Constructing Historical Realism: International Relations as Comparative History

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis should be read as an attempt at formulating the contours of a new theory of international relations. If successful, this theory will be both ambitious and modest. It will be ambitious in that it is meant to be applicable to world history in its entirety, and not just parts of the world, at certain times. It is modest in that all it tries to explain is how states reproduce themselves politically. Both the terms ‘state’ and ‘political reproduction’ will be defined in the text. In order to construct my theory, or at least its foundations, I draw on a large literature from the disciplines of International Relations (IR) and Historical Sociology (HS). I illustrate my arguments, and sharpen the meaning of my concepts, in the contexts of 19th century Japanese, Republican Roman, and Early Medieval European political reproduction.

Problem and Aim of the Study

The puzzle underlying the thesis arises initially from a confrontation between structural IR theory and world history. Much of structural IR theory posits a transhistorical structural logic that impels states to be or become alike (Ericson and Hall 1998). This logic derives from the anarchic structure of any international system. Intuitively and logically this argument appears plausible: political formations must structure themselves in the most efficient form available in order to survive in a world rife with war, hostility, or mere competition. Yet even a cursory reading of world history seems to indicate that there are significant differences between political formations across space as well as time. This apparent tension can be resolved in fundamentally two different ways. It can, first, be argued that the alleged temporal and spatial differences disappear once world history is read more critically. The essence of political formations does not vary. Alternatively it could be argued that the very fact
that there are differences shows structural IR theory to be wrong. Thus stated, both of these arguments are rather crude, and risk misrepresenting structural IR theory. The overarching aim of this thesis is to search for a theoretical understanding of international relations and history that can accommodate both historical and spatial variation in political formation and structural causal effects. If this purpose is carried through successfully, the result will amount to what might be called Historical Realism.

More specifically, and as a limitation of the overarching aim, the purpose of this thesis is to establish state political reproduction as a topic in IR, and to develop a theory that can explain state political reproduction in world history. ‘State’ can preliminarily be defined as “any institutionalized authority” (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996:410, n. 10) that dominates a given territory. ‘Political reproduction’ can be defined, again preliminarily, as the process—actions, bargaining, and institutionalization—that maintains that particular pattern of authority. Both of these concepts will be more fully discussed throughout the thesis. The more precise they become, however, the less useful they will be for historical analysis. The contrary is also true: if left imprecise, they will be virtually useless for theory construction. Since the very aim and purpose of this thesis is to find a way to combine history and theoretical analysis, a final balance between precision and imprecision cannot, and should not, be found until the last chapter.

Why, then, is political reproduction an important and interesting topic? The answer has more to do with the type of questions that IR theory poses than with the theoretical ways in which these are answered. Simply put, state survival is usually assumed, and when it is not assumed—when state breakdown is studied—this is considered an interesting anomaly. ‘The fall of X’ is a common title of books in this genre, as is ‘The rise of X’. Rather more uncommon is the analysis of what lies temporally between the rise and the fall. This thesis turns this
around. The attitude of the thesis, for the sake of argument, is that states should disappear all the time. When they do not, this is an anomaly, and therefore important and interesting. Historical Realism thereby seeks to enlarge the agenda for IR theory. This may well be its most important contribution to the IR literature, which has taken state survival so much for granted that it has been left un-theorized.

Structure of the Study

This thesis is divided into three parts. In the first part I introduce the building material of Historical Realism, the theory this thesis as a whole is aimed at developing. Chapter one is a conceptual discussion. I present the concepts of Historical Realism, and account for how they were arrived at. They are not finally defined in this chapter. The next chapter is a discussion of the meta-theoretical underpinnings of Historical Realism. I account for my position on matters of ontology, epistemology, and methodology, but I do not take issue with other positions. The reasons for this are discussed in the chapter. The aim of part one is to construct a language, consisting of a set of concepts and a ‘grammar’ as a starting point for developing theory.

The second part contains three chapters in which the concepts presented and discussed in the first part are developed. Chapter three deals with Japan at the middle and end of the last century. Chapter four deals with the growth of the Roman Republic, and its transformation into Empire, and chapter five discusses the developments in Europe during Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. The main purpose of these three chapters is to learn about the concepts of Historical Realism, not to learn about the historical cases discussed. Normal social scientific selection criteria therefore do not apply. I do not compare the three historical ‘cases’, nor do I test hypotheses. Rather, I have chosen three time-space contexts in which I believe various
aspects of my concepts can be brought into focus. This belief is based on my general historical knowledge, and had that been differently constituted, part two of this thesis might well have been constructed differently. This might not be a satisfying way to proceed, but it is the only one available. Of course, when, or if, it comes to developing hypotheses or ‘testing’ Historical Realism, in a later work, normal social scientific selection criteria must be respected. I provide a synoptic conceptual overview of the empirical chapters in figure seven, chapter six.

The third part contains one chapter. In this chapter I develop Historical Realism as far as I can on the fundament provided by the first five chapters.

Two Important Assumptions

Two assumptions underlie this thesis, and the validity of these assumptions will not be directly addressed in the bulk of the text. It is therefore prudent to note these two assumptions, and to comment somewhat on them. The first assumption is that Realism—broadly understood—has identified the central problematique of international relations, and that more is to be gained from revising Realism than from discarding it in its entirety. The second assumption is that the field of IR cannot do without historical studies.

Why Realism?

There seems to be no end to the criticisms of Realism. Recently however, there has been something of a revival for this approach. Particularly, Barry Buzan has mounted what amounts to a defense of Realism, albeit in a new form. The claim made by Buzan, in essence, is that, no matter what its shortcomings may be, the focus on “the logic of survival, and the dynamics of (in)security” (Buzan 1996:60) gives Realism a timeless appeal as an approach to international relations. This—the recognition of
the security dilemma as the core of the field of IR—is how Realism is understood in this thesis, and it is the dynamic of the security dilemma that is the controlling theme. Obviously, a recognition of a core problematic by no means leads to theoretical closure. Indeed, much of chapter one and two will be about how to interpret the security dilemma theoretically.

Robert Cox, celebrated critical theorist, does not have a ‘strawman’ view of Realism (Cox 1992). He notes that for Realism “the nature of the state changes. In classical realism, the state is not absolute; the state is historicized” (ibid:167). Cox goes on to note that classical realism is in fact a critical theory that does not “accept appearances at face value but seeks to penetrate to the meaning within” (ibid:168). In agreement with this sentiment, this thesis argues that far from being a justification or rationalization of arrogance in the foreign policy of great powers, Realism is an approach to international relations that lays bare important issues of power, and a “demystification of the manipulative instruments of power” (ibid:169). In addition, it can do so for all of history. That some realists, and some particular Realist theories, have indeed been put to use by the powers that be, is a completely different matter.

It should be emphasized, then, that this thesis is not directly concerned with Neorealism. The ahistoricity of Neorealism, and the virtues of bringing Neorealism to meet history, have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere (Buzan et al. 1993). It is not a purpose of this thesis to contribute directly to that debate.

Why History?
There are mainly two reasons why any IR theory should also be historical. The first is, as Ernest Gellner (1988) and John A. Hall (1986) argue, that all social theory relies to some extent on ideas of patterns of history, whether we want it or not. While it may be to go too far to argue that all social science is based on some speculative philosophy of history or other—although
Barry K. Gills (1989) does a fine job showing how much IR theory in fact is based on speculative philosophies of history—it is certainly true, as Philip Abrams argues, that the central problem of social theory is “the ways in which, in time, actions become institutions and institutions are in turn changed by action” (Abrams 1982:2). This is by necessity a historical problematique, whether long- or short-term history. Abrams’ argument is deeper than a statement to the effect that social action and processes necessarily occur in time, however. He argues that the relationship between human activity and experience, on the one hand, and social organization, on the other, is continuously constructed in time (ibid:16), and thus that all sociology (and, presumably, social theory in general) by necessity is historical, and that history likewise is sociological.

The second reason for a historical approach is methodological. The only way in which to approach change in international relations is through a study of earlier periods of change. Whether the present is thought of as a period of change or continuity, ignoring history would mean that the present would be a unique case, or a case belonging to no category. Thus merely by claiming to say something about the present as changing or continuing, a commitment to historical studies has in effect been made. A more mundane aspect of this methodological reason is that, given a specified outcome such as the ‘return to protectionism’ in the 1870s or revolutions, researchers may find it difficult to find variation on the dependent variable. In other words, the research question itself may imply a non-varying outcome, but the researcher wants to include cases with different outcomes in order to control his or her explanatory variable. If history is searched for such variation, then at the very least the researcher should have a sophisticated view of what can and cannot be done with historical studies and comparisons.
Part I: Language
CHAPTER 1: THE DICTIONARY OF HISTORICAL REALISM

The purpose of this chapter is to begin to develop Historical Realism as an approach to international relations and world history. It will be argued that unit political reproduction is a valid subject matter for historically minded IR analysts, since it is an issue in which a number of crucial discussions meet. The chapter consists of four sections. First, the concept of unit political reproduction will be introduced. Second, the international and domestic environment in which political reproduction takes place will be conceptualized. Section three begins the work of bringing the two previous sections together in a coherent 'framework', and contrasts this with rival approaches. The fourth section recapitulates the main arguments of the chapter. Although the concepts introduced will not be strictly defined, the relationship among them will be discussed. At first glance this discussion might seem to lend itself to model construction. To introduce a model, however, would be to predestine the ensuing inquiry as ahistorical. It should be emphasized again, then, that the purpose of this chapter is to prepare the ground for theory building, and not to deductively arrive at a social scientific model or even hypotheses.

Political Reproduction

How states are politically reproduced is not often of explicitly proclaimed concern for IR scholars. Yet the argument could be made that state political reproduction is a central issue. Political reproduction has the connotation of a continuation of significant institutions and structures of a unit. Buzan (1991: ch. 2) has argued that the state has three components. These are the idea of the state, the physical base of the state, and the institutional expression of the state. Political reproduction lies primarily in the domain of the institutional expression of the state. A fun-
damental continuity in both the physical base and the idea of the state are prerequisites for political reproduction. Not all institutions are equally important or equally analytically fundamental, however. On the contrary, those institutions that define and characterize the state's power over its environment, or autonomy from it, are both more important and analytically prior to issues of regime or policy, for instance, since they define what a state can do. They thus set the context within which policies and types of regimes can vary. Variations in regimes and policies are primarily interesting given a characterizing power structure. Political reproduction, tentatively, refers to the processes by which a state's relationship to its environment is constituted and reconstituted.

The very term 'reproduction', of course, has various connotations. Most obviously, the terms refer to biological or evolutionary processes by which individuals or populations recreate their genes. In (marxist) archeology however, the term 'social reproduction' refers to processes by which populations recreate themselves as social entities (Kristiansen 1998:41; Kristiansen and Rowlands 1998:223pp). Buzan, Richard Little and Charles Jones (1996:passim) also use 'reproduction' in a similar sense, but do not explicitly define the term. To differentiate my use of 'reproduction' from both its biological and marxist archeological meanings, I will use 'political reproduction', again, to denote the processes by which a state's relationship to its environment is constituted and reconstituted.

Michael Mann has argued that there are two different meanings of state power. Despotic power refers to “the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups” (Mann 1986b:113, emphasis added). Infrastructural power refers to “the power of the state to penetrate and centrally coordinate the activities of civil society through its own infrastructure” (ibid:114). Drawing on this distinction between despotic and
infrastructural power, John A. Hall suggests that there is a useful distinction to be made between capstone states and organic or penetrating states (Hall 1986; Hall 1994). A precursor of this distinction can be found in Gianfranco Poggi’s distinction between “politics as allocation” and “politics as us against the other” (Poggi 1978:ch.1). A couple of paragraphs of elaboration on these concepts might be useful.

Capstone states, having much despotic power but little infrastructural power, “are not able to deeply penetrate, change and mobilize the social order...[they have]...strong blocking but weak enabling power” (Hall 1986:35). The capstone state’s “concern was less with intensifying social relationship than in seeking to prevent any linkages which might diminish its power” (ibid:52). Hall’s example of a capstone state is imperial China. In this thesis the concept will also have the connotation of a state that has fully established its territorial jurisdiction—that is, it recognizes no higher authority within a given territory. It has, however, a highly limited jurisdiction over its own society. It is not that there is a higher authority than the state, but rather that the state—any state—is not an authority at all, or only in a limited way, in certain respects. It does not have strong infrastructural powers. This is thus in a small way a deviation from Hall’s usage. Imperial China remains a capstone state, but also the archetypal laissez-faire state is a capstone state with this usage. In agreement with Hall, the argument here indicates that capstone states are more or less predatory in their relations to their societies, in the sense that they do not give anything back. It should be emphasized that no argument to the effect that the capstone state does not affect its civil society is being made here.

A penetrating state, to the contrary, has strong infrastructural powers. It too has achieved territorial jurisdiction, and it has also achieved jurisdiction over all or most aspects of life inside this territory. It has, as it were, outcompeted or co-opted rival
wielders of authority inside its territory. That the state, in this way, is a part of civil society, rather than standing apart from it, means that it has less despotic, or arbitrary, powers than the capstone state. There are two reasons for this. First, the penetrating ability stems to a fair degree from a more or less consensual contract among the state and various groups in civil society. This consensus is precarious, and arbitrary decisions or policies will undo it. Second, the state-society relationship in this sort of formation is one of symbiosis rather than exploitation or predation. It is consequently in the best interest of the state to refrain from arbitrariness. These reasons are historical generalizations rather than logic necessities, however. Hall’s archetypal penetrating state is the modern European state.

It is crucial to note, at this stage, that Hall was mainly interested in economic development, whereas I am interested in political reproduction. To simply adopt Hall’s terms here would, therefore, create some oddities: a capstone state (in John Hall’s sense) might well co-exist with a strong nobility, whereas this would be impossible for the political capstone state. I will therefore use the terms alliance-building state and fortifying state instead. In figure one I show the parallel but different meanings of the concepts. This thesis does not address the nature of the relationship between economic development and political reproduction.

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<th>State is mobilizing/cooperative</th>
<th>State is blocking</th>
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<tr>
<td>Political reproduction</td>
<td>Alliance-building state</td>
<td>Fortifying state</td>
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<td>(Historical Realism)</td>
<td>Penetrating state</td>
<td>Capstone state</td>
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<td>Economic development</td>
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<td>(John Hall)</td>
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Figure 1. The parallel but different conceptualizations of Historical Realism and John Hall.
Fortifying and alliance-building, in this thesis, are modes of political reproduction. Thus, ‘fortifying’ and ‘alliance-building’ are not conditions, but processes, they denote ‘becoming’ rather than ‘being’. A fortifying state, then, is a state whose power is being reconstituted through processes of insulation from society. It preserves its integrity by blocking other groups. An alliance-building state, instead, is being maintained by processes of cooperation with groups in civil society. It is the task of the following chapters to begin an investigation of why these processes occur when they do.

In the literature, when it is implicitly assumed or, more rarely, of explicit concern, the issue of political reproduction is often addressed from either the analytical level of the international system or from the analytical level of domestic politics. A useful entry point to these issues is what Gabriel Almond (1989) called “the international-national connection”, and Peter Gourevitch (1978) “the second image reversed”. The ‘second image’, of course, comes from Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State and War (1954) in which he identified three types of explanations for international phenomena, or more specifically war. The first of these types, or images, was human nature, the second the nature of the state, and the third the nature of the international system. Gourevitch reversed the second image, and asked what the nature of the international system implied for the development of states. The core of this issue is constituted by the question of what direction causal links between domestic political developments and the structure of the international system have, if indeed there are any. An additional central question is what the relationship between economic and political factors are. Charles Tilly (1992:6) argues that these two questions taken together yields a four-field matrix in which available answers can be categorized (figure two). The four available answers, for Tilly, are Mode of Production analysis, Statist analysis, World System analysis, and Geopolitical analysis, all of which he rejects on various grounds. Certainly, however, there is a fifth category
of answers. Almond (1989:238) notes that this “minor tradition” emanating from Otto Hintze is comprised by, inter alia, Peter Gourevitch, Peter Katzenstein, and Tilly himself. To this list one could add Theda Skocpol (1979). They have all written studies broadly within the second image reversed tradition.

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<th>Relation to economy</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>Mode of Production</th>
<th>External</th>
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<td>Derivative</td>
<td>Statist</td>
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Figure 2. Charles Tilly’s four-field matrix of state-formation theories, from Tilly (1992:6, figure 1.1).

Typically a ‘second image reversed’ argument is sectoral. Either it concerns military matters, i.e. the effects of war on state building, or it concerns economic matters, i.e. the effects of the structure of the world economy on domestic economic developments. The thrust of the military-sector arguments is that as the technologies and requirements of war changed, the territorial, centralized, and fairly large state found itself in an advantageous position. To the extent that these states were not in existence prior to the developments in military technologies and requirements, leaders emulated the successful examples of others. The thrust of the economic-sector argument is that domestic political structures are derivative of domestic economic structures, which in turn are determined by position in the international division of labor. A more recent and highly sophisticated argument is that of Hendrik Spruyt (1994). He argues that the sort of trade a region was involved in was determining for the developing political structures. A combination of the military and economic arguments has been offered by Tilly:
the increasing scale of war and the knitting together of the European state system through commercial, military, and diplomatic interaction eventually gave the war-making advantage to those states that could field standing armies; states having access to a combination of large rural populations, capitalists, and relatively commercialized economies won out. They set the terms for war, and their form of state became the predominant one in Europe (Tilly 1992:15).

John Hobson (1997:5) has called this type of argument a “fiscal-sociological approach to IPE/IR”. There seems to be something of an emerging consensus on the validity of this sort of argument (Mann 1996), at least among non-marxist historical sociologists.

Thus, second image reversed arguments, and particularly those coming from Historical Sociology, have detailed how the international system helps determine national political developments. Mediated by war, the systemic structural imperative of competition compels states to assume certain forms. A central insight, overlooked particularly by Neorealism, is that the various states, and states-to-be, and also states that did not become modern states, had differentiated abilities to assume efficient forms. This is the classical historical sociological question of the determinants of regime type recast. Not only were the geographical areas containing the various states and states-to-be differently endowed with natural and human resources, they also differed, or came to differ, in their state-society relationships. Particularly Tilly is very clear on this point. He argues that there were essentially three paths to statehood, all three arising out of the need to finance new kinds of wars. These were the capital-intensive path, coercion-intensive path, and capitalized coercion path, differing among themselves in how the states mobilized resources for war-making. After some centuries only the capi-
talized coercion path remained, as the others were out-competed (Tilly 1992).

These, and similar, arguments imply that the states relate to two contexts simultaneously. In the words of Richard Little:

The agents of the state, like Janus, are required to look in two directions simultaneously. They are confronted by two sets of structures: one internal and the other external.....the two sets of structures generate a double security dilemma. (Buzan, et al. 1993:120; cf. Theda Skocpol, 1979:32 who also remarks on the Janus-faced nature of the state)

Political reproduction, now, concerns processes of maintaining a given social order. However, the threats against this social order do not come from those directly included in the order only. Political reproduction occurs with respect to a double security dilemma, and fortifying and alliance-building are two different responses to this double security dilemma.

But what are these ‘internal’ and ‘external’ structures? The next section of this thesis begins a conceptualization of the environment in which political reproduction occurs. The main argument of the section is that political reproduction occurs in one environment, and that the ‘double’ of the double security dilemma derives from the nature of threatening groups, rather than from an ontologically questionable distinction between international and domestic politics.

