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In memory of Marco Biagi and Lammy Betten

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University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
The EU Ban on Age-Discrimination and Older Workers: Potentials and Pitfalls

Ann Numhauser-Henning*

An ageing population is a general demographic trend challenging economic sustainability in terms of employment and pensions as well as overall social cohesion in terms of intergenerational solidarity. The prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of age is potentially an important legal mechanism to promote active ageing. However, equal treatment may well turn out to be a less successful strategy than expected. After presenting recent developments in non-discrimination law more generally (section 2), this article turns to age discrimination in particular (section 3) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law on compulsory retirement in relation to the Hörnfeldt case. The ‘double bind’ in non-discrimination law, with on the one hand, individual interests relating to fundamental rights and, on the other, more collective interests in line with active ageing, but also age as a traditional social stratifier, has led to a situation in which also direct age discrimination is justifiable (Article 6.1, Equality Employment Directive) and compulsory retirement is widely accepted by the CJEU. This scope for justified age discrimination is mainly to the detriment of EU active ageing strategies. However, it is important to consider the implications of a ban on compulsory retirement. This article argues that setting aside these provisions may well undermine employment protection as we know it, and also general developments in terms of ‘good quality’ work. Finally, the economic crisis and rising youth unemployment have made active ageing policies increasingly difficult.

Keywords: Age Discrimination, Compulsory Retirement, Employment Protection, Active Ageing

1 INTRODUCTION

The ageing of the population is an important challenge for modern society, not least for the European Union (EU). The ageing of the population is a general demographic trend challenging economic sustainability in terms of employment, pensions and health care systems, as well as overall social cohesion in terms of
intergenerational solidarity. The 2012 Ageing Report presents a picture from an EU point of view of the economic developments in the period 2010–2060 that could arise from a ‘no-policy change’ scenario, and outlines the expenditure projections covering pensions, health care, long-term care, education and unemployment transfers for all Member States. By 2060, the share of young people (0–14) will remain fairly constant, while the group of those aged 15–64 will become considerably smaller (declining from 67% to 56%). Those aged 65 and above will represent a much larger share of the population (rising from 17% to 30%). The number of persons aged 80 and above will come close to the number of 0–14 year olds (rising from 5% to 12%). This will result in a doubling of the economic dependency ratio (persons aged 65 or above in relation to those aged 15–64), declining from four working-age persons for every person over 65 to only two working-age persons. Active ageing is therefore a must for sustainable societies. However, workers aged 55 and over have notorious difficulties when it comes to labour-market integration.

A ban on age discrimination was introduced by the EU through the European Council’s Directive 2000/78/EC, which establishes a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (the Employment Equality Directive), covering age among other grounds of differential treatment. However, as early as the Mangold case the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) stated that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age is to be regarded as a general principle of EU law. Age is also among the non-discrimination grounds in the (non-exhaustive) list in Article 21 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights 2000, a part of primary law after the Lisbon Treaty (compare Article 6 TEU). The EU Charter’s Article 25 also contains a more general rule on the rights of older persons to lead a life of dignity and independence and to participate in social and cultural life, while Article 34.1 mentions social security and social assistance in the case of old age and Article 15 refers to the right to work, more generally.

The prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of age is potentially an important legal mechanism to promote active ageing in relation to different aspects, such as combating premature labour market exit, facilitating work beyond...
pensionable age, and facilitating the employment of older workers. However, as a legal strategy to deal with the marginalization of workers aged 55+, equal treatment and non-discrimination law may well turn out to be less successful than expected. Concerning the intention to enable people to work beyond pensionable age, the ban on age discrimination has so far shown itself to be of limited use. The broad scope for accepting discriminatory practices in employment policy, as well as labour-market and vocational training objectives, in accordance with Article 6.1 of the 2000/78 Directive, has thus led to the CJEU accepting compulsory retirement, to the detriment of the overall aim of enabling people to work beyond pensionable age. It can also be argued that in general, the ‘elitist’ design of non-discrimination rules works to the detriment of older workers, as the ‘reference norms’ laying down the criteria for comparison in cases of alleged discrimination are basically meritocratic. In addition, the realization of the potential of the ban on age-discrimination in the form of a future ban on compulsory retirement poses threats, this time in terms of undermining traditional employment protection and more articulated ‘decent-work’ regimes (generally speaking). This article is about the potentials and pitfalls of non-discrimination law in relation to EU ambitions for achieving active ageing and in relation to labour law.\(^4\)

2 NON-DISCRIMINATION DEVELOPMENTS

The ban on age discrimination and the current era of EU equality and non-discrimination law started with the Amsterdam Treaty back in 1997 and its Article 13 (now Article 19 of the TFEU), broadening the scope of anti-discrimination measures beyond sex and nationality. Bob Hepple has described this era as comprehensive and transformative, and as ‘a response to the growing social and economic inequalities between and within states under the impact of global capitalism’.\(^5\) The comprehensive aspect reflects the broadened competences under the Treaty as regards equality measures post-Amsterdam, whereas the transformative aspect reveals an increasing concern with the actual results of such

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measures, moving beyond not only the formal but to a certain extent also the substantive equality of earlier periods. In a more recent article Mark Bell characterizes EU anti-discrimination law after 1999 as **widening** and **deepening**. The term ‘widening’ corresponds fairly well with ‘comprehensive’, whereas ‘deepening’ – with Shaw – denotes the progressive constitutionalization of the equal treatment principle. In this case there is no easy parallel with equality legislation being increasingly transformative. Sandra Fredman has drawn our attention to the fact that later developments imply not only the constitutionalization of (fundamental) social rights but also, increasingly, a reconceptualization of social rights in terms of proactive institutional change, a development that threatens to dilute these rights instead of making them a truly transformative force. However, in this article EU non-discrimination law development will be described in terms of these twin processes, comprehensive and transformative, or – if you will – widening and deepening. The description reflects some general developmental traits also of relevance for the understanding of age-discrimination regulation. The complexity of precisely embedded political social rights in the equality context will become evident in the next section on age discrimination in particular.

