Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets

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Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets. / Andersson, Tommy; Csehz , Ágnes ; Ehlers, Lars; Erlanson, Albin .

In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 18.05.2020.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets

AU - Andersson, Tommy

AU - Csehz , Ágnes

AU - Ehlers, Lars

AU - Erlanson, Albin

PY - 2020/5/18

Y1 - 2020/5/18

N2 - This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs.

AB - This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs.

KW - market design

KW - time banking

KW - priority mechanism

KW - non-manipulability

M3 - Article

JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

ER -