**The Double Security Dilemma**

When Waltz and the vast majority of IR scholars write on states and systems, they usually say something like ‘when states begin to interact, a system ensues’. This means that polities are thought of as predating the international (world, global) system
which they create through their interactions. It is to the great merit of recent historical sociology, as well as classical world historians, to show that this view is historically wrong. Furthermore, Mann (1986a) and Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach (1996), among others, have persuasively argued that this view is theoretically inappropriate: “global politics has always been a seamless web, encompassing numerous layered, overlapping, and interacting political authorities” (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996:33). Better than the view that there are territorial units that begin to co-act and form a system, is the view that there is a tract of land, and waterways, such as Eurasia, in which politics and economics are being conducted. In this tract of land crystallizations or concentrations sometimes take place so that states and other wielders of authority can be said to have been created. The crystallizations which took place in Medieval Europe, and which included a territorial component, have politically reproduced themselves to this day and now cover most of the globe (Spruyt 1994, Tilly 1992). It is on these social theory is based.

These two images are very different, and the difference is very important, not only for metaphysical or metahistorical reasons. With the first image, which we can call the state system image, states are ‘ready’ or ‘finished’ when they come in contact with one another. Two different sorts of system can, theoretically, be created: hierarchy or anarchy. What differs between these two systems is how sovereignty is allocated. In anarchy sovereignty, but by no means power, is held equally by the interacting states. In hierarchy sovereignty, as well as power of course, is held unequally, such that a hegemon or empire possesses more of it than vassals (see Watson 1992 and Buzan and Little 1996 for good discussions). Sovereignty is here limited to what Janice Thomson (1994:16) has called the constitutive dimension of sovereignty. The constitutive dimension of sovereignty establishes the boundary between the domestic and international realms of politics. In contradistinction, the functional dimension of
sovereignty establishes the boundary “between the political and economic and the state and nonstate realms of authority” (ibid.). In the state-system image the functional dimension of sovereignty is seen as disconnected from the system—it is a purely ‘domestic’ affair. The constitutive dimension is all that matters.

With the other image, which we can call the polity image3, other states, which of course do not initially exist, are not the only units with which jurisdiction must be shared. In terms of Thomson’s functional dimension of sovereignty, the polity image recognizes that there are other crystallizations—resource users—than states that vie for, not sovereignty in the common-usage meaning of highest authority, but jurisdiction, within the ‘inside’, over issue areas. This is, thus, also a vertical sharing of jurisdiction, or sovereignty (cf. Ferguson and Mansbach 1996:49). The issue areas over which the state has jurisdiction, consequently, can vary historically and geographically. Since the functional dimension of sovereignty is ignored, and the constitutive dimension not explicitly examined in the state-system image, the principle of differentiation is not problematized (Ruggie 1983)4. In the polity image, on the contrary, both the constitutive and the functional dimensions of sovereignty are problematized and the principle, or principles, of differentiation is therefore central.

In these two images—the state-system image, and the polity image—the concept of the double security dilemma means very different things. In the state-system image it means that states have two strategic environments to relate to. What it does in one environment affects its range of options in the other. However, it is difficult to see that this would provide any help in answering questions of how the range of options is constituted to begin with. That a state is able to increase taxes may bolster its international power, but how come it is able to increase taxes?
In the polity image the double security dilemma stems from the existence of two different kinds of groups. One threat comes from those who would change the parameters of the functional dimension of sovereignty, and the other from those who would change the parameters of the constitutive dimension of sovereignty. In other words, there is one set of threats to the territory and self-determination of a state, and another set of threats against the institutional make-up of the state. It is not possible a priori to specify, or distinguish among, the geographical origins of these two sets of threats.

For the purposes of this thesis, neither image is fully satisfactory. The state-system image begins analytically too late; that is, when the functional dimension of sovereignty has already been filled with the content this thesis is interested in. The polity image, it seems, fails to recognize that there is a significant difference between groups within and from without the state. There is an inside/outside aspect to all organizations, although it does not have to be territorially expressed. While certainly not attempting a synthesis, this thesis searches for a third image. This image, of course, will not be pure of concepts and ideas from the other two images, and it may be that it does not differ particularly much from the polity image.

Since the interest of this thesis is state political reproduction, it seems reasonable to begin the search for a new image in the essence of states. Margaret Levi, quoting Edmund Burke, opens the issue: “The revenue of the state is the state” (1988:vi). This could be said about many, but not all, other organizations as well of course. This is not a problem, however. What is important is that without revenue the state ceases to exist. While there is more to a state than its budget, this is singularly crucial. Following Levi, in this thesis it is hypothesized that states are revenue maximisers (Levi 1988:3, 10). This hypothesis, per se, will not be explored here. It is important to specify what this
hypothesis implies, and what it does not. It is also important to
spell out which concepts and assumptions are brought with the
hypothesis, and which are rejected. These are the tasks of the
next few paragraphs. The thesis then returns to the issue of the
double security dilemma.

The Theory of Predatory Rule

Douglass North (1981:21-22) has argued that there are two
general types of explanations for the existence of states in Eco-
nomics. He calls these contract theory and predatory or exploi-
tation theory. In the former the state “plays the role of wealth
maximiser for society”, and the latter “considers the state to be
the agency of a group or a class; its function, to extract income
from the rest of the constituents” (North 1981:22). Levi,
however, distinguishes between predatory and exploitative
behavior: “I hypothesize that rulers are predatory, but this does
not mean that they are necessarily exploitative” (Levi 1988:3,
n.3). What Levi means is that states do maximize revenue but
that there are limits to what they can rationally do. There are
three sets of constraints on rulers’ predatory behavior (Levi
1988:ch.1). These are bargaining power, transaction costs, and
the discount rate.

The state’s bargaining power is determined by the degree to
which it monopolizes coercive, economic, and political re-
sources (Levi 1988:12). Coercive resources refer to military and
policing resources. Economic resources refer to ownership and
control of the means of production, and also “the routes and
facilities of trade; valued skills and knowledge; the labor supply;
negotiable wealth, that is, money or its substitute” (ibid:19).
The most important transaction costs, from a political point of
view, are “costs of bargaining a revenue production policy; the
costs of acquiring information about revenue sources, constitu-
ents’ behavior, and agent behavior; and the costs of enforcing
compliance with that behavior” (ibid:27). Discount rate, finally,
refers to how important the future is relative to the present.
The lower the discount rate, the more important the future. Military conflict, of course, tends to increase the discount rate significantly.

For the present study the theory of predatory rule means the following. Rulers are predatory, but not necessarily exploitative. Those rulers who have an absolute advantage in violence in a given geographical area are states (cf. North 1981:21). States, in their pursuit of revenue within the territory, are constrained by the extent to which they monopolize means of coercion and economic resources (bargaining power), by the costs implied in a given mode of revenue extraction (transaction costs), and by the level of acute threats to its survival (discount rate). But states bargain not only with groups in civil society, and costs of transaction are incurred also when dealing with extraterritorial formations. Finally, the discount rate—perhaps simplistically operationalized in terms of revolution and war—is most certainly affected by a range of different groups.

Perhaps the first analyst of international relations to use the term ‘security dilemma’, to return to this concept, was John Herz (1950:157). Herz argued that whereever society was anarchic, individuals and groups would strive to attain security from attack by others, while by these very actions increasing the insecurity of others. These others would be induced to increase their own power, and the “vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on” (ibid.). By adding ‘double’ to this concept Buzan, Little, and Jones (1993: passim) argue that “agents of the state are constrained by two sets of structures” (ibid:121), internal and external. For the purposes of this thesis all three component terms of the concept require elaboration. It is not obvious, from the vantage point of mainstream IR theory, that I am concerned with either security or a dilemma, and it is not clear who the two referents of ‘double’ are.
The state, it has already been argued, is first of all its revenues. Therefore, a threat against its revenues, in whichever way these are obtained, is a threat against its security. I argue that there are two sorts of groups which threaten a state in this way: members of the society which the state directly extract revenue from (that is, in effect, tax); and those that either (potentially) extract resources from the state in turn (such as suzerain states extracting tribute, for instance) or, by way of the structure of the system-wide economy, get ‘unfair’ terms of trade, broadly understood. Herein lies the ‘double’ of my double security dilemma: its two referents are not territorially, or even geographically, defined groups, although there is an inside/outside dimension present. Rather, they are defined by which kind of threat they pose to the state. The fact that taxable groups typically coincide with a particular territorial extension is, first, historically contingent, and second, not necessarily true even for the Cold War era. At any rate, being an empirical conclusion it should not be built into a theory.

My usage of the term ‘dilemma’ is not motivated by the relationship in which what the state does to diminish its problems in one area increases its problems in the other area so as to create an impossible situation. A rather more forgiving meaning of ‘dilemma’ is intended here: what happens in one area has implications for what happens in the other, and unless the state can formulate one strategy for responding to both areas simultaneously, it may fail to reproduce itself politically. Hence also ‘security’.

These, then, are the two contexts. The next few paragraphs offer a conceptualization of both, in turn.

**On the characteristics of tax-payers**

If the state—as a tax-collector—is predatory, it is interesting to know something about its prey, the tax-payers. It is not necessary to know very many details about them, however.
Sufficient, for the time being, is to know whether they compete to a significant degree among themselves, and if any of them, or a potential coalition among them, would compete with the state for the same resources. For instance, is there a church which has the right to extract taxes, or are transcendental needs satisfied by a set of beliefs that require no elaborate institutional and ceremonial expression? To take another example, are taxpayers divided into classes with potentially opposing interests, such as exporters and importers or employers and employees, or do they constitute a fairly homogeneous group where common interests dominate? These issues have great impact, not only on state policies, but on the nature of statehood itself. Or, at least, this is part of the Historical Realist language. Already now, however, is it useful to note that there may be two logics involved here: one arising from competition within society, and one arising from competition between the state and elements in society.

One aspect of life often forgotten in social theory is that things happen in space. Much of the IR literature is not only ahistorical, but also takes a problematic understanding of spatiality as uncontroversial (Agnew 1994). The spatial dimension that matters in this thesis is whether tax-payers can exit and enter (for instance, traders who become tax-payers by paying customs) the area, which the state draws resources from, without major costs. This is determined by a host of factors, in particular geographical position relative to costs of transport and communication. The state’s capacity to control exits and entries is also a determining factor, given a state policy. This, in turn, certainly depends on surveillance capacity, but only relative to logistical infrastructure. State policies should be kept distinct from this dimension, however, as they are consequences rather than causes of the processes we are interested in. For simplicity, we can say that an area—not necessarily the same as a territory—can be either open or closed. A closed area is one in which it is relatively cheap for states to regulate comings and
goings, whereas an open area is costly to supervise. That an area is closed does not mean that it is not part of a wider system. It refers only to the cost or difficulty of communication and transport.

If these two dimensions—geography and cohesiveness—are combined in a four-field matrix four kinds of contexts can be distinguished, as in figure three. These may not all be historically relevant. What sort of incentives and requirements obtain in these four different contexts?

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<tr>
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<th>Competitive</th>
<th>Non-competitive</th>
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<td>Open</td>
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<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>3</td>
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Figure 3. The state as a tax-collector: four contexts.

The context of type one is obviously the most perilous for the state, but perhaps also the most promising one. Since the ‘system’ is open, producers may be able to avoid paying taxes through channeling goods and payments beyond the reach of the state. Groups in society can also form alliances with groups outside the reach of the state. At the same time, however, there is an opportunity for the state to form alliances with a particular group in society, and thereby gain increasing leverage over the rest of society. If successful in this, the state may find openness to be an asset, as it increases economic opportunity.

A context of type two is dangerous for the state primarily because of the exit option tax-payers enjoy. It is potentially dangerous also if the society is relatively homogeneous. At the moment the interests of the state and those of the ‘homogeneity’ diverge, which could happen when the discount rate of the state increases, the state stands without friends. For instance, it might matter little to an agricultural population if the king or his dethroned and exiled uncle rules the land. When this uncle has assembled an army and is ready to invade, however, the in-
terests of the tax-payers and the state diverge. The king will have to extract more resources to defend himself from the invader, and the population may find it to be in its interest to cooperate with the invader rather than with the king, in order to avoid the additional extraction.

A closed and competitive context follows much the same logic as a type one context, with a diminished danger of outside alliance formation, as well as diminished economic opportunities. A type three context can therefore be expected to be more stable than a type one context, and perhaps not as potentially explosive as a type two context, due to the state's option of alliance formation, or groups' needs to guard on each other.

Finally, a type four context is the least dangerous for states. While it is likely that the interests of rulers and ruled will diverge, and that this poses the same danger as it does in a non-competitive and open society, there is no relevant exit option. Moreover, but this is a weaker argument, the closedness probably contributes to a slowness in anti-state ideological development.

Although the last few paragraphs speculated somewhat on what states face, it is far too early to say anything about modes of political reproduction. Only half of the double security dilemma has been discussed at this point. The other half, in which the state does not extract taxes, is the topic of the next section.

On inter-state systems
It has already been pointed out that, for the purposes of this thesis, neither the state-system image nor the polity image is fully satisfactory. Yet, common to all historical political formations, which by any definition can be called states, is that they collect taxes. The political formations, then, that do not collect taxes from each other, but do from some others, have relations among themselves that are distinct from those they have with
tax-payers. For convenience, these relations will be called the inter-state system henceforth. The purpose of this section is to conceptualize this system.

In the introduction to this thesis it was noted that there is a tension between structural IR theory and a cursory reading of world history. Indeed, one of the two overarching aims of this thesis is to resolve this tension. As I have argued in somewhat different phrases elsewhere, the pressure for likeness among units in the state-system image arises not from anarchy per se, but from competition (Ericson and Hall 1998). As a number of observers have noted, however, competition need not lead to likeness. The Neorealist argument was constructed in retrospect. It built on an observation of likeness among units, and inferred a logic from this. In a ‘second step’ this logic was transformed into a theory of international relations, disembodied and timeless.

Buzan and Little (1996; see also Buzan et. al. 1993) have suggested that there are different kinds of international systems, all anarchic. Drawing on John Ruggie (1983) they suggest that it is possible to differentiate among anarchic international systems. This is a useful starting point for this section.

Buzan and Little propose that international systems can be either functionally differentiated or not. ‘Function’ here refers to the “tasks of government that political units perform” (Buzan and Little 1996:407). Functional differentiation is distinct from differentiation of roles. Thus, the U.K. during the heydays of the balance-of-power system in Europe need not have been functionally differentiated from modern-day Iceland. Essentially, the argument is that international systems can be either functionally differentiated or functionally undifferentiated. In the latter kind of system constitutive sovereignty is an established principle. The prime example, in the literature but only arguably in history, is the ‘Westphalian state’. An example of a
functionally differentiated system is the international system of the Sumerian cities Adam Watson (1992) analyses, in which one political unit had jurisdiction over the interactions of the cities, but not over the cities themselves.

Functionally differentiated inter-state systems are fully intelligible from a polity image, although the focus of Buzan and Little might be a bit narrowly defined from the vantage point of that perspective. More important than the chosen focus, however, is the recognition that the state-system image builds on a reification of the state—which is the raison d’etre of the polity image.

The dimension of function, however, speaks insufficiently to the issues of state revenue and states as economic agents. We need to add a theory of economic structure to that of function in order to fully conceptualize the inter-state system. For clarity, it should be made explicit that an assumption, hitherto implicit, of this thesis is that there are no national economies, only a world economy. Economic activity has probably never been coterminous with political control, and if it has, this is an interesting anomaly to be studied, not—again—something to base theory on.

In the literature a number of alternative economic structures suggest themselves, the two most obvious of which are whether the international, or world, economy is capitalistic or not, and whether world trade is expanding or contracting. The latter alternative is clearly a matter of process, and would thus confuse the analysis. The former alternative initially seems useful, but there are four serious problems with using this criterion in conceptualizing inter-state systems. First, ‘capitalism’ is a highly contested concept, with a range of meanings or definitions. Second, and more seriously, there are historical and geographical varieties of capitalism. Capitalism is not a fixed state, but is itself changing over time as well as across space. Third, it is not
at all clear, especially given the two previous problems, which inter-state systems have been capitalistic. How, in other words, is capitalism to be dated? Fourth, it is not clear how capitalism and anarchy are distinguished (Chase-Dunn 1981).

A rather less obvious possibility is to make heuristic use of Karl Polanyi’s terminology of embedded and disembedded economies. It should be noted at the outset what is not intended with this: The debate, in its various manifestations, between formalists and substantivists (see Swedberg and Granovetter 1992 for an overview) is not directly addressed. Furthermore, Polanyi’s claims as to the singularity of the developments in the 19th century and henceforth are not necessarily subscribed to (Polanyi 1957:71). In other words, the question of the dating of the rise of the market economy is kept open. Lastly, there is no intention of classifying international systems as having structures of reciprocity, redistribution, or exchange.

The terms ‘embedded’ and ‘disembedded’ in this thesis are used solely to distinguish among inter-state systems that are constituted by a particular economic arrangement and those that are not. Thus, it is not the economy that is embedded or disembedded in politics, as Polanyi would have it. On the contrary, it is relations among states that are disembedded or embedded in the economic structure. A range of theories, particularly those finding their roots in the writings of Marx, would probably argue that this is a pointless distinction, since political arrangements are always embedded in economic structures. I advance two arguments in defense of the distinction.

First, with the distinction it is at least conceptually possible to think about an inter-state system that is not a mere derivative of the economic structure. It is also possible to think about systems that are so derived. With the distinction, in other words, what is normally an issue of fruitless theoretical argument instead becomes an empirical question. It might well be hypothesized
that disembedded inter-state systems are historically few, but this is an entirely different matter.

Second, a disembedded inter-state system is not one in which the economy is unimportant or one in which pursuits other than the search for revenue occupy states. Rather, it is one in which other types of relations are determinant of the economy. These other types of relations include ideological/religious and military-strategic, for instance. It could thus be argued that the relations between the USSR and China during the Cold War were disembedded. Certainly, it must be pointed out that this is in large measure a matter of judgement on the part of the analyst.

In summary, economic relations are always embedded in wider social and cultural relations, Polanyi's claims to the autonomy of the market economy notwithstanding. 'Disembedded economy', in this thesis, is nonsensical. Here, it is politics that is embedded or not. A disembedded inter-state system is one in which the relations among states are not constituted by the economic structure. An embedded inter-state system, on the contrary, is one in which relations among states are derived from an economic structure.

International systems thus have two dimensions, whether they are functionally differentiated or undifferentiated, and whether the inter-state system is embedded in the economic structure, or not. These two dimensions taken together yield a typology of four possible kinds of international systems, represented in figure four. In other words, even ancient Europe would be seen as an anarchic international system in this thesis, albeit an anarchy inhabited by a number of empires as well as other sorts of states, each of which could fruitfully be analyzed on their own terms as hierarchies. With respect to the four kinds of inter-state systems, it should be noted that they are always seen from the vantage point of one of the constituent units.
To summarize so far, political space is global. States are not created in a space in which no relations exist. On the contrary, states are crystallizations or concentrations of power in this global political space. By necessity, then, states face a double security dilemma: they face threats and rivalry from other crystallizations. The central issue around which these rivalries center is revenue. Some threats or rivals are from crystallizations the state can tax, and some are from crystallizations it cannot tax. States have had varied success in winning the rivalries. It is this variation that gives rise to different modes of political reproduction, and indeed, it is this variation that makes political reproduction an interesting topic. Furthermore, the view of states as crystallizations makes the principle on which they, and other political units, are differentiated a matter for investigation rather than assumption.

### Alternative and Rival Approaches?

Given the dangers of reification involved in lumping a range of creative scholars together in ‘schools of thought’, I have chosen to focus on individual texts instead. The approaches that are discussed here have met the following two selection criteria: they generally agree with the two fundamental assumptions presented in the introduction of this thesis—that history is important and that the logic of survival rightfully belongs to the core of any analytical undertaking—and they have something valuable to offer. That is, I do not have the ambi-
tion to discredit these theories. On the contrary, they are most valuable. They do not, however, answer the questions I am asking.

On Neo-statism

Neo-statism is a very broad category, encompassing a range of various approaches. The locus classicus, by now, is Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter Evans, Dieter Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (1985). A good introduction is Caporaso and Levine (1992). A recent contribution to the neo-statist literature is John M. Hobson’s The Wealth of States (1997). Hobson has also co-authored, with Linda Weiss, States and Economic Development (1995).

