A problem for confirmation theoretic accounts of the conjunction fallacy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


This paper raises a principled objection against the idea that Bayesian confirmation theory can be used to explain the conjunction fallacy. The paper demonstrates that confirmation-based explanations are limited in scope and can only be applied to cases of the fallacy of a certain restricted kind. In particular; confirmation-based explanations cannot account for the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered form of the conjunction fallacy. Once the problem has been set out, the paper explores four different ways for the confirmation theorist to come to terms with the problem, and argues that none of them are successful.


Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Philosophy


  • Conjunction fallacy, Inverse conjunction fallacy, Bayesian epistemology, Bayesian confirmation theory, Formal measures of confirmation
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)437-449
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2016
Publication categoryResearch