Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms

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Abstract

Abstract in Undetermined
Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one
doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is
normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is
suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought
not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I
argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we
have no reasons to accept the further claim that self-falsifying beliefs are absurd because
violating norms.

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  • Philosophy
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)445-464
JournalLogos & Episteme: an international journal of epistemiology
Volume5
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Publication categoryResearch
Peer-reviewedYes

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