Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan and Tanzania share a past and present as authoritarian states. Dominant parties are in power in Tanzania and Kazakhstan, while elections are competitive but not democratic in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan. Returns for political support (clientelism), and persecution of political adversaries and the electorate (repression), are key components in all four states. This dissertation provides an account of these features, and how and when dynamics of clientelism and repression have changed.

Clientelism and repression are widely used to explain why states transition to a different regime type, suggesting that their presence or absence, degree or form, informs seminal changes.

This dissertation turns such arguments around, instead investigating how changes in regime affect clientelism and repression, allowing an investigation of change within elites, society and the state. It looks at changes in clientelism and repression that did not lead to regime change, and at cases when clientelism and repression continue despite turnovers.

Patterns where a more diverse set of actors than the incumbent are involved in repressive and clientelistic practices are investigated, and sub-concepts are developed in order to speak of these changes in more specific terms.

This is investigated through careful empirical study and field work carried out in all four states. More than 300 people were interviewed during the course of several years. The perspective is historical, from the late Soviet era in Central Asia, and independence in East Africa. It tracks clientelism both within the elites (intra-elite clientelism), and aimed towards the general public (mass-elite clientelism). Changes in repression are also investigated, using an actor-centered approach regarding resources and operation.
Sustaining Authoritarianism
Sustaining Authoritarianism

Clientelism and Repression in Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan and Tanzania

Mia Orange

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Abstract
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Sustaining Authoritarianism

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Faculty of Social Science
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For my family
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Preface and Acknowledgements

Again and again during the process of writing this dissertation, I have found myself alone, only to be welcomed into a warm and supportive community. Most of the fieldwork was done during the years 2009-2012, after which I took a break from academia to raise two children and embark on other professional pursuits. I am immensely grateful to the Department of Political Science for allowing me the opportunity to return to finish the work I once started, and providing support and resources. My supervisors have followed the process through ups and downs, always with encouragement and invaluable comments. Thank you for your time and commitment Jan Teorell of Lund University and Bo Petersson of Malmö University. I would also like to thank Axel Hadenius, who was instrumental during the first year of my studies. Many more have contributed commenting in various stages: Catarina Kinnvall, Anders Uhlin, Kristina Jönsson, Anders Sannerstedt, Klas Nilsson, Mi Lennhag, Anders Persson, Michael Wahman, Christian Goebel, and Staffan I. Lindberg, a sincere thank you for your advice and careful reading.

At the department, community matters a great deal, Jonna Pettersson, Nils Gustafsson, Emma Lund, Ted Svensson, Catia Gregoratti, Ina Möller, Helena W. Lindberg, Niklas Altermark, Sofie Gustafsson, Sara Kalm, Mikael Sundström to mention a few have been great company, I am grateful. Countless more than I can mention have made me feel welcome in the academic community.

Another time when I have found myself alone was when I arrived in Almaty Kazakhstan for the first time. The academics at KIMEP University, who not only welcomed me to the department, but also to dinner, hiking, skating, their homes and the Stalker bar, named after a movie by Tarkovsky. Many journalists and others helped deepen my knowledge of Kazakhstan, over Shashlik and beer in Astana as well as Almaty. Two translators helped me with many of the interviews - thank you Amir Batkovic Ordabayev and Alexandra Shaposhnikova. To my neighbour in Almaty, who would later become my beloved husband and father of our two children, Richard Orange. I’m sure he will be delighted to see me finish this dissertation, so that we can finally get to know each other and talk about something else.

Kazakhstan was without doubt the most challenging of all four states to work in, find interviewees and fully gain insight into the political landscape. Sometimes, not much information emerges from the corridors of power. This is not least illustrated by Nursultan Nazarbayev’s resignation from the presidency after 30 years in power 9 days before this dissertation was sent to print. I feel privileged to know so many insightful journalists and analysts, who could contextualise the
events in real time. This provided an opportunity to include some updates and analysis on the coming Tokayev presidency.

In Kyrgyzstan, I would like to extend my thanks to the American University, where a community of academics were helpful both in reading and commenting, and in practice with my fieldwork.

I want to thank my family. My mum Kikki, who worked in Kenya during my fieldwork, meaning we could live together for the first time in many years. Not only did we have a wonderful time looking at chimpanzees, we could also discuss Kenyan current events. To my dad Ulf, ever the enthusiast, who always believes in my abilities. And my brother Martin, who knows me better than most.

In Kenya, I would also like to thank the numerous personal assistants to MPs, who not only gave up their time to help me secure interviews, but also kept me company during lunch breaks in the cafés around parliament, helping me understand the political culture, jokes and banter.

Unlike the other three states, Tanzania was a return home. I spent much of my childhood in Dar-es-Salaam, and I had the opportunity to meet old and friends, who were also helpful in finding interviewees. One of the loneliest times during my fieldwork was when I fell ill in the capital city of Dodoma, where I had no previous connections. Herman Berege, employee at the parliament in Dodoma took me to hospital when I was unable to care for myself because of Typhoid Fever. When I was discharged from hospital, he brought me to his family home, where I was cared for until I was well enough to leave the city. And my gratitude to friends who looked after me in Dar-es-Salaam.

The people who have been most important to my ability to tell this story are too many to name. Each and every one of the people across two continents who chose to meet me for an interview have influenced the outcome of this work, even those who are not quoted or cited. Many took personal risks in speaking to me, and I cannot express my gratitude enough.
Introduction

Kyrgyzstan, Kenya, Kazakhstan and Tanzania are four states, where politics is guided by repression, the persecution of individuals or groups for political reasons, and clientelism, the proffering of goods for political support. It is inherent to authoritarian regimes\(^1\) that they are repressive. If not, they would not be authoritarian. Clientelism, can be understood as a direct exchange of goods, both within the elites and between elite and mass actors, for support. Dynamics of clientelism and repression change with the type of authoritarianism, both as states move from single-party to multi-party rule, and from one-party dominance to competitive authoritarianism.

This is venture into how the dynamics of clientelism and repression change as regimes shift. It tracks historical changes in the four states, all of which have experienced significant political transformation in our near history yet have remained non-democracies.

I follow the historical trajectory of Tanzania and Kazakhstan, at present dominant party states, and Kyrgyzstan and Kenya, which are competitive authoritarian states, tracking changes in the dynamics of repression and clientelism. The point of departure is that competitiveness is a prerequisite for democracy, but that all competitive states are not democracies. In that sense, there is a strong relationship with the literature on democracy and democratisation. To be more precise, it is an attempt to understand how clientelism and repression changes when states remain autocracies despite regime change. All four states have experienced at least one such shifts during the period studied here, from single party rule (where only one party can run), and dominant party rule (where multi-party elections are held, but a single party wins by a large margin). Kenya and Kyrgyzstan have transitioned to competitive authoritarianism, representing another change between authoritarian categories.

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\(^1\) For the purpose of this study, a regime is understood as a form of government, not any particular government, which is in power. For example, the ousting of Akayev in Kyrgyzstan through the Tulip Revolution in 2005 does not constitute regime change in this definition. The reason is that one dominant leader was replaced by another, while the formal and informal institutions and rules largely remained the same.
The cases studied here are not unusual in their non-democratic outcomes. This is illustrated not least by the current global democratic backsliding, with fewer liberal democracies now than before the year 2000. Tanzania and Kyrgyzstan are such examples, where the end of dominance has not resulted in liberal democracy.

There are several authoritarian regime types, ranging from failed states such as Somalia to stable dictatorships like North Korea. In totalitarian states, the problem of establishing and maintaining order is solved by tyranny, while weak states are persistently failing to institute order. Most authoritarian states are not ruled by repression alone, nor are they failed states without a functioning state, they are electoral autocracies, which hold some form of multi-party-elections.

It is common for leaders to lose power through elections, despite electoral fraud and other democracy shortcomings. Some have been hailed as moves towards democracy such as Mexico in 2000 when the Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI) lost power after reigning sovereign for more than 70 years (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2003; Langston, 2006). Other cases are more ambiguous, where turnovers have led to short lived liberalisation, and a return to autocratic practices. Zambia faced its second turnover from single party rule when the Movement for Multiparty democracy (MMD) candidate Rupiah Banda lost the 2011 election to Michael Sata of the Patriotic Front (PF) (Kennedy Ochieng, 2012; Melber, 2007). Subsequently, Zambia returned to autocracy after Edward Lungo’s ascent to power in 2015. There are numerous cases where dominant party losing power has not had positive outcomes for democracy. Competitive systems where clientelism and repression is rife are autocracies, even when elections are meaningful and can lead to turnovers of power. Although there is evidence to the effect that competitive authoritarian systems are less stable than dominant party systems, there are still a significant number of cases that remain autocracies, despite strong elite groups vying for power.

Electoral autocracies are a large and diverse group of states. Some are dominant party states, where electoral outcomes are predictable, and elites are connected to or part of the state apparatus. A large and growing number of electoral authoritarian states do not fit this description. They are highly competitive and electoral outcomes unforeseeable like in many democracies. Yet, competitive authoritarian states do not follow democratic principles; the playing field is uneven, repression is commonplace and clientelism determines choice.

Clientelism and repression are tools available to political actors in authoritarian states as well as what inherently defines autocracy, as they counteract political

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2 Clientelism is sometimes be used seek legitimacy, either an individual office seeker, a political party, or the state. Rather than create mistrust, both elites and voters expect returns and failing to deliver may reduce legitimacy.
choice. In view of that, it is surprising that there are so few studies on the changes in clientelism and repression and how that can be understood - Are elites clientelistic networks large or small? What actors are involved in repression; the state, parties, or other groups? And how is repression and clientelism financed and executed? Most scholars establish that clientelism and repression exist in states studied and in autocracies in general, some offer theoretical definitions of the concepts while others use them to explain regime change and stability. This study is rare in its aim to further theorise types of clientelism and repression in relation to significant political change.

Many scholars seek to answer why democracy develops in some states but not in others, a question not addressed in this study. More recently, studies focus on why some states face backsliding (Kramer 2018). Explanations for rapid or gradual democratic reform have ranged from the development of a middle class, modernisation and economic development in general to the breakdown of clientelistic networks in single party states (see for example Bellin, 2000; Carothers, 2002; Collier, 1999; Geddes, 1999; Greene, 2007; Huntington, 1991; Magaloni, 2006; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Rustow, 1970; Schumpeter, 1976).

Notwithstanding the recent increase in the number of elections held and the downfall of many autocratic dominant parties through elections or other means, there has been backsliding in a great number of states. Many scholars have in recent years studied the persistence and breakdown of dominant party politics in electoral authoritarian settings (see for example Bogaards, 2008; Greene, 2010; Greene, 2007; Levitsky and Way, 2010b; Lindberg, 2004; Magaloni, 2006; Brownlee 2017; Mechkova, Lührmann, Lindberg, 2017; Schedler 2013). It is well established that single party systems are more stable than other types of autocracy, as there is little incentive for factions within the party to bring down the regime (Geddes, 1999). The focal point of many studies on autocracy is thus what triggers change and how competitive systems comes about. The substantial academic interest hinges on the idea that the breakdown of dominant party rule is significant, in that elites no longer have unhindered access to the state for clientelism. The point in time when dominant parties lose has been an endpoint to some studies, rather than investigating what happens after (Brownlee, 2007a; Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 2006)

Few currently active scholars would argue in favour of a view of transition to democracy in phases or steps in the vein of Rustow (1970) and O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986). Those theories were developed to explain democratisation in the 1970s and 1980s and cannot inform the current with many electoral authoritarian regimes. The criticism of such approaches, which was well
formulated by Carothers (2002) challenges the core assumption that states moving away from dictatorship and other forms of authoritarianism are moving towards democracy. Transformation into other forms of authoritarianism is also a likely outcome turn over in authoritarian settings. This is not least evident in the attention given to such shifts in the literature. For example, Hadenius and Teorell (2007) have developed a dataset, which does not only measure the level of democracy, but also pays attention to movements from one type of authoritarianism to another. Despite the general acceptance of this idea, moves from single party dominance to competitiveness are often viewed as moves towards democracy. The argument sometime comes close to a tautology; the presence of a competition is in itself interpreted as more democratic than dominant party regimes. There are however several states where fierce political competition and electoral autocracy go hand in hand. Two such cases are investigated in this study, Kenya and Kyrgyzstan.

One of the reasons why dominant party breakdown is conceived in this way is that Mexico has received much scholarly attention and has been used as an example when developing theory within the field. When the incumbent lost in Mexico, in 2000 after almost 70 years in power, the shift resulted in increased levels of democracy and the rise of a new party system, where voters had more options when voting (see for example Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 2006). Mexico’s turnover was clearly a seminal event, that does not make Mexico’s transition an illustrative case of such shifts in other contexts. It is therefore essential to qualify the meaning of these turnovers, as authoritarianism often persists.

It would be tempting to understand dominant party states as stable, and competitive authoritarian states as unstable. On the surface, such an analysis may be correct – the ousting of one government in favour of another is more common in competitive authoritarian states than in dominant party systems. That lies in the definition. Yet, both regime types can be stable, in that they remain authoritarian for an extended time with few changes to the rules of the game. In competitive authoritarian states, the incumbent party in power changes more frequently than in dominant party states, that is inherent to the definition. These changes do not entail that a state in moving to a different regime type.

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3 In an earlier contribution, Collier (1999:5f) makes clear that the "transition literature" tends to view democratisation as three distinct steps, and criticizes O’donnell and Schmitter’s path dependant approach to transition.

4 Schedler (2014) contends that even Mexico is facing threats to its democratic institutions due to high levels of violent crime even though it is often viewed as a an example of a successful transition to democracy through elections.
It is arguably so that competitive authoritarianism is developing into a fairly stable regime type. It is often individuals and groups and their connections to spheres of power, not formal politics that take centre stage when determining the outcome of elections. Parties and leaders tend to attempt to remain in power in all systems, be they democratic or authoritarian. One of the fundamental differences between democracies and autocracies can conceptualised as whether politics as such are a matter of public concern or private intrigue.

Politics, in Crick’s (2013, 7) understanding is a way of mitigating different interests, by distributing power in order of their importance to the collective as a whole, thus upholding stability. Politics becomes public, and a matter of concern for society. Cricks ideal type presupposes that order is upheld through conciliating public interest rather than through repression. In fact, Crick (2013, 140) sees totalitarian regimes as “explicitly anti-political”. Crick’s position does not correspond well to a more general understanding of the concept, namely activities related to governance and/or power and as such his conceptualisation may lead to more confusion than clarity. The theoretical model of private elite politics in autocracies vs. public politics in democracies makes clear that authoritarian regimes are difficult to study from an outsider’s perspective. Herein lies the fundamental challenge: to study the politics of elites in electoral autocracies. What happens inside elites, the intrigue, bargaining and conflict of the elites, is private, not public politics.

The antics of political elites sometime meet the public eye in electoral autocracies, played out in the media like a soap opera, the main characters made famous. Exposure should not however be equated with public politics, as the tools at the disposal of elites are not aimed at reconciling public interests. Often, the media is influenced by clientelism or fear of repression. Reports of corruption, slander and other accusations are often highly selective, relaying the message that the regime is accountable and responsible. These displays can be interpreted as seeking legitimacy, and an image of the “good autocrat”. Dukalskis and Gerschewski (2017) argue that authoritarian regimes have a toolbox for legitimacy. Alongside creating political apathy and a sense that resistance to the party state will fail, they argue that the introduction of multi-party elections and the semblance of democratic institutions, however marred, creates the appearance of fairly elected leaders.

I contend that electoral authoritarian regimes are upheld through intra-elite clientelism, exchanges within the elite for support, mass-elite clientelism, where

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5 Autocratic legitimacy may seem an incongruous term, as legitimacy is often equated with democracy and rule of law. Here, it refers to justifying the regime and avoiding protest from the population at large.
goods change hands between mass actors and elites, and repression. Aside from the immediate returns, clientelism can be a way of seeking legitimacy, in that it bestows legitimacy on the patron and creates apathy for political change. Dukalskis and Gerschewski (2017, 258) argue that “responsiveness” (or the appearance of responsiveness) also helps create an image of a legitimate authority that respects the will of the people.” Clientelism can be part of such a process, as it is a method of providing some of the desired goods for a portion of the population.

Clientelism and repression demand access to resources. Clientelistic networks are difficult to uphold without substantial assets, and repression requires force, a way of persecuting or eliminating individuals or groups from acting politically. Conventionally, scholars tend to focus on resources available through the state when studying authoritarianism. Repression is equated with the police, secret services, military and judiciary, ignoring private actors. With regards to clientelism, Greene (2010) shows that dominant parties tend to lose power when privatisation puts state resources out of reach. This creates a puzzle, as elites in competitive authoritarian states cannot be certain that they will be able to obtain means from the state. Nonetheless, authoritarianism remains, which presupposes that elite actors can acquire resources for repression and clientelism elsewhere. From where these resources stem and how they are acquired and distributed is central, as it allows us to understand how competitive authoritarian states remain, despite shifts in government. For this reason, much attention is paid to how repression and clientelism can be privatised, when access to the state is restricted.

Kazakhstan, Tanzania, Kyrgyzstan and Kenya are electoral authoritarian regimes and are investigated in a historical perspective. The years studied vary depending on when regime change took place in each case. In the African cases, independence from Britain is the cut off, while the late Soviet era is studied in Central Asia. Two are currently dominant party states, Kazakhstan and Tanzania. In Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, the former dominant parties have lost its grip on power making way for competitive systems, where several incumbent have lost elections in recent years. All four states share a past of formal single-party rule, followed by the introduction of multi-party competition in the 1990s. For a period, they were all dominant party states, despite legal changes, which allow for multi-party competition. The historical perspective is important as the qualities and dynamics of previous eras is instrumental to understanding how clientelism and repression persists and changes.

Kazakhstan is dominated by a single party, the Nur Otan. In March 2019, president Nursultan Nazarbayev who was the last general secretary of the Soviet Republic resigned from office, handing over the presidency to Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who was selected by Nazarbayev to lead the country until the next
presidential elections scheduled for 2020. In the 2015 presidential elections
Nazarbayev won a staggering 97.7% of the vote. It has been established by local
and international observers that the elections were marred with fraud, and it is
clear that the dominance of the current elite is not under threat in Kazakhstan.

Neighbouring Kyrgyzstan has experienced two “revolutions”\(^6\) in which the
incumbent has been ousted from power through popular protests. The first took
place in 2005, when then president Askar Akayev left office after mass
demonstrations in Bishkek and other cities. The same fate met his successor
Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who was accused of corruption and misconduct and forced
into exile in April 2010. A few months afterwards, ethnic violence broke out in
the south of the country, killing hundreds and displacing thousands of
Kyrgyzstanis of Uzbek decent. After the most recent elections in October 2015,
there are six parties in parliament, with the largest party winning 27% of the vote.
The presidential elections in 2011 and 2017 both lead fairly peaceful turnovers of
power.

While geographically far away, Kenya and Tanzania have much in common
with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan politically. The two states in East Africa share
the dynamic of one dominant authoritarian state and one competitive autocracy.
The same political party has ruled Tanzania since independence\(^7\). Chama cha
Mapinduzi (CCM)\(^8\) won a clear majority in the 2015 parliamentary elections,
winning 259 out of the 350 seats in parliament and CCM’s presidential candidate
John Magufuli defeating opposition candidate Edward Lowassa with 58% of the
vote to Lowassa’s 39%\(^9\). Although CCM does not dominate to the same degree
as Nur Otan in Kazakhstan, it has a firm grip on power and the 2015 elections
show that there is little chance that opposition parties will come to power without
a split in the party or major defection of key players. Since his inauguration
Magufuli, Tanzania has reverted to authoritarian practices, several journalists have

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\(^6\) The term revolution is contested in the Kyrgyz context, as the “Tulip Revolution”, which
occurred in 2005 did not lead to democratic outcomes. As the Tulip Revolution is a well-
established description for those events, it will be used in this thesis. Strictly speaking Akayev’s
ousting from power does not constitute a revolution.

\(^7\) Before 1977, the party was known as Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). The name
CCM was adopted when TANU merged with the Afro-Shirazi Party of Zanzibar.

\(^8\) Party of the Revolution

\(^9\) Edward Lowassa crossed the floor from CCM when the party refused to nominate him are their
presidential candidate, instead selecting relatively unknown former minister of works John
Magufuli. CCM veteran Lowassa, Tanzania’s former Prime Minister, was ousted from the
parties inner circle over corruption allegations, despite enjoying popular support and wealth to
fund an election campaign.
gone missing, radio and TV-stations have been shut down, and opposition politicians have been murdered or arrested.

In Kenya, Kenya African National Union (KANU)\textsuperscript{10} lost the 2002 elections to the National Rainbow Coalition NARC\textsuperscript{11} coalition, which was made up of several opposition parties. They joined forces to oust KANU from power. A short time after NARC’s win, the coalition was dissolved, and new alliances were formed. Ahead of the 2007 elections, which took place before the New Year, two new coalitions had been formed Party of National Unity (PNU) and Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The result of that election was highly contested and both coalitions accused the other of election fraud. Massive post-election violence with ethnic connotations broke out throughout Kenya. The result of the elections was disputed, and a power sharing deal was brokered leaving Kenya with the largest government it had ever seen and a new position that of Prime minister. That post was instated so that Raila Odinga, the losing presidential candidate would have some power in the newly formed government. In the subsequent 2013 elections, Uhuru Kenyatta became Kenya’s fourth president. There were only minor outbreaks of violence during the elections, yet Raila Odinga, who was running against Kenyatta, has accused the Kenyatta camp of electoral fraud. In the subsequent 2017 elections, Kenyatta again defeated Odinga with a slim margin, with repeated fraud allegations. In the runup to the elections a senior official with the electoral commission was murdered, and VP William Ruto’s home was held under siege and a security guard murdered.

**Purpose and Research Questions**

This is a study of change and continuity of repression and clientelism focusing on three eras - single party rule, dominant party rule and competitive authoritarianism. At the heart of the matter is how the dynamics of repression and clientelism have been adapted in the face of political and societal transformation. The four states studied have all undergone immense political change in our near history, yet they have remained autocracies. Some of these changes have been formal and legalistic such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan’s independence from the Soviet Union and Tanzania and Kenya’s introduction of multi-party rule. Other changes have been informal: the make-up and the type of intra-elite networks, the dynamics and scale of mass-elite clientelism, and the modes and extent of

\textsuperscript{10} KANU was in power for almost 40 years between 1963 until its electoral loss in 2002.

\textsuperscript{11} NARC was an alliance of opposition parties that succeeded in ousting KANU from power in 2002.
repression. Like most electoral autocracies, the four states studied are to varying degrees clientelistic and repressive, and the resources and actors involved have changed over time. This study seeks to investigate how and why the characteristics of clientelism, and repression has changed, contingent on political and social circumstances.

It is key that incumbents have failed to uphold dominance in two of the states studied here, as this may provide clues as to how clientelism and repression has changed when access to state resources is restricted for elite actors. A comprehensive answer to why and how dominant party regimes loses power is not the focus. The state of affairs in the four states is examined during distinctly different periods of time. In all four states, dominance persisted for a time despite the introduction of multi-party rule. It is therefore significant to investigate why politics did not become competitive when the formal rules allowed more than one party to register.

The second empirical section is devoted to dominant party rule in the four states. This period is still on going in Kazakhstan and Tanzania. Again, the purpose is to investigate how and why clientelism and repression has changes in the four states. In the third and final empirical section, the time after the dominant parties have lost in Kyrgyzstan and Kenya is examined. Once more, the purpose is comparative. In a careful study, the regime before and after the dominant party lost is examined in order to determine how clientelism and repression has changed. I also investigate in which sense the regimes before and after the dominant party lost differ.

This dissertation builds on a long tradition of research within the field of comparative politics. Although comparisons between different regions are unusual, it is not unique. The contribution of this study is a question of what has changed after dominant parties have lost and in what way the state of affairs in history informs outcomes.

If clientelism is seen as a cause of dominant party persistence, does clientelism disappear or diminish after the dominant parties have lost? If not, what are the new dynamics of clientelism in competitive authoritarian states? Similarly, if repression is seen to uphold dominance, what does it mean if repression remains in a competitive authoritarian setting? How does repression change? These questions may seem simplistic, but beg a much larger theoretical query: can we view clientelism and repression as reasons for regime change if they remain after the dominant party has lost? Looking into how, and if, clientelism and repression changes in three time periods addresses these issues.

The point of departure is that clientelism and repression change with regime change, yet the degree to which they matter may stay the same. I develop theories
on these two concepts to better understand how they function under competitive authoritarianism, dominant party rule and single-party rule respectively. Thus, I view the end of party dominance as a continuation rather than as a break with the past.

As mentioned, much of the more recent research on party dominance has used the demise of the PRI in Mexico as its empirical case and developed theories from that case (see for example Greene, 2007; Hernández Company, 2019; Langston, 2002; Magaloni, 2006). Both Magaloni and Greene discuss the persistence and the breakdown of single party dominance in relation to resources available to the incumbent to stay in power. For Magaloni, it is vital to understand how the PRI and the state (which at the time were difficult to distinguish) increased and withdrew spending strategically in order to garner support at election time. She shows that spending increased dramatically before and during election campaigns, which worked as an incentive for supporters. At the same time, spending was withdrawn from less loyal municipalities (Magaloni, 2006, 149f). Greene (2007, 2010) on the other hand is concerned with the sources of revenue and the effect of reduced resources in the patronage system due to privatisation of state resources. The theories on the durability and demise of party dominance developed by Magaloni and Greene, as well as more general theories on clientelism will be discussed at length and tested on the four cases for example (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes, 2009).

Other scholars, such as Schedler (2010, 2013) and Levitsky and Way (2010a) have focused on the interplay between clientelism and repression. Brownlee (2007a) also focuses on historical institutional approaches and how the strength or weakness of parties as institutions may affect outcomes. These theories are applied, tested and developed not only in during the dominant party era, but during single-party rule as well. The conditions during single-party party rule and the circumstances of the move to allow multi-party competition may influence the longevity of the dominant party regime.

The current theoretical literature on clientelism is either geared towards understanding how it upholds dominant party systems (see for example Brownlee, 2002; Isaacs, 2010a), or are not mainly intended to understand dominant party systems or their breakdown (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Here, understanding how clientelism changes under certain conditions and in relation to repression is key. There is a large body of literature where clientelism and related concepts like neopatrimonialism and patronage, are used as variables to explain a variety of other political phenomena (see for example Bellin, 2000; Brownlee, 2002; Greene, 2010; Lust, 2009).
I develop subtypes to better describe how clientelism and repression evolves. Clientelism is conceptualised as two separate but related phenomena: intra-elite clientelism, how elites attempt to co-opt each other for the purpose of gaining influence. This concept is related to Hale’s (2014) ideas of patronal regimes, which also concern clientelistic exchanges within the elites. He discerns two distinctive patterns, single-pyramid structures, where power emanates from a top individual and elite networks are aligned or related to the chief patron. In competing pyramid systems, there are several elite networks, near equal in power competing for the position of top patron (ibid: 64f). These pyramid structures may arrange themselves in different ways at different times (ibid:115). Hale’s concepts are instrumental in that they clearly describe variants of intra-elite clientelism, providing a tool for analysing changes. It does not however take the size of elite networks into account, where actors are excluded or included from elite networks altogether. This aspect adds an additional dynamic Hale’s theories.

The second type of clientelism is mass-elite clientelism, where elite actors co-opt the public in a broader sense to gain political support. Repression is discussed in a broad sense, encompassing electoral fraud, harassment of voters, potential challengers and the media. Repression can either occur using state institutions such as the police or judicial system, or by using private actors to insight fear. Most of these strategies are discussed by Schedler (2002) as strategies used in electoral authoritarian regimes to remain in control.

There are both theoretical and empirically geared ambitions. Literature on elite linkages and how politicians behave in order to stay in power is used. Strategies designed to stay in power is not always rational, planned or well managed. It can just as well be a response to sudden events, highly emotive or based on personal loyalty, as events in Zimbabwe illustrate (for more on party dominance in Zimbabwe see Bratton, 2011; Cheeseman, 2011; Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010; Morse, 2012, 187)

The empirical aim is to dissect the elite linkages in the four cases I investigate. The focus is on our near history (post-independence Tanzania and Kenya, and the latter years of the Soviet era in the case of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan), to see how factors such as the makeup of elites, whether they are cohesive or fractured, influences regime outcomes. Three eras are discussed; single-party rule, dominant party rule and competitive authoritarianism. The purpose of this is to investigate how clientelism and repression changes, given that there is party dominance in two cases and turnovers in two. In Kyrgyzstan and Kenya, which both have several parties in parliament; the question of how stable the party systems are and to what extent floor crossing takes place. How stable the party systems are in these two cases are is also relevant – if parties mushroom in terms of voter support, disappear
and reappear ahead of elections, this signifies that the function of the parties and party system in perhaps not what we would expect based on the basic concept of party. In Kazakhstan and Tanzania on the other hand, elite linkages have a different significance. I compare the state of affairs of internal party competition and fractions in the ruling parties with the competitive dynamics in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan.

Introducing the Cases

Kenya and Kyrgyzstan have very fluid party systems, where floor crossing is common and coalitions and parties regularly mushroom and die. Both have experienced turnovers in recent years, and the outcome of elections is unpredictable. Kazakhstan and Tanzania on the other hand are stable dominant party regimes, where it seems unlikely that turnovers will occur, but where there is a formal possibility for opposition parties operate. In this section, a brief summary of the four cases is presented in order to facilitate further reading.

Kazakhstan

Single Party Era

Kazakhstan was a part of the Soviet Union from 1920. Initially, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan were the same republic. In 1925, the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Republic was formed. Like other parts of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party soon became all dominant and had a profound impact on the lives of citizens. A party card or membership in organisations connected to the party was instrumental to personal success. During the late 1920s and early 1930s, agriculture was collectivised leading to mass starvation. It is estimated that about 1.5 million people perished, and an estimated 15-20% of Kazakhs migrated out of Kazakhstan (Schatz, 2004: 43; Brill Olcott, 1995: 184f). The traditional nomadic lifestyle of the Kazakhs largely disappeared for an account see (Shayakhmetov, 2006).

During the Stalin years, large groups of people were deported to Kazakhstan from other parts of the Soviet Union. Germans, Tartars, Koreans and others arrived in large numbers. Later on, under Khrushchev in the 1950s the "virgin lands campaign", a policy to massively increase wheat production in Kazakhstan, brought in Russian and Slavic "volunteers" in great numbers to farm the Kazakh steppe (Brill Olcott, 1995; Jackson, 1956: 224; Laird and Chappell, 1961). Although the campaign failed to meet the production targets, the large number
of Russians immigrants and close ties with Moscow meant that politics and government was to a large extent controlled by ethnic Russians, leaving most Kazakhs outside of the realm of power.

In 1960, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, an ethnic Kazakh, became the first secretary of the communist party. This was part of a Soviet nativisation policy, to increase the number of Kazakhs in positions of power. Although Kunayev was a Kazakh, ties with Moscow were close; he was a full member of the politburo and close friend of Brezhnev. Under Kunayev, intra-elite clientelism and corruption increased exponentially in Kazakhstan. During those years, personal connections were a prerequisite for gaining access to higher education, housing, careers and wealth.

In 1986, Gorbachev dismissed Kunayev to root out the old, clientelistic guard in Kazakhstan. Gennady Kolbin, an ethnic Russian sent by Moscow, replaced him. This sparked fury, and protesters in their thousands hit the streets of the capital Alma-Ata. Although Soviet forces soon put down the protests, Kolbin’s position became untenable. He was soon replaced as first secretary of the republic by Kazakhstan’s long serving president Nursultan Nazarbayev, who was a close ally of Kunayev.

Dominant Party Rule

Like in the other Central Asian states, independence came suddenly in Kazakhstan, leaving little time to reform the political system (Brill Olcott, 2010: 24). The first few years after independence were turbulent. Kazakhstan faced economic recession and chaotic and rapid privatisation, mainly into the hands of the former nomenklatura. Public services such as health care, education and the pension system were in steep decline as the newly introduced currency, the tenge, fell. Winters were cold, and many cities faced gas shortages.

During this time of hardship, Kazakhstan introduced a multi-party system, though political parties did not have much significance (Bowyer, 2008). The first presidential elections were held in 1991. Nazarbayev ran uncontested and won more than 98 % of the votes. The first few years after independence were marked by conflict between parliament and president, where Nazarbayev sought to increase the power of the executive. This met with resistance from parliament, which was” asked to” dissolved itself in 1993. The parliament was dissolved again in 1995 by presidential decree, by which time the constitution was change paving way for a bicameral system and stronger executive power (Cummings, 2005: 24ff).

Since then, the economy has stabilised, largely due to Kazakhstan’s wealth in natural resources. The oil and mineral trade are still largely controlled by a small number of individuals with close ties to the president. As the economic situation
has stabilised, Nazarbayev’s dominance has increased. Nazarbayev has won each presidential election with a staggering margin and his supporters have dominated the parliament. There is much speculation, given that he has stepped down. Current president Tokayev will, according Nazarbayev, serve until the upcoming presidential elections (Leonard, 2019). The Otan party, chaired by President Nursultan Nazarbayev was formed in 1999 through the merger of the pro-political parties in parliament. Yet another merger of pro-presidential parties took place in 2006, when the Otan party merged with the Agrarian Party, the Civic party and Asar, forming Nur Otan (Hale, 2014: 250). The president’s daughter Dariga Nazarbayeva chaired the Asar party, and the other two parties were clearly not opposition parties. Nur Otan is now a mass membership party, with an active youth wing. It is becoming apparent that Nur Otan is an institutionally strong party and that party membership now facilitates careers.

