Foresight, function representation, and social intelligence in great apes (Commentary on K. Vaesen “The cognitive basis of human tool use”)

Research output: Contribution to journalDebate/Note/Editorial

Abstract

We find problems with Vaesen's treatment of the primatological research, in particular his analysis of foresight, function representation, and social intelligence. We argue that his criticism of research on foresight in great apes is misguided. His claim that primates do not attach functions to particular objects is also problematic. Finally, his analysis of theory of mind neglects many distinctions.

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Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Zoology
  • Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
  • Learning
  • General Language Studies and Linguistics
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)234-235
JournalBehavioral and Brain Sciences
Volume35
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2012
Publication categoryResearch
Peer-reviewedYes