Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs.


External organisations
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences
  • University Of Quebec In Montreal
  • Stockholm School of Economics
Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Economics


  • market design, time banking, priority mechanism, non-manipulability
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages23
JournalAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2020 May 18
Publication categoryResearch

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