From Idea to Norm - Promoting Conflict Prevention

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From Idea to Norm

Promoting Conflict Prevention
From Idea to Norm

Promoting Conflict Prevention

Annika Björkdahl

Lund Political Studies 125
Department of Political Science
Lund University
To Olle
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Lund

April 2002
**LIST OF ACRONYMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>EU programme for Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALA</td>
<td>EU programme for Asia and Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARDS</td>
<td>Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COREU</td>
<td>Correspondence européennes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPN</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHA</td>
<td>Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECPS</td>
<td>Executive Committee on Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Eight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAC</td>
<td>General Affairs Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICFY</td>
<td>International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Peace Implementation Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPA</td>
<td>International Peace Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo International Security Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDA</td>
<td>European-Mediterranean Partnership programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCA</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Central Africa Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Alignment Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORDBAT</td>
<td>Joint Nordic Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbr.</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORDCAPS</td>
<td>Nordic Military Cooperation Concerning Joint Training and Planning for International Missions</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>Poland and Hungary Aid for Economic Recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPEWU</td>
<td>Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRM</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEX</td>
<td>Foreign Relations Councillors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCANCOY</td>
<td>Scandinavian Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Multinational Stand-By Forces High Readiness Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Peace Stabilisation Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Assistance to the Newly Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDPA</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF I</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Training and Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>United Nations Preventive Deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

THE STUDY OF IDEAS AND NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

When every violent conflict is dismissed as distant and inconsequential, we run the risk of allowing a series of conflict episodes to undermine the vitality of hard-won international norms.

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict

Instead of peace, the end of the Cold War gave way to new types of conflicts. During the period 1989-2000, there were 111 armed conflicts—the vast majority of which can be characterized as new wars, taking place within the borders of states. The civil conflict of Somalia, the violent break-up of Yugoslavia and the civilian genocide in Rwanda demonstrate the complexity and dynamics of conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Despite numerous failures to prevent both old and new wars, the visionary idea of conflict prevention has gained increased international attention. Inherent in the idea of conflict prevention are prescriptive and proscriptive elements that identify rights and obligations to settle conflict peacefully and to prevent the outbreak of violence.

The call for a Culture of Conflict Prevention by the United Nations’ Secretary-General has been widely echoed in the international community, as the idea of conflict prevention has traveled across borders. The United Nations’ General Assembly and the Security Council have expressed commitment to pursue conflict prevention with all appropriate means. The European Union has adopted a European Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, stating that the highest political priority will be given to improve external action in the field of conflict prevention. A vast number of non-governmental organizations, individuals and non-state actors have been promoting the idea of conflict prevention. Today, a near-universal agreement on the idea of conflict prevention is emerging, as few dispute that “an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure” when it comes to dealing with violent conflicts.
It appears that conflict prevention is an idea whose time has come. Why is it that, despite historical as well as recent evidence of the infeasibility of preventing wars, the idea of conflict prevention has resurfaced to meet the challenge of the new wars of the post-Cold War era? This study is concerned with tracing the process of how conflict prevention is moving from the realm of ideas to the field of action.

Aims and Questions of the Study

The general aim of this study is to explore the growing interest in the notion of conflict prevention and its implications for preventive practices. Interests are not just “out there” and practices are not undertaken in a vacuum—they are constituted by norms. Thus, I want to investigate whether the growing interest in preventing violent conflicts marks the coming of age of conflict prevention as an international norm able to induce preventive practices. Adopting a social constructivist perspective this study explores the link between ideas, norms, interests and practices.

The theoretical aim of this study is to advance an analytical framework that draws attention to the pivotal role of the norm entrepreneur in norm evolution. The central theoretical question guiding the research is: How do norms in the international sphere evolve over time? Beyond this principal question, three additional subordinate questions will be posed to specify the analysis: How do norms enter into the international sphere? How come certain norms become widely accepted practices while others do not? What role do actors play in norm evolution? Theoretical work on norm evolution needs to provide empirical illustrations, which this study does.

The empirical aim is to analyze and trace the evolution and influence of the norm of conflict prevention since the end of the Cold War to better understand the growing interest in the prevention of violent conflicts. By providing an empirical illustration of the analytical framework, and trying to answer the following empirical questions, this study attempts to enhance the understanding of the evolution of international norms in the field of peace and security. How has the particular norm pertaining to conflict prevention evolved? What role has the Swedish foreign policy elite played in this process of norm evolution? How can an emerging norm of conflict prevention contribute to establishing a preventive practice, and how can such a practice contribute to spur the evolution of a conflict prevention norm?

The theoretical as well as the empirical questions will be specified to focus
the analysis, and hence additional sub-questions will be introduced in the various chapters.

Two important limitations in the scope of the study should be stated explicitly so as to avoid misunderstandings. It is not argued here that there exists such a thing as a “settled” norm of conflict prevention and that conflict prevention has a taken-for-granted status. Rather, this study explores an open-ended and on-going process of norm evolution. Furthermore, this study neither speculates on how to prevent the outbreak of a violent conflict, nor specifies or assesses tools and strategies to prevent violent conflicts.

Although this study investigates Sweden’s contribution to the evolution of the norm of conflict prevention, it is not argued that Sweden is the only actor advocating conflict prevention. A broad range of actors has shown a growing interest in the idea and has contributed to its advancement in the international community. However, Sweden is an interesting actor to scrutinize. Being a small state with a traditionally internationalist vision and an active foreign policy it is now attempting to find a niche for itself in the international relations of the post-Cold War era.

An Overview of the Research on Norms in IR

The research focus of this study can be put in perspective by a brief overview of earlier research. Scholars in the fields of jurisprudence and moral philosophy have analyzed the influence of international norms for centuries, and the relevance of norms is well established. As a brief overview cannot reflect the broad range of literature that has contributed to further our understanding of international norms, only a selection of the International Relations (IR) research that has identified norms as an important piece in a larger theoretical puzzle of peace and security is presented. Nevertheless, not all IR researchers have been swayed to accept the importance of norms in the field of peace and security (cf. Mearsheimer 1994/95; Farber and Gowa 1995: 126).

Early IR scholarship concerned with norms developed most prominently in the field of international organizations. Such studies focused on issues like decolonization, human rights and peacekeeping, recognizing that much of the UN’s activities involved establishing norms (Jacobson 1962; Henkin 1965; Kay 1967). However, these early attempts often failed to theorize the normative processes. The just war literature devotes considerable attention to international norms and moral principles, particularly those pertaining to the rightful conduct of war known as justice in war or jus in bello principles to
regulate the right and wrong ways to wage war. The two main principles in the just war literature are proportionality of means to ends and discrimination in targeting between combatants and non-combatants. The aim is to place normative constraints upon the conduct of war by delineating when, how, and against whom states may use deadly force (Walzer 1977: 44; Amstutz 1999: 100-102; Coates 2000: 33-46; Harbour 2000: 50-51). Both principles are relevant to contemporary security challenges. Closely related is research on alliance norms where identity, ideas, values, norms and knowledge are highlighted as important for the establishment and maintenance of alliance (Barnett 1995; Risse-Kappen 1996). Two norms regarding commitment to alliances have competed for acceptance throughout the history of the modern state system. The first is pacta sunt servanda i.e. agreements are binding, which defines an obligation that must be upheld. The second, by contrast, is the norm rebus sic stantibus i.e. by reason of changed circumstances, which defines the alliance norm in a more flexible way (Kegley and Raymond 1989). If the norm regarding agreements as binding is predominant, then research shows that alliances will contribute to stability. On the other hand, if the norm allowing for flexibility dominates, then mistrust will flourish, contributing to instability. An interesting corollary is the research on norms supporting the concept of neutrality (Thomson 1990: 23-47; Raymond 1997: 125-127) that make it possible for states to abstain from participating in a war between two or more other states.

The democratic peace literature pays great attention to the influence of shared norms, as an explanation for the absence of war among democracies. It builds on the liberal vision of Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace, where he foresaw the ever-widening pacification of the liberal pacific union (Kant 1795). The central idea is the development of an international society founded on individual reason and the evolution of norms (Russet 1993; Maoz 1997: 162-209; Russett 1998; Mitchell and Gates 1999: 771). Domestic practices for peaceful conflict resolution are externalized and employed when dealing with international disputes among those who share the same norms (Risse-Kappen 1995: 499-511). The mutual identification as being a liberal democratic state provides the key mechanism for a relationship of stable peace (Wendt 1995; Ericson 2000). Similarly, stable peace, according to Kenneth Boulding (1978: 13) is “a situation in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved”. In the constructivist reasoning, the shared identity of democracies makes war impossible (Adler 1997). In this field of research, preliminary results indicate that the spread of democratic norms may be stimulated by demonstration
effect (Starr 1991). In general the argumentation in this literature is frequently a combination of both rationalist and normative claims concerning the incentives and restraints on state leaders by their societies and the international system (Rosecrance 1986). That “democratic states do not go to war with one another” has become a mantra for many in the international community, and some assert that democratic states are more legitimate than others and less likely to have domestic conflicts. Hence, democratization has been suggested as both a preventive strategy and the cure for post-conflict societies and the symbol of “free and fair elections” has ended many UN operations—although it is unlikely that one election is enough to usher in democratic practices.

Resembling the democratic peace literature, research on security communities contains frequent references to norms. Constructivists are most prominent in resurrecting Deutsch’s concept of security communities, as they urge International Relations scholarship to recognize the social character of global politics (cf. Adler and Barnett et al. 1998). A security community is defined as a political community based on shared values, norms and symbols that will provide actors with a social identity, and in which it is assumed there is a “real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way” (Deutsch 1957).

The importance of compatibility of core values derived from common institutions and a mutual responsiveness among the members of the security community is strongly emphasized (ibid.). It is also argued that such community can exist at the international level and that it shapes security politics as well as predisposes those states within an international community to prefer peace. This is based on the recognition that the concept of community is premised on the idea of shared social identities (Adler and Barnett et al. 1998). Thomas Risse-Kappen (1996) gives an example of a security community in a study on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which suggests that a sense of collective identity exists within the transatlantic community of democracies that specifies norms of appropriate behavior for its members. Hence, it is possible for norms to exist in the field of security at the international level as well.

The regime literature is overwhelmed with references to norms. Despite definitional controversies, one common element in this literature is the prescriptive character of regimes and how the role of norms in understanding state behavior is accentuated (Krasner 1982; Keohane 1984; Haggard and Simmons 1987; Jönsson 1987; Young 1989; Rittberger 1995; Parker 2001). Regimes may be imposed or voluntarily devised to regulate behavior in single-
issue and multi-issue areas, or to manage access to common resources or provide a public good (Puchala and Hopkins 1982; Donnelly 1986; Young 1989). Regime theory explains norms primarily in terms of cost-benefit analysis: reciprocity prevails and norms become institutionalized because such arrangements provide substantial benefit which may outweigh the opportunity costs of not acting immediately based on short-term interests (Keohane 1984). Most regime studies however, take a rationalist perspective, arguing that norms are regulative, and fail to see norms as constitutive.

Finally, there is a wide literature on the role of *epistemic communities* in spreading ideas and norms. Through the bureaucratic power of epistemic communities, new ideas may be injected to the policy process. According to Peter Haas (1989: 384; 1992: 2-3), an epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area. The members of such a community possess “a shared set of normative and principled beliefs”, “shared causal beliefs”, “shared notions of validity” and “a set of common practices associated with a set of problems”. Such a group will gain influence by diffusing ideas and influencing the positions adopted by a wide range of actors such as government bureaucrats, decision makers, the public etc. The group of experts will also exert direct influence on policy-making by acquiring bureaucratic positions and powers, and once the position has been consolidated the influence of the epistemic community has been institutionalized (Haas 1989: 380; 1992: 4; Adler and Haas 1992: 374). This approach pays less attention to the ideas and norms in themselves affecting behavior, but perceives actors as the mechanism affecting the policy positions adopted.

Although aspects of the various literatures presented above have inspired this study, it will mainly draw on the growing body of IR literature taking a social constructivist point of departure. The importance of ideas and norms has been highlighted in a growing number of studies, covering topics such as apartheid, abolition of slavery, chemical weapons taboo, decolonization, human rights and institutionalization of foreign aid. Albert Legault’s (1999) study of emerging norms in the field of UN peacemaking points to significant developments in the field of peace and security. Important research has revealed that norms may have lasting impacts on the conduct of war and may motivate interventions for humanitarian purposes. My focus on a norm pertaining to conflict prevention allows me to discuss norms in the security field where such norms may limit state discretion in areas perceived as essential to survival, such as sovereignty and security.
A fair number of the studies on norms claim to apply an ideational-based understanding of international relations and that is, as we will see, not without its problems.

Challenges for Ideational-Based Understandings

Ideational-based understandings of international relations in general, and of foreign policy in particular, suffer from a number of interrelated problems. The first conundrum presented by many norm-oriented explanations is the opposing conclusions that these various studies reach. There are empirical studies that conclude that norms and ideas have no decisive influence and therefore cannot explain international policy (Gilpin 1981; Mearsheimer 1994/1995), while others conclude that ideas and norms have causal influence and an independent explanatory power (Sikkink 1991; Klotz 1996). One flaw in some of these studies is that the questions posed are “do norms and ideas matter?” And if so, “how much do they matter?” I argue that we need to calibrate our analytical tools more finely, and consider the possibility that different types of ideas and norms play disparate and differential roles in influencing foreign policy. This analytical premise allows us to observe a more nuanced relationship between norms and foreign policy.

A second problem with ideational-based accounts of international relations is that, strictly speaking, there are very limited ideational-based explanations of policy outcomes in relation to peace and security. Many accounts that are deemed to be ideational-based in fact focus on factors other than the ideas and norms per se. The literature on epistemic communities, transnational advocacy groups and networks that has gained prominence in the constructivist study of international relations in the last decade, focuses on the role of individuals, or groups of individuals, with a strong notion of appropriateness of behavior and their influence on policy outcomes. They share beliefs and values and are politically empowered. Supposedly norm-based, most of the constructivist literature in fact advances an interest-group understanding of policy outcomes. It understands interests and policy outcomes, not with ideas and norms per se but with the political activism of a group. This facile replacement of ideas and norms with advocacy groups, transnational networks and norm entrepreneurs clearly depicts a transition made between ideational phenomena to those who handle them. By shifting focus from ideas and norms to norm entrepreneurs, the analysis may, if unaware of this
problem, slide back into the realm of interest-group-based understandings, taking us away from the original proposition that ideas and norms matter.

A third problem is that norms are often used for understanding both change and continuity. This has occasionally created confusion. A frequent bias in the literature is that scholars use structure to understand continuity whereas actors are used to explain change. As the present study is concerned with norm evolution, it views change as a dynamic process of actors and structure interaction, as we will see in subsequent chapters.

The fourth challenge is that most of the constructivist research is biased towards moral, and in our view today, “good” norms. Clearly, all norms are not “good”. There are, for example, norms up-holding slavery, racism and other types of oppression. This is why it is important to distinguish between the empirical study of norms and ideas in international relations and the normative realm applying morality to a particular foreign policy issue. This study should be regarded as an attempt to empirically scrutinize the evolution of a particular norm that in a contemporary ethical perspective will most likely be perceived as a “good” norm.

Outline of the Study

For the sake of overview, I will end this chapter by outlining the study. It is divided into ten chapters. In Chapter One, I have presented the aims of the study, the research problem and the argument in brief, a literature overview and some challenges to the ideational-based understandings of international relations. In Chapter Two a meta-theoretical discussion is pursued to identify a social constructivist point of departure, and its epistemological and ontological stance. This is followed by some methodological reflections concerning case studies, process-tracing and the material used. The meta-theoretical discussion and the structurationist approach guide the conceptualization of the main building blocks of the study: norm, norm entrepreneur and normative structure. Chapter Three is a theoretical chapter, in which I conceptualize international norms, identify their functions and their influence, and establish norms as a useful analytical tool. Norm entrepreneurs are identified as a crucial driving force behind norm evolution, and the chapter concludes with a discussion of the normative structure and the match between emerging norms and the normative structure constructed by the norm entrepreneur. This is followed by the theoretical Chapter Four, in which I advance an analytical framework for tracing norm evolution. The analytical framework
highlights the role of norm entrepreneurs in the different phases of norm development and will then guide the empirical analysis of Swedish norm entrepreneurship and the development of a norm pertaining to conflict prevention.

*Chapter Five* will discuss how ideas take off and the role of the norm entrepreneur selecting a persuasive idea. It traces the idea of conflict prevention, and attempts to understand how the idea was selected by the Swedish foreign policy elite to enter the process of translation from idea to a norm candidate. The empirical analysis of norm evolution continues in *Chapter Six*, where the role of norm entrepreneurs in constructing an international norm candidate will be illuminated. Empirically, the chapter will analyze the framing of the norm candidate of conflict prevention in language, commonly held values and as a response to an urgent problem. *Chapter Seven* follows naturally, by discussing norm diffusion and socialization as an interactive process. It will illustrate this interactive process by exploring the Swedish efforts to diffuse the norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention in the UN and the EU, and efforts to persuade norm followers and establish a norm community. *Chapter Eight* discusses how an unsettled norm can eventually become institutionalized and settled into the normative structure of international organizations. Institutionalization will be discussed in terms of rhetorical support for the norm, organizational and procedural changes in the UN and the EU, as well as adaptations of existing policies and programs and the development of new ones. *Chapter Nine* illustrates how norms and practice are mutually constitutive by analyzing the preventive deployment of peacekeepers in the UN mission to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1992 and its potential influence on the process of norm evolution. *Chapter Ten* is the concluding chapter, discussing the robustness of the norm of conflict prevention and elaborates on the contributions of a social constructivist perspective on norm evolution as well as speculates about the future of international norms.
It is a paradox that scholars whose entire existence is centered on the production and understanding of ideas should grant ideas so little significance for explaining political life.

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For the purpose of this study, an in-depth exploration of the various approaches to the study of international norms is unwarranted. What is required, however, is to explain why social constructivism is an attractive approach to the study of a complex world, to elucidate the ontological and epistemological stance adopted here and to offer a brief justification of this stance. Rather than adding yet another combative voice to a meta-theoretical debate with little prospect of “resolution”, I will settle for clarifying the position of this study. Such clarification is needed because social constructivism is a broad movement that includes a variety of traditions that—while accepting the mantra that ideas and discourse matter—may differ depending on ontological and epistemological positions. When discussing social constructivism in this study, I refer to the specific brand that has developed in IR. The meta-theoretical debate is followed by methodological reflections on how to empirically study ideational phenomena consistent with a social constructivist approach. This said, it is beyond the scope of this study to enter into the intricacies of what is a highly complex subject, and there is no pretension to provide more than a clarification of the social constructivist position embraced here.

A Middle Ground Approach

During the last decade, important research on international norms has taken “a social constructivist turn” in IR. Social constructivism in my opinion, should not be viewed as competing with, but as complementing the tradi-
tional IR theories, as it seeks to expand the traditional theoretical discourse as well as broaden the focus of the study of international relations by paying more attention to ideational phenomena. The specific approach of social constructivism that has developed in IR emerged in response to many of the problematic issues raised in the grand debates that have dominated the discipline. In the latest debate, sparked by ontological and epistemological divisions between what some, for the sake of simplicity, refer to as the rationalist and the reflectivist approaches to IR, social constructivism has claimed to “seize the middle ground”. Social constructivism challenges the ontological and epistemological foundations of the reflectivist perspectives such as postmodernism, critical theory and poststructuralism as well as the rationalist perspectives, exemplified by neo-realism and neo-liberalism (Adler 1997; Checkel 1997; 1998; Guzzini 2000; Pettman 2000). As we will see, ontological positions have often, but not always, epistemological implications. Some may even argue that ontology conditions epistemology and for a social constructivist they are intertwined.

This desire to take possession of the middle ground by mixing rationalist epistemology and reflectivist ontology is not unproblematic, as the discussion will show. As a result, this “middle road” approach has been criticized for being “either eclectic or redundant” (Guzzini 2000: 148). It is eclectic in the sense that many researchers pick and choose their particular version without looking at the particular epistemological and ontological coherence of the end product. It is redundant, when stating the obvious, that the world out there is a mixture of social facts and material matters—a statement almost all theories accept (ibid.). The self-identification as a middle ground approach sits uncomfortable with how social constructivism has been perceived by for example critical theorists (cf. Price and Reus-Smith 1998). In the following sections I will attempt to show that IR social constructivism actually bridges important meta-theoretical gaps by applying a middle road approach that may contribute to both reflectivist and rationalist perspectives.

A Constructed World

As a middle road approach, social constructivism claims that reality is socially constructed, and ideas give meaning to the material world (Klotz 1995a; Finnemore 1996a; 1996c; Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In the words of Emanuel Adler (1997: 322), “constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action
and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world”. This position, however, is contrary to Alexander Wendt’s (1999: 51) stipulation that “the world is independent of the mind and language of the individual observer”. It also disagrees with postmodernist and social critical theorists who deny the existence of a reality outside of our mind. This study accepts the notion that there is a “real world out there”, but that intersubjectivity defines this reality. Consequently, that reality is not independent from our interpretations and understandings of it (cf. Adler 1997: 324, 327). Simply put, social constructivism is ontologically about the social construction of reality and epistemologically about the social construction of meaning, including knowledge (Guzzini 2000: 149). Critical realistic ontology facilitates an understanding of the socially constructed world, as it allows ideational phenomena such as ideas, norms and other constructions ontological status which extreme realism would deny them. Critical realism could be regarded as balancing between realism and relativism (Searl 1995; Djurfeldt 1996: 53-66; Badersten 2002). Intersubjectivity can assist us in understanding the world as it balances between objectivism and subjectivism.

This social world can be constituted of both material factors and ideas linked in complex ways. While social constructivists are concerned with bridging a gap between materialism and idealism, others regard this middle road to be based on a false view of ideas and material facts as dichotomous. Robert Keohane (2000: 125-130), for example, states that setting up a dichotomy between materialists and idealists is misleading, as most theories recognize ideas not determined by material reality as playing a major role in international relations. Criticism has also been raised from a reflectivist perspective. Roxanne Lynn Doty (2000: 137-139), for instance, argues that thinking of ideas and material forces in dichotomous terms and then trying to construct a synthesis, points to social constructivism’s failure to question the ideas versus materialist opposition, which is central to postmodernist interpretations of constructivism. In defense of his treatment of ideas and material conditions as separable, Wendt (2000: 167) holds that the dichotomy is linked to an ambition to disentangle and identify the influence of one independent of the other. The influence of ideas is complex and widely debated and will be addressed in the next section. In the debate between materialism and idealism this study is not purist: it operates with a mix of material and social factors, but I argue that material forces cannot be considered in the absence of prevailing norms and ideas (cf. Björkdahl 2002b). In the analysis of norm evolution I will pay less attention to material objects and ideational factors will be given predominance. When I discuss the powers of norm entrepreneurs,
the focus will be on the so-called “soft powers” and I will analyze the normative structure’s influences on norm evolution.

“Ideational Causality” and the “Independent Explanatory Power” of Norms

Ideas’ and norms’ “independent explanatory power” and “ideational causality” have been widely debated (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Yee 1996; Laffey and Weldes 1997; Ruggie 1998). The central problem within this debate has concerned the “causal effect” of ideas and norms, understanding causation in the usual social science sense “causes are responsible for producing effects” (Yee 1996: 70). This conception of causality has significant implications for how ideas and norms are understood. In general, postmodernists and poststructuralists appear to have abandoned the search for causes and objective truths. David Campbell (1998: 4), for instance, argues that “contrary to the logic of explanation I embrace a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of cataloging, calculating and specifying the ‘real causes.’” Rationalists seeking causal effects usually position norms as an “intervening variable”, mediating between interest and political outcomes with little or no independent explanatory power.9 The controversy between the rationalists seeking causal explanations and those rejecting causality may appear irresolvable (cf. Björkdahl 2002b).

The constructivist literature attempts to come to terms with ideational causality and ideas’ independent explanatory power. It accepts ideas as “real” in the sense of having irreducible ontological status and they can therefore be perceived to have independent explanatory power (Finnemore 1993; 1996a; Klotz 1995b; Katzenstein 1996). According to Audie Klotz (1995b: 460), “system-level norms play an explanatory role, [and] the shifting importance of contending global norms offers a theoretical explanation of interest (re)-formation”. Despite these efforts, social constructivists have been criticized for not “proving” the “independent explanatory power” of ideas. The persuasiveness of ideas is often assumed rather than ascertained (Jacobsen 1995: 285; Yee 1996: 71).

Much social constructivist research strives to focus on analyzing both the ideas themselves and the “causal mechanisms” stemming from the ideas and norms to better understand ideational effects (Klotz 1995a). But often the causal effect of ideas and norms are attributed to socialization, education and propaganda, according to critics (Jacobsen 1995: 285, Yee 1996: 71). Many have struggled with the notion of ideational causality, by some referred to as social causality (Giddens 1984: 345; Finnemore 1996a: 28; Adler 1997: 329-
Alexander Wendt (1998: 101-117) attempts to overcome the problem of ideational or social causality by relying on constitutive theorizing, which involves posing questions about how features of the social world are constituted, for example, how ideas constitute the meaning of material objects. According to Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes (1997: 202) “the meaningful constitution of social reality is not inconsistent with causal explanation; indeed, it is central to it”.

Causality as well as “ideational causality” are problematic if adhering to a social constructivist perspective where the search for social patterns does not necessarily guide research. The approach to “ideational causality” chosen here is based on the independent ontological status given to ideational phenomena. Ideational causality means taking reasons as causes by relying on constitution (Adler 1997: 329). This is separated from the positivist understanding of explanatory causality. Hence, it does not mean to privilege an explanation approach over an understanding, which has been a common criticism of this approach (Smith 2000: 152-160). Applying reasons as causes means that actors act on the basis of norms and norms therefore socially constitute—“cause”—the behavior of actors. Constitution or mutual constitution is a central concept throughout this study. One must, however, be careful as mutual constitution is frequently used to describe both causal relationships and relationships that are in fact mutually constitutive such as norms and practice. Similar caution must be practiced when discussing actors and structures as mutually constitutive, which structuration theory may assist us in doing.

**Structuration Theory**

The continuous methodological debate about the actor-structure dilemma has revolved around the question of how to resolve the impasse wherein “either agency is privileged over structure, or structure over agency” (Carlsnaes 1992: 250). A realization has dawned that dynamics can best be understood by conceiving of neither the structure nor the actor as ontologically privileged, but of both as mutually constitutive since “properties of both agents and social structures are relevant to a proper understanding of social behavior.” (Carlsnaes 1992: 246). Contributing immensely to this realization is Anthony Giddens’s theory of structuration, which is characterized as “probably the single most influential recent contribution to the question of structure and agency within social and political theory” (Hay 1995: 197). According to this theory, actors and structures are perceived as continuously interacting and mutually constituting.
Mutual constitution can be described as mutual dependency and an internal relatedness of structure and actor where actors and structures produce and reproduce each other (Giddens 1979; Wendt 1987: 338-339). “Agents and social structures are in a fundamental sense interrelated entities”, and “we cannot account fully for the one without invoking the other” (Carlsnaes 1992: 245-246, 258). But, in contrast to Giddens, Walter Carlsnaes (1992: 258) retains a distinction between actor and structure and suggests a dialectical interplay between the two as he allows for a considerable relative autonomy between the constitutive elements.

The structuration theory applied here draws on Giddens’ approach and presupposes a conceptualization of actors and structures as ontologically dependent upon each other. In this study, social structures are conceptualized as consisting of the intended and unintended consequences of human agency, and of patterns of ideas, norms and practices as well as social relationships. This conceptualization also allows social structures to take precedence over material structures (cf. Lundquist 1987: 40; Wendt 1999). Furthermore, actors are here assumed to be conscious, knowledgeable and self-reflecting, guided by ideas and norms, as well as by desires and intentions, but their actions presuppose, or are conditioned by, an irreducible structural context.

Although there may now be said to be a growing consensus among IR theorists that one must take account of both actor and structure in the analysis of human behavior, opinions are divided when it comes to how the actor/structure *problematique* should be resolved, or indeed can be resolved. Hence, not all theorists have been swayed by the persuasive appeal of structuration theory and remain unconvinced that the structuration theory bridges the dualism between structure and actor. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith (1991: 393-410; 1994: 241-276), for example, replied to Wendt’s structurationist intervention with their thesis that “there are always two stories to tell” about agency and structure: one ontological and the other epistemological or, as stated elsewhere, one from the “outside” and one from the “inside”. Campbell (1998: 220) and Smith (2000:160) continued by criticizing Wendt for being unconcerned with the construction and constitution of actors. Doty (1997: 374, 375) holds that IR has failed to solve the intractability of the agent/structure problem and argues that *no* solution to this problem can be found. The quest for a “solution” is misguided and “foreclose[s] important possibilities in terms of critical International Relations Theory”.

Clearly, structuration theory is neither the only, nor the perfect solution to the actor/structure *problematique*.10 Wendt (1987: 360), holds that “structuration theory by itself cannot generate specific theoretical claims about
international relations”, and on its own “it does not make a direct contribution to our substantive understanding of international relations per se” as it is a meta-theory. Although drawing heavily on Giddens, Wendt’s approach to structuration may be criticized for simplifying Giddens’ more complex analysis of the dynamics between actor and structure. I recognize the limits of structuration theory and do not regard it as “a magical key” to unlock the mysteries of empirical research. Yet, I hold that the theory of structuration nevertheless provides us with the richest and most useful conception of the relationship between structure and actor available in IR. It also provides a conception of actor and social structure that fits well with the aims and concerns of this thesis. Hence, I find that its strengths outweigh the objections that have been raised by its critics.

The ontological stance taken here is the social constructivist one adhering to a structuration approach of co-determined entities as outlined by Giddens (1979; 1984), which emphasizes interaction and the mutual constitution of structure and actor. For the purpose of this study, structuration theory provides a framework for understanding the essential properties of both state actors as norm entrepreneurs and the normative structure in which they exist. This is denied in actor-reductionist theories as well as in structure-reductionist ones. Structuration could be considered a middle road approach in the actor-structure debate, but it is not simply a synthesis aimed at avoiding a difficult choice of ontological primacy. It is an ontological stand, which gives actors and structures equal ontological status while analytically regarding them as distinct ontological entities and conceptualizing them as dependent upon each other. The view of actors and structures as mutually constitutive, places the individual actor firmly in its social context. This will assist me in understanding the norm entrepreneur in its normative context. By arguing that actors and structures are “mutually constituted entities” the analysis of this study can more easily comprehend change and accommodate dynamics, which is necessary for this analysis of norm evolution. As mutual constitution refers to the reproduction of social reality through the interaction of actors and structure, it is crucial to the understanding of norm evolution, the norm entrepreneur in this process and the influence of the normative context upon both the norm entrepreneur and the norm evolution process.

However, mutual constitution has proved difficult to apply, particularly in empirical research, and for that reason some form of simplification and abstraction seems necessary. In practice this has meant “bracketing” first one entity and then the other “that is, taking social structures and agents in turn as temporarily given in order to examine the explanatory effects of the other”
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(Wendt 1987: 364; cf. Dessler 1989: 444). For this study it means bracketing the norm entrepreneur when analyzing the normative context, and then bracketing the normative context to examine the norm entrepreneur. To adopt “bracketing” as a methodological device to facilitate the presentation of the analysis can be criticized as logically inconsistent with the ontology of structuration theory since it does not separate actors from structures. This does not mean, however, that “bracketing” permeates the whole structurationist approach of the study.

This brief clarification of the constructivist position within the current ontological and epistemological debate of IR theory has merely scraped the surface of what is a complex and nuanced area. Many bones of contention have deliberately been left buried. This foray into some highly contested social science territory was, however, unavoidable. The middle road approach taken here attempts to defend an IR social constructivist position both against mainstream scholars who reject all notions of social construction, and against postmodernists and more radical constructivists who think that this middle ground is too rationalistic because it perceives there to be a real world “out there”. I share the reflectivists’ concern with ideational phenomena, and take a similar ontological stance as the reflectivists as I provide norms with independent ontological status, while adapting a critical realist ontological stance. This ontological position, however, may disagree with rationalists, who rarely favor ideational matter over material objects (Checkel 1998: 327; Wendt 1999: 38, 39). Epistemologically, mainstream social constructivism may accept causal explanations as sought for by rationalists, but rejected by reflectivists, who generally dismiss causality as a natural science enterprise, irrelevant for the social sciences. I adhere to an ideational causality separated from the positivist understanding of causality.

At this point, we should be able to move on from the meta-theoretical debates between rationalist and reflectivist approaches and switch the focus of our inquiry back to more practical issues.

Methodological Reflections

The methodological implications of theorizing norms and ideas have been widely discussed. Taking a social constructivist approach means recognizing the difficulty inherent in any attempt to separate theory and observation (cf. Lundquist 1998: 27-39). To argue that a rigid distinction between theory and observation is unsustainable is no longer a subject of controversy. Most IR
Theorists agree that observation is theory-laden (Wendt 1999: 62, Krasner 2000: 131-136). The empirical material is therefore not regarded as independent of the theoretical concepts of the study. Furthermore, the “world out there”, as we notice it, is socially constructed and depends on the theoretical glasses through which we look at the world. This study recognizes the dynamic process between theory and what could be called the theoretically informed empirical material as part of the research enterprise. It is a methodology suitable for theoretical discovery rather than confirmation, since the theoretical inquiry is refined and developed as the theoretically informed empirical findings are expanded. Hence, these findings are illuminated from different angles, as new theoretical insights are gained (Alvesson and Sköldberg 1994: 42-47). This methodology is consistent with the overall epistemological and ontological stance of this study.

**A Case Study as a Research Strategy**

Early constructivist research by Wendt (1992; 1994), Dessler (1989), Kratochwil (1984), Onuf (1989) and others has been criticized for not demonstrating empirical applications. This study does that. This is an interpretive case study that analyzes the norm evolution and traces the process of Swedish norm entrepreneurship in building, diffusing and institutionalizing the norm pertaining to conflict prevention. According to Robert Yin (1984: 23), the single-case method is useful for empirical studies of complex social and political phenomena. I find that the case study method allows the researcher to study a phenomenon intensively, interpret how theoretical elements are related to each other and thereby arrive at a better understanding of complex problems and dynamic processes such as norm evolution. The case used in this study cannot, however, “prove” that a social constructivist approach to norm evolution is the “correct” one. Rather, it can demonstrate the utility of the constructivist approach in understanding complicated dynamic processes, and perhaps offer an alternative understanding consistent with the findings. Furthermore, the case is an illustration that can give a provisional indication of the relevance of the analytical framework proposed in this study. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to advance a theoretically informed argument for why a certain theoretical approach can be adequate in illuminating the particular research problem at hand.

Within the positivist approach to science, case studies are seen as problematic because single-case studies in themselves do not provide sufficient bases.
for generalizations. A positivist argument in favor of single-case studies is that by employing the procedure of process-tracing the researcher can trace a process in the sequence of events that increases the number of theoretical relevant observations within the one case studied (King et al. 1994: 208). Social constructivist counter-arguments are to claim that the ambition to find universal laws should not be confused with generalizations. Furthermore, generalizations are perceived to be overvalued as a source of scientific development (Flyvbjerg 1991: 149; Andersen 1997: 10-35).

As previously mentioned, the methodological route of this study is explorative, aimed at advancing theory and simultaneously breaking new empirical ground by studying the evolution of a norm pertaining to conflict prevention. To trace this process is not a random choice, but motivated by the theoretical insights for norm evolution that can be gained from studying this emerging, but not yet “settled norm”. In addition, limited research has been designated to explore this idea’s transformation into a norm. Moreover, the choice was motivated by an interest to explore the growing political interest in conflict prevention, combined with a special opportunity to study the Swedish norm entrepreneurial efforts in this process. I argue here that a single-case study, such as this one, is valuable on its own, as it can demonstrate the usefulness of a constructivist approach to norm evolution and contribute new theoretical insights. A case study such as the one analyzed here can be the source of limited generalizations for a specific class, or category, but I also hold that generalizations are only one source of scientific development.

**Tracing a Process**

One major challenge is how to assess the effects of ideation on policy choices in single-case studies. Alexander George (1979) delineated the process-tracing approach when attempting to trace the process by which norms, ideas and beliefs influence behavior. Considerable research in the constructivist tradition and within the diffusion paradigm has been devoted to process-tracing i.e. retrospective tracer studies reconstructing the sequence of main events and decisions in an evolutionary process (Finnemore 1996a; Checkel 1998; 2001). A process-tracing methodology, which emphasizes discourse and justification in terms of policy advocacy, allows for the disaggregation of the case and the subsequent ability to understand both the moments of progress and the periods of failure in terms of the norm entrepreneurial activity (Risse-Kappen 1995). Well aware of the difficulties involved in the empirical study of
norms, Amy Gurowitz (1999: 416) states: “the impact of international norms varies across time and place, and it is only through detailed process tracing that we can understand when and where they matter”. I argue that a study based on a process-tracing method, focusing on the consistencies of norm entrepreneurial activities in the norm evolution process, has the potential to reveal and reassert the growing importance of ideas and shared norms and to offer a tool for identifying changes in the normative structure.

As with most other motivations of political action, there are often only indirect indications of the existence of a norm. Indications of the emergence and existence of norms can be found in norm-created patterns of behavior, in organizational and procedural changes as well as in discourses surrounding a particular behavior. By applying process-tracing methodologies, these key areas can be thoroughly examined (cf. Sikkink 1991: 19-28); Finnemore 1996a: 23; Bergström and Boréus 2000: 148-156). Because norms by definition are collectively held, intersubjective and related to shared moral assessments, they are often discussed before a consensus is reached (Florini 1996: 364). In particular, emerging norms are often articulated and possible to trace in the discourse, while settled norms, on the other hand, are less often subjected to conscious reflection but rather taken for granted (Finnemore 1996a: 23-24). Clearly, the manner in which states talk about norms is often just as important, if not more so, than how they act. Actors may refer to a particular set of international norms to motivate and persuade others to act or mobilize joint action, and to justify actions. One of the more comprehensive attempts to study norms in this way is Michael Walzer’s (1977: 44) discussion of the war convention. He states that “we cannot get at the substance of the convention by studying combat behavior, any more than we can understand the norms of friendship by studying the way friends […] treat one another”. Instead, the norms are apparent “in the expectations friends have, the complaints they make, the hypocrisies they adopt”. Walzer (ibid.) applies this reasoning to war, and states that “relations between combatants have a normative structure that is revealed in what they say (and what the rest of us say) rather than in what they do”.

Here, I will attempt to trace the process of norm evolution by focusing on the activities of the norm entrepreneur in this process. An analysis of rhetoric, communication, organizational and procedural changes, enables me to account for lags in behavior without automatically discounting the relevance of incremental normative progression. An exclusive focus on action would place one in the difficult position of only recognizing norms after states decided to adhere to the norms in question or act upon them. Doing so does
not allow for a sophisticated understanding of the emergence of new norms and norm development.

**A Note on the Written Material**

As this study attempts to trace a process, several types of material have been used. This use of multiple sources of information is a characteristic of case studies (Yin 1984: 23). Most settled international norms are stated explicitly in treaties, resolutions and declarations including soft declarations, rules and standards established by international organizations. Uncodified unsettled norms may be inferred from these same sources, but also from statements by leaders and state practices, as well as from behavioral traces in the form of treaty commitments, action plans and policies. Scholars studying international norms have used a variety of materials. Some have relied on legal treaties and public documentation and used these documents as data sources (Goldmann 1971: 306-310). Others have used unofficial material to examine the role of legal norms (Nilsson 1988). Yet a third approach has been to focus on behavior compliance or non-compliance with a norm (Goertz and Diehl 1992). It has been suggested that a combination of textual analysis of formal and informal documents and in-depth interviews can be a fruitful approach when one wants to establish actor interests independent of behavior (Züern quoted in Checkel 1999: 92).

To study the Swedish norm entrepreneur efforts, I utilize formal documents such as declarations, press releases, public statements, articles, speeches and briefs. I rely mainly on formal documents, such as UN reports, statements, resolutions and speeches in the General Assembly as well as official summaries of the Security Council debates. For tracing the process of norm evolution in the EU arena, I depend on reports, documents, statements, press releases and speeches from the EU Presidency, the European Council, the General Affairs Council, the European Commission and the European Council Secretariat. However, I find that too much attention to formal documentation and action could be misleading when attempting to trace an emerging norm. Hence, internal non-classified material such as memoranda, background papers and internal briefs are used, and they can be far more revealing about the process of socializing norm followers than formal UN Resolutions, Council and Presidency Conclusions and formal communications. Additional information about the process, however, can only be found by interviewing officials who participated in the meetings and discussions.
A Note on Interviews

Although interviews are not an uncomplicated method for gathering information, they are highly useful when tracing a process concerning ideational phenomena (Alvesson and Deetz 2000: 215-216; Checkel 2001: 565-566). As studies in foreign policy and international relations may suffer from material restrictions due to secrecy, interviews are important complements to the written material. According to Lars-Göran Stenelo (1985: 29), “the interview method may assist in breaking through the barrier of secrecy”, particularly interviews off the record. I gained deeper understanding of the process through interviews with certain individuals occupying central positions or serving as the driving force behind the norm entrepreneurial efforts. Some were members of the cabinet, high level diplomats or EU and UN officials; others were the “busy bees” at lower level of the foreign ministry bureaucracy, the UN Secretariat and the European Council Secretariat and the European Commission. Clearly the interview material is context dependent, which cannot be disregarded (Alvesson and Deetz 2000: 216). The selection of respondents was based on their involvement in and knowledge of the process of promoting conflict prevention on the international arena. The interviews conducted were open-ended in the early stage of the research, serving an explorative function and helping to inform the analysis of the written material. In the final stage, I employed semi-structured interviews, in the sense that a number of broad questions were formulated in advance and posed to all the respondents, while still leaving room to follow up impulses and suggestions from the interviewee. These interviews were conducted to confirm certain facts and my own interpretations of the written material as well as to give me a deeper understanding of the process as a whole (cf. Stenelo 1985: 30).

There are certain problems associated with using interview material, which is often pointed out in the methodological literature (Stenelo 1972: 21; Diesing 1991: 273-299; Alvesson and Deetz 2000: 215-221). A selection bias may develop if only respondents supporting the argument of the thesis are selected for interviews. The bias may be reinforced if one follows recommendations for additional interviews from respondents themselves. An additional problem is that in retrospect, most people tend to recall events and developments incorrectly as well as overestimate their own importance in the process. Particular problems emerge when using interview techniques to explore the influence of norms and ideas. This has been pointed out by Judith Goldstein
and Robert Keohane (1993: 27), who state that “students of the role of ideas will always have to interpret what is in the people’s heads: their conceptions of what is true, reflecting their own attempts to create meaning in their lives”. In an interview situation it is impossible to establish that the respondent believes in what he or she says. However, this study is not concerned with the truthfulness of the actor, but the role of that actor in the process of norm evolution. If the actors are relatively consistent in what they say and write over time independent of audience, and if they act according to their ideas, then they seem likely to believe in the ideas (Uhlin 1995: 60; Checkel 2001: 565, 566). At times, I received information that the interviewee did not want me to attribute to him/her directly, or from written but confidential sources. Despite the drawback of lack of transparency and corroboration, I made the choice of including the valuable information without revealing my source. In some phases of the norm evolution process there is little written documentation; thus I rely firmly on the material from my interviews.