To begin with, and already in the Treaty of Rome back in 1957, only two grounds of discrimination were present in EU law: nationality and sex. Much later – also in close relation to the internal market and freedom of movement, and following the Maastricht Treaty – the principle of equal treatment on the grounds of nationality was expanded to include not only workers and some other categories, but also ‘Union Citizens’. To put it simply, in relation to free movement, Union citizens and their family members are entitled – at least in principle – to equal treatment as nationals. In addition, third-country nationals, legally residing long-term in a Member State, have been successively granted the right of equal treatment as regards free movement. Subsequently, the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination was widened to cover certain categories of so-called flexible workers. The first two directives are based on framework agreements banning discrimination of part-time workers and fixed-term

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7 J. Shaw, *The European Union and Gender Mainstreaming: constitutionally Embedded or Comprehensively Marginalised?* 10 Feminist Legal Studies, 213 (2002).


Both directives adhere to the principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination as a central means to improve the quality of part-time and fixed-term work. The application of the principle of non-discrimination to part-time/fixed-term work poses special problems as compared to other, more traditional, fields of application. One problem is that what is forbidden by the non-discrimination provision – differential treatment as regards employment conditions – is at the same time part of what constitutes the groups that are to be protected. This problem is reflected in the Wippel case, in which full-time workers on another type of employment contract were found to be not comparable to Mrs Wippel, who was employed on a ‘work-on-demand’ contract. Another ‘problem’ is that these directives also introduce the justification for direct discrimination. The two directives are a result of the Maastricht social protocol and the amended rules on social dialogue, that were complemented in 2008 by the Temporary Agency Work Directive.

The next step refers to the evolution post-Amsterdam. We are now at the end of Hepple’s period of substantive equality, entering into the period of comprehensive and transformative equality. An important feature of the Amsterdam Treaty from our perspective is Article 13, which provides a legal basis for Community institutions to take action to combat discrimination on a whole new range of grounds, within any area of Community activities, thus creating a floor for comprehensive or widened equality. At an early stage, the Commission adopted an Action Plan for non-discrimination and subsequently the two directives on Ethnic Equality and Employment Equality were adopted, introducing ethnicity, religion and other beliefs, disability, sexual orientation and age as new non-discrimination grounds.

With the widening to include new grounds for discrimination, there is also a widening of the areas covered by such legislation. This started out with the ban on sex discrimination in terms of equal pay and then legislation was extended to include working life more generally. Later on came the directives concerning sex discrimination and social security, self-employment and helping spouses, and

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11. See the judgment in the case C-313/02 Wippel [2004] ECR I-09483.
14. As for sexual orientation there is reason to point also to the earlier development in case law concerning the extension of the sex concept to include transsexuality and the case of gender reassignment as in the case C-249/96 Grant v South-West Trains [1998] ECR I-621 (but not sexual orientation as shown in the case C-249/96 Grant v South-West Trains [1998] ECR I-621). In the Swedish (2008:567) Discrimination Act ‘transgender identity or expression’ as a specific non-discrimination ground was introduced.
occupational pension schemes. The 2000/43 Ethnic Equality Directive was considerably more comprehensive than previous ones, covering not only working life and social security, but also education, health care, social advantages, and goods and services including housing and insurance.

Here is the moment to consider the matter of a hierarchy of rights. It is obvious that the Employment Equality Directive, adopted after the Ethnic Equality Directive, has a considerably narrower field of application, covering only working life and a few closely related issues such as membership of trade unions, as opposed to the whole range of areas covered by the Ethnic Equality Directive. Gender or sex discrimination is still regulated separately, one reason being the different basis for such directives under the terms of the Treaty. Later on we had the 2004/113 Goods and Services Directive concerning gender, but this still leaves gender in an intermediate position as compared to ethnicity and the other grounds in Article 19. The Ethnic Equality Directive has thus been said to create a hierarchy in discrimination, to the detriment of both sex equality law and a number of other grounds including age. The fact that sex discrimination is lagging behind is further underpinned by the Commission’s proposal for a new Article 19 Directive, extending the scope of protection for all grounds except sex to that of the Ethnic Equality Directive. However, a recent initiative is the Commission’s gender-specific proposal for a directive on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges, and related measures.

As for the transformative part, and despite Hepple’s periodization, I would argue that it is only after Amsterdam that Community law can be said, in terms of the Treaty, to have moved from formal to substantive equality. First of all this development concerned sex equality. The then-new Treaty provisions thus proclaimed equality between men and women as a ‘task’ and an ‘aim’ of the Community and imposed a positive obligation to ‘promote’ it in all Community

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16 Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, COM(2008) 426 final. The outcome of this process is still uncertain, though, to say the least! Amended proposals have been submitted by the different presidencies since its presentation, questioning the scope regarding, for instance, social protection and education, and it is now blocked in the process. See further L Waddington, Future Prospects for EU Equality Law: lessons to be learnt from the proposed Equal Treatment Directive, in E: Rev. 2011 36(2) 163–184.


activities. The new Article 13 was worded in softer terms as a way to ‘combat’ discrimination.

Post-Amsterdam, we have also seen important developments at the constitutional level, such as the adoption of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000 and later on the Lisbon Treaty, which gave a treaty status to the Charter. Let us start with the TEU and Articles 3 and 6 on the values and goals of the union and also on fundamental rights. Article 3.3 describes the Union as a Social Market Economy based on full employment and social progress. Article 6 refers to the fundamental rights in three categories: the Charter as adopted in Strasbourg in 2007 and now a part of primary law, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Union’s accession, and fundamental rights as general principles in Union law. According to Article 7 TFEU, the Union is required to ensure consistency between all its policies and activities, both economic and social. Behind these treaty provisions there is arguably a change in the perception of social rights in an internal market perspective. In this perspective, equality and social rights are regarded as economic assets, or as Sen has put it: ‘Market works best when supported by a proper framework of social entitlements, which ensure productive and skilled workers’. The EU social market economy is a model which synthesizes the economy, social policy, the market and the State, and this is what characterizes the Lisbon Treaty as well as many policy documents such as the EU 2020 Strategy and the integrated economic and employment guidelines. Here, the Lisbon Treaty implies some important changes. In terms of being truly transformative, intertwining economic and social goals makes equal treatment an even more compelling goal.

