CEO Age, Risk Incentives, and Hedging Strategy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We test if managerial preferences explain how firms hedge using hand-collected data on derivative portfolios in the oil and gas industry. How firms hedge involves choosing between linear contracts and put options, and deciding whether to finance these hedging positions with cash-on-hand or by selling call options. The likelihood of being a hedger increases with CEO age, and near-retirement CEOs prefer linear hedging instruments. The predictions of the managerial risk incentives-theory of hedging strategy, according to which managers with convex compensation schemes would avoid hedging strategies that cap upside potential, find no support in the data.

Details

Authors
Organisations
External organisations
  • Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Business Administration

Keywords

  • Vega, executive compensation, hedging, options, CEO age
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)687–716
JournalFinancial Management
Publication statusPublished - 2017
Publication categoryResearch
Peer-reviewedYes