There are no signs that the Nur Otan party will lose power soon. The use of repression has become more common in recent years and several well-known opposition figures have been imprisoned. There are however some potential threats to the regime. On the 19th of March 2019 Nazarbayev resigned as president of Kazakhstan at age 78. His successor, interim president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, represents a continuation rather than a break with the past. At 65 years of age, Tokayev is at the end of his political career, which he started as a diplomat during the Soviet era, and has since independence been a Nazarbayev loyalist, serving as Prime Minister (1999-2002), and as Chairman of the Senate (2013-2019). Nazarbayev retains his title as “Leader of the Nation “, giving him power over government policy after leaving office. He is also head of the national security council for life. This indicates that Nazarbayev will have considerable power in future.

Kenya

Single-Party Rule

At independence in 1962, most of Kenya’s land and resources was concentrated in the hands of an elite, which has dominated Kenya’s political and economic life since. This group of individuals and their families were closely connected to the colonial power at independence and able to accumulate wealth through favourable terms when most British settlers left.

Kenya was a multi-party state at independence. Two parties, Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) were represented in parliament. The first president, Jomo Kenyatta used a combination of repression and intra-elite clientelism to side-line the opposition, and Kenyan
politics was soon dominated by KANU and KADU was disbanded. Although Kenya was formally a multi-party state, in practice no other parties were permitted. Kenya Peoples Union (KPU), the only significant opposition party during the Kenyatta years, was prevented from holding meetings its leaders harassed and imprisoned until the party was eventually banned. When party competition was prohibited in 1982, the move was a formality with little effect on Kenya politics.

When Kenyatta died in office in 1978, Daniel Arap Moi became the new president. If Kenyatta had ruled mainly through intra-elite clientelism, and expanding his elite circle, Moi’s strategy was more repressive. Kenyatta was part of Kenya’s largest ethnic community; the Kikuyu while Moi belongs to the Kalenjin, a much smaller group. After an attempted coup in 1982, a number of oppositional politicians and activists were imprisoned and political organisations besides KANU outlawed. Although elections were still held, the process was tightly controlled leaving little room for dissent.

**Dominant Party Rule**

Multi-party rule was introduced in 1992. There was some political opposition to the Moi regime from the first, and subsequent elections. It was not a given that Moi would be able to hold on to power without repressive tools at his disposal.

KANU moved to use privatised repression. In the 1992 and 1997 general elections, there were outbreaks of violence in contested constituencies in the Rift Valley and in Coastal Province. Many people were killed and whole communities were displaced, preventing a great number of people from voting. In the 1992 elections, the KANU youth wing YK’92 were responsible for much of the violence. In 1997, criminal gangs, mercenaries and disenfranchised youth instigated violence. In both cases, there is little doubt that KANU politicians were involved. During the 1990s, there were two major corruption scandals with KANU involvement. The funds raised were used to win the 1992 and 1997 elections by broadening the intra-elite networks and to pay key opposition figures not to create an opposition coalition. A combination of clientelism and repression were used to remain in control. It is also clear that more resources were used to strengthen the role of KANU.

Despite these measures, KANU narrowly won the 1992 and 1997 elections. Without the repressive mechanism of the state at his disposal, Moi was facing difficulty consolidating power.
Competitive Authoritarianism

The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) under the helm of Mwai Kibaki won the 2002 election. Moi stepped down ahead of the 2002 elections leaving a power vacuum within the KANU party. Uhuru Kenyatta\(^{12}\) was fielded as the KANU presidential candidate and is the son of Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's first post-independence president. He lost the elections with a clear majority.

Ahead of the 2007 elections in Kenya, the NARC coalition split and two of the leaders, Raila Odinga and President Mwai Kibaki stood against each other in the election. The KANU party was no longer an important player in Kenyan politics and many of the more prominent politicians within that party had crossed the floor to join either PNU and Kibaki or ODM represented by Odinga. PNU was formed through a coalition of parties shortly before the elections. After the announcement of Kibaki's victory in the election, many parts of Kenya erupted into violence. More than 1000 Kenyans were killed, as violence instigated by the main political actors played out.

One of the characteristics of the Kenyan party system is its fluidity. Floor crossing is common, and it is common for political parties and coalitions to form and disintegrate ahead and after elections. The counting of the votes in the parliamentary and presidential elections was never concluded and it was unclear whether Raila Odinga or Mwai Kibaki had won the elections. Widespread violence executed by criminal gangs, groups of young people, and police, broke out, leaving many dead and a displaced. The violence was concentrated in the Rift Valley, parts of Nairobi and in Kisumu close to Lake Victoria.

In February 2008, after several attempts, a coalition government was formed consisting of 38 ministers from both PNU and ODM (excluding assistant ministers), almost doubling the number compared to the previous government. The formation of the new government was part of a power sharing deal, where the presidency was awarded Kibaki and Odinga was made Prime Minister. This dramatically increased intra-elite clientelism, as many individuals now had access to state resources.

In 2010, Kenya introduced a new constitution through a referendum. One of the most prominent features of the new constitution is more executive power. In 2012, general elections were held. Uhuru Kenyatta won the presidency and William Ruto became vice-president. Both had pending court cases in the International Criminal Court (ICC) for their alleged involvement in instigating the violence after the 2007 elections. The second runner up, Raila Odinga, made allegations of electoral fraud. After the 2012 elections, the number of ministers

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\(^{12}\) Who is Kenya’s current president.
was slashed by more than half, reducing the group of elite actors receiving patronage.

In some ways the 2017 presidential elections were a repeat of 2012, with Odinga and Kenyatta as the main competitors. Some serious incidents took place prior to the elections, including the murder of a senior election official. Kenyatta won a slim majority, amid allegations of election fraud. The supreme court ordered presidential re-elections to be held. Odinga later announced that he would withdraw from the repeat elections, which were cancelled.

**Kyrgyzstan**

*Single-Party Rule*

Like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan was part of the Soviet Union until 1991. A party card was essential for anyone wanting to further his or her career. Another similarity between the two states is the influence and influx of ethnic Russians, who early on held most positions in the nomenklatura. There were however some important differences. The collectivisation of land and loss of traditional culture and customs was not as intense in Kyrgyzstan. Although there were famines in Kyrgyzstan in the 1920s and 1930s, they never reached the scale of those in Kazakhstan.

Between 1961 and 1985 Turdakun Usabaliyev, an ethnic Kyrgyz, was general secretary of the CPSU. The republic was in the view of Moscow, politically and economically insignificant. Unlike in Kazakhstan, there were few grand schemes for development, there was no virgin lands project in Kyrgyzstan. For this reason, traditional clan ties helped create intra-elite networks, which included both ethnic Russians and Kyrgyz. These became a challenge to Soviet authority. This form of rule was consolidated during the years when Usabaliyev was Secretary General of the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet. Usabaliyev built strong elite ties, which transcended his own family and clan, and included a number of ethnic Russians. There is no question however that individuals from northern Kyrgyzstan were in a dominant position. These ties were instrumental to securing an income for an ever-stronger group of financially independent actors.

In 1985, Usabaliyev and 80% of the individuals in senior positions in the civil service and party lost their positions in a purge ordered by Gorbachev. The charges were that Kyrgyzstan had become a hotbed for embezzlement of state funds and corruption. Similar purges took place in other Central Asian republics at the time. Absamat Masaliyev was appointed the next general secretary. Unlike Usabaliyev, in Kazakhstan, migration from Russia was greater in real numbers than in Kyrgyzstan.
he did not have an extended elite network, and many of the former power holders were left out in the cold after the reshuffle. It became apparent that several intra-elite networks competed for power and resources.

**Dominant Party Rule**

The chairman of the communist party Absamat Masaliyev failed to remain in power after independence. Instead, Askar Akayev was named the president and went on to win the first presidential elections shortly after independence. Akayev was a part of the elite group surrounding Usbaliyev. He also chose a similar strategy: although individuals from the northern part of the country were favoured, intra-elite clientelism extended to people who were not part of his immediate kinship groups. State enterprises were privatised in order to buy support.

Initially there were some signs that Kyrgyzstan was successful in its democratic reforms at least compared to other Central Asian states. This image soon faded, as the Akayev regime became more repressive, corrupt and it became clear that elections during the early 2000s were far from free and fair. As Kyrgyzstan hit economic decline, Akayev was no longer able to uphold his extensive elite networks. This caused dissatisfaction, and repression increased in an attempt to remain in power.

In 2005, Askar Akayev was overthrown in a series of events dubbed the Tulip Revolution. After the 2005 elections, people took to the streets in several cities throughout the country, demanding the resignation of Akayev and the government. There were allegations of election fraud and corruption.

Internationally, the Tulip Revolution was interpreted as a victory for democracy and there were high hopes that the new president would be more accountable and democratic than the previous one. In July 2005, Kurmanbek Bakiyev was elected president and a new government formed. It soon became clear that the Bakiyev and Akayev regimes were quite similar: both had relatively small intra-elite networks, relied heavily on repression and did not attempt to consolidate power through the use of a strong dominant party.

**Competitive Authoritarianism**

In April 2010, Kyrgyzstan yet again experienced a time of political unrest and violence. Bakiyev and his government were overthrown in a manner that had many similarities with the Tulip Revolution. Again, there were accusations of election fraud and corruption. The military and police were used to try to put a stop to the protests, some people were killed. In the end, protesters were able to gain control of key government buildings in Bishkek and overthrow the regime.
The following months were marred with political and ethnic violence. In June more than 400 people, mainly Uzbeks were killed in the city of Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan14.

Directly after Bakiyev’s ouster, Roza Otunbayeva became interim president. Like in Kenya, a new constitution was passed through a referendum. The new constitution limits the power of the executive with a relatively strong position for the parliament and prime minister15. Parliamentary elections were held in 2010 and presidential elections in 2011. The new president Almazbek Atambayev has a history in both the Akayev and Bakiyev regimes. The new parliament included five parties, none winning more than 16% of the vote. The party system is fluid, with MPs frequently crossing the floor. Despite a competitive setting, Kyrgyzstan is not a democracy. Clientelism is rife, there are reports of harassment and abuse of journalists and the elections held, were marred by irregularities.

During Atambayev’s time in office, several media outlets were closed down, and journalists fined for defamation. A number of opposition politicians were imprisoned on corruption charges, in particular of the Ata Meken party. While some of these charges may be legitimate, there is little doubt that the prosecutions were selective and politically motivated.

The following elections, parliamentary in 2015 and presidential in 2017 were highly competitive. Due to term limits, Atambayev was barred from running in the 2017 presidential elections. Atambayev publicly backed Sooronbai Jeenbekov, with the implicit promise of an influential role behind the scenes.

Since then, a number of those close to Atambayev have been charged with corruption. At the time of writing16, there is a very public war of words between Jeenbekov and Atambayev, and it is not unlikely that the latter will be prosecuted. Simultaneously, harassment of journalists has continued, and there has been an escalation in corruption.

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14 The events in Osh in 2010 were similar to ethnic clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz that took place in 1990.
15 Reducing the power of the executive was seen by many as a move towards democracy. As Sedelius and Linde (2018) argue, “President-parliamentary constitutions accumulate power in the hands of presidents that are often not very interested in promoting democratic reforms.”.
16 November 2018
Tanzania

Single-Party Rule

When Tanzania became an independent state in 1961\(^\text{17}\), the TANU party already had a strong position and soon became the only party. Julius Nyerere was elected the first president. There was a strong ideological agenda: the state building project was built on Ujamaa, a form of African socialism. During the 1960s and 70s Tanzania underwent land reform, traditional villages were abandoned, and residents moved to collective villages\(^\text{18}\). At the same time TANU (later CCM) developed into a mass membership party with a representative from every ten households throughout the country. Party membership soon became a prerequisite for success.

The strong party and ideology did not prevent the Tanzanian regime from relying heavily on clientelism. During the first 20 years of independence, the public sector expanded rapidly, and appointments were often based on kinship ties or friendship. Tanzania had few political prisoners and repression was not commonplace\(^\text{19}\). The regime became dominant based on the institutionalising power of the party and clientelism rather than outright repression.

In 1985, Ali Hassan Mwinyi became Tanzania’s second president after Nyerere had voluntarily stepped down. During the late 1970s and early 1980s it had become clear that the Ujamaa policy had not resulted in economic growth. The economy was in steep decline and the state faced severe budgetary deficits. In a move to reverse this, Tanzania embarked on a structural adjustment programme. The economy was liberalised, public spending slashed, and a number of state-owned enterprises were privatised. Corruption and intra-elite clientelism increased dramatically during Mwinyi’s term in office, when many state companies were privatised into the hands of public officials, politicians and their families.

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\(^{17}\) Then, Tanganyika. The name Tanzania was adapted in 1964 when Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed a union.

\(^{18}\) Most of the rural areas in Tanzania were not affected by villagisation. Ujamaa villages became an ideal for how politics was organised.

\(^{19}\) On Zanzibar, where there was some opposition to CCM after it’s merger and there were movements on the islands aspiring for independence from the mainland. There, repression was rife with frequent crackdowns on oppositionals, arrests and abuse.
Dominant Party Rule

Tanzania introduced a multi-party system in 1992 and the first elections where more than one party was permitted to compete were held in 1995. Mwinyi stepped down ahead of the presidential elections and CCM fielded Benjamin Mkapa as their candidate. In Tanzania no president has served more than the stipulated 10 years in office since Nyerere stepped down. The 1995 elections marked a clear and decisive victory CCM, in the parliamentary and presidential elections. Since then, the party has remained dominant in every subsequent election, although other parties are represented in parliament.

The 1995 presidential election campaign was dominated by discussion on corruption during the Mwinyi years. Some of Tanzania’s most publicised corruption scandals came to light between 1995 and 2005. Although a number of high-ranking politicians and officials were implicated, there were few prosecutions, and no indication that corruption had ended. Intra-elite clientelism became increasingly important element Tanzanian politics.

Tanzania has yet to hold elections declared free and fair by international observers. There are examples of fraud in all elections held since the introduction of multi-party rule. Irregularities range from vote buying to outright tabulation errors. Until recently, there are comparably few examples of harassment of the opposition, voter intimidation or the use of violence at election time.\(^{20}\)

The 2015 presidential elections changed the status quo in Tanzanian politics. CCM’s dominance diminished further, as an opposition candidate gained 40% of the vote.\(^{21}\) John Magufuli, the CCM candidate was elected with 60% of the vote, a sign that CCM may not stay in power indefinitely. In response to this, repression has increased in recent years. Prominent opposition politicians have been arrested, media outlets closed, online freedom of expression curbed, several people have been murdered, and a ban has been placed on all opposition rallies until the scheduled elections in 2020. Magufuli and his government has launched an anti-corruption campaign, removing 16 000 ghost workers from the government payroll (Robi 2016) and investigating corruption in the Port

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\(^{20}\) The exception to this is Zanzibar, where the repression of opposition supporters has been rife, especially during the 2005 elections.

\(^{21}\) The CHADEMA candidate Edward Lowassa crossed the floor from CCM shortly before the elections. He served as PM in Kikwete’s government between 2005 and 2008, but was dismissed due to allegations of fraud and corruption. Before his defection, several Chadema politicians have been very critical of Lowassa (interview refs.) and he was included of their “list of shame” of the most corrupt individuals in Tanzania (Kwayu 2015)

\(^{22}\) The Tanzanian police banned all opposition rallies and protests in June 2016 “[…] until the security situation improves” in response to a rally protesting the “undemocratic actions” of John Magufuli’s government (Ng’wanakilala 2016).
Authority and the Revenue Authority (Paget 2017). Prosecutions have been geared towards officials and political adversaries of Magufuli.
Regime Types

It is essential to understand the type of regime the four states studies in this dissertation fall into in order to see how well the theories developed in this study travel to other cases. Regime is a somewhat ambiguous concept. In this study regime denotes a form of government, not a specific government in power at a particular time. Competitive authoritarianism is a regime type. Another use of the word delineates an era, for example the Brezhnev regime in the USSR. This usage only makes sense if the era is synonymous with a set of rules and circumstances. For that reason, we can speak of the Moi regime in Kenya, which had its own internal logic, but not the Kibaki regime as much has remained the same since Uhuru Kenyatta came to power in 2013.

At present, all four states are electoral authoritarian states: they are not democracies, nor do they fall into the category of closed autocracies such as North Korea. Two subtypes are discussed, namely competitive authoritarianism and dominant party regimes. Tanzania and Kazakhstan are both dominant party regimes, while Kyrgyzstan and Kenya are competitive authoritarian regimes.

Electoral Authoritarianism

There is some degree of conceptual confusion within the field of comparative politics. Many states fall into a “grey zone”, where elections are held, some democratic institutions upheld, yet they remain authoritarian. The number of states, which fall into this category has increased in recent years, due to backsliding. Many states have become less democratic in recent years, while retaining the formal institutions of multi-partyism (Houle, 2018; Mechkova, Lührmann and Lindberg, 2017). Sometime these states are referred to as hybrid regimes, which is a broad concept that encompasses of these most cases23. There

23 Using the concepts hybrid regimes (as developed by Diamond) and grey zone cases (as used by Carothers) is not without controversy. As Schedler points out this treats these types of authoritarian regimes as a midpoint between autocracy and democracy rather than as a separate regime type, which is not always closely related to full autocracies or full democracies. I
have been discussions within the academic community on how to further classify them, and much confusion has ensued (see for example Bogaards, 2009; Collier and Levitsky, 1997; Diamond, 2002; Gilbert and Mohseni, 2011; Levitsky and Way, 2010b; Snyder, 2006; Wigell, 2008). Quite naturally, the increase in the number of these regimes has sparked a great deal of interest from scholars, not least, as many regimes where elections are held regularly have not experienced turnovers.

There are two main schools of thought – either states, which do not achieve the minimal standard for procedural democracy are considered flawed democracies, or they are thought of as authoritarian states with some democratic qualities. Fareed Zakaria (1997) for example refers to this category of states as “illiberal democracies”. Others use the term “new democracies”, which is sometimes used to signify states that are democratically immature (see for example van Biezen, 2000; Verge, 2012) and other times hybrid regimes (see for example Webb and White, 2007 who define Russia as a new democracy). Morse (2012, 170) points out, whether we label states as flawed democracies or electoral autocracies has consequences: “To identify a regime as autocratic rather than minimally democratic means that the country is not necessarily on a trajectory towards deeper and more consolidated democracy.” This is in line with Carothers (2002) argument that paths towards democracy are rarely linear, giving good cause to avoid defining hybrid regimes as democratic.

It makes a great deal of difference whether we refer to these regimes as “democracies with adjectives”, or “autocracies with adjectives”. I ascribe to the second, as it tells us what these regimes are rather than what they may or may not become at a future date. The states, which I am analysing, all hold regular presidential and parliamentary elections24. They are electoral regimes, but not democracies.

Schedler (2006) has developed the concept electoral authoritarianism. He suggests that electoral authoritarian regimes hold elections and the incumbent has the means and inclination to remain in power through clientelistic practices or outright repression (ibid: 3). Currently, the four states studied in this study fall into this category; they are not democracies and they hold regular elections. In Schedler’s (2013: 21) view, electoral authoritarianism posits uncertainty, as the

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24 Although elections in Kazakhstan are sometimes called at very short notice. See for example the 2011 presidential elections and the 2012 parliamentary elections.
hold on power is not secure. Thus, a repertoire of manipulation strategies is put in place in order to remain in power.

In some cases, both opposition and incumbent can manipulate election results, and use repression and clientelism. It does not render a state more democratic if all parties are attempting to win elections through illicit means. The concept of electoral authoritarianism does not take competition into account, and as such lacks some specificity.

Despite this, electoral authoritarianism is a useful concept. Its strength is that it does not refer to non-democratic states as democracies and it’s a broad concept, which does not the confuse degree of competitiveness with level of democracy. In fact, Schedler (2006: 10) is critical of Przeworski (2000), who includes peaceful turnover of power as a measure of democracy, arguing that single party dominance is not necessarily a sign of an autocratic regime.

All authoritarian states, which hold elections, are not electoral autocracies. Before the surge in multi-party regimes after the end of the Cold War, most authoritarian states held elections in some form or another. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which were at the time part of the Soviet Union, elections for the Supreme Soviet were held (Swearer, 1961; White, 1985). In Tanzania, local elections on the village level were held, and the process of nominating candidates to the Bunge had a measure of political choice (Hydén, 1994). In single-party Kenya, elections for candidates were also held. Voters had to stand in line behind their favoured candidate in the polling station in order to vote (Widner, 1992: 153). The executive was not contested in any of the states. They did not qualify as electoral authoritarian regimes as more than one option for voters is a prerequisite.

Competitiveness and the level of democracy are separate concepts. It is theoretically and practically possible for states to be competitive – i.e. the outcome of elections being uncertain and authoritarian simultaneously. Some scholars make a distinction between competition and level of democracy. Nicolas van de Walle (2002: 73) for example uses the concept contested autocracies to describe states: “… where the presidential party is clearly in the minority and the regime could not survive a reasonably free and fair election against a united opposition.”. He uses Kenya prior to KANU losing the 2002 elections as an example. Both dominant party and competitive authoritarian regimes are subtypes of electoral

25 Parliament
authoritarian regimes\textsuperscript{26}. The difference is not the level of democracy, but the degree of competitiveness.

\textit{Competitive Authoritarianism}

The concepts competitive authoritarianism is a subtype of electoral authoritarianism. Schedler (2006) defines competitive authoritarianism as electoral authoritarian regimes, where the incumbent does not have a dominant position in the political landscape. The outcome of elections in these regimes is not predictable. Kenya and Kyrgyzstan are competitive authoritarian regimes, while Kazakhstan and Tanzania are not. This should not be confused with Levitsky and Way’s (2002) use of the concept. They make very definite statements about the internal dynamics of competitive authoritarian regimes:

Rather than openly violating democratic rules (for example by banning or repressing the opposition and the media), incumbents are more likely to use bribery, co-option, and more subtle forms of persecution, such as the use of tax authorities, compliant judiciaries and other agencies to “legally” harass, persecute, or extort cooperative behaviour from critics. (Way and Levitsky, 2002: 53).

Their definition comes very close to electoral authoritarianism. Levitsky and Way (2010b: 7) explicitly rule out defining Kazakhstan as a competitive authoritarian regime on the basis that the function of elections there is not to determine who governs, yet they include Tanzania as a case. Defining competitive authoritarianism in this way is problematic for this study, as it comes too close electoral authoritarianism, while conflating the degree of competitiveness with liberal practices and democracy.

\textit{Dominant Party Regimes}

There are three dimensions inherent to the concept dominant party systems. Firstly, most scholars discuss the level of authoritarianism or democracy. Some scholars such as Hadenius and Teorell (2007) choose to conceptualise dominant party systems as authoritarian, excluding the more democratic variety from analysis. Others, such as Sartori use two categories, \textit{hegemonic} and \textit{predominant} party systems, depending on the degree of authoritarianism inherent to the system (Sartori, 1976: 196, 230). Most scholars make a distinction between democracies ruled by the same party for several years and regimes, where the incumbent party

\textsuperscript{26} It is of course possible and even plausible for for fierce competition to take place within parties in all regime types. This type of competition, although of interest, does not qualify for regimes to be categorized as competitive unless they cause ruptures in the party.
dominates through illicit means. There are however some exceptions to this rule. Greene (2007: 12ff) among others does not use the level of democracy as an indicator at all; he argues that dominance as such is a democratic problem. This would place several states, which have traditionally viewed as democracies in the dominant party category.

One of the main characteristics of autocratic dominant party states is that it is difficult to distinguish between state and party resources. This creates a resource advantage, which is difficult for challengers to bridge (see for example Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; Greene, 2010; Magaloni, 2008). Although incumbent parties in democracies often have a resource advantage as well, party funding is usually separate from the state budget. For example, like the PRI party in Mexico, the Social Democratic party in Sweden was supported by trade unions (Anthonsen et al., 2011; Aylott, 2003; Magaloni, 2006). One of the main differences between the two contexts was that the PRI could illicitly siphon state resources in return for support, which was not possible for the Social Democrats in Sweden. Because of these differences there are very few advantages to analysing them as the same regime type.

Some scholars argue that there must be a time element inherent to defining dominant party systems; Cox (1997: 238) for example argues “Dominant parties are those that are uninterruptedly in government, […], for a long period of time (say three to five decades)”. Others, such as Maurice Duverger (1959: 308f) are careful not to specify an exact amount of time needed in order for a party to be considered dominant: “A party is dominant when it is identified with an epoch; when its doctrines, ideas, methods, its style so to speak, coincides with those of an epoch”. Those who do specify a specific time do so in relation to two different measures: years and elections. Greene (2007: 12) uses twenty years as the cut-off point, while Boogaard (2008: 115) pinpoints three consecutive election victories as the dividing line. Not all scholars take time into account at all; Hadenius and Teorell (2007) for example do not. The consequence is that the typology of states changes quite rapidly in their dataset, a state may be dominant one year and not the other. This illustrates that the time element has a huge impact on quantitative research on party dominance. A landslide victory for a party in a single election would be enough to categorise them as a dominant party regime. An argument against not taking time into account is that it may take time for an incumbent to gain access to state resources that can be utilities to stay in power. The time element may also tell us something about the degree of control.

The degree of dominance is also central. Some scholars specify a percentage of the votes the incumbent must win; others choose a more arbitrary definition. Sartori (1976) for example chooses not to be specific here, which is common for
scholars working with comparative or qualitative data. Using precise measures is nevertheless important in comparative studies as well, as it helps establish when states cease to be dominant party regimes. There is also contention regarding how the degree of dominance should be measured. Vanhanen (2000) measures the percentages of votes, while Hadenius and Teorell (2007) measures the size of the largest party in the legislature. Vanhanen’s definition is problematic because as there may be formal or informal rules, which skew the number of seats awarded to each party, which are a way for the dominant party to exercise control. Hadenius and Teorell’s definition focuses on outcomes. An example of this is the 2010 elections in Tanzania where the incumbent party CCM won 70% of the votes in the parliamentary election yet hold 80.5% of the seats in parliament due to a system of special seats for women, which skews the result in favour of larger parties.

In sum, dominant party regimes are those where a single dominant party can control the political arena. No other parties gain enough seats in parliament to pose a serious threat to the incumbent party’s majority and decision-making power. It should also be mentioned that not all dominant party regimes have a ruling party. For example, Belarus has no dominant party despite Alexander Lukashenko’s absolute dominance over the legislature. This does not place Belarus in a different category, as there is no doubt that other features of the dominant party regime type have been met.

Single-Party Regimes

Single party regimes are not a subtype of electoral authoritarianism, as law excludes all or close to all competition. All states studied here were single party states in the past – political competition was limited, and a ruling party could form government, yet the dynamics of competition vary.

Many African states, such as Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana and several more held competitive multi-party elections at independence and in some cases for a few elections that followed and then banned competition. It was argued that Africa states above all else needed national unity to counteract the detrimental influence of tribalism and dissension (Meredith, 2005: 166f; Worsley, 1967: 198). The exclusion of parties or the introduction of single-party rule was not always viewed as contradictory to democracy. Tanzania’s first president Julius Nyerere argued that “Where there is one party – provided that it is identified with the nation as

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27 Some scholars make a distinction between de jure and de facto single (or one) party states, where de facto implies that opposition does not exist, despite no law prohibiting competition (see for example Barkan 1995).
a whole – the foundations of democracy can be firmer, and the people can have
more opportunity to exercise a real choice, than where you have two or more
parties” Similarly Tom Mboya, one of the early protagonists of African socialism
in Kenya argues that parties as such are not a necessary prerequisite for democracy
(Mboya, 1963).

Lenin did not view rule of the people and socialism as irreconcilable values yet
believed that the Bolshevik party should remain the only party. Many associations
were set up to ensure that most Soviet citizens were party members in some sense.
Lenin argued in Pravda in 1921 that Trade Unions should serve as the
“transmission belt from the Communist Party to the masses” (cited in Widner,

Like in most African states, regular elections were held in the Soviet Union. In
theory, every citizen in the USSR was a part of a local Soviet and elected the
members of that council. The Soviet would in turn elect a Soviet at a higher level,
which would in turn elect the next all the way up to the highest level. At least
until 1987, real influence by the population in the election process was very low.
99% of the voters voting in favour of the proposed candidates were the norm in
all Soviet republics (see for example Karklins, 1986; White, 1985). Like many
African states, elections in the Soviet Union sometimes took the form of exchange
of goods in return for support. Voters cast their vote in favour of the pre-selected
candidate in return for specific services.

Single party states in Africa and the USSR shared some characteristics. The
most important one is perhaps that they were built on an idea that a single party
would create stability and avoid conflict and confrontation between different
groups in society. In the African states, this was connected to ethnic identities and
attempt to build states, which could transcend these differences. Multi-party
systems were thought to create ethnic conflict and civil strife. In the USSR, a high
degree of ethnic fragmentation, was not initially viewed as a threat to the state.
Instead, it was thought that the Communist party, with its committee system
would create consensus among the working class, which would facilitate social
stability.

Despite their origins and ideals, single party states in Africa quickly turned
repressive. According to Herbst (2000: 15ff), most African states were unable to

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28 That is not to say that Lenin was a proponent of Liberal democracy. As Magun (2018) puts it
“In contrast to the usual liberal humanist understanding of democracy as freedom, self-
expression, etc., Lenin gives a relatively bleak technocratic picture of discipline, accounting,
and control. In contrast to the usual liberal humanist understanding of democracy as freedom,
self-expression, etc., Lenin gives a relatively bleak technocratic picture of discipline,
accounting, and control.”
wield power because of lack of resources, unnatural borders and insufficient infrastructure. Although this meant that many Africans did not have access to basic social goods such as education and healthcare, it also meant a degree of freedom, as the state was unable to effectively police political activity. In general terms, single party states in Africa were authoritarian, but rarely totalitarian.

Unlike post-independence African states, the USSR turned totalitarian, with the culmination of Stalinism. According to Arendt (1968) totalitarianism creates a condition where freedom, public as well as private becomes an illusion. The difference between totalitarian states and authoritarian ones is that in totalitarian states (i) an official ideology exists, and all citizens are forced to adhere to it. (ii) A single hierarchically organised party is closely intertwined with the state. (iii) The party has monopolistic control of the military and means of communication. (iv) There is an effective police state, which can control the population and (v) the state is able to effectively control the economy.

Because of these differences a distinction between authoritarian single party states, such as Kenya and Tanzania during most of the post-colonial era and totalitarian single party states like that Soviet Union is called for.

It could be argued that opting for totalitarianism would have been a false economy for most African states during the single-party era, as it is a relatively costly endeavour. The resources used in the Soviet Union to uphold the regime were immense. Although there are no estimates made on the cost of labour camps, the police, purges and state control a reasonable assessment would be that it put a significant strain of the state’s finances during the Soviet Era. On the other hand, remaining in control of a vast and diverse territory such as the USSR may be difficult relying solely on clientelism and repression. The reasons why leaders choose one type of regime over another are important. Although there are many differences between dominant party and single party regimes, the former regime may inform the present. This is not least true with regards to the differences between the two regions studied here. Party dominance can persist or fail regardless of the geographical, cultural and historical context. The four cases studied here make that assumption clear. The difference lies not in the possibility of breakdown. Rather, how the internal politics operate, what forms of repression are used, how electoral fraud takes place and how clientelism networks and practices are put in place and persist may be influenced by past ways of doing politics.
Clientelism and Repression

The previous section has discussed regime types; the qualities and meaning of electoral authoritarian regime and single-party regimes. Thus far, the practicalities of how autocrats manipulate the playing field has only been hinted at. In this section the tools available to autocrats are explored. Repression and clientelism can be understood broadly as carrot and stick strategies. Clientelism is a reward system, so that elite and mass actors gain rewards for supporting political actors. Repression is punishment for not doing so. It may include strategies such as harassing, torturing or arresting political opponents as well as more subtle methods such as electoral fraud. Clientelism and repression are not merely the tools of political actors in authoritarian regimes; they are what make them autocracies.

Scholars have for centuries or more argued on the definition of elite vs. mass actors. Much of the debate can be summed up in two very simple questions posed by Putnam (1976: ix), “who rules?”, and the more normatively geared “who should rule?”. The second will not be dealt with here, but the first hits at the core of determining who belongs to the elite group, and who is a mass actor. Mills (1956) portrayed the elites in post-war America as those holding top positions in the political administration, the military and in business. This definition describes who was able to exert power in the US at that moment in history but fails to consider the possible contextual variations regarding elite structures. In Mills’ writing, the question of “who rules?” is limited to institutionalised power. In the cases studied here, it is common for individuals to have the ability to mobilise based on social cleavages such as clan and ethnicity, while lacking institutionalised power (see Clarke, 2017 for an overview on social cleavages). Thus, it is impossible to create a list of professions, wealth or social standing, which would place an individual in the elite category across social and political contexts. Those determined by Mills (1956) are of course elites in most circumstances, but for a comprehensive view of any state’s elites, we must ask who has influence here? We must make important distinctions between political elites and others, and if those lines are blurred, analyse the meaning. A contribution in this dissertation is the study of elite-networks, on inclusion or exclusion based on the criteria of “who rules?” in each state and time period.

The explanatory power of the theories presented in this section is twofold. Firstly, the presence and characteristics of repression and clientelism is investigated. This is done regardless of regime type. We know that all four states in this study have seen regime change in the time investigated. These changes have
informed changes in repression and clientelism due to factors such as access to state and private resources.

It is self-evident that leaders in electoral authoritarian regimes need to garner support in order to remain. Even totalitarian regimes cannot rely on repression alone. Arendt (1968: 341) for example notes that:

Wherever totalitarianism possesses absolute control, it replaces propaganda with indoctrination and uses violence not so much to frighten people (this is done only in the initial stages when political opposition still exists) as to realize constantly its ideological doctrines and practical lies.

