Logical Dialogues with Explicit Preference Profiles and Strategy Selection

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Bibtex

@article{19ba70c67699453d80931bfa0529225b,
title = "Logical Dialogues with Explicit Preference Profiles and Strategy Selection",
abstract = "The Barth–Krabbe–Hintikka–Hintikka Problem, independently raised by Barth and Krabbe (From axiom to dialogue: a philosophical study of logics and argumentation. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1982) and Hintikka and Hintikka (The sign of three: Peirce, Dupin, Holmes. In: Eco U, Sebeok TA (eds) Sherlock Holmes confronts modern logic: Toward a theory of information-seeking through questioning. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1983), is the problem of characterizing the strategic reasoning of the players of dialogical logic and game-theoretic semantics games from rational preferences rather than rules. We solve the problem by providing a set of preferences for players with bounded rationality and specifying strategic inferences from those preferences, for a variant of logical dialogues. This solution is generalized to both game-theoretic semantics and orthodox dialogical logic (classical and intuitionistic).",
keywords = "Game semantics, Dialogical Logic, Game-theoretic semantics",
author = "Emmanuel Genot and Justine Jacot",
year = "2017",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1007/s10849-017-9252-4",
language = "English",
volume = "26",
pages = "261--291",
journal = "Journal of Logic, Language and Information",
issn = "0925-8531",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "3",

}