There are also innovative and transformative uses of the discriminatory concepts reflected in recent case law. In Coleman, before the Lisbon Treaty, the Court used the Employment Equality Directive in a transformative way by accepting transferred discrimination or discrimination by association. When finding that Ms Coleman had been discriminated against when she was treated differently and harassed because of her son’s disability, the Court turned to the overall purposes of the directive, linking them to the realization of personal

19 Articles 2 and 3(2) EC.
20 S. Fredman has elaborated on this in terms of the Third Way... a kind of compromise in the struggle between neo-liberalism and social democracy, see S. Fredman, Transformation or Dilution: Fundamental Rights in the EU Social Space 12 European Law Journal, 41 (2006).
autonomy and empowerment. Then there is the *Feryn* case,\(^\text{24}\) dealing with discrimination by declaration. The Court found that a public statement by an employer that he would not recruit employees of a certain ethnic or racial origin constituted direct discrimination within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Directive 2000/43/EC, and this despite the wording of the article: ‘direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where *one person* is treated less favourably than another’. This case law was recently confirmed in *Accept* concerning a public statement on the impossibility to recruit homosexual football players.\(^\text{25}\)

Reasonable accommodation is another way to counteract inequality in terms of positive duties placed on the employer. It now applies to disability discrimination, but it is also discussed in relation to working life and family reconciliation as well as age discrimination. Here, too, we have recent important case law in *HK Danmark*\(^\text{26}\) where the CJEU interpreted Article 5 in the Employment Equality Directive in a fairly comprehensive way, stating that also a reduction in working hours may well constitute one of the accommodation measures referred to.

These cases also reflect EU anti-discrimination law as truly transformative. This was true as early as the establishment of case law based on the concept of indirect discrimination; this represents a qualitative leap in anti-discriminatory legislation, with tremendous potential. As soon as it is possible to establish that a certain norm results in a worse outcome for the protected group, a court may review the content of the applied reference norm.\(^\text{27}\) This is a truly pro-active and transformative approach, within the individual complaints-led model.

The present study takes as its starting point the terms comprehensive and transformative, as well as the concepts of widening and deepening. Deepening has been articulated as a constitutionalization of EU discrimination law, a trend reflected not only in Treaty provisions but also in case law. An important example is Mangold, recognizing the principle of equal treatment on the grounds of age on a treaty basis, well before the entry into force of secondary legislation in the form of the Employment Equality Directive. Another is the *Test-Achat* case,\(^\text{28}\) where the CJEU declared Article 5(2) of the Access to and Supply of Goods and Services Directive to be invalid as it was deemed to be incompatible with Articles 21 and 23 of the Treaty-based Charter of Fundamental Rights. Another case worth mentioning in this context is *HK Danmark*, where the CJEU interpreted the concept of disability in the Employment

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\(^{24}\) C-54/07 *Firma Feryn* [2008] ECR I-5187.

\(^{25}\) C-81/12 *Asociatia ACCEPT* [2013] ECR I-00000.


Equality Directive in accordance with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, now formally approved by the Union and thus an integral part of the EU legal order.

Some other important traits or trends in subsequent European non-discrimination legislation and its interpretation can also be said to be related to the two major parallel processes mentioned above. One is the development towards Single Acts and Single Bodies, naturally accompanying ‘the comprehensiveness and widening trends’. A catalyst of this trend is of course the multi-ground Equality Employment Directive, followed up with the directive proposal on extended protection for the grounds covered by this directive in parallel with the Ethnic Equality Directive. As already indicated, however, this proposal now seems to be blocked for the foreseeable future.  

There are also the (so far) very much neglected situations implying different forms of multiple or compound discrimination. Legal design and limited experience have given rise to worries about the possibility of success for complaints based on multiple-grounds discrimination, especially so-called intersectional discrimination. Multiple discrimination claims may be furthered by single discrimination acts. In the EU case law we now have, finally, a case of alleged multiple or compound discrimination in relation to the Employment Equality Directive, namely the Odar case. In this case, according to a German Sozialplan, redundancy payments were related to the right to early retirement so that such a right resulted in a payment that was reduced in certain ways. This was accepted from the age-discrimination point of view, whereas taking into consideration the ‘extra’ retirement rights available to disabled workers amounted to unacceptable discrimination on grounds of disability according to the Directive. The concept of multiple discrimination was not mentioned, though nor was a case of multiple discrimination found to be at hand.

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29 Compare Waddington (2011). Lisa Waddington questions whether the future really is a new multi-ground directive or rather a new series of ground-specific equality directives. One argument for the latter is her analysis of the process concerning the proposal implying (1) a questioning of the proposal as ‘unconstitutional’ or outside the scope of the Union’s competences, (2) at best a ‘more-of-the-same’ solution and thus a missed opportunity to introduce rules on, for instance, multiple discrimination and single bodies, or (3) a more ambitious approach in relation to disability discrimination law, an area where the required unanimity is most likely to be achieved.

30 Intersectionality is also something that not only adds to each other but also interact concurrently. The classic example is the US General Motors’ case where black women were discriminated against as opposed to white women and black men. See further K. Crenshaw, *Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory as Antiracist Politics*, in D.K. Weisberg (ed.), *Feminist Legal Theory Foundations* (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1993).


32 I have seen the design of the Swedish (2008:567) Discrimination Act as holding a special potential in relation to multiple discrimination claims. Generally speaking, the Act has been criticized for its subtle way of banning discrimination on all grounds in a ‘tacit’ ban, for example of discrimination
3 AGE DISCRIMINATION IN PARTICULAR

Generally speaking, the reason for the legislator to contemplate non-discrimination legislation to protect a certain group is that unacceptable differential treatment – social injustice – has been identified in the real world and at a structural level. It is not just individuals that are identified as being worse off than others; an entire group may be considered to be so. This means that anti-discriminatory legislation is connected with processes of normative change, that are in turn connected with processes of material change. As a result of these changes, differential treatment that used to be regarded as perfectly legitimate is transformed into impermissible discrimination. The goal is thus to change normative perceptions about belonging and exclusion, and to achieve social justice and integration at an individual and societal level. This is precisely the challenge of age-discrimination regulation. Now active ageing is also a central concern.