This presupposes that even when a party has absolute control of the political space, repression and violence is not enough, other measures are still needed. In electoral authoritarian regimes, there are some constraints on repressive measures. Parties aside from the incumbent exist, and there is at least some space for opposition. Therefore, popular and elite support is even more important in these regimes than in closed autocracies. In order to secure support, leaders in electoral authoritarian regimes use clientelism. This is true in relation to elite actors and non-elite actors alike.

Methods used by political actors to gain access to power range from creating a resource advantage for the purpose of co-opting the elite and garnering support from the masses to outright electoral fraud. Whether the strategy is to remain dominant though creating an uneven playing field, through repression or through fraud, resources and support are needed to make it possible. A loyal cadre is essential in order to execute repression and electoral fraud, which is often costly. When dominant parties lose, other office seekers may use the same or similar strategies as the incumbent.

Schedler (2002) discusses the options, which incumbents in electoral authoritarian regimes have as informal and formal ways of manipulating the public as well as elites. He discusses how political preferences can be formed either though restricting civil liberties and political right for oppositional forces (formal) or through controlling access to media and resources (informal) (ibid 39). Elite cohesion is a necessary means to execute these formal and informal policies. Seeking legitimacy from the general public is also preferable for leaders who aim at maintaining stable authoritarian dominant party regimes. According to González-Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson (2015), autocrats seek high turnouts and winning big in elections, and may resort to what they coin “legitimacy buying” prior to elections. Delivering goods not through public
politics, as in democracies\textsuperscript{29}, but by ways of clientelism moves politics away from the public to the private sphere. This creates apathy and prevents protest, as the condition for access to goods and services is not a public political struggle but maintaining and building private relationships with elites who can provide.

\textit{Clientelism}

There is virtual consensus that clientelism is a central component in most electoral autocracies. In some cases, patronage, patron-client relationships, neopatrimonialism and clientelism are used as interchangeable concepts, while in others they denote different but related phenomena (Keshavarian, 2005: 78).

Patronage and patron-client relationships are problematic concepts for this study, as they presuppose the existence of a patron and client on different levels in the hierarchy, for example between a politician and her constituents. This is relevant when mass-elite clientelism is discussed, but not always intra-elite clientelism, as they cannot include relationships between elite actors or groups in the absence of a “big man” at the very top of the hierarchy. There may be several equally or near equally strong elites, attempting to form alliances using a clientelist rational. From the onset, we can delineate more than one pattern of clientelism. Actors matter a great deal: there is a difference between mass-elite and intra-elite relationships. In both types of relationships, private or public resources change hands in order to secure political support. As such, they are clientelistic in Stokes (2009) basic definition of the concept: “[…] the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simple: did you (will you) support me?”. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) make a similar contribution and argue that clientelism is the direct exchange of goods, services or access to employment in return for political support.

The main argument in favour of distinguishing between mass-elite and intra-elite clientelism is that the purpose of the exchange is somewhat different. Van de Walle (2007b) shares this view, making a distinction between mass clientelism and elite clientelism. He argues that elite clientelism is aimed at granting a person access to state resources, while mass clientelism uses state resources to provide goods and services. This distinction is useful, in that it distinguishes between different types of clientelistic relationships, specifying that they perform different functions.

I see two aspects of van de Walle’s categories, which could be modified to better suit a variety of regime types. Firstly, I choose the terms intra-elite and mass-elite

\textsuperscript{29} As discussed by Cricks (2013), where interests are discussed in public, and politics becomes a means of consolidating those interests.
clientelism because it is specific. Intra-elite clientelism is when the exchange of goods takes place between elite actors, for example if a political actor offers tax exemptions if elected in return for political support. Mass-elite clientelism is when elite actors provide goods to non-elite actors. Secondly, I argue that van de Walle’s discussion on the source of resources for clientelism is best suited to single-or dominant party states, as it precludes clientelistic networks upheld by other sources of income. In competitive authoritarian states, elites cannot be assured that they will have long-term access to the state. Nonetheless, relationships both within elites and between elite and mass actors have clientelistic features. Office seekers, who do not have direct access to the state, use resources from other sources to uphold clientelistic networks. These relationships remain clientelistic because they follow a simple rationale; it is an exchange of goods for political support.

In relationships between elite and mass actors, the purpose is simply to gain support. It makes no odds if the elite actor is in an incumbent position or not. It may be as straightforward as a candidate garnering support to get elected into parliament, or as intricate as a coalition of parties attempting to establish a dominant position. Intra-elite clientelism on the other hand is usually aimed at establishing or preserving relationships within elites. It can also be used to convince political actors not to partake in competition for power. Intra-elite clientelism is sometime a relationship between actors on the same hierarchical level, and sometimes between those at the top of the pyramid and those lower down. Thus mass-elite clientelism is aimed at mass support, while intra-elite clientelism is aimed at co-opting elite actors.

Mass-elite and intra-elite clientelism share some features besides the exchange of goods for support. One is the lack of programmatic politics, or in Crick’s (2013) words, politics becomes a private, not public affair. Bratton and van de Walle (1994: 458) share this notion:

The distinction between private and public interest is purposely blurred. The essence of neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal favours both within the state […] and within society […]. In return for material rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions upwards as a mark of deference to the patron.

Like patron-client relationships discussed above Bratton and van de Walle’s concept neopatrimonialism30, assumes a hierarchy and the existence of a single big man at the top. The *neo* refers to the concept being distinct from purely

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30 Bratton and van de Walle (1997) were not the first to coin neopatrimonialism. According to Erdmann and Engel (2007), the concept was coined by Eisenstadt in 1973.
patrimonial regimes with no legal rational. As Erdmann and Engel (2007: 104) put it:

> All the attempts to define neopatrimonialism (or “modern patrimonialism”) deal with, and try to tackle, one and the same intricate problem: the relationship between patrimonial domination on the one hand and legal-rational bureaucratic domination on the other, i.e. a very hybrid phenomenon.

Theories on neopatrimonialism inform how clientelism can coexist with modern bureaucracy, electoral systems and legal systems.

Kitschelt (2000: 852) points out that clientelism does not necessarily lead to stability: “politicians who refuse to be responsive to their constituents demands for selective incentives will be held accountable to them and no longer receive votes and material contributions”. It is thus important for power holders to garner enough resources to uphold their clientelistic networks, both in relation to mass and elite actors. This observation calls into question whether clientelism is part of an autocratic rational or provides voters with political choice. Oftentimes, opting out of a clientelistic exchange holds unacceptably high costs, both for elites and voters. As Trantidis (2015, 127) argues, “[…] clients have no real choice to accept or deny the rewards offered and are essentially deprived of the freedom to opt out of clientelist exchange and avoid informal sanctions.”. Clientelism can thus be part of an autocratic toolbox, in much the same way as repression. It is also pertinent to this study that clientelism may increase or decrease regardless of the level of competition. Driscoll (2017) finds that clientelism increased in Ghana, when elections became more competitive. This indicates that clientelistic practices may not be contingent on access to the state.

**Mass-elite Clientelism: Strategies**

One of the most common types of mass-elite clientelism is vote-buying. It is very common in electoral authoritarian regimes where there are large socioeconomic differences (see for example Bratton, 2008; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Lehoucq, 2003; Lindberg, 2003: 239; Schedler, 2002). Voters are encouraged to make political choice based not on programmatic or policy differences but on what resources candidates, parties or states will provide. In some states, vote buying takes the form of candidates canvassing whole villages with cash, whereas in others it is more sophisticated. Local leaders are approached by candidates with suggestions of donations to various village funds or projects in return for electoral support (Case, 2006: 103f).
The question naturally arises if vote buying is effective. Obviously, checking if voters have complied with the attempt to buy their vote would include violating the secrecy of the ballot, which is only possible in some circumstances. According to a study by Vincente (2007), voters often comply by voting as promised. In some cases, voters are asked to abstain from voting (if they are expected to vote disfavourably), or receive returns for going to the polling station. Nichter (2008) calls this phenomenon “turn-out buying”, political supporters who might otherwise have stayed at home on election day are paid. Lawson and Greene (2014) have conducted a study that shows that voters will often comply, even when ballot secrecy exists, suggesting that normative change, rather than transparent electoral systems may be required to end these practices.

Pork-barrel politics, investing in areas where there is strong support is a mass-elite clientelistic tactic. Hilgers (2011) argues that this should not be considered clientelism, as the relationship is not personal, everyone in an area will benefit regardless of support. Stokes (2009) shares this view as it cannot be done on a quid pro quo basis, as persons who do not support the patron benefit as well. This argument is at loggerheads with Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 2) whose understanding of the concept includes groups as well as individuals. Hilgers (2011) critique is pointful, and there are several other scholars who have criticised the stretching of the concept in recent years (see for example Erdmann and Engel, 2007; Guliyev, 2011; Pitcher et al., 2009). Contrary to Hilger’s precise definition of clientelism, which excludes vote-buying, pork barrel politics and any relationship, which is temporary, I take a more pragmatic approach. There are many phenomena, which many or may not be included in clientelistic exchanges, including vote buying, and pork barrel politics. The key is that the purpose of resources changing hands is political support. This support is useful both at the ballot box, and as a means of mobilising mass-actors for rallies, to repress another group, or to ultimately oust political adversaries.

Aside from reducing the need for repressive measures, mass-elite clientelism also serves to grant incumbent, as well as other elite actors’ legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Higher turnout and results in elections, even when they are fraudulent affords legitimacy.

Intra-elite Clientelism: Strategies

As mentioned, most but not all scholars of clientelism include unequal relationships as the basis for their definition of clientelism, thus placing what I

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31 Pork barrel politics is localised spending done primarily to win support for candidates or representatives.
call intra-elite clientelism in the grey zone. Hilgers (2011: 568) for example clearly states that clientelism “[…] a lasting personal relationship between individuals of unequal socio-political status.” Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 86) on the other hand see elite co-optation, competition and fragmentation as inherent to clientelistic systems. Van de Walle (2007a: 54) goes even further, stating that “the primary function of political clientelism in [post-colonial] Africa was to facilitate intra-elite accommodation […].” Further, van de Walle (2009) also argues that the primary beneficiaries of clientelism are limited to a small group of elite actors, finding that clientelism is inefficient as at distributing wealth. These insights lead him to argue that elite clientelism is the dominant form of clientelism in sub-Saharan Africa (van de Walle, 2007b: 3) Van de Walle (ibid) shows that income inequality is on the increase in sub-Saharan Africa, where clientelism is prevalent. This evidence suggest that wealth is not being redistributed effectively in clientelistic systems, which points to intra-elite clientelism being more common.

The makeup of elites varies from case to case and over time. Individuals may belong to the elite one day, only to be ousted the next. Intra-elite clientelism can serve several functions. For dominant parties or leaders, it can be a co-optation strategy. Potential challengers are led into the fold, decreasing the risk of open opposition. This leads to relatively large intra-elite networks, which may be costly to uphold. There are also some risks involved in a large group of individuals receiving access to wealth, as independently wealthy groups may become challengers in the long run. This strategy can reduce costs for repression. Other incumbents may opt for small clientelistic networks, distributing resources to a close-knit group. Choosing not to co-opt elite actors carries obvious risks if not counteracted by repressive measures. This suggests an interplay between different strategies. Intra-elite clientelism may also be used in order to form coalitions in order to challenge the powers that be. Defections from the incumbent party to opposition may be a sign that independent clientelistic networks are forming. The creation of such networks does not necessarily have to include the incumbent.

Resources

In order to uphold any form of clientelistic networks, resources are needed. The office seeker, coalition or party needs a source and a form of goods to distribute. Sources of income may be the state, either through corruption\textsuperscript{32} or through allocation of state resources using a clientelistic rationale. Corruption is often

\textsuperscript{32} A broad definition of corruption is used: the abuse of public office for private gain. There is an ongoing debate on defining corruption (for an overview see Sparling 2018, Rothstein and Varraich 2017)
inherent to clientelistic systems, yet they are distinctive concepts. The purpose of clientelism is always political support, while resources from corruption may be used for any number of purposes. In Hale’s (2014: 21) work, corruption is the “lifeblood” of patronal regimes, that cannot be easily removed without the system failing completely. Privatisations of state resources such as land or state enterprises have played an important part in intra-elite clientelism, as these resources can be given in return for support. Land and enterprises continue to generate income, which can then be used to uphold both mass-elite and intra-elite networks. Income from other sources, such as private enterprise and organised crime also plays an important role in some clientelist systems.

Van de Walle (2007b) makes a distinction between prebends and patronage resources. Prebendalism refers to placing individuals in a position where they can enrich themselves through corruption or other means. This is mostly associated with intra-elite clientelism. Patronage is the distribution of public goods and services. Van de Walle (2007: 4) exemplifies:

Hiring a member of one’s ethnic group to a senior position in the customs office is an example of patronage. Allowing the customs officer to use the position for personal enrichment by manipulating import and export taxes is an example of a prebend.

Greene (2010) argues that access to state resources are essential for parties to remain in a dominant position in electoral autocracies. Van de Walle (2003: 313) suggests that: “The winning party tends to become dominant since individual politicians know that they are more likely to get access to state resources if they are in the president's party.” In that sense, the dominant party performs a function in formalising support for the president. Reuter (2010) observes this pattern in Russia, where Governors are to a large extent joining the ranks of United Russia in order to secure resources for clientelism. Way (2012: 631) also imparts that ties to old elites gave Post-Soviet leaders a resource advantage, as clientelistic networks often remained intact. A similar conclusion can be drawn in many African cases, where many individuals from the era before the introduction of multi-party rule remain in power today.

This evidence suggests that access to the states is an important resource, providing ample revenue for clientelism. It is however questionable if the origin of the resources needs to be specified as clearly as Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Greene (2010) and Stokes (2009) do. As this study and many others will

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33 Hale’s concept patronal politics is similar to what I label intra-elite clientelism. Intra-elite clientelism makes a clearer distinction between strategies aimed at mass actors.
show, the end of dominance in politics does not necessarily spell the end of clientelism. Elites, be they incumbent or not, use private and public resources to secure their place within intra-elite networks. Practices such as vote-buying and pork barrel politics do not inevitably end once a dominant party has lost its grip on power.

There are several examples of resources from private enterprises and organised crime being used for upholding clientelistic networks, vote buying and repression. The most well-known examples of this in probably the involvement of the Camorra politics in Southern Italy and Naples (for an overview see Allum and Allum, 2008). Naples is not the only case. Chin (2003: 220) writes of Taiwan:

To obtain political influence, one needs money to buy votes and brute force to assure that vote buying is effective. Gangsters provide strong-arm tactics and business entrepreneurs offer monetary support. […] Some gangsters had enough money and some businessmen had enough connections with gangsters to run for office themselves. Consequently, the underworld, the business community and the political arena in Taiwan became so entangled that it is almost impossible to differentiate among gangsters, businessmen and politicians.

Although there are a few examples to draw from, there is a lack of theory on the development of clientelism with the involvement of business and/or organised crime. This dissertation provides a starting point with ample empirical evidence to draw from on the privatisation of clientelism and what that means in authoritarian regimes.

Clientelism is an entrenched system and consequences reach beyond winning or losing elections. It is the bread and butter, which supports elites through private use of state resources, private enterprises or organised crime in exchange for political support. There are several reasons why elites wish to uphold clientelist networks, not all of them connected to securing the future and stability of the regime. Nonetheless, it is the clientelist networks that allow for garnering support during election time though formal or informal means.

**Ethnicity, Clan and Clientelism**

In the Central Asian and African setting, several scholars contend that clan or ethnicity inform clientelism in a variety of ways (see for example Schatz, 2004; Jacquesson, 2012; Bogaards, 2007; Houle 2018). Clan is said to determine coalition building and mass support in Central Asia, while ethnicity is afforded more attention in the East African context. It has been demonstrated that political support is sometimes contingent on ethnicity. Several studies on Kenya have
shown that voting takes place along ethnic lines, and that it is highly unlikely that voters would elect a candidate of a different ethnic group to represent their constituency in parliament34 (see for example Ashforth, 2009; Cheeseman, 2011; Hulterström, 2004).

Ethnic diversity within a state does not per se affect the quality of democracy or levels and dynamics of clientelism. Houle (2018) shows in a large N study that it is not the existence of ethnic diversity that may be detrimental to the quality of democracy, but the politicisation of ethnicity in a given context. Ethnic voting tends to have adverse effects on democracy over time (ibid). This finding does not directly tie into how ethnicity may affect clientelism, yet it indicates that it is politicisation of ethnic difference and clan ties that may influence rather than ethnic diversity in itself.

Clan and ethnicity are not the same, yet they are both complex and sometimes overlap. According to Horowitz ethnicity “easily embraces groups differentiated by colour, language, and religion; it covers “tribes,” “races,” “nationalities,” and castes.” (Horowitz 1985: 53)35. Horowitz’s umbrella concept of ethnicity has since been used as a starting point for many studies in comparative politics, where the stated ambition is to compare, define and analyse the impact of ethnicity in different settings. Although it may seem unprecise on the individual level, it has been salient in studies of elections, democracy and clientelism (Hulterström 2004, Horowitz and Long 2016, Bratton and van de Walle 1997). No such umbrella concept exists for clan. According to Collins (2004: 231) “[…] a clan is an informal organization comprising a network of individuals linked by kin-based bonds.” We can infer that ethnicity and clan can be conceived as forms of social cleavage (Clarke, 2017).

Clientelism and ethnic politics are sometimes conflated; the relationship between patron and client is viewed as inherently ethnic in some context but not others. Clientelistic networks can be based on several different types of loyalty, and sometimes on no loyalty at all. It is questionable it is theoretically relevant if commitment is based on clan other types of allegiances. Collins, who does research in the Central Asian context (2004: 233) emphasises that:

[…] clan is not (but is sometimes confused with) clientelism, patronage, corruption, blat, mafias, regions, ethnic groups, nations, or tribes. In contrast to

34 There are some examples of this. Peter Kenneth, who is the MP for Gatanga constituency is half American. Kisumu East is represented by Sakeel Shabbir of Indian descent. In both cases, the MPs are supported by ethnic parties.

35 There is an ongoing debate on defining ethnicity in political science. For an overview see Chandra 2006.
the clan, clientelism (often used interchangeably with "patron-client relations") is an informal institution involving the exchange of goods/services through an asymmetric, dyadic tie between patron and client, based not on ascription or affection but on need. It is explicitly tied to a political/economic inequality that trades political support for public goods; consequently, the relationship dissolves when its economic basis disappears.

Clientelistic ties can be fleeting, electoral coalitions can for example be formed through an exchange of goods. Clan and ethnic ties are usually more long lived, and they are not necessarily clientelistic. Ethnic, clan and other social cleavages may facilitate and lower the cost of mass-clientelism. Voters in some states and regions may feel loyalty to the coethnic community, which precludes candidates from other ethnic groups from positions of power. This introduces a measure of stability, where outcomes become more predictable. Like Hale (2014: 32) argue, ethnicity and ideology sometimes create bond that facilitate clientelism and sometimes not. Within the elites, ethnic or clan politics may determine coalitions building and bargaining. Where ethnic and/or clan are politicised, elite actors have given political adversaries and allies. Clan and ethnicity (if politicised) can change the dynamics of both intra-elite and mass-elite clientelism. How this plays out in each case will be further discussed in coming chapters.

Repression

Like clientelism, repression is sometimes aimed at the public or mass actors, and sometimes an affair that takes place within the elites. Davenport (2007: 2) argues that “[repression imposes] on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions.”

The types of actions described by Davenport are a definition of hard repression, i.e. the consequences of dissent are physical. Levitsky and Way (2002: 58) include more subtle acts, which do not necessarily lead to physical consequences.

36 There are a number of examples of states, which are ethnically diverse, yet display few clientelistic traits. Switzerland is one such example (Kitcheld 2007: 304)
37 An example is election violence, where violence against groups is used to affect the results, or force re-election.
38 This may include harming or arresting political opponents.
39 Davenport (2007) mentions harassment, surveillance/spying, bans, arrests, torture, and mass killing as examples of physical repression.
These methods often include bribery, the selective allocation of state advertising, the manipulation of debts and taxes owed by media outlets, the fomentation of conflicts among stockholders, and restrictive press laws that facilitate the prosecution of independent and opposition journalists.

The common defining feature of repression is that it is a tool used to incite fear of the consequences for taking political action rather than payoffs (such as clientelism) for support. There are of course cases, which are not clear-cut. Most notably electoral fraud, as these actions do not necessarily incite fear in the opponent. Lehoucq (2003: 233) has a useful definition: “[… we define electoral fraud as clandestine efforts to shape electoral results”. The methods to achieve this may vary, but would certainly include voter intimidation, vote buying, formal or informal exclusion of challengers, and tampering with the electoral process. Birch (2009) makes a useful distinction between fraud aimed at affecting voters, and manipulation of rules and administration of elections. Voters can be manipulated through misinformation in the form of false campaign material, skewed media coverage, obstructing political campaigns or through vote buying or intimidation of voters. Tampering with the administration of elections usually includes ballot stuffing or misconduct in counting or tabulation of votes. Other subtler ways of influencing the administration in favour of a candidate or party includes having fewer polling stations in opposition strongholds to reduce turnout, or to restrict access though poor transportation links. Some forms of electoral fraud, such as vote buying, are a part of clientelist strategies. Others such as restricting access to resources or tampering with the electoral process itself do not incite fear and are thus not repression. In some cases, electoral fraud is repression, for example, cases of voter intimidation. Illicitly influencing voters may take play either through vote buying or intimidation.

Insulating voters from such preconditions is essential for free and fair elections. According to Schedler (2002: 44), these are common tools in electoral authoritarian regimes. Other examples of electoral fraud, which is repression, include the use of formal or informal means to exclude candidates from competition, arrest or otherwise skew the competition by using force. According to Donno and Roussias (2012:595ff), manipulation before elections, harassment of the opposition and other strategies to prevent competition before Election Day reduce the number of parties competing. Electoral fraud is an infringement of rights like repression, is costly for the party executing it, and has similar outcomes as forms of repression that create fear of consequences. It is therefore discussed in concert with repression.
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue that repression is a last resort, that autocrats are only likely to use repressive tactics when the cost of toleration exceeds the cost of repression. Several other scholars share this approach (see for example Greene, 2010: 159). This is like the way electoral fraud was viewed by a number of scholars who argued that incumbents primarily used fraud when they risked losing elections (see for example Lehoucq, 2003; Schedler, 2010: 73; Thompson and Kuntz, 2006). This claim has been refuted by Simpser (2008), who has found that autocrats often use illicit practices to increase the margin of victory to seek legitimacy, not only to win elections. This is a deterrent to opposition forces in dominant party regimes, as resistance to an all-powerful opponent seems futile. Gandhi and Rueter (2013) make a similar argument on when and why repression takes place in electoral autocracies. They argue that repression is more common when there is a strong dominant party as “[…] it is likely that dictators will be restrained from sharing spoils with opposition parties.” (ibid: 147). We can thus conclude that both electoral fraud and repression may take place for several different reasons, under various conditions. In some cases, it is likely that fraud and repression will take place as a desperate measure to remain in power or win elections. In others, the motive is rather to establish an already dominant party or leader as invincible.

It is often assumed that the state is the main tool used for repression see for example (Davenport, 2007; Lust-Okar, 2004). In several empirical cases, we can see that other actors are used as tools of intimidation. Roessler (2005) indicates that the states may privatise violence against mass-actors, when the states repressive apparatus in inefficient or if the state wishes to conceal oppression. He specifies that vigilante groups, paramilitaries, and militias are used. Collier and Vicente (2012) state that criminal gangs have been recruited to instigate violence in Nigerian elections. They also find that tools of coercion, through this privatisation of violence are no longer the sole prerogative of incumbents ahead of, during and after elections. Rather, opposition parties and other groups pitted against the incumbent may have access to and actively use intimidation and violence as a strategy. Tools of violence and repression may be available to incumbent and opposition alike, especially in competitive authoritarian regimes. Collier and Vicente (2012) have found that voters fear intimidation from criminal gangs in several Sub-Saharan African states ahead of and during elections. In a similar manner, tools of election day fraud may be available to more actors than the incumbent. In competitive authoritarian regimes, it is not a given that unduly influencing the local electoral commissions is the privilege of incumbents.

Schedler (2014), who has conducted a study on the involvement of organised crime in Mexican politics, finds that there are four types of coercion used by
criminals. Firstly, criminal gangs may capture candidates, i.e. through subversive means manage to get friendly candidates elected. Secondly, unfriendly candidates may be discouraged or prevented from running through intimidation or violence. Thirdly, criminals may set the political agenda; the mention of organised crime or strategies to combat it may lead to lethal consequences for any elected official. Fourthly, criminal gangs may intimidate voters, preventing certain groups from voting altogether. Of the four types mentioned, only the last is aimed at mass-actor. This categorisation of actions is useful, in that it identifies avenues open to criminal actors. For Schedler’s theory to travel, it needs some slight amendments. A problem is that it does not include the possibility of long-established politicians co-opting criminal gangs in order to gain access to resources for clientelism and muscle for repression; in the Mexican case it seems that criminals are co-opting politicians rather than the other way around.

Like with clientelism, strategies aimed at elite and mass actors serve different purposes. Inciting fear of repression in elite actors may affect elite cohesion or discourage potential challengers from taking part in elections. In addition, repression of elites can be targeted to bring larger groups of society in line, as fear of reprisals is spread. Regarding repression and intimidation of mass actors, the intention is also to discourage opposition. In cases of electoral violence, the aim is usually to prevent voters from casting their ballots. In contrast, mass-elite clientelism at election time is often a way to mobilise supporters, who would otherwise not have voted.

Summary
In this section I have theorised two possible sources of influence on single party, dominant party and competitive authoritarian regimes namely clientelism and repression. These are tools, which are sometimes only available to incumbents, while at other times or in other cases non-incumbent actors may have access to them as well.

Clientelism and repression have much in common. They can be aimed at mass or elite actors. The agent may be an incumbent or not, and they may be executed by state actors or others. In terms of repression, it is possible for incumbents to use the state apparatus40, while private channels are repression through other actors such as criminal gangs, militias, individual agents or private companies.

40 Including the judiciary, police, military and other branches. It may also may include any other authorities including tax and revenue authorities.
Regarding clientelism, it is possible to use state resources or other resources for both mass-elite and intra-elite clientelism. Although incumbents have an advantage in that they have access to the state, both as a repressive mechanism and as a cash cow for clientelism, they are not the sole actors with access to these strategies. It is not uncommon that private resources are used for clientelism. The costs of using clientelism or repression, either to gain access to power or remain in power may vary, yet it is inherent to electoral authoritarian regimes that they use both strategies. While repression is a form of punishment, clientelism is a form of reward for compliance. Most strategies used in electoral authoritarian regimes can be categorised as either repression or clientelism. There are however some exceptions. One is the use of electoral fraud, which can be repressive and clientelistic at once. Gyimah-Boadi (2007: 29) elaborates on patronage and formal and informal pre-electoral fraud in African elections:

[Patronage] allows the ruling party to use subtle and crude means to disorganize and destroy opposition parties; to deny the opposition the oxygen of media coverage; to deploy state security forces and sometimes the courts to harass the opposition; and to block private sector sources of funding for the opposition by destroying businesses of those not aligned with the ruling party or suspected to be sympathetic to the opposition.

The interplay between clientelism and repression will provide an analytical framework for analysing single party rule, dominant party rule and competitive authoritarianism in the four states studied here. The legacy and practices from the single-party era may be relevant to understanding how clientelism and repression operate and is structured in each of the cases investigated. It is here that the differences between the regions become visible and the unique dimensions of the cases become clear.

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41 Seeking compliance is also a way of seeking legitimacy for the regime.
Methods and Research Design

Design

This study is comparative; it compares states over time as well as in relation to each other. In comparative studies, the aim is often to analyse similarities and differences in order to understand the essential conditions of the subjects studied. Here, these conditions are the differences and similarities regarding clientelism and repression. The idea of studying similarities and differences is almost as old as Political Science itself, John Stuart Mill’s (1850) method of agreement and method of difference, where the method of agreement aims at comparing similar cases and that of difference the dissimilar. Differences are sought in order to determine why something has occurred in one case but not the other. Theoretically, the method asks the question “all else being equal, why has X occurred in one state, but not the other? In contemporary Political Science, the most similar and most different case research design mirror Mill’s early thoughts on the subject. Mill’s methods have inspired the development of the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) and the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD).

The cases in this study were selected to fit a modified MDSD model. With MDSD, cases are selected which do not share characteristics so that you can track the effect of a key similarity (or similarities) on an outcome. Przeworski and Tuene (1970) developed the method in order to study different systems (in this case states) with similar outcomes. For example, if internationalist attitudes are related to education in several states, other systemic differences are irrelevant (ibid: 35). In contrast, a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) compares similar systems, with a view to find factors that cause divergent outcomes. Anckar (2008) argues that in order to compare systems using MDSD, the dependent variable (i.e. outcomes) must be constant across the cases. MDSD also allows for investigation below the systemic level.

Given that the purpose of this study is explorative, the outcome or dependent variable is unknown. At the onset, how the qualities of clientelism and repression change during and after regime transition is uncharted territory, and one of the
The main aims is to collect, evaluate and analyse new knowledge on the subject matter. The case selection was based on two sets of similar cases (Kenya/Tanzania and Kyrgyzstan/Kazakhstan), with a key difference\(^{42}\), the current regime type (see table 1).

Kenya and Tanzania are similar cases; they are neighbouring countries in East Africa, they are both former British colonies, both are developing countries and have experienced transitions to multi-party rule during the 1990s. The crucial difference is that Tanzania is a dominant party system and Kenya experienced an opposition victory in the 2002 elections and has since then had vivid competition for power\(^{43}\). Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are related in the same way: they are neighbouring states, share a Soviet past, introduced formal multi-party rule during the early 1990s. Since independence, Kazakhstan has remained a dominant party system, while Kyrgyzstan is a competitive authoritarian state.

Traditionally, most similar cases are identified through geographical criteria, as well as historical and political likeness. Countries like Norway and Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands, and Spain and Italy are often considered similar cases (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 37f).

The cases were selected on the basis that they are ideal for studying how clientelism and repression changes when dominant parties persist or lose in two very different geographical settings. I believe that there is logic to including cases from more than one region. King, Keohane and Verba (1994) caution against drawing conclusions based on a single case. Two pairs of cases in separate regions should provide enough data to indicate whether the findings are relevant to studies in other contexts, to investigate patterns of changes in the dynamics of clientelism and repression.

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\(^{42}\) The regime type is not the outcome in this study, as the aim is not to investigate why transitions happen, but how transitions may inform clientelism and repression.

\(^{43}\) There are of course other differences between the two. Kenya was a settler colony left with a fair number of political institutions at independence, while Tanzania had a very small British administration. Kenya has historically experienced a greater degree of ethnic conflict, while Tanzania has succeeded in overcoming some of those potential threats to national stability through an active and deliberate nation building strategy. Similarity and difference are thus a matter of interpretation.
### Different Systems

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#### Similarities

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#### Differences

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<td>Competitive Authoritarian</td>
<td>Dominant Party</td>
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#### Outcomes/Questions

- Mass-elite clientelism: State, private or party resources? Executed by state/party or other actor?
- Intra-elite clientelism: State, private or party resources? Executed by state/party or other actor?
- Repression: State, private or party resources? Executed by state/party or other actor?

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44 The has varied in Kyrgyzstan, with a period of more division of power between executive and legislative. A return to a stronger executive is pending.
Selecting cases from two very different geographical regions may seem arbitrary, especially considering the current debate on different forms of authoritarianism and the problem of conceptual clarity when discussing cases, which are too divergent. Morse (2012: 188) for example warns specifically against comparing Central Asia with Africa:

In sum, how do we integrate what is a prolific field into a sounder comparative structure? A [...] solution offered is to confine arguments to similar contexts with regard to the origins and timing of electoral authoritarianism. The emergence of electoral authoritarianism in the new states of Central Asia is bound to follow a different pattern from that seen in Africa.

Morse’s argument is not well founded as we cannot know if the states in Central Asia are “bound to follow a different pattern” if it is not empirically investigated. We cannot discard theories on similarity and difference simply because they seem implausible at first glance. On the contrary, the cross regional investigation in this study is its strength. If clientelism and repression have a similar function in these contexts, it strengthens the probability that the theoretical conclusions of this study can travel to other regions and cases.

Scholars on authoritarianism can often be identified as having a specific regional focus. Michael Bratton, Nicholas van de Walle, Lise Rakner, Staffan Lindberg, and many more who’s theoretical and empirical work is cited in this dissertation work almost exclusively on African cases and contexts. It is sometime argued that African political realities differ significantly from other contexts because of a shared colonial past (Ake, 1996: 1ff). Comparing with non-African states has the added advantage of bringing some of the theories, which have been developed for the African context onto the global arena. Africanists have been at the forefront of research on clientelism (see for example Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Gyimah-Boadi, 2007; Hydén, 2005; Lindberg, 2003; van de Walle, 2007a). Applying and developing these theories in a different setting will show how well these theories travel and if they are applicable to the Central Asian context. There are some embryonic attempts to apply these theories to the Central Asian context, although it is obvious that communication between scholars of the two regions is not always smooth (Isaacs, 2010a; Schatz, 2006).

In a similar manner, there are groups of scholars who work solely on the Central Asian context see for example (Brill Olcott, 2005; Collins, 2004; Isaacs, 2010a; Radnitz, 2010b; Schatz, 2000). There are a few exceptions to this rule: Berins Collier (1999) compares the democratic development a great number of states in Western Europe and Latin America, Levitsky and Way (2010b) analyse a great
number of cases in their book Competitive Authoritarianism. There are exceptionally few works, where few states are analysed and they are from different regions, a notable exception being Brownlee’s (2007a) Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, where he draws on research from Iran, Egypt, Malaysia and the Philippines. While Brownlee’s perspective is comparative, he has selected four cases with similar outcomes. Although there are significant differences between the cases, all four are (or were at the time of writing) authoritarian regimes where multi-party (or in the case of Iran multi-fractional) elections were held on a regular basis (ibid:2007a: 3f).