**Personal Experience—Some Reflections**

As a member of the Policy Planning Unit and then the Secretariat for Conflict Prevention at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs between 1999-2000, I was able to closely follow the developments of the Swedish foreign policy elite’s thinking in relation to conflict prevention during a crucial period. It gave me the opportunity to intimately study Sweden in the role of a norm entrepreneur when building and diffusing the norm of conflict prevention. This gave me important insights without which this particular study could not have been carried out. For example, I learned to understand the subtext to conversations, what was said and not said, how information was framed, the symbols that were emotionally charged, what knowledge was relevant, how arguments were constructed and topics debated. The foreign policy bureaucracy, like all organizations, has its own culture to the extent that it has its own discourse. I was socialized into this culture in the sense that I became familiar with its language, norms and symbols—although my identity as an academic and visitor never disappeared.

There are of course drawbacks involved in participating in a process while at the same time studying it. For instance, my personal involvement may reflect my interpretation of the process, in terms of determining what was important and who was the leading figure and identifying the obstacles and the facilitating factors in the process. The fact that some time has passed since
I worked at the Secretariat for Conflict Prevention has made me able to assess my experiences. However, my values clearly affect both the topic chosen and my argument as I seek to increase our understanding of norm evolution in general and the evolution of a norm pertaining to conflict prevention in particular. Since I cannot keep my analysis entirely distinct from my values, it seems fair to indicate to the reader that I, perhaps uncontroversially, perceive conflict prevention as a “good” norm and would like to see it develop and become incorporated into the normative context of the international society in the not too distant future.

In this chapter I have identified social constructivism as an attractive middle road approach to the study of ideas and norms in international relations. Furthermore, I have discussed the methodological implications of theorizing norms and ideas in-depth. The method chosen for the analysis is a single-case study, which will provide the theoretical reasoning with empirical illustrations suitable for theoretical discovery. This illustration, I believe, can demonstrate the utility of the social constructivist approach as complementary to other IR theories. The meta-theoretical discussion and the structurationist approach identified here will guide the conceptualization of norms, norm entrepreneurs and normative structure as well as the development of a theoretical framework for norm evolution, as the next two chapters will take us to the theoretical heartland of the study.
The importance of principles and norms is easily underestimated; but in the
decades since the United Nations was created, the spreading acceptance of
new norms has profoundly affected the lives of many millions of people.

Kofi Annan

Recently, ideational phenomena have once again moved to the forefront of the
research agenda of international relations, and it has become intellectually
fashionable to discuss their importance. Much research has focused on
establishing that ideas and norms matter in international relations while other
studies evaluate the influence of international norms. Less attention has been paid
to the process of how norms evolve and the elements involved in norm evolution.

To approach norm evolution, this chapter investigates three elements
central to norm evolution—norm, norm entrepreneur and normative struc-
ture. It presents an understanding of international norms, their functions and
their influence. It brings actors back into the study of norms and identifies
norm entrepreneurs as a crucial mechanism in norm development. By first
bracketing norm entrepreneurs the analysis will focus on norms, and then
norms will be bracketed to shift analytical focus to norm entrepreneurs. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the normative structure.

On Norms

Because norms vary over time and often are context-dependent, their elusive
nature poses serious analytical problems. There are a number of definitions of
international norms, which converge and overlap, stemming from different
philosophical traditions and theoretical approaches. As expected, these litera-
tures also present different views on the function and influence of interna-
tional norms. As norms will be one of the cornerstones for the development of a theoretical framework, I will conceptualize norms and identify their functions and influence.

**Conceptualizing International Norms...**

Common definitions of norms are based on behavior, prescription, and shared expectations. A primary element in a conceptualization of norms is standards of behavior. Norms are perceived as creating regularity and consistency of behavior. Gurowitz, (1999: 417) for instance, defines norms as a “result from common practices among states”. Norms represent “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations” (Krasner 1982: 186). Standard behavior, however, is an insufficient definition of norms, as constant repetition of the same act does not necessarily create a norm of conduct. In contrast, sometimes norms may be created as a consequence of only one precedent (Tunink 1974: 13-15). This type of definition, while focusing on regularities in behavior and normal practices, tends to overlook the prescriptive aspect of norms.

For the normal to become normative, a feeling of obligation needs to be added, and the behavior must be driven by norms (Florini 1996: 364). Norms have prescriptive or proscriptive qualities such as “Thou shalt not kill” (Shannon 2000: 295). In this sense norms are general prescriptions of behavior. This prescriptive element is inescapable since norms involve “appropriateness” and concerns about proper behavior because actors are forced to conform to certain “norms of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1998: 943-969). But what is appropriate is known only by reference to a social community (Axelrod 1986: 1097). Hedely Bull’s (1977: 6, 7, 13) notion of rules is similar to the prescriptive character of norms, and he asserts that rules are general imperative principles which require or authorize persons, groups or states to behave in prescribed ways. Most norms stipulate conditions under which behaviors are allowed or not. The norm “thou shalt not kill, except in self-defense”, indicates under what situations the norm’s prescriptive character may not apply (Shannon 2000: 295). Clearly, all norms are not moral, which is emphasized by among others Klotz (1995a: 14).

The third element common to the conceptualization of norms is shared collective expectations. Norms are considered as a set of intersubjective understandings and collective expectations regarding the proper behavior of actors, in a given context or with a certain identity (Klotz 1995a; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Norms entail a collective evaluation and future expectations
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of behavior. To Peter Katzenstein (1996: 5) norms describe “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity”. Collective expectations may, however, be problematic since intersubjective interpretations of norms rely on the mediating role of agents in receiving and interpreting messages from the norm (Shannon 2000: 298).

…and Their Functions

Norms are typically portrayed as regulating, enabling or constituting actors (Krasner 1982; 88; Kratochwil 1989; Schweller and Priess 1997; Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1999). Before delving into the questions of the functions of norms, I will clarify two things. First, I will not uphold the distinction between enabling and constituting norms. I understand norms to constitute interests and thereby enable actors to undertake certain actions that could not otherwise have been undertaken. Second, I view norms as simultaneously regulative and constitutive.

Regulative norms that are thought to influence international relations by prescribing, proscribing and ordering behavior have gained a great deal of scholarly attention (Krasner 1982: 185-206; Schweller and Priess 1997: 1-32). These norms operate like standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity and establish rights and obligations. A metaphor for norms that tends to capture the regulative sense of international norms is to liken norms to “rules of the road” (Raymond 1997: 214). Norms can then become important when the normative principle they reflect presents actors with alternative political strategies to reach their goal(s).

Clearly, norms not only regulate behavior, but also constitute the interest and identity of the actor, thus having “constitutive effects” (Katzenstein 1996: 5). The norm of sovereignty, for example, both regulates the interaction of states in international affairs and defines what a state is (Risse 2000: 5). Constitutive norms create categories of action, and in the long run they create new actors. It is not only norms that will affect states’ adoption of means, but their identity will also determine which means are acceptable (Jepperson et al. 1996: 54). Consequently, certain states cannot, according to Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, (1996: 114-143) for example, adopt means such as nuclear or chemical weapons, since their identity prohibits the use of these weapons.

Over time, constitutive and regulative norms may become settled norms institutionalized into the everyday practices and interactions in the international community. Settled norms can therefore be considered as action-
guiding devices, instructional units directing the behavior of actors and identifying commonly accepted notions of “best practices” (cf. Kratochwil 1989: 5; Florini 1996: 367). By encouraging special functions and recurrent practices, norms facilitate coordination of action. Settled norms can function as a tripwire in case a widely accepted rule is violated; attention can be focused and a collective response be mobilized (Raymond 1997). By providing information, norms establish a context for interpreting policy signals sent by other actors they facilitate monitoring and discourage cheating on international agreements and they serve as signposts to warn policymakers of prearranged actions that other states will take under certain conditions. Against this backdrop it is possible to view norms and practice as mutually constitutive (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 35).

…and Their Influence

One common approach to norm influence is to perceive only settled norms as having an impact on practice. However, this study is concerned with the influence of emerging norms and will “evaluate” this in terms of norm robustness (Legro 1997: 34). Robustness is conceptualized in the following way. Durability will here characterize how long the norm has been around and if the norm can be regarded as having long-standing legitimacy (Legro 1997: 34; cf. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 906). Persuasiveness will refer to the intrinsic characteristics of the norm, i.e. how well the ideas, values and beliefs that underpin the norm resonate with the norm followers. If the intrinsic characteristics of the norm are persuasive, the norm has expansive potential (cf. Legro 1997: 34; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 906). Feasibility is related to how well the norm translates into practice, i.e. whether or not it can guide action (Kingdon 1995: 131-132). Applicability refers to the potential norm community. “Norms making universalistic claims…(such as many Western norms) have more expansive potential than localized and particularistic normative frameworks” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 907). However, this evolution of robustness should not be considered as an attempt to measure the influence of norms. It offers no formula for how to aggregate the different elements of robustness, nor a specific measurement scale. I believe that any assessment of norm influence, in terms of robustness or otherwise, will have to rely on interpretation. Therefore, the components described above will be used to discuss the evolution of the particular norm of interest to this study in the concluding chapter.
An Understanding of International Norms

Drawing on the conceptualization of norms, this study recognizes the widely accepted view of norms as patterns of behavior. However, I find that “norms do not necessarily identify actual behavior; rather they identify notions of what appropriate behavior ought to be” (Bernstein 2000: 467). Hence, norms are social structures consisting of intersubjective understandings of appropriate behavior in the international community. In my opinion, it is the prescriptive quality of “oughtness” that sets norms apart from other kinds of rules (cf. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Norms express values that create new rights and responsibilities. They constitute interests and identities, and may provide states with both preferences and effective and legitimate means and strategies for pursuing these preferences (Finnemore 1996a: 15). I find that a conceptual distinction between interests and norms central to rationalist perspectives cannot be retained if one believes in the constructivist assumption that norms constitute interests and identities. Consequently, interests cannot be determined in isolation from norms. This discussion leads me to define norms, in the following way: Norms are intersubjective understandings that constitute actors’ interests and identities, and create expectations as well as prescribe what appropriate behavior ought to be by expressing values and defining rights and obligations.

Some outstanding conceptual issues continue to create confusion and discussion. To put the previous reasoning in perspective I will briefly touch upon one such issue, namely the distinction between ideas, norms and institutions. Constructivists in political science talk in terms of “ideas” and “norms”, sociologists speak a language of “institutions” to refer to similar behavioral rules. It is difficult but necessary to construct analytical distinctions between these terms.

Although many researchers use norms and ideas interchangeably, I find it essential to uphold a distinction between the two. Here, I view ideas as mental events that entail thought, but unlike norms ideas may be held privately and they are not necessarily intersubjective (Yee 1996; Finnemore 1996a: 22). Ideas also differ from norms as “ideas may or may not have behavioral implications: norms by definition concerns behavior” and here norms also include a prescriptive element which sets them apart from ideas (Finnemore 1996a: 22). As a brief footnote it is necessary to mention collective ideas, as the notion has surfaced in the growing constructivist literature. Collective ideas are presented as social and holistic, and cannot be reduced to individual
belief systems. They are the “property” of a community and can be characterized as intersubjective creations (Czarniawska and Joerges 1996: 32-36; Legro 2000: 420) However, the concept of collective ideas is similar to the notion of norms, but lacks the prescriptive and normative element and does not refer to practice. Consequently, I found that norms can be specified with greater analytical rigor and therefore be analytically more useful. To employ the concept of collective ideas seems unnecessary, since introducing yet another concept in this conceptual jungle would only create more confusion.

A distinction between norms and institutions is needed. James March and Johan Olsen (1998: 948), for example, define institutions similarly to norms. Institutions are “a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior of specific groups of actors in specific situations”. Instead of speaking about institution to refer to a collection of norms I will use normative structure, and following Mervyn Frost’s (1996: 97-105) terminology I use the term “settled norm” when referring to norms that are institutionalized into this normative structure.

On Norm Entrepreneurs

Actors at work in the initiation, promotion and institutionalization of norms will be given special attention in this study. The ambition is to develop and employ the concept of norm entrepreneur, to characterize these actors. This study attempts to identify norm entrepreneurs’ motivations, their possibilities and limitations to influence world politics.13

Bringing Actors Back in

Despite the ambition that actor and structure are mutually constitutive, social constructivism, as interpreted by Wendt (1987), is criticized for over-emphasizing structure at the expense of actors. For instance, Jeffrey Checkel (1998: 325) claims that “constructivism lacks a theory of agency”, and “as a result, it overemphasizes the role of social structures and norms at the expense of agents who help to create and change them in the first place.” To come to terms with this problem, some researchers strengthened the focus on actors, which resulted in criticism for reinforcing an actor-oriented ontology. A general critique of the constructivist research program is that it needs a theoretical framework where neither actor nor structure is given ontological priority. As previously discussed, this study will attempt to explore the relation-
ship between actor and structure, seeking as it does to explore the role of norm entrepreneurs in the process of norm evolution without giving either ontological primacy.

**Norm Entrepreneur and Its Conceptualization**

The origin of the term “norm entrepreneur” can be traced to the French word “entrepreneur”, which literally means the undertaker of a project. In political science and international relations the concept of entrepreneur is frequently used to describe, for instance, agenda setters, policy innovators, morally committed actors as well as epistemic communities. In many ways, the concept of “norm entrepreneur”, recently revived by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) and used in this study, mirrors similar concepts used in the literature. For example, the term “transnational moral entrepreneurs” is used by Ethan Nadelmann (1990: 482) to characterize actors who legitimize or de-legitimize behavior and thus change norms. Howard Becker’s (1963: 148) notion of moral entrepreneurs refers to those who “operate with an absolute ethic” in seeking to create new rules to do away with perceived greater evil. Policy entrepreneurs refer to an actor, strongly committed to a particular idea or policy, acting as an informal agenda-setter (Kingdon 1995: 122-124; Jacobsen 1995: 291; Pollack 1997: 124-128; Moravcsik 1999). The term “norm-maker” defines the agents behind norm diffusion (Checkel 1999). Evidently, entrepreneurs play an important role in bringing about new ideas in various political settings. Whereas many conceptualizations of the entrepreneur refer primarily to an individual entrepreneur and not a collective, the concept of collective entrepreneur is not uncommon in political science.

A salient trait of the norm entrepreneur is a strong commitment to a particular idea. The norm entrepreneur is an agent of social change with an ability to shape the collective behavior of others. Norm entrepreneurs are agenda setters introducing new ideas into the international debate. A norm entrepreneur could also be characterized as a problem-solver who takes the initiative to sort out intricate issues, or steps into the breach for a particular cause (cf. Nadelmann 1990; Pollack 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). This often involves efforts to change the constraints and recognize opportunities of social interaction. Opportunity is very much a two-way street: it opens the way for entrepreneurial activity, but certain norm entrepreneurs may also have the ability to create opportunities. When the time is right, typically when there is a window of opportunity—open for a short time when the conditions for presenting an idea are right—these norm entrepre-
neurs present their ideas on the political agenda as an ideal solution to the problem at hand (Kingdon 1995: 88). Norm entrepreneurs are here conceptualized as follows: *By identifying or creating opportunities, actors committed to a particular idea set out to change the existing normative context and alter the behavior of others in the direction of the new norm.*

**Identity**

A large body of literature in international relations attests to the importance of identity in international politics (cf. Wendt 1994; 1999; Katzenstein 1996; Weldes 1996; Neumann 1999). In this study norms and identities are perceived as mutually constitutive. The identity of the norm entrepreneur is crucial to the selection of ideas, the choice of diffusion strategies and the arenas favored for the norm entrepreneurial activities. A number of different types of actors can become “norm entrepreneurs”. An individual like Henry Dunant, whose personal experiences at Solferino in 1859 led him to advocate care for the wounded in wars and propose a relief society, later to be called the International Red Cross Committee, can be characterized as a norm entrepreneur (Finnemore 1996a: 73-85). Transnational policy networks, such as the transnational anti-apartheid pressure group, have been identified as promoting norms of racial equality (Klotz 1995a; 1995b), and the social movements advocating the recognition of women’s home-based work are other examples (Prügel 1999). I find that much constructivist research has focused on activities of non-state actors in the process of norm evolution, where norms are constructed at the grass root level and then diffused to the state level. I tend to agree with Checkel (1999: 88) who argues that an “implicit and unfortunate dichotomy” between the “good” NGO entrepreneurs or civil-society activists and the “bad” state has been created by the lack of attention paid to state actors as norm entrepreneurs. One may question whether non-state actors are more suitable norm entrepreneurs, and if ideas and norms really are formed at the grass root level and then percolate up to the state level of the society. Depending on the issue, it is possible the elite representing the state plays the key role in transforming the normative structure by promoting new norms for international relations.

Inspired by Wendt (1999) who gives state actors a prominent place in his social theory of international politics, this study focuses on state actors as norm entrepreneurs. A state’s identity, however, is not exogenously given, but constructed in the interaction with other states in the international society and with the normative context (Wendt 1994). This conceptualization of state identity implies the possibility of multiple and changing identities. Collective
identity formation is widely discussed in IR theory (cf. Neumann 1999: 20-25). As Wendt’s analysis of collective identity formation begins with the state treating it as a unitary actor, it has been criticized for not questioning the state and deconstructing it (Chakrabarti Pasic 1996: 85-104; Doty 2000: 137-139). To avoid this debate, the state will here be discussed as if it was a unitary actor (Neumann 1999: 207-228; Checkel 2001: 578). The focus on state actors is motivated by the fact that there are issue areas where states and interstate organizations remain dominant players. In the area of international peace and security, a number of studies demonstrate that states have been the driving force for example, in establishing global prohibition regimes such as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons agreements, the chemical and biological weapons taboos, and developing norms of neutrality and alliances (cf. Nadelmann 1990; Price and Tannenwald 1996; Parker 2001).

Norm entrepreneurs, however, need not be powerful states. Yet, it has been suggested that great powers will have obvious advantages if they wish to try to create a new norm. Robert Axelrod (1986: 1108) for instance, suggests that “it is easier to get a norm started if it serves the interest of the powerful”. Norms held by powerful states, it is argued, will more easily be transmitted to the international community through the great opportunities afforded to powerful states to persuade others to become norm followers. Small states, in contrast, may not be able to afford to have such broad involvement (Florini 1996: 375). Small states, as we will see, may be able to play the role of norm entrepreneurs influencing world politics under certain circumstances.

I will focus on those who act in the name of the state, as these elites are often highlighted when discussing foreign policy ideas. The diplomatic corps, for example, is perceived as a conveyor of ideas across borders (cf. Keynes 1936: 383-384; Der Derian 1996: 85). Weldes (1996: 281) claims that individuals who “inhabit offices in the state play a special role in constructing the national interest”. Foreign-policy elites are expected to act as entrepreneurs in international politics where states are still the most important actors, at least in certain areas such as international security (Cerny 2000: 435-463). Yet these norm entrepreneurs are frequently condemned to catch up with broad domestic and international trends initiated elsewhere. The notion of a foreign policy elite is employed in the subsequent chapters to denote the circle of diplomats, politicians and officials representing Sweden on the international arena. They are the ones responsible for developing the conflict prevention idea, which is not one individual’s brainchild. This circle of people is the collective carrier of the idea of conflict prevention and engaged in norm advocacy.
Motivations

Clearly, the motivations for norm entrepreneurs vary, but altruism, ideational commitment and self-interest have been suggested (cf. Goertz and Diehl 1992; Jacobsen 1995: 291; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 898). To act according to altruistic motivations means to promote or defend values, ideas or norms, and contribute to realizing these values or norms in practice (Elgström 1982: 33). Ideational commitment, for example, may motivate norm entrepreneurs to promote certain norms because of the moral and ethical values that underpin such norms (a moral commitment to something that is perceived as ethically “right”). In contrast, Jacobsen (1995: 291) believes in self-interest and argues that “entrepreneurs do not descend from Mount Olympus; they are usually interested actors who benefit when their ideas are adopted”. At times it may be difficult to distinguish between norm-influenced interests and self-interest. Norm-like behavior may be driven by pure self-interest and norms are then only used as convenient justifications for self-interested behavior (Goertz and Diehl 1992: 637). Other times, self-interest is actually “other-regarding interests”, which refers to “benefits that accrue primarily to other states or their citizens” or a “collective interest” where one “cannot clearly separate benefits to oneself from those to others” (George and Keohane 1980: 221).

Some actors may have an interest in becoming norm entrepreneurs so as to create a niche for themselves in international politics, but the norm they promote may be in the collective interest of the international community. I hold that self-interest, like identity, is constituted by norms, and that to separate norms from interest is fundamentally flawed. I perceive norm entrepreneurs not as acting against self-interest but rather in accordance with a redefined self-interest. For that reason self-interests need not be completely ruled out as a motivating factor for a norm entrepreneur.

Ability to Influence

In the new changing world of international relations a situation has been created where not only is power dispersed, but it also assumes more forms than the traditional power analysis suggests. Norm entrepreneurs may or may not possess traditional power resources to influence policy outcomes. Soft power resources such as knowledge, technical expertise, social skills and moral authority are becoming increasingly important. Moral authority comes from reputation based on repeated interaction, meeting obligations and behaving
consistently with the international community’s norms (Hall 1997: 591-622). Since norm entrepreneurship is about interaction and influence, social skills may enable actors to interact effectively with others. Social skills and to some extent moral authority refer to the qualities of an individual entrepreneur (Garrett and Weingast 1993; Kingdon 1995: 180-181), and for that reason could be difficult to apply to a collective entrepreneur.

Norm entrepreneurs obviously need followers, but as international politics rarely witness mass movements, norm entrepreneurs can be regarded as influential if they merely take the lead on a specific issue and gain support from only a few other actors. They have a number of strategies at their disposal to influence norm followers and the international normative context. To initiate a norm, a norm entrepreneur may use selection and framing strategies (Kingdon 1995: 131-134; Snow and Banford 1992: 135-139). These strategies rest on the power that goes with compelling ideas that can be constructed to fit with the existing normative structure, and with the skill to present one’s ideas convincingly at the right time. It is also a matter of constructing norms suitable to the problems the norm entrepreneur wants to address. To diffuse the norm candidate and “change the minds of others”, the norm entrepreneur may use strategies such as persuasion, convincing, coercion, shaming and blaming (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999; Johnston 2001). Furthermore, in order to institutionalize the norm into a normative structure the norm entrepreneur can initiate organizational and procedural changes, suggest new policies and programs and provide rhetorical maintenance of the norm. The choice of strategy depends, as previously mentioned, on the identity of the norm entrepreneur and structural constraints.

Norm entrepreneurs perceived as impartial and not pursuing any direct self-interest are more influential than those unable to project such disinterest. The norm entrepreneurs need to be able to look beyond their own interests and concerns, to the interests of a wider group (i.e. the norm followers) in order to be perceived as legitimate (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 896-899). Thus, the norm entrepreneur attempts to elevate the norm candidate beyond its identification with the interest of the entrepreneur.

**Innovation**

As entrepreneurship is frequently associated with innovation and novelty, this needs a brief clarification. Norm entrepreneurs are not compelled to select a new idea or construct a novel norm candidate. Particularly not since “it matters little, so far as human behavior is concerned, whether or not an idea
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is objectively new as measured by the lapse of time since its first use or discovery” (Rogers 1995: 11). As has been pointed out by many, “norms are rarely if ever created de novo”: all norms have their antecedents (Kowert and Legro 1996: 469). Norm entrepreneurs may frame old ideas in new ways or revive an old norm, in order to build a norm candidate. A norm candidate is therefore often a recombination of mainly familiar ideational elements in a new constellation. New circumstances may, however, demand reformed normative structures. For that reason new norm candidates are frequently built on existing idea complexes and are adaptations of the existing normative structures. The norm entrepreneur may also introduce the norm candidate in a new milieu where it was previously foreign and can therefore be perceived as new. Hence, the content of the norm may be old but the “framing” is new. The norm entrepreneur analyzed in this study is, therefore, regarded as a reformist gradually reforming the normative context, rather than a radicalist transforming the existing normative framework. The reform strategy is less threatening and more adaptable and could have pedagogical advantages when persuading norm followers.

Organizational Arena

“Rarely do new ideas thrive in the modern world outside of institutional networks” (Sikkink 1991: 2). Norm entrepreneurs, therefore, shop around for a forum that can assist them in their norm promoting activity and where the norm can become institutionalized and settled (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 11-13; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 899). Like traveling salesmen, the norm entrepreneurs arrive at a designated organization, which provides them with an international arena on which to exchange ideas and advance norms. Norm entrepreneurs consciously cultivate “their” norm in these international settings and they build coalitions to wield more support for the ideas and norms they intend to “sell” (cf. Wallace 1998; Gurowitz 1999). Organizations themselves reflect a set of dominant ideas and norms translated into their structures and procedures. Once a new norm is institutionalized, organizations will facilitate the implementation of the norm by giving it institutional support and means of expression, as well as help teach, articulate and transmit the norm so that it can become a settled norm (cf. Finnemore 1993: 595; 1996a: 22; Barnett 1995).

Small states in particular tend to rely on international organizations and multilateral settings for their norm promoting activities (cf. Jerneck 1996: 147-149). Most small states share the recognition that multilateral organizations can protect and promote their interests, and they tend to
support stronger multilateral organizations and multilateral norms. However, when norm entrepreneurs use existing organizations the norm may be shaped by the agenda of the organization. An additional problem connected with using international organizations is that they may act as ideational gatekeepers, controlling the access of ideas and keeping them separated from the policy and decision makers (Yee 1996: 92). Alternatively, a new organization can be created for the specific purpose of upholding and promoting the norm.

On Normative Structure

New norms do not emerge in a vacuum as many have noted. A norm should, therefore, not be scrutinized in isolation, but analyzed in relation to the existing normative structure and in competition with other norms. International norms are interrelated “in a complex mosaic of interrelated parts to form a normative order” (Raymond 1997: 231). This can also be characterized as a “web of shared normative understandings about what behavior is acceptable” (Florini 1996: 376).

Clearly, normative structures are rarely monolithic. Usually they contain a hierarchy of normative elements with one norm dominant and at least one main challenger. An analysis of norms must therefore pay attention to the interdependence of norms (Väyrynen 1999: 31). New norms enter a context already defined by prevailing norms (Sikkink 1991: 2; Florini 1996: 376). New norms compete with other emerging norms or existing ones in a limited, normative space. They are shaped by this interaction and by the extant normative structure. Once a new norm is emerging, some portion of this normative space must be de-colonized and reoccupied by the emerging norm. If the new norm is to be adopted and institutionalized, this can often only be done at the expense of settled norms and well-entrenched standards of behavior (cf. Sikkink 1991: 2; Elgström 2000).

Hence, efforts to promote new norms often take place within an existing framework of “appropriateness”, a framework defined by “settled” norms and social practices. This normative space is important not only for the displacement it demands, but because settled, monopolizing norms necessarily condition the types of norms promoted by entrepreneurs. Existing norms demand that competitors meet standards of appropriateness that compel a meshing of the emerging parameters of behavior with the prior norms. In the terminology of Thomas Franck (1990: 94-97), specific norms have a pedigree if their rights and obligations can be linked to previous or more comprehensive norms. Hence,
a norm can be “symbolically validated by its pedigree”, which also increases the likelihood of compliance with it. Depending on the norm the need to match the existing normative structure will vary.

A Normative Fit

Any new norm must fit coherently with other existing norms” (Florini 1996: 376). Norms that “fit” with extant norms gain persuasiveness, while norms that do not “fit” with underlying social values are unlikely to find support among norm followers (Sikkink 1991; Goldstein and Keohane 1993). This suggests certain limitations for introducing completely new norms, making abrupt normative changes seem unlikely. Laffey and Weldes (1997: 203) point out that claims about “fit” do not carry much explanatory power, since “fit” does not just happen, but is created. The “[fit] between new norms” and existing norms is “actively constructed rather than simply ‘there’” in the norms themselves. In support of the normative fit approach, Thomas Ward (2000: 107) argues that “what is important is the way in which a morally compelling principle fits into the prevailing structure of the international system”. Ward (ibid.) finds that “if there is a compatible or, better still a mutually reinforcing relationship between a moral principle and the environment in which that principle is to be applied it is more likely that an effective norm will arise”. Normative match according to Checkel (1999: 87) is “not a dichotomous variable”; rather “it scales along a spectrum”.

Against this background three types of normative fitness will be explored in this study. First, the normative fit with the norm entrepreneur’s normative frame of mind, second, with the potential norm followers’ normative convictions and third, with the existing normative context will be investigated (cf. Checkel 1999: 87; Bernstein 2000). These types of fitness are constructed, and hence, can be affected by the norm entrepreneur. This means that entrepreneurs seeking to frame issues and build norms must remain cognizant of the manner in which emergent norms fit with the existing normative structure and how these norms will fit with norm followers’ convictions.

Normative Clash

The potential for normative fit seems to be constrained if the promoted norm clashes with other norms (cf. Jackson 2000: 339). Norm candidates are in competition with other norm candidates as well as settled norms that carry incompatible instructions. Within a limited normative space, norm candi-
dates must compete for time and attention, and their prevalence waxes and wanes over time. In this competition one can think of two types of outcomes: firstly, only one of the competitors prevails absolutely and the other one disappears; secondly, the two competing norms coexist over time (Florini 1996: 367). Clashes with existing international and domestic structures may shape and reshape both the substance and the format of the norm candidate.

Norms, norm entrepreneur and normative structure will form the building blocks of the dynamic analytical framework of this study. In this chapter, I have conceptualized the three building blocks in a way consistent with the social constructivist perspective. Furthermore, I have explored the actor-structure dynamics in terms of the need to construct a normative match with the normative structure. This discussion has prepared the ground for developing the analytical framework in Chapter Four.
One of the most important features of norms is that the standing of a norm can change in a surprisingly short time. 

Robert Axelrod

Norms wax and wane over time. It is not simply a matter of norms’ existing or not existing, but instead of how they evolve. How do norms enter into the international sphere? How do they evolve over time? And why do certain norms become widely accepted standards of behavior, while others do not? This chapter presents an analytical framework for understanding norm evolution that explores the role of norm entrepreneurs and the normative structure in the process. In looking at norm evolution there is a process to trace, but it is not present everywhere. By examining the efforts of norm entrepreneurs we can gain a better understanding of idea takeoff and the initiation, diffusion and institutionalization of norms. This framework will also assist us in understanding if and how norms become increasingly robust, and therefore more influential, as a growing number of actors are socialized into becoming norm followers.

Towards an Understanding of Norm Dynamics

By exploring existing theories concerned with norm dynamics, an analytical framework for norm evolution is advanced. The ambition is to connect the three building blocks, norm, norm entrepreneur and normative structure, into a coherent framework. The analysis will focus on the following elements shared by most existing theories of norm evolution: structural changes, practices, pre-existing normative structures and actors.

To understand evolution we must understand change over time. The temporal dimension is therefore crucial to an analysis of norm evolution. Because established norms usually have a historical dimension it has been
argued that in order to study norm change one needs a long-term perspective. Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl (1992: 645) suggest that “although norms change, they do so usually quite slowly and the weight of the past is strong in determining the current status of the norm”. But, even though the norm of today is not dramatically different from the norm of yesterday it is different nonetheless. Hence, “norms are a dynamic phenomenon because the past influences the present, but behavior in the present changes the norm” (ibid.). Axelrod (1986: 1096) finds that one crucial feature of a norm is that its standing can change in a surprisingly short time. The finding that a norm may change rapidly is something this study will explore carefully by relating it to the persuasiveness of the norm, the activities of the norm entrepreneur and the existing normative structure.

Structural changes due to exogenous shocks, crises, dramatic policy failures or disillusionment may invoke demands of new norms (cf. Ullmann-Margalit 1977; Haggard and Simmons 1987: 506-507; Väyrynen 1999: 35). Although these types of structural changes may create a window of opportunity for introducing new norms, there is limited understanding of how new norms are supplied and how structural changes are linked to the evolution of norms (Finnemore 1993: 576; Kingdon 1995: 17; Berger 1996: 331). This approach is conducive to understanding the origins of norm change, but it fails to emphasize the processes of evolution once a window of opportunity for a new norm has opened.

Practices are regularly perceived as driving forces behind norm evolution (Klotz 1995a: 14; Keck and Sikkink 1998: 35; Gurowitz 1999: 417). Evolution of norms depends on whether current practice is consistent with the prescription of the norm or not. All actors in a community to which the norm applies need not comply with the norm all of the time to prove the existence of the norm, but if the practices of powerful actors in a given historical period are consistent with the norm, the norm will be strengthened. Most norms, however, are violated from time to time. If there were no possibility for violation of the norm (i.e. that actual practice should differ from the prescribed behavior) there would be no point in having the norm (Bull 1977: 53). It is not only emerging norms that are violated, but also established norms. Consequently, a particular norm cannot be disputed by referring to instances when states did not act according to the norm (Frost 1996: 97-105). Compliance or violation of a norm has the effect of strengthening or weakening the norm in the future (cf. Shannon 2000). Naturally practices are not undertaken in a normative vacuum, but informed by the existing normative structure and supported by pre-existing practices as norms and practices are mutually constitutive.
Evolutionary processes in general are less concerned with norm origins than with theorizing about the dynamics of development. An evolutionary approach presented by Ann Florini (1996: 365-370) is based on a biological analogy that draws on a neo-Darwinist perspective and the theory of natural selection. Florini (1996: 369) claims that “norms are subject to forces of natural selection because they meet all the criteria necessary for natural selection to occur”. According to this theory, norms are contested and compete with other norms. In the process of norm evolution, a natural selection causes some prominent norms to prevail and others to decline and disappear. Hence, norms evolve because they are subject to natural selection. The mechanisms behind the selection process are initial prominence, coherence and certain environmental conditions (Florini 1996; cf. Legro 1997). Nevertheless, primitive evolutionary metaphors are troubling. The reason is that many models present the evolution of norms as a mechanical process—a process of natural selection. Such a perspective on norm development is not a useful way of thinking about the process. Not even the most committed defenders of Darwinism still believe that natural selection is the only source of change. I do not see that ideas and norms in the social realm battle or evolve in a game-like situation, nor do I see much evidence of the “survival of the fittest” among competing ideas and norms. Instead of viewing norm evolution in a mechanical way or as a process of natural selection, I imagine a complex of ideas and norms living together in a less draconian milieu than an imaginary primeval swamp. Some conglomerates of ideas and norms co-exist, some compete, some are synergistic, some are cooperative or symbiotic, some die of their own accord, and there is the occasional innovation (Weber 1996: 273). This indicates a diversity that continues to exist because there is no single truth that can be discovered and agreed upon to eliminate alternative ideas.

Although including actors in the understanding of norm evolution, Florini (1996) perceives actors as hosts for norms who unconsciously transmit norms from one actor to another through a process similar to that of inheritance. This, however, fails to allow actors a prominent role in constructing and diffusing international norms. Others argue that great powers are the origins of norms, and that they create and shape norms so that they can maintain their share of world power or even increase it (Axelrod 1986: 1108; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Mearsheimer 1994/95: 7). This approach, however, fails to acknowledge the influence of non-state and small state actors in norm evolution. A model of norm dynamics highlighting the role of a purposeful norm entrepreneur (state actor or non-state actor) in norm evolution has been presented by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). This model reveals an interest-
ing interaction between the norm entrepreneur and the norm followers. While applying an interactive approach, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) fail to analyze the interplay between norm entrepreneurs and the normative structures. Such an approach reinforces the social constructivist bias towards using actors to explain change, whereas normative structure is used to understand constancy of social phenomena. “Agents (especially human ones) are seen as the calculating and creative entrepreneurs ever-willing to innovate and transform the existing order” (Legro 2000: 423). A division of labor where actors explain change and structure consistency disregards the way structural conditions facilitate change, such as the creation of new norms, and the way actors thwart evolution. A discussion on norm building will benefit by theorizing the norm entrepreneur’s ability to construct a normative match between the norm and the normative structure.

Pre-existing normative structures may influence norm evolution. International norms may become domestic and vice versa, and as domestic and international normative standards are approaching each other we can note a “domestication” of international norms. Agents of various kinds, play an important role in these processes by exporting and importing norms (Kier 1996: 187-215; Gurowitz 1999: 417-419; Lynch 1999: 1; Risse et al. 1999: 3; Väyrynen 1999: 29). To improve our understanding of the influence of normative structures and their interaction with norm entrepreneurs I draw on Steven Bernstein’s (2000: 464-512) socio-evolutionary explanation for norm entrance and evolution. While neglecting the importance of actors, he discusses “social fit” between norms and the social structure in depth. The strength of this approach is its understanding of why certain ideas get selected to become international norms (cf. Florini 1996). The drawback is that structural approaches to norm evolution in themselves are unable to explain change and thereby development. Bernstein, among others, believes that social or normative structures contain their own logic of transformation. I criticize the structure logic of transformation as I argue that transformation cannot be derived from, for example, a pre-existing formula for change or contradictions within the structure. Rather it depends on external elements outside the structure. For instance, when trying to specify why a normative structure with internal contradictions changes at one point in time rather than another, it is obvious that an external element is needed to understand how change comes about (Legro 2000: 422-423).

Most evolutionary models demonstrate that different social processes and logics of action may be involved at different stages in the evolution of a norm. Hall (1997: 596), for example, shows that normative change usually occurs sequentially. Various schemes have been suggested for sequencing the evol-
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tion process and breaking it down into its component parts. Bull (1977: 52-54), for instance, observes that norms must be made, communicated, interpreted and adopted, administrated, legitimized and at times adapted, protected and enforced. Martin Marcussen (1997: 81-88) speaks of different stages of the policy cycle of ideas, which he refers to as ideational shifts, transfer or dissemination of new ideas and institutionalization. Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998: 895-905) model perceives norm dynamics as a three-stage process: norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internalization. Nevertheless, one needs to be aware of the difficulties involved in dividing a norm evolution process into phases. Norms wax and wane over time, and phases are thereby related to the time dimension but also to the activities of the different phases. It is important to ask whether a phase is part of subsequent phases. One also needs to question whether the sequence of phases is a one-way street, that is, can it only move forward or is it possible that a process along this division of phases may reverse?

An Analytical Framework for Norm Evolution

The framework for norm development presented here is consistent with the overall social constructivist approach of the study. I draw on existing evolutionary models developed in this field in the following way. Norms are regarded evolving sequentially. As norms constitute actors’ interests, purposeful actors acting according to their redefined interests are perceived as an important driving force in norm evolution. Nascent norms emerge in competition with other norms and need to fit with the existing normative structure. Norms and practices are mutually constitutive (cf. Axelrod 1986; Florini 1996; Hall 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Bernstein 2000).

This proposed framework for norm evolution is, however, a modified version of previous evolutionary model and departs from the existing evolutionary models in some important ways. Many argue that norms are not “just out there” and that they are not self-evident or self-sustaining (cf. Risse-Kappen 1994: 187), but few trace their origins. This framework traces the origins of norms back to the stage of ideas, and regards ideas as the foundation for the norm entrepreneur’s construction of a norm candidate. By suggesting that purposeful norm entrepreneurs are crucial to norm evolution, this framework also differs from those evolutionary models that are structure-oriented and those that view norm evolution as mechanical and inevitable processes, as well as the ones that are based on natural selection. Norm
entrepreneurs with strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior within their community select a persuasive idea and invest energy in developing a norm in order to modify behavior so as to improve the normative context in which the norm entrepreneur operates.

This framework identifies the norm entrepreneur’s notion of appropriateness to be linked to the fact that norm entrepreneurs are situated in a particular normative context in time and space and will be influenced by existing practices and domestic and international normative structures. The framework proposed here emphasizes the mutual constitution between actors and structure in the sense that the norm entrepreneur is constituted by pre-existing normative structures, while simultaneously constituting these structures. When constructing a new norm, the norm entrepreneur attempts to construct a normative match between the norm and the normative structure. Furthermore, existing practices constitute the norm, and the new norm will constitute a new practice because norms and practices are mutually constitutive.

It is impossible and unnecessary to attempt to identify either norm entrepreneurs or normative structure as a point of departure other than for analytical purposes. Norms are here understood as socially constructed, and, since they are socially constructed, they evolve with changes in social interaction. As Finnemore (1996b: 160) points out, it is ironic how norms inherently consensual and intersubjective evolve through challenges to that consensus. I contend that understanding the evolution of norms requires an examination of three processes of interaction: between norm entrepreneurs and the normative structure of already institutionalized norms, between the norm entrepreneur and the potential norm followers and between norms and practices. While focusing on norm entrepreneurs, this framework pays less attention to the norm followers. To take a stand in a central debate in the current study of international norms, the present study adopts a constructivist interpretation of norm diffusion, which assumes that norm followers are socialized to accept norms based on a perception of what is appropriate on a voluntary basis, rather than being coerced.

In contrast to most researchers’ broad employment of the concept “norm” during the entire norm process, I carefully attempt to avoid conceptual stretching by using idea, norm candidate, norm and settled norm. Clearly it can be problematic to introduce a new terminology as it may contribute to conceptual confusion, but I find that the benefit of clarity outweighs the drawbacks. The analytical framework of this study proposes the evolution of norms to incorporate the following four phases: idea takeoff, norm initiation,
diffusion and socialization as well as institutionalization. The process of norm development is here approached as a metaphor, rather than as a formal model, and the phases are constructions.\(^{19}\) I am aware of the problems of dividing a process into sequential phases, so this framework therefore allows the process to reverse and the development is not perceived as an inevitable process since norms may fail to move from one phase to another. There are no sharp boundaries between various phases of evolutionary developments in “reality”. In “reality” these are parallel processes continuously affecting each other, and these processes are affected by unforeseen events. This distinction between the various phases is therefore not intended to make any analytical points but to act as an organizing device. It is a theoretically oriented distinction, even though it may exist in practice but there less defined.

**Idea Takeoff**

Norm entrepreneurs are crucial in the first stage of the norm development. It is here that the norm entrepreneur selects a compelling idea from a particular idea complex. Ideas are considered as the foundation for norm building, but any attempt to trace the origin of an idea is futile. Ideas can come from anywhere and everywhere, and tracing origins involves the researcher in an infinite regress, as there is no logical place to stop. While ideas compete with each other they are reshaped, recombined and redefined before being selected by the norm entrepreneur, and their origins become less important (Kingdon 1995: 124). Ideas with certain properties tend to be selected by the entrepreneur and used for the construction of norm candidates. Familiar ideas that match the norm entrepreneur’s own values, beliefs and practices are more likely to be selected (Sikkink 1991: 26). The substance of the idea is essential (Kingdon 1995: 131). The idea is more likely to be selected if perceived as morally and theoretically appealing as well as feasible i.e. possible to translate into practice (Finnemore 1996a: 141; Kingdon 1995: 131). In addition, if the attributes of the idea match the characteristics of the problem the norm entrepreneur intends to address, the idea is more likely to be selected and framed as a norm candidate (Kingdon 1995: 16-17, 124). Normative “fit” is suggested as important, because new ideas, as Sikkink (1991: 26) observes, “are more likely to be influential if they ‘fit’ well with existing ideas and ideologies in a particular historical setting” (cf. Yee 1996: 90, 91; Bernstein 2000: 464-512; Legro 2000: 425). This process of idea take off will be discussed in depth in Chapter Five where an empirical illustration also will be provided.
From Idea to Norm—Promoting Conflict Prevention

Norm Initiation

Once selected, the idea enters the chain of translation to become a norm candidate. A crucial step for the norm entrepreneur is to frame the idea in a persuasive way to construct a norm candidate that may gain widespread acceptance. A frame is a persuasive device used to “help fix meanings, organize experience, alert others that their interests and possibly their identities are at stake, and propose solutions to ongoing problems” (Barnett 1999: 25). Carefully constructed frames constitute a soft power resource with relative autonomy from material power resources.

