Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


Why, how, and with what consequences do national governments delegate political authority to supranational institutions? Contrary to the static conceptions of delegation that dominate the existing literature, this article adopts a dynamic approach, where the stages of the delegation process are integrated into a coherent rational institutionalist framework. With demonstrations from the case of the European Union, the article argues that: (1) the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions; (2) the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions; (3) institutional design shapes the consequences of delegation by facilitating or obstructing attempts by the institutions to implement private agendas; and (4) the consequences of previous rounds of delegation affect future delegation, institutional design, and interaction, through positive and negative feed-back loops.


  • Jonas Tallberg
Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Political Science


  • Internationell politik, Politik i Europa
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)23-46
JournalWest European Politics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2002
Publication categoryResearch