Neo-statism and Historical Realism have much in common. Hobson argues that

states are not passive victims (Träger) caught between the Scylla of global capitalism/inter-state system and the Charybdis of society/societal forces. Rather, states actively shape both arenas by drawing on one to enhance their position in the other (Hobson, 1997:253).

There are a few differences, however, although these may be in degree rather than of kind.

First, the conceptualization of the relationship between states and societies is very complex in neo-statism. Neo-statism is a well needed antidote to the simple dichotomies that have so far failed to produce an acceptable state theory (cf. Hall, 1994:ch. 4). Hobson as well as Weiss and Hobson, however, seem to be chiefly concerned with the varying economic results of different states’ intervention in the economy. The focus is on the result of state capacity and state strength and weakness, not the causes. While Historical Realism has much to incorporate from neo-statism, then, it is mainly interested in an analytically prior issue.
Second, with reference to primarily Fred Halliday (1994) and Theda Skocpol (1979), Hobson (1997:13, 266, passim) introduces the idea of a dual reflexivity, or a spatial trinity, in which there is a causal chain running from ‘the international’ to ‘the national’, and back to ‘the international’. The prominent example here is that defeat in war leads to internal revolution which in turn leads to a new international war. For Hobson, this does not mean that ‘the international’ is directly determining the domestic outcome. The varying state-society relationships—as intervening variables—mediate the causal effects of the international system. This is similar to Historical Realism. However, ‘the international’ is reduced to pressures to raise revenue in Hobson’s book. In Historical Realism, ‘the international’ is an intervening variable which mediates the causal effects of the ‘domestic’ context, as much as the other way around. Furthermore, the ‘international’ is problematized in Historical Realism. There are different sorts of inter-state systems, and it is particular combinations of inter-state systems and tax-payer - tax-collector relations that exert causal pressure on states.

On ‘A Neoclassical Theory of the State’

Douglass North has argued that in order to understand economic history a “theory of the state is essential because it is the state that specifies the property right structure” (North 1981:17). North further argues that “the key problems are to explain the kind of property rights that come to be specified and enforced by the state and to explain the effectiveness of enforcement” (ibid:21). A state, as defined by North, is “an organization with a comparative advantage in violence, extending over a geographic area whose boundaries are determined by its power to tax constituents” (ibid:21). This lies very close to the definitions and approaches of this thesis. However, this thesis differs from North’s approach in the following ways.
First, while North in his definitions assumes that the state can specify property rights at will, this thesis is focused on understanding the limitations and extensions of the state's power to specify property rights. These limitations and extensions are not seen as arising from the state's rational calculations of costs and benefits, but from its relative capacity. The question of this thesis, in these terms, is: why and how did the state get what power to specify property rights?

Second, while North recognizes that the state always has rivals (ibid:27), he has not drawn the full implications of this. North identifies rivals as “competing states or potential rulers within his own state” (ibid:27). Competing states, however, and thus the double security dilemma, disappear from the analysis, and the relationship between the state and potential rival rulers is simplified. When there are no other potential rulers “the existing ruler characteristically is a despot, a dictator, or an absolute monarch” (ibid:27). If there are other potential rulers, the existing state is less free and tax-payers will retain comparatively more of their income. As seen in figure three, and the subsequent discussion, above, this thesis offers a more complex conceptualization of rulers and ‘potential rulers’. In addition, this thesis takes relations with other states fully into account.

Perhaps more importantly, Historical Realism differs from North's approach in that it does not ask about democracy and despotism, monarchy or republicanism. A fortifying state, theoretically, can be despotic or democratic, and an alliance-building state can be authoritarian or democratic. What Historical Realism asks about lies at another level of analysis.

Thus, while North's approach is important and insightful, it does not suit the purposes of this thesis.
On Polities

Both neo-statism and neoclassical state theory fall into the state-system image of international relations. Historical Realism draws on, and differs from, the polity image as well, however. It is therefore prudent to explicate the differences between Historical Realism and an approach that falls within the polity image. Yale Ferguson's and Richard Mansbach's book Polities (1996) is the clearest and most forthright actual application of a polity-image theory. The similarities between Polities and the present undertaking are important but perhaps not obvious.

In their book, Ferguson and Mansbach

focus attention on the manner in which individuals have directed and redirected their loyalties (micro components) and have strengthened or weakened polities (macro structures) that were competing for their loyalties (1996:31).

Furthermore, Ferguson and Mansbach argue that politics has always been among polities that have been overlapping and embedded in each other. Politics, in other words, has always been rather messy.

The chief similarity between Historical Realism and Polities lies in the rejection of the terms ‘international’ and ‘domestic’. Both approaches suggest another distinction—that perhaps in most historical instances coincides with the international-domestic distinction. In Ferguson’s and Mansbach’s terminology, competition for loyalty takes two basic forms. One is “competition between and among polities of the same or similar type (peer polities)”, and the other is “long-term competition for loyalties among different types of polities” (1996:46). This corresponds to my distinction between politics among tax-collectors (peer polities) and politics between tax-collectors and tax-payers. In abstract terms this may seem very different. How is it possible to equate the struggle between the
popes and national-states, for instance, with that between states and groups in society? The answer is not very dramatic. Throughout this chapter I have used the term ‘society’ to denote tax-payers. Strictly, this is not satisfactory. For instance, the Church, before the reformation, was a competitor to the developing European states and part of a trans-European group, and yet not a state. It did collect taxes, but it could also sometimes be taxed by the state. The difference between Polities and Historical Realism is that while the former emphasizes loyalties, the latter emphasizes revenue.

Arguably, Polities is a more encompassing approach, allowing for cultural and ideological forces as well as material forces. However, it is as yet difficult to see that the Polities approach can yield causal hypotheses or enable systematic comparisons across cases, a point Ferguson and Mansbach recognize (1996:60). Both of these tasks are important for Historical Realism, and it has therefore been necessary to choose a narrower focus and a higher degree of deductive reasoning.

I hypothesize that my conceptualizations give me better leverage on the issue of political reproduction, than do either neostatism, neoclassical state theory, or Polities. I do not argue that Historical Realism is a better or ‘truer’ approach than either of these other approaches. The latter designation is not applicable to theory, and the former is contingent on the questions asked. What remains for this thesis is to support the hypothesized superiority of Historical Realism in understanding political reproduction. My selection of ‘rival theories’ is certainly limited, and probably biased. This is an undeniable weakness, but one not possible to avoid.
Summary

Throughout this chapter a range of concepts have been discussed. The central concepts are political reproduction, the double security dilemma, fortifying and alliance-building, embedded and disembedded, and functional differentiation and non-differentiation, open and closed, and competitive and non-competitive, in no particular order of importance. It has been argued that political reproduction must be studied with a view to the double security dilemma. Indeed, political reproduction can be understood as the process of solving this dilemma. The double security dilemma implies that states face competition over revenue from different kinds of groups, the central distinction being between those the state can tax and those it cannot. It was suggested that these conceptualizations provide a language with which to approach state political reproduction.

Figure five summarizes the chapter diagrammatically, and shows a possible research process of Historical Realism. First I shall determine whether an inter-state system is differentiated or not. Given this, I determine whether it is embedded or not. For the particular state I am interested in, I determine whether its society is competitive or not, and whether the relevant area is open or closed. I then discuss the double security dilemma and mode of political reproduction following from this. Certainly, one could instead have begun with the embedded-disembedded dimension, or any of the other two. Also, I could have begun with the mode of political reproduction. The lines from ‘functionally differentiated’ to ‘disembedded’ and onward are dotted since, as indicated in figure 3, the configuration ‘functionally differentiated’ and ‘disembedded’ is historically rare or non-existent. I will pursue this argument further in the conclusions of this thesis.
Figure 5. A heuristic map of Historical Realism
Chapter 2: The Grammar of Historical Realism

A set of concepts is not of much value unless there are also some guidelines as to how they can be used in conjunction with one another. Without such guidelines they would constitute, at most, a catalogue, or indeed a dictionary. The purpose of this chapter is to provide these guidelines for the concepts of Historical Realism. These guidelines are rightfully called the grammar of Historical Realism, since they will be as important as the concepts themselves for constructing the theory. My use of the term ‘grammar’ denotes ontology, epistemology, and methodology, and these are the three issues this chapter will deal with.

The grammar of Historical Realism is not as loosely held as the dictionary. In this chapter I will take a number of hopefully clear positions on ontology, epistemology, and methodology. I will present, explain, and defend the position I take, but I will not present, explain, and discard alternatives, unless I judge it necessary for my own positive arguments. The reason for this is the following: there are no ontologically and epistemologically independent criteria for judging the status or truth-value—if indeed such a term can be applied—of ontologies and epistemologies. It is thus impossible, or at least futile, to enter into arguments over these matters, although conversations can be highly rewarding. It is my firm belief that the set of concepts introduced in chapter one can be brought to bear on the questions from the introduction and be used in the construction of a theory, only if they are combined with the following grammar to form a language. But the chapter is not an attempt to make this argument. Instead, it is an invitation to a conversation on this belief.

The chapter is organized in the following way. In the first section I present my social ontology, which is structurationist. I
show how the concepts from chapter one fit in this structurationist ontology. In the following section I take the epistemological position that constitutive theory is a necessary condition for causal theory, and that the two should be considered a dualism rather than a dichotomy. In the third section I take the position, and possibly even dare the argument, that a particular historical comparative method follows from this epistemological claim. In this chapter I also identify reification, retrospectivity or teleology, and periodization as three methodological problems which will cause difficulties, no matter what.

**Ontology**

One conclusion from the introduction and chapter one combined is that, if differentiation of collectivities and the political reproduction of particular differentiations belong to the core of a historical international relations theory, then a top-down perspective on world politics is required. Any bottom-up perspective, any perspective where there are already political formations present, that is, takes the issue of differentiation for granted and thus introduces a bias to the research. On the other hand, a top-down perspective might well be thought to require a clean slate, where no differentiations yet exist. The only possibility, it would seem, is to do what Mann (1986a) did, and begin "from the beginning". The time, skill, and bravery to begin at the beginning is not granted everyone, however. Does this mean that we mere mortals should refrain from studying historical international relations? Are there no valid compromises, where differentiations are in existence, but where these do not bias the research beyond the limit of the acceptable?

To my mind there is a valid compromise situated in the acceptance of the top-down approach itself. With a top-down approach the contents of social ontological categories are contingent upon each other. In other words, no particular differen-
tiation is given, although it is given that there will be some differentiations. Thus neither the state nor anarchy is given, although political formations as well as relations among these are. Similarly, and more obviously, the forms of governance and governees are not known, although we do know that governance, governors, and governees will exist.

In fact, the various possible contents of social ontological categories are not themselves ontological categories, but empirical types. The state, then, is not an ontological category at all, but an empirical type of political formation, just as is empire or chiefdom. As a first step, we could consequently claim that there are only two social ontological categories, and that these are units and structures. Once this has been accepted, we could go on to claim that neither of these two is autonomous. In other words, we could claim that by stating that something is a unit we are thereby implying that there are also structures, and that ‘structure’ is a meaningless—as opposed to merely pointless—concept without units.

The first of these two claims is straightforward. Units and structures, respectively, are the highest abstractions possible of that which can be said to exist and their relationships with one another. Everything can be construed as unit or structure. This is not particularly interesting. As a matter of fact, I could stipulate—but of course never prove—that units and structures are the only two possible ontological categories without thereby causing any major excitement. More important is how units and structures are understood. First, are both units and structures ontological categories, and second, are they mutually exclusive as well as all encompassing?

A great many students of international relations understand structures to be a description of how units relate to each other. Hence ‘anarchy’ refers to the absence of higher authority. It may be that this view of structure ultimately rests on a spatial
metaphor. In anarchy units are spread out on a plane, and none of them are located on a plane above or below the others. In hierarchies there is a top which is more narrow than the base. Structures are seen as patterns of the world. Unit here becomes the only ontological category, since structures must be recognized as the observers’ impositions.

On the other hand, there are students of international relations who understand structures as necessary sequences of events. Structures are not relational but historical, determined sequences of cause and effect. In this view, structure becomes the only interesting social ontological category. Units may be effects of structures, but do not constitute the structure.

In contradistinction to both these views of structure, Wendt (1987) suggests a view of structures as generative. With generative structures he means “sets of internal relations” (ibid:346). That is, structure is that which makes units into units, as such. Without structures units would be incomprehensible and perhaps even unobservable as units. A tract of land may thus still be a tract of land, but it is a state only when the interstate system is included. The essential point here is that “the relationship [among units] itself explains essential properties of each entity, and thus the character of their interaction” (ibid:346). In other words, units and structures do not interact to create certain outcomes. Instead, units and structures are not mutually exclusive: they constitute each other, and neither is reducible to the other although they are analytically distinct.

Where has this brought us, and can we now begin to arrange our Historical Realist vocabulary into sentences, or at least phrases? I have suggested that the social ontology implied by a top-down perspective privileges neither units nor structures, but posits them as mutually constituting. Structures, being internal relations, are thus the principles of differentiation and they can take different shapes. From a top-down perspective, we have no
reason to assume the shape of a structure just because we assume the existence of a structure. Assuming a structure, while remaining agnostic as to its shape, frees us from the need to begin at the beginning. This is the compromise. Units, being collectivities, can likewise have different shapes. At various levels of abstraction they can take the shapes of states, empires, or chiefdoms, or regulative, authoritarian, or liberal states, for instance. At the level of abstraction of Historical Realism, however, they can take only two shapes: fortifying and alliance-building.

Now then, embedded, disembedded, functionally like and unlike, closed and open, competitive and non-competitive, are the various possible shapes of structures, but none of these can be understood, observed, or explained, without at the same time understanding, observing, or explaining fortifying or alliance-building units, and vice versa. For instance, there is nothing in embeddedness that either explains its continuation or discontinuation, just as there is nothing in ‘fortifying-ness’ that explains its continuation or discontinuation. These concepts can simply not be handled on their own. Two questions arise. First, if the concepts cannot be handled on their own, if they can be grasped only in conjunction with one another, does this mean, in itself, that there are necessary links among them? For instance, can we understand ‘fortifying’ only when we also understand ‘disembedded’, or can we understand ‘fortifying’ also when we understand ‘embedded’. Second, what sort of concepts are ‘political reproduction’ and ‘double security dilemma’?

The first set of questions has two sorts of answers. On the one hand, it is an empirical issue, which it is not yet possible to address. Indeed, one of the ambitions of this thesis is to begin to address the issue. On the other hand, there is an ontological aspect involved. By saying that it is an empirical issue, we have already implied that it is at least possible that the generative or constitutive links among structures and units are not necessary.
Does this in turn mean that we must allow for generative effects from elsewhere, or does it mean that there is a degree of randomness involved in the processes? Rather than attempting to resolve this issue here, it will be left for the last chapter. The second question is less complicated. ‘The double security dilemma’ and ‘political reproduction’ are not ontological categories at all. They are instead analytical concepts, which means that they are epistemological categories. They will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

A further issue arises from seeing structures-qua-differentiations and units-qua-collectivities as being mutually constitutive. In short, it is now possible to define criteria for setting temporal boundaries of international systems. Ruggie (1993:152) argues that “modes of differentiation are nothing less than the focus of the epochal study of rule”, and further, quoting Jacques Le Goff, that “la longue durée should be regarded not simply as lasting a long time but ‘as having the structure of a system,’ emerging at one point and dissipating at another” (Ruggie 1986:157). For the purposes of this thesis the word ‘long’ can be dropped, and we can define an epoch—the temporal encasement of an international system—as any given pattern of the shapes of structures and units. Consequently, we can conceptualize transformation as the unfolding of these patterns.

In sum, the social ontology of Historical Realism is structurationist. No particular differentiations are given, but political space is instead viewed top-down. This means that although it is given that there will be structures and units, the shapes of these are not known. The concepts from chapter one, with the exception of ‘political reproduction’ and ‘the double security dilemma’ express the different shapes of units and structures. It should thus be noted that this social ontology is fully compatible with a range of other conceptualizations of the shapes of structures and units. Historical Realism, with its particular conceptualization, primarily determines the level of abstraction.
Epistemology

In this section I shall be concerned with what kind of knowledge Historical Realism might contribute to the IR field. In the IR literature at large it is nowadays common to distinguish between causal theory or explanation and constitutive theory or understanding (Wendt 1998; Ruggie 1998). I shall suggest that this distinction, while crucial, should be seen as a dualism rather than as a dichotomy. More specifically, I shall suggest that constitutive theory is a necessary condition for causal theory and that causal theory makes constitutive theory more interesting. In other words, one cannot have causal theory without constitutive theory, and constitutive theory without causal theory is dull. I will begin this section by showing why constitutive theory is a necessary condition for causal theory. I will then attempt to show that there are no epistemological incompatibilities between constitutive and causal explanations, and finally I will give my reasons for considering constitutive theory without causal theory dull.

Unless a study begins at the beginning of history, whenever that may be, some form of periodization is necessary. Explicitly or implicitly, in developed or rudimentary form, intentionally or by default, a study which does not include all human history is based on a periodization. I have elsewhere argued that any periodization in itself biases the research (Hall 1999). My argument was that Hendrik Spruyt’s study (1994) on the rise of the sovereign state, while avoiding the methodological error of retrospection, failed to appreciate that the universe of types of units, from which one type emerged victoriously, was in itself an outcome of an earlier generative-selective sequence. This earlier generative-selective sequence yielded more than one type of political formation, of course, which rhymes ill with Spruyt’s general argument. This failure in appreciation, which in no way invalidates Spruyt’s substantive argument—it only limits its applicability and range—followed from his particular periodiza-
tion. The argument can be generalized. Causal theories, such as Spruyt’s, are dependent on the existence of certain conditions. These conditions are those specified in a constitutive theory— that is what constitutive theories do.

When the causal arguments later travel to other periods— other periodizations— as they are bound to do in comparative historical studies, this new period is inevitably reified, since the conditions of the causal argument must come along for them to make sense at all. But certainly, it cannot be known beforehand whether these conditions characterize the new period or not. And without a constitutive theory we cannot even inquire into their presence. At the very least, then, we need constitutive theories to decide whether a causal theory is applicable or not. If we lack a constitutive theory we have to assume that the conditions necessary for a valid application of our causal theory obtain, and, again, without a constitutive theory we can have no basis for any such frivolous assumptions.

Furthermore, there is no inherent incompatibility between constitutive theories and causal theories. It is true, as Wendt (1998:106) argues, that “the ‘independent variable/dependent variable’ language that characterizes causal inquiries makes no sense, or at least must be interpreted very differently, in constitutive inquiries”. As Wendt goes on arguing, however, this does not mean that they have different epistemologies (ibid.). They both rely on a correspondence theory of truth. That is, the ultimate test for both constitutive and causal theories is that they convincingly make sense of the world as we observe it. This might in itself be a problematic epistemological position; what is important is that it is the position adopted in this thesis, and that both constitutive and causal theories are consistent with it. However, a theory cannot be both constitutive and causal at the same time. For instance, it is not possible to argue that structures and units constitute each other, and at the same time
argue that structures cause units to be or behave in a certain way.

The social ontology discussed above would seem to be an ontology for a constitutive theory. In order to conceptualize causality I thus need to go beyond my ontology. I need concepts that can stand as cause and effect, or as independent and dependent variables. As they cannot fit into my ontology, I make no claim as to their existence. They are instead analytical concepts, or ‘as if’ concepts. For Historical Realism these concepts are the double security dilemma and political reproduction. Proceeding ‘as if’ the double security dilemma and political reproduction in some sense exist, we posit them as cause and effect and effect and cause. Thus, with our constitutive concepts we identify changes and continuities, and with our causal concepts we explain them. Thus, we can observe that a fortifying state has changed its mode of political reproduction to become an alliance-building state instead. We could never argue that changes in the structures caused this, but we could say that a change in the double security dilemma caused it. The only problem here seems to be that I would have to posit a direct relationship between ontological concepts and ‘as if’ concepts. These ‘as if’ concepts must then be understood as emerging from my ontological concepts. Crucial for my attempt at constructing Historical Realism, then, is that emergent concepts, such as the double security dilemma and political reproduction, are accepted.

