Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the problem of finding housing for refugees once they have been granted asylum. In particular, we demonstrate that market design can play an important role in a partial solution to the problem. More specifically, we investigate a specific matching system, and we propose an easy‐to‐implement mechanism that finds an efficient, stable, and maximum matching. Such a matching guarantees that housing is efficiently provided to a maximum number of refugees, and that no refugee prefers another specific landlord to their current match when, at the same time, that specific landlord prefers that refugee to their own current match.

Details

Authors
Organisations
External organisations
  • University Of Quebec In Montreal
Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • International Migration and Ethnic Relations
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)937-965
Number of pages29
JournalScandinavian Journal of Economics
Volume122
Issue number3
Early online date2019 Mar 27
Publication statusPublished - 2020 Jul
Publication categoryResearch
Peer-reviewedYes

Related research output

Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers, 2016 Dec 7, Lund: Department of Economics, Lund Universtiy, 31 p. (Working Papers ; vol. 2016, no. 18).

Research output: Working paper

View all (1)