An Account of Boeschian Cooperative Behaviour

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapter

Abstract

According to reductionist accounts, intentional joint action can be exhaustively analysed with concepts that are already available and anyway needed for understanding intentional singular action. Most such accounts include a condition that it must be common knowledge between the participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that causes and coordinates the joint action (a CK-condition). Without such common knowledge, the resulting joint action supposedly isn’t an intentional joint action. I argue that reductionists should reject the CK-condition. Either the CK-condition is unnecessary or else the reductionist fails to account for the target phenomenon of intentional joint action.

Details

Authors
Organisations
External organisations
  • University of Copenhagen
Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Philosophy
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCollective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems
Subtitle of host publicationExplanation, Implementation and Simulation
EditorsCatrin Misselhorn
PublisherSpringer
Pages169-184
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-15515-9
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-15514-2
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Jul 1
Publication categoryResearch
Peer-reviewedYes

Publication series

NamePhilosophical Studies Series
PublisherSpringer
Volume122

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