One of the strengths of the design is that it attempts to bridge the gap between studies, which focus on a single region, and broad quantitative comparative studies. It is true that there are some similarities between states in sub-Saharan Africa, they share a colonial heritage and often low GDP per capita. It is also true that the post-Soviet legacy influences the current political systems and regimes in Central Asia. However, in some regards the proponents of regional comparisons miss the mark. The differences described above are systemic, and it is plausible that explanatory factors are at a different level45.

Regime change affects the makeup of clientelistic networks, the resources available and repression46. For that reason, a historical perspective is applied, spanning from the 1960s47 to the present. It contributes and understanding of how historical legacies and past regimes influence clientelism and repression.

A pairwise comparison of Kenya and Kyrgyzstan throughout the time period is done. Single-party and dominant party rule in Kazakhstan and Tanzania is compared. The conclusions based on these extensive empirical investigations will inform the debate on privatising repression and clientelism.

Methods

Interviews

In practice, the writing of this dissertation thesis has involved spending a long time in each of the states studied. During the years 2009-2011, I conducted field work in each state studied, staying for at least 4 months in each country and in Kazakhstan for a significantly longer period48. For that reason, the focal point of

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45 For example, relationships with the elites.
46 And, perhaps vice versa.
47 And in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan even earlier.
48 Kazakhstan was by far the most difficult political context to penetrate.
the empirical contribution is on that time period. Since that time, all for states have remained within their regime types, despite several elections taking place in the interim. Follow up interviews with experts and journalists have been conducted to bring the findings up to date. These interviews were conducted through Skype or Messenger. I have also reviewed academic literature, media sources and reports on critical developments in each case. The extended time period of the study means that new dynamics, such as the effects of democratic backsliding, are considered, which increases the scope of this study. There are clear advantages to this, as it provides more evidence for theories developed on the privatisation of clientelism and repression.

During my time in the field, I have conducted interviews with MPs, former MPs, people who are planning to run for parliament, party leadership in various political parties, experts, journalists, academics and activists. Approximately 300 interviews were conducted. Initially, selecting the interviewees was based on extensive reading of local and international media in order to find persons who are active in the political debate and could contribute their knowledge and insights. It was also essential to find representatives from the incumbent regime as well as the opposition in all states, as I believe that the responses would differ. Former MPs were also selected, as people who are retired from the political stage may be willing to contribute information that would be detrimental to an active politician. I then contacted the individuals through various channels. In the Kenyan and Tanzanian context, very few people responded to emails. Personal connections and phone calls was essential. Each interviewee was asked if she or he had suggestions for persons I should interview, using snowball selection method. In this way, I gained access to politicians and others on different levels in the hierarchy. I quickly realized the importance of an extensive social network, including administrative staff at the various assemblies to get connected to potential interviewees.

Snowballing is often used by researchers in the social sciences for practical reasons; it is simply an easy way to approach potential interviewees. It has been suggested that using the snowball method also provides information about social, organic networks. Noy (2008: 340f) argues that using the method gives access to knowledge about how people are connected socially, which may be vital to understanding how a particular context is made up. In this study, it has been interesting to map the social network in the sense that the persons suggested have been connected in a variety of ways – it is not necessarily so that they belong to the same political party. On Zanzibar, a CUF leader put me in contact with some of the main CCM players on the island. This was quite surprising to the CCM leader Ali Mzee, who regarded the interview as an olive branch from the
opposition. Put into context, there is sometimes valuable information to gain from snowball methods, not least in terms of what key individuals are not suggested. Aside from the formal interviews, I gained a lot of information about the political game in each state through informal discussions. For example, I watched the final of the All Africa Cup in a hotel bar in Dodoma with MPs representing the CCM party. During the halftime, there was a lively discussion on the developments and a possible split in the party. In Kazakhstan, where representatives of the ruling party Nur Otan stated that the party had practically universal support, speaking to people in bazaars, in taxis and other public places revealed that this was far from the truth. These encounters have been useful to broadening my understanding of each context.

One problem with the selection of interviewees was that representatives of opposition parties in Tanzania and Kazakhstan were more willing to be interviewed than representatives of the dominant party. In all four cases, western oriented English-speaking individuals were more likely to say yes to interviews than others. A concerted effort was made to counteract this by asking a many representative of dominant parties and old guard politicians for interviews.

In many cases, interviewees agreed to be interviewed only if anonymity was granted49. In many instances, individuals in opposition, activists or journalists would request to remain anonymous because of fear of repercussions. In other cases, representatives of the incumbent party agreed to speak more freely under those conditions. Many more individuals requested anonymity in Central Asia than in East Africa. A possible reason may be a more efficient secret service in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In Kazakhstan in particular, it was difficult to find Nur Otan representatives who were willing to speak openly. It was clear that many anonymous representatives of incumbent parties told a different narrative to the official discourse. I found it surprising that many anonymous interviewees were willing to speak of corruption, clientelism, personal networks and illicit tactics in detail when trust had been established. There are of course a number of disadvantages to anonymous interviewees. Ascribing statements to particular political leaders may be important to gain a complete understanding of the political landscape. Nonetheless, the advantages far outweigh these problems. It is unlikely that incumbent party representatives and individuals with political views deemed controversial would have agreed to be interviewed had they not been anonymised.

49 I decided to anonymise all interviews conducted in 2018 and 2019 due to a recent increase in arrests of journalists and activists in all four states.
All interviewees in the study are informants rather than respondents. The difference between these two approaches is that an informant interviewed in order to gain information, while respondents are an object of study when investigating the thoughts and opinions about a certain issue (Esaiasson et al, 2003: 254f.). The number of respondents and methods for selecting them is of course immensely important for the validity of the study, while the it is the quality rather than the number which is important when using informants. It mirrors the distinction between informants and respondents between cases and observations. In King et al’s (1994) view a case is an object of study, while an observation is a piece of information, which provides data on a case. It is the number of cases that increases the reliability of a study while the number of observations increases the validity. Hence, it is possible to use statistical methods while studying a very small number of cases without increasing the reliability. One interview may provide more information than four others depending on the quality of the interview and the information an individual is willing to volunteer. The number of interviews is not the deciding factor, rather it is the information gained from the interviews put together.

In practice, the interviews were conducted using an interview guide50, consisting of several areas for discussion rather than a set of concrete questions. As the interviewees are viewed as informants with very particular knowledge on the subject area rather than respondents, I employed interview methods specific to elite or expert interviews.

According to Flick (2006) interview guides for expert interviews need to be more directive than in other types of semi-structured interviews in order to exclude unproductive topics as there is a real risk that the interviewee will try to influence the direction of the interview. Oftentimes, the expert the order of the day, ongoing conflicts within the field or the personal interests of the interviewee will influence the interview adversely if precautions are not taken (Flick 2006: 165f). On a similar note Dexter (2008: 6f) warns of the perils of elite interviews:

In standardized interviewing […] the investigator defines the question and the problem […]. In elite interviewing, as here defined, however, the investigator is willing, and often eager to let the interviewee teach him what the problem, the

50 There were five main themes, wherein questions about repression and clientelism were central. The themes were: the state and party, media, voters, elites and private enterprise. Given the overarching topic of repression and clientelism, I would for instance ask “What do voters expect in return for supporting a particular candidate in the elections? Do they expect this from the candidate or from the party/state/other actor? How does the candidate or party gain access to resources for this?”
question, the situation, is. [...]. [T]his approach has been adopted much more often with the influential, the prominent and the well-informed than with the rank and file of a population. [Elites] insist on explaining to him how they see the situation, what the real problems are as they view the matter.

Although it seems drastic to allow the interviewee to control the premise of the interview, Dexter’s approach to the issue is quite humbling; in many cases politicians and other elite actors are more knowledgeable about local political issues than me as a researcher. In order to counteract the lack of control described by Dexter and Flick, the interview guide was constructed in a manner as to get more specific as the interview progressed. In order to put the interviewee at ease I started off with a set of “grand tour” questions, allowing the individual to elaborate on the issues at hand, and then going on to discuss the specific questions of interest in this study (Leech 2002: 667). I did careful research on each of the individuals interviewed beforehand, primarily through reading local newspapers and other media. This allowed for a set of specific questions on the processes and events he or she was involved in, and a more informed set of follow up questions.

In practice, the quality, length and specifics of each interview varies a great deal. For example, an interview with a Kenyan MP, Rachel Shebesh, took scarcely more than 20 minutes as she had other appointments, while I spoke with a Tanzanian MP, Ismail Jussa, on Zanzibar for a full 2 hours. The replies provided by Shebesh were useful for the study, yet the depth provided by longer interviews cannot be underestimated. Moreover, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan I was obliged to bring a translator to many interviews as my skills in Russian are rudimentary and my knowledge of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz languages nil. This was not the case in Tanzania and Kenya. This of course affected the interviews, as the directness of communication with a common language is preferable. Many of the persons who have translated for this dissertation have been skilled and reliable, facilitating communication with few difficulties. Most of the interviews were recorded and transcribed by me. When difficulties concerning language or meaning arose, I used the assistance of translators. In some cases, interviewees asked not to be recorded, notes were used. In those instances, the notes were transcribed immediately, as not to lose detail or quotes.
Single Party Rule

At some point, all four states included in this study have a history of formal single-party rule, where only one party could compete for political power. This section investigates the dynamics of clientelism and repression prior to the introduction of multi-party rule. The states studied here introduced multi-party rule during the 1990s when a great number of states in Africa and former communist states in Europe and Asia took a similar path.

In the first section, Kenya and Kyrgyzstan are discussed. In the Kenyan case, there were significant variations over time. Initially Kenya was a multi-party state. After independence, two parties, KANU and KADU competed for power. After only a few years, KADU and KANU merged. Another attempt was made to create an opposition party in 1966, when Kenya People’s Union was formed through the defection of a number of party members from KANU. Although KPU competed in one election winning parliamentary seats in some constituencies, it was outlawed in 1969. From 1969 until 1992, no parties apart from KANU won seats in the parliament. It was clear that challengers to KANU would be outlawed and members of opposition parties harassed. Kenya was without doubt a single party state. Although KANU had a firm grip on power, political competition was not formally outlawed until 1982. The entire era between independence and 1992, when multi-party rule was reintroduced does however have more in common with single party states than dominant party states.

Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand was not an independent state during these years. Before independence, the republic was referred to as the Soviet Republic of Kyrgyzstan and its capital Frunze, modern day Bishkek. Many of the dynamics of single party rule during this time are common for the entire Soviet Union. This is especially true regarding the party as an institution and how other organisations, which were linked to the party, functioned. For that reason, the analysis of party and other state institutions is, at least in part, valid for Kazakhstan as well. In terms of clientelism, there are however features, which are unique to Soviet Kyrgyzstan and cannot be universally applied to the entire USSR. What part intra-elite clientelism and mass-elite clientelism played in Soviet Kyrgyzstan may have
a bearing on the dynamics of dominance during the subsequent dominant regimes and well as pluralism after 2010.

In the following section, the single-party regimes in Kazakhstan and Tanzania will be discussed. Several similarities between the state of affairs in the Soviet republics of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan will be made apparent. This is especially true regarding the role of the party as a stabilising force in Kazakh politics. About clientelism, there are clear differences between the state of affairs in the two republics, where Kazakhstan displayed fewer independent elites and more loyalty to Moscow throughout.

Like Kenya, the Tanzanian state suffered with weak and underfunded state institutions immediately after independence. Unlike Kenya, Tanzania became a formal single-party state almost immediately. Clientelism became a mode of governing, though loyalties within the elite as well as mass-elite clientelism took on different patterns. Ethnicity was not as significant in Tanzanian politics. The greatest difference between the two states was the degree of state control.

Single-Party Rule in Kyrgyzstan and Kenya

Clientelism

Both Kyrgyzstan and Kenya have had elements of clientelist relationships for many years. These relationships during the Soviet Era in Kyrgyzstan and the single-party era in Kenya are investigated. The purpose is to examine if and how these patterns have a bearing on clientelism in the two states today.

Mass-Elite Clientelism

It is sometimes assumed that the Soviet authority was hierarchical, and that the threat of retaliation would ensure that repression was the main tool of the state. Some scholars have assumed that elections were just a mandatory part of life for Soviet citizens, and that non-compliance could have severe consequences (see for example Wheeler, 1955). This is true to an extent, during the Soviet era millions were deported and arrested, and it is likely that not supporting the communist party publicly would cause reprisals. However, some forms of clientelism did exist, and it was commonly used as an incentive for voters during election time. Huskey (1995: 820) writes that voters in would often expect favours in return for their votes in Kyrgyzstan, for example a new road or water drawn to a particular village or place. In the Soviet Union, near 100% turnout rates with no dissent were common (Karklins, 1986). If these numbers were achieved, citizens could expect clientelist resources in return. Even though Soviet Kyrgyzstan was totalitarian,
public support still mattered to leaders, as it created some legitimacy. Scarce goods such as oranges and eggs, which would often not be available in the shops, would be sold at low prices at the polling stations (Birch, 2011: 712). According to Karklins (1986), music and a festive atmosphere were essential during elections in the Soviet Union, as was a buffet where voters could enjoy cheap food and drink. These and other methods used to encourage turnout rates can be viewed as a form of clientelism.

Gilison (1968) writes that it was possible for Soviet voters to vote “no” to the candidate nominated by crossing out the name on the ballot. In order to do so, the voter was obliged to use the “secret” polling booth, which was available in all polling stations. Voters who intended to vote yes had no reason to use the booth, as folding the ballot and placing it in the ballot box was enough. In this way, voting no was very difficult without detection. The act of voting was a symbolic act rather than as an exercise of political choice. As a party member of the Ata-Jurt party said in an interview in Bishkek:

> When we went to vote in the 1980s, we weren’t really thinking of what voting meant in other parts of the world. We went because the whole village came out, we put on our best clothes, we ate good food, we flirted with men and listened to music. Elections were made to be fun for everyone. […] The other side is that we, all of us, knew that we didn’t have a choice, we had to go there to vote. Nobody I knew even thought about voting no, in fact, I never heard of anyone doing that.

Mass-Clientelism in Kyrgyzstan before the break-up of the Soviet Union was usually directed at groups rather than individuals. When Kyrgyzstan became part of the Soviet Union, agriculture was collectivised. For the first time, many citizens settled permanently. Traditionally, the Kirgiz were nomadic, with few connections to central authority or the state. The advent of Soviet Rule created a link to the state that had previously been at most weak and often non-existent. Jones Luong (2004) writes that the Soviets made some concession to traditional kinship ties, in that collective farms often compromised one such group. Further, there was a clear division of labour during the early Soviet years, where Slavs from Russia and Ukraine were skilled labourers in the urban areas, while the titular population remained in the rural areas, doing menial labour. This became a breeding ground for mass-elite clientelism, as the rural population became highly dependent on the urban elites. Through compliance and support, districts or villages could gain access to resources, which would otherwise not have been made

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51 Soviet power was established in 1918.
available. The difference between these policies and pork barrelling is that a measure of control existed; persons who voted no or did not vote at all did not get access to resources and were sometimes punished or persecuted.

In Kenya, mass-elite clientelism was more important than in Kyrgyzstan shortly after independence. Before the end of colonialism, local leaders established networks of support, which paved the way for the new clientelistic state (Anderson, 2005: 550). During the Kenyatta years, clientelism was the most important bond between ordinary citizens and politicians. According to Widner:

Elected officials and senior civil servants competed to secure development projects in their home areas or made monetary contributions to local initiatives in order to secure votes and other elements of political support (Widner, 1992).

Mass-elite clientelism was an effective way of preventing political protest. Tamarkin (1978: 315) for example writes:

The rural masses that form the bulk of the under-privileged class have certainly not arrived at the stage at which they can organize nationally for effecting a revolution. The loyalty of the majority of the rural population centres most probably still around their immediate kinship groups. The vertical patron-client networks, which are spread throughout the country, also inhibit the development of horizontal class loyalties and bring the rural masses under the influence of the ruling elite through local ‘big men’.

Development projects, such as the digging of wells sometimes benefits single families rather than the community. In Kenya, clientelism was often the only way that ordinary Kenyans could get access to public goods. The public service was poor, as were most of the electorate.

It was common for politicians to spend resources during election time. During the 1977 elections, one candidate for KANU in Mombasa boasted to the media that he had spent 750000 KSH on the election campaign. The same year, it was reported that the strategy of the citizens in Western Kenya was to receive candidates with enthusiasm in order to take advantage of the clientelist resources (Tamarkin, 1978: 318). A former MP, Otieno Mak’Onyango said speaking about elections during the 1970s and 1980s:

Everyone knew that at election time, it was time to get something extra. A new layer of paint was put on everything. And suddenly local development was a priority. If you went to the rallies, you could expect to come home with something,
The 1966 elections were far from free and fair. The opposition received virtually no media coverage and there were serious irregularities in counting and tabulation of the vote. Despite this, KANU used clientelist strategies to increase their margin of victory. There were serious allegations that KANU used public money for the campaign (Hornsby, 2012: 165). KANU, unlike other parties, had access to the state coffers, using it generously for the purpose of buying support.

In 1982 a few years after Moi became Kenya’s president, the dynamics of mass-elite clientelism changed dramatically. Kenya abolished its formal multi-party system and banned all other parties. In terms of power, this shift made little difference as KANU had dominated the political stage completely for many years (Widner, 1992: 188). It did however signify a shift, where mass-elite clientelism became less significant and repression became more important.

In 1985 the electoral process changed. The secret ballot was replaced by a system of “queue voting”. Voters would simply stand in line behind their chosen candidate in primary elections. If a candidate received 70% or more of the vote, there was no need for general elections (Hydén, 1994: 91). Before that, it had been difficult for Kenyan incumbents to know if their system of clientelism worked on an individual level. Polling booths were generally used and there were few options available to find out how an individual had voted. In that sense, the situation was different to that of Soviet Kyrgyzstan, where dissent was easy to detect at every polling station and in much of society. Prior to the change in the electoral law in Kenya, candidates would canvass whole communities with cash before elections. Crowds would assemble, and money would be distributed to those who had gathered to support the candidate.

Although these practices were not completely abandoned when Moi became president, they were to a large extent replaced with more subdued forms of clientelism, such as supporting development projects. Ajulu (2002) argues that mass-elite clientelism was completely politicised during the Moi years, with resources being steered away from Kikuyu dominated areas. Investment in infrastructure, healthcare and education was now completely contingent on public support for Moi. Mass-elite sometimes turned from carrot to stick, as KANU candidates would threaten to cancel support to a particular area if voters did not turn up to support him or her in the queue voting exercise (Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 45).

The relatively liberal policies of Kenyatta relied on public support, yet that support was not based on programmatic politics. At independence, there were two...
parties on the political arena: KANU and KADU. They were both based on clientelistic ties and had strong support within their respective ethnic communities. KADU represented smaller ethnic groups, while KANU was the party of the largest ethnic group the Kikuyu, Meru and Embu groups (Widner, 1992: 51ff). KANU won the founding elections, yet KADU held enough seats in the Senate to prevent constitutional changes and absolute dominance by KANU (Hornsby, 2012: 95). There were political differences between the two, KANU promoted Kenyan nationalism and a strong central government and KADU majimboism, a form of federalism which would protect smaller communities and ethnic groups (for an overview see Anderson, 2005). Early on, political support was based on clientelism and ethnicity rather than the real and existing policy differences between the parties. In 1964, KADU was forced to merge with KANU, creating a single-party state. This did not diminish the importance of ethnicity in Kenyan politics, rather there are clear signs that the Kikuyu community, which was Kenyatta’s ethnic group was favoured during his time in office, while resources shifted to the Kalenjin group when Moi took office.

Mass-elite clientelism came to resemble Soviet Kyrgyzstan in Kenya when Kenyatta died, and Moi became Kenya’s new leader. In Kyrgyzstan, as was the case in the entire USSR, repression was the most important tool. During Moi’s presidency, this became the state of affairs in Kenya as well. Both the single-party regime in Kenya and in Kyrgyzstan were stable autocracies, which left little room for dissent, while at least to some extent relying on mass-elite clientelism for support. This is not surprising, as clientelism serves several purposes, regardless of the regime type. As Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 458) point out, mass-elite clientelism blurs the line between the public and the private good. In doing so, it is an effective tool in thwarting opposition. Although resources spent in Kenya reduced, and where never great in Kyrgyzstan, the expectation of mass-elite clientelism rather than public goods was a tool used to keep politics a private, rather than public affair. It changes the public expectation on politicians; rather than demanding change, access to goods and services through clientelist exchange is desired. As Crick (2013) argues, politics cannot be a private affair, as this precludes inclusiveness of those who have a stake in decisions.

**Intra-Elite Clientelism**

There is no watertight divide between elite and mass actors. On an individual level, persons become elite or mass actors depending on changing personal circumstance. Elite actors are those who are important enough to co-opt; they are the business elites, civil servants, and political elites on the national and local level. Elite actors are simply those who can influence the political choices of others. For
example, civil servants may be elite actors in some cases but not in others depending on the influence they have in society.

Although the Soviet system attempted to break down traditional clientelistic networks, this strategy was not always successful (Hale, 2014: 47). The political system introduced after the revolution rather encouraged new forms of intra-elite clientelism. With only one person nominated for each political position, the scramble for nomination was fierce. It was not uncommon for nominations to be viewed as a reward, payment or favour. Harasymiw for example writes:

That the nomenklatura should suffer the second defect is not surprising; it is an excellent instrument of patronage. Instances are exceedingly plentiful where party organizations have been upbraided for restricting their nomenklatury to a select handful of well-known and supposedly "indispensable" workers (Harasymiw, 1969: 509).

Turdukan Usubaliyev, of Kyrgyz decent, was the party secretary of Kyrgyzstan from 1961-1985. He surrounded himself with loyal Kyrgyz party officials and government personnel and established a rather elaborate system based on clientelism. During his time in office, he filled many positions with individuals from his own region Naryn Oblast, introducing an element of regionalism in Kyrgyz politics (Jones Luong, 2000:16). In the later years this included the co-option of Slavs into these networks meant that some autonomy from Moscow could be achieved. There were several scandals involving government officials and corruption, in particular the sale of black-market goods (Huskey, 1995: 816. Anderson (1999a: 15f) describes elite networks under Usubaliyev:

[T]his personnel policy represented a more overt reversion to clientelism it was one which exhibited elements of change are adaption as well as continuity. In consequence patronage networks would continue to be based on kinship and regional identities, yet simultaneously the system allowed for the co-optation of individuals from other groups, even Slavs and Europeans were drawn in on occasions.[…] Moscow appeared content to allow the creation of regional fiefdoms so long as political loyalty was maintained and five-year plan targets more or less met.

Gleason (1991: 620) observes that:” The Central Asian states seem to be particularly fertile ground for “administrative failure” having its source in clientelistic relationships. “. He also observes that the corrupt practices were so ingrained that officials did not understand that they were at fault when caught. Their superior simple required compliance in corruption and embezzlement
The party was the arena for such exchanges, and the distinction between party and state was unclear. This indicates that the exchange of favours in return for support was entrenched and that this was used as a system to co-opt local elites.

Low-level corruption was also quite common in the Soviet Union in general. A survey study of ex-Soviet citizens conducted by DiFranceisco and Gitelman (1984), shows that most Soviet citizens felt that they had little influence over policy, but could influence decision makers and civil servants through corruption and connections. When posed with the question: “What should a woman do who wants to get her mediocre son into the mathematics department of a university?” 62.1% responded that she should use her connections or bribe the official in charge. During the 1940s and 1950s, there was a substantial housing shortage throughout the urban areas in the Soviet Union. In order to secure adequate accommodation individuals and families would turn to the official housing agency that would allocate a place to live. One respondent in DiFranceisco and Gitelman’s study (1984: 615) said that “people did not ask each other “did you give”, but only “how much””. Party officials, people with responsible posts, friends and family of those in the housing authorities or others with goods or services to trade were at an advantage and could relatively easily obtain a dwelling. Low-level corruption is not synonymous with clientelism. Clientelism has the explicit purpose to secure political support (see for example Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Hilgers, 2011; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Pitcher et al., 2009; Stokes, 2009). Low-level corruption is not the same as clientelism as political support is not part of the equation. It is quite telling that positions within the administration, such as the public housing agencies put individuals in a position where they could expect to be on the receiving end of rents. Positions were cash cows and were used as a resource in intra-elite clientelism. Gleason (1991: 620) argues that interpersonal relationships were more important in Central Asia than in many other parts of the Union. He writes:

Throughout the USSR as a whole, the fusion of political and economic decision making tended to invest formal positions with access to resources. Under conditions of market scarcity, access to goods and services was often dependant on having the right connections. […] In bureaucratic contexts, higher and lower actors were enmeshed in networks of mutual obligation and responsibility (Gleason, 1991: 619).

There were several purges during the Soviet years, where individuals who were uncomfortable were removed, deported, killed or imprisoned in Kyrgyzstan (Zenkovsky, 1954). During the final years of Soviet rule, thousands of individuals
were removed from office in an attempt to root out ingrained clientelistic networks and bring individuals who were loyal to Moscow in as power holders. In Kyrgyzstan, that meant that Absamat Masaliyev, a man with strong party ties, but weak intra-elite network became the new leader of Kyrgyzstan in 1985 (Collins, 2004: 240). The main reason for the purge was that the corrupt practices were seen as a threat to Moscow’s dominance and supremacy (Huskey, 1995). During Usabaliyev’s time in office, aspiring elites looked to Frunze for promotion. With his ouster, the dynamics of intra-elite clientelism changed, bringing the spotlight firmly back to Moscow. Most interviewees were unwilling to speak of intra-elite clientelism in Kyrgyzstan during the Soviet years. An exception to this is a political activist and journalist interviewed in Bishkek:

Back in those days, it was very clear to us: The nomenklatura had the power in every aspect of your life. They would get very rich using the money from Moscow and all of the industries. They shared among themselves. Sometimes Moscow would change the set-up, some people were thrown out and new people came in. It was the same but with new faces. Maybe they were more loyal. Now, it is the same but hidden. Many of them [politicians] are the sons, relatives or friends of the people who had it then. […] That’s why they don’t want to talk about it.

Temir Kulov, a scholar at the American University in Bishkek, expressed a similar sentiment:

During the Soviet years, political loyalty was completely essential to wealth. […] Moscow was important, but the relationships and networks here were more so. Masaliyev was not really a part of that, so on the surface things changed. […] In the end, the old networks, before Masaliyev, became important again after independence.

The appointment of Masaliyev caused upheaval within the elite networks in Kyrgyzstan. Not surprisingly, Masaliyev chose to distance himself from Usabaliyev stating that:

He [Usabaliyev] singlehandedly resolved cadre and other questions, did not tolerate objections, would not suffer any observations which differed from his opinion, and did not shrink from persecuting people who did not suit him ...

52 Now Bishkek

Those loyal to Usubaliyev had largely been in control of the state, the bureaucracy and state-owned industry. Gorbachev’s attempt to curb the power of the group was not entirely successful. According to a historian at Kyrgyz National University, Gorbachev did not have the power to thwart the influence of Usubaliyev loyalists, even after Masaliyev came to power.

Everyone was connected to him [Usabaliyev]. Gorbachev tried to get rid of it, but the Usabaliyev’s people were in every factory, every institution, every university. Everyone who had achieved an elite position was with Usabaliyev. For Gorbachev it was impossible, there is no way you can get rid of that, not quickly. […] The result? Well for the first time there were a lot of people [authors note: referring to elites] in Kyrgyzstan who were not loyal, not loyal to Moscow and certainly not loyal to Masaliyev. It all became very difficult.

Masaliyev was forced out of the political elite shortly before independence when Askar Akayev became president. Elites, powerful under Usabaliyev, came back into power and were allowed to profit from Kyrgyzstan’s rapid privatisation of state enterprises.

The means used to uphold elite networks in Soviet Kyrgyzstan were state resources. Very few other resources were available at the time as industry was the property of the state. Access to the state was thus essential; as networks were built on the sharing resources, links could be severed if and when individuals or groups were excluded from the sphere of power. In theory, other sources income was of course possible, even though there were few private companies. Organised crime sometimes facilitates resources for clientelism. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, organised crime was not a major source of income for individuals seeking to break into the political elite. Lee (1990) reports that drug use and trafficking in the Soviet Union in general and in Central Asia in particular was a modest problem, much smaller than in the west. During the Soviet years almost all drugs for domestic consumption were produced in the USSR, smuggling from Afghanistan was limited. During the years of liberalisation leading up to independence, organised crime activities increase, only to explode in the years after independence. To a large extent, state assets were privatised into the hands of criminals (Shelley, 1995).

In Kenya, intra-elite clientelism was also inherent to politics. Early on Kenyatta’s strategy was co-opt potential challengers within the elite, rather than
to exclude them from power. Kenyatta had for many years been opposed to multi-party competition in Kenya on principal. In 1964, he said that those who were opposed to the single party state were the people who had been “warming their bellies under the imperialist wings”. Elites who were unwilling to become members of KANU were often jailed, lost their employment or were disadvantaged in other ways (Widner, 1992: 55). The use of force was not the first alternative. Kenyatta was eager to encourage KADU elites to join the ranks of KANU. For example, Ronald Ngala, one of the last KADU leaders to cross the floor was rewarded with the Chair of the Maize Marketing board, a position, with little political influence but plenty of opportunity for corruption (Hornsby, 2012: 96). KADU leaders were co-opted into KANU, as Kenya was heading for single-party rule53. Loyalty was awarded above all else (Branch and Cheeseman, 2006: 16). Bigsten and Moene (1996) argue that almost anyone could run for office under the KANU umbrella, if that individual remained loyal to Kenyatta. When asked about the function of KANU during the Kenyatta and Moi years, a former politician and business owner in Nairobi said that:

KANU was what tied it all together. The party itself was nothing, but you had to be in the party to do business. It didn’t really matter, you had to be in the party. Patting the right backs would only get you so far, promoting the party was the open display – it showed everyone that you would not try to bring them down, that you were playing the game.

Throup (1993) observes allocation of jobs in the civil service, government positions, low interest loans, government contracts and land grants were almost exclusively distributed along intra-elite clientelistic rational during both the Kenyatta and Moi years (Throup, 1993: 382). The government’s control of the well-educated elite’s employment opportunities did not end with the public sector. There was a real fear of losing one’s public sector job if there were signs of dissent. It was also unlikely that private enterprises would employ uncomfortable individuals for fear of reprisals (Mueller, 1984: 419). The reason for this was that private businesses were dependent on the government for their existence. An anonymous businessman stated in 1971 that:

53 KANU was not entirely without challengers. A splinter group of KANU, Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) under the leadership of Oginga Odinga competed for power in the 1966 “little general elections”. Party members were routinely harassed, lost their jobs and the police disbanded political meetings. KPU was eventually banned in 1969 (Widner 1992: 69f, Branch 2011: 87f, Good 1968: 129)
people who were known to be supporters of the KPU54 lost their jobs both in
the government and in private employment. What used to happen was that
managers and executives of private companies were approached and were
threatened that if you employ KPU supporters it will be known that you are against
the Government, and that you would either lose your trade licenses or be deported.
Therefore, these people had to comply. This was very effective because with the
present unemployment for a man to lose his job because of politics - well, he would
rather keep his mouth shut and keep his job, than come out in the open in favour
of the KPU (Throup 1993: 420).

Kenyatta established a system based on siphoning state resources for the purpose
of clientelism. Barkan (1995: 16) writes that: “[...] KANU was a patron-client
network of local and regional bosses held together by Kenyatta. He dispensed
patronage to subordinate leaders, who in turn provided patronage to their clients
below”. At Independence, white British settlers left Kenya, left behind vast
acreages of arable land. Kenyatta gradually distributed this land was in return for
support (Branch and Cheeseman, 2009). Before independence, Kenyatta had
been fairly ideologically minded, paying lip service to the plight of the poor. Paul
Muite, a lawyer and former MP does not mince his words on the Kenyatta years:

[W]e took the wrong turn in 1963 […] [T]he struggle for independence was about
injustices. The British had come and displaced people from their lands. […] The
first president became a very willing convert to the ruling class. […] Corruption in
this country was introduced by the British, because those who agreed to work with
them were given licences and started making money and showing signs of social
wealth when the majority were suffering. Those were collaborators; the chiefs who
were appointed by the British […]. He [Kenyatta] became an adopted son of the
chiefs. And it is him really who set in place policies that resort to 10% of extremely
wealthy people, owning the resources of the country, land grabbing, corruption,
where the majority continued to wallop in poverty (Paul Muite 2010).

Before independence, Kenya had experienced a major upheaval: the Mau Mau
rebellion, an uprising against colonialism and land grabbing (For an overview see
Anderson, 2011; Branch, 2007; Elkins, 2005). The rebellion had led to mass
mobilisation in some parts of the country particularly in Kikuyu dominated areas.
The rebellion was put down in 1960, a few years before independence, yet had
important consequences for how resources were allocated as the British departed.
Those who had been loyal to the British were given the opportunity to acquire

54 KPU (Kenya Peoples Union) was a small opposition party in Kenya.
land, which had previously belonged to white settler or Mau Mau who had been killed or detained. According to Branch (2007), loyalty with the colonial power became a means of gaining access to resources during the years leading up to independence. Many of the former Mau Mau fighters were evicted from land after the conflict and denied access to education and employment. In that manner, an elite, almost entirely populated by loyalists was created. Power was peacefully handed over to this group at independence, which had consequences for the make-up and structure of the new state:

Through preferential treatment during land and political reform and the post-conflict reconstruction of the local economy, loyalism had become a path towards land, self-mastery and, inadvertently, freedom. When independence eventually arrived in 1963, it bore a striking resemblance to colonial subjugation due to the state’s continuing reliance on patron-client networks […] (Branch, 2007: 313).

