Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper provides sufficient conditions under which regular payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics (a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic) select against strategies that do not survive a sequence of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We apply these conditions to Bertrand duopolies and first-price auctions. Our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against iteratively strictly dominated strategies.

Details

Authors
Organisations
External organisations
  • Södertörn University
Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Computational Mathematics
  • Economics

Keywords

Original languageSwedish
Pages (from-to)82-97
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume117
Early online date2019
Publication statusPublished - 2019
Publication categoryResearch
Peer-reviewedYes