Military spending as a coup-proofing strategy: opening the ‘black box’ for Spain (1850-1915)

Research output: Working paper

Standard

Military spending as a coup-proofing strategy: opening the ‘black box’ for Spain (1850-1915). / Sabaté Domingo, Oriol; Espuelas, Sergio; Herranz-Loncán, Alfonso.

2017. p. 1-43 (STANCE Working Papers Series; Vol. 2017, No. 6).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Sabaté Domingo, O, Espuelas, S & Herranz-Loncán, A 2017 'Military spending as a coup-proofing strategy: opening the ‘black box’ for Spain (1850-1915)' STANCE Working Papers Series, no. 6, vol. 2017, pp. 1-43.

APA

Sabaté Domingo, O., Espuelas, S., & Herranz-Loncán, A. (2017). Military spending as a coup-proofing strategy: opening the ‘black box’ for Spain (1850-1915). (pp. 1-43). (STANCE Working Papers Series; Vol. 2017, No. 6).

CBE

Sabaté Domingo O, Espuelas S, Herranz-Loncán A. 2017. Military spending as a coup-proofing strategy: opening the ‘black box’ for Spain (1850-1915). pp. 1-43. (STANCE Working Papers Series; 6).

MLA

Sabaté Domingo, Oriol, Sergio Espuelas and Alfonso Herranz-Loncán Military spending as a coup-proofing strategy: opening the ‘black box’ for Spain (1850-1915). 1-43. STANCE Working Papers Series; 6. 2017, 43 p.

Vancouver

Sabaté Domingo O, Espuelas S, Herranz-Loncán A. Military spending as a coup-proofing strategy: opening the ‘black box’ for Spain (1850-1915). 2017 Dec, p. 1-43. (STANCE Working Papers Series; 6).

Author

Sabaté Domingo, Oriol ; Espuelas, Sergio ; Herranz-Loncán, Alfonso. / Military spending as a coup-proofing strategy: opening the ‘black box’ for Spain (1850-1915). 2017. pp. 1-43 (STANCE Working Papers Series; 6).

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Military spending as a coup-proofing strategy: opening the ‘black box’ for Spain (1850-1915)

AU - Sabaté Domingo, Oriol

AU - Espuelas, Sergio

AU - Herranz-Loncán, Alfonso

PY - 2017/12

Y1 - 2017/12

N2 - Armies have recurrently intervened in politics by leading (or giving support to) coups d’état. Several authors suggest that civilian governments have used military spending to overcome armies’ grievances and avoid their insubordination. However, recent quantitative analyses do not reach conclusive results when exploring the impact of total military expenditure on the frequency and the success of coups d’état. We argue that total military spending might not be a good indicator of governments’ effort to gain the loyalty of the army, as it may conceal relevant changes in the composition of the military budget. This paper aims to open the military spending ‘black box’. While total military spending does not seem to have any relationship with the frequency of coups, payments to officers (along with other coup-proofing strategies) appears to be associated to a lower frequency of coups in 1850-1915 Spain.

AB - Armies have recurrently intervened in politics by leading (or giving support to) coups d’état. Several authors suggest that civilian governments have used military spending to overcome armies’ grievances and avoid their insubordination. However, recent quantitative analyses do not reach conclusive results when exploring the impact of total military expenditure on the frequency and the success of coups d’état. We argue that total military spending might not be a good indicator of governments’ effort to gain the loyalty of the army, as it may conceal relevant changes in the composition of the military budget. This paper aims to open the military spending ‘black box’. While total military spending does not seem to have any relationship with the frequency of coups, payments to officers (along with other coup-proofing strategies) appears to be associated to a lower frequency of coups in 1850-1915 Spain.

KW - Military spending

KW - coup d’état

KW - Spain

M3 - Working paper

T3 - STANCE Working Papers Series

SP - 1

EP - 43

BT - Military spending as a coup-proofing strategy: opening the ‘black box’ for Spain (1850-1915)

ER -