On Locating Value in Making Moral Progress

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


The endeavour to locate value in moral progress faces various substantive as well as more formal challenges. This paper focuses on challenges of the latter kind. After some preliminaries, Section 3 introduces two general kinds of “evaluative moral progress-claims”, and outlines a possible novel analysis of a (quasi) descriptive notion of moral progress. While Section 4 discusses certain logical features of betterness in light of recent work in value theory which are pertinent to the notion of moral progress, Sections 5 and 6 outline the ambiguous character of “making moral progress”.


Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Philosophy


  • Moral progress, Value comparisons, Betterness, Value incomparability, Value dualism
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)137-152
Number of pages16
JournalEthical Theory and Moral Practice
Issue number1
Early online date2016 Aug 4
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Feb
Publication categoryResearch

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