The last point I shall try to make in this section is that constitutive theory without causal theory is unsatisfying, and my argument revolves around comparisons. When Ruggie (1998:871) explained what constitutive rules are, as opposed to regulative rules, he pointed to the difference between traffic rules and the game of chess. Without traffic rules there would still be traffic, but without the rules of chess there would be no game of chess. The rules of chess are the game of chess, so these are
constitutive rules. Now, we can certainly compare the game of chess to another board game, such as go, for instance, using only the constitutive rules as comparative dimensions. Most likely we would gain some insights into the essence of chess by this comparison, particularly if we were already familiar with go. If, however, we allowed ourselves to ask a causal question, such as ‘why did chess player A and go player P pursue defensive strategies?’ and found that both player A and P had unstable holds over strategic areas, I submit that we would have gained important knowledge about both chess and go, as well as about strategy.

Of course, I readily admit that this last point is entirely dependent on a degree of similarity between go and chess, and perhaps even on a reification. However, the reason for both my ontological and emergent concepts to lie at such a high level of abstraction is exactly this. They can compare across history without reification.

In brief, then, Historical Realism is not intended as a generalization- or law-producing theory. It is not intended to produce statements or hypotheses of the kind “fortifying states will become alliance-building states when X and Y, but not when Z”. Historical Realism is instead intended to make comparison without reification possible, and its epistemology is geared to this purpose. It does this, or rather it will do this, by providing both a constitutive theory and a causal theory. These two sorts of theories are not inherently incompatible, although they must be kept apart.

**Methodology**

The first thing to be noted is that the methodology for Historical Realism and for this thesis must differ, since the methodologies for constructing and employing a theory cannot be the
same. The methodology for this thesis is broadly interpretive, but in an unorthodox way. I have drawn a set of concepts from the relevant literature, sometimes changing their meanings. I have further attempted to make clear what sorts of concepts these are by specifying which role they fulfil in an explanatory undertaking. In the next part of this thesis I will investigate whether the concepts can be developed by being submerged in received history, and, at the same time, whether they at all speak to the aims of Historical Realism as stated in the introduction of this thesis. Thus, I do not use concepts to draw attention to certain features of history, in the tradition of, for instance, Clifford Geertz (e.g. 1973) or Reinhard Bendix (e.g. 1978; see also Skocpol 1984), as much as I use history to draw attention to certain features of my concepts. Herein lies the unorthodoxy. I will juxtapose the three histories with one another, not to search for ‘differences and agreements’ (Skocpol 1984) among them, but to learn about the concepts.

Since the epistemology of Historical Realism is dual, it is necessary for its methodology to be dual too. The constitutive and causal elements of Historical Realism require different methodologies. They will be discussed in turn.

The methodology of the constitutive part of Historical Realism is ultimately meant to search for patterns. The narrative is controlled by the ontological concepts, and tries to answer ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions. It is, in other words, descriptive and interpretive. This, however, does not mean that comparisons do not play a role. It was suggested before that, with a constitutive theory, time-periods can be considered as systems. It is consequently possible to compare epochs in order to contrast and highlight similarities and differences among them. Since the controlling concepts are both quite abstract and narrow, the risk for reification is not daunting. The result of this methodology would amount to a ‘constitutive map’ of world history, or
perhaps a taxonomy of systems. This ‘constitutive map’ sets the perimeters of, and tempers, causal theory.

The methodology for the causal part of Historical Realism should be analytical-comparative (Skocpol 1984:374), where political reproduction is the dependent variable and the double security dilemma the independent variable. With the method of agreement we compare constitutively different epochs that nevertheless exhibit some interesting similarity in the dependent variable, and with the method of difference we compare constitutively similar epochs that show some interesting difference in the dependent variable. Certainly, we can also compare constitutively similar cases that differ in the dependent variable, and any other way around, although some of these variations might be less interesting. What we can learn from these comparisons is not something like Y causes X (given Z). Rather, we can, hopefully, identify in which ‘direction’ various configurations of our ontological elements push. Thus, we are not searching for the causes by which a fortifying state becomes an alliance-building state, but instead we are looking for which sort of double security dilemma we can infer from these various configurations, and which elements in double security dilemmas motivate which sorts of political reproduction. Possibly then, we will be able to say something like ‘in embedded and functionally similar systems, it is difficult for a fortifying state to remain fortifying, unless competition is weak and the cost of closedness low’.

**Summary and Conclusion**

The primary argument of this chapter has been that Historical Realism should contain both a constitutive and a causal theory. In fact, the constitutive theory is a necessary condition for determining the applicability of the causal theory.
The majority of the concepts from chapter one—embedded, disembedded, functionally like and differentiated, competitive and non-competitive, open and closed, alliance-building and fortifying—all belong to the constitutive realm of theory. They are specifications of the two ontological categories structure and units. The double security dilemma and political reproduction, on the contrary, are emergent concepts, and belong to the causal realm of theory. As such, they have no real-world reference, but emerge from the analyst’s constitutive specification of the world. The degree of determinancy in this relation of emergence is left open.

No argument to the effect that this meta-theoretical foundation for Historical Realism is the only possible one was made. It was merely suggested that with this meta-theoretical foundation, comparison without reification is possible, primarily because the concepts lie at a rather high level of abstraction, without thereby—as the next part of this thesis attempts to show—being devoid of meaning.
Part II: History
CHAPTER 3: POLITICALLY REPRODUCING JAPAN

This chapter is about how Japan—having been a fortifying state for at least 250 years—became an alliance-building state, as it was forced into an inter-state system characterized by embeddedness and processes towards functional differentiation. I do not offer a historical narrative, as this need is well served by a large literature. Instead, my ambition is to give content to the range of concepts that constitute the Historical Realist language. The disposition of the chapter is therefore thematic rather than chronological.

Fortifying Japan

The year 1600 is a watershed in Japanese history. Up until that year there had been either warfare, or unstable rule by a Shogun more or less loyal to the emperor. In the 16th century a number of warlords had attempted supremacy, but not succeeded entirely. When the last of them died, a new war broke out. This new war ended with the battle of Sekigahara.

Tokugawa Ieyasu won the battle of Sekigahara, but his victory was not overwhelming. His opponents could retain approximately 40 percent of the total land of Japan (Beasley 1990:5). The state which Tokugawa created—in which the emperor played but a ceremonial role—was a fortifying state. This state, which we will call Bakufu—after the name of its government—for short, seems to have had two main goals: to preserve the peace, or the stability of the system, and to preserve the agricultural economy on which it was dependent (Crawcour 1997:6; Sansom 1974:215). The Bakufu did have the ability to block society from upsetting the balance, and it did manage to preserve the agricultural economy. Towards the middle of the nineteenth century it was failing in both aims, however. The intensification of foreign contacts after the 1850s finally put an
end to Bakufu’s blocking power, and the Japanese state either had to become alliance-building, or follow the course of China. But what were these blocking abilities, and where did the absence of alliance-building policies come from?

A Double Failure of Taxation

The Bakufu failed in taxing Japan to its capacity. It failed in taxing the feudal lords at all. There were no tax transfers from the domains to the Bakufu—all Bakufu revenue came from Tokugawa lands. The Bakufu also failed in taxing its own lands to their full capacity. It is not that the farmers were living a life in luxury—far from it. The potential tax-base, however, was larger than the actual one. During the first decades of the Bakufu this was not a problem—the Tokugawa lands were rich. Soon, however, the rice-economy constituted a relatively smaller share of the total economy, and the Bakufu ran into serious fiscal difficulties. This, combined with the rather precarious ‘balance of power’ between the Bakufu and some of the other lords, prevented any alliance-building developments, even had the will existed. The next few paragraphs will elaborate somewhat on each of these failures of taxation, and speculate on their causes.

The political system Tokugawa Ieyasu developed after he had consolidated his victory has been called the baku-han system (Hall 1971:160). This indicates that the system consisted of the state (Bakufu) and somewhere between 250 and 300 feudal domains (han). These domains were of different sorts. The lords who had been on the losing side in Sekigahara but who retained their domains were called the Tozama. The Bakufu did not tax—in an ordinary sense of the word—the domains. Tax transfers were primarily from farmers to lords, and not from lords to overlords (Howe 1996:58). In fact, as long as the feudal lords—or at least the Tozama—did not begin any major military build-ups, they were left more or less alone. They had their own administrations and laws, and were not accountable
to the Bakufu in most matters of policy. Why was this? The answer lies in the kind of victory Tokugawa had won, and is quite simple. It would have been too expensive to tax the other lords. As it was, particularly in combination with the inaccessible geographical location of Japan, the expenditures for military purposes were kept very low. The samurai was transformed from a warrior to a much less romantic bureaucrat. For the Bakufu to tax the feudal domains would have required a much higher military and bureaucratic presence in the domains. As this was not needed for external defense in any case, the costs in relation to what could have been gained must have been deemed prohibitive. Thus, a balance of power of sorts was struck. The Bakufu left the domains alone, by and large, and the domains obeyed the few directives the Bakufu did give. In terms of the tax-collector - tax-payer contexts discussed in chapter one, then, it would seem that Japan was closed and competitive, and that this gave few incentives for the state to become alliance-building.

The Bakufu also failed in taxing its own lands as much at it could have, however. It did tax the rice farmers to the verge of violent resistance—and sometimes beyond—but it did not tax the increasing numbers of increasingly wealthy merchants and other non-agricultural producers. Although the explanation for not taxing the domains goes a long way in explaining this too, it is not sufficient. Why would the Bakufu not tax its own lands to the extent that it could end the power stand-off with the Tozama once and for all? There seems to be a lack of rational explanation for this. In the words of W. G. Beasley: “Taxing merchants—apart from some small imposts on the guilds and on urban housing—was apparently beyond the regime's competence” (1990:12). Although the reason behind this failure of taxation may elude us, we can quite easily see its consequences for the budget of the Bakufu.
The Japanese economy was, of course, agricultural. Rice was used as ‘currency’. For instance, taxes were paid in rice. However, with pacification and urbanization after the wars, demand for luxury goods rose. In addition, one of the measures the Bakufu used to control the domains was to demand that the lords kept a residence at the capital, and that they spent half their time there. This led to an increase in consumption, as well as a market for services. Indeed, while the lords collected their revenue in rice, all their major expenditures, except the ‘salaries’ of the samurai, were to be paid in money. It was thus necessary to organize a market for the transfer of rice to money. This market was established in Osaka, but was under Bakufu control. With economic growth and subsequent economic diversification, the agricultural economy as a proportion of the total economy shrank. Moreover, agricultural technology had improved and there were increases in the yield of land. Taxes were calculated on old estimations of the yield of a given plot, however, and not the actual yield. This encouraged farmers to diversify into growing crops for the market, which in turn contributed to diminishing the proportion of the rice-economy. A further consequence of the economic growth and agricultural improvements was that other prices, relative to the price of rice, rose. The samurai, who received their ‘salaries’ (actually stipends) in rice, thus became relatively worse off, and the merchants relatively wealthier.

For the Bakufu, as well as for the domains, all this led to severe fiscal problems. The way in which the domains attempted to solve their fiscal problems conflicted with the attempted solutions of the Bakufu. The way in which the non-Bakufu lords tried to solve their fiscal problems was by diminishing their dependence on Osaka as a market. They developed local markets in which they sold their rice revenue and expanded production of goods both for ‘domestic’ consumption and for ‘export’. New channels of economic interaction thus came into being, which the Bakufu, again, could not tax. In fact, what was de-
veloping was an integrated and diversified ‘national’ economy, with a state that could only tax some rice producers. In sum, then, the rice economy on which the Bakufu was dependent was being supplanted by a money economy over which it had no control.

Success in Blocking

The Bakufu was not just another feudal domain, however. It was more than the first among equals. The Bakufu was able to block groups in society in primarily three areas. First, it prevented the lords of the domains from growing too rich and powerful. Second, it controlled foreign contacts, and, third, it froze the structures of society. The next few paragraphs elaborate on these three areas of blocking.

The Bakufu had two principal means of keeping the other lords in check. The Bakufu could order other lords to “carry out expensive public works, like flood control, road-building, or repairs to one of the Shogun’s castles” (Beasley 1990:5; cf. Sansom 1974:20). The other was through the system of sankin-kootai. Sankin-kootai, or ‘alternate attendance’, meant that each lord was required to spend half his time in the capital Edo. This was a major financial burden (Beasley ibid.). The sankin-kootai system was intentionally a hostage system that functioned to secure the obedience of lords. Conrad Totman argues that the system “became the single most important mechanism of daimyo control, remaining intact and little changed until 1862” (1993:108). To keep a residence in the capital and to travel back and forth with a large retinue was of course costly. Not only was the hostage system a way of securing obedience, then, but it “also placed a heavy burden upon the wealthy Tozama, who were expected to keep up a grand style” (Sansom 1974:20).

That Japan was more or less closed between 1600 and 1854 is perhaps the most well-known aspect of the history of Japan.
Whereas the closedness of Japan should not be exaggerated—there were trade-links with both the Dutch and the Chinese—it is safe to argue that there was little opportunity for anyone to forge alliances with outside power-holders. Moreover, the dangerous waters surrounding Japan, as well as the hostile coast-line, made communications rather costly. Thus, it was fairly easy and cheap for the state to oversee and control outside contacts. The Japanese state was not created as a by-product of external war, as Tilly argues the European states were (1992).

When the Bakufu was established, Tokugawa was eager to develop overseas trade (this paragraph draws on Hall 1971:186-190). Foreign traders, however, preferred the ports of Kyushu to that of Tokugawa’s capital Edo (later Tokyo). The Bakufu, then, turned instead to regulation of ports and licensing of merchants. Moreover, for various reasons the hostility towards Christians increased, missionaries and Japanese Christians were executed, and in 1624 the Spaniards were expelled from Japan. The English had given up Japan on their own initiative the year before. In 1635 all Japanese were forbidden to travel abroad and from returning once having gone, and in 1639 the Portuguese were expelled from Japan. The remaining foreigners—the Dutch and the Chinese, neither of whom had missionary ambitions—were confined to a few designated and controlled ports. Written material from Europe—Dutch learning—was censored. In sum, then, the Bakufu had a near-monopoly of foreign contacts.

The social order of Tokugawa Japan was heavily regulated. The Bakufu instituted a division of the population into classes, which were not transcendable (Sansom 1974:29; Hall 1971:177-181). While the earlier social order was neither fluid nor the least egalitarian, it was not without flexibility. The most powerful warlord before the Tokugawa victories, for instance, was originally a farmer. This warlord—Toyotomi Hideyo—
shi—initiated the freezing of the social order by forbidding farmers to possess arms. He also forbade farmers to move from their lands. The Bakufu continued and strengthened these policies, and codified a recognition of four major classes samurai, farmer, artisan, and merchant. John W. Hall argues: “[M]uch of Tokugawa legislation was directed then to the clarification of the boundaries between the different classes and the efforts to define behavior appropriate to each” (1971:178). In short, entry into the samurai class was closed off, farmers could not easily leave their lands and were not to abandon cultivated soil, and artisans and merchants were by and large confined to designated areas within the towns. A range of laws prescribed their behavior in these areas, including style of clothes, for instance. In the words of Sir George Sansom: “In principle no man could rise above the class in which he was born, for it was the purpose of the rulers by legislating against change to found a self-perpetuating state” (1974:29).

Summary
Through these measures the Bakufu managed to reproduce itself for about 250 years, and it is not possible to know if it had been able to continue to reproduce itself for an even longer time, if the Western powers had not insisted on being let in. In the light of this it would be absurd to claim that the Japanese state was weak, just as it is difficult to assert, given the difficulties of taxation, that it was strong. The Bakufu was neither strong nor weak. It was a fortifying state.

Why, then, was the Bakufu a fortifying state in the nineteenth century? In which way did this maximize revenue? The answer lies in the competitiveness, the closedness, and, at least poetically, in the outcome of the battle of Sekigahara. The Bakufu—or the Shoguns—did dominate Japan. Pacification after the centuries of warfare could proceed without major resort to violence. In addition, Japan was fairly inaccessible, and thus relatively easy to close. Military expenditures—for both internal and
external use—could be kept low. But this was true only to the extent that the Bakufu did not interfere overly much in the affairs of the other lords. Such interference—which would have been necessary with an alliance-building strategy—would have been very costly. A balance of sorts—without arms race—was struck. In this balance, any new weight added was bound to have dramatic effects.

At this point one may fruitfully wonder if Japan really should be analyzed as a state, or rather as a hegemonic inter-state system, or even a ‘Dark Age’. If the Bakufu could not tax the other lords but only hinder them from growing too powerful, is this then not more of a highly interdependent system than a state? This notion is far from absurd, and might well be pursued in another context. However, on balance, more speaks for treating Japan as a state than as a system.

A sufficient reason for treating Japan as a state is that there was a self-perception of Japan as a political, social, and cultural unit. Not only did everybody recognize the emperor as being the emperor of Japan, but in dealings with China and Korea for a millennium and more, preceding the Tokugawa Bakufu, Japan had been a unit. It was Japan that on a number of occasions invaded Korea, and it was Japan that sent emissaries to the court in China. It was Japan, in name if not really in terms of soldiers, that prepared to defend against the invasions of Kublai Kahn. Undoubtedly, there was an idea of Japan going back for centuries If this means that medieval Europe, for instance, also should be analyzed as a state, so be it, although the section above on the blocking powers of the Bakufu showed that these went far beyond what any medieval European magnate could hope for as far as Europe was concerned, as opposed to a part of Europe. Nothing like a monopoly on ‘foreign’ relations or the sankin-kootai system was ever achieved in medieval Europe. The difference between a state and a system of states, then, seems largely to be one of degree rather than kind.
The Inter-State System of East Asia in the Nineteenth Century

The purpose of this section is to argue that the nineteenth century world, for East Asian purposes, was a world order being replaced by a hegemony. I thus need to show that inter-state relations were embedded in economic structures and that there were processes towards functional differentiation.

Karl Polanyi (1957) has argued that sometime in the nineteenth century the world economy disentangled itself from inter-state politics, and became autonomous. In this section I carry this one step further and argue that politics was, or became, embedded in economics, at least for East Asian purposes.

Throughout history different cultures have been able to agree on forms of interaction that will enable them to trade with one another, without damage to the honor of either (Curtin 1984). The Chinese and, mainly, the British, who wanted to trade with them in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, were no exception. Europeans who wanted to trade with the Chinese had to do so in Canton, where they could not live outside a designated area, located outside the city walls; and at certain times of the year they had to leave China altogether (Curtin 1984:242). The ‘Canton system’ (Howe 1996:77) fitted with the Chinese system of tributary trade. By the 1830s, however, it no longer fit with the British ideology of free trade.

Beginning at least in the eighteenth century, Great Britain had been buying, mainly, luxury goods from China. The balance of trade between China and Great Britain was negative for Britain, and there was an outflow of specie to China (Chan 1990:20; Borthwick 1992:96, graph 2.5). To the rescue of the British came the sharply growing addiction to opium in China around the turn of the century. With unofficial blessings, opium
was exported from India to China, and the silver flows became reversed. Fairly soon this destroyed the Chinese economy, and the social consequences were looked upon with concern by the imperial court in Beijing (Chan 1990:21). The Chinese state attempted to ban the trade in, and use of, opium, while the British insisted—in the name of free trade—on their right to sell opium in China. The Opium War broke out (1839-1842), and China was defeated. The result of the Opium War was a set of treaties that has been called “the treaty port system” (Beasley 1989:259). In the words of Beasley:

The nature of the treaty port system in the nineteenth century derived principally from the commercial policies of Great Britain. These, in turn, reflected a shift from the eighteenth-century doctrines of mercantilism to those of laissez faire, linked with the coming of the Industrial Revolution (1989:259).