Bob Hepple identified the human rights interest behind the first stage of European anti-discrimination regulation. However, the inclusion in the Treaty of Rome of both the ban on nationality discrimination and on sex discrimination in the form of gender-differentiated pay has generally been characterized as instrumental. Gillian More has even described these bans as ‘market unifiers’. The principle of equal pay in the Treaty of Rome was drafted so as to be neutral in respect of sex, but the historical background of this principle is found in the low wages paid to women. At the time of the Treaty of Rome, France had introduced the equal-pay principle in its national legislation. The reason why it was also included in the Treaty was that France was anxious to protect its textile industry from the low wages of women workers in the Benelux countries. The prohibition of nationality discrimination was also there from the beginning. It is, of course, closely connected to the whole idea of a European Community and an internal market. We can thus argue that the rules on non-discrimination in the original treaty were basically ‘market rights’. It is common knowledge that the principle of equal treatment between men and women has gradually gained a more general standing, and so has the social dimension from an overall perspective. With this evolution follows a human-rights discourse support for the

33 Compare Christensen (2001).
equal treatment principle, and we can also refer to the deepening and constitutionalizing aspects of anti-discrimination law.

These two aspects of the origin of non-discrimination law give rise to what has been called the double bind in non-discrimination law.\(^{35}\) As regards sex discrimination, the background thus implies a dual aim, and to some extent this is still inherent in EU sex equality law: one linked with (internal) market arguments and one with the discourse of fundamental rights.\(^{36}\) Moreover, the double bind may be even more obvious in relation to some other grounds.

Age is an extreme example. On the one hand, there is the aim to establish a principle of non-discrimination on the basis of age based on a fundamental-rights approach to the equal treatment principle. On the other hand, the fundamental organizing role of age in our societies is also exceptionally well reflected in age-discrimination law and case law. In Premise 25 of the Employment Equality Directive, it is stated that ‘differences in treatment in connection with age may be justified under certain circumstances and therefore require specific provisions which may vary in accordance with the situation in Member States. It is therefore essential to distinguish between differences in treatment which are justified, in particular by legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and discrimination which must be prohibited’. This statement is then followed up by Article 6.1 of the Employment Equality Directive, justifying differential treatment on the grounds of age within a broad range of employment policy objectives. In addition, the numerous more recent strategy statements referring to active ageing make the instrumental goals behind the ban on age discrimination and its exceptions contradictory and conflicting.

Regarding age, the double bind reflects the combination of the process of the progressive constitutionalization or deepening of EU Equality Law, and the collective socio-economic interests typically informing these non-discrimination rules both in terms of tradition and future strategic goals concerning active ageing.

There are also the treaty provisions deepening the equal treatment principle in terms of age. The ban on discrimination in Article 21 of the Charter thus prohibits differential treatment on the grounds of age.

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36 The Court has stated that ‘the economic aim is secondary to the social aim’ in its case law; see cases C-270/97 Sievers [2000] ECR 1-933 and C-50/96 Schröder [2000] ECR 1-774, para. 57 of both judgments. The instrumental/market interest or collective interests are still apparent in the formulations concerning gender-inclusive labour markets in the EU 2020 Strategy and the Integrated Employment Guidelines.
Intergenerational conflict is one of the threats that may well be an outcome of population ageing; the lack of economic sustainability is another. It is only natural that the response is to support active ageing across all aspects of life. The EU declared 2012 The Year of Active Ageing. The overall purpose was to ‘promote active ageing and to better mobilize the potential of the rapidly growing population in their late 50s and above’. Active ageing means not only creating better opportunities and working conditions for the participation of older workers in the labour market, but also combating social exclusion more generally by fostering active participation in society and encouraging healthy ageing. These ambitions are reflected in Article 25 TFEU, where it is stated that Member States ‘acknowledge and respect the rights of the elderly to lead a life of dignity and independence and to participate in social and cultural life’. It is also reflected in the Europe 2020 strategy and the Employment Guidelines of 2010. The Europe 2020 strategy thus focuses on meeting the challenge of promoting a healthy and active ageing population to achieve social cohesion and higher productivity. The goal is to achieve an employment rate of 75% for all 20–64-year-olds in 2020, and at least 20 million fewer people in or at risk of poverty and social exclusion. According to Employment Guidelines 7 and 8, Member States are urged to increase labour-market participation of individuals 50 and older by introducing policies of active ageing based on new forms of work organization and lifelong learning, whereas Guideline 10 underlines the importance of effective social security and integration policies to empower individuals and prevent social exclusion. At the same time, in its extensive recognition of direct differential treatment on the grounds of age, the directive reflects the conflict of interest as regards the collective interest approach.

At the level of application the double bind reflects the difficult balance to be struck between the individual approach – so important in discrimination law, and built on individual rights within a liberal, individual claim-based design – and a more collective-interest approach linking age discrimination to a larger policy context concerning not only the functioning of labour markets (with age as a traditional social stratifier), but also pension schemes and overall social welfare in an economic and political perspective. However, the overall concern should be intergenerational solidarity and sustainable societies.

39 Compare Hendrickx (2012).
Up to now, the CJEU has ruled on some twenty age discrimination cases – close to half of them dealing specifically with the issue of compulsory retirement and a few others with issues linked to premature retirement.

The Employment Equality Directive does not apply to rules on retirement age in social security pension schemes and the like (compare Recital 14). However, it does apply to the termination of employment contracts. One would therefore think at first that rules on compulsory retirement at a certain age should be contrary to the ban on age discrimination. As reflected in case law, however, this is far from the case. A general background motive for this, as mentioned above, is stated in Recital 25 and reflected in Article 6.1 of the Employment Equality Directive concerning the justification of such treatment, thus confirming the rather ambiguous position of the Directive. According to this Article, Member States may provide that differences of treatment on the grounds of age shall not constitute discrimination if they are ‘objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary’.

