On-Conditionalism: On the verge of a new metaethical theory

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


This paper explores a novel metaethical theory according to which value judgments express conditional beliefs held by those who make them. Each value judgment expresses the belief that something is the case on condition that something else is the case. The paper aims to reach a better understanding of this view and to highlight some of the challenges that lie ahead. The most pressing of these revolves around the correct understanding of the nature of the relevant cognitive attitudes. It is suggested that the distinction between “dormant attitudes” and “occurrent attitudes” helps us to understand these conditional beliefs.


Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Philosophy


  • metaethics, moral judgement, moral internalism, conditional belief
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)88-107
JournalLes Ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum
Issue number2-3
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Nov 19
Publication categoryResearch

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