Buck-Passing Personal Values

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapter

Standard

Buck-Passing Personal Values. / Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni.

Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology. ed. / David Chan. Springer, 2008. p. 37-51.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapter

Harvard

Rønnow-Rasmussen, T 2008, Buck-Passing Personal Values. in D Chan (ed.), Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Springer, pp. 37-51.

APA

Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2008). Buck-Passing Personal Values. In D. Chan (Ed.), Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology (pp. 37-51). Springer.

CBE

Rønnow-Rasmussen T. 2008. Buck-Passing Personal Values. Chan D, editor. In Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Springer. pp. 37-51.

MLA

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni "Buck-Passing Personal Values". Chan, David (ed.). Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Springer. 2008, 37-51.

Vancouver

Rønnow-Rasmussen T. Buck-Passing Personal Values. In Chan D, editor, Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Springer. 2008. p. 37-51

Author

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni. / Buck-Passing Personal Values. Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology. editor / David Chan. Springer, 2008. pp. 37-51

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Buck-Passing Personal Values

AU - Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - Abstract in Undetermined So-called fitting-attitude analyses or buck-passing accounts of value have lately received much attention among philosophers of value. These analyses set out from the idea that values must be understood in terms of attitudinal responses that we have reason to or that it is fitting or that we ought to have regarding the valuable object. This work examines to what extent this kind of analysis also can be applied to so-called personal values - value-for, rather than to the impersonal value period which has been the standard analysandum. The shift from impersonal to personal values can, it is argued, be taken without any major change to the pattern. It is not the normative element that needs to be changed in the analysis but rather the kind of attitude - what is required is that the attitudes all have to be so called 'for someone's sake' attitudes.

AB - Abstract in Undetermined So-called fitting-attitude analyses or buck-passing accounts of value have lately received much attention among philosophers of value. These analyses set out from the idea that values must be understood in terms of attitudinal responses that we have reason to or that it is fitting or that we ought to have regarding the valuable object. This work examines to what extent this kind of analysis also can be applied to so-called personal values - value-for, rather than to the impersonal value period which has been the standard analysandum. The shift from impersonal to personal values can, it is argued, be taken without any major change to the pattern. It is not the normative element that needs to be changed in the analysis but rather the kind of attitude - what is required is that the attitudes all have to be so called 'for someone's sake' attitudes.

KW - buck-passing

KW - fitting-attitude analysis

KW - good-for

KW - personal values

KW - value-for

M3 - Book chapter

SN - 978-1-4020-6871-3

SP - 37

EP - 51

BT - Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology

A2 - Chan, David

PB - Springer

ER -