Locating Value in Moral Progress

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper, not in proceeding

Standard

Locating Value in Moral Progress. / Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni.

2015. Paper presented at Moral Progress: Concept, Measurement, and Application, June 2015, .

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper, not in proceeding

Harvard

Rønnow-Rasmussen, T 2015, 'Locating Value in Moral Progress' Paper presented at Moral Progress: Concept, Measurement, and Application, June 2015, 2015/06/24 - 2015/06/26, .

APA

Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2015). Locating Value in Moral Progress. Paper presented at Moral Progress: Concept, Measurement, and Application, June 2015, .

CBE

Rønnow-Rasmussen T. 2015. Locating Value in Moral Progress. Paper presented at Moral Progress: Concept, Measurement, and Application, June 2015, .

MLA

Vancouver

Rønnow-Rasmussen T. Locating Value in Moral Progress. 2015. Paper presented at Moral Progress: Concept, Measurement, and Application, June 2015, .

Author

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni. / Locating Value in Moral Progress. Paper presented at Moral Progress: Concept, Measurement, and Application, June 2015, .

RIS

TY - CONF

T1 - Locating Value in Moral Progress

AU - Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - The endeavour to locate value in moral progress faces various substantive as well as more formal challenges. This paper focuses on challenges of the latter kind. After some preliminaries, Section 3 introduces two general kinds of “evaluative moral progress-claims”, and outlines a possible novel analysis of a (quasi) descriptive notion of moral progress. While Section 4 discusses certain logical features of betterness in light of recent work in value theory which are pertinent to the notion of moral progress, Sections 5 and 6 outline the ambiguous character of “making moral progress”

AB - The endeavour to locate value in moral progress faces various substantive as well as more formal challenges. This paper focuses on challenges of the latter kind. After some preliminaries, Section 3 introduces two general kinds of “evaluative moral progress-claims”, and outlines a possible novel analysis of a (quasi) descriptive notion of moral progress. While Section 4 discusses certain logical features of betterness in light of recent work in value theory which are pertinent to the notion of moral progress, Sections 5 and 6 outline the ambiguous character of “making moral progress”

KW - moral progress

KW - value comparisons

KW - betterness

KW - value incomparability

KW - value dualism

M3 - Paper, not in proceeding

ER -