An idea can be framed in a number of ways in order to capture attention. For example, it can be framed in language, commonly held values, as a solution to an urgent problem, in terms of rational economics and with scientific support in order to resonate with the audience (Hall 1989: 383, 384; Sikkink 1991: 2; Snow and Benford 1992: 133-155; Adler and Haas 1992: 378). Whereas ideas need not have behavioral implications or prescriptive qualities, norms do. Consequently, for the idea to become a norm candidate it must be supplied with an image of action that proscribes certain actions, prescribes appropriate behavior, rights and obligations. Framed in such a way, the norm candidate may be diffused by the norm entrepreneur and become accepted, and hence a collectively held norm. A further elaboration of norm initiation will be provided in Chapter Six, complemented by an empirical illustration.

Norm Diffusion and Socialization

This phase of norm evolution highlights the conscious efforts of norm entrepreneurs. These norm entrepreneurs are regarded as the primary impetus for diffusion of a norm candidate and socialization of norm followers. Diffusion, by standard definition, is the “transfer or transmission of objects, processes, ideas and information from one population or region to another” (Walker 1969; Karvonen 1981; Schmidt 1986: 27-34; Rogers 1995; Mintrom and Vergari 1998). This definition, while general, captures the central dynamic of concern to constructivists studying the dispersal of norm candidates. Once a norm candidate has entered the diffusion process, its sustained influence, ability to survive and become an intersubjectively shared norm depends to a large extent on the ability of the norm entrepreneur to build a norm community of likeminded actors.

Socialization is the other side of the coin and refers to how norm followers come
to accept the norm candidate (cf. Risse et al. 1999). Whether or not a norm candidate will be adopted by others and become a collectively held norm depends on whether it fulfills certain requirements. Naturally, the intrinsic characteristics of the norm candidate—such as the idea it is built on and the values it expresses—must be considered legitimate. The prescriptions of the rights and obligations framed in the norm candidate must match the problem it addresses. To convince, the norm candidate must be elevated beyond its identification with the interest of the norm entrepreneur to reflect a widely shared or even universal values, rather than the peculiar values of one society (Nadelmann 1990: 482). It must also fit with existing normative convictions of the potential norm followers (cf. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Bernstein 2000). Once a critical mass of actors has become socialized to accept the norm candidate, a norm community has been established. This critical mass may then “tip” the norm candidate into a norm that constitutes interests and identities and creates expectations of appropriate behavior within that norm community (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 902-903; Väyrynen 1999: 36; DeSombre 2000: 12). However, there may still remain pockets of resistance against the emergent norm where skeptics maintain their normative convictions and/or may advocate a different norm candidate. The dynamic interactive processes of norm diffusion and socialization will be analyzed thoroughly in Chapter Seven and illustrated empirically.

**Norm Institutionalization**

Norm institutionalization concerns how unsettled norms may become settled norms. Once the norm is “settled” it is part of the normative structure where it gains a taken-for-granted status. Naturally, all unsettled norms will not become settled through a process of institutionalization, but for a norm to complete the evolutionary process it needs to become settled. A settled norm may redefine the normative structure and induce patterns of behavior (Sikkink 1991: 2, 23-27).

For a norm to be considered to have settled status the following requirements must be fulfilled. If the norm is institutionalized into the normative structure, justification must be provided if behavior or arguments appear to override or deny the settled norm (Frost 1996: 110). Once a norm is institutionalized, norm-violating countries also find it necessary to make rhetorical concessions and cease denying the validity of the norm in order to avoid international pressure to comply (Risse 2000: 32). As mentioned previously, however, it is not the case that acting contrary to a “settled norm” always invalidates its settled status (Frost 1996: 110). In contrast to unsettled
norms, which create expectations of appropriate behavior. Because norms and practice are perceived as mutually constitutive (Risse 2000: 17), common practice will reinforce the norm and strengthen its settled status. How norms become settled and induce common practices will be explored in Chapter Eight and Nine.

A Note of Caution

One should be aware that completion of the process is not inevitable. Many emerging norms fail to gain broad support, are rejected by the potential norm taker, or fail to become fully institutionalized into practice. It is, however, rare for one set of norms either to diminish to extinction or dominate completely (Weber 1996: 273). “Ideas and norms do not become extinct but are merely shelved for future references” (Adler and Haas 1992: 372). Furthermore, “they are subject to reinterpretation later on” (ibid.). Some describe ideas as perennial—flowering in one season, then lying dormant, only to flourish anew (Kingdon 1995: 141).

One should also be aware that norm entrepreneurship is not an uncontested endeavor (cf. Elgström 2000). The construction of cognitive frames is a combative, competitive process, which posits emerging norms in adversarial positions vis-à-vis settled norms. Norm promoters must call attention to issues, frame and build norms not in normative voids but in already monopolized normative space that is resistant to change. Deliberate efforts to promote certain norms may succeed or fail. These efforts may also be affected by events in world politics in ways the norm entrepreneur cannot predict, but must adjust to.

Although constructivist literature mostly avoids explicit theorizing about why one norm rather than another comes to dominate, this proposed framework can assist us in understanding why certain norms are constructed and how they evolve over time, as it traces the origins of norms, and investigates the influence of norm entrepreneurs and the normative structure as well as the interaction between the two. The focus on emerging norms and their influence challenges the conventional wisdom—norms that have an impact are norms that are settled and embedded in institutions. This framework for norm development will be illustrated by the evolution of the idea of conflict prevention, promoted by Sweden in the role of norm entrepreneur.
CHAPTER FIVE

IDEA TAKEOFF

*Greater than the tread of mighty armies is an idea whose time has come.*

*Victor Hugo*

All ideas circulate most of the time at least in some places, but there is a time and place when a particular idea can catch on. We need to explore how and under what conditions an idea can “take off”. Thomas Risse-Kappen (1994: 187) recognizes that “research has failed so far to specify the conditions under which specific ideas are selected and influence policies, while others fall by the wayside” (cf. Bernstein 2000: 464). Some research is, however, able to generate *ex post facto* descriptions of how “idea takeoff” happens once the results are in, but cannot predict timing before it happens, or, more importantly, not contribute to the understanding of “why” certain ideas take off (Weber 1996: 274).

This chapter commences the empirical analysis of norm evolution by analyzing the first phase, idea takeoff, and considering how ideas pertaining to international peace maintenance surface, compete, catch on and gain broad support. In particular, this chapter focuses on the idea of conflict prevention and how it has gained attention and been selected by the Swedish foreign policy elite. It also illustrates how Sweden has reconstructed its foreign policy identity as a norm entrepreneur to create a niche for itself in world politics of the post-Cold War.

The idea of conflict prevention is actually not new. It is an idea that can be traced back to early philosophers and thinkers concerned with creating conditions for perpetual peace. The idea however, can be considered to have re-emerged on the international arena in the early 1990s, as the end of the Cold War opened up a space for new security thinking. Conflict prevention is certainly not the only idea in this growing idea complex pertaining to international peace and security. A vast number of ideas emanated to meet the new security challenges that emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War.
An Idea Complex

Many similar ideas compete for attention on the battleground of ideas. Yet, only a limited number can be noticed and reacted to, regardless of their acuity. Idea competition has sometimes been understood by utilizing the metaphor of the “marketplace”, as it is argued that the “marketplace of ideas” shares some characteristics of the economic marketplace. For example, political elites, societal actors, and the public are hunting for ideas provided by experts, entrepreneurs and ideologues (cf. Hall 1989: 365). However, the use of the marketplace metaphor can be criticized because it obscures alternative understandings of ideas. It “turns attention away from the constitutive role of ideas in generating or constructing interests, in defining the problems to which policies are the response” (Laffey and Weldes 1997: 208). From the marketplace metaphor, the metaphor of ideas as commodity may follow. This according to Laffey and Weldes (1997: 207) is not merely “a benign rhetorical flourish but an indication of an understanding of what an idea is”. It creates an image of ideas as public, tradable and separable from the individual. Hence, ideas should not be understood as tools for norm entrepreneurs to manipulate. Taking this critique seriously, I find the marketplace metaphor incompatible with the constructivist approach of this study. Instead, I refer to a space—“an idea complex”—that represents a realm of potential ideas suitable to address a particular problem that may compete, co-exist or confederate. The more ideational space, or the more ideas within an idea complex, the greater the universe of potential outcomes.

A Window of Opportunity

Ideas may emerge at a certain point in time when there is a demand for new ideas and a potential for them to gain influence and be selected. These windows of opportunities are sometimes referred to as defining moments in time, triggered by epoch-making events. The peace of Westphalia in 1648, according to Stephen Krasner (1993: 235-265), is an epoch-making event, which embodies a set of new ideas about political order and interstate relations that led to the emergence of state sovereignty. In a similar manner, World War II is perceived as a defining moment in time, as the atrocities of the war gave birth to the idea of international human rights as a responsibility of the international community (Sikkink 1993a; 1993b).

The end of the Cold War, according to conventional wisdom, is such an epoch-making event. In this time of change, new ideas concerning international peace and security are in demand, as the numbers of “new” wars have risen. New wars
now vastly outnumber the conventional type of conflicts between states. Of the 111 armed conflicts, recorded during the period 1989-2000, only seven of which were interstate conflicts. In contrast to old wars fought between states, by large armies, financed by centralized economies, and involving the majority of a country’s population, most contemporary conflicts occur within the borders of states, but with a potential to spill over into neighboring states. These new wars do not follow the traditional dynamics of war. They differ from the old ones in a number of ways: they are not fought by traditional means and for traditional goals, such as control of territory or the institutions of the state, but are identity focused (Kaldor 1999: 6). New wars are often transnational in character and directed against civilians and/or particular ethnic, religious or class groups. They are concentrating on sowing fear amongst the populace, rather than on decisive military battles and the traditional idea of military victory. Hence the frequent use of intimidation, rape and murder; of ethnic cleansing writ large. These new wars are not financed by a mobilized war economy, but rely on global financing from various sources, such as criminal activity and large diaspora communities (ibid. 1999). The driving forces behind new wars are not only political or ideological, but to a large extent motivated by economic incentives, such as individual wealth and control of organized crime. This creates a political economy of war that contributes to perpetuate the war. The wars in Rwanda, the Balkans and Indonesia clearly illustrate that the boundaries between war, organized crime and human rights abuses are becoming increasingly blurred. The distinction between new wars and terrorism is also becoming increasingly difficult to uphold in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001. This is a “new kind of war” in which informal violence by non-state actors, capitalizing on secrecy and surprise, may inflict great harm with small material capabilities as violence is dispersed, fragmented and directed against civilians (Held 2001; Keohane 2001).

The dynamics of these new wars and ways of avoiding them do not follow the old rules of the Cold War. As a result, policy makers and scholars alike are faced with the need to gain deeper knowledge of the new wars, their root causes and driving forces, and to develop knowledge and new ideas about how to deal with them (George 1999: 7-17).

**Competing, Co-existing and Collaborating Ideas**

A number of ideas have emerged on the international arena in response to the demands that “something” must be done to alleviate the consequences of new wars. In this ideational space opened up by the changed conceptions of peace
and security, a broad range of old and new ideas of international peace and security compete for influence, while others might coexist and jointly enhance international security. Some ideas that appeared during the Cold War to prevent small-scale conflicts escalating into superpower tensions are now reinterpreted in light of changing conceptualizations of peace and security. Others surfaced in the aftermath of the Cold War to face the new security challenges of a changing world. Thus, conflict prevention is only one of a multitude of ideas in the contemporary idea complex relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The idea of peace-building for instance, was one of the ideas that surfaced in the aftermath of the Cold War as a response to the urgent problems of how to deal with the new wars. The influential UN-report An Agenda for Peace first brought it into the international policy arena. Peace-building was initially a post-conflict term as it referred to “actions to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” (A/47/277-S/24111). It involved helping countries recover from civil war by economic and social reconstruction. In A Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, peace-building was defined by its activities and objectives rather than by its sequencing in a process of conflict management, and it came to be defined as assisting the establishment of indigenous capacity to resolve conflict peacefully (A/50/60-S/1995/1; Ball 2001: 719-733). Formal and informal institutions of civil society were the target for external peace-building support, and the issues involved were fundamentally political in nature. Initially, the Swedish foreign policy elite made no clear distinction between the concepts peace-building and conflict prevention and used them interchangeably, applying both to early actions prior to the outbreak of conflict. Peace-building remains on the international agenda, important for creating stability, addressing root causes of conflicts and mitigating the consequences of war. Rather than competing, the two ideas may in fact support each other as two sequentially complementary approaches.

Peace-building should not be confused with regular foreign aid. Foreign aid is an idea that has been around under various terms since the foundation of the UN. Development aid was originally proposed by the United States in 1949, and quickly endorsed by the UN to alleviate poverty. By the 1970s poverty moved from being a condition of states to a condition of people, and the poor were understood to be individuals (Lumsdaine 1993; Eberstadt 1997: 151). As development aid was frequently delivered in times of conflict to alleviate starvation that may follow in the wake of violent conflicts, a new idea evolved—humanitarian aid, closely related to both development coop-
eration, which is the current term used, and peace-building. Humanitarian aid like development cooperation, however, lacked an explicit goal to promote peace and security, and focused instead on assisting the civilian population in times of conflict. From a Swedish perspective it was important to integrate a development cooperation perspective in the idea of conflict prevention.

The idea of preventive diplomacy was coined by the former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, to characterize efforts to prevent small-scale conflicts from escalating into conflicts between the superpowers during the Cold War. The underlying rationale was expressed in Hammarskjöld’s introduction to the 1959-1960 annual report of the United Nations: preventive action “must in the first place aim at filling the vacuum so that it will not provoke action from any of the major parties” (Hammarskjöld 1960, cf. Urquhart 1972). Hammarskjöld’s approach covered only one type of conflict escalation, i.e. horizontal escalation to involve additional parties in the conflict, neglecting the vertical escalation when the destructiveness of violence increases without necessarily spilling over across borders. Initially, the term referred to Hammarskjöld’s own preventive activities as a third-party mediator in conflict situations in order to reduce tension. Preventive diplomacy served Swedish foreign policy well, particularly during the Cold War. It is still considered an influential tool and part of the Swedish “toolbox” for conflict prevention, and “must be retained as an operational category” (Ds 1997: 18). As the use of the term preventive diplomacy refers mainly to diplomatic efforts undertaken by governments acting in concert or individually to keep disputes that arise between or within states from escalating into violent conflicts, the idea excludes other actors from undertaking preventive action (Nicolaïdis 1996: 24; Ginifer and Eide 1997: 9-10).

The idea behind traditional peacekeeping was to promote stability through third-party intervention in interstate conflicts. The purpose was to supervise a truce prior to the signing of a peace agreement, or to monitor the implementation of a peace agreement. This type of intervention can only be accomplished with the consent of the disputants, and third parties cannot use force to affect the behavior of the parties to the dispute. Peacekeeping operations of this traditional kind must be “expressly non-threatening and impartial” (Berdal 1993: 3; cf. Roberts 1996: 297-321). However, an expanded security concept forced the UN security apparatus to adjust, and a new idea was presented—"second generation" multifunctional peacekeeping. This confused the narrowly defined practice of peacekeeping, as it tasked the peacekeepers with a number of new civilian responsibilities (Chopra 1998: 6; Doyle 2001: 529-554). The competing idea of “third generation peacekeeping” so called peace enforcement exacerbated the confusion. Mainly because this new practice did not exclu-
sively rely on the consent of the belligerents, it did not restrict the peacekeepers’ use of force to solely self-defense. It is concerned with “responses to conflicts or other major security crises in situations where the agreement of all relevant governments or parties is lacking” (Evans 1993: 12). Hence, it refers to the threat or use of military force in pursuit of peaceful objectives in response to conflicts. To enforce peace means disregarding the norm of sovereignty. Article 2(7), Chapter VII of the UN Charter—the exception of nonintervention—is conveniently utilized as a way of circumventing the issue of sovereignty (Knight 1998: 21). The evolution of the peacekeeping idea in the post-Cold War era has been severely criticized as it is “lying somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement—for which it lacks any guiding operational concept. It has merely ratcheted up the traditional peacekeeping mechanisms in an attempt to respond to wholly new security challenges” (Ruggie 1993: 26).

One needs to avoid confusing peacekeeping duties with peace enforcement functions. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are idiosyncratic undertakings. Sweden has a long history of endorsing the idea of UN peacekeeping both in theory and practice. The support of the UN Blue Berets dates back to the establishment of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Israel/Palestine area in 1948 and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949 (Sköld 1995: 115-129; Björkdahl 1999: 64). The Swedish policy position has been more ambiguous towards peace enforcement, as in practice it often means overriding the principle of sovereignty. This ambivalence became obvious in light of the NATO enforcement mission to establish peace in Kosovo. On the one hand, the Swedish position indicated an understanding of the NATO intervention and the need to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, but it also reflected support for maintaining the principles of international law (cf. Lindh 1999b; Press release 990506). Prime Minister Göran Persson (Press release 990324) stated that “from the point of view of international law it is difficult to find a clear and unequivocal basis for the military operations which are now taking place. I regret that it hasn’t been possible to achieve unity within the international community to support this action through a UN Security Council mandate”. Despite this ambivalence, Sweden contributed troops to the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, its successor, Stabilization Force (SFOR) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo, which were mandated according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and can thereby be regarded as peace enforcement (S/RES/1031; UD:12/97).

New ideas also surfaced in the EU debate, mainly in response to the lack of coherent EU action in the Balkans—the backyard of the EU (Wegener 1997: 21).
One such idea, strongly supported by the British and the French, was crisis management, which involves efforts to manage tensions and disputes that are so intense as to have reached the level of confrontation (Hill 2001: 317-333). The Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in 1999, laid the ground for crisis management or the execution of the Petersberg tasks in the EU context (Bringéus 2000: 65). This was followed by the Franco-British initiative, launched at the meeting at St. Malo on 4 December 1998, which gave the process a new impetus and political dynamics. Within the EU, a distinction was made between military and civilian crisis management, regarding them as parallel tracks (Hill 2001: 319). While accepting crisis management, the Swedish foreign policy elite was wary of the reluctant domestic public opinion towards what was viewed as a militarization of the EU (Bringéus 2000: 66).

Changing Conceptions of Security

The changed conceptions of the scope and nature of security allowed for the emergence of rivaling ideas concerning peace and security. Within the particular understandings of security, such as collective security, common security, comprehensive security, cooperative security, and most recently human security, which influenced foreign policy in recent decades, a space was created for new ideas to emerge. It is evident that conceptualizations of peace and security influence the way we think about the role of the international community in establishing stable peace. Collective security is a traditional concept entrenched in the UN Charter, which refers to a particular security community where all members renounce the use of force among themselves, and agree to come to the aid of any member state attacked by a “defector from the ranks” (Evans 1993: 16). Common security is an alternative vision articulated in the Palme Commission in 1982, and by the late 1980s it was one of the mainstream foreign policy concepts in Europe (Risse-Kappen 1994: 197). Common security is a Cold War concept, which transformed the initial arms control idea of stabilizing strategic deterrence through cooperative measures into a concept transcending the notion of national security. The central idea is that lasting security rests on a commitment to joint survival, and taking into consideration the legitimate security concerns of others. Its emphasis on force structures in a bipolar world makes it difficult to apply to contemporary small-scale internal wars.

The end of the Cold War unleashed a spiraling number of proposals and statements that called for shifting the definition of international security. Comprehensive security and cooperative security convey the idea that security is
multi-dimensional in character. These broad notions of security include not only political and diplomatic disputes, but also economic underdevelopment, trade disputes, unregulated population flows, refugee problems, environmental degradation, human rights abuses, trafficking in drugs and small arms, child soldiers and the economic agendas of civil wars (cf. Evans 1993: 15-16). The main weakness of these terms is that they are all-embracing, disregarding nothing.

Those in and around the UN voiced the concept of human security in various guises, suggesting that what matters is the security of peoples and individuals and not of states. It is pointed out that states are often a source of insecurity rather than protection, and domestic rather than interstate conflicts are a greater threat to most individuals’ security in today’s world. Clearly, the working definition of international security is expanding to more fully include individuals and identity-based groups residing within states (Björkdahl and McMahone 1999).

This idea complex clearly demonstrates a broader normative trend of shared responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. Conflict prevention is an idea breaking through in the light of lessons learned by the international community. Recent experiences show that responses to new conflicts often were too little and too late, failing to hinder the outbreak of violence. The appearance of the idea of conflict prevention on the international security agenda can only be understood in the context of changed understandings of security that are taking hold among the foreign and security policy elites.

An Idea that Catches on

Ideas are regarded as the foundation for norm construction. However, only certain ideas have properties that may lead to their selection by norm entrepreneurs, and used for the construction of norm candidates. As in any selection system, there is a pattern to the ideas that endure and characteristics that enhance the odds of an idea’s selection. This study identifies such a pattern and outlines its characteristics.

The phrase “an idea whose time has come”, captures one important condition that facilitates selection and hence, “idea takeoff”. Unfamiliar ideas require much time and many repetitions to be observed, because new ideas rearrange our beliefs and purposes as we adopt them. Clearly, different actors are influenced by the same idea in different ways depending on how they
perceive the idea in relation to their prior experiences and on what they expect. Yet ideas are rarely leaps into the unknown; they arise from new ways of association, previously known ideas or reconstruction of familiar methods. New ideas can therefore be regarded as a “result of a gradual learning process, not a sudden burst of enlightenment” (Crenshaw 2000: 416). An idea is, therefore, unlikely to catch on unless it has already existed for some time in many people’s minds, as part of an accepted idea complex (cf. Czarniawska and Joerges 1996: 36). However, old ideas may be perceived as new, as Albert Hirshman (1991: 29) notes: “almost any idea that has not been around for a while stands a good chance of being mistaken for an original one”. Hence, the new and innovative are not always easy to distinguish from the old and familiar.

Selection is also affected by the inherent properties of the idea. As previously mentioned, an idea that demonstrates feasibility, and is perceived as theoretically and morally appealing, tends to persuade (Kingdon 1995: 131; Finnemore 1996a: 141). However, it is not only the intrinsic characteristics of an idea that will persuade. If a match can be constructed between the attributes of the idea and the characteristics of the problem the actor is addressing, the likelihood for idea takeoff increases (Kingdon 1995: 109-115). Furthermore, if a fit with the norm entrepreneur’s own values, beliefs and practices can be constructed, the idea is more likely to be selected.

However, no matter how timely and “good” the idea, it needs promotion to take off. Thus, the ability of the norm entrepreneur to translate the idea into a norm candidate is significant. If selected by a skillful and “prominent” entrepreneur the idea’s chances to succeed are improved.

Conflict Prevention – An Idea Whose Time has Come?

The idea can be traced to a longstanding tradition in international politics. A number of attempts have been made to try to translate normative convictions into workable proposals—a perpetual peace plan—for eliminating war as an instrument of statecraft. Some thinkers have stressed the need to re-educate human beings in order to change values and principles, while others have argued the need to reconstruct the anarchic state system, as they believe it creates a persistent pattern of violence in the international system. These traditions reflect significant variations in attitudes from era to era, and from place to place, concerning when it is legitimate to use violence, and what moral limits should be put on the use of force (Bull 1977; Ray 1989: 438; Hoffmann 1995: 22-38; Coll 1995: 58-77).
Hence, the notion of prevention as such is not unusual, and the idea of conflict prevention is clearly not new, at least not in its essentials. The fact that the idea of conflict prevention is familiar, a familiarity approaching boredom, some might say, should be considered favorable in a selection process, as it would be surprising if a wholly new idea suddenly appeared on the international scene and gained international attention.

The apparent infeasibility of previous attempts to eliminate war from the world compel those determined to promote the new idea of conflict prevention to prove it is a feasible approach to tackle the problem of increasing numbers of internal conflicts worldwide. To become successful, the idea must be able to translate into practice. By referring to successful cases where potentially violent conflicts actually were prevented—such as the preventive peacekeeping mission UNPREDEP to Macedonia, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Estonia, and the international efforts to reduce the tensions between Hungary and Slovakia—the norm entrepreneur can claim that the idea of conflict prevention is complex, yet feasible and suitable to meet the challenges of the new wars (cf. Lund 1996a: 66-69; Björkdahl 1999: 54-71).

The idea pertaining to conflict prevention builds on the core notion contained within the expression: “proaction is better than reaction and…crises and conflicts can be better addressed as they emerge, rather than when they have already deepened and widened” (Lund 1996a: 37; cf. Stedman 1995; Wallensteen 1998). Conflict prevention refers to “action taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat of use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change” (Lund 1996a: 37). This view captures the proactive qualities of the conflict prevention idea, which can be regarded as theoretically appealing. It highlights the normative ambitions to contribute to build a “better” society, while also providing an understanding of what that is, which may make conflict prevention a morally persuasive idea. Many perceive the essence of the idea of conflict prevention as inherently “good”. A quote worth citing came from a senior official at the EU Commission (0112), who observed that conflict prevention is like “motherhood and apple pie—one cannot be against it”.

Nonetheless, there are philosophical and political problems attached to distinguishing between the undesirable conflicts to prevent and those that may be constructive for transforming a society. The perennial dilemmas of appeasement and ethnocentrism lurk beneath the surface.

Despite its problems, the inherent properties of the idea of conflict prevention
are conducive for idea takeoff, i.e. to be selected and translated into a norm candidate. “It [conflict prevention] seems to have the quality essential in any successful concept of showing how interests and ideals can be yoked to each other” (Hill 2001: 315). Considering the numbers and characteristics of contemporary intrastate conflicts, conflict prevention is clearly a morally persuasive solution to the problem of new wars. The idea rests upon a range of established long-standing ethical and moral principles as well as new values of humanism. Hence, there is a potential normative “fit” and a supportive normative structure if the idea were to enter the translation process to become a shared norm.

Norm Entrepreneur or Moral Superpower?

The Swedish identity as a small, neutral state in international relations, has guided its foreign policy, and contributed to its internationalist vision and strong support of multilateralism (cf. Stenelo 1972: 174-189; Elgström 1982; 1983; Goldmann 1991; 1994). Sweden has historically worked with NGOs, international organizations and other small states to strengthen peace and advance humanitarian goals. In addition, Sweden as a neutral small state has acted as a critic, mediator between the blocs, peacekeeper and donor of foreign aid (cf. Jerneck 1983; Stenelo 1985; Skjöld 1995: 115-129). As such it has gained the respect and confidence of many on the international arena.

Critics have argued that Sweden has made claims to be the “moral superpower” of the world and that its international reputation is not in proportion to its actual influence (Nilsson 1991: 7, 115). Sweden has attempted both to interpret the complex system of norms as well as to portray itself as representing and upholding these international norms. The self-perception is apparent in the national rhetoric. For example, “in different ways we [Sweden] have in this century helped to influence the international community to base international relations on respect for international law, democratic working methods, and principles of social and economic equality” (Ds 1999:24). Reflecting upon international perceptions of Sweden, Ambassador Jan Eliasson (020207), former State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, admitted in an interview that Sweden often has been considered as a “dogooder” in international politics. It is, however, not unlikely that Sweden “punches above its weight” in international politics, but it remains a small state with limited influence, and for that reason it could benefit from focusing on a particular set of well defined issues.
Selecting Conflict Prevention as a Foreign Policy Idea

When the idea of conflict prevention re-emerged on the international agenda, it was an idea that could be traced to an old tradition from Hammarskjöld’s era, and an idea that could easily mesh with overall Swedish internationalist visions.

According to State Secretary Hans Dahlgren (011018), conflict prevention was perceived as an intrinsically good idea that resonates with Swedish domestic values, internationalist vision, traditions and practices. A Swedish diplomat (0112) pointed to the political imperative of conflict prevention as a motivating factor for selecting that particular idea. In an interview, af Ugglas (010910) assumed that the Swedish foreign policy elite had been inspired by the international efforts to prevent violent conflict in the Baltic States when they claimed their independence from the disintegrating Soviet Union. Often, an idea will be selected because it fits, not only with the state identity, but also with the values and convictions of individuals within the foreign policy elite (cf. Cortell and Davis 1996: 452-454). According to Deputy Prime Minister Hjelm-Wallén (010905), this was the case when selecting the idea of conflict prevention, as State Secretary Eliasson and Deputy State-Secretary Anders Bjurner had practical experiences from mediating conflicts and from dealing with post-conflict humanitarian catastrophes (cf. Eliasson 020207; Bjurner 011205).

Later changes in the top-level leadership of the Ministry partly altered the political priorities, which suggests that personal commitment by political leaders and high-level officials affected the prominence of the norm. This, however, does not imply that the current leadership is uninterested in the issue, merely that somewhat different political priorities now guide the foreign policy, as individual policy-makers have their own vested interests.

Becoming a Norm Entrepreneur

With the end of the Cold War Sweden gradually began to reconstruct its foreign policy identity. The old one, as a neutral state, small mediator and critic in a bipolar world, was perceived to be obsolete. However, despite profound changes in international relations, parts of its traditional and internationalist identity as an active player in international politics were maintained. Sweden could be perceived to develop an identity (by some called, “small but smart”) as a norm entrepreneur, capitalizing on past experiences as a
An anna Björkdahl vocal supporter of international law and international organizations, while at the same time adapting to a new security environment (cf. Sundelius 1995). For Sweden to become a norm entrepreneur could be viewed as a way to yield influence, in a time when soft power and value-based foreign policy merit attention (Haaland-Matlary 2002).

A number of small, but significant steps towards reconstructing its foreign policy identity, steps that can be interpreted as strengthening Sweden's norm entrepreneurial influence, were taken in the past decade (cf. Dahl 1997: 187-194). For example, the decision to participate in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994 gave Sweden a forum for collaboration with NATO in areas of practical crisis management and peacekeeping operations. Joining the EU in 1995 was certainly the most important change (cf. Gustavsson 1998). Among other things, it provided Sweden with an additional international arena for its norm entrepreneurial activities. The most recent step in reconstructing the Swedish foreign policy identity was taken in 2002, when the doctrine of neutrality was reformed. According to this new doctrine, “Sweden pursues a policy of non-participation in military alliances. This security policy, making it possible for our country to remain neutral in the event of conflict in our vicinity, has served us well” (Statement on Foreign Policy 2002, emphasis added). Instead of the traditional, independent security policy, where “no one else defends Sweden and Sweden only defends itself” (Defence Bill 1991/1992), it was now stressed that “threats to peace and our security can best be averted by acting concertedly and in cooperation with other countries” (Statement on Foreign Policy 2002). As the prominence of multilateral solutions to peace and security was accentuated, the foreign policy identity built partly on the traditional common security concept, while making non-traditional cooperative approaches an option. The revised foreign policy identity can also be viewed as strengthening the trustworthiness of Sweden as a norm entrepreneur, since it opens up new possibilities for translating rhetoric into practice and participating in less conventional multilateral preventive action, for example in the EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). This incremental re-conceptualization of Sweden’s role in international relations was rooted in a new collective understanding of the possibilities and constraints for a small state to influence world politics. These gradual changes of adaptation rather than innovation contributed to reconstructing the foreign policy identity along rather traditional lines with some novel elements (cf. Carlsnaes 1993: 15-17).
Committed to the Idea of Conflict Prevention

The idea of conflict prevention was selected in competition with other ideas for example, peace-building and the more traditional notion of preventive diplomacy. Initially, both preventive diplomacy and peace-building were used when referring to notions similar to conflict prevention (cf. Statement on Foreign Policy 1991). State Secretary Pierre Schori (910514), however, proposed the idea of conflict prevention in a speech in 1991 in the context of Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) developments. For some time the different ideas co-existed in the Swedish rhetoric, and the concepts were used interchangeably. Consequently, there was no consistent use of the concept of conflict prevention in an unchanged form, and it was not used in a repetitive way to entrench the idea in the foreign policy discourse. This may imply that the idea of conflict prevention met resistance internally within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the early 1990s. Ambassador Eliasson, former State Secretary, recalled in an interview (020207) that at the outset, not everyone within the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs was convinced by the idea of conflict prevention. Some perceived it to be a Trojan horse, in the sense that there were certain political risks involved in selecting and promoting the idea of conflict prevention that could not be foreseen. The two main competitors to the idea of conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy and peace-building, merged into the broad understanding of the notion of conflict prevention. Eventually, “conflict prevention” became the buzzword and a catchphrase repetitively used in speeches, action plans and reports by the Swedish foreign policy elite.

In 1994, the Swedish government concluded that Swedish efforts in the area of conflict prevention were to be intensified, and Statements on Swedish Foreign Policy between 1995 and 2001 stressed the importance of strengthening the Swedish capacity for prevention. To ensure that conflict prevention was entrenched in the development cooperation policies and programs, Sida was given a mandate to develop a strategy for conflict prevention in 1998 (cf. UD/98/1567/IC; UD/99/1503/IC).30 As a consequence, conflict prevention became a formal Sida-Strategy and the issue was beginning to become integrated into Sida’s country strategies—an instrument for guiding the implementation of development cooperation on a macro level (Viking 010522).31 The commitment to conflict prevention was maintained in the Statement on Foreign Policy 2002 confirming the rhetorical commitment to the idea of conflict prevention. However, rhetoric needs to be put into practice, and as a senior official at the UN Secretariat noted in an interview with reference to the Swedish efforts, “talk is cheap” (0202).
However, Sweden did more than rhetorically embrace conflict prevention. To support its norm entrepreneurial activities, some procedural and organizational adjustments were undertaken within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. For example, an investigator and a secretary were appointed in February 1996 to carry out a study on conflict prevention activity to identify long-term objectives for Swedish efforts. This resulted in the report *Preventing Violent Conflict—A Study*, which received both praise and blame when presented in the spring of 1997 (Ds 1997:18; cf. Gür 1997). The investigation was supported by a Reference Group consisting of representatives from the relevant divisions of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and a representative from the Ministry for Defense (Jonsson 010523).32 As proposed by the study, a small Secretariat for Conflict Prevention was established within the Policy Planning Unit in 1999, supported by an interdepartmental Steering Group to ensure a unified policy. The work of the Secretariat resulted in, among other things, a new report, *Conflict Prevention—A Swedish Action Plan* (Ds 1999:24). This could be regarded as a step towards entrenching conflict prevention into all the departments of the Ministry. A government communication *Preventing Violent Conflict—Swedish Policy for the 21st Century* (Skr. 2000/01:2) presented in 2000, assessed the efforts to implement the Swedish action plan.

Policy guidelines and action plans were important, yet to achieve concrete results the entire organization needed to be supportive of the idea and infuse it into their daily activities. Thus, efforts were undertaken to mainstream conflict prevention into the everyday routines of the Foreign Ministry. To establish an in-house “culture of prevention”, focal points for conflict prevention were established, different operational departments were assigned special administrative responsibilities, and interdepartmental temporary project groups were established (Olausson 010520). This called for new skills, changed attitudes and the development of new methods. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in contrast to Sida, had no internal training program to enhance its staff’s knowledge of conflict prevention (Skr. 2000/01:2; development cooperation desk officer 0105). Instead, previously informal cooperation with academics, researchers and representatives from the civil society was formalized in the *Council for Peace and Security Promoting Activities* (press release 950412). A recently established Forum continued to emphasize a more focused collaboration with the Swedish scholarly community (Troedsson 011107).

For the Swedish norm advocacy to be taken seriously USD 10 million was allocated for conflict prevention out of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs’s budget in 2000 (Skr. 2000/01:2). However, conflict prevention has become
a label that is currently applied to a number of activities, that may not be
directly linked to the prevention of violent conflicts, and for that reason it is
difficult to estimate the actual amount allocated for conflict prevention.

Although conflict prevention has been widely advocated by non-govern-
mental actors, Sweden was one of the first states to develop theoretical as well
as practical thinking on conflict prevention as a response to the new types of
conflicts in the post-Cold War era (Boothby 020208). The strong Swedish
interest in the idea, and her willingness to play a key role internationally, was
recognized both within the UN and the EU (Solana 010122; Mack 020212).
In a recent interview, Former Director at United Nations Department of
Political Affairs (UNDPA), Derek Boothby (020208) also credited Sweden
with being “the only country that has adopted conflict prevention as a major
plank of its foreign policy and supported it with an Action Plan”. Within the
EU, conflict prevention was also recognized as an idea with Swedish conno-
tations. “Swedes could be considered the fathers of conflict prevention”,
according to the Director of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
(PPEWU) of the Council Secretariat of the EU, Christoph Heusgen (2000).

Limitations on Adopting Conflict Prevention

Even though the idea matches the overall Swedish foreign policy, and a
number of organizational and procedural changes have been undertaken since
adopting the idea, it cannot yet be interpreted as fully institutionalized into
the daily activities of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The institutionalization
of conflict prevention challenges the existing organizational structure of the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It cuts across traditional divisions and work
sections, and there are pockets of resistance. According to an interview with
a senior official at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (0105), the initial
skepticism towards conflict prevention within the Ministry could partly be
explained by internal turf-guarding, organizational challenges, limited per-
sonnel and dubious financial resources. This was partly a matter of inadequate
political support from the highest level, a problem that increased with changes
in the top-level administration.

Although the establishment of the Secretariat for Conflict Prevention was
combined with the allocation of some financial and staff resources, the focal
points for conflict prevention within the Ministry and Sida were not sup-
ported with additional resources to facilitate their work (senior official at the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 0105; senior Swedish diplomat 0105, develop-
ment cooperation desk officer 0105). In addition, one may question the effectiveness of housing such a Secretariat in a policy planning unit, rather isolated from the daily activities and the operational work of the Ministry, and separated from the political decision-making processes. An interviewed Swedish diplomat (0112) argued in favor of designating an operational department as the focal point for conflict prevention, as the issue would then have been institutionalized into the organization and the daily activities of the Ministry in a smoother and less cumbersome way. This could have been the reason behind relocating the Secretariat to the Department for Global Security, which may either improve the Secretariat’s integration into the organization and its daily activities or marginalize it further, thus leaving conflict prevention without organizational support.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs developed a number of policy documents covering conflict prevention, but no well-focused work plan for integrating conflict prevention into the daily activities of the organization exists yet (junior Swedish official 0105). Furthermore, Sida’s efforts to integrate conflict prevention into development cooperation programs and policies were initially constrained by a lack of an explicit mandate from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. One reason for this could be that representatives from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs struggled to maintain conflict prevention solely as a security and foreign policy issue, separated from development cooperation, and did not want to be constrained in their policy formulation by a Sida strategy (development cooperation desk officer 0105).

**Likeminded Supporters**

Sweden is clearly not the only actor recognizing conflict prevention as a good idea. International organizations, individuals, researchers, transnational networks, advocacy groups, supranational officials’ networks, as well as states can be found supporting and promoting the idea of conflict prevention. I will here only briefly mention a few of the most influential ones. The OSCE, a forerunner in conflict prevention, has advocated a broad notion of conflict prevention. This included efforts to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent disputes from developing into conflicts, to eliminate conflicts when they occur and to contain and limit the spread of these conflicts not amenable to swift elimination (Rotfeld 1996: 69). Since the early 1990s, the UN has promoted a similar approach to conflict prevention and identified three areas of conflict prevention: “actions to prevent disputes from arising
between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (A/47/277-S/24111). Suggestions for how to improve conflict prevention stem equally from the policy world and from the scholarly community (cf. Lund 1996a; Wallensteen et al. 1998; Cross and Rasamoelina et al. 1999; George 1999; Brown and Rosecrance et al. 1999; Jentleson et al. 2000; van der Goor and Huber et al. 2002). The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, a renowned US think tank, has also contributed to bringing conflict prevention to the forefront. The Commission has deployed a far-reaching approach to preventing deadly conflict, which rests on: early responses to signs of trouble; a forward-looking approach to counteract the risk factors that trigger violent conflict; and an extended effort to resolve the underlying causes of violence (Carnegie Commission 1997).

Despite somewhat different interpretations, “the usual suspects” referring primarily to Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway supported the idea of conflict prevention. The Canadian government was one of the first states to support the UN’s report *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992, and has subsequently woven the goal of preventing conflicts into its concept of peacebuilding. In October 1996 the “Canadian Peace-building Initiative” was launched to increasing Canada’s capacity to contribute internationally to conflict prevention, peace-building and democratic development. Peace-building has been linked to conflict prevention through the concept of human security (The Canadian Peace-building Initiative; cf. Björkdahl and McMahone 1999; Mack 020212).

The democracy and human rights focus of Danish foreign policy and development cooperation also includes conflict prevention, as all development cooperation efforts need to take into account the linkage between conflicts and economic, political and social development (Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1993; 1995).

Similarly, the Netherlands has interpreted conflict prevention in a broader sense, linking it to two concepts coined by the Dutch, *development for peace* and *peace aid*. These concepts were based on the assumption that “the needs of people whose security is threatened by violent conflict require a coherent and effective international response integrating preventive diplomacy, political mediation, humanitarian relief [and] social action, economic alternatives” (Pronk cited in van der Goor and van Leeuwen 2000: 61).

As a member of the group of likeminded states, Norway has promoted ideas relating to conflict prevention for several years. Most recently, the idea of conflict prevention has been made a priority of the Norwegian membership in the UN Security Council during the term 2001-2002 (Norwegian Minis-
try for Foreign Affairs 2001). The Norwegian view has similarities with the broad Swedish conceptualization of conflict prevention, and particularly to the notion of early, thus termed, structural prevention.

There has indeed been a group of states consistently advocating a role for the international community in preventive action in response to emerging violent conflicts. Like Sweden, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway have embedded ideas similar to conflict prevention into their wider foreign policy objectives. This advocacy may have contributed to facilitate the norm evolution regarding conflict prevention.33

Selecting International Arenas

International organizations are important because they govern the entry of ideas into the policy-making process, encourage exchanges of ideas between countries and provide the norm entrepreneur access to important audiences, such as the foreign policy elite from member countries.

Thus, the norm candidate of conflict prevention was introduced in a number of international organizations dealing with peace and security issues (af Ugglas 010910; Ängeby 010906). However, according to Ambassador Rydberg (010910), there were really only two international organizations that could provide military, political and economic measures needed for comprehensive conflict prevention—the EU and the UN. Based on political priorities, the Swedish foreign policy elite developed a comprehensive strategy to promote conflict prevention on these two arenas (ibid.).

The Swedish choice of international arenas was obvious, as the UN often takes the lead in establishing norms related to international peace and security, and has played an important role in developing the idea of conflict prevention. The recent developments within the CFSP and the ESDP make the EU an increasingly important actor on the international stage. By advancing the idea in the UN and the EU, the Swedish foreign policy elite intended to cultivate and gain support for the idea so that it could eventually be shared by other member states and become the collective property of these organizations.