It is unlikely that all proffering of material goods during these years were connected to political support, siphoning of resources from the state often took place simply to acquire wealth. On the other hand, these exchanges would not have been possible without access to power, and that access was intimately connected to the office of the president and the KANU party. Branch (2011: 104) exemplifies this through mapping the family connections and corruption in Kenya during the Kenyatta years, where intermarriage with power holders in different ethnic elites served both to facilitate intra-elite and mass-elite clientelism.

From 1975 until Kenyatta’s death in 1978, political life in Kenya was highly contentious. Kenyatta was in ill health and the issue of succession was at the top of the agenda (for a comprehensive overview see Karimi and Ochieng, 1980). According to the constitution, the vice president would take over the presidency at the president’s demise (Widner, 1992: 111f). Daniel Arap Moi was the vice-president. Being a Kalenjin, and former KADU highlife, the appointment of Moi as vice President is the ultimate symbol of Kenyatta’s policy to co-opt rather than repress his political enemies. Bigsten and Moene (1996:180) point out that Kenyatta was committed to maintaining Kikuyu domination. Strong connection between business interests and politicians were bolstered. In many cases, political elites as well as leading figures in the bureaucracy also had interests in the private sector. This allowed for the accumulation of private wealth through granting government contracts to insiders. Political elites with private interests also provided financial services and political consultancies, giving ample opportunity for kickbacks. Bigsten and Moene (1996:191) exemplify this:
A minister with one of the 255 parastatals under his control is for instance allowed to set up a bank or financial institution and order the parastatal to deposit its money there. The bank can then lend money to the minister, his firms or his associates who later default on the loans while the insolvent bank is bailed out by the government.

Although members of other ethnic groups were not completely excluded, their participation was limited. Powerful interests were opposed to Moi becoming the next president of Kenya. Kenyatta’s favoured candidate was Njore Mungai, Kenyatta’s personal doctor and close friend. He lacked popular support in his home constituency and had lost his seat in parliament. Mungai’s needed to increase his financial resources for mass-elite clientelism and to win control of his local KANU branch. With the blessing of Kenyatta, the Central Bank allegedly granted him a loan, which enabled him to engage in the smuggling of embargoed Ugandan coffee (Branch, 2011: 131). Although this did not win Mungai the presidency, it is a clear example of how corruption was connected to intra-elite and mass-elite clientelism in Kenya at the time.

During the Moi years, no attempts were made to root out clientelism. Rather, most politicians considered it acceptable. There was however a shift – where mass-elite clientelism was essential during Kenyatta, intra-elite relationships took centre stage during the Moi years. Hornby (2012: 398) argues that Kenya became near-feudal, where the treasury and Moi’s private fortune had become indistinguishable.

The business community was interlinked with the political elite through family, ethnic or friendship ties. Silas Muriuki, the only MP for Mazingira Green party55 explains that the amassment of wealth within the party escalated:

I would say that it started happening in KANU around 1980 after the coup in 1982, which is when it started happening so that people started amounting a lot of wealth and taking everything to the few. Grabbing every available cloth now, that is when they lost the ideology of African socialism taking care of everybody and that is when KANU lost its track (Silas Muriuki 2010).

What Muriuki is describing is that the size of the clientelistic networks decreased rapidly after Moi’s accession to power. The Kikuyu elites, who had been able to control business and politics for many years found themselves excluded from the state and its resources (Branch and Cheeseman, 2009). This move caused

55 The party was established by the late Nobel Laureate Wangari Maathai. She was an MP for the party during 2002-2007, but failed to win a seat in the 2007 elections.
animosity. The group loyal to Kenyatta no long had access to the state, yet they still controlled a large portion of the wealth in the country. Due to the distribution of land under Kenyatta, and the opportunities giving to amass substantial wealth, some of Moi’s most fervent opponents were independently wealthy individuals. Ajulu (2002) finds that the new Kalenjin (and to some extent from other ethnic groups) elites, was a ”relatively impoverished alliance”. Where Kenyatta’s supporters came from Kenya’s wealthiest areas, the Kalenjin heartland had not benefited from clientelistic resources. The result was that the Kenyan elites became fractioned; there were insiders and outsiders and Moi made few attempts to bridge the gap. According to Throup and Hornsby (1998: 27), excluding Kikuyu elites, who had come to form the financial as well as political power of Kenya threatened the stability of the state, leaving the wealthiest individuals in the country without access to political power.

The reason for Moi’s decision to exclude these groups can in part be explained by the fact that resources became scarcer. During the late 1970s and early 80s, Kenya faced a financial downturn, with earnings from several industries falling while others levelled out. Kenyatta had distributed much of the land and Kenya faced a more difficult economic backdrop (Branch and Cheeseman, 2009). It is also clear that further distribution of wealth to the Kiambu elites56 would have caused an outraged among Moi’s core supporters. A historian at Moi University said that:

> At that time, you have to understand that the Kikuyu had been awarded almost everything since independence. They had the land, the had the businesses and they had political power. It had caused problems, I think for those close to Moi, they felt that it is our turn now. They have had their time, now it is time for us to help our own (2010).

Powerful challengers, increased demands from allies, and a faltering economy meant that maintaining order was demanding. In 1982, a number of former Kenyatta loyalists staged an attempted coup. After this, Moi came to rely heavily on repression rather than attempting to co-opt challengers (Githinji and Holmquist, 2012). It also become important that Moi’s followers could rival the former elite in prosperity and influence. For that reason, Barkan (2004:89) argues, “Moi turned Kenya into his personal fief a kleptocracy under which KANU leaders looted with impunity”. The clientelistic politics of Kenya shifted away from electing outsiders into government, to purging even Moi’s gentlest critics.

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56 Refers to Kikuyu and other related groups from the Central Highlands in Kenya.
Many persons who had previously been insiders were in exile, in prison or were no longer part of the core.

The changes with the Kenyan elite can be compared with the purges, that took place in Soviet Kyrgyzstan during the 1980s. Between 1982 and 1990, fourteen ministers were sacked from government and even more were not reappointed after elections (Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 45). The “Kiambu Mafia”, Kenyatta loyalists from the central highlands were gradually pushed out of government and elite circles in favour of persons from Moi’s own ethnic group the Kalenjin. The power of the party was used to crush dissent among these former elites (Throup, 1993: 371).

Another difference between elite co-optation in the two states is that the system was institutionalised in Kyrgyzstan. In practice, it was necessary for business elites to be KANU members in Kenya, though this rule was not formalised. In Kyrgyzstan, for many types of professions, party membership was mandatory. It was not possible to be the manager of state-owned industries or rise through the ranks of other state institutions without a party card. Article 126 of the Soviet constitution stipulated that role of the party was to be "the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state" (Harasymiw, 1969: 93).

Unlike Kazakhstan, Kenya and Kyrgyzstan do not possess great quantities of natural resources. In resource rich states, the revenue from exporting natural resources is sometimes enough to create elite cohesion; there is little incentive for elites to oppose the current regime if the incumbent can distribute the resources without causing intra-elite strife. Several scholars have argued that resource rich states are less likely to develop into democracies and that an abundance of resources fuels authoritarianism and corruption see for example (Huntington, 1991; Mahdavy, 1970; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008). As Kenya does not have a great deal of natural resources, jobs within the public sector were and are very lucrative. Not only do they provide and income, they often put individuals in a position where they can be on the receiving end of corruption.

In both Kyrgyzstan and Kenya, resources for intra-elite clientelism stemmed from the state. As there was virtually no private enterprise in Kyrgyzstan, most resources were simply looted. Also, elites would use their position within the system to gain certain advantages in terms of housing, luxury goods and access to services such as health care and education. In Kenya, matters were slightly more complex. There, several methods were used aside from siphoning money of the state. As many politicians had stakes in the private sector, corruption was often performed through state tenders, consultancies or financial services. It clear that there were few sources of income beside the state, which were used to uphold
clientelistic elite networks. There is no evidence to suggest that political elites were embroiled in organised crime in Kyrgyzstan to any great degree. Nor was this the case in Kenya; crime rates were relatively high in Kenya, starting from the 1980s, especially in Nairobi and other urban centres. However, as Andersson (2002) points out, it was not until the 1990s that vigilante and criminal activity became entangled with politics and political elites.

Repression

It is self-evident that single-party regimes are repressive in that they do not allow political competition. Kenya and Kyrgyzstan are no exceptions to this rule; however, repression can take many forms and serve several functions in society. This section is an attempt to eke out the nature of repression in the two states, who the actors were and how repression contributed to regime stability.

When Kenyatta came to power after independence from the United Kingdom, many had high hopes of a relatively democratic Kenya. These hopes hinged on Kenya upholding the Westminster model, with representative democracy, multi-party rule and regular elections. As discussed earlier, Kenyatta soon abolished multi-party rule in favour of a single party model.

The role of the state as an agent of repression becomes clear, when examining the plight of the opposition party KPU. In many ways, KPU was relatively insignificant in that they did not enjoy substantial popular support, nor did they have access to power\(^\text{57}\). After the merger of KADU and KANU, KPU was the only opposition party. The party was formed as a result of internal conflict within KANU. Thirty MP’s crossed the floor, among them Kenya’s vice president Oginga Odinga (Mueller, 1984). Politically, KPU represented the more radical left-leaning forces within KANU. Support for the party was based on ethnicity as the party was linked with the Luo and other groups residing close to Lake Victoria. From the start, party members and those assumed to be affiliated with the party faced stark persecution. KANU and Kenyatta used a number of methods to sideline KPU; pre-term elections were held in 1966, as Kenyatta forced MPs who had crossed the floor to contest their seats (Mueller, 1984). Good (1968) mentions several occasions, where the police intervened to stop peaceful KPU rallies ahead of the elections. During the late 1960s, many KPU supporters and members were arrested and imprisoned. This came about after a constitutional amendment, which gave the president the power of detention without trial (Hydén and Leys, 1972). Oginga Odinga spent more than two years in jail. The culmination of the

\(^{57}\) At its formation the party held 30 parliamentary seats. That was the number of MP sto cross the floor. After the 1966 elections, KPU won 9 seats in parliament.
repressive acts came with the murder of Tom Mboya, a cabinet minister in Kenyatta’s government and a Luo. He was shot dead in broad day while shopping in central Nairobi. Mboya was opposed to the formation of KPU and was a firm supporter of KANU and Kenyatta (Hydén and Leys, 1972). The murderer was Nahashon Njega, a Nairobi businessman who had been sent for military training in Bulgaria by KANU insiders in the early 1960s. Njega was secretly executed four months after murdering Mboya, and no motive for his action has been revealed (Kamau 2016; Kwama 2013).

This was seen as an attack on Luo identity and ironically spurred support for the party. In order to quell discontent, Kenyatta travelled to the Luo heartland and the city of Kisumu, where he held a speech to a largely hostile crowd. Security forces opened fire on the crowd, killing ten and injuring seventy. The drama ended when KPU was banned in 1969, leaving Kenya with no opposition until 1992. The example of KPU shows that Kenya under Kenyatta was repressive when need be; when faced with individuals who refused to be co-opted, Kenyatta opted to use heavy-handed repressive measures.

The conduct towards KPU must be seen as an exception. Kenyatta attempted to co-opt elite actors, who could prove a challenge to his rule. Although mass actors were killed and injured in Kisumu, the level of political violence was low compared to in coming eras.

In comparison to Soviet Kyrgyzstan, state repression in Kenya was a light hand. During the 1930s, Stalinism hit the Kyrgyz republic with full force. In a matter of years, farming was collectivised, to a large extent obliterating the traditional nomadic lifestyle. By 1940, 98% of all agriculture has been collectivised (Anderson, 1999a: 11). Collective farming did not increase productivity, rather the drive led to food shortages and in some cases famine (Conquest, 1986:197). For example, the number of sheep and goats reduced from 3.1 million in 1924 to just 1 million in 1932 (Anderson, 1999a: 11). Purges took place in order to root out dissent, reducing the number of members of the Communist Party from 19,932 in 1933 to just 6,385 two years later (ibid:13). For ordinary citizens, being declared “Kulak” often spelled a one-way ticket to a prison camp in Siberia or a death sentence.

58 The famines, which took place in Kyrgyzstan during the Stalin years were not as severe as those, which ravaged Kazakhstan. In part, this was because Kyrgyz herdsmen rebelled against Soviet authority by bringing their livestock high into the mountains or across the Chinese border (Conquest 1986).

59 Kulak was a term used to describe well off farmers or someone who refused to hand over produce or livestock to the central authority. It also referred to anyone who opposed the regime or member of the elite.
The level of repression varied through the course of Soviet rule, easing somewhat after Stalin’s death. However, there was no room for dissent in Kyrgyzstan, arrests simply became less arbitrary. Zenkovsky (1954) describes a purge at the Institute of Language, History and Literature during the early 1950s. Scholars at the institute have published:

[A] study on the principal phases of the civil war in Kirgizia, which contained gross political and methodological errors, and a book of Kirgiz heroic epics, Manas, whose ideology was regarded as close to that of the pan-Turkic movement. This Institute also published books by the historians K. Rakh-matulin and A. N. Bernstam which compared Russian annexation of Kirghizia to the conquest of Kirgizia by Manchu emperors and Kalmyk and Kokand khans (ibid: 426).

The transgressions of the scholars lead to their dismissal, and a number were sent to Gulag camps. Compared to earlier purges, there was a clear and stated reason for the state’s actions. The state went to great lengths to control the population, setting up programmes aimed specifically at authoritarian control. Gleason and Buck (1993: 522) argue that:

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s in particular, Soviet society devoted immense resources to innumerable social science institutes and bureaus that analysed such topics as the "scientific study of society," the "scientific organization of labor," and the "optimization of economic functioning".

The role of the academic community was to find ways to incorporate ideological thinking into labour, society and economy. Their task was administering a society infused by a single ideology. These studies did not only provide the state with information, the ever-present “studies” discouraged any form of rebellion.

The success of repression in upholding order was contingent on keeping a close watch on the population. In the USSR, surveillance was from the outset a system of terror. As early as 1917, a new secret service the Cheka enforced a complex system of informants and interrogation imposed on all Soviet citizens to a varying degree for the duration of the Soviet years (Rendle, 2011). The secret police became known under several different acronyms: Cheka, NKVD and KGB among others (for an overview see (Fedor, 2013). The key to the success of the secret service was masses of informants in every sphere of Soviet society. The secret service was according to Waller (2004: 333):
the most infamous and enduring of any political enforcement system ever devised. They became the matrix for communist regimes from Poland to Mongolia, Ethiopia to Cuba; for pro-Soviet revolutionary governments in Africa and Nicaragua; for non-communist, one-party states in Libya, Syria, and Iraq; and for the anti-Communist government of the Republic of China, as well as the antithetical People’s Republic of China.

The party and other organisations such as the Komsomol\(^{60}\) played an important part as a base for recruiting informants (Weiner and Rahi-Tamm, 2012: 29). The CPSU was a mass party in the true sense of the word. All civic organisations were connected to the party and the state and in some way; most Soviet citizens were a part of the system. For example, 1988, there were about 125 million union members in the USSR, which was close to all individuals who were employed (Sakwa, 1998: 141). Initially, a higher proportion of ethnic Russian citizens were members of the CPSU, but membership numbers in Central Asia grew faster than in Russia. For example, in 1976 party membership in Russia grew by 10.2%, while in Kyrgyzstan that increase was 15.2% (Sakwa 1998: 88f). Party membership was an essential step for most individuals who sought to be successful. As Unger (1981:110) puts it:

The great majority simply regarded party membership as a standard career requirement. Some had tried a little harder and earlier to obtain admission, others had held off until their professional careers reached a stage at which non-membership became a definite impediment. For either group party entry was an inevitable and long anticipated stage in life [...].

The meaning of membership in the CPSU or other organisations connected to the party or the state in the Soviet Union was simply to show support. Mass membership made the majority a part of these institutions, which made criticism of them more difficult. In some cases, membership was mandatory. All school children between 7 and 14 participated in organisations for children. All workers were organised in unions (Sakwa, 1998). The act of membership was designed to create loyalty with the party and the regime, and it truly did mobilise almost the entire population. There were however differences between the party itself and other associations:

\(^{60}\) Komsomol was a youth organisation connected to the communist party. It was active throughout the Soviet Union.
These status differences are clearly mirrored in the perceptions of the interviewees, often in somewhat exaggerated form. 'The party is like God . . . it is omnipresent', was how one interviewee referred to the role of the CPSU in Soviet life (Unger, 1981: 109).

Because of its mass membership, CPSU was one of the most important mechanisms of surveillance. Party members were encouraged to observe the activities of others and to report on the activities of others. In Soviet Central Asia, as in other parts of the USSR, the surveillance system created a sense of insecurity and fear in party members and the general public alike. Anyone could be accused of being anti-party, anti-communist or anti-Soviet. For example, between 1984 and 1988 more than 58000 officials in Central Asia lost their jobs and were replaced in a purge to drive out the inefficient and corrupt. At the same time, more than three quarters of the central committee was changed (Gleason, 1991: 616). Unlike its counterpart in Kenya, the secret service was a strong institution in the USSR and did not have to rely on the party itself to detect dissent. Nonetheless, the party played an important role as informants were often recruited from within its ranks.

When Moi came to power, repression increased dramatically in Kenya. This is evident, not least as many persons interviewed for this study were detained or spent time in prison during the Moi years (Wafule Buke 2010, Paul Muite 2010, Norman Nyagah 2010). The Kenyan judiciary almost completely lacked independence. The judges, who served in Kenyan courtrooms, were a remnant of the colonial era; British judges who served as part of the United Kingdom’s development aid programme. They were there under the discretion of the Kenyan government, which meant that they could be sent home if Moi elected to do so. Many of the judges had lived in Kenya for many years, and were not willing to stand up to Moi, as it would most likely uproot them from their homes. One judge, Eugene Cotran, openly stated that judges were under pressure to rule in the state’s favour (Adar and Munyae, 2001). Gitobu Imanyara, a lawyer and currently an MP in parliament serve a 2-year sentence:

[…] it was highly politicised trial, and I eventually served 2 years at Kamiti Maximum prison under very atrocious circumstances in which they call psychiatric wing. When I got there, I found out that the entire air force had been locked up there. So, I again got involved in doing their appeals. I was in segregation, but I always managed to get documents to prepare appeals. But more importantly, I found hundreds of Kenyans who were in prison without knowing the reason why
they were there; victims of political abuse of the judicial process (Gitobu Imanyara 2010).

In 1982, members of the Air Force attempted a coup while Moi was attending a conference of the Organisation of African Unity in Tripoli. Several groups of officers were plotting the overthrow, but the most serious was a group of Kikuyu officers and politicians, who were troubled by the recent appointment of non-Kikuyus into the military and civil service (Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 31). Students at several universities joined the protests, which resulted in the closing of Nairobi University several times for months on end. The coup attempt was badly organised and was easily put down by the government. This spelled the start of a series of purges in the military, political life and in student circles. 800 soldiers were court martialled after the attempted coup (Currie and Ray, 1986: 55). University students continued to protest. Wafula Buke was the chairman of student organisation at Nairobi University in 1987. At that time, many students believed that the one-party state was bound to fall, and democracy arrive in Kenya. He said:

I suppose we were fairly well inspired so we decided that we could be part and parcel of the democratic forces. So, when I got elected I announced that I would be supporting those pushing for democratisation. I lasted nine days in office and I was in jail for five years (Wafule Buke 2010).

These arrests of insiders, outsiders and militaries changed the political circumstances dramatically in Kenya. The judiciary was under the thumb of Moi and that many arrests were arbitrary and spread a new culture of fear within the ranks of the elite (Barkan, 1993).

Political insiders in KANU could no longer criticise the president in any way. At the same time, a KANU membership card became essential for access to jobs and local services (Hornsby, 2012: 399). Norman Nyagah, who was an MP for KANU during those years, and whose father was a prominent KANU figure explains:

I am reminded at one point an old colleague of my father in high school who became attorney general brought in an order that that it was illegal to, think, to dream, to imagine that a sitting president could be sick or could die. That is the kind of situation that did not allow another political party to exist. So what happened when agitation for an opposition party took place? Many people suffered, torture chambers were created, people were maimed, and there was great fear. I personally spent a lot of time in some of those places. If you look at my face,
I do not have my two front teeth, it is reminiscent of the fact that I lost them in a political situation in a cell because of criticising the then president. He was a very good friend of my father and my father at the time was a cabinet minister. [...]. I personally was a member of KANU and I wore a big badge with the head of state then. But I didn’t do it because I liked what KANU was doing; it was the only movement that was around (Nyagah 2010).

In 1985, Kenya abandoned the secret ballot for a system of queue voting. After this change, more repressive measures were utilised in order to curb the opposition. According to Branch (2011: 176) the reason for the shift was that the Kenyan state no longer had sufficient resources to build support on clientelism alone: “Neoliberal reforms devised by the IMF and the World Bank removed the state’s influence over the economy and cut public spending, which in the past had been used as a “slush fund” to build up networks of clients.” Diminishing state resources made it impossible for Moi to rely on mass-elite clientelism to secure popular support (Throup, 1993: 377).

The role of the KANU party also changed during these years. The party took on a controlling function. Widner (1992: 170) exemplifies:

Moi’s New Year’s speech of 1989 empowered KANU to monitor public places such as bars, hotels and restaurants to identify those who opposed the office of the president. In practice, the country’s internal security service had engaged in such surveillance for many years. Involvement of the general KANU membership greatly increased the scope of the operations [...].

Widner’s (1992) argument is that KANU from Kenyatta to Moi transformed from being little more than a loosely knit association for political elites into a fully-fledged party state. A significant number of new party members on all levels were recruited. As Khapoya (1988: 60) notes:

Moi has consolidated his control over the party machinery in a remarkable fashion since the party elections of 1983. He has reduced the power of parliament to that of an advisory panel. A massive recruitment effort to enlarge the party has been under way for quite some time.

On the surface, the reason was seemingly to increase the mass appeal of the party. The new members were instructed to keep a close eye on their fellow Kenyans for signs of dissent (Widner, 1992: 170). At the same time, new body was created: the KANU National Disciplinary Committee, who’s role was to punish members of the party who publicly disagreed with the government (Khapoya, 1988: 60f).
KANU thus became a tool of political control and information. It was clear to Moi and the government that there was widespread dissatisfaction with the regime. Barkan (1993: 89) notes that:

> On the one hand, KANU stalwarts eager to demonstrate their loyalty engaged in flights of rhetoric extolling the president’s every deed. At the same time, suspected enemies, both real and imagined, were detained, tortured, and forced to confess to trumped-up charges of sedition.

It is no secret that the Kenyan state was weak – there was not a secret service strong enough to keep an eye on possible challengers to the regime. With inadequate state institutions, Moi turned to his own party to become the eyes and ears, on the lookout for signs of opposition. The increased number of members during the 1980s should thus not be seen as an attempt to co-opt the general public into supporting the party. Rather, the party apparatus developed into a tool of repression.

The repressive function of KANU cannot be compared to that of the communist party in Kyrgyzstan. If KANU was informal secret police, the communist party, even towards the end of the Soviet Union was a well-established, institutionalised machine of control and information. Even though Kyrgyzstan was a peripheral republic far from Moscow, the KGB had a firm grip on signs of dissent among the general population.

In 1992, Kenya introduced multi-party rule. This move came as a surprise to most Kenyan oppositionals, the state had become ever more repressive during the late 1980s and early 1990s, indicating the Moi was willing to go to great lengths to remain in power. According to Adar and Munyae (2001), the worst human rights abuses in Kenyan history occurred during the years 1989 -1991, when proponents of multi-party democracy were detained without charge, accused of subversion. In an echo of the murder of Tom Mboya, the body of Robert Ouku, Moi’s foreign minister was found burnt and with a bullet hole through his head in 1990. It had become clear that he believed that corruption within the ranks of the government was an impediment to good relations with donors and western countries (Branch, 2011: 190f). Although it has not been made clear who was responsible for his murder, a 2010 report point to some of Moi’s closest allies (BBC, 9/12/2010). This shows that the Kenyan government escalated repression before the decision was taken to introduce multi-party rule.
Conclusion

This section has shown that Soviet Kyrgyzstan and Kenya’s single party experience share many similarities. There are general trends, which both states follow: When repression increases, clientelism is scaled down and vice versa. These patterns hold both in terms of mass-elite and intra-elite clientelism. In both states the main resources used for clientelism and repression was the state itself, though in Kenya private wealth was increasingly used. Intra-elite networks retracted and expanded rapidly, while clan and ethnicity remained important. Within those networks, spoils were distributed in exchange for support.

The role of mass-elite clientelism was never to win elections in Soviet Kyrgyzstan. This was not a possibility, as no real options existed for voters. Rather, the aim was to give a semblance of unity, consensus, and legitimacy. During the Kenyatta years in Kenya, mass-elite clientelism had a much more important function in society and politics. Canvassing, vote-buying and other forms of material exchanges in return for support were rife and occurred in virtually every constituency throughout the country. Although clientelism remained important after Kenyatta’s death and the succession to Moi, it was less important. Kenyan elections became more like those in Soviet Kyrgyzstan, where they were more similar to rituals of consensus than exercises in political choice. Clientelist goods were used as a method to secure some public support for the regime, though the authoritarian regimes did not shy away from repressive measures in order to remain in control.

There is a similar pattern with regards to intra-elite clientelism. In totalitarian Kyrgyzstan, there were frequent purges, which can be interpreted as attempts to change clientelistic patterns. Outright challenges to the regime itself were met with repression; people were simply arrested. The Kremlin feared the development of clientelistic networks in Kyrgyzstan, which were independent and could challenge the central authority of Moscow. For that reason, Usabaliyev, who had a clientelistic network was removed and replaced by Masaliyev in 1985. This created factions within the elites, as people from Usabaliyev’s circles were in control of almost all aspects of society. Unlike other Central Asian leaders, Masaliyev failed to remain in power after independence, which may be connected to the lack of a local clientelistic network of support. This brought the well-entrenched elites from the Usabaliyev years back into power.

Kenya has also seen shifts in the structure of its elite-clientelist networks. During Kenyatta’s time in office, a great number of individuals were included in the clientelistic networks. When Moi came to power, and especially after the attempted coup in 1982, Kenya became more repressive. Instead, Moi focused on building a small, wealthy and powerful network on his kinsmen, which could
support him against the former political elite. In doing so, he effectively challenged the domination of Kikuyu in politics.

In both Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, the state was the main source of income for mass-elite and intra-elite clientelism. In Kenya, resources were often garnered through corruption, either through simply skimming state resources or through dual involvement of political elites in private industry. Jobs within the civil service, scholarships and other advantages were distributed based on a clientelistic rational. Few other sources of income were available; in Kyrgyzstan, private industry was embryonic, while Kenya’s state capitalist model meant that industry was highly reliant on the state. At the time, elites in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan did not seek income for clientelism from organised crime.

In both states, repression was a more important means of control than clientelism, although this only became true in Kenya during the 1980s. The Kenyan experience shows that a shift from mainly relying on clientelism to a highly repressive state is possible while retaining political stability. From the 1980s onwards, the number of persons who were arrested increased dramatically. This applied to persons who had previously been political insiders but were now considered a threat to the regime as well as political outsiders such as student activists. This event can be compared to the purges, which took place in Kyrgyzstan during Soviet times.

To a large extent, repression relied on the state both in term of funding and action. Signs of dissent were met with detention, prison terms, or deportation. Instances of political violence and repression by actors other than the state were rare. In Kenya the murders of Tom Mboya and Robert Ouko are early examples of politicians bypassing the state in order to get rid of political opponents.

Soviet Kyrgyzstan had a well-funded and all-encompassing secret service, which elites relied on for information. This in turn allowed state repression to take its course, rooting out dissent through legal action or purges within the elites. Kenya on the other hand did not have an effective security agency. KANU as an institutional entity became more important; membership increased, and party conferences were held. Despite this, KANU never became a mass party. Nor did it provide avenues for outsiders into the elite. Rather, the party became a tool of repression. The Kenyan state did not have the ability to keep potential opposition under control. The youth wing and the disciplinary committee of KANU took on that role and kept a close eye on dissent within the party and in society.

For all intent and purposes, repression and clientelism in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan was the affair of the state. The resources, for both mass-elite and intra-elite clientelism emanated from the state. Although clientelist relationships are by their very nature personal, individuals and groups engaged in the system of clientelism
in the two states sought very few other sources of income. This mirrors the conditions of repression; where both funds and execution were mainly the domain of the state. Yet, the lack of state capacity in Kenya made necessary the involvement of other actors when repression increased in the 1980s. The involvement of KANU in surveillance activities set a precedent for years to come.

Single Party Rule in Tanzania and Kazakhstan

Like Kyrgyzstan and Kenya, Tanzania and Kazakhstan have single party origins. Kazakhstan shares many similarities with Kyrgyzstan, as they are former Soviet Republics. The formal institutions of state, party and elections are therefore very similar. The focus here will be on how the function of intra-elite and mass-elite clientelism and well as the role of party and repression differs from the Kyrgyz context. Tanzania on the other hand is quite dissimilar both from the two post-soviet states and neighbouring Kenya.

Intra-Elite Clientelism

In some respects, Kazakhstan was more influenced by the central authority in Moscow during Soviet times than Kyrgyzstan. In the early 1950s, the Soviet Union faced a grain crisis, and a decision was made to cultivate large portions of northern Kazakhstan. The “Virgin Lands Policy” was to transform land, which had mainly been used for animal husbandry into productive agricultural land (Brill Olcott, 1995: 224ff; Schatz, 2004: 142). The project was to be a major feat of modernisation; the Alma-Ata Pravda wrote in 1954 that the Kazakh collective farms were to cultivate “several million” hectares of virgin lands (Mills, 1970: 61). In the end, the entire project lead to the ploughing of 13 million acres of land, of which 6.3 acres were in Kazakhstan (Durgin, 1962: 257). The Soviet authorities reported that there were 68 million acres of arable land in Kazakhstan, of which only 36% had been cultivated (Jackson, 1956: 7). The grain output increased massively from 1954 to 1960. The scale of the project had a massive impact on Kazakh society in several ways. Firstly, one of the main effects was that there was an influx of Slavic people, mainly Russians into the region as “external experts”

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61 The virgin lands programme was not restricted to Kazakhstan. Land in western Siberia and northern Caucasus was also cultivated.

62 Alma-Ata was the capital of the Soviet republic of Kazakhstan. The city has been renamed Almaty, and the capital moved to Astana.

63 Soviet data on grain output and potential for new collective farms must of course be viewed with scepticism. There is no doubt however that vast areas of land was cultivated in Kazakhstan during the virgin lands project.
1.7 million people arrived from Russia also, enough to change the ethnic makeup of the republic (Lillis 2019: 118). Kazakhstan soon became the most ethnically diverse of all the Soviet States (Brill Olcott, 2005:30). Ethnic Kazakhs were no longer in majority in Kazakhstan. The virgin lands project is not the only reason why Kazakhstan became ethnically diverse. Many people from other parts of the USSR were deported to Kazakhstan (Brill Olcott, 2010: 54f; Cummings, 2006; Jones, 2010). This had a significant impact on the make up the elites.

The virgin lands project caused opposition and fractionalisation within the Kazakh SSR (Brill Olcott, 1995: 226ff; Cummings, 2006). The First Secretary of the Kazakh Soviet Zhumabay Shayakhmetov was sceptical of the project, as it would have a significant and negative effect on livestock production. This led to his dismissal and demotion of those considered close to him. Formally, the concerns were about the ratio of cultivation vs. animal husbandry, however there was a power struggle. In 1955, Wheeler wrote on the state of affairs in that:

There is nothing particularly remarkable in the political and economic control exercised by the Soviet Authorities in Central Asia. It is simply imperialism under another name. Rigid political and economic control over backward peoples has been exercised by imperialist Powers at various times in different parts of the world, […]. The distinctive feature of the Soviet method is that it includes preventing the subject peoples by propaganda and segregation from knowing what self-government is (Wheeler, 1955: 320f).

Shayakhmetov replacement was sent from Moscow, a move to make sure that local intra-elite networks could not thrive. Through these events, the intra-elite networks of local elites were side-lined, and Kazakhstan would remain under the watchful eye of the centre for many years to come. This made dissent, the forging of independent intra-elite alliances and clientelism more difficult in Kazakhstan than in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan. In the end, Kazakhs complied with the virgin lands programme, and more importantly came under strict Moscow control. From 1938 to 1986, eight people served as First Secretaries for the Kazakh SSR. Only two were ethnic Kazakhs (Brill Olcott, 2010: 346).

Like in Kyrgyzstan collectivisation of animal husbandry and farming spelled the end of nomadic lifestyles. Collectivisation took place during the Stalin era and preceded the virgin lands policy by about two decades. Aside from the cultural

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64 Shayakhmetov was an ethnic Kazakh and First Secretary of the Republic 1946-1954
65 For an excellent personal account of collectivisation in Kazakhstan and the perils it caused see Shayakhmetov 2006.
aspects, collectivisation caused a major famine. Approximately 1.5 million Kazakhs died of hunger in a region with a total population of no more than 4 million (Olcott, 1981; Shayakhmetov, 2006: vii).\(^{66}\)

The famine caused mass migration, with an estimated 15-20% of the population leaving for China, Turkey, Iran and other parts of Central Asia (Schatz, 2004: 43). Collectivisation was more rapid in Kazakhstan than the other Central Asian republics, which lead to a more significant impact on society (Roudík, 2007: 127f). There is little doubt that the policies essentially failed (Brill Olcott, 2010: 13). The collectivisation of land early on, in concert with the influx of non-ethnic Kazakhs changed formal and informal authority structures in Kazakhstan for years to come.