The issue of compulsory retirement may be illustrated here using the Swedish Hörnfeldt case. Mr Hörnfeldt had been working part-time for the Swedish Postverket since 1989. When he reached the age of 67 on 15 May 2009, his employment contract was terminated on the last day of that month, according to the Swedish ‘67-year rule’ and the collective agreement covering the contract. His monthly retirement pension amounted to SEK 5,847 net (approx. EUR 680), quite a low pension by Swedish standards. Mr Hörnfeldt claimed that this constituted unlawful discrimination on grounds of age.

At the centre of the Hörnfeldt case is the Swedish rule in section 33 of the (1982:80) Employment Protection Act (EPA, Anställningsskyddslagen) on the right of an employer to freely terminate an employment contract at the end of the month in which the employee reaches the age of 67. In this case the employer

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42 Compare Palacios de la Villa and Age Concern England.

43 For a more comprehensive presentation of the Hörnfeldt case, see A. Numhauser-Henning and M. Rönnmar (forthcoming).
only has to give the employee at least one month’s written notice, and the ‘normal’ requirement for just cause, or objective grounds, does not apply. At the same time, according to section 32a EPA there is an unconditional right to work until the age of 67. Sections 32a and 33 EPA together form the 67-year rule. The Framework Directive’s provisions on age-related discrimination were as such transposed into Swedish law by the (2008:567) Discrimination Act (Diskrimineringslagen).

The core question in the Hörnfeldt case is whether the Swedish 67-year rule is compatible with Article 6 of the Employment Equality Directive. It is clear that terminating an employment contract on the basis of an employee reaching retirement age amounts to differential treatment based on age. The question is whether that difference of treatment can be regarded as objectively and reasonably justified by legitimate aims, and whether it is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve those aims.

According to the referring court, the 67-year rule was established to give individuals the right to work longer and increase the amount of their retirement pension, and it reflects a balance between considerations relating to budgetary matters, employment policy and labour-market policy. No such explicit aims were expressed in the EPA itself though, nor in the travaux préparatoires. Not surprisingly, the CJEU stated that a lack of expressive aim is not decisive: what is important is ‘that other elements, derived from the general context of the measure concerned, should make it possible to identify the underlying aim of that measure for the purposes of review by the courts as to whether it is legitimate and as to whether the means put in place to achieve it are appropriate and necessary’ (p. 24). The Swedish Government introduced multifaceted arguments for the 67-year rule, and these aims were acceptable to the CJEU, because ‘the automatic termination of the employment contracts for employees...’

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44 If the employer does not make use of this possibility to terminate the employment contract, the permanent employment relationship continues; however, it does so with limited employment protection (the employee has, for example, only one month’s notice, and is given no right of priority in accordance with the seniority rules or rules on re-employment in redundancy situations, s. 33 EPA). Moreover, when an employee turns 67, fixed-term contracts may be freely entered into, s. 5 EPA.

45 This rule was introduced as of 31 Dec. 2002: before that, another retirement age could be introduced by collective agreement. This is no longer the case as the 67-year rule is unconditional.

46 The judgment p. 20. Compare Palacios de la Villa and Age Concern England.


48 It seeks, first, to avoid termination of employment contracts in situations which are humiliating for workers by reason of their advanced age; second, to enable retirement pension regimes to be adjusted on the basis of the principle that income received over the full course of a career must be taken into account; third, to reduce obstacles for those who wish to work beyond their 65th birthday; fourth, to adapt to demographic developments and to anticipate the risk of labour shortages; and, fifth, to establish a right, and not an obligation, to work until the age of 67, in the...
who meet the conditions as regards age and contributions paid for the liquidation of their pension rights has, for a long time, been a feature of employment law in many Member States and is widely used in employment relationships. It is a mechanism which is based on the balance to be struck between political, economic, social, demographic and/or budgetary considerations and the choice to be made between prolonging people’s working lives or, conversely, providing for early retirement’ (p. 28). The ‘distribution between generations’ argument has long been accepted. The CJEU also finds the 67-year rule to be appropriate for achieving the aims set out: the rule was established expressly to avoid humiliating situations for older workers, and make it easier for young people to enter and/or remain in the labour market (p. 34). The question as to whether the means were also necessary to achieve the aims was answered in relation to the second question, referring to the importance of financial compensation in the form of payment of a ‘reasonable’ retirement pension. In the early case Palacios de la Villa the CJEU seemingly implied that the fact that the individual in question was in receipt of a pension that was not unreasonable was an important part of assessing whether the legislation at hand met the conditions of being ‘appropriate and necessary’. In the subsequent Rosenbladt case, however, the CJEU made no reference to the level of the retirement pension received by the person concerned, despite the small amount received following upon a part-time position as a cleaner. In the Hörnfeldt case the CJEU makes it clear that despite referring to Article 15.1 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the right (also for older persons) to engage in work, the considerations must not be made at individual level but rather at system level. What is evaluated is rather the Swedish system as such, which means offering an unconditional right to work until 67 years of age, further work possibilities in the form of fixed-term employment, and a multifaceted pension scheme including basic coverage from the age of 65 years in terms of a guaranteed pension, housing benefits and/or old-age support.

In the Hörnfeldt case the CJEU thus concluded that the Employment Equality Directive does not preclude:

a national measure, such as the Swedish 67-year rule, which allows an employer to terminate an employee’s employment contract on the sole ground that the employee has reached the age of 67 and which does not take account of the level of the retirement pension which the person concerned will receive, as the measure is objectively and

sense that an employment relationship may continue beyond the age of 65. Setting a compulsory retirement age also makes it easier for young people to enter the labour market (p. 26).