Naturally, the UN stands out as the multilateral actor primarily concerned with conflict prevention. For instance, the idea to prevent future wars was central to secure international peace and cooperation, which brought the founding fathers of the UN to San Francisco in the last years of World War II. Article 1, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter established with absolute clarity that a principal purpose of the United Nations is “to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats...to the peace”. As signatories of the UN Charter, member states were under an obligation to resolve their disputes peacefully. This was inscribed in Chapter VI, Article 33 of the UN Charter, where a full range of peaceful means, such as negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement and resort to regional agencies or arrangements were recommended. The difficulties of solving disputes and conflicts peacefully suggested that disputing parties needed the assistance of a third party. Consequently, the UN was increasingly becoming involved in peace maintenance. Preventing violent conflicts was, and still is, the organization’s raison d’être, despite the fact that normative expectations and political potential do not always suffice to generate results.34 Andy Knight (1998: 19) argued that the reason for this was that “the world organization [the UN] continues to utilize old and worn doctrines in its response, even though the current global security situation cries out for new conceptualizations and approaches”. The time seemed ripe to introduce ideas pertaining to peace maintenance to the UN, as the organization searched for new ideas on how to fulfill its mandate and role in the international society.

The EU can in itself be regarded as a peace project and its role in conflict prevention is growing persistently. Through the process of enlargement, the development of the CFSP and the ESDP, as well as EU’s development cooperation and external assistance programs, the EU has attempted to contribute to international peace and stability (Björkdahl 2002a: 105-126). An explicit objective of the CFSP is to preserve peace and strengthen international security. This should be done in accordance with the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter of the OSCE, according to the Amsterdam Treaty.35 According to an interview with Martin Landgraf (011204) at the European Commission, the idea of conflict prevention first entered the development sphere of the EU, and addressing root causes of conflict has been a goal of the EU’s development agenda since the early 1990s. The idea of conflict prevention emerged a few years later in the traditional security policy sphere as a relatively non-controversial idea upon which the new Union’s foreign policy could be based (Hill 2001: 315-317).36

Hence, the UN and the EU may potentially facilitate the evolution of the norm candidate by providing organizational support, means to cultivate the norm candidate, and eventually an institutional structure in which the norm can become institutionalized. However, while providing opportunities, both the UN and the EU provide highly technical and fluid policy sectors, and their institutional complexity suggests some barriers to norm entrepreneurs and may constrain the entrepreneur’s ability to alter the normative structure, as we
will see in Chapter Eight. The fragmentation gives multiple opportunities for opposing views to exert influence and requires a consensus across the institutions. Hence, the EU and the UN contexts challenge any single norm entrepreneur.

From the idea complex pertaining to peace and security, the idea of conflict prevention was selected, as it was possible to construct a match between the idea and the reconstructed Swedish foreign policy identity. Idea takeoff was possible, not only because the idea of conflict prevention matched the internationalist Swedish foreign policy tradition, but also because it was perceived as inherently good. To some extent, it was regarded as revitalizing a familiar idea to address the new and urgent international problem of new wars. A supportive normative structure found in the UN and the EU, facilitated the Swedish choice of international arena for their norm entrepreneurial activities. These two arenas, it was imagined, would assist the norm entrepreneur in translating the idea into a norm candidate, and that is the topic to be discussed in the next Chapter.
CHAPTER SIX

NORM INITIATION

The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else...I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.

John Maynard Keynes

Research on ideas and norms has one reoccurring problem in common — it has not been able to demonstrate how certain ideas are translated into norms. Clearly, norms “do not float freely”, to paraphrase Risse-Kappen: they have to be constructed, and norm entrepreneurs play a pivotal role in this development. Norm initiation is an interesting topic to study, because once a new norm has emerged, it may help shape new identities and interests and enable the development of new or different behaviors. This chapter explores norm initiation, which refers to the process of framing a certain “catchy” idea to construct a norm candidate. While highlighting the efforts of norm entrepreneurs, this study relies on the interplay between actor and structure to understand how norm candidates are built.

Constructing a Norm Candidate

Norm candidates are consciously constructed by norm entrepreneurs with strong notions about appropriate behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 897). Consequently, norm entrepreneurs are crucial for norms to get a foothold. The use of soft powers, such as carefully constructed frames may enable norm entrepreneurs to construct a persuasive norm candidate that resonates with their audience (cf. Snow and Benford 1992: 133-155). As resonance is imperative, norm candidates need to have the potential to become the “property” of the community rather than of the individual (cf.
Legro 2000). Norm entrepreneurs sometimes, therefore, construct a norm candidate by renaming and re-framing old ideas, and recombining familiar elements in a new constellation, since that increases the likelihood for the norm candidate to resonate with potential norm followers.

For this purpose, the norm entrepreneurs may use a strategy of framing. Framing refers to activities to define reality by placing issues in a context that will favor certain interpretations and promote particular ideas, and thereby modify and change the ideational frameworks (Snow and Benford 1992: 135-139). A frame can be viewed as an interpretive structure that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” (Snow and Benford 1992: 137). Framing denotes an “active, process-derived phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction” (Snow and Benford 1992: 136). For the process of norm building, frames provide an interpretation of a particular problem, suggest a general line of appropriate action for ameliorating a problem and assign responsibility for carrying out actions to address the problem at hand. However, framing as a strategy for norms construction has been criticized for being “limited and flawed”, as the content of a specific idea matters less than the communicative environment (Payne 2001: 39). Clearly, the communicative environment is important to a norm candidate, but without a persuasive and appealing idea as a foundation for framing, the norm candidate may not resonate with a broad audience.

If the idea can be framed in a way that links it to an issue of great common concern on the international agenda, it is more likely to catch attention (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 17). Consequently, the selected idea needs to be framed in a specific language that names, interprets and dramatizes it. By supplying the words and concepts, the norm entrepreneurs, through their language, “define the terms of political debate and provide participants in the political arena with a discursive repertoire to be used there” (Hall 1989: 383-384). Such a frame enables the norm entrepreneur to articulate a vast array of events and experiences so that they are coherent and meaningful. Furthermore, the idea can be framed in commonly held values in order to fit with the existing normative framework and the normative convictions of potential norm followers (Sikkink 1991: 2). Framing processes are clearly highly contested, as they involve interpretation of the “world out there”, and as norm entrepreneurs may manipulate frames, these interpretations of the world may reflect the subjective view and interest of the norm entrepreneur (cf. Payne 2001: 39).

I elaborate with three types of framing (cf. Snow and Benford 1988: 197-217). Diagnostic framing, which involves identification of a problem. Prognos-
tic framing, which means to suggest solutions to the problem, and to identify appropriate strategies and instruments. Often the prognostic framing corresponds with diagnostic framing efforts, and at times they may overlap as diagnostic framing may also incorporate prescriptions. Motivational framing, which reaches beyond diagnosis and prognosis, refers to developing frames that function as incentives.

Some important studies have provided illustrations of the effective employment of frames. For example, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), in their study of human rights, have documented the effective use of a frame that interpreted human rights in relation to the prevention of bodily harm. Another example of successful employment of frames has been provided by David Lumsdaine (1993: 275), who has suggested that: “once foreign aid had been placed on such a [humanitarian] footing, it could be criticized on such footing. Ever afterward it became politically difficult to set up aid practices—especially international ones—except on a basis that had to be defensible as appropriate to programs with primarily developmental intent. Foreign aid became embedded in a context of debate that made it easier for those who wanted to have aid geared to developmental and antipoverty purposes to argue their case”.

Once a particular argument, buzzword or phraseology has been developed to describe the norm candidate, a “rhetorical momentum” may be generated (Lumsdaine 1993: 274, 275). These examples, while illustrating the framing of ideas relevant to conflict prevention, also indicate that the way a norm candidate has been framed will have significant bearing not only on the diffusion of the norm candidate, but on the practices developed in response to the norm once diffused.

Framing the Idea

Discouraged by the international community’s failures to prevent violent conflicts, Sweden looked for ways to replace the international community’s reactive practices to managing violent conflicts, with a preventive approach, contributing to the establishment of a culture of conflict prevention. One way to do this was to create new norms and develop the international system of norms and strengthen its implementation. “Conflict prevention” it was argued “must be based on and further develop the norms of freedom and law which have shaped us for generations and are reflected in international treaties and conventions” (Ds 1999:24).
Although the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been the locus for conflict prevention thinking, a number of other Swedish actors have also been involved. Sida for example, has strongly advocated the integration of the development cooperation approach into the conflict prevention thinking. A number of Sida-reports stressed the humanitarian assistance and development cooperation aspects of conflict prevention as well as the need to address the root causes of conflicts.37 The Swedish Ministry of Defense’s interests intersected with those of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, yet its representatives have not been very influential in the process of developing the concept of conflict prevention. However, also Swedish participation in international military peacekeeping efforts should be directed towards preventing violent conflicts as well as conflict management and traditional peacekeeping.38 The Swedish ambition has clearly been to develop a broad approach to conflict prevention, where for example military matters were combined with civilian, humanitarian, development dimensions of conflict resolution.

**Diagnostic Framing**

Norm entrepreneurial activities are frequently a matter of problem solving. Diagnostic framing means identifying a problem and relating the selected idea to the problem. The idea of conflict prevention was framed as a remedy for the problem of increasing numbers of new wars around the world. Already in 1991 the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, af Ugglas (911010), framed the notion of conflict prevention as a means for the international community to avoid having to deal with full-scale wars. By linking the idea to the recent experiences of the UN in the Gulf War, a frame was created to interpret past experiences. This frame was later used to interpret the burning issues of 1994 and 1995—the new wars in Rwanda and Somalia, and the breakup of Yugoslavia and the conflict in East Timor, which all demonstrated the need for preventive action (Ds 1997:18; cf. Ds 1999:24). Noticeably, historic cases were rarely referred to in the discourse. Presumably, conflict prevention was perceived and promoted as a remedy to the new wars of the post-Cold War era, which were regarded to be so dissimilar from old wars that parallels could be misleading.

The importance and urgency of the problem were illustrated by appalling figures of the consequences of the new wars, such as “the war in Bosnia alone claimed the lives of more than 200,000 people, and two million were forced to leave their homes”, in Rwanda, over 800,000 people were massacred in 100 days in 1994”(Ds 1999:24: 9).
The diagnostic framing of the idea of conflict prevention identified both root causes and the symptoms of conflict, which meant integrating development cooperation thinking with the new thinking on security. Root causes were regarded to be poverty; social, political and economic inequality; political and economic process of transition; religious and cultural tensions and weak and/or corrupt governance—all circumstances that may appear only indirectly linked to a specific outbreak of violent conflict (Ds 1997:18). Symptoms of emerging violent conflicts were identified as growing social, political and economic inequalities; failed states, marginalization and discrimination of minority groups; multiethnic power struggles; and increased patterns of human rights violations (cf. Eliasson 1996: 319-343; Eliasson and Rydberg 1997). Both root causes and symptoms of violent conflicts were identified in Conflict prevention – A Study (Ds 1997:18). In addition, this framing also identified the limited ability of international actors to undertake preventive efforts.

This frame enabled the Swedish foreign policy elite to exploit the emerging international consensus on the new security challenges of the post-Cold War era in order to organize internationally shared experiences and to propose conflict prevention as a solution to these new wars of common concern.

**Prognostic Framing**

Corresponding to diagnostic framing is prognostic framing, which means prescribing strategies. Consequently, in order to sell the idea of conflict prevention it was necessary to frame it in an image of action, i.e. with prescriptions for when, how and who to take preventive action. The idea was framed by clarifying when preventive measures should be undertaken. A first attempt to conceptualize what this actually meant was presented in relation to the “conflict lifecycle”, developed by US Peace Institute researcher Michael Lund, where preventive initiatives were related to the growing intensity of violence as the conflict escalated over time (Ds 1997: 18; cf. Lund 1996a: 38). “Measures should concentrate on a specific situation which is liable to become violent within a foreseeable period” (Ds 1997:18: 35). Eventually, conflict prevention became related to an actual risk situation: “specific, imminent or distant, risk situation in which armed conflict is likely to break out” (Ds 1999:24: 22). The reason behind framing conflict prevention in this way was a concern that failure to relate conflict prevention to a specific risk situation would create a risk that all foreign policy and development cooperation could be classified as conflict prevention, and that the idea would lose political
significance. To include the time dimension in the framing of the idea was an effort to come to terms with the common phenomenon of acting too late to early warning signals of emerging crises (cf. Eliasson 1995: 405-412; Jentleson 2000).

When constructing the norm candidate the question of how, i.e. what instruments should be used to prevent violent conflict was also addressed. To prevent violent conflict was primarily a matter of using existing instruments at the disposal of the international community for partly new purposes. For example, development cooperation, international law, trade and economic cooperation, as well as peacekeeping operations, could be further refined so as to be more effective in the context of conflict prevention. These instruments could be divided according to a conceptualization of conflict prevention that distinguished between early and late conflict prevention—later re-conceptualized as direct and structural prevention (Ds 1997:18; Ds 1999:24). Early conflict prevention reflected the development cooperation approach to emerging conflicts and was aimed at addressing the structural causes of conflict—the deep-rooted factors that create a fertile ground for conflicts. Essentially, early prevention was aimed at fostering amicable future relations among contending groups. Late conflict prevention, on the other hand, was perceived as taking its point of departure in traditional security policies and reflected a short-term perspective. It was regarded as action to prevent a conflict from becoming violent, coming at the moment before the actual employment of force i.e. actions when a particular crisis was approaching. State Secretary Eliasson (1995: 405-412) developed a “ladder of prevention”, which could be seen as corresponding to the level of violence. The “ladder of prevention” illustrated the broad range of instruments available for the purpose of preventing outbreak of violent conflicts, such as early warning systems, negotiations, mediation, conciliation arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional arrangements, peacekeeping etc. Late conflict prevention was the most familiar to the international community, as many of its instruments were recommended in the UN Charter, but early prevention was perceived as less controversial. The attempt to fuse early and late conflict prevention meant bringing together the initially opposite views of the departments responsible for development cooperation and the departments concerned with traditional security issues.

The Swedish foreign policy elite was concerned with identifying actors to take preventive action. Guidance was found in assessments of past experiences and in the UN Charter, which clearly expresses a shared responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Experience showed that
most successful preventive initiatives were multilateral, involving a broad range of actors as no single actor possessed all the tools and strategies needed. A number of actors were recognized: states, international organizations at regional and sub-regional levels as well as NGOs, prominent political leaders and other committed persons, representatives of the media and business, and members of the civil society in general (Ds 1997:18). However, it was pointed out that, according to the UN Charter, the primary responsibility for preventing violent conflicts rested with the parties to the conflict, and if the parties concerned failed to solve their dispute in a peaceful manner, the dispute should be deferred to regional organizations (Eliasson 1996: 323).

This prognostic framing suggests a norm candidate with important prescriptive and proscriptive qualities. It prescribes when and how preventive action ought to be taken, as well as identifying with whom the responsibility for conflict prevention rests. The frame clarifies rights and obligations. It warns states on the verge of violent conflict that international efforts to prevent the outbreak of violence will be taken if the parties themselves are unable to solve the dispute without violence. The practical instructions inherent in the norm candidate may also facilitate efforts to mobilize a collective international response to the emerging conflict.

**Motivational Framing**

States, as potential norm followers and eventually as undertakers of conflict prevention activities, need motivation to adopt the norm candidate and to allow it to guide their actions. Consequently, the norm entrepreneur will attempt to frame the norm candidate so that it will motivate an international audience. Naturally, the diagnostic frame, identifying the magnitude of the problem and the consequences of inaction, may provide motivation, as may the prognostic frame.

However, motivational framing was also used to construct the norm candidate, and this frame linked conflict prevention to commonly held values such as, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human equality in order for it to resonate with members of the global audience (Ds 1997:18). For example, Minister for Foreign Affairs Hjelm-Wallén (950928), stated that dynamic conflict prevention is only possible within the culture of democracy. This frame also came to include human rights, as conflict prevention was framed as a way to uphold international human rights in view of the fact that armed conflicts often were preceded by human rights violations (Ds 1997:18).
The idea was framed as a moral and humanitarian imperative for a responsible international society. State Secretary Eliasson (1996: 318) held that “prevention of conflicts is a moral imperative in today’s world, [and] it is a humanitarian necessity in order to save innocent lives”. The Swedish foreign policy elite echoed this statement over the years, as illustrated by the rhetoric of Hjelm-Wallén’s successor, Minister for Foreign Affairs Lindh (1999a), who stated that conflict prevention “is a moral imperative as well as a humanitarian, political and economic necessity”.

To establish conflict prevention as a humanitarian issue, which could motivate a large group of states, the idea was linked to sustainable development and the eradication of poverty by emphasizing the need to address root causes of conflict (Ds 1997:18; cf. Ds 1999:24). As both the EU and the UN developed approaches that underlined the importance of targeting root causes of violent conflicts, this aspect of the Swedish interpretation of conflict prevention was reinforced. In the EU, the idea of conflict prevention corresponded, for example, to the Common Position on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa of 2 June 1997 (97/356/CFSP). The UN Secretary-General’s report, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, gained strong support within the UN, and particularly among representatives from the South (A/52/871-S/1998/318; Dahlgren 011018).

In its approach to conflict prevention the Swedish foreign policy elite built on the normality of conflict prevention and embedded domestic values as well as longstanding domestic and Nordic practices. The Minister for Foreign Affairs argued that “it is high time to transfer and strengthen the sophisticated preventive habits we know so well at home into the field of international security” (Lindh 1999a). It was believed that conflict prevention could benefit from “methods and procedures for conflict resolution and conflict prevention which have evolved in the Swedish society” (Ds 1999:24: 6). Some members of the Swedish foreign policy elite also referred to this domestic analogy in interviews when attempting to explain the feasibility of conflict prevention (Hjelm-Wallén 010905; Ångeby 010906; Rydberg 010910). This line of argument was rather recent and could be interpreted as an *ex post facto* rationalization of the promotion of conflict prevention, having the domestic audience rather than for an international audience in mind. Drawing on the criticism of Sweden as the moral superpower, a different interpretation of this rhetoric could suggest Swedish conceit based on an exaggerated opinion of the Swedish domestic model.

In addition to framing conflict prevention as a morally appealing idea, rational, economic arguments were also used to motivate and build a
persuasive frame. It has frequently been noted that one of the main barriers to preventive practices have been cost considerations (Brown and Rosecrance 1999). Consequently, it was perceived important to include the cost benefits of preventive efforts in the motivational framing of the idea. This was illustrated by State Secretary Eliasson (1996: 318), who regarded conflict prevention to be an “economic necessity both for the countries immediately involved and for the international community, because of the exorbitant price of war and postwar reconstruction”. This was a reoccurring theme in framing the idea, as seen by the following statement: “The enormous resources of human creativity, money and material now being used for destruction should instead be put to constructive use” (Ds 1999:24: 9). This frame, however, failed to acknowledge that, even though conflict prevention measures are perceived as less costly than measures to impose peace during a violent conflict or reconstruction of a war-torn society, they nevertheless entail political and economic costs (cf. Stedman 1995).

An idea that could be framed as having scientific support may gain credibility, which in turn may facilitate potential adoption by norm followers (cf. Johnston 2001: 497). As the scholarly community began to accumulate knowledge bearing on the problems of managing new wars (George 1999: 7-17), their research contributed to framing the idea and their expertise was also used in order to give the idea scientific support. A collection of academics, researchers and consultants from the Swedish and the international scholarly community such as the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, the Carnegie Commission, the International Peace Academy (IPA), Oxford University and Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) were consulted, and their expertise and in-depth knowledge contributed to the Swedish understanding of conflict prevention (Lyrvall 010521; Jonsson 010523; Ängeby 010906). During the investigation leading up to the report Preventing Violent Conflict—A Study, fifteen thematic reports were commissioned from academics and experts for the purpose of developing the idea of conflict prevention. A draft of the study was then referred back to a number of Swedish research institutes and universities for consideration (Jonsson 010523). Informal discussions with researchers involved in this process indicated strong support for establishing conflict prevention as a foreign policy idea, and for the efforts to involve researchers and draw on their expertise, but the study itself, some perceived, left room for improvements.
A Supportive Normative Structure

To some extent the current normative logic supports the emerging norm candidate conducive to preventive action. “Peace between states is the normal condition of the international system, while conflict and war are deviations from the norm of inter-state civility” (Holsti 1993: 126). Similarly, Frost (1996: 109) finds that states in their normal dealings with each other clearly proceed on the assumption that “war requires a special justification in a way that peaceful relations do not, thus indicating that peace is regarded as a settled norm”. This does not mean that wars cannot be justified, since they can, but rather that war is regarded to be in need of justification in a way peace is not. Most states going to war attempt to justify their actions before the international community, while states in peaceful relations never have to justify these peaceful relationships.

Thus, there is support for the norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention in the principle of *ius ad bellum* of international law, which narrowly restricts the circumstances under which states are allowed to resort to war. Evolving norms inhibiting the initiation of international war may have made wars among the rich and powerful states a relic of the past. John Mueller (1989) concludes that major wars among developed states have been subject to a gradual obsolescence that has not occurred in other areas of the globe. James Lee Ray (1989: 439) suggests that moral progress and long-term trends towards humanizing the “other” have contributed to the decrease of incidents of international wars. The well-established institution of diplomacy, which consists of a number of norms, such as the peaceful resolution of disputes among states may also have contributed to maintaining peaceful interstate relations (Frost 1996: 110). When a state acts to threaten international peace and security, it is perceived to be appropriate for the international community to establish a collective security arrangement for the purpose of counteracting threats to peace. Collective security can therefore be considered a settled norm. The agreement on this norm remains despite criticisms against the actual performance and results of these collective arrangements of the UN (ibid.).

Although many of these norms refer to interstate wars, rather than to internal conflicts, these norms can be considered as supportive of the norm candidate of preventing violent interstate, as well as intrastate, conflicts. These norms however, have emerged among likeminded, often democratic, states in the West, and are not in any sense universal, and have obviously often failed to affect the practice of waging internal wars.
Previously, internal conflicts were not considered to violate international norms to the same extent as interstate wars, and they were frequently not defined as threats to international peace and security as defined in the UN Charter Chapter VII, Article 2(7) motivating a collective response. This is now changing as human rights law and other legal domains have placed individuals, governments and non-governmental organizations under new systems of regulation, which in principle recast the legal significance of state boundaries. These systems entrench powers and constraints, and rights and obligations that go beyond the traditional conception of the proper scope and boundaries of states and can come into conflict and sometimes contradict national laws. Within this framework, sovereignty is reinterpreted (Trachtenberg 1993). The fact that internal armed conflicts, for example the breakup of Yugoslavia, today can be defined as threatening international peace and security reflects a possibility for multilateral prevention of new wars, if they are regarded as threats.

The expansion of the concept of “humanity” has contributed to consolidate new norms (Sikkink 1993a; 1993b; Finnemore 1996b). The abolition of the slave trade and slavery in the nineteenth century, for example, can be understood in terms of changing ideas about morality, moral progress and changing understandings about who is human (Ray 1989: 439). The killing, torture and maltreatment of millions of people during World War II led to the adoption of an international declaration of human rights, and the conclusion that the implementation of the declaration should not be hindered by norms of sovereignty (Sikkink 1993a: 411-441). Human rights are now perceived as a settled norm that must be protected by states and the international community, even though the international consensus is vague on what precisely these rights are (Frost 1996: 111). Likewise, the process of decolonization in the 1950s was partly justified in humanitarian terms (Goertz and Diehl 1992: 634-664; Finnemore 1996b: 172-175). Since the 1990s, interventionists have claimed humanitarian justification for their intervention, despite the fact that humanitarian intervention is not a fundamentally new concept or practice (Finnemore 1996b: 153-185).

These expanding norms based on the growing understanding of humanity provide a supportive normative framework for the norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention. The normative structure strives for logical consistency, and it has long been noted that new norms that are logically coherent with the existing normative context greatly enhance their possibility of becoming embedded and of gaining influence. The widely held belief that “to prevent is better than to cure” is the foundation of the norm candidate, and it is strengthened by the current logic of “appropriateness”.
Normative Clash

Although the contemporary normative structure seems to support the emerging norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention, opposition to the norm candidate can be found. Norms pertaining to human rights, humanitarian intervention and conflict prevention clash with settled norms, such as sovereignty, which is perceived as the constitutive rule of international relations (Barkin and Cronin 1994: 107-130). Sovereignty is “the institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains” (Ruggie 1986: 143), and in the present context it refers to the principle of non-intervention and mutual recognition that create the boundaries between independent states (Barkin and Cronin 1994: 107-130). Claims about sovereignty are forceful, because they represent shared norms, understandings and expectations that are constantly reinforced by state practices as well as by the practices of non-state actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 35-37). As sovereignty norms are now so taken for granted, “it is easy to overlook the extent to which they are both presupposed by and an ongoing artifact of practice” (Wendt 1992: 412-413). However, sovereignty is a norm that exists “only in virtue of certain intersubjective understandings and expectations” (ibid.). Although the norm of sovereignty is often viewed as static and fixed: neither the practice nor the doctrine of sovereignty has ever been absolute. The actual content of sovereignty, the scope of the authority a state can exercise, has always been contested (Krasner 1993: 235; Kratochwil 1995: 21-43; Onuf 1995: 43-58).

The intrinsic characteristics of sovereignty have been persistently challenged by the creation of new norms, e.g. the norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention. The evolving normative logic offers a critique of, and a challenge to, the principle of sovereignty as it is currently constituted. At the same time it provides an example of shifting understandings of how and when violence as a sociopolitical tool is accepted or not in inter- and intra-state relations.

Conflict Prevention – A Norm Candidate

A norm candidate requires certain properties to distinguish it from an idea. As we are discussing conflict prevention as a norm candidate, an “assessment” of its configuration is needed.

The norm candidate is portrayed as a remedy for the new wars such as those witnessed in the Balkans, East Timor and Somalia, which strengthens its legitimacy, but it also raises expectations. It expresses certain commonly held
values such as, human rights and democracy, and can be regarded as morally persuasive, hence motivating potential norm followers to adopt it. The essence of conflict prevention also relates to humanitarianism and the prevention of bodily harm.

The normative element is crucial in translating an idea into a norm candidate. The norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention contains prescriptive and proscriptive elements and identifies rights and obligations. It proscribes the use of violence to settle conflict and prescribes peaceful means to solve disputes. In Conflict Prevention — A Swedish Action Plan, the norm candidate was framed to prescribe measures that can be implemented before a difference or dispute escalates into violence; measures designed to counteract the spreading of conflict into other geographical areas; and measures that prevent violence from flaring up again after the signing of a peace agreement or a cease-fire (Ds 1999:24: 22). It has behavioral implications as it prescribes the appropriate behavior of parties to conflicts and the international community. Parties to conflicts should themselves, first, attempt to prevent the dispute from escalating. The international community then ought to take a collective responsibility to prevent the outbreak, escalation and relapse of violent conflict. The appropriate behavior prescribed by the norm candidate is to act before the outbreak of violence, preferably with the consent of the parties, although this is still rather vague. It prescribes a number of instruments to address both the root causes and the symptoms of new wars. This norm candidate can be used to make demands, rally support, justify action, ascribe responsibility and assess the praiseworthy or blameworthy character of an action.

The norm candidate consists of a constellation of familiar elements making it less threatening. The comprehensive approach and the inherent ambiguity of the idea make it persuasive and easy to accept, but it is also a liability for the norm entrepreneur when attempting to translate it into a norm candidate. Conflict prevention is, according to an anonymous EU official (0112), so vague and ambiguous that it is “like trying to put chocolate pudding on a clothes-hanger”. Yet a constructive ambiguity included in the construct of the norm candidate can be desirable. A vague norm candidate, for instance, is easier to accept, and a flexible norm candidate can more easily absorb criticism and incorporate other ideas. The vagueness of the concept also disguises the fact that it may clash with some established norms and principles of interstate relations such as sovereignty. Many complex ideas and norms are ambiguous and far from immediately comprehensible. In these cases, interpretation is a necessary prerequisite for understanding (Hall 1989: 370). Potential norm followers may interpret the norm candidate quite differently, because relevant
historical experiences diverge. The meanings of norm candidates are inter-
preted in the setting into which they are inserted, in this case the context of
potential norm followers as well as international organizations. To some
extent the persuasiveness of the norm candidate depends on interpretive
exercises (Sikkink 1991: 253).

This empirical chapter on norm initiation offers an understanding of how
ideas are translated into norm candidates by norm entrepreneurs, through a
process of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing, as well as an
empirical illustration of the Swedish foreign policy elite’s efforts to construct
a norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention. This norm candidate
reflects universalistic terms to resonate with a global audience, and to mitigate
the clash with the established norms of sovereignty. How the norm entrepre-
neur diffused the norm candidate, and if and how norm followers adopted the
norm candidate, will be discussed in the next chapter.
There is near-universal agreement that prevention is preferable to cure…

Kofi Annan

The spreading of norms is traditionally discussed in terms of diffusion and whereas most researchers in the norm business refer to diffusion processes, few focus on the mechanisms behind diffusion of norms. A detailed process tracing is needed to explore the actual mechanisms behind the diffusion. Here, recent developments in diffusion research can assist social constructivist analysis. The present study only modestly skims into this vast literature on diffusion, and, by combining it with the constructivist norm literature, it attempts to gain a better understanding of norm evolution. It draws on these recent developments in diffusion studies in three ways. First, by paying attention to the norm entrepreneur, the actor is brought into the analysis and restored in its context. Second, a focus on ideational phenomena in the diffusion process and the degree of “normative match” between the norm candidate and normative context will emphasize the structure. Third, by exploring the interplay between the norm entrepreneur and the norm followers, an interactive analysis will be pursued that marries the processes of norm diffusion and socialization. Three components central to the process of diffusion and socialization are emphasized in this chapter: a sender—the norm entrepreneur, an adopter—the norm follower, and an object of diffusion—the norm candidate (cf. Rogers 1995).

Approaches to Diffusion and Socialization

There is a rich tradition of diffusion research in anthropology, history, sociology and more recently, in political science, where it has expressed itself in a multitude of studies on policy convergence, policy diffusion, policy
learning, lesson drawing and policy transfer. Diffusion, however, has been criticized for referring to a physical process associated with structural dynamics and technocratic determinism, neglecting the actor and the “voluntaristic” aspect of diffusion and, more importantly, socialization (Rose 1991: 9; Czarniawska and Sevon 1996: 6). Instead, a more actor-oriented concept of “translation” has been introduced, meaning “displacement, drift, invention, mediation, creation of new links that did not exist before”, modifying in part the two agents. (Latour cited in Czarniawska and Sevon 1996: 24; cf. Jönsson 2002). Translation thereby focuses on the relationship between actors and ideas.

Although diffusion can be unintentional and unconscious, for example through inheritance or imitation, the focus here is essentially on the conscious activities of norm entrepreneurs (cf. Rogers 1995: 40; Florini 1996: 367, 375). In addition, a common bias has been detected in the diffusion literature towards successful processes of diffusion, presumably due to the fact that successful diffusion leaves a visible trace that can be studied, while unsuccessful diffusion is difficult to reconstruct. By focusing on an ongoing and open-ended process of evolution, the analysis will avoid this common bias (Rogers 1995: 104-105).

Diffusion in the constructivist literature is often related to a process of socialization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895; Risse 1999: 529-568; Risse et al. 1999). Socialization is interpreted as a process of moral consciousness raising, argumentation, dialogue and persuasion (Risse 1999: 529; Johnston 2001: 487-515). The “socialization to international norms is the crucial process through which states become members of the international society”; hence it means introducing new members into ways of behavior that are preferred in a society (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 11). This however, presupposes the existence of a society. On the level of the international system there must be an international society of states, and, paradoxically, Bull (1977: 315) finds that successful socialization at the international level is unlikely to occur unless states retain their sovereign status. Thus socialization is aimed at constructing membership in a society where the intersubjective understandings of the society become taken for granted.

By approaching diffusion and socialization as two sides of the same coin, the analysis intends to capture the interaction between the norm entrepreneur and the norm followers. Although a theoretical distinction is made between diffusion, focusing on the efforts of the norm entrepreneur to propagate certain norm candidates, and socialization, referring to the adoption of the norm candidate by the norm followers, it is the interaction between the two that creates an interesting dynamic.
Strategies of Norm Diffusion

Certain strategies of norm diffusion may seem more or less appropriate, useful or achievable depending on the identity of the norm entrepreneur. The constructivist literature provides examples of how persuasion is used by actors who either lack traditional power resources, or find their use inappropriate. Persuasion—the core of politics and the central aim of political interaction—has also been identified as an important strategy when establishing new norms. “Argumentation and persuasion play the key role in norm setting”, according to Giandomenico Majone (1989: 28). Consequently, norm entrepreneurs can be assumed to rely on persuasion to convert normative convictions and influence norm followers to adopt favorable attitudes towards the norm candidate.

However, there are variations in how the term “persuasion” is used. For some, it refers to non-coercive communication of new normative understandings (Crawford 1993; Risse 1999; 2000). For others, persuasion also refers to the normatively coercive, entailing for example shaming (Simons 1971; 1976; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 344; Risse and Sikkink 1999: 13-14). At times, non-coercive and coercive approaches may however overlap.

By exploiting work in social psychology and communications research, Checkel (2001: 562) is able to develop this reasoning by distinguishing between manipulative and argumentative persuasion and to identify two channels for persuasive communicative acts: unidirectional through speeches and two-way interactive through personal contacts. Against this backdrop, rhetoric is viewed as the craft of persuasion. The manipulative persuasion is perceived as “asocial and lacking in interaction, often concerned with political elites manipulating [the] mass public” (ibid). In this sense, ideational phenomena are particularly suitable for this type of persuasion as they can easily be manipulated to persuade (Laffey and Weldes 1997: 201). A manipulative act, however, tends to leave the receivers with the perception of choice (Simons 1976: 20). Argumentative persuasion on the other hand, “is a social process of interaction that involves changing attitudes…in the absence of overt coercion”, and it is a strategy that may affect the interests and preferences of actors (Checkel 2001: 562). This type of two-way communication can be referred to as reciprocal persuasion, where both the persuader and the persuaded adjust their convictions through a process of two-way learning (Majone 1989: 2; Risse 2000: 13, 17). Learning is interpreted here as an active process of redefinition or reinterpretation of reality on the basis of new (normative) knowledge. This notion of learning has a social dimension to it because it can shape the identities of the actors (Barnett and Adler 1998: 422).
Coercive norm diffusion involves a norm entrepreneur pushing or even forcing a norm taker to adopt the norm candidate by utilizing coercive measures, such as pressure, arm-twisting, penetration, sanctions and shaming (cf. Thomson 1990; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 344; Risse et al. 1999). Moral consciousness raising through a process of “shaming” and denunciation aimed at converting normative convictions by isolating and embarrassing the uncommitted means treating the norm-violating state like a pariah state outside the community of civilized states. Shaming is effective in creating an in-group and an out-group (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 14-15), but may lead to “public conformity without private acceptance” (Festinger cited in Johnston 2001: 499). Hence, shaming may be inefficient because it fails to ensure internalization of the norm candidate, as Neta Crawford (1993: 52) observes: “norms established through coercion…lack legitimacy”. Coercive approaches, therefore, do not reflect authentic persuasion in a constructivist understanding, because in the absence of forced compliance the actor would not adhere to the norm. Clearly, the norm has not been accepted in a way that redefines the actor's preferences and interests (Payne 2001: 41). Authentic persuasion involves changing minds, opinions, and attitudes in the absence of overtly material or mental coercion.

Building a Norm Community

Through persuasion the norm entrepreneur attempts to build a norm community of norm followers. When a norm candidate has been diffused and adopted, the norm community expands, as the group of norm followers grows. The first to become norm followers are often likeminded actors who share the norm entrepreneur's identity. As norm followers, they may help to persuade other actors to adopt the new norm candidate, which creates a momentum in the diffusion process (Risse-Kappen 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). A norm community is built with the specific intent of bringing about normative change, and it may play a significant role in norm evolution.

A critical mass of norm followers, however, is necessary in order for the norm candidate to be recognized as a collectively held norm. This threshold has been referred to as a “tipping point” (Schelling 1978: 99-102; Kingdon 1995: 139-140; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 901). A norm entrepreneur may therefore function as the “tipping agent” that has managed to convince enough norm followers to “tip” the norm candidate into a norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 901).
Within a norm community, all states are not equal in normative weight. Some states have to be considered critical states, in the sense that without them the goal of the norm entrepreneurs will be compromised and the norm candidate will most likely not progress into a norm. These states may be critical because they possess moral authority, or are prominent and prestigious actors in high standing and whose actions are perceived as legitimate and appropriate by other actors and often imitated (cf. Axelrod 1986: 1095-1111; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 901). Hence, it is important which states adopt the norm candidate.

Diffusion in the UN Arena

In the early 1990s Sweden actively began to call attention to the importance of preventing violent conflicts in the UN. Sweden utilized both the General Assembly and the Security Council, in which Sweden was a member in 1997-1998, to advocate the need to prevent violent conflicts (Björkdahl 1999: 64). The term in the Security Council provided an opportunity to persuade the permanent five, but for the norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention to become the collective property of the UN and accepted among the UN member states, Sweden also needed to use the General Assembly.

Persuasion

Large public meetings in the UN General Assembly provided opportunities to advocate conflict prevention, spread the norm candidate to the international society and reach out to those states where many of the contemporary conflicts were enacted (Ängeby 010906). Sweden introduced the concept of conflict prevention as a remedy for new wars at the 46th UN General Assembly debate (af Ugglas 911010). In the following years’ annual debates in the General Assembly, conflict prevention was frequently advocated as an alternative response to the new wars that had caught the international community’s attention for example, Rwanda, Somalia and East Timor where existing measures had failed to maintain peace (cf. af Ugglas 930928; Hjelm-Wallén 941011; 950928; Persson 960925). The need to address the root causes and the symptoms of violent conflicts was used to appeal to UN member states and to avoid criticism that development aid would decrease if resources were reallocated to the prevention of violent conflicts (Hjelm-Wallén 970924). To
persuade, many speeches offered practical measures to prevent violent conflict. Some were initiated by Sweden, such as the deployment of civilian police officers, while others, such as limiting the proliferation of anti-personnel mines, small arms and light weapons, were supplied by other actors (ibid.). Incorporating prescriptions of practical measures invented by others into the norm candidate increased its familiarity and made it more persuasive, as it could then be considered more of a joint venture.

However, not only rational and logical arguments were used to communicate the importance of preventing violent conflict. Minister for Foreign Affairs Lindh (000914) also appealed to emotions in the General Assembly by stating “in many conflicts, deliberate terror directed against civilians is used to create fear. Women suffer from violence and rape. Children are denied their dignity and childhood when forced to become soldiers. Men are imprisoned in concentration camps, forced to take sides—or killed” (cf. Hjelm-Wallén 970924). Rhetorical, emotional and symbolic appeals were clearly persuasive and propagandistic, and generally more common in one-way communication situations, such as the UN General Assembly, than in dialogue situations.

The common values and principles inherent in the norm candidate were highlighted in order to persuade. For example, democracy and human rights were repeatedly used in speeches delivered in the General Assembly to advance conflict prevention as something familiar. Minister for Foreign Affairs Hjelm-Wallén (970924, 980923) promoted conflict prevention in connection with the 50th anniversary of Human Rights and thereby invoking a powerful symbol. This linkage between conflict prevention and human rights was repetitively used in the rhetoric. Foreign Minister Lindh’s (000322) for example declared that “violations of human rights are often the very root causes of a conflict [and] if we want to prevent conflict it must be at the heart of our efforts to prevent such violations at an early stage”. Inherent in the norm candidate was the “appropriateness” of conflict prevention, and consequently the UN member states were urged to recognize the moral, economic and political imperative of conflict prevention and share the responsibility for international peace and security (Hjelm-Wallén 980923).

The element of development cooperation and sustainable development inherent in the norm candidate could defer criticism from developing countries of the South, where the strongest resistance was found (Hjelm-Wallén 010905). In addition, this aspect could assist in distancing conflict prevention from hardcore security policies. When advocating the norm candidate, prevention was clearly separated from intervention in order to
appeal also to states that, due to their particularly historical experiences as colonies, interpreted prevention as intervention. In an interview Eliasson (020207), recalled that over the years when holding the position of State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, he frequently promoted conflict prevention as an alternative to interventions—an approach to peaceful resolutions of disputes based on consent of the parties and respect of the principle of sovereignty. Conflict prevention was proposed as an alternative to force, and force should only be the last resort when all other means have been exhausted. Lindh’s (990921) statement in the General Assembly stressed this difference by arguing that “the most obvious alternative to the use of force is conflict prevention and early action”. Intervention, it was viewed, must be considered on a case-by-case basis, in view of the values at stake and whether or not all other means have been exhausted. However, a more recent statement, reflecting the experiences of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, suggested support for a reinterpretation of sovereignty. “Respect for sovereignty”, it was stated, “must not stand in the way of necessary international action to prevent humanitarian catastrophes or gross human rights violations in intrastate conflicts” (Ds 1999:24: 13). To some extent the preventive undertakings in the Balkans demonstrated the universal applicability of the norm candidate. Deputy Prime Minister Hjelm-Wallén (010905), former Minister for Foreign Affairs, said she found it useful to illustrate the norm candidate with preventive efforts in the Balkans. This demonstrated the applicability of the norm candidate also to the European context, making the norm candidate less threatening and more legitimate in the eyes of certain skeptical states.

At the General Assembly meeting in 1999, Minister for Foreign Affairs Lindh (990921), promoted the Swedish thinking on conflict prevention and with reference to the Swedish Action Plan for Conflict Prevention she noted: “it is our hope that this action plan will stimulate a debate on how to change the focus from crisis management to early preventive action—in other words to promote a culture of prevention”. A summary of the action plan was distributed through the UN distribution system to the UN member states in the summer of 1999, which meant that a summary of the Action Plan was translated into the six official languages of the UN. In addition, it was also distributed to all the embassies in Stockholm and to the Swedish embassies abroad. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s visit to Sweden in 1999 was an additional opportunity to promote the norm candidate as well as the Swedish thinking (Skr. 1999/2000: 130).

In the UN General Assembly debates, communication is unidirectional
since little room for interaction is given by the prepared pre-written speeches. This type of communication is closely related to what Checkel (2001: 562) refers to as manipulative persuasion. Arguments based on both logical reasoning and emotional appeal are used in the rhetoric. Although it is important to call attention to conflict prevention and initiate a dialogue in the General Assembly, a prolonged debate where the norm candidate is constantly questioned and reshaped by the debate is not constructive for diffusion and institutionalization. Despite lacking the interactive communicative approach, which in theory is regarded as the more fruitful approach when diffusing norms, the Swedish rhetoric increased the awareness of conflict prevention and clearly illustrated the Swedish ambitions concerning the issue.

Informally, a diplomat at the Swedish Mission to the UN (0112) recognized the difficulties inherent in promoting the norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention in a multilateral setting with 189 members with few common values and shared attitudes. To change the normative convictions in such a setting with mainly rhetorical measures and by attempting to build ad hoc coalitions could only achieve very limited results. Reflecting upon the Swedish efforts, the same Swedish diplomat concluded that the Swedish representatives should have been more goal-oriented in their advocacy and “few concrete results were achieved”.

**Coalition Building**

Swedish representatives attempted to use informal meetings based on interpersonal and argumentative persuasion rather than unidirectional and manipulative persuasion of the General Assembly to build coalitions (cf. Checkel 2001: 562). The strategy employed meant to first approach a number of countries identified as likeminded so that once persuaded, they might contribute to the coalition building.

