A Distinction in Value - Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapter


The paper argues that the final value of an object, i.e., its value for its own sake, need not be intrinsic. It need not supervene on the object’s internal properties. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the opposite, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values is largely motivated by a mistaken belief that appropriate responses to value must consist in preferring and/or promoting. A pluralist approach to value analysis obviates the need for reduction: the final value of a thing or a person can be given an independent interpretation in terms of the appropriate thing- or person-oriented responses: admiration, love, respect, protection, cherishing, etc.


Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Philosophy
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationRecent Work on Intrinsic Value
EditorsToni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Michael Zimmerman
ISBN (Print)9781402034857
Publication statusPublished - 2005
Publication categoryResearch

Total downloads

No data available