Evolutionary Games and Matching Rules

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This study considers evolutionary games with non-uniformly random matching when interaction occurs in groups of n ≥ 2 individuals using pure strategies from a finite strategy set. In such models, groups with different compositions of individuals generally co-exist and the reproductive success (fitness) of a specific strategy varies with the frequencies of different group types. These frequencies crucially depend on the matching process. For arbitrary matching processes (called matching rules), we study Nash equilibrium and ESS in the associated population game and show that several results that are known to hold for population games under uniform random matching carry through to our setting. In our most novel contribution, we derive results on the efficiency of the Nash equilibria of population games and show that for any (fixed) payoff structure, there always exists some matching rule leading to average fitness maximization. Finally, we provide a series of applications to commonly studied normal-form games.

Details

Authors
Organisations
External organisations
  • University of Surrey
Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), non-uniformly random matching, assortative matching, Replicator dynamic
Original languageEnglish
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume47
Issue number3
Early online date2018 Jun 11
Publication statusPublished - 2018
Publication categoryResearch
Peer-reviewedYes