Unlike Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan was significant for the central authority in Moscow. In Kyrgyzstan, with little industry, fewer Russian migrants and less potential for growth in the agricultural and energy sectors, informal intra-elite networks could flourish out of sight from Moscow. Kazakhstan on the other hand had important and productive industries in the north. There were mines, oil refineries and factories, which were critical to Soviet productivity (Brill Olcott, 2005: 30f). This prompted Moscow to keep a close and watchful eye on clientelism and possible elite dissent in Kazakhstan.

Despite this, Schatz (2004) argues that clan and kinship ties were significant and remained largely intact during Soviet years, albeit under the radar of the centre. This claim is refuted by Murphy (2006: 526), who argues that the importance of clan has been exaggerated, as urban areas were not homogenous in terms of clan and ethnicity and that positions of power were not related to clan. Further, Murphy argues, the clan affiliation of Kazakh citizens has never been officially recorded making historical empirical studies of the subject difficult.

There is little doubt that clan ties mattered less in Kazakhstan than in Kyrgyzstan. Clientelistic networks were largely destroyed during the Soviet years, due to collectivisation, the virgin lands project, migration of non-Kazakhs and the repressive policy of the central authority. Schatz (2004) claim, that the networks went underground, indicates that they may have mattered more on lower levels in the hierarchy.

Like Kazakhstan, Tanzania faced major land reform in the rural areas in the name of socialism. From 1968 until 1975, the ujamaa villagisation project moved millions of people into collective villages. The outcome was quite different from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and other parts of the Soviet Union. For one, the process

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\(^{66}\) Famine due to collectivisation killed an estimated 6-8 million people in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan (Lillis 2019: 131)
never encompassed the entire rural population. By 1973, only 15% of the rural residents had moved to into collectives (Hydén, 1975: 53). Although the process accelerated after that, it never reached the same numbers as it did in the Soviet Union, where virtually every rural citizen moved into collective farms. The emphasis was on agriculture. Urban areas were seen as parasites, living off the labour of the rural, which was where real growth and development took place (Brennan, 2006a: 400). As expressed by president Nyerere, the people of the new villages should jointly own the means of production, work and live together and share the fruits of their labour (Hydén, 1975: 53). Throughout the countryside, the plan was to construct 7000 such villages, which essentially collectivised agricultural production (Schneider, 2006). Villagisation was not voluntary in Tanzania; repression was used to force families off their land and into villages. Schneider (2004: 345) notes:

The basic modus operandi of villagization was coercive and top-down, and it is generally agreed that it did not improve the majority of rural Tanzanians' lot, as had been hoped.

Ujamaa did not have the intended effect on growth. Agricultural output did not increase significantly, nor did the new villages provide economic growth in other areas. In 1974-75, crisis hit Tanzania. Yields were at a record low and the government was forced to import large quantities of food to avoid famine. In the rural areas, malnutrition was rampant, and many people died. The government took steps to avoid the loss of lives through taking out emergency loans. It is likely that villagisation is part of the explanation for the low yields and the crisis. The food crisis was small compared to the perils the people of Kazakhstan went through to collectivise farming. It does show that a stern belief that ideology sometime came before sound policies in reforming Tanzania after colonialism.

Ujamaa villagisation had a profound effect on intra-elite clientelism in Tanzania. The rhetoric on ujamaa emphasised that the villages would lead to participation in important decision-making processes for all. Unlike in colonial times, when the traditional authority figure had been chiefs, who were part of the colonial administration. Traditional authority structures were altered, and a clientelistic system was established (see Ranger, 1979 for an account). Chiefs in the countryside during colonial times were responsible for upholding the regime and collecting taxes (Heilman et al., 2000: 144). For these reasons, chiefs were seen as agents of imperialism, and not suitable as leaders in the new independent state. Many of the previous chief were disposed of, or only held informal authority in the new villages (Glickman, 1965: 499). Huizer (1973: 187) reports that some
chiefs were able to reinvent themselves as party “cell leaders”, but only after being re-educated by the party. Nyerere himself stated that Ujamaa was a form of self-reliance, and that decision making should be decentralised to the village level.

Ujamaa villages never became participatory or democratic. In fact, as Mamdani (1996: 108) argues, the party officials often exceeded their formal authority. They would act as courts sentencing individuals to pay fines, and detain people for up to 48 hours, despite holding no formal state authority. Tanzania after independence was paternalistic, party officials did not trust that the peasantry was educated, developed and politically aware enough to be truly involved in running their own affairs. At a Central District Committee meeting a TANU officer remarked: “Remember, you farmers are the chickens and we are the mother hens. If you follow our example you will survive, but if you are not attentive you will perish” (quoted in Schneider, 2004: 356). This paternalistic attitude soon became an excuse to form new clientelistic ties. As Samoff (1979: 37) writes:

Where the managers do not dominate by themselves, they form alliances with the most prosperous of the local peasants and combine patronage and local influence networks. As a result, not only do ordinary farmers have little say, but centrally provided inputs (agricultural technology, improved seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides) tend to be concentrated in the upper stratum of the peasantry, thus further reinforcing inequality within the local area.

Although the chiefs no longer held power, a new hierarchy based on the party (TANU and then CCM) took its place. Party officials replaced local authority figures throughout the country and party offices were built in many villages. Like in Kazakhstan, there was a breakdown of traditional authority.

The official policy of the Tanzanian government during the Ujamaa years was to establish a bottom-up approach to the exercise of power. Every 10 households would have a cell leader, who would be the representative to a higher level. This level would then in turn send a representative to a higher level of authority and so on to the national level. Most Tanzanians, especially in the rural areas were included in this system. Like in the Soviet Union, the structure of power worked more to exercise power from the top to bottom rather than the other way around. The party had standardised documents regarding local affairs, which were in practice mandatory for lower level officials to sign. Dissent against official party policy was not possible. Hydén (1975: 59) writes:

[…] plans, consisting of physical output targets, have been prepared in the regional headquarters and then presented to the villagers, who have usually not raised
objections which might reduce their chances of getting social amenities from the government. Thus, whether the production targets are realistic or not, the villagers have unanimously adopted them in the presence of higher officials.

In this way, the new leadership of Tanzania established a new form of clientelism, where clients at lower levels were unable to execute any form of authority for the risk of losing valuable resources for their communities and themselves. It was a direct exchange: paying lip service to the ideals of African socialism and supporting leaders higher up in the hierarchy would yield tangible material benefits for clients. Regarding the role of party vs. government officials Costello (1996: 126) writes that:

In the rural areas, administrators responded to this uncertainty by building alliances with the richer peasants, using their positions to channel resources in return for political and economic support [...]. This generated a growing class inequality at odds with the emerging socialist vision of Nyerere and TANU leaders. Administrators appeared less concerned with national development than with personal aggrandizement.

In general terms, holding administrative positions in the rural areas in Tanzania did not engender much income. Although in breach of the policy of the party, officials would cooperate with wealthy landowners in intra-elite networks, as this was a way to provide a living.

Ujamaa and rural policy in Tanzania in general never had as far reaching consequences for the population as collectivisation and the virgin lands project in Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan, dissent was not possible because of repression and politicised famine. In Tanzania, repression also took place; villagisation was not a voluntary project. However, the main means of control was clientelism. Material support was always conditional; those who supported TANU or CCM gained access to resources.

The two land reform programmes share one important characteristic; they weakened previous authority structures. In their place, new types of clientelistic networks, based on allegiance to central authority rather than traditional structures were formed. In Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, these networks did not break down, rather long standing intra-elite networks remained in soft opposition to the centre.
Intra-Elite Clientelism in the Public Sector

Unlike Kenya, Tanzania was not a settler colony. The colonial administration was small as was the white British population. Settler farms were few and far between. At its peak, Kenya had 10,000 settler farms compared to 3,000 in Tanzania (Lofchie, 1994: 156). The presence of the colonial state was barely noticeable in some areas, and there was significantly less investment in infrastructure, education and the bureaucracy than in Kenya. At independence, the group of educated Tanzanians was very small, and the number of people who had experience in government or public sector jobs only a handful of people. A personnel survey conducted in 1962/63 found that 80% of all positions, which required a university degree, were occupied by non-Africans. The same survey found that there were only 12 civil engineers who were Tanzanian nationals and not a single geologist had been trained in a country with a mining industry (Chazan et al., 1988: 228). Aside from providing services and adequate health care, there was a lack of professionals who could form the core of the government, staff ministries and other parts of the bureaucracy. Within this small group of educated elites, clientelistic loyalties quickly became a vital part political life. A retired CCM politician who wished to remain anonymous said:

Back in the 1960s, everyone who was educated knew one another. Some were idealists from the start, we wanted to build a better country, eradicate poverty, we thought we could get ahead. […] After a few years it all caught up with us…. You know we had large families to feed, poverty was very close by when it is your sisters' boy who is sick or your mother who has no money in the village. We were responsible to help these people. Some people fell for the temptation, helped each other to help out the families.

Because of the small size of the elites, these bonds often transcended ethnic loyalties and regional concerns. Tanzanian nationals soon replaced European public sector employees to Africanise the state. White employees were seen as a symbol of colonialism and imperialism (Chazan et al., 1988: 52f). The public sector grew rapidly; people with very little education were employed to carry out complex tasks. Mukandala (1983: 253f) finds that “[…] the number of established posts increased from 65 708 in 1967 to 101 182 in 1972. The total number of posts increased from 65 708 to 101 182 in 1972. This is reflected in the ethnic makeup of the two states today. According to Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, about 35,000 Kenyan citizens have European decent. Fewer British settled in Tanzania.

67 The number of white colonial administrators was greater in Kenya than in Tanzania, as was the number of white settlers engaged in agriculture. This is reflected in the ethnic makeup of the two states today. According to Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, about 35,000 Kenyan citizens have European decent. Fewer British settled in Tanzania.
was 191,046 in 1976, and the Ministry of Manpower put the total number of posts at 295,352 in 1980.

Public sector jobs were hard currency, even though wages in the sector were low, to the point of not providing a reasonable living for the employees. Already in 1973 Hydén (1973: 57) notes that it was financially impossible for the state to increase wages while rapidly increasing the number of employees. In fact, wages had been slashed several times, while the number of employees increased. At the time, approximately half the national budget was used on wages alone. Recruitment into the civil service was often based on intra-elite clientelism; someone’s sister, uncle or cousin were eligible for employment, regardless of education or merits (Mukandala, 1983: 255ff; Glickman, 1965: 144). In addition, there was an expectation that most if not all university graduates were offered a public sector job after graduation (Taylor, 1992).

Why then would public sector employment be desirable, considering the meagre earnings a public service employee could expect in Tanzania during the single party era? The first answer is that public employment was at least some form of paid labour, in a country where many had no means of employment at all. As of 1992, only 6% of Tanzanian were formally employed (Taylor, 1992: 198). In 1983, a full 78% of those in other employment besides agriculture were employed in the public sector (Gelb et al., 1991: 1186). Secondly, there were very large income differences with the public sector, taking a low-paying job may be a stepping-stone to rise up in the hierarchy (Hydén, 1973: 57). The third reason is probably the most important: public employment gave access to public goods and intra-elite clientelistic networks. It was possible to siphon goods or cash off the state and receive bribes from the public. Van de Walle (2007b) argues that this form of prebendalism, where access to rents is granted is common in African clientelistic states. In general, there was very little risk of being reported for such crimes. Hopkins (1970: 64), who conducted a survey among MPs in Tanzania finds that his respondent would be unwilling to report cases of possible corruption: “[We] asked what an M.P. would do if he suspected corruption was occurring in some Ministry. Responses to this question tended to fall into categories of passivity or hesitancy to act.”. This response indicates that public sector employees could act with virtual impunity. This argument is further supported by Heilman et al. (2000: 503) who write about the Tanzanian case:

It [corruption] has become a norm to the extent that people assume most public servants receive bribes. Some people believe that without bribing, they cannot get fair treatment. Evidence of the widespread nature of real corruption can be seen in popular language […]. […]. A few terms help to elaborate what is being suggested
here. [...] They use other words that are more polite and disguised. Such terms include *chai* (tea), *kitu kidogo* (something small), and *mshiko* (something that greases hands).68

For example, police officers could easily be convinced to turn a blind eye to petty crimes or be paid to investigate an offence given a contribution. Large-scale corruption was also prevalent, such as a piece of the pie of corrupt government contracts. Also, throughout the single-party years, there was a great shortage of goods and services in Tanzania. Aside from public sector jobs, access to higher education, quality healthcare and other public goods were often contingent on kinship or friendship connections. Access to imported goods was also often dependent on clientelistic networks. Goods such are cars, in the higher end of the hierarchy, or western clothing among lower officials were important signs of status and could69 not be obtained without connections in the bureaucracy (Hydén, 1973: 54f). Like in the USSR, scarcity of these goods made them desirable.

As noted in the Kyrgyz case, these types of networks were common in the USSR as well. A relation or friend in the public service was an asset, and a practice of reciprocity was rife. Schatz (2004: 60f) elaborates on this, describing shortages of goods and services as an engine, which promotes small scale corruption or *blat*. These forms of networks were often based on kinship in Kazakhstan during Soviet times. Like in Tanzania, clientelism in the public sector in Kazakhstan was based on jobs in the civil service, access to resources and services.

In both Soviet Kazakhstan and Tanzania before economic reforms during the late 1980s, almost all industry was owned by the state. In Tanzania, private enterprise was almost non-existent. Mukandala (1995: 61) writes that:

> [The Arusha Declaration] denounced capitalists as exploiters and oppressors. Considerable nationalizations of Banking, Insurance, beer brewing, cigarette manufacture, milling, shoe making, mining, sisal and other plantations, housing etc. were undertaken.

Many of the state-owned industries in Tanzania were inefficient and poorly managed, leading to low returns and became a rife with petty corruption and

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68 These terms were frequently used in Tanzania during the 1980s and 1990s as well. Growing up in Dar-es-Salaam, people would often say that they had to pay *kitu kidogo* to be able to open a shop, or have *chai* to obtain foreign currency from the bank.

69 Initially during single party rule, many imported goods were simply not available to the public at any price. Liberalisation of the economy during Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s president made the goods accessible, but only to the financially wealthy.
nepotism. (El-Namaki, 1977). Corruption in state owned companies was seen as a problem by the regime, and some measures were put in place to resolve it. For that reason, many analysts did not view public sector corruption in Tanzania as especially incapacitating compared to other states in sub-Saharan Africa (Kelsall, 2002: 598). Others argue that petty corruption, especially the practice of bribe taking was so entrenched that refusing a bribe could put public officials at risk. Refusing a “reasonable” bribe may land the official in trouble, if the person offering the bribe spoke to superior officials (Pepinsky, 1992). Because there were very few sources of revenue, state employment or a political position, was an attractive option for elite actors. This was the case despite low wages and comparably low levels of corruption. Heilman and Ndumbaro (2002) argue that as wages in the public sector, even at managerial rank fell below subsistence level, employees sought alternative sources of income:

Parastatal Regional Trading Companies (RTCs) and cooperative shops became the only legal source for many goods like foodstuffs, sugar, building materials, radios, and batteries. Because they controlled the allocation of scarce goods, RTC employees became very powerful. Consumers often had to pay bribes or give favors to these employees in order to obtain goods at the subsidized official prices.

It should be emphasised that there is a difference between Tanzania during the early years after independence, where corruption was seen as a problem be the regime and Kenya where corruption, although rampant, was not on spoken about by political leaders. The Arusha Declaration, which was written when Tanzania adopted its Ujamaa policy in 1967, takes a clear stance against corruption. The role of the aims and objects of TANU are identified as: “To see that the Government eradicates all types of exploitation, intimidation, discrimination, bribery and corruption.” (Nyerere, 1967).

After a number of years of relatively short-lived General Secretaries of the Kazakh SSR, Brezhnev recruited an ethnic Kazakh, who was loyal and reliable in the eyes of Moscow in 1960. Dinmuhamad Kunayev was the only Asian ever to become a member of the Soviet Politburo, which gave access to intra-elite networks at the very top of the Soviet authority. For Brezhnev, personal loyalty was of the essence, something that Kunayev demonstrated from the start. Rigby (1972: 12) notes that Kunayev was not recruited into the politburo because of

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70 It is difficult to estimate levels of corruption in Tanzania at the time. A number of scholars indicate that most corruption was confined to receiving bribes, jobs and favours. A relatively small number of large scale corruption scandals have been revealed in Tanzania during this time.
merit, but because of Brezhnev’s patronage. The politburo was the highest instrument of control in the Soviet Union. Direct access to the very top for Kazakhstan was a clear sign that the republic was no longer viewed as a peripheral republic was little significance.

During the Kunayev years the tight grip of Moscow on Kazakhstan loosened somewhat. The Kazakh Soviet had up until then been dominated by ethnic Russians. By the early 1980s, ethnic Kazakhs dominated on all levels of authority in Kazakhstan (Murphy, 2006: 533). Cummings (2006: 191) goes further, noting “Kazakh monopolization of power” during the Kunayev years. Many ethnic Russians, who had previously held high positions were purged, lost their jobs, were sent to prison or simply migrated back to Russia. To put this process into context, Kazakhs made up only 30% of the population, while the Russians numbered 42.7%. This policy was sanctioned by Moscow as a part of a “Kazakhisation” process, handing over power to the titular population (Cummings, 2006: 191). Kunayev was able to build his own intra-elite clientelist network locally in Kazakhstan, creating an expectation that Kazakhstan would be ruled by the Kazakhs (Lillis 2019:160). According to Shiek and Hensell (2012:206), Kunayev recruited members of his family close allies into important positions and preferred to exercise power through informal networks rather than the formal structures of the state (Roberts, 2012: 319). State assets were used liberally to avoid challenges within the elite (Collins, 2004: 242). The clientelistic ties had a different structure from those in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan. There, Usabaliyev could also build clientelistic networks based on kinship and loyalty. Usabaliyev allowed Russians to hold many positions of power in the state. Positions and other forms of clientelism were based on negotiating the terrain of competing clientelistic networks to create elite cohesion and stability. In Kazakhstan on the other hand, the structure was strictly hierarchical; Kunayev did not have to grant positions or other resources to competing groups simply because the elites did not include competing networks. Hanks (2005: 208) writes that virtually every position in government filled by a friend or relative of Kunayev, indicating that sharing power with potential challengers was not necessary. The first president of independent Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev has commented on this:

A narrow circle of those who had become close to the first person [Kunayev, First Party Secretary] settled practically all matters… A person who was part of the family of D.A Kunayev could decide the fate of another person: give him a promotion or an award, fire him, or give him an apartment (quoted in Schatz, 2004: 69).
Although the people of Kazakhstan still knew their clan and lineage, clans or other intra-elite networks did not have significant power. The traditional leaders of those clans had almost without exception died. People with some personal wealth were regarded as “Kulaks” by the authorities under Stalin and were the first to be sent to the Gulag (Shayakhmetov, 2006). For Kunayev, this meant that he did not have to negotiate with different clientelistic networks, simply because these networks were too weak to pose a real challenge to his authority.

Nazarbayev, rose to power under Kunayev within this intra-elite network (Hanks, 2005: 209; Isaacs, 2010a: 10). The relationship seems to have been personal as well as professional. The Nazarbayev and Kunayev families spent a great deal of time together.

When Gorbachev came to power in 1986, he viewed the leadership of the Central Asian republics with suspicion. Kunayev, was a Brezhnev loyalist and likely to counter the reforms Gorbachev felt were needed (Hanks, 2005: 209). According to Roberts (2012: 316) the problem, which faced Gorbachev was that: “During the later Brezhnev years in particular, informal mechanisms of interaction that circumvented formal state institutions began to play an increasingly significant role in the daily life of the Soviet Union.”

Moscow viewed Usabaliyev in Kyrgyzstan, Gapurov in Turkmenistan and Kunayev in Kazakhstan as too independent. Gorbachev felt the leadership was corrupt, not loyal and nepotistic (Schatz, 2004: 68). Because of Kunayev’s status as a member of the politburo and his large intra-elite network in the very top of the party, ousting him outright would cost Gorbachev dearly. Gorbachev negotiated with Kunayev, who eventually agreed to retire from his position in 1986, without accusations of corruption, and retaining his dignity (White 1993: 19). This was unique, as the other Central Asian leaders faced harsh accusations from Moscow. There is no evidence to suggest that Kunayev was less corrupt or nepotistic than the others (Collins, 2004; Hanks, 2005: 208). Kunayev’s resignation illustrates how strong his informal power in Moscow was, and how intra-elite clientelistic networks could in the end provide a great deal of protection.

The replacement for the position of General Secretary of Kazakhstan was a Russian party boss (Lillis 2019: 160). Gennady Kolbin immediately became immensely unpopular with the elite actors who had thrived under Kunayev, who felt that the position should be filled with an ethnic Kazakh from their own ranks (White, 1993: 155f). Kolbin’s time in office was short; he was replaced as General Secretary by Nazarbayev in 1989. Not surprisingly, he failed to build intra-elite clientelistic networks. There was civic unrest and anti-Russian sentiments
flourished. As it became clear that the Soviet Union was crumbling, Nursultan Nazarbayev was chosen as the new general secretary of the republic.

In Tanzania, elite conflict was dealt with through co-opting rather than purging. For example, Zuberi Mtemvu, ran against Nyerere in the 1962 presidential elections. He was a vocal critic of TANU for being too compliant with Asian and European interests, advocating an Africa for Africans only. By 1963, Mtemvu joined TANU, abandoning ANC. ANC and other small opposition parties had been disbanded before single-party rule was formally introduced (Terretta, 2013:406). The prospects offered for those who joined forces with TANU were tempting. Zuberi Mtemvu, remained a member of parliament for TANU and then CCM and held various positions in his successful political career. As mentioned, political office in Tanzania provided access to state resources and jobs within the civil service. A CCM interviewee in Dodoma stated:

The people from ANC and others, they abandoned their cause early on. They had other ideas in the beginning but look at them now! The ones who are still alive, they are very rich and their families, they are in business. […] They left their parties for one reason, because they could make money. I would say, many are still congress.

In Tanzania, the first president Julius Nyerere almost immediately became a mythical figure. His status can be compared to Kunayev’s in Kazakhstan. Both Kunayev and Nyerere have symbolic meaning as nationalist leaders. Nyerere was referred to as “Mwalimu”, teacher in Swahili, indicating a patrimonial system, where wisdom emanated from the top. The writings of Nyerere, including “Ujamaa -Essays on Socialism” (1968) and The Arusha Declaration (1967) were legendary, and were quoted liberally by scholars, politicians and others as truth. The ideological content of Nyerere’s writings and speeches was clear. Tanzania was to become a model of African socialism: egalitarianism, self-reliance and villagisation. The moral message was strongly against corruption, nepotism, clientelism and ethnic politics. Nyerere himself and the party policy were rarely questioned. A reflection of this is the weak role of parliament. Tanzania soon

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71 Mtemvu was the party leader of a small opposition party, the African National Congress (ANC). Although the party had very limited electoral success, the party was seen as a threat to nation unity (Interview CCM official Dar-es-Salaam)

72 Tanzania introduce One-party rule in 1963. In the first parliamentary elections TANU won all of the seats.

73 The word ”congress” in Swahili is sometimes used to refer to traitors.
became a presidential system, where the views of the president could not be questioned. Hopkins (1970: 768) writes on the role of the MP in 1970 that:

Parliament was asked to vote on five bills which would affect the recommended nationalization, these bills received the unanimous support of Members “who, one after another, took the floor to deliver militant speeches commending the Party, the government and the correct leadership of President Nyerere.

The support for Nyerere by political elites cannot be understood in terms of tangible material benefits and the exchange of clientelistic goods. In addition to clientelism, there were elements of seeking legitimacy through a nationalist and socialist rhetoric. Hydén (1975: 66) writes:

In neighbouring Kenya this patron-client relationship is very demonstrably pursued in materialistic terms. In Tanzania President Nyerere has tried to build up such a system on the basis not only of material goods but also of ideological conviction. Whether in Kenya or Tanzania, however, political leaders tend to count success in terms of followers and use their resources to increase their number and bind them more firmly to themselves.

Despite the incorruptible public image of Nyerere, intra-elite clientelism within the political elite existed during the Nyerere years. A former MP, who had been close to Nyerere during the 1970s and 1980s said:

Most of us believed in Mwalimu, we thought more of him than of Ujamaa and all of that. We thought, “here is the man who will give us a fair chance”. No, we didn’t make money like the Kenyans, but being a follower was really the only chance for us. [...] He would give a ministry if someone was loyal, and with that, you could employ whoever you wanted. It was really the only way. There was no money in Tanzania, and people expected you to help and support if you were close to him. [...] If you were left out, maybe you would be in prison or maybe at home in the village working the shamba74.

In the same interview, it emerged that almost all power in the political elites was centred on Nyerere himself. There were no competing elites, local big men who needed to be co-opted to ensure regime stability or ethnic loyalties, which threatened to break the consensus. This sets Tanzania apart from Kenya, where

74 A ”Shamba” is a small farm or plot of land in Swahili. Many low paid civil servants and politicians had shambas to subsidies their income.
Moi dealt with constant conflicts between elite actors. Van Donge and Liviga (1986: 621) who conducted a study on political culture in Tanzania write that:

The type of major disagreements that divided Jomo Kenyatta from Oginga Odinga in Kenya, Kenneth Kaunda from Simon Kapwepwe in Zambia, Robert Mugabe from Joshua Nkomo in Zimbabwe, or Kamuzu Banda from Orton Chirwa and Henry Chipembere in Malawi, are unknown in Tanzania.

Tanzania was like Kazakhstan during the Soviet years, where Kunayev could create his clientelistic networks in a strict hierarchy, without much competition or potential challengers. In that sense, Nyerere was not charged with attempting to co-opt competing elites to remain in power. Traditional power holders had already been sidelined through the fierce ujamaa villagisation policy and exclusion of chiefs from the realms of power.

The financial situation in Tanzania went from bad to worse during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Unemployment was high, industrialisation slow and the yields from ujamaa villages and other farms poorer than expected. Corruption in the parastatal and cooperative stores increased during the late 1970s, as the economic crisis grew deeper and the shortage of consumer goods more acute. Fruend (1981: 499) reports that the maize and rice crisis of 1979 gave new opportunities for this type of corruption. The government responded to the food crisis by restricting the sale of these basic foodstuffs to certain stores and outlets, which resulted in an immense increase in bribery cases. Heilman and Ndumbaro (2002) further argue that corruption in Tanzania was systemic rather than personal; it was a system put in place and partaking in petty corruption could not be avoided by officials of any level. As the state failed to provide services and growth through the formal channels, public employment had become a form of welfare system.

In 1985, when the World Bank and other international institutions demanded that Tanzania change its economic policy, Julius Nyerere chose to voluntarily step down rather than try to reform the economy (Chazan et al., 1988: 140). Ali Hassan Mwinyi became the second president of the republic. There is no evidence to suggest that these events are in any way connected to the breakdown of intra-elite clientelistic networks. Nyerere still enjoyed popular support, and he remained a mythical figure in Tanzanian politics and society. An example of Nyerere’s retained status as leader is that all shops in Tanzania were obliged to hang a portrait of Mwinyi as well as Nyerere on display to the customers on the wall. Brownlee (2007b) explains the orderly succession as a genuine will on the part of Nyerere to liberalise Tanzania and give way for democratic reform.
Although this can be contested, it is difficult to find a plausible explanation for Nyerere stepping down other than a will to change Tanzania in a direction, which he could not execute himself. Heilman and Ndumbaro (2002) argue that it was pressure from the financial crisis that prompted Nyerere to step down. The cooperation between Tanzania and the IMF and the World Bank was at a halt in the early 1980s, as Nyerere refused to execute the reforms demanded by the organisation. When Mwinyi became president, Tanzania complied with IMF and World Bank demands and could secure new loans.

During the Nyerere regime, intra-elite networks were cohesive, and corruption largely limited to bribe taking and nepotism. Although the size and nature of intra-elite networks did not change, the level and type of corruption did. Land grabbing kick-backs, large scale tax evasion, the buying and selling of government contracts as well as the corruption in the judiciary became the new norm (Koechlin, 2013: 165). Hydén (1999: 143) did not mince words when describing the new regime:

Ali Hassan Mwinyi, was in many respects Nyerere's opposite. He had no a political vision of his own; he was not really committed to socialism and lacked the predisposition and capacity to enforce social discipline. He may have been the right person to bring "laissez-faire" to the Tanzanian economy, but unfortunately, during his ten years in office (1985-95), this concept was allowed to permeate all spheres of society. The result was an epidemic of corruption, land grabbing, and lawlessness.

Nyerere soon became critical of the government, accusing Mwinyi of completely losing control of corruption (Southall, 2006: 254). Market liberalisation took off, and many previously state-owned enterprises were privatised, and the protectionism of the Tanzanian economy ended almost overnight (Donge and Liviga, 1989: 46).

For the Tanzanian elites, this meant that the time of shortage was over. With market liberalisation, the purchase of goods became a matter of wealth rather than connections. Initially, it was the parastatal companies and trade cooperatives, which were privatised in Tanzania. These privatisations gave way to a new form of corruption. When Mwinyi came to power, politicians began using their intra-elite networks to become part-owners or receive kickbacks when companies were privatised (Kelsall, 2002: 610).

In Kazakhstan, resources to uphold the intra-elite networks came from similar sources as in Kyrgyzstan. Through party membership and connections, elite actors could receive access to foreign goods, housing and positions in the state, and state-
owned enterprises. Resources for clientelism in both countries came from the state, rather than private sources.

*Mass Elite Clientelism*

The previous section has shown that intra-elite networks developed and were important elements of politics in Soviet Kazakhstan as well as single party Tanzania. In Kazakhstan, mass-elite clientelism was quite similar to Kyrgyzstan during the same time, and where formal employment, housing and access to education often depended more on connections than on formal rules. Tanzania shares many commonalities with this, especially with regards to employment in the public sector.

During Nyerere's time in office, mass-elite clientelism was expressed through elections. The expectation was that the parties chosen candidate would deliver the most patronage possible for their constituents (see Hydén and Leys, 1986: 416). In Tanzania those selected into leadership positions belonged almost exclusively to a small urban elite. At independence, mass-elite clientelistic links based on personal connection were broken, and it would take some time before a similar system was re-established. Not surprisingly, intra-elite clientelism was more important in Tanzania under Nyerere than mass-elite links. CCM representatives rather rapidly replaced village chiefs, and former chiefs only rarely achieved high status within the party.

This break up of traditional mass-elite links did not however end the expectation of clientelistic goods for support. During the 1960s, TANU experienced trouble in the rural areas, as local peasants did not respect the authority of the newly appointed party officials, simply because of the lack of clientelism. A retired CCM official said of his early years as a party official in a village close to Mbeya in eastern Tanzania:

> In the beginning, they had no respect for us at all. The TANU people, we were all quite young, and we were coming with different ideas. The chief from before, he was still the one they turned to because he could give them something. We… we came with nothing. All we had was ideas, we wanted everyone to work together. In the long run, that didn’t work. We had to return to the old way, you had to give a little to get their attention. […] Basically, in return, they would praise Ujamaa.

In order to cater to the expectations of clientilistic goods, the party created the regional development fund in 1967. The objective of the fund was to increase the support for TANU and to wrest power from the remaining post-independence
chiefs (Hydén, 1980: 108). During single-party rule, elections were held in Tanzania, and they were to some degree competitive in that several candidates competed within the same party. For example, the 1985 parliamentary elections 1145 candidates competed for 119 seats in parliament (Donge and Liviga, 1989). In fact, Collier (1982:135) finds that the 1965 and 1970 elections increased the legitimacy of the Tanzanian regime, creating trust and support for TANU. This sets the Tanzanian case apart from the USSR, where voters only had one candidate to choose from. On an individual level, this meant that TANU and later CCM candidates could not be certain that they would be elected, increasing the incentive for mass-elite clientelism. A culture of small gifts in return for support soon developed. John Cheyo, party leader and MP for United Democratic Party said about elections prior to the introduction of multi-party rule:

I would say that kito kidogo, it increased all the time. Even from the start, the one who wanted to be elected, he had to pay. It got more and more. For many, they had to pay the party for the nomination and then the voters something too for the support. It was very expensive.

It has often been stated that ethnic politics lack significance in Tanzania. It is said that Nyerere succeeded in his mission to create on nation, promoting the importance of individual Tanzanian over ethnic identity. Nyerere employed a strategy of promoting the Swahili language over English, which was considered imperialist, and embarked on a nation building strategy to create unity in an ethnically fragmented state. These strategies where in many ways successful; Tanzania has not seen ethnic conflict or violence, and relations between the various groups tend to be respectful. Despite this, there is clear evidence that mass-elite clientelism was somewhat dependent on ethnic identity from the onset. Omari (1987) contends that recruitment into the political elite and civil service was based on ethnicity, with Nyerere’s own ethnic group was favoured. Omari had himself been a government official and writes of his own role and sentiments on clientelism:

My being a Mpare does not contradict my being a Tanzanian. On the contrary it cements and affirms my nationality. When I am working for the government, I

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75 There were some exception to this rule, most notably the 1989 elections, which were more competitive.
76 With the exception of recurring events on Zanzibar.
77 The Pare ethnic group is a community of about 730.000 people, originating from the Pare mountains close to Mt. Kilimanjaro.
consider myself a Tanzanian and I defend the national interest. When I am helping my village to get clean water or other developmental programs. I do so on the basis of my sentiments as a Mpare from that village (Omari 1987: 72f).

Omari’s account illustrates that it was essential for ethnic communities to be represented in the party, parliament and the civil service to gain access to local investment. While ethnicity was used to garner support in Tanzania, it was not spoken of publicly, nor was it a mobilisation strategy.