The content of the system reflected the priority of access to commerce. Thus the British, according to the treaties, had “full access for British trade to specified Chinese ports; a low fixed tariff on goods entering and leaving those ports; and legal protection for British merchants in the form of extraterritoriality” (ibid.). This, then, is a forthright example of an embedded inter-state system. The whole purpose of the Opium War, as well as the content of the following treaties, was to remedy the British adverse trade-balance, and to make it possible for British merchants to trade in China. The political relations, including war, between China and Great Britain were not autonomous from economic, or commercial, relations, then, but were in fact determined by them. Was the East Asian inter-state system also functionally differentiated?

The few treaty-ports in China, and later in Japan, can surely not be enough to base an argument to the effect that the constitutive dimension of sovereignty was eroded. While it is probably possible to construct such an argument, it does seem a
bit trivial and—just that—constructed. Extraterritoriality is significantly more important. Yet, the argument here is that the East Asian inter-state system was functionally differentiated, and that this had little to do with extraterritoriality, which was just the icing of the cake. The key is rather that another state both defined the functional dimension of sovereignty, and governed part of what had earlier been the jurisdiction of the state, namely tariffs and some other aspects of trade. The next section shows how this worked in the Japanese context.

**Changing Japanese Mode of Political Reproduction**

Japan became incorporated in the system of treaty ports after 1854. In most history books this is seen as a key component in the explanation of the Meiji restoration of 1868. That is probably correct. In this thesis, however, the Meiji restoration is little more than incidental to the shift in the mode of political reproduction brought on by the 1850s. Indeed, the Meiji restoration is an effect rather than a cause of the processes towards a shift in mode of political reproduction.

The opening of Japanese trading ports created numerous problems for the Japanese state. What these problems amounted to was a stop to the blocking powers of the Bakufu. With the new economic opportunities the class structure broke down, and new wealth and new poverty were created. The earlier measures of blocking the Tozama lords became insufficient, when some of them profited from the new possibilities. However, the remaining competitiveness—which the fortifying state had not stamped out, only managed—in conjunction with the embedded and functionally undifferentiated inter-state system allowed Japan to become alliance-building. This section attempts to show this.
The problems of the Japanese state were partly new and partly old. They can be discussed in terms of the double security dilemma. Bakufu and Osaka control of the economy, already shaky, was further eroded by the economic developments caused by participation in international trade. Although all the treaty ports were located in Tokugawa land, and foreigners were kept away from Osaka, Japanese merchants bought up agricultural products, such as raw silk, and sold them directly to foreign merchants. This raised the price level in Japan to the extent that domestic craftsmen could not compete for raw materials, and imports rose. According to the treaty terms, Bakufu could not restrict either the outflow or the inflow. A balance-of-payments deficit ensued (Howe 1996:80-83; Francks 1992:24-28). All Bakufu attempts at monopolizing or regulating trade were thwarted by the foreign powers (Crawcour 1997). For instance, an agreement of 1862 stated that the Bakufu was not allowed to limit “the classes of persons who shall be allowed to trade with foreigners” specifically including feudal lords (quoted in Beasley 1989:290). In addition, tariffs were set at five percent, for both imports and exports, and these were to be subject to no further taxation.

A second economic problem was that the already problematic fiscal situation was made worse by the very opening of Japan. According to Howe (1996:82), “ports, guns, ships and similar outlays” increased from 5 to 70 percent during the years 1859 to 1866, as a proportion of total Bakufu expenditures. To finance this, Bakufu relied on currency debasement, which of course helped cause inflation.

In addition to the Bakufu fiscal problems and relative loss of control, the Tozama lords grew more powerful, and numerous samurai grew quite poor. Already before the opening of the ports, the Tozama lords had actively developed their domains’ ‘export’ sectors in order to be less dependent on Osaka and Edo. The opening of the ports increased their markets, and they
went on to develop manufacturing industries. More seriously in the short run, many samurai had become poor, as an effect of the general price rise. The samurai received their stipend in rice instead of in cash, and rice was the only commodity that did not increase in price. Moreover, many younger samurai—some of whom later became the new Meiji leaders felt that the dignity of the emperor, as well as that of Japan had been affronted by the treaties and their consequences (Beasley 1990:36). The upshot was several acts of terrorism against both the Bakufu and foreigners. On some occasions the Bakufu was not able to punish the offenders, who were protected by Tozama lords, and instead Western warships carried out the punishment.

Thus, the Bakufu could no longer block ‘civil society’, whose members had forged an implicit alliance with foreign powers. When Bakufu yielded to these foreign powers, the relative power of non-Bakufu groups increased, and Bakufu could not take action against these groups, both because of weakness and the ‘protection’ of the treaties. This allowed anti-Bakufu and anti-foreign sentiments to grow and become organized—primarily by lower-rank samurai of a modest age—particularly in the two Tozama domains of Satsuma and Choshu. The Bakufu, afraid of how the now stronger leadership of the domains would react to harsh measures, did little in effect to hinder this. Again, warships of the Western powers demonstrated that they would accept no terrorism against foreigners, and no reneging on the treaties. After this the anti-groups changed: leadership was taken over by higher ranking samurai, and the focus was the Bakufu, not the foreigners. Indeed, Satsuma began to send students abroad, and imported weapons. The new ‘philosophy’ was to use Western methods to overcome the threat from the Westerners. When the Bakufu sent a military force against Choshu without bringing the campaign to a successful end, it seemed obvious to all lords that a major civil war threatened. To avert this Satsuma and another domain drafted a proposal that meant that the
Shogun should resign and become a lord amongst others, and a council responsible to the emperor should replace the Bakufu. This happened, and the Meiji Restoration was a fact, with only a little fighting following. In his letter of resignation, the last Shogun wrote that “[N]ow that foreign intercourse becomes daily more extensive, unless the Government is directed from one central authority, the foundations of the state will fall to pieces”, and the new government declared that “[O]wing to the recent high prices, the rich get ever richer, while the poor are driven to dire destitution. All this comes from the incompetence of the Shogunate” (quoted by Howe 1996:89).

For Japan to use Western methods to protect itself against Westerners, as well as survive as a unit, both economic and political changes were understood to be required. Not only did the foreign threat not go away just because the new leadership accepted trade, it was by no means certain that all the feudal lords would accept the new government. The Tokugawa clan was still by far the largest land-owner and had the highest number of military men at its disposal. Moreover, of Japan’s hundreds of domains, only a very few participated in the new government. Politically, Japan had to become centralized and economically it had to become industrialized, then. In the process of centralization and industrialization, Japan changed mode of political reproduction. This change, consequently, must be understood neither as an intentional outcome nor as a functional necessity. It was the unintended outcome of acting on firm beliefs about how to respond to a double security dilemma.

While Japan was commercially and agriculturally developed, it had little or no industrial experience and a highly decentralized capital accumulation. The problem facing the government was thus that industrialization could not be expected to take place from below, in particular not since infant industries could not be protected by tariffs. Furthermore, the new government had
actually no domains of its own, and thus no revenue source. The emperor’s court had had no land whatsoever, but subsisted on stipends from the Bakufu. Since the new government did not emanate from any particular clan or domain, as opposed to the Bakufu, it was without economic means.

The problem of securing revenue for the government was solved through the negotiated dismantling of the domains—with the former lords still in place as governors—a tax reform to the effect that taxes were collected in a uniform manner and in cash rather than kind, and a military creating a conscript army rather than feudal samurai. In addition, all restrictions on movement and choice of occupation were removed (Howe 1996:90). With the dismantling of the domains revenue was ensured, and with the tax reform the total amount of revenue was increased. This was the primary means of the military build-up and of industrialization. At the same time the government undermined the power bases for potential opposition groups.

With the new revenues the state initiated a program of industrialization. In order to increase investments a network of banks was created and savings were encouraged. Still, however, the state accounted for between 40 and 50 percent of total investment in the period 1868-1910 (Jones et. al. 1993:104). Crucially for later developments, the state did not keep the industry thus created, but sold it off, often at discount rates. In addition, it was realized that for the economy to advance further and for Japan to achieve a measure of security, more exports were necessary (Duus 1984:134p). Furthermore, as Japan could hardly compete with the new territories of Australia and America, for instance, in agricultural production, it was felt that Japan should compete in manufactured goods. By the late 1880s the structure of Japan’s international trade had shifted. From being an importer of manufactured goods and exporter of raw materials, Japan began to export value-added products and import foodstuff and raw materials such as coal and raw cotton.
(Sheridan 1993:41). In the period 1886-1911 Japan experienced the world’s fastest growth rates in exports ever, and by the outbreak of the first world war she was a significant industrial power (Jones et. al. 1993:105).

Politically, Japan went through the same transformation as many of the Western states. The original Meiji leaders were being replaced from the 1880s on with a leadership more dependent on popular support. In 1890 the Diet opened, and this increased the influence of political parties and various pressure groups. Japan was of course not able to solve her problems of national economic growth, or perhaps rather meet the demands of domestic groups, as some of the Western powers did by raising tariffs. The treaties stipulating extraterritoriality and fixed tariffs were still in effect, and Japan was not strong enough to force a revision. Instead, ‘protection’ had to take the form of subsidies and government support. Instead of a command economy, however, the Japanese state did this through a tightly controlled, but private, financial sector, and an oligopoly of seven trading houses, which were not to compete with one another. Other building blocks of the new alliance-building state were a national education reform, with mandatory schools, and the construction of a physical infrastructure.

Thus, the treaties, which were an expression of the embeddedness and functional differentiation of the inter-state system, gave Japan no jurisdiction over tariffs. Therefore, Japan developed an alliance-building mode of political reproduction.

Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that Japan was a fortifying state that came in increasing contact with an embedded inter-state system in the process of developing functional differentiation. Fortifying Japan could not withstand both this emerging
hegemony and rival groups within Japan, while maintaining the fortifying mode of political reproduction. By managing to shift the mode of political reproduction, however, Japan solved the double security dilemma. The following factors were crucial to the shift of mode of political reproduction.

Tokugawa Japan had been fairly good at being a fortifying state. There had been no civil war or major political upheavals for some 250 years, after centuries of violence. Being a fortifying state, however, it kept the lid on competition, rather than exterminating it. This had two consequences. First, added weight to the balance was bound to have dramatic consequences. When the foreign powers arrived in greater numbers and with military back-up, both the state and the competitors had to revise their objectives and priorities, and the balance of power shifted sufficiently. Second, however, since there were alternative authority structures and bureaucratic or governmental know-how, when the center fell, chaos did not follow.

The inter-state system the Japanese met was embedded in industrial capitalism. This was fortunate for the Japanese, for it made the Western powers disinclined to annex Japan, China, or Korea, territorially. Again fortunately, the Japanese economy fitted rather well in the division of labor that was in development. Although they certainly had some financial difficulties in the beginning, rather soon the new Japanese leaders realized that a major program of industrialization was necessary, and that this could take place only through a very active state. The reason for this, of course, was that there were tasks of government that others performed, but Japan did not. While the European powers, as well as the U.S. could resort to tariffs when the world economy declined, the Japanese were unable to do so. Thus the alliance-building state was created, and Japan reproduced politically.
CHAPTER 4: POLITICALLY REPRODUCING REPUBLICAN ROME

The argument of this chapter is that Republican Rome had an alliance-building mode of political reproduction from its beginning in the late sixth century B.C. until the end of the second century B.C. Thus, the change in mode of political reproduction does not coincide with the traditional dating of the 'fall of the Republic'.

This chapter spans approximately half a millennium. Evidently, the argument cannot be given the form of a narrative. Instead, this chapter is thematically organized by the language of Historical Realism. In the first section I attempt to identify the double security dilemma of the Republic from the fifth century until the second. I argue that the alliance-building mode of political reproduction could solve this double security dilemma.

In the second section I argue that the double security dilemma changed character beginning from the second Punic War (219-202 B.C.), and increasingly so during the end of the second and beginning of the first century. The alliance-building mode of political reproduction ceased functioning as a result, and the possibilities were two: a change to the fortifying mode of political reproduction, or failure in political reproduction. The third section of this chapter is an outline of the argument that relations between the Roman empire and Germanic tribes were embedded, and that the changes in the social structure of northern Europe can be seen in the light of this. A final section of the chapter summarizes the arguments made.

Inevitably, I make considerable injustice to the great variation contained by the period with which I shall be concerned. Moreover, it will be recalled that modes of political reproduction are always becoming rather than being. 10
The Roman Republic

The Roman Republic was founded in 509 B.C., as the native population of the town revolted against its Etruscan kings. The fundamental social structure consisted of a ruling aristocracy (patricians), farmers, a few trades people, and relatively few slaves. Freed slaves and a large number of the farmers were closely bound to patrician families, or clans, in clientage. Those who were not, as well as the trades people, formed the plebeians. Rome was a relatively small city-state, surrounded by Etruscan city-states, Latin city-states, and various non-urbanized tribal peoples. Within 300 years Rome was to become one of the most powerful states in the western Mediterranean, and within 400 years without competitor.

The Republic's Double Security Dilemma

How should the Republic's double security dilemma be characterized? The four relevant dimensions discussed in chapter one were whether the state-society relationship was competitive or not, whether the relevant territory was open or closed, whether the inter-state system was embedded in an economic structure or disembedded, and whether it was functionally differentiated or not. These four dimensions can be discussed in turn.

The issue of whether Rome's territory was open or closed is the easiest and most straightforward. It was open, and this did not change for the entire period. There were no geographical, cultural, major linguistic, or 'ethnic' barriers to exits and entries of people or goods. Admittedly, land transport was very costly relative to sea transport, and it would therefore have been feasible for the state to oversee at least bulk trade. As Rome's territory grew, however, more and more ports would have had to be monitored. The point is that we might expect that the cost of extracting revenue would rise steeper than the revenue itself, at least as concerns revenue from trade. In economic jargon, the marginal utility of revenue extraction would be diminishing.
At no point in its history can the Roman Republic be characterized as anything but competitive. Patricians and plebeians struggled over seats in the Senate and the magistrates. The Roman nobility had to make room for nobles from allied or confederate cities, and, increasingly after the second Punic War, peasants had to compete with large land-owners for public land—conquered or not. Characteristic of this competition was that not until the first century B.C. was the issue about the form of rule, but rather about share in it. Furthermore, not until the land problems of the second and first centuries were the conflicts really about revenue. That is, not until late in the Republic was the state’s form and revenue base as such the object of conflict. This is highly important, for our purposes. Although it is easy to identify lines of conflict among groups in Roman society, none of these groups presented themselves as alternatives to the Senate, until late in the second century. The Republican state, in form as well as function, was added on to as a result of the resolution of various social conflicts, not replaced. Writes S. E. Finer: “[...] the Roman constitution was a patchwork that had evolved piecemeal over many centuries as a consequence of social convulsions” (1997:396).

Two arguments point to the disembodied nature of the interstate system the Roman Republic existed in. First, there seems to have been no significant economic specialization, implying a division of labor, that gave offprint in the relations among states. There is no evidence of attempts at developing comparative advantages in production of goods or services, with monopoly and force rather than efficiency being the final arbiters of commercial success. I would thus argue that it was not commercial relations among political formations that determined how they related to each other, but instead military strength and success and strategic position that determined commercial relations.

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The second argument pointing to the disembedded nature of the west Mediterranean system is that the strategic behavior of units must be characterized as power balancing rather than bandwagoning. By applying these terms I merely want to say that the various powers, such as the Etruscan city-states, the Macedonians, and the Carthaginians, for instance, formed temporary and shifting alliances with one another throughout the period 600-200 B.C. The point is this: while it may be argued that a balancing strategy should be expected in order to counter the disruptive growth of new competitors in an embedded system, we should at least expect the alliances to be relatively stable. Shifting alliances would in themselves disrupt an embedded economy, and it would be less costly to pursue a bandwagoning strategy. Had the system been embedded, in short, we should have expected fewer wars and more stable alliances. Prima facie, therefore, we have no reason to consider the system embedded.

My argument that the inter-state system the Roman Republic was a part of was disembedded must be clearly distinguished from the argument best made by Moses Finley (1985). Finley argued that there was no separate economic sphere in the ancient world, and that we therefore cannot apply the tools of economic analysis when studying this period in history. Neither ‘capitalism’, ‘intervention’, nor ‘laissez-faire’ are applicable concepts, in his view. This may be correct or not. Either way it does not affect my argument that the political formations were not derivatives of the economic system. Moreover, I am not arguing that the entire west Mediterranean was a disembedded system. Writes Scullard:

The Greek cities of southern Italy had formed part of the capitalist system of the Hellenistic world [...]. They exported much grain to Greece, while Etruria and Carthaginian Sicily and Sardinia supplied the Punic cities of Africa, which concentrated on com-
merce and the production of wine, olive oil, and fruit for the western markets (1980:342-1).

Capitalist or not, Rome, first, did not participate in this system, and second, assisted in the destruction of it (ibid.; Cunliffe 1994) without thereby threatening itself. So, whether this Hellenistic system was embedded or not is a somewhat different issue that will not be addressed here. However, obviously Scullard's views on the economy of the western Mediterranean are not universally accepted (Finley 1985). Be this as it may, my argument should not be overstated. All I am claiming is that the early Roman Republic was not part of an embedded inter-state system.

Finally then, the issue of functional likeness or differentiation. From a simplistic point of view it is evident that at least the west Mediterranean sub-system was not functionally differentiated prior to the second Punic War. Who, or what, would have been the unit which performed what tasks of government that none other performed? Although relations among Rome and its closest neighbors as well as, presumably, Carthage and its neighbors were not equal in any sense of the word, the overall picture of the Mediterranean system is of another hue. Rome, Carthage, Macedon, Egypt, Syrian, and so forth and so on, did not exist each in their own vacuum, but neither were affairs within the totality determined by any one of them. True, in the late fourth century Alexander the Great did manage to build a short-lived empire. However, Alexander's doings seem to have had little effect on the west Mediterranean. The west and the east were not sufficiently 'interdependent' for Alexander to matter. Wrote Polybius, quoted by Scullard (1980:324): "Hitherto the world's history has been, so to speak, a series of disconnected transactions...but after this epoch [the second Punic War] history becomes a connected whole". In any case, the empire did not survive Alexander, and by the turn of the century a range of competing states existed.
That whole, which Polybius wrote of, was centered on a Rome which had fused the Mediterranean into one system in which Egypt, Greece, and other areas in fact were Roman protectorates. Certainly, Rome had expanded already before the second Punic War in various ways. Some territories were annexed and incorporated, particularly those on the Italian peninsula, while others were provinces, taxed but not directly governed. The point here is the following. The second Punic War marks a historical turning-point of gigantic proportions. Before, the Mediterranean inter-state system was loosely bound and not functionally differentiated. No political formation had extra-territorial jurisdiction, and the constitutive dimension of sovereignty was fully established for all major units. At most, it can be argued that the system was two-layered. At one layer there were empires and mini-empires that among themselves were functionally undifferentiated. At another layer, these empires were the nodes of functionally differentiated sub-systems. From the perspective of Rome, itself such a node, then, the inter-state system was undifferentiated. After the war, processes that were to lead to differentiation set in. It is of course not possible to identify a particular date for the transformation, but it occurred during the second century B.C.