49 The judgment, p. 73.

50 This was clear also from the Rosenbladt case.
reasonably justified [. . . ] and constitutes an appropriate and necessary means by which to achieve that aim.\textsuperscript{51}

‘It’s all about justification’ was the characterization of EU non-discrimination law made by Brian Bercusson at a Stockholm conference back in 2002.\textsuperscript{52} This was a reflection on the widening process that had only just come about with the introduction of labour law equal treatment and the flexible work directives, as well as the Article 13 Directives. A common ground for the flexible work directives and the case of age discrimination is that these are grounds of discrimination deemed less ‘suspicious’\textsuperscript{53} than many others. With regard to flexible work and age, this is directly reflected in the regulation allowing the justification of direct discrimination. Monika Schlachter has argued in relation to CJEU case law regarding compulsory retirement that ‘there are almost no limits to the discretion of the Member States in adopting mandatory retirement rules’, while distinguishing between two separate standards. One is a ‘control standard’ arguing for more general systems for compulsory retirement, as in the Rosenbladt case, and another is a considerably stricter standard when it comes to specific professional groups, such as those in the Petersen, Geiger, Fuchs and Köhler cases and, now recently, Commission v Hungary.\textsuperscript{54} Claire Kilpatrick has also pointed to the fact that in these cases, the CJEU has developed another framework for analysis than that hitherto applied in sex discrimination cases: ‘a new EU Discrimination Law Architecture’ applying a looser proportionality test.\textsuperscript{55} The ‘more flexible approach to the issue of proportionality in retirement cases’ was recently highlighted also by Elaine Dewhurst in a critical analysis of CJEU case law.\textsuperscript{56}

The trend towards ‘it’s all about justification’ leaves us with an increasingly unpredictable application of non-discrimination law, as it is a difficult balancing

\textsuperscript{51} Hendrickx has commented that the CJEU here struck a balance between the individual argument and the collective, but tilted the result in favour of the collective, Hendrickx, 21. (2012).
\textsuperscript{53} A suspicious ground of discrimination – such as sex, ethnicity or sexual orientation – is considered to have no link whatsoever with someone’s ability to contribute to society.
\textsuperscript{54} M. Schlachter, Mandatory Retirement and Age Discrimination under EU Law, in 27(3) IJCLLR, 290 (2011).
\textsuperscript{55} C. Kilpatrick, The Court of Justice and Labour Law in 2010: A New EU Discrimination Law Architecture, in 40 (3) ILJ (September 2011).
of individual and collective interests on a case-by-case basis: this is thus especially
ture with regard to age.

A general conclusion concerning the double bind and the socio-
economic/collective side of non-discrimination law is that, when it enforces the
need for non-discriminative behaviour, typically speaking, the double bind and
socioeconomic/collective aspect work to emphasize the transformative aspect of
anti-discrimination law. The greater the socio-economic need, the stronger the
impetus of a proactive approach to non-discrimination, even positive action. This
brings to the fore the classic issue of formal v. substantive equality. However, as is
the case with age discrimination, the collective interest aspect may also result in
an expanded scope for exceptions or justification for differential treatment.

4 POTENTIALS

The outcome of the Hörfeldt case may in many ways seem evident if we
contemplate previous case-law developments. The two questions referred to
here had already been answered in cases such as Palacios de la Villa, Age Concern
England and Rosenbladt.

However, neither from a Swedish law perspective nor from an EU law
perspective is it obvious that the 67-year rule – or compulsory retirement as
such – should be considered consistent with the ban on age discrimination. From
an EU law perspective, it is the overall assessment of compulsory retirement in
relation to the collective public interest approach that makes one question the
acceptance of compulsory retirement. Increased labour-market participation of
people aged 55+ in terms of active ageing is thus an important part of EU
employment strategies.

There are substantial as well as attitudinal obstacles to increased
labour-market participation of people aged 55+. The traditional approach to the

57 This may also be the reason why the CJEU decided – after hearing Advocate General Bot – to
proceed to judgment without an opinion.

58 The rule can be questioned in relation to the disproportionate scope for arbitrariness that it provides
on behalf of the employer, who can freely chose to 'retire' one employee, whereas others seemingly
in the same situation are kept on. In Rosenbladt (p. 51) the CJEU pointed to the fact that a system of
automatic termination of employment contracts does not authorize employers to terminate an
employment contract unilaterally when employees reach the age at which they are eligible for
payment of a pension. This is, however, precisely what the Swedish 67-year rule permits. In Hörfeldt
the CJEU is apparently conscious of this character of the Swedish law, though, and makes no point
of it (the judgment p. 40). Another argument could have been the compatibility with the Swedish
pension system as such: strictly speaking, there is no fixed pensionable age. Pension can be taken
from the age of 61 and the system is based on lifelong average earnings, making work beyond
'normal' pension age economically very advantageous. Compulsory retirement at a set age is not
really compatible with such a system. In the cases of Ole Andersen and Prigge the termination of
employment contracts at pre-normal retirement age was seen as a disproportionate measure
considering the individual's economic interests; see also the case Commission v. Hungary.
organization of labour markets represents an impediment in many ways, both in terms of regulation and factual operation. Working life is thus traditionally restricted by rules on – more or less – compulsory retirement at a certain age, relating to public as well as occupational pension schemes. However, working practices in terms of working conditions, working-time arrangements and knowledge turnover have also tended to marginalize older workers, including those who have not yet reached pensionable age, thus creating unemployment and costly early retirement schemes. These practices are accompanied by social norms that support the functioning of such a system both in terms of ‘pension norms’ and discriminatory perceptions and behaviour on behalf of, among others, employers. The hitherto prevailing ‘pension norm’ – understood as general perceptions of when to leave working life – says that there is ‘a right and a duty to retire at a certain age’. Should a worker be laid off before reaching the ‘normal’ pensionable age, this may well be conceived as a social good. Such normative conceptions are, of course, a major challenge to contemporary society’s ability to foster active ageing. The ban on age discrimination is among the essential tools designed to counteract these realities.

