Essays on Bargaining and Social Choice
Research output: Thesis › Doctoral Thesis (compilation)
Abstract
This thesis consists of three theoretical essays on Bargaining and Social Choice. The first essay addresses the problem of retaining the uniqueness of equilibrium when extending the Rubinstein model to accommodate more than two players. We achieve a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with three players by assuming that the players make demands in a clockwise order and practice goodfaith bargaining. Goodfaith bargaining implies that they may not subsequently raise their demands. In equilibrium, agreement is reached in the first period. In the limit, as the discount factor approaches unity, the agreement is an equal split of the surplus (i.e. a third each). The second essay addresses the fact that people seems to use conventions (or fairnessnorms) rather than strategic reasoning when coordinating their actions to an agreement. We look for candidates for such a convention in an alternatingoffers bargaining game with outside option. The concept of a modified evolutionary stable strategy (MESS), which takes complexity as well as payoff considerations, is used to derive evolutionary stable strategies. Strategies are modeled as automata and complexity is measured by the number of states an automaton has. It turns out that quite a few partitions can be supported by a MESS automaton, in fact all that lie between the outside option principle partition and the partition that assigns the entire “pie” to the player with the outside option, given that the outside option exceeds half the pie. For a bargaining game in which the outside option is not greater than half the pie, we establish the existence of a MESS.
The third essay characterize strategyproof social choice functions (SCF:s) for the allocation of multiple public goods. If the public good is composed of several categories, preferences are separable and the SCF only has to be coordinatewise onto, then the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem cannot directly be applied. We find that if the range of SCF is decomposable, it is uniquely decomposed and the SCF is dictatorial in each component of the range. If the range cannot be decomposed, then the SCF is dictatorial. If, however, a component of the range only has two alternatives (we assume at least three) then there are nondictatorial SCF:s, e.g. voting by committees.
The third essay characterize strategyproof social choice functions (SCF:s) for the allocation of multiple public goods. If the public good is composed of several categories, preferences are separable and the SCF only has to be coordinatewise onto, then the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem cannot directly be applied. We find that if the range of SCF is decomposable, it is uniquely decomposed and the SCF is dictatorial in each component of the range. If the range cannot be decomposed, then the SCF is dictatorial. If, however, a component of the range only has two alternatives (we assume at least three) then there are nondictatorial SCF:s, e.g. voting by committees.
Details
Authors  

Organisations  
Research areas and keywords  Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY
Keywords

Original language  English 

Qualification  Doctor 
Awarding Institution  
Supervisors/Assistant supervisor 

Award date  2004 Dec 18 
Publisher 

Publication status  Published  2004 
Publication category  Research 
Bibliographic note
Defence details
Date: 20041218
Time: 10:15
Place: EC3:210, Holger Crafoord Ekonomicentrum
External reviewer(s)
Name: Shaked, Avner
Title: [unknown]
Affiliation: Professor, Bonn University
