Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
In this paper, we investigate the problem of finding housing for refugees once they have been granted asylum. In particular, we demonstrate that market design can play an important role in a partial solution to the problem. More specifically, we investigate a specific matching system, and we propose an easy‐to‐implement mechanism that finds an efficient, stable, and maximum matching. Such a matching guarantees that housing is efficiently provided to a maximum number of refugees, and that no refugee prefers another specific landlord to their current match when, at the same time, that specific landlord prefers that refugee to their own current match.
|Research areas and keywords||
Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY
|Number of pages||29|
|Journal||Scandinavian Journal of Economics|
|Early online date||2019 Mar 27|
|Publication status||Published - 2020 Jul|
Related research output
Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers, 2016 Dec 7, Lund: Department of Economics, Lund Universtiy, 31 p. (Working Papers ; vol. 2016, no. 18).
Research output: Working paper