From an EU perspective it is true that ensuring that people work until they reach the ‘normal’ pensionable age, thus preventing early retirement and other forms of premature labour market exit, seems to be the most important factor in making active ageing a reality. According to the 2012 Ageing Report, the average labour market exit age in the EU-27 was 61.4 years in 2009 and the predicted exit age for 2060 is ‘only’ 64.3 years. However, this future overall scenario makes it only more important to make people today work beyond their normal pensionable age, whenever this is possible. In addition, generally speaking, there is ‘room’ for a longer working life. The service society entails other demands than industrial society, and older generations are achieving better health outcomes. There are good – also economic – reasons to adapt the current perception of work and of a ‘good worker’ to the human scale from a lifespan perspective, if the traditional pattern of the three clear-cut phases of life – pre-work life, work life and ‘after-life’ – is to be replaced, as reflected in the ILO strategy ‘decent work for all’.

Thus, from an EU law perspective, it is not obvious that rules on compulsory retirement should be seen as consistent with the ban on age discrimination. In order to make people work beyond the ‘normal’ retirement age, they must have both the practical and the legal possibility to do so, and here, of course, the acceptance of compulsory retirement is a key issue. The CJEU in

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its case law seems to have given a lot of consideration to Member States’ traditions, because ‘the automatic termination of the employment contracts for employees who meet the conditions as regards age and contributions paid for the liquidation of their pension rights has, for a long time, been a feature of employment law in many Member States and is widely used in employment relationships’. So far, the application of the collective interest approach in case law regarding compulsory retirement at post-pensionable age has rather been to the detriment of active ageing and the potential of the ban on age-discrimination.

However, in relation to early retirement related issues, the CJEU has thus been considerably stricter in its judgments. One way to promote active ageing – and thus social sustainability as the dependency ratio increases – is to successively raise the ‘normal’ retirement age, making people work longer, while still accepting compulsory retirement. The issue of what the ‘appropriate’ pensionable age is currently lies at the core of many delicate reform processes across Europe, inter alia in the wake of the economic crisis, and these reforms are leading to political strikes and upheaval. An important reason for these reactions is that pension rights are not only perceived of as social, political rights but also as property rights in the form of postponed income. Such perceptions are reflected in the first part of the traditional pension norm: there is a right and a duty to retire at a certain age.

5 PITFALLS

At the core of this contribution lies the issue as to whether there should (still) be a (more or less) set pensionable age, and whether this implies the acceptance of compulsory retirement. Or, should the prevailing pension norm be modified to assert that ‘you have both a right and a duty to work according to your

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60 Hörnfeldt, the judgment p 28.
61 According to a 2011 report, based on the situation as at 31 Dec. 2009, 24 out of 29 Member States did have a set age of for automatic termination (compulsory retirement) concerning specific professions and/or public employees. However, 23 out of 29 Member States did not have a general rule on compulsory retirement applicable to the private sector. D. O’Dempsey and A. Beale, Age and Employment, Report from the Network of Legal Experts in the non-discrimination field to the European Commission (1 July 2011).
62 Compare, for instance, Eliasson, Nils, Protection of Accrued Pension Rights, An Inquiry into Reforms of Statutory and Occupational Pension Schemes in a German, Norwegian and Swedish Context (Lund, Juristförlaget i Lund, 2001). Compare also the case the Commission v. Hungary where the CJEU obiter dictum accepted a general increase in pensionable age from 62 to 65 years of age in Hungary, thus meeting reasonable demands on gradual transposition rules, the judgment p. 73.
abilities', and that 'to retire is a personal/individual choice’ rather than a social order?

In such a case at least the practice of compulsory retirement needs to be abandoned. There is also a need for a general reconceptualization of work during working life in order to adapt to a more diversified and ‘greying’ work force. Working life today tends to require workers to be more productive, well-educated and flexible than ever before. In expanding sectors such as the IT world there is a romantic vision of enthusiastic employees working around the clock and eating at their desks, in a state of total commitment to their activity. This ideal has hitherto mostly been seen as being detrimental to the reconciliation of work and family life and other caring responsibilities. However, it is also incompatible with a working life well beyond pensionable age. Such a working life requires a reconceptualization throughout working life, as the quality of working conditions affect workers’ future ability to work. There are good – also economic – reasons to adapt the current perception of work and of a ‘good worker’ to the human scale from a lifespan perspective, if the traditional pattern of the three clear-cut phases of life – pre-work life, work life and ‘after-life’ – is to be replaced.

Thus far, the double bind behind age-discrimination rules and the relative weight given to the collective interest approach as regards compulsory retirement has mainly been applied to the detriment of active ageing policies. However, what would a ban on compulsory retirement imply?

An adaptation of pension norms and labour law in line with what has hitherto been argued – the elimination of compulsory retirement and reconceptualizing work – also gives rise to risks. It may well have detrimental effects on employment protection as we know it.

One accepted argument in favour of compulsory retirement is thus to avoid a practice where working-life termination, as a general rule, is based on the ‘disqualification’ of the older worker⁶³ – a less satisfying order.⁶⁴

Such an abolition also risks diminishing employment protection before actual retirement age is reached. If retirement practices are to become more diffuse or more individualized, there is no possibility to uphold a practice such as that found in Sweden where, as a general rule, ‘normal ageing’ does not

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⁶³ Hörnfeldt. Compare also Rosenbladt, Georgiev and Fuchs and Köhler.

compensate for just-cause dismissal, and incentives for age management may weaken.\textsuperscript{65,66}

Moreover, there is an elitist element to non-discrimination law, requiring a comparator in ‘a similar situation’, for instance, as regards merits and abilities. This makes non-discrimination claims a weak defence in real life, especially for disabled people and those growing older.\textsuperscript{67} At the same time there is currently a trend by which employment protection is levelled down, and claims argued in terms of discrimination tend to grow in importance in relation to employment protection.\textsuperscript{68} This leaves non-discrimination as the lowest common denominator for employment protection law as well, substituting employment protection, so to speak.

This relation between employment protection law and discrimination law is particularly interesting with regard to workers reaching retirement age and the application or non-application of the ban on age-discrimination. The weakening of employment protection and an anti-discrimination law approach can thus be expected to go hand in hand and to be mutually reinforcing. The acceptance of compulsory retirement can be criticized for undermining the ban on age discrimination.\textsuperscript{69} At the same time, to uphold the ban on age discrimination and thus, as a rule, require just cause for dismissal at any age would lead to an increased emphasis on ‘capability’ as an employment requirement.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{65} Compare S. Manfredi and L. Vickers in their draft article Retirement and age equality: Dignity and Solidarity Perspectives presented at the Barcelona Labour Law Research Network Inaugural Conference, 13–15 Jun. 2013, regarding the effects of the UK abolition of mandatory retirement in 2011, apparently making employers more precise about the boundaries between acceptable and less acceptable contribution at all stages in an employee’s career, and, also making the UK legislator consider weakening employment protection altogether.