Naturally, the Nordic countries were among the first approached, because of the close relationship and the long tradition of cooperation between the Nordic states in the UN on issues of peace and security. Together the Nordic states contributed to the ongoing discussion on the role of the UN in peacekeeping and peacemaking by presenting a document to the United Nations, *Shaping the Peace: the United Nations in the 1990’s*. A number of the recommendations in the report were subsequently taken up in the Secretary-General’s report *An Agenda for Peace* (Archer 1994: 380). In an interview Ambassador Eliasson (020207), characterized *An Agenda for Peace* as “a successful case of idea diffusion”. Likewise, af Ugglas
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(010910) noted that the UN Charter and the contemporary international agenda had inspired the Nordic report, which in turn may have influenced the UN report. The Nordic states are traditionally likeminded, although Eliasson (020207) perceived that efforts to engage them in bilateral discussions were declining, as Swedish representatives increasingly began to rely more on the EU to promote issues on the international arena.

The increased trend towards more unified EU action in the UN was an opportunity for coalition building around the norm pertaining to conflict prevention (cf. Strömvik 1998: 181-197; Wiklund 1998: 197-210). The EU cooperation and coordination is obvious for example, on the issue of Human Rights where the EU presented a joint proposal to the UN General Assembly in 1999 (Skr. 1999/2000:130). Despite the close EU collaboration and the obvious link between Human Rights and conflict prevention, only limited attempts were made to build a coalition among the fifteen EU member states on the issue of conflict prevention (diplomat at the Swedish Mission to the UN 0112). Inexperience in using the recent EU membership and a willingness to pursue a traditional small-state strategy may have mattered. However, the EU membership increased Sweden’s political weight in the UN, as it is not commonly known that the EU member states do not necessarily cooperate in the UN (ibid.).

As Ambassador to the Swedish Permanent Mission to the UN, Dahlgren (011018) described in an interview how he assembled fourteen of the UN’s member states and Under-Secretary-General for UNDPA Kieran Prendergast in an informal “Group of Friends for Conflict Prevention”. The ambition was to strengthen the support within the UN for conflict prevention and bridge the North-South division on the issue. Remarkably, traditionally supportive and likeminded states such as, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands did not participate in these meetings. Dahlgren’s successor, Ambassador Schori (020124), continued to gather the group to promote the implementation of the UN Secretary-General’s recent report on Prevention of Armed Conflict. At the UN Secretariat some officials found that, although a group of friends can be a very useful device, it needs leadership. When met with reluctance and opposition Sweden tended to withdraw a little and was not assertive (former senior UN official 0202). A more assertive Swedish leadership and consolidation of support from the EU member states in combination with a better analysis of potential norm followers open to persuasion could have assisted in building a broader coalition in the UN General Assembly.
Membership in the Security Council increased the opportunities for building coalitions with the permanent five on the issue of conflict prevention. Already when Sweden emerged in 1992 as a candidate for membership in the Security Council for the period 1993-1994, conflict prevention together with peace-building and peacekeeping were singled out as top priorities (af Ugglas 920922). When Sweden resumed its campaign to gain a position in the Security Council in 1996, the Swedish foreign policy elite continued to prioritize conflict prevention and stated that they would give prominence to the following areas. First and foremost, emphasis was put on early conflict prevention; second, on strengthening the so-called, new generation of peacekeeping operations, particularly stressing the need of civilian elements; and third, on striving to increase transparency and openness in the Security Council’s work methods (UD:11:54). These different priorities could reinforce and support each other. However, to prioritize conflict prevention was, according to an interview with Eliasson (020207), not uncontroversial even within the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Many perceived it risky, as it was doubtful that the norm candidate would gain broad support and they feared that Sweden would have difficulties translating its rhetoric into practice. Controversial or not, the issue was important when campaigning for a term in the Security Council. In addition, personal connections and knowledge of how to “work the system” should not be underestimated in campaigning according to Eliasson (020207). When elected to the Security Council in 1996, it was perceived as an expression of international recognition of Swedish foreign policy in the UN, and to some extent, support for the issues Sweden prioritized (press release 960925).

During the Swedish term in the Security Council 1997-1998, the ambition was to develop a conflict prevention practice within the Security Council, built on a case-by-case approach, according to a senior official at the Swedish permanent mission to the UN (0112). Several attempts were made by Sweden and other non-permanent members of the Security Council to discuss thematic issues such as conflict prevention in the Council. State Secretary Eliasson (971029) stated that “the Security Council has the right and the duty to take the necessary action when international peace and security are threatened”, but the response from the permanent five was lukewarm. Despite this disinterest, Swedish representatives repeatedly stressed the need to prevent urgent situations around the world. For instance, Sweden was one of
the first countries to bring the emerging conflict in Albania to the attention of the Security Council (Swedish Ambassador 0109). In an interview, a Swedish Ambassador diplomatically said that the Security Council did not always accept the Swedish suggestions—for example, to reduce tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Furthermore, in March 1998 Sweden noticed the early warning signs from the deteriorating situation in Kosovo and notified the Security Council (UD:11:54; Lidén S/PV.3868; S/RES/1160). In September that year, this resulted in a strongly worded Security Council resolution drafted by Swedish representatives, which urged Belgrade to deal with the deteriorating situation in a peaceful manner and to respect the ceasefire, as the only measure (UD:11:54; S/RES/1199). More successful were the Swedish representatives in achieving extended mandates for the UN Preventive Deployment Mission to Macedonia (Björkdahl 1999: 62). During the Swedish Presidency of the Security Council in 1998, a ministerial debate was held on the Secretary-General’s report on Africa, and Swedish representatives drafted the Presidency’s conclusions which embraced a holistic approach to UN peace efforts, linking conflict prevention to peacekeeping (S/PRST/1998/38).

In order to maneuver in the Security Council, the Swedish representatives established ad hoc coalitions with various members of the Council, and used their personal networks. As State Secretary Dahlgren (011018), then Ambassador at the Permanent Mission to the UN noted, it was clearly more efficient to use informal meetings and channels than to rely on the limited formal opportunities to exert influence.

However, the limited success of promoting the issue of conflict prevention during the Swedish Security Council membership was a disappointment (UD:11:54). Despite extended opportunities for interactive persuasion, it was obvious to the Swedish representatives that persuasion had not been effective, and a political commitment to conflict prevention was still lacking (Hjelm-Wallén 980923). Based on the experiences in the Council, State Secretary Eliasson (971029) admitted that “conflict prevention is a difficult subject in the Security Council”, yet, the Security Council must be able to take early action and “be politically prepared to consider preventive measures at different levels, and at short notice”.

One reason for the limited success could be that although conflict prevention was a familiar notion within the UN system, many perceived introducing it in the UN Security Council as intrusive, because the Council traditionally only dealt with crises and ongoing conflicts. Most of the time, Dahlgren
(011018) noted, the Council was preoccupied with ongoing conflicts and crises and there was little room for pro-action. Furthermore, Dahlgren also stressed the limited ability of any President of the Security Council to bring new issues to the agenda. The power asymmetries within the Security Council combined with the short period of only one, or, possibly, two months in charge of the Presidency during a term probably constrained the Swedish ability to influence the agenda and the efforts to focus the Council’s attention, and contributed to the limited response. Despite lack of success, the Swedish foreign policy elite chose to view and officially present the efforts to promote conflict prevention in the Security Council as goal-oriented and well respected by the members of the Security Council, including the permanent members (Skr. 1999/2000: 130).

Slovenia, during its term in the Security Council, continued where the Swedish representatives had left off. This resulted a year later in the following statement by Slovenia, as acting President of the Security Council: “the Security Council recognizes that early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, preventive disarmament and post-conflict peace-building are interdependent and complementary components of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy, [and] emphasizes continuing commitment to addressing the prevention of armed conflicts in all regions of the world” (S/PRST/1999/34; SC/6761). Danilo Türk, Slovenia’s Ambassador to the UN at that time (991204), noted that the Security Council was overburdened with acute crises and that there was no energy or time left to discuss preventive initiatives. But, as the international climate was changing, it was becoming more “natural” to talk about prevention. The fact that it only took a week to negotiate the draft of the statement was a positive sign, according to Türk. The Council was however, taking a cautious approach to conflict prevention and national interests still prevailed, which was reflected in the contradictions apparent in the statement (Türk 991204).

This raises the question why Slovenia successfully managed to establish conflict prevention on the Security Council’s agenda, where Swedish representatives had failed. One way to interpret this is that the Swedish advocacy had prepared the ground by raising the awareness of conflict prevention. An alternative interpretation is that Slovenian representatives were more persuasive and argued a better case for conflict prevention. A senior UN official, formerly at the UN Secretariat (0202), perceived Sweden to “punch above its political weight” and to know how to work the UN system, but argued that influence was a matter of “putting up the money”, and that advocacy needed to be combined with financial support to achieve its objectives.
Identifying a Focal Point

Likeminded actors or units within the UN system were identified as focal points for conflict prevention. With their assistance in diffusing the norm candidate in the UN arena, the norm entrepreneur would gain momentum in the diffusion process. Sweden attempted to establish support from the UN Secretariat, because its support was perceived to be useful to persuade the UN member states.

The primary responsibility for conflict prevention rested within the Secretariat, with the UNDPA and its Policy Planning Unit, which had extensive experience in the field of conflict prevention. UNDPA, the Policy Planning Unit and particularly the Head of the Unit became stable allies (junior Swedish official 0105). In an interview, a former senior UN Official at UNDPA (0202) said that he viewed the close links established between UNDPA and the Swedish Mission as important in promoting conflict prevention. Additionally, the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Danilo Türk, previously the Slovenian Ambassador to the UN, was identified as another important ally within the UN Secretariat (senior Swedish Ambassador 0109). Through a small network of norm followers within the UN Secretariat the Swedish foreign policy elite could interact with the UN Secretariat (Eliasson 020207).

One way to promote the norm candidate was to attempt to discuss conflict prevention with the speechwriters of the Secretary-General, aspiring to have conflict prevention included as a prominent feature in the speeches (ibid.). A window of opportunity was opened when Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali resigned and was succeeded by Kofi Annan, who in contrast to Boutros-Ghali showed a genuine interest in conflict prevention, which was necessary for a breakthrough on the issue, according to Ambassador Eliasson. Correspondingly, a former senior official at the UN Secretariat (0202) recognized that Sweden had contributed to establishing a climate that allowed the Secretary-General to speak on the issue. The recent report Prevention of Armed Conflict (A/55/985-S/2001/574) presented by the Secretary-General in June 2001, was influenced by the Swedish thoughts on conflict prevention (Eliasson 020207; former senior UN official 0202).

Mobilizing a Norm Community in the EU

Diffusion in the EU context differs from diffusion in the UN in a number of ways. Frequently held meetings at various levels—the European Council four times a year (including two informal meetings), the General Affairs Council
(GAC) once a month, and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) meetings twice a week, just to mention a few—increase the opportunities for personal contacts. Although structured, discussions in some of these gatherings are conducive for argumentation and persuasion. In addition, bilateral meetings were used to consolidate the norm candidate prior to its formal presentation on the EU arena. This illustrates the importance of bilateral meetings in a context where multilateralism otherwise flourishes. Representatives from the EU Commission and the Council Secretariat identified as focal points for conflict prevention were persuaded to spur the diffusion process and to maintain the issue on the agenda. With the opportunity to use the power of the EU Presidency during the spring of 2001, Sweden could establish a norm community within the EU.

**Shaping the Agenda**

Typically, influence is equated with introducing new ideas on the agenda—so-called agenda setting. A norm entrepreneur, however, may also contribute to shaping the agenda through efforts to bring a particular issue to the forefront (cf. Tallberg 2002). Although the notion of conflict prevention had been discussed in relation to EU development cooperation, it was uncommon to discuss it in terms of security policy. The ongoing process of constructing EU’s foreign and security identity provided an opportunity for Sweden to reinvigorate the idea of conflict prevention.

Working with Finland, Sweden took a first initiative by proposing to introduce the Petersberg tasks into the Amsterdam Treaty. According to a Swedish diplomat, this was “not intended as a means to militarize the Union”, but to “give it new goals and tools that reflect contemporary threats and challenges to the international system” (Bringéus 2000: 66). Indeed, the Swedish foreign policy elite frequently accentuated this point. For instance, State Secretary for European Affairs, Gunnar Lund (1997: 55), said “let me just stress that from the Swedish point of view, a clear distinction can and must be made between this type of activities and other Western European Union (WEU) tasks related to territorial defence”. Deputy Prime Minister Hjelms-Wallén (010905) indicated in an interview that a political ambition behind introducing conflict prevention into the EU crisis management debate was to provide an alternative interpretation of the EU defense dimension.

The Petersberg initiative was followed by a Swedish-Finnish suggestion to change the Maastricht Treaty’s Article J4 concerning the CFSP, so that all
member states should be able to participate on equal terms in conflict prevention and crisis management activities (press release 961007). Except for this initiative Swedish or joint initiatives with likeminded states were not frequently undertaken in the CFSP context (Strömvik 1999: 261). On a general level, however, Christopher Hill (2001: 316) considered the accession of Sweden and Finland—two neutral states—to further strengthen the emphasis on the prevention of armed conflict within the EU.

It was not until the spring of 1999 that the Swedish foreign policy elite began to bring the norm candidate to general notice within the EU. At that time, EU member states were provided with information about conflict prevention. For example, the report *Preventing Violent Conflict —A Swedish Action Plan*, was distributed to the EU member states during 1999-2000. The yellow book, as the report frequently was referred to, provided both morally persuasive and rational arguments in favor of conflict prevention, and it attracted attention in most of the influential capitals as well as in the EU Council Secretariat and the EU Commission. Also the EU’s electronic communication network—the Correspondence européenne (COREU)—was used, when Sweden sent a COREU to present additional persuasive arguments by recalling and developing some of the ideas presented in the Action Plan (COREU/STO/0240/00).

Conflict prevention was already an issue on the expanding security agenda at the European Council summit in Cologne of 3-4 June 1999. A clear link between the norm promoting activities of the Swedish foreign policy elite and the fact that conflict prevention was a prioritized issue on the agenda is difficult to establish, yet it should not be ruled out. At the meeting, the European Council adopted guiding principles concerning conflict prevention and agreed that the EU must enhance and better coordinate the Union’s and Member States’ non-military crisis response tools, including conflict prevention (Presidency conclusion 150/99). Encouraged by this development the Swedish foreign policy elite decided to pursue their normpromoting activities.

Diplomatic tactics and persuasion kept conflict prevention on the EU agenda in times when support for crisis management grew strong, according to a Swedish diplomat (0112). Despite the Finns’ preoccupation with developing their pet project the “Northern Dimension”, Swedish representatives vigorously persuaded the Finnish Presidency during the pre-negotiations prior to the Helsinki Summit of 10-11 December 1999, to include conflict prevention in the conclusions from the Helsinki summit (Swedish Ambassador 0109; cf. Arter 2000: 677-697). As an indication of successful persuasion, the Council conclusions came to include...
a reference to conflict prevention as a separate but parallel track to civilian and military crisis management. The conclusions stressed that the EU should “assume their responsibilities across the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the EU Treaty” (European Council conclusions 991210). These conclusions illustrated the fruitfulness of framing conflict prevention as a flexible and absorbent norm candidate able to incorporate a view of conflict prevention as a supplement to crisis management.

Although commissioned by the European Council to carry work on conflict prevention forward, the Portuguese Presidency showed little genuine interest in conflict prevention. Yet, it was required to report on the progress on the issue, in Santa Maria de Feira, 19-20 June 2000, where the European Council underlined the Union’s determination in its approach to conflict prevention and crisis management (European Council conclusions 000619). At the summit, the European Council invited the incoming French Presidency, together with the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission, to present a progress report on conflict prevention in Nice. As Sweden would inherit the agenda of the French, it was perceived as important to retain conflict prevention on the EU agenda, despite conflicting French priorities. The French-advocated crisis management competed with the conflict prevention for attention within the EU (Swedish Ambassador 0109).

The commissioned report by the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission, *Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of the European Union Action in the Field of Conflict Prevention*, was submitted and welcomed by the European Council at its summit in Nice 7-9 December 2000. Its concrete recommendations highlighted the need to continue these discussions. The European Council concluded that if the EU was to fully play its role on the international stage, it must develop a coherent European approach to crisis management and conflict prevention (European Council conclusions 001209). The recommendations of the report, combined with the European Council’s conclusions, formed the basis for the Swedish Presidency to carry work forward on conflict prevention. Thus, the incoming Swedish Presidency was given a mandate to report to the European Council in Gothenburg with “a definition of proposals for improving the cohesion and effectiveness of Union action in the sphere of conflict prevention” (ibid.). In the EU context, conflict prevention was increasingly related to crisis management, which enabled the norm candidate to gain from the momentum of the crisis management process. On the other hand, the norm candidate was partly reshaped to meet new expectations and to match the evolving normative context of the EU and its member states.
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In preparation for the Swedish Presidency, a number of seminars and conferences were held by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. At one of these conferences, the Swedish State Secretary for Development Cooperation, Migration and Asylum Politics, Gun-Britt Andersson (2000) stated that “one of Sweden’s priorities will be to emphasise conflict prevention in the foreign, security and development cooperation policy areas of the European Union”. These conferences and seminars were regarded as an opportunity for the Swedish foreign policy elite to confront their views on conflict prevention with those of the academic community, representatives from EU member states, representatives from the EU Commission and Council Secretariat and from international and non-governmental organizations. Additionally, it could be regarded as an effort to build support for the norm promoting activities that would commence with greater intensity during the Presidency. Lack of support could mean that the norm candidate would need to absorb criticism and be re-framed to better fit the normative environment of the EU and the normative convictions of the other fourteen member states.

Persuasion through Bilateral Contacts

It was perceived as crucial to establish informal contacts and support from likeminded states prior to diffusing the norm candidate among all the EU member states. In order to identify potential allies, the Swedish foreign policy elite scheduled meetings with civil servants from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of individual member states. The ambition was, according to an interview with a Swedish Ambassador (0109), to establish a consensus while at the same time promoting Swedish priorities.

Continuous discussions with the Finns, particularly during the pre-negotiations of the Helsinki Summit conclusions, shaped their perception of conflict prevention. In the aftermath of the Finnish Presidency, they expressed an interest in operationalizing conflict prevention within the EU (senior Ambassador 0109). The common interest in civilian crisis management and conflict prevention was illustrated in a joint article by the Swedish and the Finnish Ministers for Foreign Affairs, in which they stressed the need for a new preventive approach to the new pattern of conflict (Lindh and Tuomioja 2000).

Meetings with the Portuguese revealed an interest in a Common Strategy for Human Rights and Democracy, and they expressed a hope that the European Council in Santa Maria de Feira would agree on such a strategy. Strongly supported by Greece and Spain, the European Council adopted a Common
Strategy for the Mediterranean Region (European Council conclusions 000619). Swedish representatives interpreted this Common Strategy to include components of conflict prevention, for example the first chapter that concerns political dialogue, security policy, respect for human rights and promotion of democracy (Skr. 2000/01:2). After bilateral discussions, the Portuguese Presidency accepted a Swedish suggestion to invite the incoming French Presidency, together with the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission, to present the previously mentioned progress report on conflict prevention in Nice, according to a senior official at the Council Secretariat (0112).

Bilateral consultations in Berlin in the spring of 2000 indicated a strong German interest in the Swedish ambition to develop the EU capacity for conflict prevention. As the Germans invited Sweden to close cooperation on the issue, Swedish representatives concluded that the Swedish and German positions were closely related (senior Ambassador 0109). Considering the German foreign policy elite’s efforts to promote conflict prevention during the German Presidency of the Group of Eight (G8) in 1999, and the personal engagement of the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joshka Fischer, their interest in conflict prevention was not unexpected (Schmunk 000619). At the G8 meeting in Berlin 16-17 December 1999, the G8 promised to make “conflict prevention a priority on our political agenda for the years to come” (G8 Presidency statement 991216). Clearly, there was no need to persuade the German foreign policy elite about the benefits of conflict prevention, as they already could be perceived as norm followers.

In bilateral meetings held in Rome in the spring of 2000, Italian officials, like Swedish officials, stressed the need to balance the military measures of crisis management with civilian capabilities, and stated that conflict prevention could be a means to coordinate and link the activities the EU is already performing (Toscano 000922). As noted by a senior Swedish Ambassador (0109), the Italians acknowledged being inspired by the Swedish thoughts on conflict prevention. They offered to work jointly with the Swedish foreign policy elite, as the Italian Presidency of the G8 coincided with the Swedish EU Presidency and the Italians were eager to make progress on the G8 Miyazaki Initiative for Conflict Prevention. During the Italian Presidency of the G8, conflict prevention headed the agenda, indicating their interest in the issue (cf. G8 conclusions 010719).

Interviews with Swedish officials indicated that during talks in the spring of 2000, Belgian representatives revealed weak interest in and limited expertise on the issue of conflict prevention. Skeptically, they argued that preventive diplomacy could not function in the political sphere, as political will could not
be mobilized for preventive purposes. This argument was illustrated by the inability of the EU to prevent the developments in Kosovo. In addition, the Belgians argued that conflict prevention would overlap and thereby not add value, as newly established institutional structures were already in place for crisis management, and that these structures could provide what Sweden was looking for. Few efforts were made at this stage to persuade them.

Consultations in Paris during the same spring indicated little or no French interest in conflict prevention. The French favored crisis management, which was perceived as a potential competitor to the Swedish enterprise of gaining support for conflict prevention. Without French support it was judged to be difficult to get an agreement in Santa Maria de Feira on how to pursue the work on conflict prevention (desk officer 0105). In the fall of the same year, a more nuanced view of conflict prevention was presented by the French Secretary General Loïc Hennekinne (2000), who held that “common sense should lead the international community to devote more resources to conflict prevention”. Recognizing Sweden’s efforts, he continued by stating “Sweden has been very active in this area, especially concerning the non-military means” and that “France viewed Swedish proposals to focus particularly on questions of conflict prevention during its presidency with considerable interest and sympathy”.

Discussions with the British Foreign Office suggested that particularly the Department of International Development showed a strong interest in integrating conflict prevention into development cooperation, according to an interview with State Secretary Andersson (010910). This illustrated the general openness of the development cooperation departments in various Ministries for Foreign Affairs, including the Swedish, towards incorporating a conflict prevention perspective into their activities. Overall, more reluctance and resistance were initially found among those concerned with traditional security policy.

Establishing Focal Points

It was important to muster support not only from likeminded member states, but from representatives from the Commission and the Council Secretariat as well. According to a senior official at the Council Secretariat (0112), smaller member states, with limited resources of their own, tend to utilize the EU institutions to a larger extent. The Commission’s monopoly on policy initiatives within the first pillar, including development cooperation, entailed
close cooperation to ensure support for the development cooperation aspect of the norm candidate. In contrast, on second pillar issues such as the CFSP, member states could initiate proposals, but support from the Council Secretariat was considered conducive for broad acceptance within the EU (cf. Strömvik 2002). Hence, focal points for conflict prevention were identified in both institutions, as conflict prevention was perceived as a crosscutting issue. As pockets of support were found, these representatives assisted in diffusing the norm candidate, which provided momentum in the diffusion process. Despite these devoted individuals, the Council Secretariat and the Commission demonstrated passivity and at times resistance towards the issue, which gave some Swedish representatives a sense of fighting an uphill battle.

The Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, however, perceived conflict prevention as a CFSP project not concerning the Commission, according to a senior official within the Commission (0112). As the Commission became increasingly involved in preventive efforts, the Commissioner eventually changed his mind and argued in favor of early prevention, interpreting conflict prevention as clearly linked to development cooperation (Patten 991123; 991216). To some degree, this can be interpreted as a result of Swedish advocacy within the Commission, both by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and more importantly by Swedish officials working within the Commission (senior Ambassador 0109). At the working level, some representatives from the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit in the Commission proved to be valuable allies, and Swedish representatives worked closely with them, according to a representative of that Unit (EU commission official 0112).

A similar development took place within the Council Secretariat. Initially, according to senior officials at the Council Secretariat, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana was reluctant to accept conflict prevention (0106; 0112). Over time, however, Solana, began to interpret conflict prevention as a second pillar issue. If interpreted as a CFSP matter, conflict prevention could be used to attempt to change the balance of power between the Commission and the Council Secretariat.

Strong and early support for conflict prevention was found within the PPEWU of the Council Secretariat, which contributed to changing the mind of the High Representative. Christoph Heusgen (2000), Director of the PPEWU, pointed out that “one of the first to visit me when I became Head of the Policy Unit was (then Deputy State-Secretary) Anders Bjurner, who brought with him the Swedish booklet on conflict prevention in four different formats”. The cooperation with the PPEWU intensified during the months
leading up to the Swedish Presidency with frequent meetings and consultations (Bjurner 011205, Heusgen 011205).

The strong support from some members of the PPEWU and from certain members of the Commission can be understood as part of the tradition of the Council Secretariat and the Commission to work closely with the incoming and present Presidency. In addition, good personal connections facilitated the close cooperation (junior Swedish official 0105; Council Secretariat official 0106). However, there was constant competition between the two institutions (senior Swedish official in Brussels 0112). One reason for the Commission’s and the Council Secretariat’s acceptance of conflict prevention could be that both perceived that they could strengthen their influence in the ongoing institutional turf battle within the EU, and perhaps more importantly, adopting conflict prevention did not mean creating new institutional structures.

*The Opportunity of the Chair*

After preparing the ground through informal meetings, bilateral consultations and establishing support from the EU institutions, conflict prevention was presented as an important commitment for Sweden during its Presidency of the EU, in the first half of 2001. By occupying this formal position the Swedish norm entrepreneurial activities were provided with improved opportunities, as the Presidency enjoys a “problem formulation prerogative”, allowing it to define concerns deserving collective attention as well as develop concrete proposals for action (Svensson 2000: 24; cf. Kingdon 1995; Tallberg 2002).

Conflict prevention was the thematic issue of the open debate at the GAC meeting, 22 January 2001. In the first public and televised speech the rapid development of EU’s military crisis management capability was contrasted with the need to develop civilian crisis management and conflict prevention in the same way. In this speech Lindh (010122), presented the values and the substance inherent in the framing of the norm candidate. For instance, it was noted that “long-term conflict prevention is largely about standing up for fundamental values—respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law”. The rhetoric also referred to prior experiences of the EU in conflict prevention such as the Stability Pact in South Eastern Europe to illustrate that conflict prevention in fact was something familiar and feasible. Lindh pointed out that necessary tools already existed within the EU, but that greater
coordination and capacity for information, analysis and planning were required and the need “to make better use of Community resources in conflict prevention” was stressed. The Swedish framing of the norm candidate was presumably persuasive, as a consensus on the principles underpinning conflict prevention, such as democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, and human dignity, was reached in the debate that followed. The consensus on conflict prevention also covered concrete measures such as trade, development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and as the last resort, military action to prevent violent conflict (GAC conclusions 010122).

At the GAC meeting, it was publicly announced that one aim of the Swedish Presidency was to develop an EU program for conflict prevention. According to an interview with a Swedish Ambassador (0109), it was considered important to develop some kind of political document establishing guiding principles for the EU in conflict prevention. There were a number of sources to tap into to develop such a program, for example the Swedish policy documents (Ds 1999:24; Skr. 2000/01:2) the Secretary-General/High Representative’s and the Commission’s report at Nice and the Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, which was in progress.

Many of the proposals and recommendations presented in the Secretary-General/High Representative’s and the Commission’s report at Nice were to be converted into political decisions at the European Council summit in Gothenburg. As part of that process the PSC developed some of the ideas from Nice in their discussions and established a schedule for how the different suggestions could be translated into practice (Swedish Ambassador 0109). To follow up on the discussions in PSC, a seminar devoted to generating new ideas and pre-negotiations for a first draft document on conflict prevention, was held in Simrishamn 4 April 2001 (desk officer 0105). Experts from the capitals of the EU member states as well as representatives from Brussels and from the Commission and the Council Secretariat discussed a Swedish draft of an **EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict**. Although the draft was welcomed, according to Swedish participants in the seminar, the negotiations were a mutual learning experience. New ideas were discussed that resulted in a redraft of the program, and new elements were incorporated in the norm candidate, which was marginally reshaped (desk officer 0105, Swedish Ambassador 0109).

Difficulties emerged when deciding within which EU structure the program for conflict prevention was to be negotiated, according to a Swedish official in Brussels (0111). The process commenced by a presentation in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which launched a
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discussion in PSC and in the EU Development Council (Rydberg 010910). The actual negotiations on the substance of the conflict prevention program took place in the Foreign Relations Councillors (RELEX), a cross-pillar working group (Nilsson 011122; Olausson 010520). Although the negotiations were perceived as relatively frictionless, a senior Swedish official in Brussels (0112) acknowledged that the negotiations on conflict prevention highlighted two related problems. The first problem was the EU-NATO relationship. Despite a high-level meeting between the EU and NATO, an agreement allowing EU access to NATO resources could not be achieved. To some extent, this can be understood as disagreement between those member states that wanted to maintain NATO as an organization devoted to its core tasks, and those who wanted to establish cooperation with NATO to gain access to its resources for crisis management. The French, for example, were reluctant to strengthen cooperation between EU and NATO on crisis management, and were pleased if the EU, by developing the ESDP, could become independent of NATO and thereby of the US. This discussion had only implicit links to conflict prevention. The second, and related, dilemma was if and how conflict prevention should be linked to the ESDP. Conflict prevention was perceived as an element of the ESDP, yet it was broader and more comprehensive, including, for example, development assistance. The issue was sensitive, because certain member states, such as France, perceived the growing cooperation on developing the ESDP to be threatened if conflict prevention were included. Sweden was reluctant to establish close links with NATO and to discuss the future of the ESDP, as domestically that could be interpreted as contributing to militarizing the EU, and inconsistent with the traditional Swedish security policy doctrine. The dilemmas were, however, resolved in PSC prior to the discussion in COREPER, according to a senior Swedish official in Brussels (0112). In addition, less politicized disagreements were resolved in low-level bilateral meetings, where reference could be made to the GAC meeting which indicated political support for conflict prevention (Swedish official in Brussels 0111; desk officer 0105). Interviews also indicate that when problems emerged threatening to derail the negotiation process in RELEX, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs brought them up informally, in connection with GAC meetings to boost the negotiations in RELEX.

On a parallel track, feeding into this security policy related process was the Development Council’s discussions. The Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation, Asylum Policy and Migration, Maj-Inger Klingwall, placed conflict prevention at the head of the Development Council’s agenda in line with the overall Swedish priority (Development
Council conclusions 010531). Prior to the Development Council meeting, the Swedish Presidency circulated a discussion paper on the role of conflict prevention in poverty reduction. The ambition was to increase the awareness of conflict prevention and focus the forthcoming Council discussion on the EU’s role in the prevention of violent conflict from the perspective of development policy (cf. desk officer development assistance 0105; Presidency discussion paper for the Development Council 010531). The member states were receptive to the persuasive Swedish reasoning, yet the response was hesitant and passive, except for the Belgian representatives who demonstrated disinterest (desk officer development assistance 0105).

Solid preparatory work prior and during the Swedish Presidency, a certain passivity among some of the EU member states with limited interest in the issue, a culture of reciprocity in EU negotiations, combined with the fact that the time was ripe for conflict prevention, led the European Council to endorse an **EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict** in Gothenburg on 15-16 June 2001. The program “would improve the Union’s capacity to undertake coherent early warning, analysis and action”. Furthermore, the conclusions stated that “conflict prevention is one of the main objectives of the Union’s external relations and should be integrated in all its relevant aspects, including the European Security and Defence Policy, development cooperation and trade” (European Council conclusions 010615). In contrast to the Finnish-initiated “Northern Dimension” which was regarded as a Northern project by the Southern states, conflict prevention became a joint EU-project, according to a senior official at the Council Secretariat (0112). As a program, however, it lacked legal status within the EU, but this was not perceived as if the program was weak and only a rhetorical statement. The fact that the Council adopts a number of programs on various issues was not perceived as limiting the success (Swedish official in Brussels 0111).

Considering the role Sweden played in reinvigorating conflict prevention, it was perceived as important to establish mechanisms for subsequent action to maintain the attention conflict prevention had acquired, particularly since the incoming Belgian Presidency held different political priorities. The European Council, therefore, established a process for the continuation of the program. Consequently, it was agreed that “future Presidencies, the Commission and the Secretary-General/High Representative are invited to promote the implementation of the program and to make recommendations for its further developments [and] the first report on the progress made in implementation of this program should be submitted by the Presidency of the European Council in Seville” (European Council conclusions 010615).
Thereby, the Belgian Presidency had no obligation to present a progress report in Laeken, and that was their condition for accepting the program during the negotiations in RELEX (junior Swedish official 0202). The process had gained momentum and would, independently of Swedish involvement, persist as mechanisms for follow-up had been established. For example, Global Overview papers were to be discussed in the GAC, and a Swedish initiative to host a regional meeting with organizations involved in conflict prevention in Europe during 2002 was accepted (Heusgen 011205; Rönquist 020213). The Swedish Presidency concluded with a GAC meeting, and once again conflict prevention was on the agenda as the Council agreed on cooperation between the EU and the UN in the area of conflict prevention (GAC conclusions 010611).

The Swedish foreign policy elite presumed that the endorsement of the EU program was an indication that the notion of conflict prevention was becoming widely accepted among the member states. However, the EU culture of reciprocity and compromise could have contributed to the support granted to the Swedish-advocated conflict prevention. Endorsement of the EU program could have been based on expectations that Sweden would reciprocate and support issues promoted by other member states rather than on authentic private adoption of conflict prevention. Still, the Swedish Presidency was recognized as a “golden opportunity” to promote conflict prevention, and interviews with officials at the Council Secretariat and the Commission confirmed the Swedish perception that conflict prevention had now become accepted in principle. Conducive circumstances inside and outside the EU facilitated the efforts to mobilize a norm community (Swedish Ambassador 0109, desk officer 0105). Many of the officials from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Commission and the Council Secretariat who were interviewed noted that the Swedish Presidency came at a crucial time for the diffusion of conflict prevention. Without this opportunity, it would have been unlikely that a program for conflict prevention would have been adopted.

Socialization of Norm Followers

Norm followers can be socialized into accepting the norm candidate by repeated persuasion efforts through unilateral manipulative communication or through interactive and argumentative communication. Proceeding from the notion of mutual learning, it is possible to identify a process of learning where norm followers are repeatedly exposed to a norm candidate. Minds, attitudes, beliefs and
convictions may be changed by logical arguments, reason, facts and information, and by appealing to emotion and evoking powerful symbols.

However, many norm candidates are contested, and norm acceptance requires the fulfillment of a number of conditions. First, the norm entrepreneurs must be able to elevate the norm candidate from their own interests to reflect the interest of the norm followers. Second, normative clashes must be mitigated. By systematically linking the norm candidate to the normative context and constructing a match with the existing normative convictions of the potential norm follower, normative clashes can be mitigated and the norm follower may be persuaded (Checkel 1999: 87; cf. Johnston 2001: 496). Third, the trustworthiness and legitimacy of the norm entrepreneur influence adoption. Norm entrepreneurs perceived as unbiased and motivated by moral values are often regarded as more trustworthy, which increases the persuasiveness of the norm candidate as well as the legitimacy of the norm entrepreneur (Risse 2000: 7). Fourth, norm followers may also be persuaded because of their relationship with the norm entrepreneur or because they share the same identity (cf. Risse-Kappen 1996: 357-399; Johnston 2001: 497). Fifth, adoption by critical states may give a momentum to the process of diffusion and facilitate the building of a norm community of norm followers (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

Elevating the Norm Candidate

One major obstacle to adopting a norm candidate is the perception that it advances the interest of the norm entrepreneur rather than the interest of the international community. As a norm entrepreneur, Sweden needed to elevate its norm candidate beyond its identification with the national interest of the Swedish state in order to persuade the foreign audience (cf. Nadelmann 1990: 482; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 896-899). It is virtually impossible in public debates to make self-serving arguments or to justify one’s claims on self-interested grounds (Elster 1998: 1-18). Even rhetorical arguments that try to justify egoistic interest must normally refer to some universalistic values or commonly accepted norms. Even though conflict prevention, internationally, was thought of as a Swedish “pet-project”, to quote a senior Swedish official in Brussels (0112), Sweden strove for international recognition and acceptance of the norm candidate and learned that it should appeal to shared values and collectively held norms.

To the global audience of the UN General Assembly, the Swedish foreign policy elite introduced the norm candidate as reflecting widely shared or even universal moral values, rather than being a Western norm candidate. It was
clearly stated that the aim of promoting a global culture of prevention is “to strengthening the will, capacity and preparedness of the international community to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict”. “Sweden’s policy is to raise awareness of the rationale for conflict prevention, help to strengthen the political will and establish routines for conflict prevention” (Ds 1999:24: 12).

Also in the EU, the Swedish foreign policy elite attempted to emphasize values of the norm candidate shared by the EU member states, rather than the idiosyncratic moral values of Swedish society. To stress the domestic analogy and being seen as attempting to export domestic values could actually counteract the ability to elevate the norm candidate.

The rhetoric and argumentation used to promote the norm candidate rarely separated values, emotional appeals and efforts to invoke symbolic events from facts and reason. To attempt to maintain such an artificial separation between values and facts was not possible when advocating a norm candidate. The manipulative persuasion, mainly used in the UN General Assembly, and argumentative persuasion strategies employed by the Swedish foreign policy elite in the UN Security Council and in the EU context, made no distinction between the two, and emotional appeals were used to reinforce factual arguments.

The Normative Match

A normative match between the norm candidate and the normative convictions of the norm followers facilitated acceptance, in other words, the norm candidate resonated with the the norm followers (cf. Checkel 1999: 86-87). In constructing such a match, the norm candidate needed to absorb criticism and possibly be re-framed.

The general acceptance of the values underpinning the norm candidate appeared to be founded on a common realization that violent conflict may negatively affect the security of states and societies beyond the borders of the specific conflict (Dwan 2000). The ability to promote the norm candidate of conflict prevention as addressing the challenge of these “new” conflicts shaped the acceptance of the desirability to prevent such conflicts. The fact that the norm followers shared the perception of the new wars as the main security challenge to international peace and stability played a significant part in matching the norm candidate with the normative conviction of the norm followers and transforming the norm candidate into a collective norm.

One could argue that national self-interest motivated acceptance of the norm candidate. As the EU is a large donor and contributor to the UN, the
cost-benefit argument inherent in the motivational framing of the norm candidate resonated well with the EU member states as one interviewee from the EU Commission pointed out (0112). In contrast, a normative match with the convictions of developing states was constructed through promoting the persuasive structural prevention aspect, relating the norm candidate to development cooperation, which was attractive to developing states of the South.

However, other than simple calculations of direct self-interest might shape the norm followers’ acceptance of the norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention. The evolution of humanitarianism, the focus on human security and the recognition of the costs of violent conflicts in terms of human lives affected the adoption of the norm candidate (cf. Jackson 2000; Finnemore 1996b). The normality of prevention was stressed to make the norm candidate more familiar. For example Foreign Minister Lindh (1999a) stated that “in all cultures, and in every society, prevention is something normal”. By expressing values perceived as legitimate e.g. normality and familiarity of preventive thinking, the norm candidate matched the convictions, not only of EU’s member states but also of a number of states in the UN.

The promotion of a norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention cannot be separated from concerns about state identities, because much in the same way that human rights norms could increasingly be understood as a constitutive property of what it meant to be a “modern state”, so could conflict prevention (cf. Jackson 2000). Hence, conflict prevention was constructed to match such a perception of those adopting the norm. By becoming norm followers and adopting the norm candidate with its prescriptions of strategies to prevent violent conflicts, they perceived themselves to be regarded as progressive and responsible states within the international society.

In general, the lack of specificity, the conceptual ambiguity and the vague substance of the norm candidate facilitated the construction of a normative match. This disguised the fact that little agreement existed on the steps necessary for effective prevention of conflict. Clearly, the liability of the ambiguity of the norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention is, in part, a problem with prevention itself. The norm candidate needed to be perceived as broad enough to include structural root causes of conflict yet narrow in terms of operationalization.

Mitigating Normative Clash

The norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention clashed with the traditional conceptualization of the norm of sovereignty. Incorporated in the norm candidate was the recognition of the rights of the citizen as an international
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The characteristics and identity of the norm entrepreneur tend to affect the norm followers and can either retard or propel norm adoption, as norm advocacy is an interactive process (Johnston 2001: 496-498). A norm entrepreneur tends to benefit from frequent interaction over time with potential norm followers, as there will be more opportunities to persuade, strong relationships based on trust can be built, and eventually the norm entrepreneur and the norm follower can come to share the same identity.

A number of states have had close relationships with Sweden over time as neighbors, recipients of Swedish development aid, collaborators on joint
international projects, members in the same organizations etc., which increases exposure, contact and familiarity (ibid.). The traditional Swedish identity as a small, neutral state, and the consistency of an internationalist approach made many perceive Sweden as unbiased and therefore trustworthy when attempting to promote the norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention. Those who “liked” and shared traits with the Swedish internationalist identity, such as the Nordic states and Canada, were more prone to accept the norm candidate Sweden promoted (Mack 020212). As the Swedish foreign policy elite seemed very certain about their beliefs and were knowledgeable they were more likely to be persuasive (cf. Johnston 2001: 497-499).

Many diplomats, however, characterized the Swedish advocacy as “le boy-scoutisme suédois”, meaning that the Swedish norm promoting activities were idealistic, naïve, yet well-meaning, according to an interview with a Swedish diplomat (0112).

As a member of the EU, Sweden shared a collective EU identity as a liberal democratic state, respecting human rights and the rule of law, which affected norm adoption in the EU (cf. Risse-Kappen 1996: 397). The norm candidate matched these states’ domestically constructed norms governing democratic decision-making processes and the non-violent and compromise-oriented resolution of political conflicts (Risse-Kappen 1996: 366). The homogeneity of the EU and shared identity assisted in a common interpretation of the norm candidate. In such a homogenous setting, reluctant norm followers may feel discomfort from diverging from the normative convictions of the group (Johnston 2001: 500).

In contrast to the EU, the UN does not require conformity of values and norms. Its universality of membership and pluralist ethic renders the shared UN identity thin (Jackson 2000: 340). UN member states do not share the same identity, and all are clearly not guided by domestic norms of democratic governance suitable for accepting the norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention. Lack of shared identity meant that Sweden would have to rely more on other types of relationships such as the informal “Group of Friends of Conflict Prevention” or donor-recipient relations to persuade states to become norm followers.

The use of non-coercive strategies and some kind of social skill may have contributed to the willingness of potential norm followers to consider the proposed norm candidate and reflect upon it in relation to their own normative convictions. The ability to manipulate the norm candidate to fit with the normative convictions of the norm followers and form international opinion in support of it was useful to the Swedish foreign policy elite.
Socialization of norm followers may be spurred by the adoption of the norm candidate by critical states. Because not all members of a norm community have the same normative weight, the norm entrepreneur’s influence and the success of the norm candidate depend on securing powerful allies (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

Although all EU member states eventually gave rhetorical support to conflict prevention, the first norm followers were of particular importance as they contributed to establishing the EU norm community on conflict prevention. The early Finnish acceptance of conflict prevention at a crucial point in time when conflict prevention was not firmly established on the EU agenda, made Finland a critical norm follower. As the process progressed, the Finnish representatives however were not as constructive and dependable as the Swedish foreign policy elite had reckoned (junior Swedish official 0202).