To sum up so far, the Roman Republic’s double security dilemma, up until the second century B.C., looked like this: its territory was open, making it costly to forcefully increase revenues from its tax-payers. The state had no significant competitor, but those groups that in essence made up the state competed among themselves. The wider world in which Rome existed was neither embedded in an economic structure, nor functionally differentiated. Not much of a dilemma, one might think. However, the combination of disembeddedness and functional non-differentiation, of course, constitutes a ‘classical’ anarchical system. War, or the possibility of war, would not have been negligible. Here, indeed, the double security dilemma
looks rather familiar to any observer of the Cold War: while preparing to defend against another polity, any state runs the risk of antagonizing and alienating its own society, and finally to be destroyed by it, rather than by the allegedly threatening other polity.

It is, however, prudent to note that we are not interested in the absolute values of the four dimensions. Recalling that becomings are more interesting than beings, all that we are interested in are how they compare with what happened in the second and first centuries. Indeed, I will argue that three of the four dimensions changed significantly, and that the mode of political reproduction changed as a consequence.

The Republic’s Alliance-Building Mode of Political Reproduction

Before turning to the changes of the second and first century B.C. we have to discuss the Republic’s alliance-building mode of political reproduction. This section does that. The emphasis will be on showing that an alliance-building mode of political reproduction could ‘solve’ the described double security dilemma. That is, the Roman state could both fight and win wars and maintain its relationship to society.

There is no need to discuss formal governmental institutions or the specifics of policies to show the Roman Republic’s alliance-building mode of political reproduction. My whole argument hinges on seeing the Republic—with tongue-only-half-in-cheek—as a ‘military-agricultural complex’.

The Republic’s first century in existence was far from harmonious. The two main issues of contention in what is usually called ‘the struggle of the orders’ were plebeian political participation and the lack of land. The issue of plebeian participation was resolved towards the middle of the fourth century by the incorporation of the plebeian elite into a new nobility consisting of
patricians and these leading plebeians. The land—and debt—problem, however, was a recurrent issue and is indeed key to the whole history of the Republic, and it is through this we can see the state's alliance-building mode of political reproduction.

Rome's army was made up entirely of its propertied citizens. As opposed to the various Greek city-states or Carthage, Rome did not use mercenaries in its army. Two magistrates—the censors—counted the population every five years, and determined into which class each citizen belonged. The different classes were to provide certain number of soldiers, equipped at their own cost and according to a certain regulation. The urban poor—the proletarii—had no right or duty to join the army. Now, for various reasons the Roman economy declined in the fifth century B.C. (Brunt 1971:29), and this is whence the self-perpetuating logic began. Small land-holders, unable to subsist on their farms, went into debt, and land began to be concentrated in fewer hands. With Rome's success at war, however, came territorial conquests; some of this land was distributed to the poor, and colonies were established. Thus, not only was the perennial land problem continuously but temporarily mollified, but the pool of peasant-soldiers was replenished. Certainly, the conquered land, which by law belonged to the Roman people, was not distributed in an egalitarian manner, and throughout the centuries there would be quarrels over how the public land should be allocated. However, by actually distributing some land, the state was able to mobilize enormous proportions of the population for military projects. And of course, these military projects were needed in order to mitigate the hunger for land. Referring to W. Harris, Oakley (1993:28-29) suggests that 29 percent of all citizens (adult males) were enrolled at the height of the second Punic war (213 B.C.), but that even in 225 B.C. and 295 B.C. 17 and 25 percent of the citizen body were enrolled, respectively. Brunt (1971:13) claims that "half the men between eighteen and forty-six qualified for legionary service
The median for the last two centuries of the Republic would, according to the calculations Oakley depends on, would be 13 percent. Furthermore, Oakley (ibid. 15-16) notes that during the 150 or so years between 415 and 265 B.C., Rome was at peace for 13.

Thus, the state of the Roman Republic had little arbitrary power. The spoils of conquest could not be monopolized by the state elite, and the peasantry had a weighty weapon in the form of withholding martial services. This ‘popular’ power could not be blocked by the state. Rather, the state could, and did, mobilize vast proportions of its population, and did this at least in part in order to secure its survival. Its infrastructural power must be deemed extensive, while its despotic powers were certainly limited.

Unwittingly, Brunt summarizes my argument well, although I would contend that the same logic obtained also in the century before, albeit with less force:

for nearly a century and a half (287-134 B.C.) Roman energies were mainly directed to conquests abroad, and the colonization that ensued from these conquests helped to assuage popular discontent. (1971: 59)

Summary
The Roman Republic was faced with a constant threat of war from other political formations. There was no designed inter-state order in which rules of conduct were defined and upheld by someone with a preponderance of power or authority. There was no functional differentiation. In addition, Rome, as well as most of the other city-states on the Italian peninsula, subsided on agriculture and was by and large self-sufficient. This means that, in principle, territorial conquest would be the ma-
jor, if not single, way in which a population growth could be accommodated. War, as such, would be the most feasible way of gaining wealth. The very simple implication of this is that Rome needed an army. Two alternatives were theoretically available: a citizen army or a mercenary army. A mercenary army, however, would have required a significant surplus which was not forthcoming, and, as I argued, the costs of revenue extraction were steep. The alternative was to have a citizen army. This required the consent of the citizens as well as a sufficient pool of citizens to draw upon. Both the consent and the numbers were nurtured by the state’s continuous mobilization of the population in a steady territorial expansion. Obviously, a comparison with the principles of Spartan and Athenian polities would have yielded three very different solutions to similar problems.

Changes in the Double Security Dilemma and Mode of Political Reproduction

Beginning after the Roman victory over the Carthaginians by the end of the third century, and increasingly so during the second century, the world changed in fundamental ways. By the first century B.C. the world was both functionally differentiated and embedded in an economic structure centered on Rome. Moreover, competition within Rome had intensified, and particularly after 133 B.C. there was competition between the state and groups in society, not only among groups that constituted the state. The alliance-building mode of political reproduction became unworkable, and the Republic’s mode of political reproduction changed. This change was a necessary condition for the autocracy of Caesar, Augustus’ principate, and ultimately the Empire. However, it was in no way inevitable that Rome would become a fortifying state. It might as well have gone under, or at least sunk into historical obscurity.
The New Double Security Dilemma

The first and most dramatic consequence of the Roman victory over the Carthaginians at Zama in 202 was that the inter-state system was firmly set on the course towards functional differentiation. Carthage was not annexed, occupied or otherwise incorporated in the developing Roman empire, but Rome did curtail its independence: "Carthage handed over all but ten of its longboats (war vessels) and all its elephants, and pledged itself to pay 10,000 talents over 50 years and not to make war on others without Rome's agreement" (Le Glay, Voisin, and Le Bohec, 1996:88, emphasis added). In the next few decades Rome fought a number of wars, particularly in Greece against Macedon, but did not actually annex much territory. The policy of annexations did not begin until the mid-140s B.C. The terms of peace with the various adversaries were similar to those given Carthage, however (Scullard 1980:244pp). In short, Rome began to arrange the inter-state system to its own liking, and whether this was a primarily defensive strategy or not is beside my point. Rome had acquired, and used, the capacity to influence or determine the relationship between and among other states. From time to time, and increasingly so during the period 146-30 B.C.—when the Mediterranean was practically a Roman lake—Rome actually annexed conquered states. As a look at a historical atlas will confirm, however, most of these annexations occurred only in the last century B.C. (Times Atlas of World History 1993:86). The point is this: the Roman empire cannot be seen only as an empire. It must also be seen as a part of a functionally differentiated system. Thus, the tendency in the IR literature to contrast inter-state systems and empires must be resisted. In ancient history, there is no clear break between anarchy and hierarchy, even if we accept the peculiar notion that the Roman empire, at the height of its territorial expansion, was a bounded system unto itself. There was a period lasting for some 150 or 200 years in which the Mediterranean and its surroundings constituted a functionally differentiated inter-state system.
Another consequence of the Roman victory in the Second Punic War, as well as the following wars, was that the economic structure of Rome changed. Immense wealth, from indemnities and booty, was accumulated, trade increased, and most importantly, the agricultural structure changed. What had largely been small-scale subsistence agriculture became a large-scale, slave-based latifunda agriculture. These changes did not immediately embed political relations in the system-wide economy. By the last century B.C., though, Rome’s relations with other polities were clearly embedded in the still largely agricultural economy.

Several factors combined to change the character of Roman agriculture dramatically. Obviously, Rome acquired much land after the end of the Second Punic War. Those polities that had sided with Hannibal during his long campaign in Italy were stripped of their land. This land, as usual, was not distributed in an egalitarian manner. Great concentrations of land, latifunda, developed. Seeing that cereals could now be imported from overseas, these lands were given over to grazing or olive and wine growing for the ‘export market’. During the long war, moreover, many small farms had been utterly destroyed, and the capital required for rebuilding was not available to peasants. As the latifunda used slave labor, furthermore, there was no need for day-laborers. The upshot of it all was that cereal production declined, olive, wine, and meat production rose, small farms were replaced by large latifunda, and the country-side was emptied of free people, while the cities—particularly Rome—was flooded by poor and property-less citizens. It is important not to exaggerate this development. The Roman army was still made up of propertied citizens.

A second important consequence of the Roman victory march in the Mediterranean coastal areas and the concomitant increases in economic opportunity was the rise of an elite within the
elite and the rise of a new wealthy class. The elite within the elite—the oligarchy—did not necessarily have the same interests as the rest of the senatorial class, and the new wealthy class—the knights—did not necessarily have the same interests as the senatorial class as a whole. The knights had not gained political rights—i.e. access to office—on a par with the new wealth, and the oligarchy could monopolize higher office thanks to its capacity to solicit the support of the masses of urban poor. Moreover, the victories abroad necessitated standing armies and longer-term governorship of ruled territories and leadership of the armies. These positions were in general very lucrative. In addition, the soldiers had come to rely on their commanders not only for booty, but also for land allocations upon discharge. This created ties of loyalty between soldiers and commanders, rather than between soldiers and the state as such. Thus, competition among groups, and even individuals, in society increased, and both the oligarchy and the knights implicitly questioned the prevailing senatorial order.

It is not yet possible to argue that the Roman Republic's relationship with other states were embedded in the economic system. Although the inter-state system had become functionally differentiated, it would be ludicrous to claim that either the form of all these states or their relations with one another derived from the economic system. The Mediterranean and European world was not created anew over some decades. What we can argue is that as Rome—the eminence in the functionally differentiated system—was changing, we would be advised to look for new political forms and new kinds of relationships in the rest of the system. And these new forms and relationships might well be embedded in the Roman-defined economic system. In the next section of this chapter I will attempt to do so.

What, then, was the double security dilemma in this period? Rome was the pinnacle of the relevant world, and even if it was
plagued by internal conflict, neither the term ‘double’ or the term ‘dilemma’ seems appropriate. However, due to its overseas commitments Rome, as already mentioned, had to maintain standing armies and to prolong command over these armies. Successful commanders became powerful individuals in their own right, both because of the loyalty of their troops and because of the opportunities to accumulate wealth. In short, commanders acquired independent power. To disengage from overseas commitments, however, would have been to go against the interests of both the knights and the oligarchic elite within the senatorial class. This was the dilemma: by upholding the system that various elites at home had come to depend upon, thus dampening internal conflict, the state gave individuals—always connected to or actually from one of these elites—indeed power sources.

In retrospect it is easy to see the second century B.C. as a period of increasing tension, heading towards crisis. The ruling elite was more fragmented than ever, and with the increased complexity of the economy the stakes were higher in any potential conflict. At the same time, armies had begun to give loyalty to individual commanders rather than the state, while the cities were being swamped by property-less mobs, driven there by the concentration of land on ever fewer hands. Towards the end of the century the first of the three great conflicts that marked the beginning of the end for the Republic erupted. The two young aristocrats Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus attempted to reverse the land concentration problem by re-allocating the public lands and by establishing new colonies. They were both killed in mob violence in Rome. The two other great conflicts were the slave uprisings and the misnamed Social War (91-88 B.C.). When these three great conflicts were over, so was the alliance-building mode of political reproduction.
Fortifying Mode of Political Reproduction?

The single most important event that caused the fortifying mode of political reproduction was the consul Marius’ decision in 107 B.C. to allow volunteer proletarians into the army. The depopulation of the countryside and the latifunda economy made it impossible to fill the ranks with propertied peasants. By paying and equipping proletarians Marius was able again to meet the requirements. If peasants-soldiers had earlier been loyal to an able commander, and this had posed a danger, this new army brought the danger to new heights. What the armies became, in fact, were private retinues. On several occasions during the next 70 years Roman armies would march on Rome to further their commanders’ ends. Caesar’s crossing of Rubicon might be the most famous instant, but Marius himself, as well as Sulla, had their soldiers intimidate and even slaughter citizens and senators of Rome.

With these private armies, competition rose to new heights, as Marius and Sulla, and then Caesar and Pompey, and finally Augustus and Antony, fought each other in ‘civil wars’ with Roman armies. There was no state able to raise an army to withstand these warlords, for the armies were raised by them. The state had handed over its army to individual outstanding leaders, no longer able to outcompete them. The alliance-building mode of political reproduction had ceased to function, and Rome would either go under or change mode of political reproduction.

The victor of the last civil war of the Republic was Augustus. He established the fortifying mode of political reproduction, and he did so by tying the army to himself, rather than to the more and more ephemeral state. A range of reforms were instituted by Augustus. First of all he made the life of a soldier into a career. When a man joined the army, he did so for 20 years, instead of being discharged once a particular campaign or war was over. A set financial structure ensured the regular payment
of salaries—in coins with Augustus’ face on them—and of a reliable pension upon discharge. Officers were not in command of troops for a long period of time, and field command became just a normal step in the political career, instead of a career in itself. Commanders thus did not have the opportunity to undermine and take over the armies’ loyalties to the person of Augustus. Finally, Augustus established the Praetorian Guard, some 4,500 troops garrisoned in Rome or its immediate vicinity, under his own direct command. What Augustus did with these army reforms is clear to see: he made it impossible for anyone else to acquire military means. In other words, he blocked the possibility that others would be rulers.

This solved the new double security dilemma. A rationalized army that relied on the ruler for its income tamed the power ambitions of other individuals of the elite, in so far as there were limits to what could be achieved. Competition for power would henceforth take place within the structure guaranteed by the imperial army. Wealth, although still certainly very important, lost its capacity to create alternatives to the state. It was blocked by Augustus’ monopolization of violence. The dilemma was still there of course: wealth was accumulated, the urban proletariat remained, overseas commitments could not be ignored, individual generals would become unwholesomely popular with the troops; but none of this constituted a strong enough threat for decades to come.

Summary
The history of the last two centuries of the Roman Republic can thus be summarized very briefly by looking at the development of its army. What had been a citizen army, continuously but temporarily mobilized by the alliance-building state, became first a politicized army, prone to become a tool for ambitious leaders in the disappearing state, then developed in effect into a number of private armies, loyal to warlords. The surviving warlord finally monopolized the army, and had the acumen to
definitely professionalize it, and tie it to himself rather than to
the state. He thereby became the fortifying state, and could
more justly than any later French king claim that “l’état, c’est
moi”.

A Note: The Northern Fringes of the Roman World

Above I argued that we would be well advised to look for new
forms of political formations and new sorts of relationships as
the inter-state system shifted to functional differentiation. The
argument of this section, more sketched than developed, is that
new political formations and relations did develop as Rome
pushed north and north-east, and that these were embedded in
the Roman-defined economic structure. In anthropological
terminology, I will suggest that the Germanic transition from
tribe to chiefdom, and eventually state, as well as the Roman-
Germanic relationship, were embedded in the economic struc-
ture. This argument rests on a particular interpretation of the
limes—the borders of the Roman empire—and a consequent
understanding of the political-economic geography of Europe.
It does not rest on any particular argument concerning the
causes of Roman expansion.12

What were the frontiers of the Roman Empire? C. R.
Whittaker argues that the Roman Empire stopped where it did,
not for strategic reasons, and not by accident, but for the mar-
3, 4). Rivers, as a glance in any historical atlas will reveal,
formed an important part of the Roman borders in Europe
“not because they presented barriers to barbarians but because,
as Curzon saw, ‘they connect rather than separate’, creating
essential routes of access” (ibid:99). The Roman armies, accord-
ing to Whittaker, could not live by the land they conquered,
particularly not during the first years of occupation. They had
to ‘import’ supplies, and the frontiers—or rather what has been conceived of as frontiers—followed supply routes. Moreover, Whittaker, as well as Barry Cunliffe (1994) outline Europe beyond the frontiers in terms of economic zones (Whittaker 1994:122-25; Cunliffe 1994:440-46). That is, there was never a sharp borderline between the Roman Empire and ‘free Germany’, clearly discernable in terms of culture and political-economic organization. Rather, between the system of forts—the frontier—and free Germany there was a zone of about 200 kilometers which Whittaker calls “Romanized Celtic area-buffer zone” (1994:123, figure 34). In the Roman Empire, there was “money and market economy”, in the Romanized zone, “market economy and some money use”, and in free Germany, “money and marketless economy (perhaps moneyless markets)” (Whittaker 1994:123). These classifications are less important than the political structure that evolved in free Germany as a result. From free Germany Rome imported slaves and exotic wares such as amber and rare hides, while the Germanic peoples received weapons and silver and gold coins in return: luxury goods.

Archeologist Lotte Hedeager argues that “Roman luxury goods took a central place in the development of a new social system through their function as prestige goods. [they] represented the elite’s monopoly of alliances and long-distance connections” (1992:156). In the old social system land was owned by the tribe and redistributed annually amongst the members of the tribe. Status was acquired through bravery in raids (Cunliffe 1994:428). The new prestige goods—and this kind of goods by-passed the Romanized zone—Hedeager argues, “were active as creators of rank, and in legitimizing the construction of a new elite” (1992:174). These new elites were led by warrior-chieftains who surrounded themselves with war-bands which cut across tribal affiliations. The link between prestige goods and a political formation based on the war-band is, in the words of Hedeager (1992:175), that
the prestige goods system too must be very expansive in order to obtain the necessary economic bases for that expenditure which is demanded in order to maintain supply. One must expect, as a result, great physical mobility, a community marked by war and conquest, which is exactly what the archaeological evidence had indicated from the end of the ERIA [early Roman iron age] through the whole of the LRIA [late Roman iron age].

From the chieftains and war-bands, kingship and vassalage developed as this new social structure became institutionalized.

Thus, the argument that northern Europe from the first century B.C. was embedded in an economic structure does not imply that European affairs were determined by the Empire’s need for slaves (Anderson 1974)—although this may well be true—nor does it mean that the “Roman state was little more than a committee for managing the common affairs of the rulers of the legions” (Mann 1986a:279)—although this too may well be correct. Instead, it means that the political-economic formations that developed, and the politics of the consequent inter-state system, were a function of the economic geography. The changes in free Germany, with the new principle of social differentiation and a new basis for internal hierarchy, are directly traceable to the economic interactions with the Romans.

**Summary and Conclusion**

The Roman Republic faced the archetypal International Politics double security dilemma from its birth until its victory over Carthage in 202 B.C. It had to be prepared for war at all times, and to be so forced the state to make concessions to the overwhelmingly agricultural population in terms of political
participation and land distribution. By making these concessions the state continuously managed to mobilize significant resources for war-making purposes, thereby securing the land needed for future mobilizations. Not entirely seriously I called this system a ‘military-agricultural complex’. With the increasing scale and scope of the victorious Roman military operations, however, the inter-state system was becoming functionally differentiated. This, together with the inflow of wealth and the increase of economic opportunity, led to a new form of competition in Rome. Not only did new powerful elites rise, but particular individuals in these elites began to implicitly question the authority of the state. Due to the politicization and then privatization of the army, this amounted to an alternative to the existing state. After some decades of civil war and chaos, the winner of the last round of civil war managed to tie the army to himself, and the fortifying mode of political reproduction was established. Five hundred years of the Roman Republic’s history can be summarized in the development of its army from a peasant-soldier army mobilized by, and loyal to, the state (alliance-building mode of political reproduction), via a number of politicized and privatized armies loyal to successful warlords (chaos), to a professional army loyal to one supreme warlord (fortifying mode of political reproduction).