In Kazakhstan, mass-elite clientelism was like Kyrgyzstan: it was expected that clientelistic goods were distributed during election time, and community development was highly contingent on political support. The Zheltoksan events in December 1986 tell a story of how mass-elite clientelistic ties contributed to mass-mobilisation, protesting the appointment of Gennady Kolbin as First Secretary of the Kazakh SSR. Gorbachev appointed Kolbin to curb intra-elite clientelism, corruption and nepotism. It is no surprise that the Kazakh elites were sceptical to say the least, as this was a major disruption of the make-up of the elite networks and a return to a policy of Russian domination rather than a policy of “nativisation”, where power was delegated to local elites.

In December 1986, thousands of people took to the streets of Almaty to protest. The protests lasted for days and were violently put down by security forces (White, 1993: 156). Several hundred people were killed during the Zheltoksan78 (Hanks, 2005: 210; White, 1993: 156). One interviewee who was a party official during that time states that:

In fact, this was a very big crime, when young boys and girls get repressed by special military forces called from Novosibirsk, Tashkent and even some military forces from Georgia were involved. Many people died and several thousand got injured, but it was prohibited to speak or write about it. And when the meeting of MPS of the USSR I wanted to speak out, to say out loud what had happened. But the guys from KGB knew that, so they wouldn’t want to allow me to speak. I managed to trick Gorbachev, and I said I would be speaking of the Aral Sea, and it was broadcasted not only in the country but internationally. Everybody found out what was happening (Mukhtar Shanakov 2010).

Most scholars argue that the people protesting were had been mobilised by disgruntled elites and were paid or rewarded to take part, indicating that there was an element of mass-elite clientelism. Literaturnaya Gazeta reported that the protesters were “inexperienced and politically illiterate” joined by “hooligans,

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78 December in Kazakh
drunks and anti-social types” (cited in White, 1993: 155). Some of those partaking were students from higher education institutions in the city (Kuscu, 2008: 70). Alexandrov (1999: 11) gives a detailed account of the events:

According to later revelations, the riots in Alma-Ata were not spontaneous. Turmoil started in student dormitories on 17 December. Student activists ran from one room to another and shouted. All to the square! Let’s save Kunayev! Those who refused were called traitors and beaten up. Standing near dormitories were snow-white Volga cars, the type only available in the Kazakhstan Council of Ministers’ garage. The cars were full of cases of vodka, which were freely available to students who rushed out to the streets. At that time, Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign was in full swing, and vodka was very difficult to get.

One explanation is that Kunayev himself or those loyal to him were behind the riot. This is however quite unlikely. There is no chance that Kunayev would be reinstated as General Secretary of Kazakh SSR. He was close to retirement age and had just managed to negotiate an exit without accusations of corruption that would have landed him a prison sentence. Also, Gorbachev states in his memoirs that Kunayev himself suggested that a non-Kazakh be appointed. On the other hand, Nazarbayev had good reason to be disappointed with the appointment of Kolbin. When Gorbachev came to power in 1982, Nazarbayev quickly switched his loyalty and actively supported the reform policy. In 1984, he became the chairman of the council of ministers of the Kazakh SSR, which was the second highest political position in the republic, making him the obvious choice as the new general secretary (Kuscu, 2008: 71). Alexandrov (1999: 14) provides relatively substantial evidence that Nazarbayev was the main organiser behind the Zheltoksan events:

The minutes of the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 25 June 1987 (which are still unavailable to the public) indicated that he [Kunayev] did take the floor, disagreed with the accusations levied against him and said that Nazarbayev masterminded the Alma-Ata riots. Though Gorbachev stopped Kunayev from finishing his speech, its effect on Nazarbayev was so strong that he was taken to hospital immediately after the plenum.

If Nazarbayev was in fact behind the events, it provides an explanation for the current regime’s ambiguity in relation to Zheltoksan. On the one hand, streets are named after the events. The national day is celebrated on the day as remembrance. Despite this Adams and Rustemova (2009: 1262) contend that an official narrative of the events is lacking, as parts of the government have been implicated.
Zheltoksan and Kunayev are mythical in Kazakhstan and constitute part of a nationalist narrative (Lillis, 2019: 165).

There is no doubt that mass-elite clientelism existed in both states, and that both individual power-seekers and the state used clientelistic strategies to gain support. In Kazakhstan, the Zheltoksan protests show that Kazakh elites had the ability to mobilise mass actors using clientelistic incentives, even if the risks involved for the protesters were relatively high. In Tanzania, mass-elite clientelism changed during the period, from being almost non-existent at independence, to a part of political life by the time the first multi-party elections were held in 1995. Although mass-elite clientelism existed, resources spent, and efforts made to retain intra-elite networks were much greater.

Repression

Like Kenya, Tanzania allowed multi-party competition at independence. However, party competition was formally banned in 1965 making Tanzania a single party state (Whitehead, 2009: 65). The reasons given for this were ideological, multi-party rule was thought to be incompatible with the African traditional way of life and society. Nyerere argued that consensus was the way forward for the state and that more than one party would doubtlessly lead to fierce competition between ethnic groups and communities. This shows that there was a strategy of creating legitimacy through an ideological message. Several MPs who were interviewed still believe that a single party state and a strong party was the right decision at the time (for example Job Ndugai, Zainab Gama and Ali Mzee). Michael Laizer Lekule, a CCM MP, went far in his analysis of the advantages of the early policy of excluding political competition:

The whole reason why we don’t have any conflict, why there has been little violence and no war is that Mwalimu built a very strong party, a party that everyone was a part of. There were no differences, ethnic or religious in the party. […] TANU and then CCM was us, it was a common project for the common good. Now, things have changed, of course things need to be different now.

By 1960, TANU had 1 million members in a country of just 9 million (Glickman, 1965: 139). According the Hydén and Leys (1972:406), the success of TANU was in part due to the large number of local leaders who had been associated with
TAA\textsuperscript{79} became leading figures in the party and encouraged their supporters to join. Although membership numbers dropped directly after independence.

It is often stated that TANU and later CCM forged a culture of consensus, both within the party cadre and in the population as a whole (Donge and Liviga, 1986; Havnevik, 2010; Hydén, 1994). The strongest argument in favour of this position is that no other party was successful in elections preceding single-party rule, with TANU winning all seats in parliament. Even more telling, Julius Nyerere won more than 99\% of the presidential votes in the 1962 elections, which were officially contested\textsuperscript{80}. This irrefutably shows that there were no strong opposition movements in post-colonial Tanganyika. This narrative is only partially accurate; the voter turnout in the first few elections was disappointingly low, indicating that TANU may not have enjoyed unanimous support.

CCM bore many similarities to the Communist party in the Soviet Union. Tanzania had all the hallmarks of a party state: it was difficult not to say impossible for ordinary Tanzanians to distinguish between the power of the party, the government, the president and the state. There were however some important differences between Tanzania and the Soviet System. A Dar-es-Salaam journalist, who wished to remain unnamed, commented:

I was working at a newspaper at the time\textsuperscript{81}. All the journalists, me too, were members of the party. In Dar-es-Salaam, the party was in control of everything, everyone who was anybody was a member. You could not get a good job without talking about Ujamaa. The big difference [between Tanzania and the Soviet Union] was the country-side. There was no way they could control every single person! In fact, if you didn’t want a job, to get ahead, it was very easy to hide, to have nothing to do with any of it. There were many poor people who never voted, who didn’t care and never gave Nyerere a second thought.

By the early 1970s, all media in Tanzania had been nationalised. The stated reason for this was that Nyerere wished to minimise foreign influences of Tanzanian culture. In practice, it was impossible for journalists to act independently, criticise the government or the official position. In 1972, he dismissed the editor of Tanzania’s English language newspaper Daily News for writing an article criticising the Sudanese government’s practice of executing rebels. Nyerere had

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{79} Tanganyika African Association (TAA) was formed in 1929, and included most non-whites employed by the civil service.
\item \textsuperscript{80} Zuberi Mtewu of the AANC won 0.8\% of the popular vote.
\item \textsuperscript{81} Late 1970s early 1980s.
\end{itemize}
previously appointed the editor who had now committed the crime of “unacceptable criticism of a fellow African leader.” (Grosswiler, 1997: 105).

Unlike in Soviet Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the party and the state did was not significant in the lives of all Tanzanians, in fact many Tanzanians did not vote or have any contact with the party whatsoever. The reason for this is that a vast majority of Tanzanians during the single-party era were not employed in the formal sector. This did not prevent the CCM from having a profound impact; most people who were employed in the formal sector, on any level were expected to be members. Amon Cheliga, a professor of Political Science at Dar-es-Salaam University verified this in an interview:

Although Tanzania has never had a very large number of prisoners of conscious, it was unacceptable for anyone who had a qualified job to openly criticise Ujamaa, Nyerere or the party. […] You basically had to be a member. It is quite ironic that there was so little dissent, because we were never the Soviet Union, people were not put in camps, some people were mistreated in prison and there was Zanzibar, but it was not very many. It was not even like in Kenya. […] you have to keep in mind that the single party years, it was a culture of consensus. Protesting would leave anyone out of the elite without a chance.

In contrast, the system of control and repression was all encompassing in Kazakhstan, after an initial period of establishing control during the 1920s and 1930s. In Kazakhstan, most nomads and peasants refused to give up their land and livestock, resulting in brutal reprisals. Any dissent was met with weapons and force, and peasant with wealth was declared a Kulak and deported or killed. In some cases, Kazakhs resisted collectivisation, taking up arms against the Soviets, however by 1932 agriculture was declare collectivised (Kort, 2004:53ff). The cost of the collectivisation was dire; Olcott (1995: 184f) reports that 1.5 million people were killed and 80% of the herd was lost. The main reason was starvation, as many of the new collective farms lacked shelter, access to water, agricultural equipment and basics like nails and planks. Aside from the human cost of collectivisation, the period brought about registration and control of the population, as well as an administrative structure in the territory. According to Olcott (1995: 199ff), Soviet control of Kazakhstan was not immediate, and there was a great deal of resistance. By the time collectivisation of land had been completed, several purges had taken place in the Kazakh leadership and the republic was firmly under control and its

82 Since the end of single-party rule in Tanzania, some personal accounts of torture and abuse of political prisoners have emerged. These descriptions are likely to be truthful, but cannot inform on the scale of repression during the era (Mwijage, 1996).
citizens registered. The image of the Soviet Union in the 1930s and of Stalin as a despot with full control of the entire territory is at least in part a fallacy. Getty (1987: 29ff) writes that 67% of the Soviet population lived in rural areas. Of these citizens, only 0.3% had joined the Communist party by the end of the 1930s. Even though purges took place and a great number of people died or were sent to prison camps, the state was unable to uphold law and order in large areas, where criminal gangs robbed and burned collective farms with impunity. In Kazakhstan, 120 districts were not in direct contact with Moscow; there was no phone link and passing messages to remote areas by other means was difficult and perilous (ibid: 30). Olcott (1981: 125) shares the view that the central authority was not in control until after the 1930s, claiming that local authorities sometimes openly defied orders from Moscow to collectivise agriculture. After the 1930s, and more so after the Second World War, from when it is possible to speak of totalitarian control.

This analysis of the state of affairs may seem confusing; millions of individuals died in Kazakhstan because of repression, forced collectivisation, the virgin lands policy and purges within elite circles. Under Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev, any open challenge to the regime was harshly put down. In terms of brutality, no era could match Stalin’s. Bhavna (2007: 51) even implies that Stalin was committing genocide against the Kazakhs, due to the scale of repression. This does not diminish the fact that Moscow lacked control in Kazakhstan until at least the late 1940s – mass killings took place, but their execution was random. Deportation was a common punishment, but a few interviewees in Almaty describe the practice as completely arbitrary:

I know that many of my relatives were killed or deported under Stalin. But as the story is told in my family, there was no way of knowing who would go and who would be safe. There were cattle thieves who could keep going for years and years, yet my grandmother who was a communist was killed. [...] What they did was make everyone afraid, that way they put down the rebels who did not want to go into the collectives (University Professor Kazakhstan National University 2010).

As time passed, a system of totalitarian control was established in Kazakhstan, as it was a destination for a number of minority groups deported during Stalin’s terror, among them a large group of Koreans and Germans; a gulag system was established in the north, while other deportees were placed in villages attached to collective farms. In that way, Carmack (2014) argues, their labour could be utilised, while gradually facilitating” Sovietization” of these nationalities. They
did not immediately become insiders, while retaining a connection to the outside Soviet society.

Because of the newly instated prison system, new effective secret service and a party, which would soon be present even in the most remote areas, most people in the republic were monitored by the authorities leaving little or no room for dissent. A survey on attitudes towards the Soviet secret service shows that a full 32.5% suffered personally or experienced family members suffering from their activities. In contrast, only 16.3% of the respondents in Kyrgyzstan said that they or their families had suffered (White and Kryshtanovskaya, 1993: 173). This is a clear indication that the population in Kazakhstan experienced more surveillance than citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic. There were still some individuals who were opposed to the virgin lands policy. In response to this:

Kunayev [...] admitted that the unsettled nature of the situation in Kazakhstan had required supplementing the regular police with "voluntary people's militia units" [...] Four thousand such "militia units" totalling more than 132,000 individuals, had been created by early spring of 1960 (Laird and Chappell, 1961: 334).

The “unsettled situation” referred to here is the dissatisfaction expressed both on the elite level, but also in the rural areas with Soviet agricultural policy in general and the virgin lands project in particular. Despite few challengers to his supremacy, Kunayev chose to use extreme forms of repression in order to quell any resistance. This form of control was retained in Kazakhstan throughout the Soviet period, and it sets Kazakhstan apart from single-party Tanzania.

In Tanzania, dissent and non-compliance with the state, such as refusing to vote, refusing to relocate to an ujamaa village did not always result in consequences, according to several interviewees in Dar-es-Salaam. A retired CCM official said that:

To be frank, in the villages, if they were not Ujamaa, nobody cared about politics. People were not even aware. I think, in those places people could maybe get away

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83 White and Kryshtanovskaya study includes surveys data collected in 1991 and 1992 from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan. Respondents were asked questions about their general attitude towards the Soviet security services and their personal experiences.

84 A much greater number expressed that their family members had suffered. This may be an expression of fear of persecution if the individuals trouble with security services became known.
with thinking or saying anything. It was only if it came to the attention, but in most cases, there was nobody who would bring that to anyone's attention.

As discussed, most members of early opposition parties in Tanzania were co-opted into TANU. The consequences of not joining the party were dire. When asked why Ujamaa was so important, despite failing to affect many people's lives, a CCM MP responded:

Ujamaa, well, in those days, saying you opposed Ujamaa was like saying you wanted the British to come back, like you were no more than a slave, that they could call "boy". It was like…. It was not up for debate…. It was there and it was the way everybody was thinking. […] I was in the youth league in the early 1980s and there was no one who questioned, not even in private (Suleiman Omar Kumchaya 2010).

In 1962, the preventive detainment act was passed, giving the president the right to detain people without judicial procedure (Havnevik, 2010: 26). Those detained did not have right of appeal, and the duration of detainment was not specified. Many union leaders, oppositionals, and journalists were jailed (Havnevik, 1993; Hunter, 2012; Terretta, 2013:39). In 1964 all trade unions not associated with the TANU party were banned and 200 unionists were detained without trial. Many remained in custody for more than two years, after which they were blacklisted from formal employment (Howard-Hassmann, 1986: 132). There were also several cases where the act was used against individuals who were accused of corruption (ibid:175). Peter (1997: 119) argues that the act was used in a completely arbitrary way:

The Preventive Detention Act was then unleashed against poor peasants alleged to be involved in local brew making and cattle rustling. Of course, any political activity which was viewed by the state as amounting to dissent was greeted with detention without trial even in the 1980s.

The use of preventive detention was highly politicised. There are many documented incidents, where the act was used to incarcerate individuals who had been acquitted in court. An individual who was a part of the TANU elite during the 1970s and 80s described one such incident:

There was a story of a politician who had been opposing Nyerere. He was in the High Court, they had brought him for murder, but it was obvious to all of us that he didn’t do it. So, he was released, the High Court ruled he was innocent. When
he was coming out [of the court] the police were waiting, and he was taken away. Because, you see, there was a presidential order. I have no idea how many years he spent inside […] I think it was very convenient, because Nyerere didn’t have to have to court on side, he could just detain whoever said something.

It has been argued that the Tanzanian regime was relatively benign compared to other East African states; comparatively few individuals were detained for political reasons and that the single-party system allowed for some political participation. A study conducted by Hopkins (1970) of political speeches in parliament between 1961 and 1965 tell a different story. In 1961/62, about 18% of speeches held in parliament were critical of government policy. By 1964/65, that number had dropped to under 5%. Hopkin’s conclusion is that MPs with a critical view had simply been ousted from power: “[N]one of those who were clearly and consistently critical or who opposed the government in the first five years has survived as a popular politician or M.P.” (ibid: 758).

Several of the older member of CCM and other parties I interviewed got involved in politics through the TANU or CCM youth movements, the TANU Youth League (TYL) and Umoja wa Vijana. The youth movements had clubs at Dar-es-Salaam University and other institutions of higher education. The young men85 who were members at the universities often became leaders in TANU and later CCM. Like the Komsomol in the Soviet Union, these movements provided a route into the party for young people who wanted a career in Tanzania. According to Brennan (2006b), the TYL and its equivalent on Zanzibar worked as a security organisation: they would arrest people who were considered a threat to the party, the state or common decency. The arrests carried out by the youth league were often arbitrary, there was no due process and the individuals targeted were chosen, it seems randomly. Brennan (2006b:239f) further writes of intelligence in 1970:

Political intelligence remained in the hands of two groups – the apparently ineffectual Tanzanian Police and Security Service (TPSS) and, more informally, a group within the ranks of the TANU Youth League.

TYL had the capacity that the police and military were lacking. After an attempted coup in 196486, the army was disbanded. Nyerere turned to TYL to build a new

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85 Brennan (2006) and Ivaska (2002) report that there were almost no female members of TYL.
86 It was the Tanzania Rifles, the former colonial military force, who attempted a coup against Nyerere. Soldiers arrested their British officers, surrounded public buildings, took over the
army for the republic (Bienen, 1968: 58f). The relationship between TANU, the police force and TYL as the youth often acted quite independently. For example, (Ivaska, 2002: 585) reports that the TYL instated a rule banning women from wearing miniskirts in 1968. TYL paraded the streets and bus stations of Dar es Salaam and harassed and beat “indecently” dressed women under the code name Operation Vijana87. There were serious outbreaks of violence where the police were attempting to protect women from the angry youths. Tear Gas was used to disperse the crowd. Operation Vijana became a matter of political debate and is one of the few examples of many different political opinions being expressed in the national newspapers during the single party era. Women wearing western garments were seen as political protesters, threatening the unity of the party and the anti-imperialist stance of Tanzania. The issue of women in politics was a matter of contention throughout the single party era, despite many women joining the women’s organisations connected to the party. There were strong forces in the party leadership who wished to exclude women entirely from the realm of political power Geiger (1982: 48) for example writes:

[There were] direct anti-women reactions, which TANU seems to have done little to clarify or counter. In some places, men were clearly hostile to women’s participation beyond attendance at mass rallies […] In a Haya village, men closed down the women’s section.

Despite the TYL growing rapidly in number, it was apparent to Nyerere that there were serious problems within the organisation and in its relationship to TANU. During the late 1960s and early 1970, there were vicious leadership struggles (Brennan, 2006b). It became increasingly clear to Nyerere and others in the TANU leadership that TYL had become too independent from the party and that their actions were a threat to the legitimacy of the party. As many of the individuals in leading positions in TYL, particularly the chairman, were in their 40s, TANU decided to change the rules to the effect that only persons under the age of 35 could be part of the leadership. This move brought the TYL firmly under TANU control and hampered the youth organisations ability to act independently or build a support base. After the merger of ASP and TANU in 1977, the youth league formally became a part of CCM. TYL was renamed

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87 Vijana means youth in Swahili.
“Umoja wa Vijana” and became a party organ, much like Komsomol in the Soviet Union.

The organisations provided intelligence, made arrests and were responsible for security at party events and during elections. They fulfilled a policing role, while the Tanzanian security services and police were to a large extent defunct. This is one of the reasons why the country did not become totalitarian like the Soviet Union. To the extent that people were arrested, harassed or abused for political reasons, TYL or Umoja wa Vijana often provided intelligence, or acted as police. For example, in some areas there was a great deal of resistance to villagisation according to the Ujamaa model. Rural citizens did not comply and refused to move into ujamaa villages. Because of the weakness of the police, the state was unable to force villagisation in some regions. Von Freyhold (quoted in Mamdani 1996: 175) describes how the TYL was used in the process in Handeni district in 1967-68:

A house would be built in the village, and as soon as at least one room was finished, a lorry would be brought from the council, full of TYL members and driven to a house in a traditional hamlet. The owner and all his belongings would be shifted to the ujamaa village. Some of the people who were moved into the ujamaa village in this manner would leave after only a night, but most remained in order to avoid any further trouble. During this period a security committee was formed. One of its tasks was to report on those who openly criticized the manner or recruitment into Ujamaa.

Mamdani (1996: 175) refers to this as decentralised coercion. The police were unlikely to have an office in the rural areas. The TYL was the group, which enforced the policies of the party and the government.

After Stalin’s death, repression was much reduced and took on a different form in Soviet Kazakhstan. Like in Soviet Kyrgyzstan, it is difficult to distinguish between the actions of the state and the party, as the two were closely interlinked. There are reports that the party organisations were an important source of information alongside the security services. More importantly the mode of repression changed. The terror of Stalin: prison camps, deportation, mass killings and starvation were not the primary mode of repression in Soviet Kazakhstan after 1953. As a historian in Almaty explained:

After the terror, other ways were used. Small trespassings were met only with exclusion, for example, getting a good job, education or housing was not possible.

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88 Union of Youth
Then, of course some people were sent to prison. A more popular way was repression through mental health, people, the ones who did not comply with whatever were considered insane. It became pathological to disagree. So many people were suddenly schizophrenic, new hospitals were built.

The indefinite incarceration of dissidents in psychiatric hospitals and wards was commonplace, and took place across the Soviet Union (Reich, 2014). One such hospital was in Alma-ata, which was the capital of the republic at the time. The use of mental institutions to quell dissent was well known in the west; the world Psychiatric Association criticised the USSR for its practices in 1977. Young-Anawaty (1978) wrote in connection with this that:

There is evidence that this inhuman campaign to destroy the will or sanity of dissidents, which has a long, bleak history in Soviet policy, has gained momentum in recent years. [...] They [The Soviets] discredit the accounts of unwarranted confinement by characterizing the dissidents as mentally ill criminals and troublemakers'.

Despite international outrage, the practice of diagnosing dissidents with mental illnesses continued until the breakup of the Soviet Union. Helsinki Watch (HW) reported in 1990 that six individuals who were taken into psychiatric care after partaking in the Zheltoksan protests in 1986 remained in the Talgar psychiatric clinic (Helsinki Watch, 1990b). It is estimated that 200 were killed during the riots, around 8500 people were detained, and an unknown number of people died while in custody (Lillis 2019, 166f).

The use of psychiatric hospitals as punishment for dissent served several purposes. Firstly, it was an effective way of delegitimizing dissent; individuals who did not comply with the Soviet point of view were simple judged insane and should not be listened to. Secondly and perhaps more importantly it provided the regime with a tool to hold individuals indefinitely without the involvement of the judiciary. Soviet directives on psychiatric incarceration were very vague, allowing the authorities to incarcerate any Soviet citizen, with no right to appeal (Young-Anawaty, 1978: 791)

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89 Helsinki Watch was an American organisation dedicated to monitoring human rights abuse in the Soviet Union. The organisation later became Human Rights Watch, an organisation which works globally.
It could therefore be argued that the use of mental institutions in the Soviet Union served a similar purpose to preventive detention in Tanzania.\(^90\) Circumventing the legal system had obvious advantages; confinement to mental institutions required no legal process, which could potentially reach the public eye. Also, dissidents could be subjected to torture with justification. Many received medical treatment and mind-altering drugs without consent (Helsinki Watch, 1990b; Young-Anawaty, 1978).

There were of course other methods employed by the state to curb dissent. Sharlet (1978) outlines a few, ranging from harassment, loss of privilege, state sponsored hooliganism (essentially extra judicial beatings, muggings and murder), and forced expatriation. What many of these strategies have in common is that they depart from Stalin’s use of prison camps and political detention.

As noted, there were differences regarding repression between Soviet Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, mainly because Kazakhstan was much more well-monitored. There were also differences between the state of repression on mainland Tanganyika and on the islands of Zanzibar, which had traditions of political cleavages and fractured elite networks. There was a conflict between one wing of the CCM on Zanzibar who wished for more independence from the mainland and a group who were loyal to the union and national president. The pinnacle of conflict came in the late in 1980s when a group of CCM politicians were dismissed from the party and detained. This group of people later became the founding members of Civic United Front\(^91\), a party that has enjoyed significant electoral success on Zanzibar after the introduction of multi-party rule. Seif Hamad Sharif\(^92\) was among those arrested. The purge of party members on Zanzibar is a clear illustration that the CCM did not shy away from authoritarian methods to remain in control when it was deemed necessary. In an interview Sharif said about the events:

> We wanted to do things differently on Zanzibar compared to the mainland, more in line with our culture. We wanted to open up for small businesses. We wanted to trade freely; Zanzibar has always been a place for trade. We were changing faster than the mainland, and there were conflicts. We wanted to open up. My dismissal

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90 Preventive detention existed in the Soviet Union as well, however the practice was used mainly to keep suspects detained pretrial, sometimes for prolonged periods of time.

91 Initially, the Zanzibari oppositionals formed a party, which was never registered: Zanzibar United Front. In order to meet the criteria to register as a political party, they joined forces with a mainland organisation, the Civic Movement (CM). The party was registered under the name CUF and its founding chairman was mainlander James Mapalala of CM.

92 Current vice-president of Zanzibar and chairman of the CUF party. Formerly the Chief Minister of Zanzibar (1984-1988)
and arrest were purely political, they first said it was because I held illegal meetings, then that I had secret documents. I spent thirty months in prison.

In 1964, a revolution took place on Zanzibar. The main grievance of the instigators was that Zanzibari Arabs had gained undue influence after the first multi-party elections held shortly after independence in 1963 (Ngasongwa, 1992). On the 12 January, a revolutionary guard led by the Afro Shiraz Party (ASP) and the Umma party evicted all of Arab descent from the islands by force. During the following days, the revolutionaries killed about 5000 Zanzibaris of Arab descent (Brown, 2010: 622). According to Sheriff (2001:314) most of those killed were not successful businesspeople or land owners, that class had the resources to leave the island or were settled in Oman. Rather it was those killed were poor shopkeepers, many of whom lived in the rural areas. Arab families had lived on the islands for generations, and a great deal of inter marriages had taken place, making it difficult to distinguish between “Arab” and “African” Zanzibaris (interview Ismael Jussa)93. Race was used to legitimise violence and the revolution (Killian, 2008). ASP had close co-operation with TANU on the mainland, and only three months after the revolution, the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed the independent state of Tanzania. Although the two parties did not merge until 1977, ASP became the only legal party on Zanzibar, while TANU was the only legal party on the mainland.

The mainland policy of creating consensus and attempts to co-opt potential challengers into the party rather than detain or intimidate was not mirrored on Zanzibar. The parties that existed before the revolution continued to meet and protest the Afro-Shiraz Party until multi-party rule was reintroduced in the 1990s. One woman, who is now a member of CUF said of the 1980s in Chake-Chake94:

My husband, he would leave a few times a week to meet with people from the party. We were oppressed, they said we were Arabs. But I am as much African as anyone here, look (shows arm). We wanted independence; we didn’t want CCM. He was arrested too many times to remember and he always came back with wounds. […] He was not alone, many of our men were beaten, locked away. We had to take care of the families alone.

There is ample evidence of oppression on Zanzibar during single-party rule see for example (Glassman, 2011; Killian, 2008; Triplett, 1971). A great number of

93 For a comprehensive and well written account of the racial elements of Zanzibari politics and society see (Glassman 2011)
94 Chake-Chake is the capital of Pemba, the smaller of the two Zanzibari islands.
people were detained, imprisoned and tortured. “People’s courts”, staffed by party officials not legal professionals soon replaced the courts. According to Triplett (1971: 614), sentencing in the people’s courts was erratic and an instrument of the party rather that ruled by the law. More subtle forms of oppression were also used to intimidate potential challengers and those opposed to the regime. In 1970 for example for Iranian girls in their early teens were forced to marry high ASP officials without the consent of their parents. President Karume’s\(^{95}\) response was: “In colonial times the Arabs took African concubines without bothering to marry them. Now that we are in power the shoe is on the other foot”. Quoted in (Brown, 2010: 622). Oppression against women was common. In practice, it became virtually impossible for women to leave the islands, as they were no longer permitted to travel independently. According to Triplett (1971: 613), any man who wished to marry a Zanzibari woman and settle outside of Zanzibar on the mainland or elsewhere was obliged to pay the equivalent of 8000 USD to the revolutionary government. Brennan (2006b: 238f) also notes that the AFS youth league arrested women who were “indecently dressed”. Women and Arabs, or those perceived to be Arabs were not the only targets of political oppression in Zanzibar. Anyone who was perceived as anti-Union, opposed to ASP or outspoken on any political issue were subject to arrest and prosecution. According to Brown (2010: 623) approximately 10% or 35 000 people left Zanzibar between the revolution and 1972\(^{96}\).

The difference between the strategy of the government on the mainland and on Zanzibar is a clear illustration of the tools available to authoritarian governments. On Zanzibar, the government chose to use oppression as their main means of control; there was a strong opposition to the government and few resources available for intra-elite clientelism. There were few jobs in the public sector and the economy was mainly dependant on the export of cloves and other spices. This made a clientelist strategy for remaining in power unfeasible. On the mainland on the other hand, the opposition was weak, and the public sector could swell, providing resources for clientelism. This strategy was successful in that it allowed the party to remain in power, however it also created a debt crisis, which was one of the factors, which affected the CCM to introduce multi-party rule in 1992.

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\(^{95}\) Karume was the first revolutionary president of Zanzibar.

\(^{96}\) Karume was assassinated in 1972.
In Soviet Kazakhstan and in single-party Tanzania, intra-elite networks were largely hierarchical; there were few if any signs that of factions, which could conceivably threaten the regime. In both states, elite networks were maintained through the exchange of clientelistic goods such as access to government jobs, services, goods and kickbacks. In some cases, key individuals were placed in positions, which gave access to corruption. In Kazakhstan, First Secretary Kunayev established a relatively inclusive elite network, with members of different ethnic and clan origin, opting for a strategy of co-option. Clientelistic goods emanated from the state, there were few other options as private enterprise was limited.

In Tanzania, corruption increased as a means of upholding clientelistic networks, during Mwinyi’s time in office with many highly publicised corruption scandals coming to light.

In both Kazakhstan and Tanzania, traditional intra-elite clientelistic networks were dismantled in favour of new leadership structures when a party state was established. In Tanzania, traditional chiefs were largely dismissed from power as a new party cadre took over. In Kazakhs SSR, the collectivisation drive, the virgin lands policy and large influx of Russians and others reduced the importance of traditional leaders.

Mass-elite clientelism played a part in both states, however there is no doubt that effort spent on upholding intra-elite networks was more important. In Kazakhstan, clientelistic strategies were used to mobilise a riot in 1986 against the appointment of Gennady Kolbin as First Secretary, indicating that Nazarbayev had the ability to forge mass-elite bonds through clientelism. Although Tanzania was a single-party regime, it allowed for more competition than the Soviet system, as voters had a choice between candidates from the same party. This gave rise to several clientelistic strategies such as vote buying and selective support for development projects in exchange for support.

Repression in Kazakh SSR varied greatly over time. During the early years, millions of people died or were displaced out of the republic due to Stalin’s terror, forced collectivisation and famine. Paradoxically, this period is also characterized by a state without full control into the activities of its citizenry – violence, detentions and killings were largely ad hoc, and there was a great deal of resistance to Soviet policy. As the atrocities diminished, state control tightened, with an effective secret service and party apparatus. This ensured that information of possible dissent was almost total. The Tanzanian state never achieved the level of control experienced in the Soviet Union, with a relatively small and inefficient
secret service. Instead, the leadership in Tanzania relied heavily on the party youth organisation to uphold order and report dissidents.

In both states, alternative methods of punishing dissent were present. In Kazakhstan, as in the Soviet Union in general, psychiatric hospitals and care were used instead of the prison system, circumventing the court system. In a similar manner, the Preventive Detention Act allowed the president of Tanzania to detain possible troublemakers indefinitely without trial. These methods indicate that there was a political will to keep political deviants out of the judicial system. There may be several reasons for this, such as hiding the number of political prisoners from view, or to avoid losing legitimacy in the eyes of the public. In a donor dependent state like Tanzania, public trials could also have drawn unwanted international attention. Preventive Detention and the prospect of forced psychiatric care was also a powerful deterrent for potential oppositionals, as the conditions and amount of time in custody was uncertain.

Resources for clientelism and repression in both countries came from the state. As in many single-party states, making a clear distinction between state and party resources was not always easy. The Communist Party and well as TANU and later CCM were an extension of power, in much that same way as the police and judiciary. In that sense, the parties were carrying out repression through party organisations, but not through private actors.
The Dominant Party Era

Once Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had become independent states, they soon became formal multi-party states. Similarly, in Kenya and Tanzania the early 1990s was a time of dramatic change. After many years of single party rule, multi-party competition was officially allowed. Despite this, all four states in this study remained dominant autocracies for some time. Kazakhstan and Tanzania were to remain dominant party states, while the dominant parties subsequently lost power in Kyrgyzstan and Kenya, giving way for plural elected assemblies and competitive presidential elections. The differences in patterns of clientelism and role of parties will provide clues regarding the divergent development in these states, as will an understanding of continuity and change from the previous era. The first section discusses clientelism and repression in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, while the second is devoted to the same in Kazakhstan and Tanzania.

