Wildcat Bankers or Political Failure? The Irish Financial Pantomime, 1797-1826

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

Using a new biography of banks, we examine the stability of Irish banking from 1797 to 1826 by constructing a failure rate series. We find that the ultimate cause of the frequent and severe banking crises was the crisis-prone structure of the banking system, which was designed to benefit the political elite. There is little evidence to suggest that wildcat banking or the failure of the Bank of Ireland to act as a lender of last resort were to blame. We also find that the main economic effect of the episodic crises was major diminutions in the money supply.

Details

Authors
Organisations
External organisations
  • Queen's University Belfast
Research areas and keywords

Subject classification (UKÄ) – MANDATORY

  • Economic History

Keywords

  • banking crisis, bank failure, Ireland, wildcat banking, political economy of banking, partnership, E42, N13, N23, G21
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages68
Publication statusPublished - 2018
Publication categoryResearch

Publication series

NameLund Papers in Economic History
PublisherDepartment of Economic History, Lund University
No.2018:176

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