A new birthday-type algorithm for attacking the fresh re-keying countermeasure

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The fresh re-keying scheme is a countermeasure designed to protect low-cost devices against side-channel attacks. In this paper, we present a new birthday-type attack based on a refined reduction to RING-LPN with a reducible polynomial. Compared with the previous research, our algorithm significantly reduces the time complexity in the 128-bit leakage model—with an SNR equal to 8.21 and at most 2 20 traces, for instance, the key can be recovered using 2 41.96 bit-operations.

Details

Authors
Organisations
External organisations
  • University of Bergen
Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Software Engineering

Keywords

  • Birthday attacks, Cryptography, Fresh re-keying, LPN, RING-LPN
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)30-34
Number of pages5
JournalInformation Processing Letters
Volume146
Publication statusPublished - 2019
Publication categoryResearch
Peer-reviewedYes