Induction and knowledge-what

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences, but between properties and categories. We outline a new approach to induction that is based on two theses. The first thesis is epistemological. We submit that there is not only knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but also knowledge-what. Knowledge-what concerns relations between properties and categories and we argue that it cannot be reduced to knowledge-that. We support the partition of knowledge by mapping it onto the long-term memory systems: procedural, semantic and episodic memory. The second thesis is that the role of inductive reasoning is to generate knowledge-what. We use conceptual spaces to model knowledge-what and the relations between properties and categories involved in induction.

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Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Inductive inferences, Knowledge-what, Semantic memory, Conceptual knowledge, Naturalistic epistemology
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)471-491
JournalEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science
Volume8
Issue number3
Early online date2017
Publication statusPublished - 2018
Publication categoryResearch
Peer-reviewedYes

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