The strong support given to conflict prevention by Germany and Italy compensated for the weak support of two other member states France and Belgium. France and Belgium’s lack of support was particularly troublesome as their Presidencies preceded and succeeded the Swedish Presidency and could have slowed the pace of developments. The French representatives in particular, but also the Spanish, were reluctant to accept conflict prevention, as they perceived it diluting the military ambitions of crisis management. This was based on a misconception of the content of conflict prevention, as the Swedish and later the EU understanding of conflict prevention included both civilian and military measures (junior Swedish official 0105; COM(2001)211). As the negotiations over the EU program in RELEX progressed, the French came to accept the notion of conflict prevention, and contributed some constructive suggestions to its wordings. Once the Belgian representatives’ demand that the first progress report should be presented in Seville rather than in Laeken was accepted, they did not obstruct the negotiations (junior Swedish official 0202).

Also the commitment of the Department of International Development of the British Foreign Office indicated an early adoption of the norm candidate, demonstrated by its *White Paper on Globalization and Development*, released in November 2000, which stressed the need to address the underlying causes of conflict. These early norm followers have contributed to the diffusion of the norm candidate within and outside the EU. Germany and Italy, for example, can be considered norm advocates in the G8 where they promote conflict prevention.
The efforts to create a movement within the UN in support of conflict prevention were constrained by the failed efforts to persuade the permanent members of the Security Council to adopt conflict prevention and join the emerging norm community. Although Sweden was a member of the Security Council, the Swedish representatives’ unsuccessful attempts to gain broad support for the norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention from the permanent members of the Security Council was regarded as a miscalculation. The Swedish EU membership played a very small role in facilitating cooperation with the two permanent members in the Security Council—France and the United Kingdom. Striving to maintain their freedom of action, their interest in cooperation was limited (UD:11:54). Without these critical states as members of the norm community, a momentum in the diffusion process within the UN could not be created.

Although the United States was perceived as a critical state in the Security Council, no extensive efforts to persuade the US were made, according to State Secretary Eliasson (020207). High-level US officials were giving vocal support to conflict prevention. For instance, in 1993 the Bush administration’s statement of US national security policy was followed with the affirmation that “the most desirable and efficient security strategy is to address the root causes of instability and to ease tensions before they result in conflict” (Bush cited in Lund 1996a). Foreign policy statements by the Clinton administration continued to pay attention to conflict prevention. Considering these indications of a US interest in conflict prevention, it is odd that the Swedish foreign policy elite did not explore this venue in order to persuade and secure a powerful ally in support of the promoted norm candidate.

As an invited observer to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) caucus during its term in the UN Security Council, Sweden could have attempted to target critical states in the South to gain support for the idea of conflict prevention. This possibility was, however, not pursued, although it was recognized that by engaging key member states of the South, the North-South cleavage could be bridged (Dahlgren 011018; Ängeby 010906). This cleavage was reinforced by different interpretations of sovereignty, as Deputy State-Secretary Anders Bjurner (2000) noted: “I had a sad discussion last year with some UN representatives of Third World countries who stated that prevention equaled intervention”. This perception of the South’s interpretation of conflict prevention can be illustrated by Egypt’s statement in the Security Council debate on conflict prevention: “the Council must respect territorial integrity and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. It must obtain
approval of the states that would be affected by the decisions before adopting such [preventive] measures” (SC/6761). A diplomat at the Swedish Mission to the UN (0112), however, pointed out that Sweden attempted to convince Egypt, whose term in the Security Council coincided with Sweden’s, but Egypt, Pakistan, Cuba and India were perceived not only by the Swedish foreign policy elite, but also by UN officials as hard-liners (former senior UN official 0202).

A different interpretation of conflict prevention was made by Bangladesh, a member of the Group of Friends for Conflict Prevention, illustrated by a statement during the same debate: “the question was how to balance between the principles of political independence, sovereign equality and State’s territorial integrity with the humanitarian and legal imperative of maintaining international peace and security. Those two imperatives were not necessarily contradictory; the Charter treated them as complementary” (SC/6761).

South Africa was a critical state that seemed possible to persuade according to a former senior UN official (0202). For instance, President Mbeki demonstrated an interest in establishing an Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Unit within the South African Ministry for Foreign Affairs. A targeted effort to persuade the foreign policy elite of South Africa could therefore be perceived to have positive spin-off effects in the southern part of Africa and among some of South Africa’s allies. According to UN officials as well as a diplomat at the Swedish mission to the UN (0112), the Swedish foreign policy elite failed to identify South African representatives as potentially interested in adopting the norm candidate and take action to convince them. The impression of some UN officials was that the Swedish foreign policy elite did not do enough to identify those among the developing countries that were open to persuasion.

The strategy to mobilize norm followers in the UN was less ambitious than the comprehensive approach used in the EU. In the UN, the ambition was to change attitudes, and affect the general policy of the UN in order to create a movement in support of conflict prevention (junior Swedish official 0105; senior Ambassador 0109). In the EU, the goal was to adopt a common EU view on conflict prevention in order to socialize the member states into accepting the norm candidate. The strong support from the Commission and the Council Secretariat as well as from early norm followers, and the willingness of the Swedish foreign policy elite to accept the natural linkage between conflict prevention and crisis management, made this possible.
Reaching a Tipping Point

The number of followers, but also the normative weight of the followers, may provide the necessary critical mass for norm tipping. To bring the norm candidate beyond this threshold for international normative change, the norm advocate attempts to mobilize a critical mass of states and establish a community of norm followers embracing the norm candidate (cf. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Norm diffusion will be successful if the norm “tips” over the threshold for normative change. It is however, difficult empirically to identify such a threshold.

A general agreement is emerging that preventing violent conflict is a moral, humanitarian and political imperative for the international community (Dahlgren 011018; Hjelm-Wallén 010905). In the words of Kofi Annan “there is near-universal agreement that prevention is preferable to cure, and that strategies of prevention must address the root causes of conflicts, not simply their violent symptoms” (A/54/2000). In a similar manner, Martin Landgraf (2000), formerly at the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit of the European Commission, stresses that a broad consensus is developing in the EU on conflict prevention. A more skeptical view is presented by Anders Bjurner (2000), Swedish representative of PSC, who argues that “the devil is in the detail [and] it is easy to agree on a general level, but implementation is tougher [as] there is no consensus on implementation”. Deputy Prime Minister Hjelm-Wallén (010905) agrees that a general acceptance on conflict prevention exists, but this is far from meaning acceptance in a specific case.

Clearly consensus is a vague concept as “it asserts agreement yet skirts around specifics and hints at passivity” (Dwan 2000: 9). That this agreement should be emerging among such a diverse group of actors is undoubtedly positive, but it is also a liability to practical conflict prevention. “Such an opaque and unexplored consensus may complicate efforts to move general agreement towards articulation of a case-specific practical strategy” (ibid.). Any attempts to diffuse the norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention and achieve general acceptance that goes beyond the rhetoric of international statements must accommodate this lack of consensus. There remain a substantial number of highly contested ideas and principles, many of which are core convictions of prevention: the democratic nature of a state, the equality of opportunity for individuals, human rights, the function of state institutions, relations between a government and its peoples, and the redistributive obligations of the state.
Exploring the agreement on conflict prevention in depth, it is clear that other than a wide acceptance of the moral and humanitarian imperative of conflict prevention cannot be observed within the UN. The relationship between the rights of the state and the individuals who comprise it lies at the heart of these debates and is an issue on which no shared international understanding exists. Boothby and D’Angelo (2001) identify a broad although by no means complete “shift from suspicion and agnosticism to acceptance and support” for conflict prevention. This is “a good indication of the dawning of a new era in prevention with a much wider acceptance than in the 1980s and 1990s” (ibid.). A momentum in the diffusion process has been created even though the introduction of new members into the norm community will be obviously a slow process demanding constant repetition of the persuasive arguments in favor of adopting the norm candidate. Without the support of critical actors, the objective of the norm promoting activities may be compromised and the norm candidate may not gain sufficient acceptance to be regarded as collectively held by a critical mass of states in the UN.

The lower level of acceptance of the norm candidate among the UN member states and the skepticism towards conflict prevention revealed by certain third world states, can partly be understood in terms of norm clash rather than norm match. The norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention has not yet reached a tipping point in the UN, since a critical mass of the UN member states cannot be regarded as norm followers as there is little indication that the norm candidate reconstitutes actor interests.

The EU consists of a small number of what could be considered likeminded actors who to a great extent share the same values, ideas and norms. Against this backdrop it is perhaps not surprising that the EU member states unanimously adopted the EU program for the prevention of violent conflict. This agreement on a program can be regarded as an indication that the norm candidate is reaching a tipping point in the EU and that the norm is now generally accepted. It will create expectations of a certain individual or collective behavior of EU member states. Although the conflict prevention norm is accepted in the EU, to prevent violent conflict has not yet become a habit of the EU member states collectively or individually to the extent that preventive action can be regarded as taken for granted and new common practices have been established. The views of EU member states and the overall agreement on the EU program indicate broad rhetorical acceptance among the member states and adoption on the EU level. The norm pertaining to conflict prevention can therefore be regarded as collectively held by the

Diffusion and socialization is an interactive and dynamic process involving the norm entrepreneur and the norm followers in a mutual learning process that may, as we have seen shape and reshape the norm candidate. The power of formal positions, such as membership in the UN Security Council and the Presidency of the EU, increased the possibilities for norm entrepreneurial activities, and in the EU context, it contributed extensively to the adoption of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. Although a number of strategies were available, the Swedish foreign policy elite used manipulative and argumentative persuasion in a non-coercive manner in order to achieve, not only public conformity but also private acceptance of the norm candidate. To some extent the Swedish norm entrepreneurial efforts were successful, and a norm community supporting the norm candidate pertaining to conflict prevention can be seen to have emerged in the EU. Although no concrete results can be identified in the UN context, the Swedish efforts may have contributed to the increased general awareness of conflict prevention, which facilitated the adoption of both Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on conflict prevention. Whether or not this growing rhetorical support will be institutionalized into the UN and EU will be discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter Eight

Norm Institutionalization

The transition from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention will not be easy... but the difficult task does not make it any less imperative... What is now needed is the foresight and political will to do it.

Kofi Annan

Having established a norm that has prevailed, the study now proceeds to explore how and under what conditions such a norm can become institutionalized. Institutionalization is the process through which an unsettled norm becomes settled and embedded into the normative structure. A settled norm can redefine existing normative structures, have powerful constitutive effects, and, thereby, introduce practices not previously considered relevant or efficient. However, it may be difficult to determine how a norm becomes settled if one is limited to studying norm-induced practices. To study the process of institutionalization, we need to trace the rhetoric surrounding practices, organizational and procedural reforms and changes in policies and programs to discover if the unsettled norm is becoming reflected in the organization's infrastructure. This will allow me to account for lags in practice without automatically discounting the relevance of incremental norm evolution.

Some organizations seem to be “norm-bearing”, carrying and disseminating norms (Adler 1987: 11, 327-329; Russett 1998: 383). Hence, to be able to sustain themselves over the long term, norms need to find an organizational “home”. International organizations are, therefore, viewed as playing an important role in the path leading from unsettled to settled norm. Institutionalization into the normative structure of an organization illustrates that once a norm is embedded in the structure, a space is opened up for international organizations to promote the norm and ensure adherence to the norm (Sikkink 1991: 10-15). This chapter will focus on if and how a space has been opened up within the organizational structures of the UN and the EU, in
order to allow organizational and procedural changes in support of the norm pertaining to conflict prevention.

From “Unsettled” to “Settled” Norm

A review of the literature concerned with norm institutionalization reveals a number of conducive factors that may contribute to facilitating institutionalization. Sikkink (1991: 27, 249) identifies the organizational infrastructure, the operating procedures, leadership acceptance, and the accumulation of knowledge in pockets of the bureaucracy as factors facilitating norm institutionalization. To trace the process of norm institutionalization, these factors and the pathways of institutionalization need to be explored. Institutionalization, however, also faces a number of obstacles. Frequently mentioned impediments to progress of norm institutionalization, according to Elizabeth Ridell-Dixon (1999: 149-167) are failure to construct a normative fit between norm and the mandate of an organization, inadequate expertise in the area, insufficient coordination within the organization, absence of well-focused work plans, lack of a focal point, staff shortages and lack of norm awareness or sensitivity among staff. Norm entrepreneurs, individually or through networks of like-minded norm entrepreneurs, outside and inside international organizations, act as agents of institutionalization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 902).

When tracing the process of institutionalization of the norm pertaining to conflict prevention into the UN and EU, I will focus on the norm entrepreneur’s efforts to construct a normative match between the unsettled norm and the mandate of the organizations. Furthermore, the introduction of rhetorical buzzwords by the norm entrepreneur will be identified, and the use of these by the spokespersons of the organizations will be analyzed. Organizational and procedural changes, as well as new or adapted policies and programs, may reflect the institutionalization of the unsettled norm, and such developments within these organizations will be traced. Institutionalization is a scale along a spectrum, from complete congruence between the norm and organizational practice, by way of “no obvious barriers to a match”, to no congruence (Checkel 1999: 87).

Constructing a Normative Match

The normative match between the statement of purpose or the mandate of the organization and the unsettled norm affects the likelihood of the norm to become settled into the normative structure of the organization. Since mandates
may be reinterpreted and evolve over time, it is more important to construct a match with the role the organization sees itself as playing, rather than rely on the mandate’s historical origins or ostensible mission. Hence, the contemporary interpretation of the mandate and the explicit commitment of the organization to the norm will determine the potential for institutionalization. Once a match is constructed, the norm becomes embodied in the organization’s statement of purpose, which in turn tends to perpetuate and extend the norm. Hence, the priority given to conflict prevention within the mandate of an organization will powerfully influence the motivation and efforts for institutionalizing the norm.

**Rhetorical Support**

The rhetoric surrounding norms may often be as important to study as actual practice. Rhetorical support is given to a norm when the prescriptions embodied in the norm become, through changes in rhetoric, discourse or behavior, a focus of political attention. Actors may then refer to a norm to motivate and mobilize joint actions, and to justify actions. Norms embodied in an organization are often interpreted and expressed by its leader, who is the most important spokesperson and representative of the norm. Powerful actors within organizations are key to understanding institutionalization of norms (Sikkink 1991: 26). If these powerful actors within an organization change their convictions and give rhetorical support to a norm, a rhetorical momentum can be established. Thus the rhetoric may function as a driving force for institutionalization of the norm in the organizational structure. However, norm adoption is not a prerogative of high-level political leaders, but they may contribute to persuade other officials within the organization. As Risse (1999) argues, regular references to a norm when commenting on behavior is an indication of the settled status of the norm, i.e. that it is institutionalized. The rhetorical support signals political commitment to the norm and may empower the norm, which can be interpreted as the institutionalization having commenced (cf. Karvonen and Sundelius 1987: 84, 85; Checkel 1999: 87-89).

**Organizational and Procedural Support**

Once a norm is manifested in the normative structure, the organization will facilitate the promotion of the norm by giving it organizational support and means of expression (Sikkink 1991: 2; Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 20-24).
It has been argued that a norm may become enmeshed in a political process through the standard operating procedures of bureaucratic agencies (Young 1989: 79). The institutionalization of a norm tends to result in spreading organizational and procedural changes across the entire organization rather than confining it to one special department, and this is a process that can be traced.

Two institutionalization strategies can be used to incorporate norms into the organizational structures and procedures as well as in policies and programs. One strategy refers to capacity building through organizational and procedural innovations in support of the norm, aimed at changing the organizational mode of operation in accordance with the norm (cf. Dwan 2002: 23-46). There are many ways of giving a norm organizational support. For example, new units can be established, focal points designated, a framework for intra-organizational cooperation established, channels for cooperation with experts developed, funds allocated and internal training programs developed. In addition, supplementary programs and policies must often be developed for the norm to become embedded into the practices of the organization.

In contrast to creating new organizational structures and procedures, the second approach to institutionalization of a norm refers to mainstreaming, which seeks by a conscious effort to critically examine current work and activities through the lenses of the new norm, taking advantage of the existing resources. Many norms require an awareness and involvement of all the organization’s functions. By making it an integral and equal part of all major institutional activities, the norm becomes such a powerful part of organizational culture that the planning, making and implementation of policy all must take it into account (cf. Carment and Schnabel 2001b). Hence, once embedded in the organization’s infrastructure, the norm continues to influence and constrain policy even after the interest of the norm entrepreneurs has changed (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 20-24).

**Entrenching a Norm into Policies and Programs**

Institutionalization, however, requires the translation of the objective into practical policies. To have an impact on the policy outcome, the norm needs to be entrenched in the policies and programs of organizations. Successful institutionalization of a norm will, therefore, be reflected in programs or policies, adapted or developed in response to the new norm. The norm can be
institutionalized either through integrating it into existing policies and programs or by transforming the existing policies and programs.

Policy coherence is to some extent accomplished by bureaucrats sharing the values underpinning the norm, and by adopting the norm (cf. Karvonen and Sundelius 1987: 89). Institutionalization of a norm into policies and programs aims at disseminating the norm throughout all levels and activities of an organization to effect a fundamental attitudinal change among its end users for example recipients of development aid. This is facilitated by strong political support for the norm, a normative match with the overall policy doctrine’s overriding and explicit principles (ibid.).

The institutionalization of certain norms like conflict prevention has implications across the sectors (political, economic, social) and levels (global, regional, national, local) along which institutions are usually organized. Hence, for many organizations the process of norm institutionalization means a great organizational challenge in addition to the political challenge.

Efforts to Institutionalize the Norm in the UN Context

Several initiatives have been taken within the UN system to increase the awareness of conflict prevention, and to promote the values and norms included in a “culture of prevention” in order to institutionalize the norm of conflict prevention into common practice. Swedish representatives have attempted to build on these ongoing processes to ensure that the norm becomes settled into the UN system.

Matching the Mandate

The norm pertaining to conflict prevention could be considered to fit with the overall UN normative framework in the field of peace and security, as well as with the development agenda of the UN. Since the UN Charter speaks mainly of the issue of interstate conflicts, a flexible interpretation of the Charter and the principle of sovereignty, which is a cornerstone of the Charter, is required in order to come to terms with conflicts of internal nature. The efforts to construct a normative fit between the emergent norm and the normative context are indicated in a vast number of UN landmark documents, blueprints, policy statements and resolutions that recognize the importance of conflict prevention, despite its clash with the norm of sovereignty. For
example, the Secretary-General stated in the recent report *Prevention of Armed Conflict* that: “conflict prevention lies at the heart of the mandate of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security,” and that “a general consensus is emerging among Member States that comprehensive and coherent conflict prevention strategies offer the greatest potential for promoting lasting peace and creating an enabling environment for sustainable development” (A/55/985-S2001/574).

**Rhetorical Support of the Norm**

The recent Secretaries-General have taken an interest in conflict prevention. This interest has been expressed in their reports on the work of the organization over a number of years. Since *An Agenda for Peace* of 1992 and its supplement presented in 1995, there has been a steady evolution of ideas and approaches to the notion of conflict prevention.

Particularly the current Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, can be regarded as a spokesperson for conflict prevention. Beginning his term of office in 1997, Annan recognized the importance of prevention as one of the strategic visions of his new administration (A/51/950). For example, in the report on *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa* (A/52/871-S1998/318), the Secretary-General stressed that conflict prevention begins and ends with the promotion of human security and human development. In the annual report of 1999, the Secretary-General encouraged “a transition from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention” (A/54/1). Presented at the Millennium Summit in September 2000, the so-called Brahimi report called for extensive reforms of UN peace and security activities, including conflict prevention (A/55/305-S/2000/809). The *Millennium Report* presented by the Secretary-General at the same summit concluded that “there is a near-universal agreement that prevention is preferable to cure and that strategies of prevention must address the root causes of conflict, not simply their violent symptoms” (A/54/2000). Despite optimism concerning the growing agreement on conflict prevention, Annan noted that “consensus is not always matched by practical action” (ibid.), and “for the United Nations, the concept of conflict prevention must be put into practice, and the rhetoric matched by action” (A/56/1). In an attempt to bridge the gap between rhetoric and practice, the report *Prevention of Armed Conflict* was presented with recommendations to the Security Council and the General Assembly, in June 2001 (A/55/985-S/2001/574). According to a former senior official at the UN Secretariat (0202), the report was,
however, designed to be non-provocative to facilitate its adoption in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Even so, precedent suggests that these so-called landmark documents could well end up ignored, the recipients of praise and neglect. However, many of these reports and documents resonated with the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Recent expressions of vocal support for the norm pertaining to conflict prevention were found, for example, in the concluding Security Council Presidential Statement, drafted by Swedish representatives, from the discussion on peace and security in Africa sparked by the previously mentioned Secretary-General’s Africa report in September 1998 (S/PRST/1998/29). The growing awareness of conflict prevention in the UN system paved the way for two open debates on conflict prevention in the Security Council in November 1999 and July 2000. This can be regarded as an indication that the Council has become more prepared to pay attention, not only to ongoing crises, but also to the early stages of emerging conflicts. For example, the Council stated that it “recognizes the importance of building a culture of prevention of armed conflicts”, and emphasized its commitment to conflict prevention as a primary responsibility of the Council (S/PRST/1999/34; SC/6892). In September the same year, the Security Council unanimously approved a resolution designed around the recommendations of the Brahimi report, yet without promising to implement all of its proposals (S/RES/1318). A year later the Security Council considered the report *The Prevention of Armed Conflict*. The resolution adopted was, however, cast in the most general terms, as the Security Council expressed “its commitment to take early and effective action to prevent armed conflict, and to that end to employ all appropriate means at its disposal including—with the consent of the receiving states—its missions to areas of potential conflict” (S/RES/1366; cf. S/PRST/2000/25; S/PRST/2001/31). Despite the rhetorical commitment by the Security Council, lack of will to discuss the substantive proposals in the report illustrated the continued reluctance of some of the members of the Council towards the emerging norm. This could indicate that certain member states only pay lip service to the notion of prevention, failing to adopt and institutionalize the norm. Whether these rhetorical statements will translate into anything more substantial remains to be seen.

The General Assembly has also become more inclined to discuss conflict prevention. The Assembly adopted the politically correct, yet substantively empty, *Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace* in 1999 (A/RES/53/243). Although failing to mention conflict prevention, some of the values, attitudes and modes of behavior recommended in the resolution are
the same ones that underpin the norm pertaining to conflict prevention, such as peaceful settlements of disputes and universal respect for and observance of all human rights. Despite the rhetoric, the General Assembly was reluctant to consider concrete proposals and recommendations to reform the UN and its peace activities, such as those presented in the Brahimi report. To accept this, in many eyes, controversial report, many member states had to be persuaded, according to a diplomat at the Swedish Mission to the UN (0112). When the report entitled *Prevention of Armed Conflict* was introduced to the General Assembly, the response was limited, as the report avoided subjects of controversy, according to a former senior official at the UN Secretariat (0202). Content with the emphasis on the Assembly’s role in creating a culture of prevention, the member states unanimously adopted a resolution on 1 August 2001 urging all relevant actors to examine the Secretary-General’s recommendations on conflict prevention (GA/9896; GA/9933). Although demonstrating rhetorical support for the norm pertaining to conflict prevention, the General Assembly could not be considered as spurring norm institutionalization, as it is constrained by its inability to serve as a forum for substantive discussion and for collective action. A former UN official stated in an interview (0202) that, due to the international political attention given to conflict prevention, and the growing discourse surrounding it, many member states were now “talking the talk, but few are walking the walk”.

Reflected in these documents, resolutions and statements are the UN rhetoric in support of conflict prevention. It rests on a number of repeated arguments. For instance, lessons of past experiences such as those in Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Haiti, the Persian Gulf and Cambodia are frequently emphasized, as well as the challenges to apply these lessons. A multidimensional approach to conflict prevention is often highlighted where the root causes of conflicts must be addressed, requiring a long-term strategy and ultimately an investment in sustainable development (SC/7081; A/55/431; A/52/871-S/1998/318). A key theme of the report *Prevention of Armed Conflict* was the link between conflict prevention and development, as investment in national and international conflict prevention must be seen as a simultaneous investment in sustainable development and sustainable peace (A/55/985-S/2001/574). A rational economic argument in favor of the cost-efficient approach of conflict prevention is used to meet the general ambition to make the UN more cost-effective (SG/SM/7695; SG/SM/7747). From the same point of view, the UN spokespersons push down the responsibility for conflict prevention according to the principle of subsidiarity, arguing that the primary responsibility rests with the parties to the conflict (A/55/985-S/2001/574). Furthermore, the argument stressing the need to “translate the
rhetoric of conflict prevention into concrete action” recognizes the gap between the rhetorical ambitions of the UN and its limited capacity and capability (GA/9890; A/55/985-S/2001/574). Frequently, the Secretary-General calls for a culture of prevention, stating that the organization itself must alter its culture of reaction (SG/SM/7747; SC/6759).

Elements in the rhetoric could be regarded as a response to the criticism of the term conflict prevention. Many, especially in the developing world, have interpreted the advocates to be proposing intrusive new forms of conflict management and peace enforcement, a threat compounded by the prospect that scarce development cooperation resources will be diverted into these new types of interventionist political action. This rhetoric could also convince skeptical donor countries that while the benefits of investing in prevention may not be immediately evident, it is a core component of sustainable development. In addition, the cost-benefit argument tends to resonate well with the donor-community, and with those who demand reforms and a more cost-efficient UN. These rhetorical arguments in favor of conflict prevention are similar to the ones Swedish advocates for conflict prevention use.

These rhetorical statements indicate that conflict prevention is now becoming established in the international discourse on peace and security. They also reflect awareness of conflict prevention issues within the UN, which may contribute to entrenching conflict prevention into the normative framework of the UN and perhaps that of its member states in order to create an ethos for conflict prevention. The impact of resolutions, documents and reports should not be underestimated as political rhetoric impossible to translate into action. Rather, these documents establish the discourse, make a claim for the legitimacy of conflict prevention, and contribute to creating a consensus on the issue, which is a pre-requisite for most institutionalization efforts. Interviews indicated that UN officials regard these documents as a tool for exerting normative pressure. Beyond the rhetorical commitment to conflict prevention of the Security Council, General Assembly and the Secretary-General lies the day-to-day work of the UN system.

Organizational and Procedural Support

Establishing new organizational structures has been a way of strengthening the new norm and facilitating a change of practices within the organization. The current process of UN reform has opened up new opportunities to make effective organizational and procedural reforms to support the norm pertaining to conflict prevention. New Secretariat working practices have been initiated as a result.
Notably, the UNDP has been designated by the UN Secretary-General as the focal point for conflict prevention within the United Nations system. It is assigned with sector coordination and ensuring that the conflict prevention perspective is integrated into the everyday work of the various departments (SC/6892). By establishing a new organizational structure within UNDP, such as the Prevention Teams and a Policy Planning Unit in 1998, the early warning and policy planning capabilities have been strengthened, indicating that the norm is beginning to become institutionalized in the policy planning procedures. The Prevention Team has been charged with identifying potential conflict situations and suggesting alternative response strategies (GA/9762). The Policy Planning Unit has been given the assignment to develop a comprehensive plan for a revived early warning and prevention system for the UN (Boothby and D’Angelo 2001; GA/9783).

Also the agencies concerned with structural conflict prevention, such as United Nations Development Program (UNDP), have been reformed, as they were ill equipped for the task at hand. An Emergency Response Division (ERD) and a Crisis Committee have been set up in an effort to respond to the concern that the UNDP must become involved at all stages of conflicts (Wood 2001).

Organizational support could also be found by the establishment of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS), and the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) in 1997. ECPS’s purpose was to advise the Secretary-General and the Security Council on issues pertaining to the maintenance of peace and security, and ECHA was considered an appropriate body to deal with preventive measures of a humanitarian nature (S/2000/1081). However, according to an interview with a UN official (0105), the ECPS to date has not discussed the issue of conflict prevention in depth, although it offers much unused potential as a high-level discussion and decision-making body in the field of prevention.

A framework for Co-ordination on Early Warning has been restructured to exchange information, assess risk, and identify preventive instruments; approximately 10 UN departments have been involved, as well as some member states (Boothby and D’Angelo 2001). This forum has stimulated increased coordination and cooperation within the UN system, which may contribute to spreading the institutionalization of the norm across the entire organization (cf. Cockell 2001). According to an assessment by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs the activities of the Framework for Co-ordination are “in line with Sweden’s ideas about the need to make UN policy more pro-active”, but Sweden has not been one of the countries participating in the Framework (Skr. 2000/01:2).
A number of initiatives that could facilitate institutionalization of the norm are still embryonic. For example, the UN Global Prevention Forum, which was intended to provide UN decision makers with a channel for consulting with experts from academia, NGOs and other sectors of international civil society. A request for financial support from the UN official in charge of coordinating this Prevention Forum was met with reluctance by the Swedish representatives, who argued that a number of existing networks could be used for this purpose (UN official 0201).

To contribute to establishing a culture of prevention within the organization, a commission, chaired by the former Foreign Minister of Algeria, Lakhdar Brahimi, was convened to review the UN peace and security activities. It presented the previously mentioned Brahimi report with a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations that would allow the UN to respond robustly so long as the mandates were realistic (A/55/305-S/2000/809). The recommendations required action but no enormous financial or political sacrifice on the part of member states, and efforts have been undertaken to implement it (A/55/502; A/55/977; A/56/732). The report Prevention of Armed Conflict also made a number of recommendations with organizational and procedural implications, such as the establishment of an informal working group to discuss prevention on a continuing basis, an informal group of eminent persons to advise the Secretary-General on prevention, and the creation of an open-ended group of states within the General Assembly to facilitate a dialogue on conflict prevention (A/55/985-S/2001/574). These suggestions have been discussed, but little concrete results have been achieved.

Procedural reforms concerning budget lines could assist the process of institutionalization. In general the allocation of funds is a cumbersome process in the UN, as funding is obtained on basis of mandates approved by the governing bodies to meet specific needs or purposes and responses to crisis (Björkdahl 2002c). To come to terms with this deficiency, Norway initiated a Trust Fund for conflict prevention in 1996, at the same time pledging to contribute some million dollars (Egeland 1997: 57). Other governments have since contributed; for example Sweden has contributed USD 400,000 (Skr. 2000/01:2). The UN Trust Fund for Conflict Prevention, managed by UNDPA, is aimed at increasing the ability of the Secretary-General to undertake unanticipated, flexible, short-term conflict prevention action. It is the Secretary-General’s own discretionary reserve, and in January 2000 it had received financial support of USD 7 million (ibid). The Fund is, however, a last resort to be used if no other means are available. The UNDP budget provides the
potential to finance conflict prevention within the regular budget of the UN. Five per cent of the UNDP’s core resources were annually reserved for “development in countries in special situations”, where one of the three objectives is to build national capacities in conflict prevention (DP/1996/1; UNDP guidelines 1996).52

To create an in-house culture of conflict prevention, the skills of the officials need to be improved, and attitudes, beliefs and convictions of officials in the organization need to be changed. Since 1998, the UN Staff College in Turin has provided training programs focused on early warning and conflict prevention to more than 500 UN field and Headquarters staff (Carment and Schnabel 2001b). The primary aim of the training has been to build an awareness of UN staff in the area of early warning and preventive action (Boothby and D’Angelo 2001). When invited to participate in the UN staff training program, the Swedish representatives curiously enough declined, according to a former senior UN official (0202). Although Sweden made a financial contribution to the UN staff training program, it was “not in the same league as other contributors”, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy (ibid.).53 When Sweden recently cut back its financial contribution to the UN Staff College, the perception among UN officials (0202) was that it must have been due to internal turf battles or personal clashes within the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Entrenching the Norm into Policies and Programs

The norm pertaining to conflict prevention is beginning to affect some of the policies and programs of the UN. For example, efforts have been undertaken to incorporate conflict prevention in programs for development and relief aid, so that they may address structural causes of conflict, such as refugees and internally displaced persons, refugee flows that can destabilize neighboring states. Environmental programs have begun to recognize resource scarcity, such as water, as a potential root cause of conflict (Björkdahl 2002c). UNDP played, and continues to play, a principal and multifaceted role at the in-country level before, during and after conflicts. Responding to the call for a culture of prevention, the UNDP has outlined its updated development strategy for crises and post-conflict situations, and prevention of violent conflict is one of the pillars of this new strategy (DP/2001/4). This can be regarded as marking a renewed commitment by UNDP to assume a leading role in addressing the development dimensions of conflicts.
Conflict prevention has slowly started to become integrated at the operational level through the emerging concept of the “country team” and annual country-level strategy development tools, such as Poverty Reduction Strategies and Common Country Assessments and the Development Assistance Framework (Lund 2000). However, the record to date in integrating conflict prevention—and its tangible reflection in risk and situation assessments, program selection and project design—is still weak. For example, the basic program and coordination frameworks for most countries and the country offices, do not broach the subject of latent or potential conflicts, except as a side issue in the special cases of emergency and recovery situations (Wood 2001).

Obstacles to Institutionalization

For a long time there existed no regular practice of cooperation among UN departments and agencies. The international climate prior to the end of the Cold War was hostile towards organizational innovations and a widespread reluctance in the UN family to be drawn into “political” activities (Boothby and D’Angelo 2001). Concepts such as structural prevention had not yet emerged. Particularly the UNDP stressed its need to be perceived as impartial and neutral to be able to fulfill its tasks, and taking on responsibilities for the prevention of violent conflicts could compromise this. The updated development strategy of UNDP facilitates the construction of a normative match between the norm pertaining to conflict prevention and the UNDP’s mandate.

In spite of calls for a culture of prevention, the UN is still operating in response to international crises rather than in a proactive mode. One reason for this is that the demands it faces from existing conflicts and crises require all the financial and personnel resources of the organization. It is for the most part oriented towards responding to the symptoms of full-blown conflicts and wars, and a culture of prevention is still not entrenched in the UN system. To change the UN culture of reaction to a culture of prevention takes both time and continuous encouragement from norm entrepreneurs located within the organizational structure as well as the ones “outside”, like Sweden.

Although the Brahimi report has a broader focus than only conflict prevention, it seems to have functioned as a work plan for reform of the UN efforts in peace and security. Whether or not the report Prevention of Armed Conflict is sufficiently focused, and has gained enough political support to be translated into practical reforms, remains to be seen.

However, organizational and procedural support is necessary for the institution-
alization of the norm. The key challenge is to develop new organizational structures, and to mainstream the old ones to incorporate conflict prevention, while at the same time avoid compartmentalization and hierarchies that centralize decision making and are resistant to change. As a former UN official stated in an interview (0202), conflict prevention is a cause that needs to be constantly hammered both within the UN Secretariat, within the broader UN family, and among member states.

**Efforts to Institutionalize the Norm in the EU Context**

Until the end of the Cold War, the European Community was better known for preventing conflicts between its own member states. The EU’s involvement in conflict prevention has since expanded as a result of its increasing foreign policy responsibilities and external demands. A number of key statements on conflict prevention, organizational changes, procedural reforms, and a comprehensive EU program for the prevention of violent conflict are indications of rhetorical and organizational support for conflict prevention, which may spearhead the institutionalization of the norm.

**Matching the Normative Context**

There is evidently a normative match between the norm pertaining to conflict prevention and the EU normative context. For instance, one of the specific aims of the CFSP, suggested by the EC foreign ministers in June 1992, was “contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts” (cited in Smith 1999: 137). The European Commission President Jacques Delors (1994: 9) asserted that the EU’s priority would be “to promote stability on the eastern and southern borders paying more attention to preventive diplomacy”. According to Article J1 of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, one of the main objectives of the CFSP is “to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations’ Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter of the OSCE”.54

A recent statement by the Secretary General and High Representative of the European Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Dr. Javier Solana (010122), in the GAC open debate on conflict prevention reflects the normative fit between the norm pertaining to conflict prevention and the mandate of the Union. Reflecting upon the history and the purpose of the EU,
he concluded that: “We have achieved great success in building an ever-widening area of peace, stability and prosperity: founded on common values and better understanding; developed through closer integration; and broadened through successive enlargement. Building stability and preventing conflict is at the heart of our endeavours”.

This is an rhetorical illustration of the trend and support of the EU for conflict prevention. It indicates that the Swedish norm entrepreneurial efforts had a solid foundation to build on when revitalizing the notion of conflict prevention in the EU context, and a growing support when attempting to translate this notion into a settled norm.

Rhetorical Support of the Norm

The European Council has on several occasions reaffirmed that conflict prevention is a fixed priority of EU external action. Especially the Council conclusions from the Helsinki Summit of December 1999 set in motion a process to institutionalize the norm pertaining to conflict prevention into the CFSP/ESDP framework, where “conflict prevention has become a binding concept” (Hill 2001: 315). Apart from the European Council, representatives from the Commission and Council Secretariat acted as spokespersons for the EU, and during recent years, their rhetoric has come to strengthen conflict prevention. Patten (010314), for example, stated that “recent history in the Balkans, in Africa and elsewhere, has taught us that we [the EU] need to equip ourselves better to try to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict and to react more effectively when it occurs”. In addition, he stressed the need to address root causes, to build on the objectives of peace and democratic stability and to link conflict prevention to crisis management (Patten 991117). According to an interview with an official at the EU Commission (0112), parts of the Swedish rhetoric are now used in the commission and in Patten’s speeches (cf. 000222; 010314; 010411). The High Representative for the CFSP Solana (010629) linked prevention to crisis management, and stressed that “clearly prevention is better than the cure…and we have taken steps to ensure that our substantial existing civilian crisis management capabilities will be backed by the capacity to use military crisis management means”. A different perspective was highlighted by the European Commissioner for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid Paul Nielsen (000208), who stated that he considered “development cooperation as the most important contribution Europe can make to conflict prevention in developing countries”.
The rhetorical support is also reflected in a number of guidelines and documents, contributing to the institutionalization of the norm. For example, already in 1996, development co-operation and economic assistance was linked to political conflict when, for the first time, it was explicitly recognizing that EU aid could be used to avert or end conflict (COM(1996)153). This view was recently repeated in the Commission’s communication, where it was stated that: “development policy and other cooperation programmes provide, without a doubt, the most powerful instrument at the Community’s disposal for treating the root causes of conflict” (COM(2001)211). The previously mentioned report by the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of European Union – Action in the Field of Conflict Prevention 2000, also indicate the growing support for conflict prevention within the EU bureaucracies. However, behind the scene, Swedish officials assisted the Commission and the Council Secretariat in producing the report (official at the EU Commission 0112; official at the Council Secretariat 0112). A close examination and comparison of the Swedish recommendations and this report show a strong resemblance.

As noted in the previous chapter, the Commission presented its report Communication on Conflict Prevention (COM(2001)211), during the Swedish Presidency, strongly encouraged by the Swedish foreign policy elite. The similarity with the Preventing Violent Conflict—A Swedish Action Plan and Preventing Violent Conflict—A Swedish Policy for the 21st Century was obviously not a coincidence. According to an interview with the official at the EU Commission (0112) responsible for the drafting of the Communication, the Swedish representatives were closely involved in the drafting process and contributed “intellectual as well as political and conceptual frameworks used in developing the Communication”. Interviews substantiate the Swedish perception that the EU Secretariat and the EU Commission were open to Swedish ideas and were inspired by the work done by Sweden on the issue of conflict prevention (senior official at the Council Secretariat 0112; official at the EU Commission 0112).

In general, the EU rhetoric in support of conflict prevention relies on three main arguments. For example, it is argued that the EU needs to fully assume its responsibilities in the sphere of conflict prevention, utilizing instruments from its three pillars. (European Council conclusions 001207). It is also widely argued that the EU should further develop and direct its unique range of capabilities and comparative advantages (European Council conclusions 990603; 000619; 001207). As the EU currently focuses on the development of a military crisis management capability, conflict prevention is often
presented as a supplement in the more comprehensive argumentation in support of crisis management (European Council conclusions 990603; 991210; 000619). It is also argued that conflict prevention is in line with the fundamental values of the EU such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights (European Council conclusions 001207; 010619).

The Swedish foreign policy elite was particularly influential in institutionalizing the political acceptance of conflict prevention and translating the rhetoric surrounding conflict prevention into a comprehensive program—*the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict*. The program, although not a legal EU-instrument, clearly illustrated the growing political support for conflict prevention (Swedish official in Brussels 0111). As the political priorities have been set, the rhetoric is now being translated into practice, as the EU has been taken steps to put “principles into practice” (European Council conclusions 010619).

Conflict prevention can be seen as providing a common thread, in terms of values, objectives and instruments, which holds the CFSP and ESDP together and gives it purpose. Accordingly, conflict prevention has become the new operational code of Europe, increasingly referred to.

**Organizational and Procedural Support**

Putting principles into action means, among other things, organizational and procedural changes in support of the principles. The evolution of the CFSP and the ESDP has contributed to many organizational changes in the European Union, which to some extent gives the norm of conflict prevention means of expression as well as organizational support. The PSC, the Military Committee (EUMC), the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), the PPEWU, and the Joint Civilian and Military Situation Centre are newly established structures where conflict prevention can be incorporated. According to an interview with a senior official at the Council Secretariat (0112), Sweden should be satisfied with managing to establish the Swedish initiated CIVCOM, because it was unlikely that new institutions would be created for the specific purpose of conflict prevention. Additional institutional innovations would not add value, but overlap with the existing ones. Instead, he believed it more likely that existing structures would be mainstreamed to incorporate conflict prevention, providing it with the means of expression.

By integrating conflict prevention into some of these newly established committees and units, the norm is beginning to be incorporated into EU’s
policy planning process and standard operating procedures (Björkdahl 2002a: 111). Although suggested by the member states as the focal point for conflict prevention, the PSC, according to a senior Swedish official in Brussels (0112), only discussed conflict prevention issues twenty per cent of its time, while the rest of the time was devoted to crisis management. Despite not being formally designated as a focal point for conflict prevention, the PPEWU has been spearheading conflict prevention since it was established with strong Swedish support in October 1999.57 One should keep in mind that most of these new committees and units were established in response to the increased focus on crisis management, and less in response to the need to institutionalize conflict prevention (Björkdahl 2002a). However, according to an interview with an official at the EU Commission (0112), the efforts to institutionalize conflict prevention have benefited from the obvious linkage between conflict prevention and crisis management, as the institutionalization and organizational support for crisis management has grown steadily.

Organizational support for the norm pertaining to conflict prevention is difficult to find in the military area—an area the EU has only recently entered. Following the British-French declaration of St. Malo, the fifteen accordingly made formal decisions at Cologne and Helsinki in 1999 to set up the ESDP (Hill 2001: 319). The progress of the ESDP facilitated the agreement to establish a RRF of 60,000 men by 2003, which will provide the EU with a military arm to carry out the Petersberg Tasks, including the prevention of violent conflicts, as suggested by the Swedish-Finnish proposal (ibid.). As the Cologne European Council concluded, “the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the Petersberg tasks” (European Council conclusions 990603).

The 1999 organizational restructuring of the Commission’s Directorates General (DG) facilitated the EU’s efforts to institutionalize conflict prevention into the development sphere, according to an interview with State Secretary Andersson (010910). One example is the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, established in the middle of 2000 within the Commission, which created an organizational link between conflict prevention and crisis management.

