Ownership and First-Person Authority from a Normative Pragmatist Perspective

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Bibtex

@article{0ce48cb1e68748d9b3aa3bcfcd310479,
title = "Ownership and First-Person Authority from a Normative Pragmatist Perspective",
abstract = "Mental episodes are typically associated with subjective ownership and first-person authority. My belief that an apple is red is had by me; it is mine and I{\textquoteright}m in a privileged position to know it. Your experience of red is had by you; it is yours and you are in a privileged position to know it. The two assumptions are that mental events are had by individuals to whom they occur, and that owners are in a privileged epistemic position to fallibly report their own. This paper asks how to understand ownership and first-person authority (section 1). It argues that the two assumptions should not be accepted by default (section 2). A normative pragmatism is specified, on which mental episodes are not owned, but owed to practices of reason articulation (section 3). Finally, a positive account of ownership and first-person authority is considered (section 4).",
keywords = "first-person authority, normativity, pragmatism, mental content, ownership",
author = "{Lo Presti}, Patrizio",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.1163/18758185-17040004",
language = "English",
volume = "17",
pages = "268--285",
journal = "Contemporary Pragmatism",
issn = "1875-8185",
publisher = "Brill",
number = "4",

}