Can two wrongs make it right? Reconsidering minimum resale price maintenance in the light of Allianz Hungaria

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


Minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements constitute hard-core vertical restraints and are treated as object restrictions in EU competition law. This article suggests that the time may have come where this approach is revised. After, first, discussing the economic theory behind RPM and the EU court's approach to object restrictions, it argues that the recent widening of the object analysis and the concomitant blurring of the object and effect categories may aid EU competition law to reconceptualise the approach to minimum RPM.


External organisations
  • Queen Mary University
Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Law


  • Per se illegality, RPM, minimum RPM, object and effect distinction, effects-analysis, cartels, anti-competitive object , anti-competitive effect, object restrictions, competition law, private law
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)340-366
Number of pages27
JournalEuropean Competition Journal
Issue number2/3
Publication statusPublished - 2015
Publication categoryResearch