption / Lecture Notes in Computer Science
EditorsAlex Biryukov
PublisherSpringer
Pages274-289
Volume4593
ISBN (Print)978-3-540-74617-1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007
Event14th International Workshop, FSE 2007 - Luxembourg, March 26-28, 2007
Duration: 2007 Mar 262007 Mar 28

Publication series

Name
Volume4593
ISSN (Print)1611-3349
ISSN (Electronic)0302-9743

Conference

Conference14th International Workshop, FSE 2007
Period2007/03/262007/03/28

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering

Free keywords

  • distinguishing attack
  • Stream ciphers
  • eSTREAM
  • Pomaranch.
  • resynchronization attack

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