The decentralization process within the Commission also strengthened the coordinating role of the Commissioner responsible for External Relations (Forwood 2001: 440). Since restructuring, foreign policy and political analysis in support of conflict prevention has been assigned to country desks within the Directorate General for Development and Directorate General for
External Relations, hence strengthening the decentralization of the decision making, while avoiding compartmentalization of the responsibility for conflict prevention. The newly established EuropeAid Co-operation Office, located within the Commission, has been charged with implementation of the external aid instruments of the European Commission.\textsuperscript{58} It is, however, too early to judge whether conflict prevention is being integrated into the work of this office.

A realization that traditional budget routines limit the ability to translate the emerging norm pertaining to conflict prevention into practice has set in motion a process of establishing new and alternative budget arrangements. The EU, among others, has therefore pioneered flexible budget procedures to accommodate the political priorities given to conflict prevention. Although no dedicated individual budget line exists for conflict prevention within the EU, several budget categories support activities relevant to conflict prevention (EU Commission official 0112). A quick budget procedure without cumbersome decision-making procedures was provided by the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) (COM(2001)211).\textsuperscript{59} This recent mechanism, operational for the first time in Macedonia in 2001, was intended for fact-finding missions and for initiating programs where the regular programs would take over after approximately six months (EU Commission official 0112).

The EU attempted to formalize its cooperation with the research community when establishing the CPN, which links the European Commission and Parliament to some 30 external research institutions, and indirectly to the NGO community. The contribution of the CPN was mainly to provide commissioned studies of impending or open crises, long-term prospects for monitoring and early warning as well as to provide policy options for the EU (Björkdahl 2002a).\textsuperscript{60} Recently, the relationship between the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, responsible for the link to the CPN, and the CPN became tense, and whether this formalized institutional cooperation will change form remains to be seen (senior official at the Council Secretariat 0112).

These organizational developments as well as the rhetorical support, expressed in speeches, in the previously mentioned reports and in the EU program, could be regarded as indications that conflict prevention may be gaining political support and acceptance among the member states of the EU, as well as a foothold in the bureaucracies of the Council Secretariat and the Commission. Enhanced institutional capabilities will, however, not automatically lead to institutionalization of a norm and could not replace strong and continued political support for the norm.
Policies and programs of the EU also reflected the growing acceptance of the norm pertaining to conflict prevention. The EU attempted to integrate a conflict preventive perspective into the CFSP and ESDP, while at the same time recognizing that development assistance also had a role to play in the area of conflict prevention.

Since 1995, a comprehensive policy framework for the EU’s contribution to conflict prevention and peace-building in Africa has been developed and a number of common positions has been agreed upon. The EU developed a Pact on Stability in Europe specifically to prevent conflict, promote good neighborly relations and to resolve the problems of national minorities that arise (Smith 1999: 137). The Pact, inaugurated in May 1994, focused on those East European countries that were prospective members vis-à-vis which the EU had greater opportunities to exert its influence more effectively. This initiative clearly reflected the Union’s own experiences as it emphasized regional cooperation and dialogue (Smith 1999: 155-161).

Still, cooperation programs like the PHARE, TACIS, MEDA, CARDS and ALA were not explicitly geared towards conflict prevention. They are beginning to incorporate conflict prevention or at least to rationalize their arguments, according to an EU Commission official (0112). One way of incorporating conflict prevention is to impose conditionality to ensure respect for good governance and minority and human rights.61 Conditionality has, according to Hill (2001: 327), “become a regular practice of the EU’s foreign policy actions, whereby there is now no embarrassment about creating linkages between the granting of aid or privileges and the expectations of better behavior”. The Commission has aimed to ensure that its development policy and co-operative programs are more focused on targeting root causes of violent conflicts in an integrated way. The EU, therefore, has begun to integrate a conflict prevention perspective in country strategy papers, the main tool used to program EC assistance (COM(2001)211). For those countries where risk for conflict has been highlighted, conflict prevention measures will be integrated into the overall program, according to an EU Commission official (0112).

The institutionalization of conflict prevention could be illustrated by the Cotonou Convention approved in June 2000, which represented a radical overhaul of EU’s relations with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). During the re-negotiation of the Lomé/Cotonou Convention in 1999-2000, promoting peace and stability were important aims, according
to State Secretary Andersson (010910). The agreement, according to Genevra Forwood (2001: 426), showed “an ability to adapt to changing international political norms”, as it explicitly made provisions for the prevention of violent conflict, encouraging parties to pursue an active, comprehensive and integrated policy of conflict prevention. It particularly urged the parties to focus on preventing violent conflicts at an early stage by addressing their root causes in a targeted manner with an adequate combination of all available tools (Cotonou Agreement Article 12).

The Swedish foreign policy elite attempted to institutionalize conflict prevention as a common EU strategy. This was a novel policy instrument for foreign policy, regarded as a symbol of the EU’s political will to act on the world stage, and frequently implemented in areas where the member states have important interests in common. As such strategies are agreed upon at the European Council, the highest decision-making level, they are considered to be significant and to have public resonance. A Common Strategy for Conflict Prevention as suggested by Sweden, was thought to be thematic, global in scope and ensure pillar coherence within the EU (Swedish Ambassador 0109). The purpose was to shift EU’s effort to the earlier phases of conflicts and to build a culture of prevention in order to mainstream the daily activities of the EU. However, when Sweden intended to promote conflict prevention as a Common Strategy, the PPEWU advised against it, and the suggestion was never placed on the agenda, according to an interview with a senior official at the Council Secretariat (0112). Subsequently, the Swedish foreign policy elite settled for a EU program focused on the prevention of violent conflict, which in a sense indicate a lesser degree of institutionalization, as such programs generally, have few institutional consequences and are mainly regarded as guiding overall policy.

Obstacles to Institutionalizing Conflict Prevention

The key impediments to progress are budgetary constraints, national sensitivities and difficulties of translating resources into instruments, which all serve to inhibit the institutionalization of the norm and translating conflict prevention into practice. Furthermore, considering the limited changes of the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, it seems difficult for a conflict prevention strategy to be mounted by the EU using the CFSP and Community instruments. In comparison with the efforts to institutionalize crisis management, little has been achieved when it comes to conflict prevention. There has been no capability-pledging conference for conflict prevention where member states
pledge means and measures, no catalogue of national capabilities for conflict prevention, and no special committees have been set up for the main purpose of preventing violent conflicts (senior official at the Council Secretariat 0112). The challenge for the EU is therefore to mainstream conflict prevention into the crisis management-oriented structures and procedures as well as foreign policy and development assistance. Particularly the military structures may prove to be resistant to mainstreaming conflict prevention. Efforts to institutionalize conflict prevention may be an up-hill battle with the increased focus on rapid response to sudden crises, and in view of the absence of training programs for EU officials and representatives of member states that could facilitate a change of attitudes and beliefs, and contribute to an in-house culture of prevention.

Furthermore, since 1992, the Community has included a clause on human rights in its agreements with other European countries, and in 1995 it was agreed that the clause should appear in all agreements with third countries, and in community regulations on program aid. This means that the EU could alter the terms of cooperation, or suspend or denounce the agreement, if countries in question violate human rights and democratic principles (Smith 1999: 97-98). No such clause has been provided to encourage third countries to take preventive measures and settle their disputes peacefully.

The Swedish foreign policy elite’s attempt to express conflict prevention in terms of a Common Strategy in order to entrench conflict prevention in the normative structure of the EU failed to gain broad support (senior Ambassador 0109; Swedish Ambassador 0109). This failure can to some extent be explained by a general discontent with the existing common strategies on Russia and Ukraine, as many perceive them to be rhetorical rather than operational (Council Secretariat official 0106).

To some extent the lack of institutionalization of the norm pertaining to conflict prevention can be understood in terms of the recentness of its appearance on the EU agenda. Norm institutionalization is often a slow and cumbersome process demanding time and continues support from norm entrepreneurs outside and within the organization.

Institutionalization of a norm pertaining to conflict prevention beyond rhetorical support has proved difficult to achieve. Norm entrepreneurs have introduced rhetorical concepts and buzzwords to the political discourse on conflict prevention as a first step to gain consensus on the norm.
Norm entrepreneurs have also actively assisted in translating general political and rhetorical support for the norm into organizational changes and procedural reforms, and worked to strengthen the rhetoric, as organizational changes demand rhetorical maintenance. Such changes have been identified both within the EU and the UN, but it seems too early to suggest that the norm is guiding the day-to-day work of these organizations. A gap has been identified between the rhetorical support, on the one hand and the organizational support and supportive practices on the other, due to time lag, organizational inertia and lack of genuine political support.

Whether or not this lack of complete congruence will limit the ability to translate the norm into practice is debatable. Since the idea of conflict prevention reemerged on the international agenda in the aftermath of the Cold War, preventive efforts have been undertaken by the UN, the EU and other international organizations, individually or collectively to prevent the outbreak, escalation and relapse of violent conflicts. In parallel with the emerging norm, an emerging practice is developing. Considering the mutual constitution of norms and practices, one could expect the two processes to reinforce each other. Chapter Nine will provide an empirical illustration of preventive peacekeeping, by analyzing the UNPREDEP mission to Macedonia.
CHAPTER NINE

PRACTICES AND NORMS AS MUTUALLY CONSTITUTIVE

The imperative of conflict prevention goes beyond creating a culture, establishing mechanism or summoning political will…. The time has come to translate the rhetoric of conflict prevention into action.

Kofi Annan

As practices and norms are perceived as mutually constitutive, this chapter explores whether, and if so how, changes in practice can contribute to spur norm evolution. Practices do not simply echo norms—they may form norms. If an emerging norm can be translated into action, it is more likely to become adopted and institutionalized into the normative context, and thereby induce a pattern of practice. Norm entrepreneurs attempt to demonstrate the viability and potential of the emergent norm by taking certain actions, and by establishing a novel practice.

The ambition of this chapter is to explore how Sweden utilized the unprecedented preventive peacekeeping mission United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to invigorate the evolution of a norm pertaining to conflict prevention. This chapter starts by analyzing first the UN’s ambition to engage more proactively in conflict situations, and second its potential implications for the normative context, in which efforts to maintain international peace and security take place.

The Mutual Constitution of Practice and Norm

Many definitions relate norms to common practices, as previously discussed. Common practice, however, does not necessarily mean practice of all states in the international community, as some states may not or cannot have a practice
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on certain issues (Tunkin 1974: 115). Keck and Sikkink (1998: 35) conclude that “norms and practices are mutually constitutive—norms have power in, and because of, what people do”. Practice is frequently defined as “doing something repeatedly” (ibid.). The element of repetitive action is often stressed as crucial to the formation of an international norm. Furthermore, it is easy to imagine norms that induce practices, so automatically that over time they gain a taken-for-granted status (Tunkin 1974: 113-116; Keck and Sikkink 1998: 35). These norms are considered settled norms, as they will induce patterns of practice. This general point about the relationship between norms and practice is illustrated by the principle of sovereignty, and the longstanding practice of the international community of not intervening in the internal affairs of sovereign states. This common practice has over the years reinforced the shared norm of sovereignty.

However, routinized practice and shared norms may become questioned, and actors may contemplate new practices particularly in response to a phenomenon perceived as new or urgent. The new wars that emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War, such as the break up of Yugoslavia provided an incentive to rethink the practice of non-intervention, and to reinterpret the norm underpinning these practices. The need to prevent and limit intrastate violence and to settle disputes peacefully presupposes the normative force that may guide state actions.

While accepting the well-established link between practices and norms, it is possible that constant repetition of the same act may fail to create a norm of conduct. One could also assume, that norms may be created as a result of only one precedent, although this may be a rare exception (Tunkin 1974: 13-15). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 915) argue that norms are clearly more persuasive if grounded in precedent. Self-conscious and self-reflecting norm entrepreneurs with a normative awareness may attempt to establish a precedent to promote a particular norm. Without these norm entrepreneurs, normative changes and changes in practices are less likely to occur.

The present study stresses that norms not only identify what appropriate behavior actually is, but may identify notions of what appropriate behavior ought to be (Bernstein 2000: 464-512). What appropriate behavior ought to be in the contemporary international community is prescribed in the emerging norm pertaining to conflict prevention. Promoted as a remedy for new wars, the emerging norm prescribes the international community’s right and duty to undertake preventive efforts if the parties to a conflict fail to meet the obligation to peacefully settle their dispute prior to the outbreak of violence. This creates expectations, particularly of the international community to
undertake preventive measures when new wars challenge international peace and security. If it is possible to demonstrate the norm in a precedent, it may reinforce the norm. To this end, norm entrepreneurs may attempt to undertake activities to establish new practices.

Translating Conflict Prevention into Action

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a rapid transformation of the practice of peacekeeping in order to deal with the new wars (Chopra and Weiss 1996: 507-535). Karin Aggestam (2001: 59) illustrates how peacekeeping is a “context-dependent and transformative phenomenon” and how it has adapted to the changing characteristics of conflict. The involvement of the international community in the former Yugoslavia has made that part of the Balkans a proving ground for new approaches to conflict management. The UN’s response to the conflicts in former Yugoslavia reflects two conceptual and substantive changes in UN peacekeeping practices: one towards multifunctional and multidimensional peacekeeping, and one in the direction of proactive peacekeeping, which is the focus here. There have been attempts to take a proactive, rather than a reactive, approach to conflict management in the Balkans and beyond. Some preventive efforts have been more successful, some less. One case, often held up as a model of post-Cold War preventive action, is the United Nations’ preventive peacekeeping mission to Macedonia. This proactive UN mission will be discussed, and its potential implication on the normative environment of the UN explored.

Prevention at the Core of the Mandate

The risk of a wider Balkan war led the UN Security Council to authorize the extension of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in a radically new direction—the deployment of a precedent-setting force in Macedonia in 1992—transforming UN peacekeeping practices. Security Council Resolution 795 of 11 December 1992 established the UNPROFOR’s Macedonia Command, with a clearly preventive mandate.

Several factors contributed to the establishment of the mission. A general fear that the Yugoslavian war might spread to Macedonia contributed to raising this issue to the top of the international political agenda. The UN involvement grew out of an initiative by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), which was deeply concerned about the potential
for the horizontal escalation of the conflict. However, perhaps the most important reason for considering deploying a mission to Macedonia was a request from the President of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, for the deployment of UN observers. Gligorov was concerned about the possible impact of fighting elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia on Macedonia’s security and stability. In response to this request, the Secretary-General dispatched a fact-finding mission composed of military observers, policemen and civilians to prepare a report on the situation (S/24952). The report resulted in a recommendation from the Secretary-General to the Security Council to accept the request by President Gligorov and authorize a preventive peacekeeping mission (Björkdahl 1999: 59-61).

The mission was given the following mandate. It was to establish a presence on the Macedonian side of the republic’s borders, primarily with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania to monitor and report any developments in the border areas that could undermine confidence in and stability of Macedonia or threaten its territory. Furthermore, it was to deter by its presence threats from any source, as well as help prevent clashes, thus helping to strengthen security and confidence in Macedonia (S/RES/795).

The innovative preventive aspect of peacekeeping can be traced back to An Agenda for Peace, where it is conceptualized as follows:

The time has come for warranting preventive deployment, which could take place in a variety of instances and ways. For example, in condition of national crisis there could be preventive deployment at the request of the government or all parties concerned, or with their consent; in inter-state disputes such deployment could take place when two countries feel that a United Nations Presence on both sides of their border can discourage hostilities; furthermore, preventive deployment could take place when a country feels threatened and requests the deployment of an appropriate United Nations presence along its side of the border alone.

Inherent in the definition was the United Nations’ need to carefully balance the guiding norms of the UN as formulated by the General Assembly in 1991 (annexed to A/RES/46/182). Those guidelines stressed three sets of norms: those of humanity, neutrality and impartiality in the provision of aid; those of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in accordance with the UN Charter; and those requiring the consent of the affected country and, in principle, based on an appeal by that state. However, by allowing for deployment on only one side of the border, and at the request of only one party, An Agenda for Peace made a remarkable conceptual leap. The UN was now
prepared to cast aside the requirement of consent of both parties, if the Security Council requested it to. Within months after the idea was presented, it was moved from the realm of ideas to the field of action by the preventive deployment of troops to Macedonia.

By Security Council resolution 983 of 31 March 1995, UNPROFOR’s FYROM Command was replaced by UNPREDEP, with an identical mandate, responsibility, and composition as that of its predecessor. Since March 1995 the mission was extended on several occasions. The Macedonian government supported the extension of the mandate, claiming that the reasons that had led to its establishment continued to exist. The government expressed a wish that the mandate should continue until three conditions were met: first, mutual recognition and normalization of relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the commencement of negotiations on the demarcation of the border between the two states; second, the full implementation of the peace agreement in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including its arms control and confidence-building measures; third, the attainment of sufficient national indigenous defensive capabilities. The Secretary-General and the Security Council shared the view that the continuation of the UNPREDEP mission was an important contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. Strongly in favor of extending the mission, Sweden, then a member of the Security Council, argued along the same lines, i.e. that this mission was important for stability in the region. Turbulence in Albania it was argued, and the current conflict in Kosovo could destabilize Macedonia, particularly if there was an inflow of Albanian refugees upsetting the fragile ethnic balance in Macedonia (Lidén S/PV.3868). From a Swedish perspective this motivated an extension of the mandate (Björkdahl 1999: 62).

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An Opportunity for a Norm Entrepreneur

In the absence of a standing UN peacekeeping force, the Secretary-General must ask member states to contribute troops. An informal request directed to the Swedish government on 15 December 1992 by the Secretary-General’s military advisor, Canadian Lt. Gen. Maurice Baril, was accepted. At the Nordic Foreign Ministers’ meeting the same day in Stockholm, it was agreed that the Nordic countries should establish a composite battalion to serve in Macedonia, named NORDBAT. Following the favorable decision by the Nordic Foreign Ministers, the UN made a formal request on 23 December 1992 for the assistance of the Nordic countries, which was accepted on 7 January 1993 (press release 930107).
NORDBAT included contingents from Finland, Norway and Sweden and was set up with a joint command structure. Subsequently, in early 1993 the FYROM Command of the UNPROFOR was established with two-thirds of its personnel provided by the Nordic countries. Contributing to the rapid deployment was the long Nordic experience in UN peacekeeping operations, the history of close collaboration between the Nordic states, the infrastructure of coordination offered by NordSamFN, as well as the practical advantage that the Nordic states already had troops in UNPROFOR (Björkdahl 1999: 61). Furthermore, the Nordic governments had agreed, through their national legislation, to place a certain number of troops—about 8,600 in all—at the UN’s disposal at any one time (Archer 1994: 371). The joint Nordic Battalion was significant, as it was the first time the Nordic countries had provided a unified battalion for a UN peacekeeping operation (NordSamFN 1993). The Nordic battalion took over from the Canadian company of about 150 soldiers that had been deployed on an interim basis since 7 January, awaiting the arrival of the joint Nordic battalion. A reconnaissance mission of senior Nordic officers led by the newly appointed Danish commander of UNPROFOR in Macedonia, Brig. Gen. Finn Saermark-Thomsen, visited Macedonia in early January to prepare for the deployment of the Nordic Battalion. The advance party of NORDBAT arrived in Skopje on 4 February, and by 13-15 February 1993 most of the Nordic troops had arrived in Skopje and NORDBAT was operational by 19 February (Archer 1994: 370; Williams 2000: 50-52). Once in Macedonia, the battalion was deployed along the northern border with Serbia and along the Western frontier with Albania. In 1994, Denmark, Norway and Sweden formed a Scandinavian company (SCANCOY) composed of troops from each of the countries, and it became a part of NORDBAT.

Superpower Support

While consistently withholding ground troops from Bosnia, the US regarded sending troops to Macedonia as a way of engaging actively in the Balkans at an acceptable cost and risk, and at the same time deflecting criticism over the refusal to provide troops in Bosnia (Williams 2000: 53-55; Lund 2000: 193). The USA’s vague peacekeeping doctrine that emerged at this time held that American troops should be deployed only where they could make a difference, and Macedonia was perceived as such a case (Lund 2000: 193). In mid-1993,
although not requested by the Secretary-General, the United States decided to deploy just over 300 troops to the mission (Lund 2000: 192). The Nordic battalion had already reached the size of the mandated number of seven hundred soldiers, which was perceived to be “sufficient” to implement the mandate. Secretary of State Warren Christopher made the announcement on US participation in the UN mission during a NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Athens on 11 June 1993. In his statement, Christopher stated that US troops would fulfill a deterrent and symbolic function (Ackermann and Pala 1996: 91). The Macedonian government strongly favored the deployment of US troops, as it might hasten US diplomatic recognition of the country, and increase the military deterrence and credibility of the operation (Williams 2000: 54).

On 18 June 1993, the Security Council authorized the deployment of US troops and the expansion of the UNPROFOR forces in Macedonia, adding a new dimension to the peacekeeping operation (S/RES/842). Shortly after, on 12 July, the first US contingent, the 502d Infantry Regiment, arrived from Berlin. Macedonia was the first place in the former Yugoslavia where the United States deployed ground troops, and it is unique as this was the first time a major contingent of US soldiers participated in UN peacekeeping activities under a UN commander (Ackermann and Pala 1996: 91; Williams 2000: 55). The US troops were deployed on the northeastern section of the Macedonian-Serbian border, particularly the border with Kosovo, assuming responsibility for two observation posts, previously manned by Swedish peacekeepers. The main body of the US contingent was, however, kept as a reserve unit at “Camp Able Sentry” in Petrovec, from where US troops undertook joint assignments with the Nordic battalion along the border (Williams 2000: 56). In contrast to the Nordic troops, the US soldiers had limited, or no, peacekeeping experience. The US battalion was an active duty combat unit and had more training for combat than for peacekeeping. The Nordic battalion assisted in training them in peacekeeping methods, patrolling techniques etc. (ibid.).

The presence of US troops was a mixed blessing. On the one hand, the American forces added to the credibility of the symbolic deterrent element implicit in the mandate. On the other hand, the distinctive combat capabilities of the US troops could be perceived as provocative, potentially undermining the international character of the operation, which gave it legitimacy. In this high-profile mission, they were asked to play a largely passive role in an exercise of international diplomacy (Gow 1997: 118-127).
The motivation for the deployment of preventive peacekeepers to Macedonia was initially justified as containing spillover from the Bosnian war in the form of aggression from Serbia or a Kosovo explosion. Over time, it became evident that instabilities were as likely to stem from internal political and economic developments, such as raising tensions in ethnic-Macedonian and ethnic-Albanian relations, as from external threat from neighboring countries (Ginifer and Eide 1997: 21). The uneasy co-existence between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians only just withstood the violent break-up of Yugoslavia and the continued instability in Kosovo. As interethnic relations continued to deteriorate throughout the 1990s, there was a need to transform the tasks of UNPREDEP, and its civilian mandate grew (Ginifer and Eide 1996: 17-21).

Disconnecting UNPREDEP in 1995 from the operational complexity of UNPROFOR, and elevating its political level gave new impetus to its relations with the host country (S/RES/983). As with the border threats, the UN mission provided deterrence and violence avoidance, but now for domestic relations. First, the presence of international military force provided the basic underpinning of public security that may have discouraged domestic efforts to subvert domestic politics by covert force. The mission also allayed the insecurities of the ethnic communities by providing a neutral police function. Second, the international presence helped keep potentially inflammatory political tensions from triggering violence, by providing quick and accurate public information refuting rumors, and immediate and direct contact with the government and other parties (Lund 2000: 198-199). The good offices’ mandate provided the flexibility needed for undertaking preventive measures in these areas and UNPREDEP became an important mechanism for encouraging dialogue, restraint and compromise between the different elements of Macedonian society (Sokalski 1997: 37-45). Yet the ability of the UN mission to ease interethnic tensions had its limits. Its leverage depended largely on the consent of the Macedonian government, and at times, the government resisted uncomfortable levels of pressure on the ground that certain issues were internal matters. As the mission progressed, Lund (2000: 173-208) found that the operation changed from containment to nation building. The role of UNPREDEP was transformed into an “internal mediative, peace-building/ development role, rather than a defensive hedge against spillover effects from neighboring states” (Ginifer and Eide 1996: 18).
The Breakdown of Consensus

The consensus in the Security Council on the importance of the preventive mission to Macedonia’s security situation was eroded when China suddenly refused to allow the continuation of UNPREDEP because Macedonia recognized Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the country in exchange for foreign investments. By vetoing the renewal of UNPREDEP’s mandate, China ended the mission on 28 February 1999 (SC/6648). This coincided with the start of the Serbian offensive in Kosovo’s southern border area on 26 February, promoting an influx of refugees into Macedonia. Non-renewal of UNPREDEP’s mandate thus created a security and protection vacuum until the establishment of KFOR in Kosovo provided an element of extended deterrence (Björkdahl 1999: 62).

Evaluations of the UNPREDEP mission indicate the contribution by the mission to strengthen peace and stability in the region (Ackermann 1996: 409-424; Björkdahl 1999: 62). The Macedonian Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski concluded that “UNPREDEP…has been a very successful operation, and we hope this will serve as a model for many future activities of the United Nations” (cited in Williams 2000: 179). Needless to say, defining successful preventive effort is highly problematic, and it has become a truism to state that one of the problems of conflict prevention is to assess its success. If violence does not break out, how can you show that this was the result of successful conflict prevention initiatives? If it were possible to establish such a link, must the preventive effort then stand some test of time to demonstrate permanence in order to be considered successful? That of course raise the question of exactly when do we conclude definitely that a violent conflict is no longer a threat? This is impossible, because the prospect of failure may lie just around the corner. Despite difficulties proving the “preventive effect” of the UN mission to Macedonian, the mission has been widely considered a successful case of conflict prevention (Ackermann 1996; Ackermann and Pala 1996; Clement 1997; Greco 1999: 70-89). I hold that the notion of success is inherently relative, and whether the presence of some thousand UN peacekeepers in Macedonia actually prevented the horizontal escalation of the Yugoslav war is difficult to affirm, and it is not the focus of this chapter. However, the fact that conflict prevention could be put into action made this preventive mission worth exploring.
Preventive Peacekeeping: Change or Continuity?

In a historical overview of UN peacekeeping operations, Allen James (1996: 19) concludes that peacekeeping always has implied that the peace needs to be kept, that there is a danger of its collapse. Consequently, James considers the prime task of peacekeepers to be preventing a breakdown of peace from happening. A similar view is taken by Adam Roberts (1996: 311), who states that UN peacekeeping operations have “an impressive record of achievement” in preventing local conflicts from spilling over into regional or superpower conflicts. The UN report entitled “Prevention of Armed Conflict” also stresses that all peacekeeping operations have a preventive function. However, it continues by clarifying that “their preventive role has been particularly clear where they have been deployed before the beginning of an armed internal or international conflict” (A/55/977). Overall, this reasoning indicates that the preventive element has always been present in guiding peacekeeping operations.

The Evolution of Peacekeeping Practices

Peacekeeping, however, is a transformative phenomenon, which has evolved over time. Traditional so-called first-generation peacekeeping, which calls for interposition of a lightly armed force after a truce has been reached to monitor a cease-fire, troop withdrawal or buffer zone, with the consent of the parties concerned demonstrates this post-conflict approach. This is illustrated by the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), organized in November 1956 to contain the Suez Crisis, by overseeing the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces from the Sinai and monitoring the buffer zone between Israel and Egypt. Other examples of this type of traditional peacekeeping deployed after a conflict are the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) established in 1964, and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) created in 1978 (Ackermann and Pala 1996: 85-86).

Taking a substantial step beyond traditional first-generation peacekeeping, the second-generation multifunctional peacekeeping operations perform the traditional peacekeeping duties, and, in addition, the peacekeepers are often engaged in police and civilian tasks, the goal of which is to implement a long-term settlement. Here, the UN serves as a peacemaker facilitating the negotiation and implementation of a peace treaty; as a peacekeeper monitoring the cantonment and demobilization of military forces; and as a peacebuilder organizing the implementation of human rights, national democratic elections
etc (Doyle 2001: 529-554). Multifunctional peacekeeping has “a commendable record of success” in Namibia—United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), El Salvador—United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and Cambodia—United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), according to Michael Doyle (2001: 533). These tasks and objectives demonstrate that peacekeepers are deployed after a truce or a peace agreement has been signed.

Third-generation operations extend from low-level military involvement to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance, to the enforcement of ceasefire, management of violence and, when necessary, rebuilding so-called failed states. The defining characteristic is the lack of consent by the parties. Missions undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are for example, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) to disarm the warring factions, and the UNPROFOR mission to former Yugoslavia mandated to protect safe areas and humanitarian convoys (Roberts 1996: 297-317; Doyle 2001: 529-554). Clearly, UN peacekeeping is a transformative and context dependent phenomenon adapting to changing circumstances and conditions.

Preventive Peacekeeping—An Innovation

Against this evolution of UN peacekeeping, this chapter argues that although conflict prevention has traditionally been the objective of UN peace missions, prevention has not been the core of first- or second-generation peacekeeping, as peacekeepers frequently have been deployed post-conflict to monitor cease-fires, peace agreements etc. Neither has prevention of the outbreak of violence been the main objective of the recent third-generation peacekeeping operations deployed in the midst of conflict in order to manage the conflict. Stephen Ryan (1998: 67) argues that preventive peacekeeping is an underdeveloped area for the UN and for other international organizations. Yet preventive peacekeeping can be distinguished from traditional peacekeeping, because the former tries to stop destructive conflicts from occurring, while the latter responds after destructive violence is underway. Alice Ackermann and Antonio Pala (1996: 88) recognize the deliberate preventive efforts of the UN through measures such as preventive deployment, and characterize the UNPREDEP mission as “a revolutionary innovation but also a necessity”. The UN Secretary-General and the Security Council “broach the virgin territory of preventive peacekeeping”, according to James Gow (1997: 119).
Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1999: 134) also notes with reference to Macedonia that “…for the first time ever in the United Nations history, military units have been deployed as a measure of preventive diplomacy”. UNPREDEP can be regarded as the first preventive operation, meaning “that it was the first, which aimed at preventing a first round of fighting” (Williams 2000: 5). UNPREDEP is an unprecedented mission and a testing ground for the practice of conflict prevention proving the feasibility and efficiency of preventive action.

This chapter identifies six dimensions that distinguish the preventive peacekeeping mission to Macedonia from other types of peacekeeping operations. First, absence of political will has long been the major obstacle to taking responsibility for global peace and security. In the case of Macedonia, however, the Security Council reached a consensus on the need to undertake conflict prevention measures, overcoming the obstacle of having to pay the costs of prevention in the present, while perhaps benefiting from it in the distant future. As the members of the Security Council maintained the necessary political resolve, a rapid and efficient decision could be reached to deploy preventive peacekeepers to Macedonia in 1992.

Second, timing is obviously an important aspect in peacekeeping (Aggestam 2001: 58). It is even more so in preventive peacekeeping. Too often the United Nations has deployed peacekeepers in the midst of conflict, or traditional blue helmets after a conflict. In Macedonia, troops were rapidly deployed on the ground prior to the outbreak of violence. Ackermann and Pala (1996: 90) found that the rapid deployment reflected “the critical importance the international community was beginning to place on conflict prevention”. According to Ettore Greco (1999: 70) this is a key element in the success of UNPREDEP.

Third, consent and support of the host country is crucial (Roberts 1996: 302). Similarly to traditional peacekeeping, the deployment of the mission was based on the consent of the Macedonian government, as sovereignty remains a central pillar of the international system. However, it was deployed at the request of only one of the parties, and only on one side of the newly internationally recognized international border (Former Republic of Yugoslavia had not yet recognized Macedonia as an independent state), which makes it significantly different from previous peacekeeping operations.

Fourth, the mandate of UNPREDEP explicitly highlighted the preventive objective of the mission, making conflict prevention the core of the mandate and this is clearly different from mandates guiding other peacekeeping operations. In addition, it was a straightforward mandate and realistic in
scope, yet general enough to allow for diversified actions (Sokalski 1997: 38). Initially, it was deployed for the purpose of serving as buffers, which has been a traditional task for peacekeepers (Berdal 1993: 3). However, the mission was deployed prior to the outbreak of violence as deterrence, rather than to maintain a peace agreement or a cease fire. Over time however, it comprised both a trip-wire function along the border similar to traditional peacekeeping, and a nation-building function to deal with internal tension between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, a nation building function that is often a characteristic of multifunctional peacekeeping (Lund 2000: 173-208).

Fifth, the mission had an integrated preventive strategy comprising military, political, economic and humanitarian measures. According to Sokalski (1997: 38-47), UNPREDEP was given a prerogative to apply a comprehensive approach including a number of techniques to prevent external as well as internal threats to the stability of Macedonia.

Sixth, the composition of the force in UNPREDEP—Nordic and US peacekeepers—reflected “an ideal” mixture of old and new peacekeeping practices (Williams 2000: 182). Most of the Nordic states have a long tradition of contributing troops to UN peacekeeping missions and are experienced peacekeepers. On the other hand, the US battalion, for the first time serving under UN command, was trained in combat, and managed to send a strong deterring message to potential intruders (Williams 2000: 55). Concluding his analysis of the UNPREDEP mission, Abiodun Williams (2000: 61, 179) writes: “UNPREDEP was a major departure in UN peacekeeping…enabling the UN to break new ground in international peacekeeping”.

A Novel Model to be Copied?

UNPREDEP was a unique preventive peacekeeping operation. For the first time since the UN was founded in 1945, its peacekeeping forces were deployed before the outbreak of violent conflict (Williams 2000: 61). Lund (1996b: 381) concluded that it was the UN’s “only preventive peacekeeping mission to a place where no war has occurred in recent decades”. Preventive force deployment like any other practice is not separated from the normative context, but informed and supported by the normative framework. Despite the fact that UNPREDEP was the UN’s first-ever preventive peacekeeping mission, it was not “a leap in the doctrinal dark” to cite Williams (2000: 41). It was guided by pre-existing peacekeeping practices, established principles of
From Idea to Norm—Promoting Conflict Prevention

traditional peacekeeping and by the idea of preventive deployment, as set out in *An Agenda for Peace*. As the first preventive peacekeeping mission ever conducted, it was a test case of the UN’s role in conflict prevention. The precedent set by UNPREDEP has not, however, been quickly followed.

Despite its success, this model of conflict prevention practices in Macedonia, has not been succeeded by similar preventive peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, the UN identifies two additional preventive peacekeeping missions following in the footsteps of UNPREDEP: The United Nations Mission in the Central Africa Republic (MINURCA), and a succession of UN operations in Haiti (A/55/985-S/2001/574). Although these operations share some of the features of UNPREDEP, neither had an explicit preventive mandate (S/RES/841; S/RES/1159).

The UNPREDEP mission to Macedonia is unique, and so were the conditions and circumstances for its deployment. First, the establishment of UNPROFOR Macedonia, later UNPREDEP, came as part of a larger package of attempts to cope with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Second, long before the mission to Macedonia was established the international community had chosen to recognize the former republic of Macedonia as a sovereign state, thus setting the scene for future developments. Although Macedonia’s independence was the outcome of what, in the first place, was an internal conflict within what used to be Yugoslavia, recognition made an interstate approach to conflict prevention possible. Third, Macedonia had for some time managed to stay out of the conflict on its own. Fourth, the consent of the Macedonian government to deploy peacekeepers in the border area to prevent external threats was eventually also used to prevent domestic interethnic tension from exacerbating. Fifth, the escalation of violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a close reminder of the failures to prevent violent conflict and a factor conducive for the mobilization of political will. Sixth, the need for a success of UN peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia to balance the failures of international diplomacy in this part of the Balkans facilitated a strong commitment to conflict prevention in Macedonia. Thus, an extraordinarily benign and case-specific situation for preventive deployment existed. Despite these reservations, the preventive peacekeeping mission to Macedonia is still extremely interesting from a preventive perspective. By systematically analyzing the experiences from Macedonia, we can better understand how conflict prevention can move from the realm of ideas to the field of action.

However, a number of challenges face the international community if trying to translate this unique preventive peacekeeping mission into a common practice. The practice of conflict prevention is not merely a challenge to the
traditional *modus operandi*—it challenges the principle of sovereignty. Sovereignty is an issue not only for the actors involved in the conflict, whose consent is frequently required, but also for actors contributing to a preventive mission. Promoting the emerging norm of conflict prevention based on the notion that states in the international community has a duty to respond to an emerging crisis impinges in fundamental ways on state sovereignty, and will therefore be difficult to sell.

An often-mentioned challenge to conflict prevention is the lack of political will to undertake preventive efforts. Governments react better to tragedies that have already occurred than to warnings of tragedies yet to happen. Political decisions are rarely made on the basis of predictions of violent conflicts or chronicles of deaths foretold, and that may simply be human nature. Most governments confronting a potential crisis in a faraway land and feeling obliged to do something about it will opt for the least costly, most revocable action. This is understandable, since the very notion of conflict prevention is not compatible with the nature of most democracies. According to Jonathan Eyal (1996) politicians do not win votes “by claiming to have prevented a conflict which, by definition, never existed because it was prevented”. States, especially democracies, are likely to guard their freedom to debate whether or not to fight. “War is a deadly business”, as Mearsheimer (1994/95: 32) noted, and few states “want to commit themselves in advance to paying huge blood price when their own self-interests are not directly involved”.

Opposition to conflict prevention, however, represents more than devoted protection of the principle of state sovereignty. Rather, it is about the extent to which the international community shares a consensus on values—a culture of prevention. It might be tempting to assert that the breadth of the concept of prevention can accommodate agreement in certain areas while obscuring divisions in others. However, it is the very breadth of prevention that makes many states reluctant to seriously address implementation, for fear of opening a Pandora’s box of ever-expanding activity, one that challenges the values and beliefs on which many states are based.

### Driving Forces Behind Norm Evolution

The evolution of norms is an incremental process that can be spurred by a number of driving forces, such as prominent actors’ efforts to initiate, export or uphold new practices, growing demand to deal with a new or urgent problem, and actors’ cost-benefit calculations.
Social Practice

Social practices have been identified as one of the primary driving forces behind the evolution of international norms. This is true both for “ethical norms” and “non-moral” norms of behavior (Gurowitz 1999: 417). By undertaking certain actions repeatedly, common practice may develop, and a norm of standard behavior can be established. However, norms not only describe what practice is actually undertaken, but also prescribe practices that should be considered appropriate and ought to be undertaken in a particular community under particular circumstances. Hence, the rise of new norms can be understood in terms of pre-existing practices and norms. Although today’s emerging norm of conflict prevention can be traced to a longstanding tradition in international politics, it has not yet been translated into common practices. Most norms emerge as a consequence of regular and repeated practices, and it is unlikely that a norm would arise as a result of only one precedent. This analysis does not imply that the unique preventive mission to Macedonia, deployed under uniquely conducive circumstances, single-handedly created a new norm. Instead, this preventive peacekeeping mission could be regarded as a first step in developing new preventive practices. Regardless of whether new regular common practices will develop, the preventive peacekeeping mission to Macedonia may have contributed to the ongoing incremental norm evolution process.

Practices, however, are not undertaken in a normative vacuum, but are informed by the existing normative context. The normative context of the UN supports preventive deployment of force, as it builds on the traditional UN approach to peace and security—the deployment of peacekeepers. Hence, preventive peacekeeping draws on pre-existing practices, while at the same time it must be considered as an innovation, for reasons pointed out earlier. The fact that preventive peacekeeping is not yet common practice in the UN does not imply that the deployment of peacekeepers in a preventive mission has no impact on the normative environment.

Practices Upheld by Prominent Actors

According to the hegemon-theory of norms, norm dynamics is linked to powerful states. As a result, the impact of new practices will be greater if powerful or prominent actors in a given historical period sustain and uphold them. Axelrod (1986: 1095-1111), for example, argues in favor of powerful
actors, claiming that they will uphold norms through their practices if it serves their interests. In the preventive UN mission in Macedonia, the world’s only remaining superpower, the US, deployed ground troops for the first time in the Balkans. When addressing the General Assembly, President Bush stated that “monitoring and preventive peacekeeping, putting people on the ground before the fighting starts may become especially critical in volatile regions”, strongly supporting preventive peacekeeping (Bush cited in Lund 2000: 191). The participation of the hegemon in UNPREDEP must be perceived as crucial in efforts to establish a new norm, and its participation and support possibly contributed to spurring the norm evolution.

In contrast to the US, Sweden has extensive experience in peacekeeping and has, over the years, gained an international reputation as a peacekeeper. Sweden and the other Nordic states can therefore be regarded as prominent actors in UN peacekeeping, and for that reason their presence in UNPREDEP can be perceived as important to norm evolution. According to Clive Archer (1994: 376), “the Nordic presence in Macedonia does fit into the concept of European security that the Nordic governments have been expounding since the end of the Cold War: they have explicitly called for conflict prevention actions to prevent discord from turning into conflict and then into war”. Hence, the combination of these two different types of prominent actors reflects the influence of actors’ practices on the norm evolution process.

**Cost-Benefit Calculations**

The origins of norms can also be traced to domestic decision-makers’ cost-benefit calculations. If these calculations conclude that the benefits of constructing or adopting new norms, or complying with existing norms outweigh the immediate short-term interest of not doing so, decision-makers will become norm entrepreneurs or norm followers (cf. Keohane 1984). This approach may increase our understanding of both the US and Swedish involvement in the preventive mission in Macedonia. By deploying US troops in the low-risk, low-cost mission to Macedonia, the US government hoped to deflect criticism for lack of involvement in Bosnia. The Nordic countries had already participated in UNPROFOR I and II in Croatia and Bosnia—two high-risk and low-safety missions. Giving priority to safety, Sweden opted for transferring troops from UNPROFOR to UNPREDEP (press release 930107; Björkdahl 1999: 65-67). However, early in 1994 developments in Bosnia meant that the UN forces needed to be reinforced rapidly, and preferably by
troops with peacekeeping experience. The Nordic ministers therefore decided to withdraw a number of their troops from FYROM Command to reinforce the operation in Bosnia. The net effect was that only 100 Swedish troops were left in Macedonia. This was not a reflection of Swedish disenchantment, but a concern with the more pressing problems in Bosnia (Archer 1994: 371). It is therefore possible to conclude that cost-benefit and rational calculations concerning low risks and high safety were not the determining factors for providing troops to the UN mission in Macedonia.

**Exporting Domestic Norms**

Some researchers argue that many international norms begin as domestic norms, and become international through the efforts of agents of various kinds (Kier 1996: 187-215; Lynch 1999: 1). Mechanisms for exporting domestic norms or importing international norms include for example, norm entrepreneurs. Archer (1994: 377) holds that “the main Nordic decision-makers…have tended to externalize some of the values that are features of (though not exclusively to) Nordic political life, such as respect for the rule of law, arbitration of disputes, consensus settlements, the diminution of economic and social differences by social solidarity, and the preference for dealing with the roots of conflict rather than just its manifestation”. There is an argument to be made that the international norm pertaining to conflict prevention began as a domestic norm and became international through the efforts of agents of various kinds. In the case of the Nordic contributions to UNPREDEP, Sweden took the opportunity to export domestic and shared Nordic norms pertaining to the prevention of violent conflict to the Balkans, and used this experience in UNPREDEP in its norm entrepreneurial activities (Björkdahl 1999: 63-69). The mechanism to enable export of norms was the UN peacekeeping mission.

