Dual-reason analyses revisited

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper, not in proceeding

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Dual-reason analyses revisited. / Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni.

2012. Paper presented at Mini-symposium ‘Ethical Theory and Practical Ethics’, .

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper, not in proceeding

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Rønnow-Rasmussen, T 2012, 'Dual-reason analyses revisited' Paper presented at Mini-symposium ‘Ethical Theory and Practical Ethics’, 2012/04/27, .

APA

Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2012). Dual-reason analyses revisited. Paper presented at Mini-symposium ‘Ethical Theory and Practical Ethics’, .

CBE

Rønnow-Rasmussen T. 2012. Dual-reason analyses revisited. Paper presented at Mini-symposium ‘Ethical Theory and Practical Ethics’, .

MLA

Vancouver

Rønnow-Rasmussen T. Dual-reason analyses revisited. 2012. Paper presented at Mini-symposium ‘Ethical Theory and Practical Ethics’, .

Author

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni. / Dual-reason analyses revisited. Paper presented at Mini-symposium ‘Ethical Theory and Practical Ethics’, .

RIS

TY - CONF

T1 - Dual-reason analyses revisited

AU - Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - Abstract in Undetermined Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of it being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. However, recently such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason notions rather than only one. The general idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis- à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should favour the object on account of those properties that provide reason for favouring the object in the first place—where “favouring on account of” refers to the agent’s so-called motivating reason. This paper discusses this novel approach to fitting-attitude (and buck-passing) analysis: should those considerations (facts or features) that constitute the reason for favouring also be included in the intentional content of the favouring. In other words, should fitting-attitude analysts require a reference to the agent’s motivating reason in the analysis? While this enlargement of the original proposal might seem intuitive given that favourings are discerning attitudes, it is nonetheless argued that proponents of the fitting-attitude analysis are in fact not served by such an expansion of the classical analysis

AB - Abstract in Undetermined Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of it being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. However, recently such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason notions rather than only one. The general idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis- à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should favour the object on account of those properties that provide reason for favouring the object in the first place—where “favouring on account of” refers to the agent’s so-called motivating reason. This paper discusses this novel approach to fitting-attitude (and buck-passing) analysis: should those considerations (facts or features) that constitute the reason for favouring also be included in the intentional content of the favouring. In other words, should fitting-attitude analysts require a reference to the agent’s motivating reason in the analysis? While this enlargement of the original proposal might seem intuitive given that favourings are discerning attitudes, it is nonetheless argued that proponents of the fitting-attitude analysis are in fact not served by such an expansion of the classical analysis

KW - value analysis

KW - fitting-attitude analysis

KW - motivating reasons

KW - normative reasons

KW - intentionality

KW - intentional content

M3 - Paper, not in proceeding

ER -