Subjunctive Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Reason Distinction

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper, not in proceeding

Standard

Subjunctive Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Reason Distinction. / Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni.

2010. Paper presented at Workshop: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Münster, Germany.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper, not in proceeding

Harvard

Rønnow-Rasmussen, T 2010, 'Subjunctive Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Reason Distinction' Paper presented at Workshop: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Münster, Germany, 2010/04/29 - 2010/04/30, .

APA

Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2010). Subjunctive Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Reason Distinction. Paper presented at Workshop: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Münster, Germany.

CBE

Rønnow-Rasmussen T. 2010. Subjunctive Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Reason Distinction. Paper presented at Workshop: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Münster, Germany.

MLA

Vancouver

Rønnow-Rasmussen T. Subjunctive Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Reason Distinction. 2010. Paper presented at Workshop: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Münster, Germany.

Author

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni. / Subjunctive Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Reason Distinction. Paper presented at Workshop: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Münster, Germany.

RIS

TY - CONF

T1 - Subjunctive Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Reason Distinction

AU - Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - Elsewhere I have argued that the notion of a normative agent-neutral reason is undermined by certain views on reasons; the existence of agent-neutral reasons can be questioned. Here I shall not repeat my doubts but rather address a way of expressing the distinction that I had not considered and which would, if correct, put an end to my worries about the soundness of this dichotomy. The idea, which was suggested to me by Douglas Portmore (personal communication) is that normative reasons are facts of a peculiar kind: they are subjunctive facts of a certain kind.

AB - Elsewhere I have argued that the notion of a normative agent-neutral reason is undermined by certain views on reasons; the existence of agent-neutral reasons can be questioned. Here I shall not repeat my doubts but rather address a way of expressing the distinction that I had not considered and which would, if correct, put an end to my worries about the soundness of this dichotomy. The idea, which was suggested to me by Douglas Portmore (personal communication) is that normative reasons are facts of a peculiar kind: they are subjunctive facts of a certain kind.

KW - agent-relative reason

KW - agent-neutral reason

KW - couter-factual

KW - subjunctive facts

M3 - Paper, not in proceeding

ER -