Strategy revision opportunities and collusion

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper studies whether and how strategy revision opportunities affect levels of collusion in indefinitely repeated two-player games. Consistent with standard theory, we find that such opportunities do not affect strategy choices, or collusion levels, if the game is of strategic substitutes. In games of strategic complements, by contrast, revision opportunities lead to more collusion. We discuss alternative explanations for this result.

Details

Authors
Organisations
External organisations
  • University of Sussex
  • University of Essex
  • University of Otago
Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Complements versus substitutes, Cooperation, Repeated games, Strategy revision opportunities
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)834-856
Number of pages23
JournalExperimental Economics
Volume22
Issue number4
Early online date2018 Jul 4
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Dec
Publication categoryResearch
Peer-reviewedYes