Logical Dialogues with Explicit Preference Profiles and Strategy Selection

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Logical Dialogues with Explicit Preference Profiles and Strategy Selection. / Genot, Emmanuel; Jacot, Justine.

In: Journal of Logic, Language and Information, Vol. 26, No. 3, 09.2017, p. 261-291.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Logical Dialogues with Explicit Preference Profiles and Strategy Selection

AU - Genot, Emmanuel

AU - Jacot, Justine

PY - 2017/9

Y1 - 2017/9

N2 - The Barth–Krabbe–Hintikka–Hintikka Problem, independently raised by Barth and Krabbe (From axiom to dialogue: a philosophical study of logics and argumentation. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1982) and Hintikka and Hintikka (The sign of three: Peirce, Dupin, Holmes. In: Eco U, Sebeok TA (eds) Sherlock Holmes confronts modern logic: Toward a theory of information-seeking through questioning. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1983), is the problem of characterizing the strategic reasoning of the players of dialogical logic and game-theoretic semantics games from rational preferences rather than rules. We solve the problem by providing a set of preferences for players with bounded rationality and specifying strategic inferences from those preferences, for a variant of logical dialogues. This solution is generalized to both game-theoretic semantics and orthodox dialogical logic (classical and intuitionistic).

AB - The Barth–Krabbe–Hintikka–Hintikka Problem, independently raised by Barth and Krabbe (From axiom to dialogue: a philosophical study of logics and argumentation. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1982) and Hintikka and Hintikka (The sign of three: Peirce, Dupin, Holmes. In: Eco U, Sebeok TA (eds) Sherlock Holmes confronts modern logic: Toward a theory of information-seeking through questioning. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1983), is the problem of characterizing the strategic reasoning of the players of dialogical logic and game-theoretic semantics games from rational preferences rather than rules. We solve the problem by providing a set of preferences for players with bounded rationality and specifying strategic inferences from those preferences, for a variant of logical dialogues. This solution is generalized to both game-theoretic semantics and orthodox dialogical logic (classical and intuitionistic).

KW - Game semantics

KW - Dialogical Logic

KW - Game-theoretic semantics

U2 - 10.1007/s10849-017-9252-4

DO - 10.1007/s10849-017-9252-4

M3 - Article

VL - 26

SP - 261

EP - 291

JO - Journal of Logic, Language and Information

JF - Journal of Logic, Language and Information

SN - 0925-8531

IS - 3

ER -