Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Incentives and Personality Traits

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


Decision makers often face incentives to increase risk‐taking on behalf of others through bonus contracts and relative performance contracts. We conduct an experimental study of risk‐taking on behalf of others using a large heterogeneous sample and find that people respond to such incentives without much apparent concern for stakeholders. Responses are heterogeneous and mitigated by personality traits. The findings suggest that lack of concern for others’ risk exposure hardly requires “financial psychopaths” in order to flourish, but is diminished by social concerns.


External organisations
  • Uppsala University
  • University of Vienna
Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Economics


  • Competition, hedging, incentives, risk-taking, social preferences
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)648-674
Number of pages27
JournalScandinavian Journal of Economics
Issue number2
Early online date2019 Mar 18
Publication statusPublished - 2020 Apr
Publication categoryResearch