In this chapter I further argued that, at least from the perspective of the Germanic tribe at the fringes of the Roman empire at least, the inter-state system was embedded in an economic structure. The fundamentals of this structure was a trade of slaves and exotic goods for luxury items. The inflow of luxury goods into ‘free Germany’ had dramatic effects on the tribal societies, in which new warrior elites developed. These new warrior elites depended on continual warfare and expansion for their political reproduction, and it was from these that the hierarchical kingdoms of the migration period stemmed.
In recent years the Middle Ages have become somewhat of a battle-ground for IR theorists. Neorealists (Fischer 1992), sympathetic critics of Neorealism (Ruggie 1983), critical theorists (Hall and Kratochwil 1993), constructivists (Hall 1997; Ruggie 1993), and Marxists (Teschke 1998), in addition to Spruyt who may well represent the neo-neo synthesis, have debated both causal and constitutive aspects of the Middle Ages. In this discourse the Middle Ages have come to mean the period from the 11th to the 14th centuries; and the six hundred years preceding the economic upswing of the 11th century, the ‘coming of power’ of the Church, and the expulsion of the various invaders, are, perhaps wisely, left alone. Even recent historical sociologists and economic historians (Mann 1986a; Hall 1986; Tilly 1992; Jones 1987; Abu-Lughod 1989), who in one way or another have addressed issues of European historical development, have a tendency to gloss over this truly formative half-millennium, or more, of Europe’s history. Ferguson and Mansbach’s Polities (1996) as well as Burke’s (1997) The Clash of Civilizations are exceptions in that they each contain material on the Early Middle Ages. Hobson (1997:279) is on the right track when he, in his ‘world-historical-sociological’ research agenda, proposes—and in note 13 promises—a study of how the state has been shaped by and has shaped “multiple power actors/forces within the sub-national and international spheres from AD 500 to the present”. Praiseworthy as these excursions are, they are insufficient to counterbalance the heavy focus on the High and Late Middle Ages. Thus, in addition to being yet another venue for developing the vocabulary and grammar of Historical Realism, this chapter is a humble attempt at (re)introducing a lost half-millennium to IR.13

Much of interest to Historical Realism happens in the period AD 400 to 900. The inter-state system goes from functionally
differentiated to un-differentiated, and then back again. Likewise, what had been an embedded system becomes disem-
bedded, only to be embedded yet again, albeit now in another economic system. High competition and openness give way to closedness and low competition, only for competition to rise again, but now in closed formations. States have fortifying modes of political reproduction, but towards the end the fortifying ‘presides’ over a range of alliance-building political formations. It is, in short, a dramatic period well worth the attention of IR scholars.

In this chapter I will argue that Late Antiquity passed over into the Early Middle Ages as the Roman fortifying state failed in reproducing itself by not being able to block rival wielders of power in society. These rival power wielders were a little later to create dysfunctional fortifying states. The fortifying mode of political reproduction could not solve the double security dilemma of the sole remaining state, and feudalism ensued. Feudalism signaled the return to functional differentiation and was, moreover, embedded in the depressed economic system of the 8th and 9th centuries.

**Rome’s Failure in Blocking**

As in the end of the last chapter, we have to begin with an understanding of what the Roman limes actually were. If we insist that they were distinct borderlines, crossed by growing amounts of barbarians, increasingly with a view to settlement, our understanding of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages will not escape the traditional bottom-up view which is the following: The Roman Empire fell and was replaced by a number of barbarian successor kingdoms, which in turn were replaced by the Carolingian empire, and then the Middle Ages proper began. If instead we posit that the limes were frontier societies, a very different story unfolds. This is the story of the
failure of the fortifying imperial government to block groups,
of both ‘Roman’ and ‘barbarian’ origin, from usurping power
and resources, and of the expansion of the frontier society geo-
graphically to include more and more of the imperial
hinterland.

Two analytically separate developments are crucial in
understanding the beginning of this story. First, starting already
in the second century, it had become increasingly difficult for
the imperial government to collect the taxes required for main-
taining the army. The reason for this was not necessarily a de-
cline in the economy, but rather the growth, in the whole
western empire, of vast landholdings to which peasants could
turn to ‘protection’ from tax-collectors. In addition, it became
increasingly difficult to fill the ranks of the army, with more and
more of the rural population protected by wealthy and
influential magnates, who in return got labor and a loyal fol-
lowing. Whittaker (1994:240) calls this process “nucleation”,
and he remarks that it gave the landlords a great deal of social
control. Thus, the society was, in Historical Realist terms, open,
in so far as it was possible to escape the state’s demands,
although not necessarily open in a geographical sense. The for-
tifying government did not have the capacity to enforce its tax
and property laws, and as a consequence competition could,
and did, increase. The central government began to lose its
power to block other groups, which this time were the
landlords. A side effect of this process was that the army had to
seek mercenaries—often from across the border—to fill the re-
quired numbers.

The second development, temporally preceding the first, was the
establishment and growth of a frontier society. Ever since the
second century people had moved and traded across the borders
in Europe. The societies which had grown up on both sides
were indistinguishable from each other. In the words of
Malcom Todd:
What is observable on and beyond the northern Roman frontiers, from the third century onward, is the emergence of frontier societies, neither purely Roman provincial nor entirely barbarian. Typically, such societies on long-established frontiers develop a material culture which draws on elements from both sides while remaining part of the dominant political order. When that order weakened or collapsed, a frontier society often remained in being and filled the political vacuum. (1995:147)

From these societies recruits for the armies were drawn, and some of these recruits would rise to become generals and military overlords. Others, perhaps from beyond the frontier society, would be brought into the empire as federate armies to replace the diminishing numbers of Roman peasants.

Particularly towards the fifth century, these two developments combined, and the landlords would become warlords, and the warlords, landlords. With the declining presence of the Roman army, the landlords would have to arm their retainers, and the federate leaders would be given land in payment, and sometimes made Roman governors over ‘their’ areas. Thus, Whittaker makes it credible that both the Frank Childeric and his son Clovis—who founded the Merovingian dynasty and the Frankish kingdom—were recognized as Roman governors. Among these landlords, warlords, and generals, it was not easy to sort out who was what. Writes Whittaker: “Gaul and Germany had turned into a confusion or rival generals, some claiming Roman authority, others Frankish; and some both” (1994:252). Averil Cameron supports this view, and adds an explanation for the prevalence of the “invasion thesis” in the contemporary sources:

But there is enough [archeological evidence] to show that the Roman government was not so much faced with discrete incursions as with a slow but
steady erosion of Roman culture in the western provinces from within. [...] contemporary interpretations of highly charged events such as the battle of Adrianople and the barbarian settlements which followed it are thus liable to mislead if taken too literally. (Cameron 1993:45)

At the battle of Adrianople, in 378, the empire's army was defeated by Goths and the emperor Valens was killed.

The twin development of nucleation and warlord-ism is something which will be very difficult for historical atlases to depict, no matter how many arrows are drawn in a criss-cross pattern across Europe. Anyway, it was in this environment that more and more people moved across the rivers Rhine and Danube, driven there first by Attila the Hun, and later by other Asiatic nomad war hosts, and they added on to it in a quantitative rather than qualitative manner. Certainly, some of them did sack Rome in 410 while a little later others near-destroyed Carthage, but these events are normally not considered to be critical in the fall of the Roman empire! This is rather supposed to have happened in 476 when the last Roman Emperor was deposed by the 'barbarian' Odoacer, himself overthrown by the Ostrogoth Theoderic, neither of which chose to rule through a puppet Emperor but instead called themselves kings. With the view presented here, however, what happened in 476 was "one of the most famous non-events in history" (Cameron 1993:33).

In Historical Realist terms, the Roman Empire did not fall—not even the western half of it—as much as it failed to politically reproduce itself due to its incapacity to block other power-wielders.

Another line of reasoning that indirectly supports the argument made here—that the barbarian invasions were not as much barbarian invasions as a nucleation and militarization—concerns the non-ethnicity of the peoples historical atlases show moving around Europe. Particularly Hedeager (1997) has shown the
motley make-up of the barbarian war-bands, and how various creation myths, then used for legitimizing purposes, have led later scholars astray. The phenomenon is well known in anthropology: often in the process from tribe to chieftain to state, tribal affiliations are initially replaced by new warrior-elites as the source of authority, and these new elites promote the creation of a new mythology or cosmology in order to legitimize their rule (see also Hedeager 1992; Earle 1991). In the words of Peter Brown:

Life would have been easier, in the post-imperial west, if these gentes—these so-called ‘tribes’—had been what modern scholars once imagined them to be: compact, clearly defined groups, nothing less than the ancestors of the modern European nations. In reality, active membership in a specific army—and not ethnic origin in and of itself—defined membership in a specific gens. (1996:59)

This argument by itself does not prove that what was going on in Europe in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages was a process of crystallization, from the top-down, rather than the movements of already existing political formations. It does provide the necessary background for accepting the ‘nucleation thesis’, which indeed is a top-down argument, however.

**New Fortifying States**

Some of these other power-wielders were soon to establish states, both in continental Europe and on the British and Scandinavian fringes. What had been a functionally differentiated and embedded system thus changed into a functionally undifferentiated and disembedded system, and as a consequence those who had been warlords became kings of states. In fact, Edward James (1992:82) believes that “[A]t any one time in this period there
were probably over two hundred kings in northern Europe” (fifth to eighth century).

Whether the European political system of the Late Empire period was functionally differentiated or not can be debated. The Empire itself, of course, was a faltering hierarchy and thus differentiated. The political formations that existed beyond the frontier societies, however, were not ruled in any sense by the Empire either in their internal or external affairs. As soon as they crossed over and became part of the Empire, they were incorporated into this differentiated system, but they were then also part of the Empire. Regrettably, I cannot pursue the issue of system-wide functional differentiation here, due to lack of information. What I can argue, however, is that the whole area that was and had been the western part of the Roman Empire and its fringes became functionally undifferentiated during the course of the fifth and sixth centuries. The situation is similar for the other dimension of international systems. Whereas it is very difficult to show that the Late Roman Empire was embedded in an economic system, it is possible to argue that it became disembedded at the same time as it became functionally undifferentiated. However, the reason for partitioning the Empire in the 4th century, and before that to move the capital, was at least partly economic. It would thus seem that an argument to the effect that the politics of the Roman Empire and its surroundings was embedded is at least reasonable, although it does need further investigation.

What was happening was a twin process, and the logic of it was the relocation of power. As the warlords (now a designation for all those that had military retinues, whether of Roman or Germanic origin) took over all the military functions of the Empire, territorialization set in. Whereas the Empire had, to the best of its ability, provided for its army so that no part of it was dependent on the control of any particular area for its upkeep, the new war-bands had to secure their subsistence base. They
could no longer depend upon imperial reallocation of food. Control of land thus became paramount, and this broke the functional differentiation. It also disembedded the system, in that the only surviving types of political formations were these new warrior-kingdoms, that derived from the disappearance of central authority, and not from the organization of the system-wide economy. Cities, for instance, by and large disappeared, or lost their function as economic and industrial hubs. Thus, it was the melting away of central imperial authority that created the new kingdoms, and these were based on control of land. Jacques Le Goff (1988:23) gives a graphic illustration: “Thus the physiognomy of the medieval west began to be sketched out: a splintering into tiny cells, withdrawn into themselves, separated by ‘deserts’—forests, moors and wastes”.

The warlords with their bands constituted a very small proportion of the total population in what had been the western Empire. Le Goff believes that the barbarian share might have been some five percent of the total population (1988:29), whereas Brown argues that the Visigoths “were never more than one-sixtieth of the overall population” in a certain region (Brown 1996:58). These small portions of the population would, furthermore, not only often have a different religion—pagan or Arian Christians instead of Catholic Christians—but actually different laws. The legal consequences of one’s actions thus depended more on which population one belonged to than in which place the criminal act was performed. The Vandals in Africa purged the whole local elite, but other barbarian kingdoms established themselves parallel to local populations, and lived off them, taking what they wanted but otherwise letting life for the locals go on as it would, not attempting to reorganize their societies. The political reproduction of these kingdoms, then, was based on two fundamentals: continuing warfare to ensure the loyalty of the war-band, and a predatory relationship with local populations—typical fortifying states.
The double security dilemma of these fortifying states was acute indeed. They were all reproduced through violence, which meant that they all had to be prepared for violence at all times. Armies could neither be stable nor large, however, due to high costs of exacting resources, which followed from the antagonistic relationship with groups in society. Being dependent on land, and existing in a world full of other war-bands being dependent on land, the loyalty of any lord's retinue would have been highly important. This loyalty was, as of old in the Germanic society, secured with booty from raiding and war. The more successful warlords would be able to attract more warriors, secure more land, and so on, until rather fewer but larger kingdoms existed. Thus the Burgundian, Thuringian, Suebi, Frisian, various Saxon, and other, kingdoms all disappeared or were assimilated into the Visigoth, Frankish, Lombard, and other, kingdoms.

Moreover, the territories ruled were very much open. For instance, the Visigoths, whose kingdom was centered in Toulouse, were Arian Christians, but the population was largely Catholic. When the Franks under Clovis threatened to attack, the Visigothic kings attempted to ally themselves with the Catholic bishops, hoping to mobilize more resources and soldiers that way. When Clovis heard about this, he and his whole army of about 3000 men (!), converted from paganism to Catholicism. In 507 Clovis's Franks beat the Visigoths in battle. As it happened, however, the Visigoths' Catholic subjects had indeed rallied to the defense of their Arian rulers. Alaric II, the Visigothic king, had issued certain laws, and had called the bishops to council. Thus, my point is not that openness led to alliances which overthrew kingdoms, but rather that the continuous threat and accessibility of such alliances pushed states towards an alliance-building mode of political reproduction that they were unable to institutionalize. The successor kingdoms, therefore, were not viable political formations.
There were some exceptions to this. The Ostrogoths in Italy might have been able to change mode of political reproduction given time. Time was not given, however, as the East Roman Emperor Justinian attempted a reconquest of the Italian peninsula. This attempt failed, and instead a new war-band—the Lombards—settled down in northern Italy. The Visigoths, who had withdrawn to their Spanish hinterland after their defeat by Clovis, might also have changed mode of political reproduction, had not the Muslim advance obliterated their kingdom. Remains the Merovingan dynasty of the Franks, later replaced by their stewards, the Carolingans. The Merovingians did not manage to change the mode of political reproduction of their state(s), but neither were they overthrown by external forces. Rather, ultimately they failed to block other groups in society—in this particular case the aristocratic family that was to become the Carolingans.

**Functional Differentiation and Embeddedness**

**Bounce Back**

During the 8th and early 9th centuries trade had increased in Europe. This had not led to a change of the economic structure, however. Trade was still in essential raw materials—such as metals for arms—and high prestige goods. After the death of Charlemagne, however, this incipient trade fell apart again. In the words of Hodges and Whitehouse, by 840 “the western world was in a state of turmoil, comparable in some respects to the century following Valen’s death at Adrianople” (1983:103). The reason was twofold, and well known. First, the inheritors of Charlemagne had been unable to keep peace with one another. Charlemagne, true to his Frankish customs rather than to some Papal idea of a Christian Empire, had divided his empire among his sons upon his death. Of these only Louis the Pious survived. His sons fought each other for the spoils after
him, and divided the Frankish kingdom among themselves by treaty in Verdun in 843. Charles the Bald ruled in what is today, more or less, France; Louis of Germany in present day Germany; and Lothar in a corridor between them, stretching down into Italy as far south as the Papal state. Second, Magyars, Saracens, and Vikings raided far into the Frankish kingdoms and disrupted what few trade routes existed. As for the Vikings, however, it might be that their raiding was an effect rather than a cause of the diminishing trade (Hodges and Whitehouse, 1983:165). The east-west trade route went through the Baltic sea, and the decline in trade might well have sent the Norsemen off in search for profit.

A third, economic, development during the 8th century depressed trade and influenced political developments. The ‘balance of trade’ between east and west was highly unfavorable for the west. While importing luxury items, it had few goods the east wanted. Slaves seem to have been the major ‘export commodity’, but these were not particularly scarce in the east. As a consequence, there was an outflow of precious metals from the west, which led, in the first instance, to hoarding, and second, to a general shortage of coins. This is the economic system in which feudalism became embedded.

The origins of feudalism does not lie exclusively in the post-Charlemagne economic slump, but also in Carolingian attempts at changing the mode of political reproduction. The economic descent was crucial, but not sufficient on its own. The centuries-old practices of rewarding military followers with land—common already in Clovis’ time—and of bonding these same retainers with oaths of loyalty are both important parts of the explanation of feudalism. This is particularly so due to the economic slump. When supplies of coinage and precious metals were running low, land was sometimes the only way in which retainers could be rewarded. Vassalage and land-rewards had not led to feudalism before, however. It was the Carolingian, and
particularly Charlemagne’s, attempt to penetrate society through vassalage that created feudalism. In the absence of administrators as well as the means to form a corps of officials, the idea seems to have been that the king would have a number of vassals endowed with land, each of whom would in their turn keep vassals, and so on. Each lord/vassal would be responsible for his men, and thus the king would be able to reach the entire society. Thus the state would have changed the mode of political reproduction to better suit the enduring double security dilemma of needing warriors but being compelled to reward them in a way that hollowed out the king’s own power. What Charlemagne had not counted on and what indeed led to feudalism, was that these land endowments would become private property, to be inherited. The development towards inheritability of the fiefs was built into the chain of lord-vassal relationships. In Bloch’s words:

But in order to hold a district firmly they [the vassals] needed also to acquire new estates here and there; to build castles at the junctions of roads; to constitute themselves interested protectors of the principal churches; and above all, to provide themselves with local vassals. This was a long and difficult task which required the patient work of generations occupying the same estates in succession. (1961:193)

In brief, the state headed by successive Carolingan kings was faced with the following double security dilemma. Loyal warriors were always needed to fight against various external enemies. These warriors had to be rewarded, but the supply of precious metals was limited and land-grants became the preferred method of payment: the kings’ ‘household warriors’ did not suffice in numbers to fill the military tasks of the kingdom(s). Since the state needed quite a few warriors, it encouraged vassals to have vassals in turn, and so on. The continuous military need prompted a change in the mode of political reproduction. Since the vassals needed to keep vassals, however, the land-grants
had to become inheritable. The confusion of rotating lordships would have been counter-productive to the ulterior motive of always having a military force ready for mobilization. The problem with this attempt at changing the mode of political reproduction was that the only resource at hand in the political economy was this land that the kings in effect gave away. The successful fortifying state must be able to block other groups and the alliance-building state must outcompete them: with the continuing transfer of the only available resource from the Carolingian state to other groups, neither mode of political reproduction succeeded. The feudal lords, however, competed among themselves as much as with the state, so they never amounted to an alternative to the state, as the Carolingians themselves had successfully done in the 8th century. Therefore, the ever weaker fortifying state co-existed with the highly local lordships, which themselves had alliance-building modes of political reproduction.

Summary and Conclusion: A Comparison of AD 500 and AD 900

Allowing for some chronological imprecision, the ‘formative moments’ of about AD 500 and AD 900 invite a crucial Historical Realist comparison. At both times, a great fortifying state was falling apart, processes of nucleation set in, and the inter-state system was built anew. In AD 500 this led to functional likeness and disembeddedness with dysfunctional fortifying states. In AD 900 it led, instead, to functional differentiation and embeddedness with an uneasy combination of a fortifying state ‘sitting over’—but just barely—a range of alliance-building feudal domains. And I have not even mentioned the Catholic Church, latching on to the success of Charlemagne to become a non-territorial alliance-building polity through monopolizing the only alternative resource:
 legitimization.15 Despite some fundamental similarities there were great differences in the outcomes, then. Why?