\textsuperscript{66} Compare also Suk 2012, 93 with reference to the economist Edward Lazear and his life-cycle theory of mandatory retirement concerning wage-setting as building on an implicit contract model stating that ‘employers pay employees a wage premium towards the end of their careers on the assumption that the employment relationship will come to an end at a predictable fixed point in time’.


\textsuperscript{68} Compare B. Gaze and A. Chapman in this issue on Australia introducing in the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 a law against unlawful termination much in terms of certain unacceptable ‘discriminatory’ grounds. The later introduction of the 2009 Fair Work Act as well as case law indicate, however, the difficulties experienced to integrate in an effective way non-discrimination bans as a central element of employment relations.

\textsuperscript{69} Compare, however, S. Manfredi & L. Vickers (2013) arguing that retaining some form of regulation of the end of working lives does in fact meet the demands of equality, namely within the concept of positive action (and the intergenerational argument) and an additional mechanism for review. For a substantive approach to equality, see also Foubert et al. in this issue.

\textsuperscript{70} Compare supra n. 64. Compare however also Dewhurst arguing that staff performance appraisal is a possible way forward, Dewhurst, 543 (2013).
There may thus be a risk that setting no upper age limit on employment will bring about a decline in the number of people aged 55+ who work, thus undermining both employment protection and ‘good quality work’ from within. The question is whether, for instance, potentially increased requirements concerning reasonable accommodation also in relation to age will be enough to come to terms with such a trend.

6 CONCLUDING REMARKS – FUTURE CHALLENGES

EU non-discrimination law has been illustrated as widening and deepening. This stands in sharp contrast to American non-discrimination law, which according to de Búrca\textsuperscript{71} has been significantly weakened after decades of social and political backlash, encountering ideological conflict and strong political and social opposition. According to de Búrca, the future of EU antidiscrimination law is likely to face equally daunting challenges as that of the US – as the EU moves on, it will reach the state of affairs current in the US – decades ahead as regards antidiscrimination law advancement. However, she also points to some ‘pros’ in the European context related to a difference in culture and ideology in terms of social welfare and the responsibilities of the State, or in this case the EU, as reflected in the Lisbon Treaty and its rule on a social market economy, and now forming the transformative character of EU non-discrimination law. This is something that may well make all the difference!

However, regulating an increasing number of groups in a parallel way, despite these groups’ significantly different needs for protection, leads to a worry regarding the erosion of key concepts as a consequence of overall harmonization. A special concern here is the possibility that direct discrimination can be justified. This has thus turned out to be an absolutely crucial element as regards age discrimination. Future influences from the human rights approach may also lead in this direction, as the European Court of Human Rights permits justifications in cases of direct gender discrimination.

I was long convinced that a considerable risk existed: that the protection of so many different groups would reinforce the formal equal treatment concept as the lowest common denominator. However, I find the cases of Coleman and Feryn, not least in the light of the Lisbon Treaty provisions, really promising. There are possibilities, even within the prevailing legal model, that by referring not only to the overall aims of the different non-discrimination directives but also to the more intricately interwoven aims of the Union and multi-level fundamental rights, that future equality law can develop a more proactive

\textsuperscript{71} C. de Burca in P. Craig and C. de Burca (2011).
approach built not just on guilt, but on making use of the ‘dominance approach’ — creating legal responsibilities for key actors such as employers, because they have the power to institutionalize change. Coordinated political actions built on the new perceptions of the social market economy should also not be underestimated. There is thus considerable hope for the future that the developments of equality law will be truly transformative.

However, we cannot neglect the fact that European non-discrimination law is characterized by an increasing complementarity of hard regulation and soft policy coordination — and thus hybridity — as Somek points out. Regulation is normatively deficient: it needs equality management. This is not only true in situations where there is a double bind and conflict between individual rights of equal treatment and even contradictory collective policy interests, as is often the case when it comes to age discrimination.

Moreover, the abolition of compulsory retirement is arguably not an answer to all problems. Case law shows that age discrimination law as such is full of dilemmas: it is about weighing individual rights against public interests of a more collective character, such as intergenerational solidarity and pension systems. To balance these opposite approaches, the CJEU makes extensive use of the proportionality principle, often making outcomes highly unpredictable. Add to this the adverse effects that the abolition of compulsory retirement might have on labour law in general in terms of employment protection and good quality work.

In the doctrine it is considered unlikely that in the near future the CJEU will be willing to challenge the Member States’ traditions regarding compulsory employment practices. At the same time, we have seen that a great majority of Member States do not have a general rule on compulsory retirement in place, and in the UK for example, the statutory compulsory retirement scheme has been repealed, despite its long-standing tradition and acceptance in principle by the CJEU.

Clearly, the economic crisis and high unemployment — especially among young people — have made the achievement of active ageing policies increasingly difficult. However, the question is how this conflict as regards the right to work will play out as the increased dependency ratio and unsustainable pension costs become more prevalent. There are reasons to unite with Kasneci when arguing that we are in need of a completely new approach ‘based on a multidimensional policy approach on ‘active ageing’ which can change outdated paradigms, remove

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73 Schlachter (2011) and Kilpatrick (2011).
74 Compare also the Swedish Governmental Pensionable Age Inquiry which recently put forward a proposal to make the Swedish ‘67-year rule’ a ‘69-year rule’, SOU 2013:25.
a number of older workers related-myths, and convert the process of population and workforce ageing into an opportunity for society and older workers themselves’.

The question for the future is whether demands for decent work, non-discrimination, equal treatment and reasonable accommodation will suffice to counteract the risks implied by both the acceptance and the abandonment of age as a social stratifier.

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