Face-to-face lying – An experimental study in Sweden and Japan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


This paper investigates face-to-face lying and beliefs associated with it. In experiments in Sweden and Japan, subjects answer questions about personal characteristics, play a face-to-face sender–receiver game and participate in an elicitation of lie-detection beliefs. The previous finding of too much truth-telling (compared to the equilibrium prediction) also holds in the face-to-face setting. A new result is that although many people claim that they are good at lie-detection, few reveal belief in this ability when money is at stake. Correlations between the subjects’ characteristics and their behavior and performances in the game are also explored.


Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Economics


  • Truth detection, Lying, Experiment, Lie-detection, Game theory
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)310-321
JournalJournal of Economic Psychology
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2010
Publication categoryResearch