The defeasible nature of coherentist justification

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The defeasible nature of coherentist justification. / Angere, Staffan.

In: Synthese, Vol. 157, No. 3, 2007, p. 321-335.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Angere, S 2007, 'The defeasible nature of coherentist justification', Synthese, vol. 157, no. 3, pp. 321-335.

APA

Angere, S. (2007). The defeasible nature of coherentist justification. Synthese, 157(3), 321-335.

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MLA

Angere, Staffan. "The defeasible nature of coherentist justification". Synthese. 2007, 157(3). 321-335.

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Angere, Staffan. / The defeasible nature of coherentist justification. In: Synthese. 2007 ; Vol. 157, No. 3. pp. 321-335.

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The defeasible nature of coherentist justification

AU - Angere, Staffan

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003, Bayesian epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press) and Olsson (2005, Against coherence: Truth, probability and justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) show that the link between coherence and probability is not as strong as some have supposed. This paper is an attempt to bring out a way in which coherence reasoning nevertheless can be justified, based on the idea that, even if it does not provide an infallible guide to probability, it can give us an indication thereof. It is further shown that this actually is the case, for several of the coherence measures discussed in the literature so far. We also discuss how this affects the possibility to use coherence as a means of epistemic justification.

AB - The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003, Bayesian epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press) and Olsson (2005, Against coherence: Truth, probability and justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) show that the link between coherence and probability is not as strong as some have supposed. This paper is an attempt to bring out a way in which coherence reasoning nevertheless can be justified, based on the idea that, even if it does not provide an infallible guide to probability, it can give us an indication thereof. It is further shown that this actually is the case, for several of the coherence measures discussed in the literature so far. We also discuss how this affects the possibility to use coherence as a means of epistemic justification.

KW - defeasible justification

KW - measure theory

KW - Coherence

M3 - Article

VL - 157

SP - 321

EP - 335

JO - Synthese

JF - Synthese

SN - 0039-7857

IS - 3

ER -