A note on distinguishing attacks

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingPaper in conference proceeding

Abstract

A new distinguishing attack scenario for stream ciphers, allowing a resynchronization collision attack, is presented. The attack can succeed if the part of the state that depends on both the key and the IV is smaller than twice the key size. It is shown that the attack is applicable to block ciphers in OFB mode. For OFB mode, the attack is more powerful than the previously known generic distinguishing attack since it will directly recover a part of the plaintext while having the same asymptotic complexity as the generic distinguishing attack. The attack is also demonstrated on the eSTREAM candidate LEX. LEX is not vulnerable to any of the previously known generic distinguishing attack but is vulnerable to the new attack. It is shown that if approximately 265.7 resynchronizations using LEX are performed for the same key, some plaintext might be recovered.

Details

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Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication[Host publication title missing]
PublisherIEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages87-90
ISBN (Print)978-1-4244-1200-6
Publication statusPublished - 2007
Publication categoryResearch
Peer-reviewedYes
EventIEEE Information Theory Workshop on Information Theory for Wireless Networks - Bergen, Norway
Duration: 2007 Jul 12007 Jul 6

Conference

ConferenceIEEE Information Theory Workshop on Information Theory for Wireless Networks
CountryNorway
CityBergen
Period2007/07/012007/07/06