From a Historical Realist perspective, there were two crucial differences between the ‘moments’. First, inter-unit politics became embedded in the later period, whereas it was disembedded in the earlier period. Second, competition within ‘society’ was high in the later period, enabling the fortifying state to remain, while it had been fairly low in the earlier period. These two differences made for very different double security dilemmas, and thereby differences in unit political reproduction.

The intra-societal competition around AD 500 was fairly low. The war-bands were tightly knit groups without much internal social differentiation. Leaders could be replaced without changing the structure or function of the war-band. The society from which primary resources were drawn could not compete at all. Competition among war-bands was intense, however. The retainers needed booty, and raiding was the only means of obtaining this. By 900 booty was no longer as readily available, and land became more important. Thus arose competition among retainers, while competition among states decreased. Kings, therefore, could make various alliances and play different social groups off against each other, and met little unified internal opposition. This explains why the fortifying state remained in 900 but disappeared in, or before, 500. Herein lies also the embeddedness-disembeddedness difference. The depression of the western economy left land as the sole material power resource and this meant that alliance-building units would have an advantage, but the requirements of political reproduction compelled kings to give it away. Those who could control and gain from land were local rulers, since local rule required much less in terms of administrative capacity for it to be alliance-building. This explains why local alliance-building units developed in the 900s but not in the 500s.
Part III: Theory
CHAPTER 6: THE THEORY OF HISTORICAL REALISM

In the preceding five chapters I have introduced and discussed the basic conceptual apparatus of a new IR theory: Historical Realism. Figure six lists the most important concepts of Historical Realism, and figure seven gives a synoptic overview of the empirical arguments made.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constitutive concepts</th>
<th>Causal concepts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Embedded/disembedded; Functionally differentiated/non-differentiated; Open/closed; Competitive/non-competitive; Alliance-building/fortifying</td>
<td>Double security dilemma; Mode of political reproduction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: The most important concepts of Historical Realism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Roman Republic</th>
<th>AD 500-900</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Functional differentiation/ Non-differentiation</td>
<td>From rudimentary functional differentiation to full functional differentiation.</td>
<td>From non-differentiation to differentiation.</td>
<td>Differentiation to non-differentiation, and back to differentiation again.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embeddedness/disembeddedness</td>
<td>Embedded.</td>
<td>From disembedded to embedded.</td>
<td>Embeddedness to disembeddedness, and back to embeddedness again.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition/ non-competition</td>
<td>From competitive to highly competitive, fueled by cross-border connections.</td>
<td>Increasing and intensifying competition and challenges to the state.</td>
<td>Competition to non-competitiveness, and back to competition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness/ closedness</td>
<td>From closed to open.</td>
<td>Open for the whole period.</td>
<td>Open for the whole period, but less so for the 6th and 7th centuries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of political reproduction</td>
<td>From a fortifying state to an alliance-building state.</td>
<td>From an alliance-building state to a fortifying state.</td>
<td>From Rome's failure at fortifying state, to fortifying 'Germanic' states, to the alliance-building state of Charlemagne, to mixed feudal polities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: A synoptic overview of the empirical arguments.
In this chapter I will take stock of where Historical Realism has brought me, what Historical Realism implies for IR theory in general, what the weaknesses of Historical Realism are, and where to go from here.

The Argument of Historical Realism and Its Implications for IR Theory

The basic argument of Historical Realism is that states, or political formations, do not continue to exist by default. The long-term survival of any particular state can never be taken for granted. Such groups that the state extract resources from and such groups that compete with the state for the extraction of these, and other resources combine to confront the state with a double security dilemma. Failure to respond to this double security dilemma will lead to the downfall of the state in question. And yet, throughout an ever changing history, something recognizable as states persists both as a form of political organization and as particular instances of this form. States manage to reproduce themselves politically in enormously varied contexts. Historical Realism begins to engage the questions of how and why this is so by making a distinction between constitutive and causal theory.

Four dichotomous dimensions make up the context in which every political formation must politically reproduce itself. A state can politically reproduce itself in two different ways: by connecting to groups among its tax-payers in order to increase its own resources or by blocking other would-be rulers from building up power-bases. The choice depends on the nature of the double security dilemma, which in turn is decided by the configuration of the four dimensions. Thus, constitutively I argue that world history displays a variation of configurations, but not an unlimited variation. Causally I argue that different
configurations yield different causal mechanisms, but that there are only two different effects of these mechanisms, at this level of abstraction. I use ‘double security dilemma’ as a conceptual device for capturing these causal mechanisms.

The theoretical argument of Historical Realism, at this point, is more about historical IR theory than about political reproduction or international systems. I have argued that since different constitutive configurations yield different causal mechanisms, there can be no such thing as a general causal IR theory. All IR theory that claims to be causal must be seen as having a historically fragmented and contingent applicability. Therefore each causal IR theory must also clearly specify its criteria of applicability: “this theory is valid given conditions x, y, and z”. The problem, of course, is that much IR theory builds empirical content into these conditions, and this is why they appropriately can be called ahistorical. Historical Realism, on the contrary, allows for controlled variation in the constitutive configuration, and it can thereby clearly specify its criteria for application of causal theory. Furthermore, Historical Realism is decidedly a theory for historical comparisons. Not only does it enable hypothesis-testing in configuratively similar situations, it may also provide explanations of superficially anomalous outcomes by showing that the configurational contexts were discontinuous and that ‘similar’ causes therefore did not yield similar effects.

Historical Realism is a theory for historical comparisons in an even more fundamental sense, however. In this thesis I have argued that the Roman Republic, for most of its existence, had an alliance-building mode of political reproduction. Had I analyzed a contemporary industrialized welfare-state I would, in all probability, have found that it too had an alliance-building mode of reproduction. I have not thereby argued that there are very many similarities between the Roman Republic and, say, contemporary Sweden. The ‘alliance-building mode of political reproduction’ has no, or very little, absolute value. It is only
meant to stand in contradistinction to ‘the fortifying mode of political reproduction’. It is the tension between the two modes of political reproduction that is interesting, rather than the absolute borders of the concepts. This is true also for the constitutive concepts of Historical Realism: the tension, or difference, between an embedded inter-state system and a disembedded system is in itself more interesting than the precise and sharp definitions of the two sorts of systems. Of course, this does not absolve Historical Realism from developing conceptual precision. For now, however, in facing “the basic dilemma of social science: whether to explain trivial matters with exactitude or to treat significant matters with imprecision” (Gilpin 1981:xiii), I, like Gilpin, resolutely choose the latter alternative.

I have developed only one causal argument concerning political reproduction in this thesis, and a fairly general one at that. In the three historical chapters I have argued that when the constitutive configurations change, previously poorly utilized, or new, resources are released. Changes in modes of political reproduction are states’ means of responding to the consequences of these releases. The resources can, of course, be of many different kinds, including material, organizational, intellectual, and emotional ones. For instance, when the inter-state system the Roman Republic existed in changed from functionally non-differentiated and disembedded to functionally differentiated and embedded, resources connected to economic specialization and trade were released. As a result the economic system, then the army, and finally the mode of political reproduction changed in the Roman state. Similarly, when relations among political formations became embedded in the depressed economic system of post-Charlemagne Europe, resources connected to direct control of land were released; and what was left of the central Frankish state became fortifying as vassals had appropriated direct control of land. The fortifying Frankish state reproduced itself politically by blocking any one of these vassals from expanding. I thus submit that the two
different modes of political reproduction are two different responses to the release of new or previously poorly utilized resources, and that the nature of these new resources are determining the mode of reproduction. Of course, I immediately qualify this statement by admitting that states may certainly fail in reproducing themselves politically, or they may fail in responding ‘appropriately’. There is no built-in determinism in Historical Realism. Furthermore, the nature of the new resources are, in turn, determined by the complex changes in the constitutive configuration. Thus, it is not enough to ask what new resources a change, say, from embeddedness to disembeddedness releases, since this may vary according to whether the system is functionally differentiated or not, whether there is competition or not, and whether the ‘tax-payers’ enjoy openness or not, and, no doubt, whether any or all of these dimensions also change.

Given this complexity, I have refrained from developing a taxonomy of double security dilemmas and from trying to use ‘release of resources’ as an analytical device. Rather, I have offered a form in which complexity can be reduced, and thus expressed.

So far in this chapter I have argued that Historical Realism challenges other IR theories to be explicit about criteria of application and to be historically comparative. Historical Realism also challenges parts of existing IR theory substantially, or empirically. By arguing that constitutive configurations can be expressed in a taxonomy, I have implicitly ruled out significant secular developments. If a structural attribute is not expressed, or possible to express, in my four constitutive dichotomies, it is not important in the analysis of political reproduction, I have argued. Of course, this argument is highly exaggerated. There are most certainly secular developments that matter, and Buzan and Little’s concept of ‘interaction capacity’ probably captures the most important of them (Buzan et. al. 1993; Buzan and
Little forthcoming). And yet, given the level of abstraction at which Historical Realism is working, there are commonalities that transcend these secular developments. Historical Realism has not identified, and is not meant to identify, any transhistorical laws, but it has pointed to some possible “robust processes” (Goldstone 1991). The point is the following: while it is far from clear how a recognition of secular developments might be incorporated into Historical Realism, it is clear that periodizations that imbue historical eras with sui generis attributes—such as ‘modernity’ for instance—are misleading from the point of view of political reproduction.

The Problems of Historical Realism

Historical Realism has three major problems. All three can be resolved within the bounds of the theory, but that would require another study. Here I will just indicate the problems and raise some questions connected to them.

The first problem of Historical Realism is that there are no causal propositions or hypotheses, only causal concepts to govern a ‘causal narrative’. Particularly, the concept ‘the double security dilemma’ is not internally differentiated. Therefore I simply cannot say which kind of double security dilemma follows from which sort of configurational changes, and which mode of political reproduction is linked with which double security dilemma. Historical Realism lacks the vocabulary for this. The obvious solution to this problem would be to develop a taxonomy of double security dilemmas, and attempt to link this taxonomy to constitutive configurations and modes of political reproduction. This exercise might well take the form of hypothesis-testing. There is a danger involved in developing Historical Realism along these lines, however. If each constitutive configuration, or sort of configurational change, entails its own, specific, double security dilemma, Historical
Realism will acquire such complexity that it will be a practically useless theory. On the other hand, if the range and variation of the double security dilemma is reduced in the same radical way as the modes of political reproduction, there is one more source of potential reification and ahistoricism.

The second problem with Historical Realism, as it now stands, is that neither ‘fortifying mode of political reproduction’ nor ‘alliance-building mode of political reproduction’ says anything about states’ ‘external’ strategies. Both of these concepts express the relations between tax-collectors and tax-payers; they say nothing about peer politics. The third, and overlapping, problem is that I do not attempt, in this thesis, to analyze the chain mode of political reproduction $\rightarrow$ double security dilemma $\rightarrow$ constitutive configuration. In the three historical chapters I only analyze the reverse of this chain. Inevitably, this has meant that I have paid more attention to developing state theory than system theory or societal theory. I have, however, attempted to argue that there should be only one theory. Acknowledging the argument I just made about ‘causal narratives’, I believe that the only way to begin to rectify the present lopsidedness of Historical Realism is to carry out more case studies, in which figure 5 in chapter one is read from left to right instead. This would contribute to the development of a more balanced Historical Realism, although it would not be sufficient for redressing the absence of the peer-politics aspects of modes of political reproduction. Additional conceptual development is needed for this.

Further Research

A doctoral thesis should inspire and prepare the ground for further research. Sad is the dissertation which is the ultimate word on a topic, for it is intellectually barren. Historical Realism, taking its first hesitant steps in this text, in no way forecloses further theoretical and empirical research.
Theoretical and Conceptual Research

Two theoretical areas have been detrimentally neglected in this thesis. Further theoretical and conceptual research with a view to partial incorporation of these two areas is required for Historical Realism to develop. The first of these areas is—with a modern phrase in vogue—the construction of identities. The second, which to some extent has been informing the last two chapters, is recent theoretical advances in archeology and anthropology. I will merely indicate the direction future conceptual and theoretical development might take.

Since a few years constructivism can almost contend with rationalism and/or materialism as the dominant approach in IR (for good overviews and discussions see Adler 1997 and Ruggie 1998). Constructivism is a social theory which is primarily concerned with issues of ontology and epistemology. In the words of Adler: “Constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world” (1997:322). For Historical Realism, however, the central issue raised by constructivism, broadly conceived, is whether modes of political reproduction are affected by, and affect, ideology and identities. It would, for instance, seem difficult or prohibitively costly for a state to be alliance-building if there is a discrepancy in the ideological convictions permeating the society and the state, as in Visigothic Spain. Conversely, a state might actively create myths, for instance, in attempts at becoming alliance-building, as in free Germany during the Roman Empire. Ideologies and identities covering large areas of an inter-state system might also be expected to have consequences that are not explainable by functional differentiation or embeddedness. Conversely, whether an inter-state system is functionally differentiated or not might be expected to have consequences for identity formation. Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach (1996) have done a great deal
of this work already, and Historical Realism should draw further on their work.

A close review of recent work in archaeology and anthropology would inform Historical Realism in particularly two ways (i.e. Kristiansen 1998; Kristiansen and Rowlands 1998; Earle 1997; Earle 1991; Johnson and Earle 1987). First, social transformations are staple for these fields. Rather than assuming continuity, theorists in social archeology and anthropology remain agnostic as to change and continuity, evolution and devolution. Furthermore, very long periods of history or prehistory are required units of analysis, rather than oddities. Second, the other intellectual staple of these fields is a synchronic and diachronic variety of political formations. Buzan and Little (1994) have identified ahistoricism, eurocentrism, and anarchophilia as three impediments to the development of a more useful conceptualization of ‘international system’. Social archeology and anthropology address at least two of these impediments. Thus, prima fade, one would expect conceptual apparatuses in these fields to be attuned to the needs of Historical Realism. For instance, in addition to the works by archeologists already cited in the historical chapters, Kristiansen’s study Europe Before History (1998) might yield new insights into the differences between embedded and disembodied inter-state systems, while Earle’s How Chiefs Come to Power: The Political Economy in Prehistory (1997) should contribute particularly to the development of the conceptualization of modes of political reproduction. Indeed, there have already been IR forays into archeology and anthropology (Little 1998; Ferguson 1991). World System Theory, of course, has conversed with archeology for quite a while (i.e. Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Frank and Gills 1993; Kardulias 1999).

From another angle, it is difficult to understand why World System Theory should be the only IR perspective that, to my knowledge, contributes to theoretical development in archeol-
ogy and anthropology. An academic discipline that claims to study relations among political formations should have something interesting to offer disciplines that study systems of social formations, although these might not always be states? The absence of IR theory, other than World System Theory, in archaeology and anthropology can probably be attributed to the built-in empirical content of basic IR premises that have been discussed at various points in this thesis.

**Empirical Research**

The empirical field open to Historical Realism is identical to the period from the rise of social hierarchies and the differentiation of societies until a while into the future. Yet, it is possible to note that two sorts of empirical investigations would be highly rewarding. One is comparative studies that are structured in such a way that they might speak to, or yield, Historical Realist hypotheses. The other sort of empirical investigation concerns present-day geopolitics, which perhaps should be called 'the new fortifying-ism’ rather than the new medievalism, or at the very least, new functional differentiation.

A more systematic and structured ‘case selection’ than the one exemplified in this thesis would be useful both in the further development of the theory, and in determining whether the theory is useful or not. Either the method of agreement or the method of difference (Skocpol 1984) could be used for controlling the selection of cases.

A more controversial type of empirical investigation would focus on changes in the inter-state system during the last decade or so. Impressionistically, the inter-state system seems to become deeper embedded in the economy, while functional differentiation is increasing. The alliance-building mode of political reproduction, typical for the welfare state, appears to become dysfunctional; and resources, which units with a fortifying mode of political reproduction, such as the EU, might utilize, are
released. This approach would shift the investigation away from three common and unfortunate, but, it is true, not dominant lines of thought. One is that the New World Order is somehow peaceful, or at least that the democratic ‘zone’ is peaceful. Functional differentiation and embeddedness are likely, rather, to increase competition, and possibly therefore large-scale violence. The second unfortunate line of thought is that the state is disappearing. While it may be true that the modern state with an alliance-building mode of political reproduction is disappearing, the State—as defined in this thesis—is merely changing mode of political reproduction. And this is much more interesting. The third unfortunate line of thought is that the EU is something new and unique under the sun. From the perspective of Historical Realism, however, it may well be asked whether the EU is not just another political formation with a fortifying mode of political reproduction. Its development can thus be understood as the appropriation of resources released by the alliance-building states’ failure in maintaining their cooperation with capitalism.
NOTES

1 Speculative philosophy of history is to be distinguished from ‘analytical philosophy of history’, which is about how historians think. The former sort of philosophy of history is about the shape of history itself. See Michael Stanford (1994) for the relevant distinctions, and for interesting discussions.

2 I am grateful to John Hobson for pointing this out to me.

3 This is not to say that Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach would necessarily subscribe to the arguments presented here.

4 ‘Principle of differentiation’ refers to the basis on which groups can be said to exist. Without differentiation, all humans would belong to one group, and then we would hardly call that a ‘group’. For the ‘Wesphalian system’ the principle of differentiation is territorial. That is, groups, in this case states, exist because there are territorial demarcations among them. In a range of other social systems, kin is a more important principle of differentiation, such that which clan, for instance, one belong to is more important than the geographical space one occupies for determining group-belongingness. When I argue that the principle of differentiation is not problematized in the state-system image I mean that it is not clear that territoriality actually has been, is, and will continue to be the most fundamental basis on which groups can be said to exist.

5 This is not to say that such an exercise would not be rewarding, or at least worthwhile attempting.

6 Whether units are social ontological categories at all in the various variants of historical determinism is unclear. At any rate, they are not interesting since they are not agents.

7 Standard, and good, histories include Beasley (1990), Totman (1993) and Howe (1996), Hall (1971), and Sansom (1974). Unless otherwise cited this chapter draws on these books, and I cite only particular details, quotes, and such interpretations that are not common knowledge.

8 The questions of why Japan at all became a fortifying state and why it remained a fortifying state 250 years later are analytically distinct. The establishment of the fortifying state in the seventeenth century lies beyond the reach of this thesis.
Whether this perception was correct or not is a matter of no concern for this thesis. The point is that it was strongly felt that Japan had to unite and industrialize in order not to be crushed.


'The Social War' is a mistranslation of the word 'socii' which means allies. The proper name for the war, which is used by some historians, is the War of the Allies.

My main sources for this particular section of the chapter has been Cunliffe (1994), Hedeager (1992), and Whittaker (1994).

For students of IR interested in Early Medieval Europe there are good news and bad news. The good news is that the period is being fundamentally reinterpreted, not least thanks to advances in archeology. Lotte Hedeager (1992; 1997), Roger Collins (1991), Malcolm Todd (1992), Klaas Randsborg (1991), Peter Brown (1996), Averil Cameron (1993), C. R. Whittaker (1994) and Richard Hodges and David Whitehouse (1983) have written engaging studies that challenge the old 'Dark Ages' view of the period. I have relied on these studies for the chapter. The bad news is that also these reinterpretations, admittedly more or less so, start out from a bottom-up approach to political formations. Thus, after having dealt with the Late Roman Empire, they tend to describe the new kingdoms one by one, forgetting the systemic aspects of each kingdom's development. Thus, the history, for instance, of the Burgundians, becomes the history of the Burgundians and nothing else, as long as no Huns or Franks destroy them.

Marc Bloch's Feudal Society (1961) in two volumes, and Hodges and Whitehouse (1981) has been the major sources for this section. Feudal Society is not only the classic study on feudalism, but also a joy to read.

In order to keep this chapter manageable I have chosen not to treat the political development of the Christian faith. This is a major shortcoming of the chapter, but does not, I believe, alter the validity of my argument. For the Church's power, see Hall (1997); for the Church 'latching on' see Brown (1996).