Motivation and Motivating Reason

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapter

Standard

Motivation and Motivating Reason. / Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni.

Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. ed. / Christer Svennerlind; Jan Almäng; Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson. Ontos Verlag, 2013. p. 464-485.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapter

Harvard

Rønnow-Rasmussen, T 2013, Motivation and Motivating Reason. in C Svennerlind, J Almäng & R Ingthorsson (eds), Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag, pp. 464-485.

APA

Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2013). Motivation and Motivating Reason. In C. Svennerlind, J. Almäng, & R. Ingthorsson (Eds.), Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday (pp. 464-485). Ontos Verlag.

CBE

Rønnow-Rasmussen T. 2013. Motivation and Motivating Reason. Svennerlind C, Almäng J, Ingthorsson R, editors. In Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag. pp. 464-485.

MLA

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni "Motivation and Motivating Reason"., Svennerlind, Christer Almäng, Jan Ingthorsson, Rögnvaldur (editors). Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag. 2013, 464-485.

Vancouver

Rønnow-Rasmussen T. Motivation and Motivating Reason. In Svennerlind C, Almäng J, Ingthorsson R, editors, Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag. 2013. p. 464-485

Author

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni. / Motivation and Motivating Reason. Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. editor / Christer Svennerlind ; Jan Almäng ; Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson. Ontos Verlag, 2013. pp. 464-485

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Motivation and Motivating Reason

AU - Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - Philosophers have stressed the need to distinguish between explanatory (motivating) reasons and justifying (good) reasons. The distinction is often illustrated with an example of someone doing something that is intended to appear at the outset as incomprehensible. The next step is then to add some further details about the agent — typically some information about his or her beliefs and desires — providing some sort of explanation of the agent’s peculiar behaviour, making it suddenly intelligible. The added piece of information is intended to reveal what motivated the agent to act in such an odd way. The story continues, however, and in the next step we are introduced to further information. This time the information relates, rather, to our own epistemic position, or understanding of the situation, and only indirectly to the agent’s beliefs. Thus, we are assumed to hold some true beliefs that the agent either lacks or actually believes to be false. As a result we can be expected to form an opinion about what ought to have been — or, minimally, what ought not to have been — the agent’s reason. Cases like this afford an intuitive grasp of the distinction between explanatory and normative reasons.However, more recently the picture such cases present has been supplemented, or perhaps even corrected. There is a further feature of the case that needs to be teased out — one that gives a finer-grained understanding of what is going on than that provided by talk of the agent’s explanatory reasons. I share this view, and so what I will be doing in this paper is mainly to underline the need to dig a bit deeper. Motivation, as I shall argue, comes in different forms.

AB - Philosophers have stressed the need to distinguish between explanatory (motivating) reasons and justifying (good) reasons. The distinction is often illustrated with an example of someone doing something that is intended to appear at the outset as incomprehensible. The next step is then to add some further details about the agent — typically some information about his or her beliefs and desires — providing some sort of explanation of the agent’s peculiar behaviour, making it suddenly intelligible. The added piece of information is intended to reveal what motivated the agent to act in such an odd way. The story continues, however, and in the next step we are introduced to further information. This time the information relates, rather, to our own epistemic position, or understanding of the situation, and only indirectly to the agent’s beliefs. Thus, we are assumed to hold some true beliefs that the agent either lacks or actually believes to be false. As a result we can be expected to form an opinion about what ought to have been — or, minimally, what ought not to have been — the agent’s reason. Cases like this afford an intuitive grasp of the distinction between explanatory and normative reasons.However, more recently the picture such cases present has been supplemented, or perhaps even corrected. There is a further feature of the case that needs to be teased out — one that gives a finer-grained understanding of what is going on than that provided by talk of the agent’s explanatory reasons. I share this view, and so what I will be doing in this paper is mainly to underline the need to dig a bit deeper. Motivation, as I shall argue, comes in different forms.

KW - Explanatory reason

KW - motivating reason

KW - intentional content

KW - expressive acts

KW - habits

M3 - Book chapter

SN - 978-3-86838-190-0

SP - 464

EP - 485

BT - Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday

A2 - Svennerlind, Christer

A2 - Almäng, Jan

A2 - Ingthorsson, Rögnvaldur

PB - Ontos Verlag

ER -