**Demand-Driven**

Demand-driven processes understand the emergence of new norms as responses to demands or real and perceived needs of actors in a larger international context (Goldstein 1989: 32; Rogers 1995: 132; Väyrynen 1999: 135). In light of the increase of violent conflicts world-wide, and the inability of the UN to undertake efficient action to manage these conflicts, as illustrated by the growing crisis in UN peacekeeping, it became obvious that
new solutions were required to maintain international peace and security. The demand for new solutions contributed to stimulate new thinking on peace and security, and the idea of conflict prevention resurfaced. It was perceived as a humane and moral alternative to the costly (and often impossible) multifunctional and multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Against the backdrop of the violent conflicts following the breakup of Yugoslavia, the UN needed a success in the Balkans, and the situation in Macedonia provided a window of opportunity for the UN to be proactive (Archer 1994: 375). By deploying a preventive peacekeeping mission, the UN attempted to demonstrate an ability to actually hinder the outbreak of violence, and at the same time attempt to change the normative context of the organization and thereby replace the organization’s reactive methodology with a preventive mode of operation.

Inasmuch as the UN has undertaken preventive peacekeeping only once—in Macedonia—UNPREDEP illustrates a novelty in UN peacekeeping. The ability to translate conflict prevention into action, prescribing and demonstrating what appropriate practice ought to be, has created expectations that may contribute to the evolution of the emerging norm of preventing violent conflict. Consequently, I have argued that this novel preventive peacekeeping operation, though not yet a common practice, can have been affected by the emerging norm of conflict prevention, and, due to the mutual constitution of norms and practice, can in turn have spurred norm evolution. The explicit preventive mandate of UNPREDEP encouraged Sweden to contribute to the mission (press release 930107). The UNPREDEP engagement was a practical learning experience, strengthening the ambition to contribute to the evolution of a norm pertaining to conflict prevention (Hjelm-Wallén 010905; af Ugglas 010910). The Swedish norm entrepreneur managed to show how the “ought” became the “is”. The viability of the norm of conflict prevention was demonstrated, which in turn can be seen to have contributed to strengthen the Swedish norm entrepreneurial activities. Whether the emerging norm pertaining to conflict prevention is strong (and able to induce future preventive practices to hinder the outbreak, escalation and relapse of violent conflict), or weak (and unable to guide future proactive practices) will be discussed in the next and final chapter of this study.
As the contemporary international normative context is changing, a space has been created for introducing a norm encompassing the prevention of violent conflict. Notably, conflict prevention, as well as other ideas pertaining to peace maintenance are now being put into practice, not simply because of their proven effectiveness as remedies for new wars, but because they have found synergies with the emerging and existing norms. This study has traced the evolution of the norm pertaining to conflict prevention. The focus on a single, and relatively recently prominent idea, shows the incremental process of evolutionary change and the influence of an emerging norm. In brief, this study concludes that an international norm embodying the prevention of violent conflict is evolving and affecting the interests of the international community. Its long-term influence is, however, conditioned by its institutionalization into the infrastructure of international organizations, as only institutionalized norms induce patterns of preventive practices. Although Sweden is only one of the actors promoting conflict prevention, analyzing its efforts has provided insights into a norm entrepreneur’s ability to use the power of persuasive ideas.

In view of this conclusion, three tasks remain in this final chapter. The first section assesses the robustness of the norm pertaining to conflict prevention, and examines the potential implications of the norm for future preventive efforts. In the second section the main contributions of the social constructivist framework are discussed, and the theoretical and empirical findings are summarized. The third section speculates about the future of norms in international relations in general and the norm of conflict prevention in particular.
The Robustness of the Conflict Prevention Norm

The robustness of the conflict prevention norm is related to its evolution over time. After tracing the evolution of this norm since the early 1990s, it is interesting to reflect upon its expanded influence. While accepting the conventional wisdom that institutionalized norms have more influence on practices than do emergent norms, this study demonstrates that even emerging norms have an influence and may guide actions. To discuss how norm influence grows as norms evolve, I will deploy the term robustness, and the four criteria for norm influence introduced in Chapter Three: persuasiveness, durability, feasibility and applicability. This, however, should not be regarded as an attempt to strictly measure the influence of norms. Like any assessment of norm influence, it relies on interpretation.

The emerging conflict prevention norm is persuasive. It is constructed as a remedy for new wars and prescribes appropriate actions to prevent these wars. The general acceptance of the values underpinning the emergent norm of conflict prevention appears to be founded on a common realization that the new wars fail to respect hard-won norms, may negatively affects international peace and security, and, consequently, threaten to undermine the foundation of the international order. The humanitarian imperative inherent in the emergent conflict prevention norm is persuasive, because the ratio of military to civilian casualties in these contemporary wars is approximately 1:8. This means that the ratio has been almost exactly reversed since the beginning of the 20th century (Kaldor 1999: 8). Graphic images on CNN of human suffering in war-torn societies provide an impetus for the moral imperative of conflict prevention. As the emergent norm is concerned with preventing violent conflicts and, thereby, protecting vulnerable civilians and neighboring states from the transboundary effects of conflict spillover, and maintaining peace and stability of the international community, it speaks to a wide audience transcending specific cultural or political contexts. Similarly to the rapid evolution of the norm banning land mines, the emergent norm of conflict prevention, reinforces the suggestion that norms prohibiting the bodily harm of innocent civilians are among the persuasive norms that resonate with a global audience.

The persuasiveness of the emergent norm is both strengthened and weakened by its inherent ambiguity. The vagueness may strengthen the emergent norm because it helps to disguise the normative clash with the settled norm of sovereignty. On the other hand, the ambiguity also leaves room for interpretations that may weaken the norm. For example, some states, protec-
tive of their sovereignty, interpret the emergent norm as intervention in internal matters of states. If the normative clash between the emergent norm of conflict prevention and the settled norm of sovereignty can be mitigated, the emerging norm has an expansive potential, since it is difficult to oppose the moral values inherent in the emerging norm.

The prevention of violent conflict, as an issue of international concern, is a relatively new feature in multilateral forums, such as the UN and the EU. Despite its novelty, the emergent norm is becoming well recognized and is frequently referred to in the international discourse on peace and security. The speed with which the emergent norm of conflict prevention has evolved demonstrates that norms may emerge in rather short periods of time, but the recentness of the norm also implies that it has not yet endured the test of time. In comparison to the norm of sovereignty and the norm abolishing slavery, conflict prevention is a new norm. Yet norms are rarely created de novo, and the idea of preventing wars has a historical genealogy. The notion of preventive thinking is familiar and commonly applied to a number of areas, and many of the values and beliefs inherent in the norm are widely shared. The familiar elements underpinning the norm can be regarded as having long-standing legitimacy, indicating a durability of the notion of conflict prevention, but as a norm it is a recent feature in the international normative context.

Demonstrating the feasibility of the emerging norm by translating it into action seems to have strengthened the interest in conflict prevention. The Swedish contribution of troops to UNPREDEP illustrates the norm entrepreneur’s efforts to translate the emerging norm into a novel peacekeeping practice. Because of its success, this preventive mission to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia between 1992-1999 is frequently referred to as a model for post-Cold War peacekeeping. However, the emerging norm prescribes not only preventive peacekeeping but also a number of broad prescriptions for different preventive activities. Efforts to institutionalize these prescriptions into the infrastructure of international organizations have commenced, but these processes of institutionalization are clearly not completed. This is indicated by failures to replicate the unique UNPREDEP mission and to establish regular preventive peacekeeping practices, and by the lack of a consistency to use additional preventive strategies. In general, failures to meet increased demands and raised expectations of preventive action undermine the robustness of the conflict prevention norm.

The applicability of the emerging norm of conflict prevention, however, seems to make it more robust. The emergent norm applies to a number of actors in the international community, as it prescribes a broad range of
instruments, strategies and tools to be used during almost all phases of the conflict lifecycle. The emergent norm prohibits the use of violence to settle disputes, and prescribes rights and obligations of the parties to a conflict to peacefully solve conflicts and to prevent the outbreak of violence, as well as the international community to assist these parties in conflicts to peacefully solve the dispute and prevent escalation into violence. Hence, it is not only applicable to parties to conflict but to a vast number of actors in the international community. As the norm of conflict prevention, like the norm of human rights, makes universalistic claims, it has great potential to reach a wide norm community.

Attempting to assess international norms is highly problematic. Norms can be long-standing, widely recognized and—at the same time—frequently violated. They may endure, but they may fail to become robust and to have impact on practice.

The growing international attention paid to conflict prevention, the activities of norm entrepreneurs promoting the idea, and the changing international normative context are conducive to the evolution of a norm pertaining to conflict prevention, as are the efforts undertaken to prevent the outbreak, escalation and relapse of conflict. This, however, does not suggest that the norm evolution process has been completed and that the conflict prevention norm is settled. In the European context, the emergent norm can be considered to have reached a tipping point where a majority of the EU member states accept the norm, at least on the rhetorical level, turning it into a collectively held norm shared by the members of the EU. The challenge facing the EU now is to translate the notion of conflict prevention into coherent EU preventive practices. The challenge facing the UN is to establish a strong norm community able to support the recently commenced process of institutionalization. So far, the emergent norm has failed to gain support from a sufficiently strong group among the 189 member states to tip it into a collectively held norm constituting interests and practices.

This study concludes that the process of norm evolution can now be regarded having reached the phase of institutionalization because some efforts have been undertaken to embed the norm of conflict prevention into the infrastructure of the EU and the UN. A normative match with the mandates of these organizations has been constructed, rhetorical support for the norm is growing, and organizational and procedural structures are changing to incorporate conflict prevention into the daily activities of these organizations. At the same time, however, pockets of resistance can be found among member states of both organizations. Reluctant states that, due to their particular
historical experiences are nervous about of their sovereignty, continue to interpret conflict prevention as a threat to the norm of non-intervention in internal affairs of sovereign states. Hence, efforts to persuade reluctant norm followers continue in order to build a strong norm community in support of the emergent norm of conflict prevention. Despite obstacles, such as competing emerging norms in the limited normative space, clashes with established norms, lack of understanding and different interpretations of the emerging norm, conflict prevention is becoming accepted among a widening group of actors in the international community. But norm evolution is an incremental process, and, although a norm may emerge in a surprisingly short time the emergent norm of conflict prevention is not yet a settled norm, institutionalized into the normative context of the UN and the EU and their member states.

A Social Constructivist Account of Norm Evolution

Different theoretical approaches allow us to pose different questions. The questions I have investigated concern interest formation at the level of the international community and its implications for practice. In particular, I have been concerned with exploring the reemergence of the idea of conflict prevention and the growing international interest in preventing violent conflicts. The understanding of how interests are formed in the international community and the emphasis put on international norms inevitably privileged some factors at the expense of others. The intention of this study has not been to prove that the “middle ground” social constructivist account of norm evolution is better than other IR approaches, and the case used in this study has not “proved” that a social constructivist approach to norm evolution is the “correct” one. Rather, this study has demonstrated the utility of the constructivist approach in understanding complicated dynamic processes, and offered an alternative understanding consistent with the findings. Furthermore, the case provides an illustration that has given a provisional indication of the relevance of the analytical framework proposed in this study.

This study has revealed that a social constructivist perspective could assist us in investigating the links between ideas, norms, interests and practices. A distinguishing feature of social constructivism is that it upgrades the influence of norms and they are given independent ontological status, enabling norms to constitute interests and practices. Although rationalist theories of IR may recognize the regulating, and at times enabling effects of norms, but they generally
fail to capture the “constitutive effect” of norms. Consequently, these rationalist theories do not seriously analyze the nature and influence of norms.

Assisted by a structurationist approach, social constructivism is perceived as useful to understanding changes in norms and thereby interests and practices. Its ontological stance of mutual constitution perceives social reality to be reproduced through the interaction of actors and structures. Taking a social constructivist approach as a point of departure, this study advances an analytical framework based on three building blocks derived from the meta-theoretical stance of this study: norm, norm entrepreneur and normative context. This framework can improve our understanding of the evolution of new norms, as it draws attention to the importance of analyzing the interaction between these three components. It demonstrates the crucial role of norm entrepreneurs in the evolutionary process, and can thereby contribute to further our understanding of the relationship between the norm entrepreneur and the norm followers, as well as the normative setting. Applying this insight to the study of international norm evolution is advantageous as it can assist us in understanding how new norms emerge, evolve over time and why certain norms prevail.

On Interests

The increasingly shared interest in the notion of conflict prevention may look odd from conventional perspectives of IR. Yet, some may argue that it can be derived from national self-interests, geo-strategic concerns, and rational cost-benefit calculations or material capabilities. In general, these conventional approaches fail to problematize interest formation, as interests are perceived as exogenous and thus unexplained. The social constructivist turn in IR on the other hand, provides useful insights into this process, and can thereby improve our understanding of the widespread interest in conflict prevention. Social constructivism regards interests to be defined in the context of internationally held norms, hence such a perspective proposes to explore the growing interest in the prevention of violent conflict as a result of an emerging norm pertaining to conflict prevention.

This study has revealed how the idea of conflict prevention has evolved into an unsettled norm since the end of the Cold War. The “constitutive effect” of the emergent norm has been shown in the changed interests of those adopting the norm. This evolutionary process has been closely traced. It has demonstrated how the persuasive idea of conflict prevention has been framed as a norm candidate, diffused and adopted by a group of norm followers to become an intersubjective and collectively held norm within this norm community and thereby constitute the interests of its members.
Like human rights norms, the emergent norm pertaining to conflict prevention does not provide strategic advantages to states. States adopt it not as a means to an end, but as an end in itself. It can be regarded as an affirmation of the kind of peace and security relations states and non-state actors consider “appropriate”. If it evolves into a settled norm, the emergent norm of conflict prevention may constitute the interest of the international community, inducing preventive practices as a means to contribute to maintaining international peace and security.

This study, like the rationalist approaches, criticize could easily fall in the trap of taking its own core concepts as exogenously given. By tracing the process and attempting to outline the genealogy of conflict prevention, I have attempted to say something about how norms are constructed.

**On Practice**

This study demonstrates how norms and practices are mutually constitutive and that this mutualism is present not only between settled norms and practices, but in all phases of norm evolution. It shows that even emerging norms may affect practice, although not patterns of practice, and that practice in turn affects the process of norm evolution. The preventive UN peacekeeping mission to Macedonia has illustrated the dynamic relationship between norms and practices. To some extent this study confirms that norms are clearly powerful because of practices. The norm of sovereignty, for example, is forceful, because it represents intersubjective understandings and expectations that are constantly reinforced by state practices as well as by the practices of non-state actors. In addition, this study also demonstrates that the emerging norm may have affected the deployment of a preventive peacekeeping mission to Macedonia. At the same time, this unique preventive peacekeeping mission can be regarded as having influenced the evolution of the norm of conflict prevention, as the feasibility and potential of the norm of conflict prevention was demonstrated. Although many refer to the preventive peacekeeping mission UNPREDEP as precedent setting, and as a model for the future, it has not yet been translated into a regular preventive peacekeeping practice.

By analyzing the evolution of an already settled norm that is reflected in common practices, researchers could closely trace the process from idea to practice, and in depth analyze norm-induced patterns of practice. A study of an emerging norm will by necessity emphasize the earlier phases of norm evolution, and empirically analyze the rhetoric, discourse, organizational and procedural changes and novel or redefined policies and programs, as patterns of regular or habitual practices may not yet exist.
Regarding actors and structures as mutually constitutive, the framework advanced here can better understand the dynamics of how norms evolve. As actors are brought back in focus, this study avoids a common social constructivist pitfall of overemphasizing structure. The focus on actors can also assist us in analyzing the pivotal role of the norm entrepreneur in selecting, framing, diffusing and institutionalizing the emerging norm of conflict prevention. A structurationist approach was useful in capturing this aspect.

Tracing the process of the Swedish contributions to the development of the norm of conflict prevention has created theoretical and empirical insights. In contrast to much of the social constructivist research, the norm entrepreneur analyzed here is not an individual, a transnational network or advocacy group. By concentrating on a state as the norm entrepreneur, this study shows that there is no reason why constructivist studies on norm advocacy should be classified as an anti-statist approach to the study of international relations, which seems to be the implicit suggestion of much work in this area. Although a state actor is accentuated, this study challenges the realist hegemon theory of norm evolution, as norms clearly do not need to be imposed by the hegemon, or by any of the great powers accompanied by traditional power resources. Instead, the analysis focuses on a small state lacking traditional powers trying to create a niche for itself as a norm entrepreneur to influence international politics. One limitation of this study is that it disregards the use of material capabilities, hard powers and coercive strategies in norm advocacy. Thereby, it falls short of exploring potentially interesting dynamics of combining hard and soft powers to promote norms.

The focus on Sweden demonstrates how the traditional Swedish foreign policy activism, developed during the Cold War, is adapting to the changes of post-Cold War international relations. To promote conflict prevention meant chiefly to dress up old ideas in new rhetoric in an attempt to catch up with the broad international trend of conflict prevention advocacy. It is interesting to explore the influence of advocacy in general, and a small state's vocal support for conflict prevention in particular. The analysis of Sweden demonstrated that a small state's ability to promote norm evolution relies on the power that accompanies compelling ideas. Furthermore, timing is important, and a norm entrepreneur must present the “good” idea when the time is ripe. Moral authority and social skills, combined with persuasive rhetoric, also help convince potential norm followers. In addition, norm entrepreneurs, particularly if
they are small states tend to rely on multilateral organizations, such as the UN and the EU, to provide a setting for norm promotion activities. Occupying formal positions within these structures enhances the opportunities for norm advocacy. Although the Swedish foreign policy elite failed to overcome the structural constraints of the Security Council, Slovenia, succeeding Sweden in the Security Council, managed to mobilize the Council on the issue, which indicates that a small state may affect the dominant powers of the Council. In all, the Swedish Presidency of the EU provided a golden opportunity to formalize conflict prevention by negotiating an EU program on the issue.

This study finds that small states’ influence in international politics depends to a great extent on their ability to access, and maneuver in multilateral settings and to take advantage of the opportunities of formal positions of authority. Sweden’s recent record in the UN concerning conflict prevention demonstrates room for improvements. One general conclusion is that state support for emergent norms is crucial. Without overestimating the influence of Sweden as an international norm entrepreneur, the analysis shows that Sweden has “punched above its weight”, as its advocacy and persistence contributed to the evolution of the norm pertaining to conflict prevention.

Although treating Sweden as if it were a unitary actor, and implying that those who act in the name of the state act according to a common interest, I recognize the problem of attributing unitariness to a corporate entity. Allowing the state “multiple personalities” would probably provide a different understanding. Maintaining that states are crucial actors in some areas, such as the fields of peace and security, the focus on state actors as norm makers and norm takers interacting in intergovernmental organizations neglects the important contributions of non-state actors in the evolution of international norms. This study also fall short of understanding the discourse of conflict prevention as relatively independent of actors, and something that cannot be reduced to the intentions, motivations, interests etc. of those advocating the norm. A postmodernist approach could probably fill this gap, as it does not assume pre-existing actors.

**Mutual Learning through Interaction**

Norm diffusion and socialization is an interactive process involving the norm entrepreneur and the norm followers in a mutual learning process that may, as this study demonstrates, shape and reshape the evolving norm.

Sweden constantly interacted with other states (and non-state actors, though not addressed here) in the UN and the EU taking advantage of formal
positions in order to persuade these other states to adopt the norm candidate and become norm followers. These organizations, and the formal positions within them, clearly provide very different opportunities for norm advocacy, but it is interesting to note that within these organizations where multilateralism thrives, bilateral contacts and interaction in small ad hoc groups of likeminded actors proved crucial for successfully persuading norm takers.

To be recognized as an unbiased, legitimate and trustworthy norm entrepreneur, the Swedish foreign policy elite learned to elevate the emerging norm of conflict prevention from Swedish interests to reflect the interest of the international community. Thereby they could ensure that the mainly unidirectional and argumentative rhetoric resonated with a broad audience—for example, the General Assembly.

Norm advocacy, such as the Swedish promotion of conflict prevention, strives not only for public conformity and rhetorical support, but, more importantly, for norm followers’ private adoption of the emerging norm. The rhetorical support found within the UN may be a sign of public confirmation. One may wonder whether states really intend to adopt the emerging norm or if they are only echoing the buzzword of the moment. Public, rather than private confirmation of an emerging norm may reflect the fact that the norm taker may regard the norm to lack legitimacy, but feel pressured to publicly accept it. Authentic private norm adoption means that the norm will come to constitute the norm taker’s interest and that the norm follower will comply with the norm in the absence of coercion. Norms that are only given rhetorical support and publicly adopted, without private acceptance cannot be considered as collectively held constituting norm taker’s interests.

Adopting an emerging norm means modifying normative convictions, and this is an incremental process demanding consistent advocacy, repetitive efforts of persuasion and mutual learning. Unwavering interaction may, however, lead to a reconstruction of the social relationship between the norm entrepreneur and the norm follower, and a reconstruction of the actors themselves. The focus on interaction and its consequences may contribute to social constructivist analysis of norm formulation and diffusion.

As this study demonstrates, persuasion and learning are facilitated if the norm entrepreneur and the norm followers share the same identity, values and beliefs. The EU can be considered a “thick” international community as the EU member states possess a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions, mutual responsiveness and a mutual identity, to paraphrase Karl Deutsch, which create a sense of “we-ness”. Frequent opportunities to interact, consequently, tend to facilitate norm advocacy as these
opportunities enable the norm entrepreneur and the norm followers to learn to think together, to view the norm in the same light, and eventually, once the norm is collectively held, to act together. Hence, this analysis implicitly supports the claim that interstate interaction can foster as well as reconstruct an existing collective identity depending on the duration, frequency and quality of the interaction. In contrast, the UN must be considered a “thin” international community, since the member states share few common values and no collective identity. The rhetorical support of many member states of the UN may be tactical concession, indicating recognition and public acceptance of the existence of the emergent norm, without necessarily changing their convictions. Hence, “talking the talk”, obviously does not mean they are “walking the walk”.

This attempt to contribute to the understanding of the role of the norm entrepreneur in norm evolution, was undertaken at the expense of a thorough exploration of the norm followers’ internal learning process, response to the persuasion and adoption of the norm. Future research could attempt to better balance the analysis of the norm entrepreneur and the norm followers in a process of norm evolution.

A Normative Match

New norms do not emerge in a vacuum and they should not be scrutinized in isolation, but analyzed in relation to the normative frame of mind of the norm entrepreneur, the normative convictions of the norm taker and the pre-existing normative context. By theorizing how these extant normative frameworks may affect norm evolution and how a normative fit can be constructed, this study attempts to further our understanding of why certain norms prevail and become standard practices, while other do not.

The concept of normative match contributes an understanding of idea takeoff, as it explores how a fit can be constructed between a particular idea and the norm entrepreneur’s normative convictions. The intrinsic characteristics of the idea pertaining to the prevention of violent conflict clearly matched the reconstructed Swedish foreign policy identity as well as the Swedish foreign policy elite’s frame of mind, as it contained a number of familiar and morally persuasive elements.

Furthermore, once the idea was selected by the norm entrepreneur, its familiar elements were framed in a new constellation, and as an antidote to new wars, in order to resonate with a wide audience. A frame was constructed based on the notion that “prevention is better than cure” in order to appeal to
potential norm followers and fit with existing, commonly held values pertaining to the prevention of bodily harm and humanism. The analysis of norm maker-norm taker interaction captures how the norm maker attempts to reconstruct the emergent norm by absorbing criticism and re-framing it in order to construct a normative match with the norm followers’ normative convictions and thereby facilitate adoption. It shows the reconstruction of the emerging norm of conflict prevention to include the potential norm followers’ concerns for instance, about resources to target the root causes of conflict and the fear of intervention in internal affairs. The analysis also shows that to improve the normative fit, reconstruction of the norm also aimed at mitigating norm clashes between the emerging norm pertaining to conflict prevention and the sacred norms and principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. Hence, this study shows that the construction of a normative match between the emerging norm of conflict prevention and the normative conviction of the norm takers facilitated norm adoption.

Emergent norms enter a context where the “appropriateness of behavior” is already defined by existing norms. Those emerging norms that fit coherently with the existing norms and where a normative match with the normative context could be constructed are likely to become institutionalized. The construction of a normative match between the norm of conflict prevention and the international normative context has been facilitated by ongoing normative changes containing implications for conflict prevention. During the 1990’s much greater importance has been accorded to humanitarian norms. The notion that the international community has a right, and even an obligation to prevent violations of humanitarian law, such as war crimes, massive violations of human rights, i.e. crimes against humanity and genocide has become widely accepted. Consequently, sovereignty has in important ways been limited by the existence of an international community. To some extent this has been a consequence of the power of human rights. In this era of globalization, universal human rights have been judged to transcend state borders and weaken sovereignty. Within this supportive normative context, where sovereignty is reinterpreted and humanitarian norms grow stronger, the norm of conflict prevention is evolving.

In the various processes of constructing a normative match the emergent norm is reconstructed to improve the normative fit. Once selected, adopted and institutionalized, it will contribute to reshape these normative structures of the norm entrepreneur, the norm followers and the international organizations in which it may become settled. Exploring the normative “fit” can provide a tentative answer to the question of why certain norms prevail and
become widely accepted practices while others do not. Furthermore, this can also improve our understanding of the mechanisms behind selection, adoption and institutionalization of emerging norms.

**The Future of International Norms**

The claim that international politics involves ideas and norms has been countered by some critique. One objection is that the normative sphere is merely rhetorical camouflage to cover up hard power and dress up narrow self-interests. Thus when state representatives claim to act out of concern for international peace or human rights or the global environment or any other important value, it is only to deceive others and disguise their real intent. From that perspective norms are only convenient to mask ulterior motives and actions in international relations.

This study can be regarded as providing a response to that critique, and to cynicism about the reality, importance and influence of international norms. Norms do matter in international politics. Even war and intervention are expressed in normative language, as the rhetoric surrounding wars consist of frequent references to the profound values at stake such as democracy, freedom, security and survival. The young men that fought in the First World War fought in the name of patriotism and for King and Country. For the Allies in World War II, it was literally a war against evil and they fought in the name of democracy and/or socialism. The UN humanitarian intervention in Somalia under the code-name Operation Restore Hope was motivated by norms of human rights and human security as the resolution 794 spoke of “the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia”.

Something fundamental to international politics is involved when arguing that norms matter. This means that something equally fundamental is lost when ignoring or neglecting the importance of international norms in our study of international politics.

Taking norms seriously this study has demonstrated the emergence and growing influence of a particular norm, namely the norm pertaining to conflict prevention. Conflict prevention is not just a visionary and noble idea. Conflict prevention can be considered as an emergent international norm, moving from the realm of ideas to the field of action.

Thirty-three armed conflicts in 2000, although the lowest recorded in the post-Cold War period indicates that the culture of conflict prevention, called for by the UN Secretary-General, has not yet been established (cf. Wallensteen
and Sollenberg 2001: 629-644). These missed opportunities to prevent outbreaks of violent conflicts indicate that conflict prevention is not a settled norm, because settled norms are defined by their robustness and ability to induce patterns of practice. However, in addition to the preventive peacekeeping mission UNPREDEP, a number of preventive efforts have been undertaken by a growing number of actors since the end of the Cold War. Taken together these seized opportunities to prevent violent conflicts may strengthen the robustness of the norm pertaining to conflict prevention and could be an indication of the evolving norm of conflict prevention and its influence on practice. Whether or not this decrease in the number of armed conflicts is the beginning of a trend and an indication of an emerging international norm pertaining to conflict prevention remains to be seen.
NOTES

1 “The international community” is a complex and contested term in international relations. It has been defined in at least three contradictory ways relevant for this study: in terms of individual persons, in terms of collective “peoples” (largely defined according to identity-based categories of nationality, ethnicity or gender) and in terms of sovereign states. The UN Charter declares that it is accountable to individuals and peoples who have universal rights that are above and beyond the state. At the same time, however, the UN Charter observes that the guiding principle of the “international society” is state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference. The UN is an intergovernmental organization, its membership is limited to states, as only states are members of the General Assembly and the Security Council and states alone determine its policy. This means that any tension over the UN constituency—that is who constitutes “the international community”—has most often been resolved in favor of the states and against individuals and peoples.

2 The term has been used in the literature on sociology of knowledge and has been adapted for use in international relations to refer to a specific community of experts.


4 See for example (Finnemore 1996a) National Interest in International Society, where the author discusses the establishment of the Geneva convention for the conduct of war. See also (Finnemore 1996b) and (Reed and Kaysen et al. 1993). For insights into the key role multilateral norms play in arbitration, mediation and preventing conflict both between the superpowers during the Cold War and in contemporary internal conflicts see (Raymond 1980; Raymond and Kegley 1985; Trachtenberg 1993; Ruggie 1996).

5 This study will, in order to facilitate reading, use the terms norm maker and norm advocate interchangeably with norm entrepreneur.

6 The actual label of social constructivism may not have been attached to any international relations scholar prior to the publishing of Nicholas Onuf’s book The World of Our Making (1989), except perhaps to Anthony Giddens (1979) and his closely related work on the “theory of structuration”. Onuf understands the world to be socially constructed. Alexander Wendt (1999) is one of the most prominent spokespersons for a rather positivist/rationalist interpretation of social constructivism.

7 The first great debate in IR was that of idealism vs. realism in the 1940s, the second was behaviorism vs. traditionalism in the 1950s-1960s and the third is the inter-paradigm debate of the 1980s between liberalism, realism and world system theory and the current debate between what Keohane labeled the rationalist and the reflectivist (1988:379-396).
According to Adler (1997: 327) “Intersubjective meanings are not simply the aggregation of the beliefs of individuals who jointly experience and interpret the world”, they are “embedded in the routines and practices as they are reproduced by interpreters who participate in their production and workings”.

This is reflected in the position of Mearsheimer (1994/95: 13), who states that internationally, “the causes of war and peace are mainly a function of the balance of power”, and ideas, norms and institutions are merely intervening variables. Regime theories demonstrate that norms constrain state behavior and argue that norms are an explanatory variable that intervenes between underlying power distributions and outcomes. Diffusion literature also has a tendency to speak in terms of dependent and independent variables, usually implying that the independent variable “leads to” adoption of the new idea (Rogers 1995: 123).

A dialectical understanding of the relationship between actor and structure can also be found in the work of Roy Bhaskar (1997), Margaret Archer et al. (1998).

George (1979) has delineated two methods to meet this challenge: congruence and process tracing. The congruence approach entails establishing consistency between the content of a particular norm, belief or idea and the content of a policy decision. The consistency is made deductively. If the decision is consistent with the norms held by the actor, there is at least a presumption that the norm may have played a role in the decision-making process.

Norm follower and norm taker will be used interchangeably in the presentation.

According to Florini (1996: 375), the term norm entrepreneur was first used by John Mueller at a conference on “The Emergence of New Norms in Personal and International Behavior” held at UCLA, May 1993.

The term was first recognized by French economist Richard Cantillon who links the risk bearing activities in an economy with those of the entrepreneur (Spengler 1968). Modern use of the term entrepreneur is, however, usually credited to Schumpeter who views the entrepreneur as an innovator in the transformation of economic systems (McDaniel 2000).

The term identity is derived from sociology where it refers to the images of individuality and distinctiveness held and projected by an actor and reconstructed in relations with others. The appropriation of the concept of identity in international relations may seem forced, since states obviously do not have equivalents to “selves”.

The use of the term small in relation to state strength and capacity is debatable. Some scholars have argued that a small state should be small both in size and strength, and the more proper term should perhaps be weak state. Moreover, most international relations scholars use the terminology of small and large states to describe the distribution of power and capabilities in traditional terms, and small states are often considered unable to influence international relations. The concept of small state is not static but changes depending on context, time and issue. A categorization of states could be based on the physical size of a state, population, power and influence. It could also be issue-specific, temporal or relational. Clearly, there are wide disparities among these smaller states – geographical dispersion, economic diversity, distinctive histories and national myths. However, defining small states as being powerless states is misleading because power need not only refer to traditional material powers.

Although this study covers only a short period of time, this circle changes over time. However, as I am not interested in tracing the position of any individual in this circle, the notion is employed
to illustrate that such a circle exists and that its ideas and activities are interesting to study. (cf. Bengtsson 2000: 62).

18 *Conceptual stretching* is a frequent problem in the constructivist literature on norms due to the extensively wide use of the term *norm* (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Florini 1996). For example, the term *norm* is often used even though the phenomenon it refers to is not yet diffused and intersubjective—a crucial characteristic of norms. To avoid conceptual stretching when analyzing norm evolution, a distinction is made here between idea, norm candidate, unsettled norm and settled norm.

19 Stephen Krasner (1988:77) argues that although metaphors cannot be a substitute for analysis, they may be useful when theoretical conceptualizations are weakly developed since metaphors may clarify the underlying logic of an argument.

20 St. Augustine developed some of the restrictions on war, as we still know them today, such as just cause and proper authorization. Thomas Aquinas, a thirteenth century Catholic theologian, believed that reason could help define and establish a just political order, and developed the just war theory still more, but within the framework of the Church. In 1625, the Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, in his treatise *On the Law of War and Peace*, argued in favor of international law to reduce the role of war in the international system (Brown 1994:165). In his renowned booklet *Perpetual Peace* published in 1795, the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant is concerned with the key question of how to move the world away from a reliance on war as a normal instrument of statecraft and toward the ideal of a warless world (Kant 1996).

21 According to the Conflict Data Project of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, there were 111 armed conflicts during the period 1989-2000, in 74 different locations. Of the 111 armed conflicts only seven were interstate conflicts (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001).


23 In addition, there are two terms based on similar ideas as peacekeeping, peacemaking and crisis management that are mainly used in academia. Conflict management refers to activities undertaken with the main objective of preventing the vertical (intensification of violence) or horizontal (territorial spread) escalation of existing conflicts (Lund 1996a: 42). One major weakness of conflict management is that most of the strategies are developed to handle interstate conflicts whereas today the majority of conflicts are intrastate conflicts. The principle of sovereignty has made it difficult for the international community to manage internal conflicts. Conflict resolution is yet another term used in the literature, associated with conflict prevention. Conflict resolution, however, aims at resolving the conflict by targeting the underlying sources of the conflict and by directing attention to the basic needs of the conflicting parties. In short, this concept stresses the possibility to end conflicts if deep-rooted causes of conflicts are addressed.

24 The Independent Commission for Disarmament and Security, named after former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme.

25 For a comprehensive review of various proposals see Brown (1994: 140-161). Brown discusses among others the Quaker missionary William Penn and his plan “Essay Toward the Present and
Future Peace of Europe”, John Beller’s publication “Some Reasons for a European State”, The Saint-Pierre project with a scheme for a supranational state to prevent war, Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn of the Harvard Law school who published “World Peace through World Law”. In addition, he presents the moral philosophical roots of the pacifist tradition in pre-Christian thinking, Christian pacifist ideas and Asian wisdom, moving on to Erasmus of Rotterdam, who claimed that violence was contrary to the essential nature of man, and Gandhi, who tried to fuse Western pacifist tradition with the Buddhist and Hindu philosophies, and concluding with the Norwegian pacifist Johan Galtung’s synthesis, bringing the discussion down to interpersonal, and intergroup relations.

26 Many areas, such as medicine, traffic planning and crime prevention demonstrate an awareness of prevention and indicate that preventive thinking is quite normal.

27 Since the first peacekeeping mission in 1948, more than 80,000 Swedes have participated in UN peacekeeping operations (Skr. 1999/2000:130).

28 The Swedish participation in PfP was decided by the government on the 5th of May 1994, and Sweden signed the framework document attached to the invitation to cooperate sent out by NATO.

29 For an interesting historical overview of the Swedish policy of neutrality see (af Malmborg 2001).

30 See also SOU 2001:96 En rättvisare värld utan fattigdom, in which conflict prevention was one of the strategic issues to be investigated.

31 This Sida Document was referred to as A Strategy for Conflict Prevention and Management in Connection with Humanitarian Aid.

32 Ambassador Lars Jonsson was appointed special investigator on the 22 February 1996, and Senior Administrative Officer Madeleine Andersson was appointed secretary to the investigation from 15 May 1996.

33 Whether these individual state policies are the result of a separate internal process or influenced by certain entrepreneurs will not be explored in this study.

34 See An Agenda for Peace and its supplement. For a historical overview of the term preventive diplomacy coined by the UN’s second Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, see (Hammarskjöld 1960; Urqhart 1972; James 1996; SC/6759; SG/SM/7238)

35 See the Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J1. The Amsterdam Treaty came into force in May 1999. The European Councils at Cologne, Helsinki, San Maria de Feira and Nice added to the EU’s potential in the conflict prevention arena by strengthening the ESDP.


38 See for example Ds 1995:24 Sveriges deltagande i internationella fredsframjande insatser, Ds
The division between structural and direct conflict prevention partly stems from a bureaucratic division within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs between the departments responsible for development co-operation such as department for Global Development (GU) (formerly GC, IC and IH), and the departments oriented towards security issues (European Politics (EP), Global Security (GS), and partly from divisions between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for Defense and Sida.


Outside the constructivist body of literature, other strategies than persuasion have been identified for norm diffusion. Axelrod (1986, 1997), for example, lists identification (the degree to which an actor identifies with the group), authority (the degree to which the norm and its sponsor are seen as legitimate), and social proof (copying prominent actors’ behavior). Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990: 283-315) identify exogenous shocks and exogenous material inducements that lead, over time, to internalization of norms.

The concept of norm community is inspired by Kingdon’s (1995: 117) concept of policy community.

Finnermore and Sikkink (1998: 901) suggest that the critical mass necessary for international norm tipping often comprises one third of the states in the system, although states are not equal when it comes to normative weight.

An interesting example of the joint Nordic approach is the Nordic military cooperation concerning joint training and planning for international missions (NORDCAPS), which was institutionalized in 1998 (regskr 1999/2000:130). NORDCAPS developed in order to strengthen the UN’s capacity for rapid deployment in response to early warning signals. For the same purpose, Sweden, together with Denmark and Norway but also Canada and Austria, established a Multinational Stand-By Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG).

Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Hungary, Jamaica, Japan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Great Britain, and the Under-Secretary-General Kieran Prendergast.

The COREU system is used by the member states and the Commission, but is limited to cooperation on foreign policy matters. It makes it easier for decisions to be taken swiftly in emergencies.

For instance, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs co-hosted an international seminar in September 2000, at the Centre Culturel Suédois in Paris, with the participation of academics and practitioners from several countries as well as from international organizations. The broad aim was to analyze the future role of the EU in conflict prevention.

The Group of Eight met in Miyazaki on 12-13 July 2000, where they agreed on a G8 conflict prevention initiative, and a basic conceptual framework was developed for conflict prevention.

In March 2000, the Secretary-General convened a commission chaired by the former Foreign Minister of Algeria, Lakhdar Brahimi, to review the UN peace and security activities.
Subsidiarity refers to a delegation of responsibility to lower levels of governance so that they are not denied their competencies as long as they are capable of carrying out specific tasks assigned to them. For a further discussion on subsidiarity see (Knight 1996: 31-52).

The framework for Co-ordination on Early Warning includes the DPA, DPKO, OCHA, UNDP and UNHCR (UN official 0105).

According to the Executive Board’s decision, USD150 million was set aside for development in countries in special situations, to be allocated over three years.

Sweden has contributed to financing the UN Staff College Training Program for UN personal in early warning and conflict prevention, as well as the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). Sweden contributed USD300,000 during 1997-1999 to the UN Staff College Training Program, and USD75,000 to the UNITAR (Skr. 2000/01:2).

The Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force in May 1999, and the European Councils at Cologne, Helsinki, San Maria de Feira and Nice added to the EU’s potential in the conflict prevention arena by strengthening the ESDP.

EU Conclusion from the Helsinki Summit 10-11 December 1999. See also The Conclusions of the Cologne summit in June 1999; The Conclusions of Santa Maria de Feira June 2000; The Conclusions from the Nice Summit of 2000. The Report presented to the Nice Council by the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of European Union—Action in the Field of Conflict Prevention, 2000. In addition, there are a considerable number of related key documents such as, for example, The EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms, adopted by the GAC on 26 June 1997.

EUMC is supported by European Union Military Staff (EUMS), which is to perform “early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces” and to implement policies and decisions as directed by the EUMC. It provides an early warning capability. It plans, assesses and makes recommendations regarding the concept of crisis management and the general military strategy. See the Presidency Conclusions at the Nice European Council Annex IV-VI. The PPEWU was established by the Amsterdam Treaty in accordance with Declaration 6 appendix to the Final Act. It is located within the Council Secretariat and under the responsibility of the Council Secretary General (High Representative), charged with monitoring and analyzing international events, assessing current EU policy and suggesting future directions. Furthermore, the unit will provide timely early warning and assessment of potential crises, and produce policy option papers at the request of the Council Presidency or on its own initiative. It is however, difficult to assess the influence and autonomy of the PPEWU in shaping the CFSP.

The idea of setting up a Planning and Early Warning Unit under the common foreign and security policy stems from the belief that if the CFSP is to be effective, it will require earlier and more far-reaching analysis of external developments in the long, medium and short terms. The decisions taken under the CFSP must therefore be underpinned by more reliable briefings, which are available to all the Member States of the Union. Accepted in the Amsterdam Treaty, in an appendix to the Final Act.

Funded by the European Community budget and the European Development Fund. It does not deal with pre-accession aid programs (PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD), humanitarian activities, macro financial assistance, the CFSP or the RRM. The Office is responsible for all phases of the
project cycle: identification and appraisal of programs, preparation of financing decisions, implementation and monitoring, and evaluation of completed programs.

59 20 million euro was allocated to the mechanism in 2001, and 25-30 million euro in 2002 (official at the EU Commission 0112)

60 The CPN network was launched by Director General Günter Burghardt of the European Commission's DG1A in 1997, engaging the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik to manage it in cooperation with European partner institutes and NGOs. See Rummel (1998).

61 The commencement of the Poland and Hungary Aid for Economic Recovery (PHARE) program in 1990 marks the beginning of significant EU cooperation with Central and East European Countries complemented by the program Technical Assistance to the Newly Independent states (TACIS). The MEDA program (a part of the Barcelona process) is the principal financial instrument of the EU for the implementation of the European-Mediterranean Partnership. In 2000 available MEDA funds amounted to 945 million euro. EU cooperation with Asia and Latin America (ALA) was established as a programme of financial and technical cooperation in 1976. A new legal basis was established in 1992 (interview with EU Commission official 0112, see also COM (2001)211).

62 There are however a few excellent studies such as the recent book by Williams 2000; Lund 2000; Ackermann 1996; Archer 1994)

63 Parts of the empirical material published in this chapter have been published in an my article (1999) “Conflict Prevention from a Nordic Perspective: Putting Prevention into Practice”, International Peacekeeping vol. 6, no. 3 1999.

64 ICFY was an ad hoc institution established by the EU and the Secretary-General to facilitate the coordination of peace efforts in the Former Yugoslavia. Initially, it was headed by Lord David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg.

65 See (S/RES/1027); (S/RES/1046); (S/RES/1058); (S/RES/1082); (S/RES/1110); (S/RES/1140); (S/RES/1142); (S/RES/1186).

66 Anders Lidén in a speech at the 3839th meeting of the UN Security Council of 4 December 1997.

67 Danish troops were already committed to UNPROFOR, which is why Denmark could only provide personnel for headquarters staff.

68 NordSamFN consists of the representatives of the respective military authorities in each of the Nordic countries and pools the peacekeeping experience of all the members in manuals, training programs and seminars (Nordic UN Stand-by Forces 1993:10-12)

69 For an in-depth discussion on the complexity of the Macedonian Question see for example,
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