Abstract
The paper presents main conceptual distinctions underlying much of modern philosophical thinking about value. The introductory Section 1 is followed in Section 2 by an outline of the contrast between non-relational value (impersonal good, or good, period) and relational value (good for someone, or—more generally—good for some entity). In Section 3, the focus is on the distinction between final and non-final value as well as on different kinds of final value. In Section 4, we consider value relations, such as being better/worse/equally good/on a par. Recent discussions suggest that we might need to considerably extend traditional taxonomies of value relations.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Title of host publication | Handbook of Value/Perspectives from Economics, Neuroscience, Philosophy, Psychology and Sociology |
Editors | Tobias Brosch, David Sander |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 23-42 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-0-19-871660-0 |
Publication status | Published - 2015 |
Subject classification (UKÄ)
- Philosophy
Free keywords
- incommensurability
- parity
- value relations
- instrumental value
- intrinsic value
- final value
- impersonal value
- personal value
- good for
- good