Venting and Gossiping in Conflicts: Emotion Expression in Ultimatum Games

Margaret Samahita

Research output: Working paper/PreprintWorking paper

Abstract

Conflicts often lead to expression of emotion to unrelated parties. We study non-instrumental emotion expression in binary ultimatum games, where receivers can express emotion either privately or to a third-party audience prior to accepting or rejecting the offer. The possibility of emotion expression to an audience increases welfare, but this is driven by senders behaving more fairly rather than any change in receivers' behaviour. We thus show that the role of emotion expression in increasing co-operation is mainly driven by the punishment motive. There is demand for emotion expression even when it is unobserved, this is motivated by low self-esteem.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherDepartment of Economics, Lund University
Number of pages27
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Publication series

NameWorking Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University
No.33

Subject classification (UKÄ)

  • Economics

Free keywords

  • self-esteem
  • fairness
  • emotion
  • co-operation
  • ultimatum game

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