Fitting-attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counterintuitive scope issue, an attitudinal approach couched in terms of ‘for someone's sake’ attitudes has the unwelcome consequence that whatever is good for someone is also necessarily good. It is argued that this consequence can be avoided if we modify the standard way of formulating the fitting-attitude analysis of final impersonal value.


Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Ethics


  • Impersonal value, personal value, good-for, fitting-attitude analysis, for-someone's sake attitudes, Logical Consequence Argument, mood of an attitud
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)560–579
Number of pages19
JournalPhilosophical Quarterly
Issue number272
Early online date2017 Dec 12
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jul
Publication categoryResearch