Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Standard

Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies. / Bernergård, Axel; Mohlin, Erik.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 117, 2019, p. 82-97.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

APA

CBE

MLA

Vancouver

Author

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies

AU - Bernergård, Axel

AU - Mohlin, Erik

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - This paper provides sufficient conditions under which regular payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics (a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic) select against strategies that do not survive a sequence of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We apply these conditions to Bertrand duopolies and first-price auctions. Our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against iteratively strictly dominated strategies.

AB - This paper provides sufficient conditions under which regular payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics (a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic) select against strategies that do not survive a sequence of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We apply these conditions to Bertrand duopolies and first-price auctions. Our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against iteratively strictly dominated strategies.

KW - Iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies

KW - Iterated admissibility

KW - Payoff monotonicity

KW - Convex monotonicity

KW - Evolutionary dynamics

KW - Replicator dynamic

KW - C72

KW - C73

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.009

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.009

M3 - Artikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift

VL - 117

SP - 82

EP - 97

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

T2 - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -