An Auction with Approximated Bidder Preferences - When an Auction has to be Quick

Research output: Working paper


This paper presents a combinatorial auction which is of particular interest when short completion times are of importance. It is based on a method for approximating the bidders' preferences over two types of items when complementarity between the two may exist. The resulting approximated preference relation is shown to be complete and transitive at any given price vector. It is shown that an approximated Walrasian equilibrium always exists if the approximated preferences of the bidders comply with the gross substitutes condition. This condition also ensures that the set of approximated equilibrium prices forms a complete lattice. A process is proposed which is shown to always reach the smallest approximated Walrasian price vector.


  • Jim Ingebretsen Carlson
Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Economics


  • Approximate auction, approximated preferences, non-quasi-linear preferences, D44
Original languageEnglish
PublisherDepartment of Economics, Lund Universtiy
Number of pages29
Publication statusPublished - 2016
Publication categoryResearch

Publication series

NameWorking Papers
Publisher Department of Economics, Lund University