Dominant Party Rule in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan

The move by Moi to abolish single-party rule was unexpected. It could be argued that the re-introduction of multi-party rule in Kenya did not come as a result of popular protest. There were several pro-democracy protests in Kenya during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Most notably perhaps, the Saba Saba\textsuperscript{97} riots, where open confrontations between thousands of protesters and police took place in Nairobi (Branch, 2011: 193ff; Hornsby, 2012: 477ff). Several prominent opposition politicians had been arrested prior to the protests, and mass arrests took place after the event. Between 30 and 100 people were killed in the protests. The measures taken by the Moi regime at this time is emblematic of the repressive political climate in Kenya at this time. It is however important not to over emphasise the importance of the protests. In 1990, a committee appointed by Moi toured the country and provided a forum for complaints about corruption, land theft and repression. The subsequent report recommended many changes, but not a return to multi-partyism. Peter Oloo-Aringo, a prominent politician

\textsuperscript{97} Saba Saba means seven seven in Swahili. The riots took place on the seventh of July 1990.
claimed that “The president was given a briefing that made him believe Kenyans were totally against multi-partyism” (Hornsby, 2012: 478). Moi had little reason to think that the protests this time around were different than the ones, which took place during earlier during the 1980s. Liberal media, political protests and civil society movements were met with repression and violence, a strategy, which had previously been successful. More oppositional people were arrested, newspapers and magazines shut down. The late 1980s and early 1990s in Kenya was not an era of liberalisation, on the contrary, electoral fraud and repression increased (Throup, 1993: 388f; Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 54). This indicates that the move to introduce multi-party rule was not planned by Moi. Although there were protests and voices calling for democracy in Kenya, the Moi regimes was not on the verge of losing control of the state, nor were there truly powerful threats to the incumbency of the regime. This is reflected in the fact that Moi and KANU survived two elections after the end of formal multi-party rule.

In 1992, states in Eastern Europe were introducing competitive systems, the Soviet Union was dissolving, western countries and donor states were putting pressure on Kenya to liberalise. Foreign aid was suspended in order to compel Kenya to end single-party rule (Branch, 2011: 185). This supports Levitsky and Way’s (2010b: 24ff) theory that linkages and leverage matter a great deal in terms of democratisation. Linkages imply international connections in society, which could put pressure on the regime and leverages direct ties and influence of other states on the economy and other spheres. Kenya had both: there were strong linkages between Kenyan business interests, academics and others with western countries. Widner (1992: 226) argues that Kenyan clergy, lawyers, environmentalists and to some degree academics had strong connections with transnational organisations. In terms of leverage, Kenya was dependent on the west for tourism, exports and foreign aid. Although the economy was fairly successful in African terms, the Kenyan government had become accustomed to receiving foreign aid.

Relations with the West had throughout the Moi years been positive because of Moi’s anti-communist and pro-capitalist politics. The change in attitude of the western countries came as a shock. Moi expressed his concern: “Western diplomats, journalists and aid workers unwittingly supported and complemented this false thesis of good versus evil, democracy versus authoritarianism, and corruption versus duty” (Daniel Arap Moi quoted in Hornsby, 2012: 468). Despite Moi’s dismay, aid, tourism and coffee exports were dependent on the goodwill of the west, and multi-party competition became a necessity.
Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, independence did not come because of popular demand or political protest. In an interview, Shairbek Juraev, a professor at the American University of Central Asia stated that:

I think […] people and politicians in this country actually wanted to keep the USSR. Nobody really wanted independence. It is almost like independence was imposed on us – we did not fight for it at all. That’s why it was difficult to come up with a plan for the leaders. There were some that were promoting different ideas like democracy, but mostly they didn’t really know what to do.

Unlike the other Central Asian states, the former leader of the Communist party did not remain in power. In the 1990 elections to the Supreme Soviet, Masaliyev lost the presidency to Askar Akayev. For this reason, many scholars proclaimed that Kyrgyzstan was an island of democracy in an otherwise authoritarian region, albeit with its own set of problems and circumstances (see for example Anderson, 1999b; Pryde, 1994; Schatz, 2009: 213f). In fact, the Chief of the of the Kyrgyz KGB commented in 1990 that: “[Akayev’s] entrance to power, in my opinion, marked the beginning of a strong turn in the social life [of the country], and he was the first to come into history as a bearer of a democratic consciousness” (Asankulov quoted in Collins, 2006: 177). Kyrgyzstan was referred to as the “Switzerland of Central Asia”, referring both to the liberal politics and the mountainous terrain of the country (Kubicek, 1998: 36).

Masaliyev was a relative newcomer; he came to power in 1985 when his predecessor was dismissed because of his strong clientelistic ties were perceived as a threat by Kremlin (Collins, 2004: 240; Huskey, 1995: 816). Like in many post-Soviet states, the time following independence was tumultuous. During Soviet years Kyrgyzstan was a peripheral republic, which was never meant to function as a unit on its own. At independence, subsidies from Russia abruptly ceased. In addition, privatisation of public resources took place in a chaotic manner. Land, which had previously been part of collective farms, was privatised into the hands of a few, leaving the majority of former farmers landless (Radnitz, 2010b). This is like the process, which took place in Kenya during the years leading up to independence. Most forms of infrastructure, electricity, telephone lines, gas and heating had been under Soviet supervision, and maintenance rapidly became a problem. The privatisation of former state companies and services was marred with corruption, and in many cases Akayev privatised industries for reasons of clientelism - buying support. Old Soviet elites were able to acquire companies at a fraction of their market value, while many ordinary Kyrgyz citizens lacked basic
access to water and electricity. The economy plummeted. By 2003, despite growth Kyrgyzstan had a lower GDP than in 1989 (Sjöberg, 2011).

Both Kenya and Kyrgyzstan experienced the introduction of multi-party rule more or less “by accident”. In Kenya, it was clear from the outset that Moi intended to stay in power for the foreseeable future. The motivation for Akayev’s democratic and market friendly rhetoric is more difficult to interpret. Other Central Asian states became much more authoritarian early on.

*Intra-elite Clientelism*

In the years leading up to the introduction of multi-party rule, Moi chose to limit intra-elite clientelism to a smaller group of individuals than during the Kenyatta years.

Not only did the regime fail to co-opt the former power holders in the Central Highlands, Kenya faced a severe financial crisis and was subject to structural adjustment programmes prompted by the World Bank and the IMF. Throup and Hornsby (1998: 122) argue that 1991-1992 was a difficult time for the incumbent, as resources for clientelistic dwindled. The reasons were that structural adjustment meant that KANU and the office of the president no longer had access to the resources they were accustomed to using for such purposes. An example of this is the state marketing boards98, which controlled the sale of agricultural produce. There is little doubt that marketing boards generated resources for clientelism both for the government and for individuals, who held power in the boards. Jones (1987: 391f) writes that “[…] the powerful patronage generated by marketing boards, and its importance to the government in power, make their abolition unlikely”. Throughout the 1980s, the government had been implementing moderate economic reform in order to comply with the structural adjustment programmes. Throup and Hornsby (1998: 122) argue that the changes did not affect control over key resources like the marketing boards. With the economic downturn, it became evident that state control of these resources could not continue indefinably.

Until then, the Kenyan economy was highly state controlled although there was a high degree of private ownership. There was fixed pricing and a state bureaucracy, which was difficult for companies to circumvent without paying tribute to government officials. The challenge for KANU and president Moi was how to secure resources to uphold clientelistic ties, while changing the very foundations on which it was built (Hornsby, 2012: 807).

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98 See page 168 for an example of this.
Branch and Cheeseman (2006: 24) argue that the political and economic changes, which Kenya underwent have been overestimated by several scholars. Their main argument is that Moi’s power was contingent on upholding a “pact of domination” built on elite coalitions. This relied on the loyalty and control of provincial administrations throughout the country.

Initially, the role of the provincial administrations in Kenyan politics remained unchallenged, and it is arguably because at least some of the traditional routes for clientelism remained open that the party succeeded in winning the 1992 and 1997 elections (Branch and Cheeseman, 2006: 28). It was of course in the interest of oppositional forces to limit Moi and the KANU party’s access to resources. Prior to the 1997 elections, a new agreement was passed, which limited the provincial administration’s political activities (Orvis, 2006: 104). This somewhat levelled the playing field, as some parts of the administration could no longer be used to promote KANU.

There was very little public investment in Kenya during the 1990s, a condition set by the IMF and the World Bank. As infrastructure deteriorated, the inflow of foreign direct investment in Kenya dropped dramatically. There was a 90% drop between 1980 and 2000 (Muranga, 2007: 284). As a result, government institutions, infrastructure and other state functions declined, resulting in poor conditions for foreign businesses. The situation was exacerbated by a steep increase in crime, especially in the urban areas. Gang related activities, such as car jackings, muggings, break ins and murder reached previously unprecedented levels (Pokhariyal and Muthuri, 2003). Police were unable to cope with the increase in crime rates, which gave way to a large private security industry that was initially completely unregulated, and in some cases owned and run by politicians (interview anonymous 2009). At the same time, the drug trade through the Kenyan coastal city of Mombasa was increasing, and there were serious allegations that several MPs were involved in the trafficking operations. The 1990s saw the rise of organised crime, as well as private security firms influencing politics in Kenya. As revenue plummeted in shortly after the introduction of multi-party rule, income from organised crime grew in importance for upholding intra-elite clientelistic networks.

Many of the persons who had been imprisoned during the last decades of the Moi regime were released and were free to take part in political competition. However, a return to the policy used by Kenyatta, with extensive intra-elite clientelistic networks was unviable. There was simply not enough money in the state coffers to provide the basis for such a strategy.

One of the most widely held views is that the opposition in Kenya failed to win the 1992 and 1997 elections because of commitment problems; they could not
unite behind a single presidential candidate, there were frequent party splits and much infighting within the parties (Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 453). Several parties were formed as soon as the ban on political parties was lifted. The two most significant were perhaps Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) and Democratic Party of Kenya (DP). DP mainly consisted of Kikuyu, Meru and Embu elites. Oginga Odinga, who was a senior Luo political figure, founded FORD, which did not succeed in uniting the opposition, the party soon split into several parties. The initial split was between FORD-Kenya and FORD-Asili. Ford-Kenya then divided into two in 1995, when a faction spearheaded by Oginga Odinga’s son Raila Odinga formed the little-known National Development Party (NDP). FORD-Asili also splintered further into FORD-People and SabaSaba Asili (Kanyinga, 2003: 108). The breakup of FORD into many smaller parties is an example of the fluidity of the party system in Kenya at the time. In an interview, Musikari Kombo, an MP and chairman of FORD Kenya spoke about the split:

That took place in 1992 fighting for multi-party democracy and we were very united a movement the FORD movement. […] There was a big split between the late Jaramogi Oginga [Oginga Odinga], the Late Masindi Muliro and Mutiba that is when the split came about and so the movement as we were now going to register political parties. We found ourselves in different camps but purely because of leadership crisis (Kombo 2010).

Other sources confirm that there were serious power struggles within FORD (Fox, 1996; Hornsby, 2012: 500; Widner, 1992: 197). In the 1992 elections, two candidates, drawing on the support for different ethnic groups were fielded allowing Moi to win the presidential elections, although he only got 36.7% of the vote. Although the opposition did not win the elections, it did show that Kenya was not united under the KANU banner. Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 210) note that “[…] the most competitive founding election in Africa was held in Kenya”.

In 1993, the general secretary of FORD-Kenya was sacked after he leaked to the press that party president Oginga Odinga had received a campaign contribution from Goldenberg International99, a company which was involved in one of the largest corruption scandals ever in Kenya (Africa-America Institute, 1993; Mwangi, 2008). Ironically, FORD-Kenya had been in the middle of a campaign to bring the owner of Goldenberg, Kamlesh Pattni and Kenya’s Vice

99 Goldenberg International was a gold and gemstone exporter.
President George Saitoti100 to justice for involvement (Hornsby, 2012: 545). Kenya is not a great exporter of gold, there was one mine in Kenya at the time with a very small output. In line with the requirements of the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programme, a scheme was set up by the Kenyan government to encourage international export. The government would pay 35% more than the value for gold in US dollars if the payment were made in Kenya Shillings. Formally, this was a way of securing influx of foreign currency into the economy. Goldenberg International proceeded to import gold from Congo and resell it as Kenyan gold for export, siphoning 35% off the Kenyan state in the process (Mwangi, 2008). In 2005, under Mwai Kibaki a legal inquiry into the Goldenberg affair was conducted. A great number of officials in the Moi government and several current ministers and other MPs were implicated (Bosire, 2005).

About 600 million USD was embezzled, which was about 10% of Kenya’s total budget at the time (Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 563). Kamlesh Pattni, stated that he had made payments directly to Moi in order to get access to export compensation funds. In total, the investigation found that payments had been made to 487 companies and individuals before the scandal was revealed in 1993. In the 2005 Goldenberg inquiry, the letter in which Goldenberg International applies for the export compensation scheme was included:

Kenya has a lot of Mineral Wealth which is not being exploited properly. [...] Most of these Diamonds and Gold are bought by many jewellers and other businessmen who have smuggled these precious minerals out of Kenya as a form of siphoning their wealth overseas. Despite the abundant amount of Gold and Diamonds being bought in Kenya, no amount is seen to be officially exported to earn Kenya the badly needed Foreign Exchange.

[...]

Our Company has a capacity to buy Diamonds which are in large supplies here in Kenya. As is known worldwide, Diamonds are the most precious and expensive minerals in the world market and hence a large Foreign Workshop for manufacturing Diamond jewellery by skilled artisans.

[...]

100 Saitoti stepped down from his ministerial post in the NARC government in 2006 over allegations of involvement in the Goldenberg scandal.
We wish to export the Diamond jewellery and Gold officially through Central Bank of Kenya […] (Bosire, 2005).

The letter was seen by several ministers in the Moi government and people high in civil service. These individuals, who were professionals working with Kenyan exports must have been aware that Kenya does not have a wealth of gold and diamond deposits.

There is little doubt that the money from Goldenberg and other corruption scandals was used to uphold clientelistic ties. As the IMF encouraged export and trade, tapping these new institutions was a way of resolving a problem. The fact that Oginga Odinga, who was the president of an opposition party, likely received contributions from Goldman International indicates that the Moi and KANU may have been involved in the frequent splits in the opposition. An anonymous interviewee, who was with FORD during the initial months, states:

There was great enthusiasm at the outset. FORD was like an umbrella, where a number of different communities could unite and challenge Moi. We all wanted Moi out of power, we didn’t have much more in common. We all thought it was going to work, and we had agreements for sharing power. We wanted one party and one candidate. Then, things just suddenly fell apart. We all knew that Moi had something to do with it (anonymous 2010).

Aisingo (2003: 27) verifies that Moi was involved in dividing the opposition, stating that the split in the FORD party was due to “the invisible hand of Moi”. In this case, it seems clear that clientelistic resources were used to avoid opposition unity rather than to co-opt the political opposition into joining KANU. A former KANU MP said that the reason for this strategy was that the cost involved in fully co-opting people in opposition was greater than simply paying to avoid the creation of a coalition to run against KANU.

Coalitions are often a necessary step in order to topple dominant incumbents, securing a more competitive environment. The involvement of Oginga Odinga in the Goldberg scandal shows that the oppositional forces were not necessarily proponents of anti-corruption measures or democracy for that matter. The Goldberg scandal illustrates that Moi and KANU were quick to adapt to a new set of circumstances. Structural adjustment did not change the clientelistic features of the Kenyan state, but it changed what sources of revenue were available to support it. Instead of directly siphoning funds from the marketing boards, the Goldberg scandal illustrates that politicians, were receiving resources from a private enterprise in order to keep Moi in power.
Just as Kenya was in a difficult financial position when multi-party rule was introduced in 1992, Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan grappled with an economy in free-fall shortly after independence. Aside from causing a rapid deterioration of education and health services for ordinary Kyrgyz citizens, it also meant that Akayev was finding it increasingly difficult to uphold his intra-elite networks (Morozova 2009: 87). Within the first five years of economic reform guided by the IMF, the country accumulated external debt. The population of Kyrgyzstan went through shock therapy of price liberalisation, hyperinflation and a drastic fall in living standards.

At independence, Akayev in Kyrgyzstan privatised state-owned companies into the hands of elite actors to form a cohesive intra-elite network. The disappearance of the Soviet Union created confusion within the elites throughout the former union, unhinging expectations of clientelist returns (Hale 2014: 56). In the Soviet economy close to 100% of the economy was state owned (Abazov, 1999: 197). Kyrgyzstan has always been a low-income region, and it remains so (Spechler, 2009: 4). For the elites, this meant that resources available for clientelism were small compared to those of neighbouring countries such as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, which have large oil and gas reserves. Privatisation was rapid in Kyrgyzstan, and there was a clear four-step policy put in place. First, smaller trade outlets and retailers were privatised. Then, medium and larger companies were sold off through a voucher system. Thirdly, medium and large businesses were sold through public auction or part of their shares for cash. Fourth, the basic industry sector such as energy, telecommunications and mining were privatised (Abazov, 1999: 208f). By 1994, 4600 trade outlets, retail and service establishments had been privatised, and by 1998, 75% of all state-owned enterprises had been transferred to private hands (Engvall, 2011: 86). Abazov (1999: 200) states that: “The World Bank and IMF’s experts argue that the ‘gradual approach’ is not an option for the CIS […].” This “shock therapy” of the Kyrgyz economy was inspired by the changes that the Russian economy went through shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The similarities don’t stop there; like in Russia the persons who became the new owners of formerly state-owned enterprises were to large extent former insiders during the Soviet years. As Tarkowski (1990) puts it “apparatchiks” turned into “entrepreneurchiks”, with reference to the entire post-soviet region. Pryde (1994: 114) notes that the success of old elites in politics called into question how much really had changed in Kyrgyz politics:
Bureaucratic inertia and resistance and the reappearance of the same old (communist) faces at the head of the newly privatized firms compound feelings that democracy is still a long way off and that the supposedly new democratic institutions are just a facade behind which the old establishment carries on business as usual.

The problem in terms of establishing dominance was that there were several competing networks of former nomenklatura; as Akayev was a relatively new player on the political arena concessions needed to be made to regional power holders who were potential challengers to the central power in Bishkek (Anderson, 2000: 82). In this sense, the makeup of the Kyrgyz political elites was like those in Kenya. Engvall (2011: 84) notes that Akayev lacked both experience and political backing on the national level. Many of these former insiders strived for political influence, and one of the early challenges for Akayev was to create elite cohesion. There was a divide between politicians from the north and the south and there were also signs of disagreement between elite groups within the north (Lewis, 2010: 46). The fragmented nature of Kyrgyz politics of this time meant that co-opting elites into supporting Akayev was a priority.

Former communist leader Absamat Masaliyev’s son Iskhar Masaliyev is an example of how former elites were co-opted. His story speaks of the influence of former communist elites in Kyrgyzstan. He became a high-ranking officer in the customs service shortly after independence. In an interview he said:

In the fall of 1998, I resigned from the customs police. The reason was that 17 trucks with weapons came into southern Kyrgyzstan, and I had to resign because of this. In 1999 after resigning I became a member of the communist party […]. A year later I became an MP. I became the prosecutor of Osh province. […] So I was three times re-elected in 2000, 2005 and 2007. (Iskhak Masaliyev 2010).

Masaliyev admits to being part and parcel to a smuggling operation of guns into southern Kyrgyzstan, a part of the country, which the central authority has found difficult to control and uphold its monopoly on violence. He was not prosecuted for these offences. His position in society and politics was strengthened as he gained financial resources from presumed criminal activity. The position of Masaliyev illustrates that criminals could act with virtual impunity. Police officers, judges and prosecutors would be very selective in what individuals they would seek to investigate. Their decisions were often not based on the severity of the crime, but rather on who could pay to “act under the radar” (anonymous NGO activist 2010). Kupatadze (2008: 283) argues that privatisation of major
enterprises into the hands of former party elites had some unexpected consequences:

The intermingling of politicians and entrepreneurs created crucial ground for major organized criminal activity. Two parallel processes of political elites becoming businessmen, and businessmen being co-opted into politics, led to the confusion of public and private interests.

During the Soviet years, the state invested considerable amounts in athletics. For young people from rural areas, being accepted into sports schools was sometimes the only opportunity to move to a major city (Marat, 2006b: 37). At independence, state support for such activities ceased in Kyrgyzstan. Sports clubs across the country endeavoured to find alternative funding. The new business and political elites were quick to help, and several prominent figures soon became heads of sports associations. Being a part of the Olympic Committee soon became synonymous with involvement with organised crime (ibid: 38). Popular sports in Kyrgyzstan include boxing, wrestling and other martial arts. The sports clubs attracted many young men who were trained in the use of force, and they became an insurance policy for the political and business elites. In particular, Pavlan traditional Kyrgyz wrestlers were recruited by local leaders and new elites for political rallies, for protection or for illegal activities such as smuggling (Temirkulov, 2008: 323f). An example of this is the political connections of a crime lord in northern Kyrgyzstan, Rysbek Akmatayev, who was connected to sports clubs and pavlan wrestlers. He was protected by the Minister of Internal Affairs and allegedly by Askar Akayev himself during the early 1990s (Kupatadze, 2008: 281). These connections – sports clubs, business elites and politicians – were the embryo of the influence of organised crime over decision making in Kyrgyzstan. Many of the sports clubs became criminal gangs after independence. As early as in 1997, a Kyrgyz official stated that “in some regions, the only way to survive is to take part in the drug trade” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2007:15). This indicates that criminal activities had become the main source of revenue in many regions of Kyrgyzstan, making political connections that may give immunity from prosecution great importance.

The intra-elite clientelistic networks included business elites, politicians, and criminals. In many cases, it was difficult to tell the groups apart, as criminals invested in legitimate businesses, businessmen became politicians, and politicians became involved in criminal activities. One of the main sources of income for criminal gangs is drug trafficking. With its proximity to Afghanistan, which is the
main global supplier of opium for heroin, one of the main drug routes is through Central Asia to Russia (Engvall, 2011: 93; Graubner, 2005:16; Collins, 2011:26).

The relation between legitimate business owners, political elites and organised crime grew evermore complex. As Kupatadze (2008: 283) puts it: “The criminal leaders, initially controlled by their political protectors, gradually accumulated enough wealth and resources through illegal means and tried to legalize themselves, by entering the legal economy, venturing into politics or both.” The co-optation of sportsmen signified that politicians and others were creating their own private “armies”, which was an implicit threat that violence was a conceivable course of action. A journalist in Bishkek stated that: “During that time, every group, every politician, every businessman was arming themselves. There was a feeling that things may fall apart at any time, so having weapons, that was just a personal security.” This entailed further challenges for the weakening Kyrgyz state, as the monopoly on power came under question.

Like Kenya, Kyrgyzstan also had a major corruption case involving precious metals, the Seabaco scandal. It had severe implications for political life. An international businessman, Boris Birshtein became president Akayev’s advisor during the tumultuous years of privatisation, while simultaneously purchasing Kyrgyz gold (Engvall, 2011: 174). According to Leyla Boulton of the Financial Times, Birshtein flew 1.6 tonnes of gold to Switzerland in his private jet in 1992, where it was refined and stored. Unlike the Goldenberg scandal in Kenya, the gold was from local goldmines. The gold was then used for a US$ 13.8-million credit line for Kyrgyzstan (1994). How that money was spent was called into question, it is likely that much of the funds were used for the personal enrichment of the Kyrgyz leadership and to uphold intra-elite clientelistic networks.

Vice-president Felix Kulov was forced to resign over the scandal, as was the Prime Minister (Hofmann et al., 1995: 6). A parliamentary commission was set up to investigate, but their final report was not presented to parliament. Before it was due to be presented a boycott of the parliamentary sessions was staged. More than half of the MPs stated that they would not attend sessions, making a quorum impossible. The government was dissolved (CSCE, 1995: 5). Several persons in the president’s inner circle, including his personal guard were accused in the report (Engvall, 2011: 175). As a result of the scandal, Kyrgyzstan’s first parliamentary elections were called. Although Akayev was heavily implied in the scandal, he was not accused of any wrongdoing (Marat, 2008: 175). In an interview with Boulton (1994) a year after the scandal he said:

\[101\] There is some disagreement about the time and means of transport. Engvall (2011: 174) states that the transport took place in 1992 by helicopter, not by private jet
Boris Birshtein made a big impression on us. First of all, through his respectability. He had his own private jets, and when in Moscow, he stayed in places to which only the most powerful Politburo members had access. Birshtein did not hide this and was proud of his ties with the great and powerful of this world. Secondly, his commercial proposals corresponded to what we were looking for (Akayev cited in Boulton 1994).

Like with the Goldenberg scandal in Kenya, the money, which was embezzled in the Seabaco scandal in Kyrgyzstan, was never recovered. On the one hand, the political consequences of Seabaco were greater: elections were called, and a number of prominent individuals were prosecuted or dismissed from office. In terms of the scale of the scandals, there is the proportions of the Goldenberg scandal were much greater, in fact it had a great impact on the Kenyan economy. The Seabaco scandal is just one example of the connection between business, politicians and organised crime in Kyrgyzstan at the time. Akayev’s attempt at co-opting the entirety of the elites was a failing strategy, and more challenges were to come.

With the elections in 1995, it became evident that Akayev would not be able to retain his large and inclusive intra-elite network indefinitely. With negative growth and few state-owned enterprises and resources left to privatise, the Akayev regime faced its first major crisis. The north/south divide also meant that there were elites who felt disenfranchised without access to government power and resources. Finding new ways of paying of clients was thus essential if Akayev planned to stay in office long term. Radnitz (2010b: 5, 77f) argues that the relatively liberal economic policy lead to a greater dispersion of resources than in many other post-soviet states. This prepared the ground for a set of elites, rather than one cohesive elite to become wealthy.

As of 2000, it is widely believed that the attempts by Akayev to co-opt southern elites through the liberal use of clientelistic resources ceased (Lewis, 2012: 119; Schatz, 2009: 214). Material resources were no longer distributed to a wider circle. On the other hand, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, a southerner severed as Prime Minister under Akayev and several other southerners had positions in government. More and more power was concentrated into the hands of Akayev. Since 1995, several referendums had been held in order to consolidate more power in the hands of the president (Abazov, 2000; Lewis, 2010: 46f). From now on, state-owned companies, which were privatised, fell into the hands of Akayev’s close family and relations.

There was still money to be earned from privatisation of state resources, and it has been established that Akayev’s son Aidar Akayev and son in law Adil
Toigonbayev were the owners of 42 formerly state-owned companies by the time of the Tulip Revolution. The family owned some of Kyrgyzstan’s most profitable businesses, and a conservative estimate is that the family illegally pocketed hundreds of millions of dollars every year (Marat, 2005). After the terrorist attacks on US soil in September 2001, a surprising opportunity for state revenue appeared. The United States established an airbase at Bishkek international airport to ferry troops and material to the war in Afghanistan. In addition to the lease, companies to supply the new American airbase needed to be formed. A fuel supply route for the troops in Afghanistan was established. Engvall (2011: 172) argues that the contracts for logistics and supplies for Manas Air Base marked a shift in rent distribution in Kyrgyzstan. Instead of an even distribution of rents to government officials and bureaucrats, the supply operations at Manas were almost entirely controlled by the Akayev family. In 2010, the U.S House of Representatives wrote a report on alleged corruption in relation to fuel supply:

President Akayev viewed the airport as an opportunity for personal financial gain and took control of both the airport authority and fixed-base operators. The airport authority originally granted only two companies the right to supply fuel: Manas International Services (MIS) and Aalam Services. MIS was controlled by President Akayev’s son, Aydar Akayev. Aalam was controlled by his son-in-law, Adil Toiganbayev (Tierney, 2010: 24).

The report also gave evidence that president Akayev and his family was linked to organised crime:

[…] the FBI found that President Akayev and his family had run a “vast international criminal network that stretched all the way to a series of shell companies in the United States.” Further, […] MIS and Aalam Services were controlled by President Akayev’s son and son-in-law, and that the companies “are tied to transactions with arms traffickers, Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) and a myriad of suspicious U.S. shell companies associated with the Akayev Organization (Tierney, 2010: 25).
A politician who was active during the Tulip revolution in 2005 said in an interview:

With Manas, and all of the companies that they [Akayev’s] stole, it was like they owned the whole country. It was impossible for anyone to do any business at all without paying them, being related or offering something. […] They would just come in and take companies that were owned by someone else. It was completely impossible! People were starving, everything was going down-hill and they were making a lot of people very, very angry.

Simultaneously, Akayev lost control of organised crime (Kupatadze, 2008: 284). According to Graubner (2005: 17f) the relationship between the Akayev family and organised crime had been mutually beneficial. When Askar Akayev’s son Aidar Akayev wanted to take over a company, he would enlist the help of one of Kyrgyzstan’s most notorious crime leaders Rysbek Akmatbayev. Kupatadze (2008: 290) reports that the police force would help oust or intimidate other criminal elements, strengthening Akmatbayev’s control. Although the reasons are unknown, Akmatbayev fell out of favour with the Akayevs and became the suspect in a triple murder case (Graubner, 2005: 17)\(^{102}\). This is one example of the changing relationship between the political elite and organised crime, (Graubner, 2005; Kupatadze, 2008). As Engvall (2011: 93) argues legal businesses could be manipulated with informal sanctions imposed by law enforcement. The criminal economy, be it drug trafficking, racketeering or other forms of smuggling were much more difficult to control. The disenfranchisement of political, criminal and financial elites led to massive discontent, and many of those who had been left out in the cold were powerful in that they had a mass following and independent wealth. This no doubt contributed to the downfall of Akayev in the 2005 Tulip revolution. The revolution itself was initiated by individuals and groups with divergent interests. Kupatadze (Kupatadze, 2008: 284) emphasises that criminal elements were crucial in organising the uprising:

The support of the underworld leaders for the ‘revolution’ can be explained by their search for more power, […] These illicit actors were already powerful prior to the ‘revolution’ and were in a position to act independently from the ruling elite, articulating their own interests. In short, Akaev’s regime lost full control over

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\(^{102}\) After the Tulip revolution, Akmatbayev came into favour again; he was elected into parliament through by-elections after his brother, who was an MP was murdered. He was eventually shot dead outside a mosque (Mihalka, 2006).
the criminal underworld during its final years in office, which can also be regarded as a contributing factor to him being ousted.

This reinforces the argument made by Radnitz (2010b) that elite led mobilisation was a decisive component in the uprising. A southern politician, who was active during the tulip revolution said that:

We organised busses from Jalalabad to Bishkek. All of the people we brought were fired up – we wanted to bring down the government, we had enough. We met lots of people in Bishkek. We all wanted Akayev out, but we were not there for the same reason. [...] My people on the bus were tired of Akayev stealing from us, some in the city had grander motives.

In Kenya, the dynamics of intra-elite networks, and the sources of income to support them were very similar in 1992 as they were in 1997. Ahead of the 1997 elections in Moi again failed to build strong, broad based elite coalitions. The support base for the party did not include key communities like the Kikuyu and Luo. KANU and Moi were attempting to win the elections despite only being supported by a coalition of smaller ethnic communities (Närman, 2003: 347). The Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee estimated that 7 billion USD were plundered from the state through questionable deals during the 1995/1996 fiscal year. Most of the culprits were high-ranking government officials (Adar, 2000: 114). A corruption scandal on par with Goldenberg has also come to light. In 2004, a government inquiry headed by John Githongo uncovered a corruption scandal known as the Anglo Leasing affair. The Kenyan government had in 1997 purchased passport printing equipment and other airport security solutions from a company known as Anglo Leasing\(^{103}\). There was no tender for the sale, and the company delivered no equipment. The state did however make a large payment to the company (Lawson, 2009: 80). Anglo Leasing was a non-existent company set up for the purpose of siphoning money off the state (Mwangi, 2008). Like in 1992, the persons who benefitted from the Anglo Leasing scandal were an eclectic group. Some of those involved were KANU hardliners, others were part of the opposition. An anonymous journalist who has written about the case stated with reference to Anglo leasing that:

\(^{103}\) The Anglo Leasing scandal continued over a number of years. The Kenyan government purchased security solutions from the same company during the multi-party era after 2002 as well (For an account see Anderson, 2003).
With Anglo Leasing, everyone got a piece of the cake. KANU used the money for harambee rallies\textsuperscript{104}, to get the voters. Also, the opposition got money. My thought is that they were paid to not cooperate against KANU in the election. That’s why, even now, they don’t want anyone looking too closely.

The money was used to prevent opposition unity; there is evidence to suggest that top-level opposition figures were paid not to coalesce. John Githongo (Wrong, 2009) for example claims that Mwai Kibaki was involved in the scandal. He was a presidential candidate in the 1997 elections and came in second in the race. Secondly, KANU needed resources to fund their election campaign.

After the Tulip revolution, Kyrgyzstan’s new president Kurmanbek Bakiyev soon built a broad coalition between northern and southern elites, repeating Akayev’s initial strategy of creating a large intra-elite network. This was of course an expensive venture, which lead Bakiyev to actively attempt to increase income, which could be used for the purpose. One of the first steps taken by was to dramatically increase the lease paid by the Americans for use of the Manas Air Base. All the enterprises owned by Akayev and his family, including supply companies for the airbase were nationalised. Many were subsequently re-privatised into the hands of those close to the president or local strong men whose support was needed. Nevertheless, Bakiyev and his family were soon faced with similar problems as Akayev. The expectation for intra-elite clientelism far exceeded the resources available. Once the initial free for all was over, when companies had yet again changed hands, there was very little left in the government’s coffers, which could be used to appease powerful elites in the long run. This does not mean that local power holder; businessmen and criminals lost their interest in politics. A seat in parliament provided immunity from prosecution, access to government contracts and connections, which would make it easier to circumvent the bureaucracy. Seats in parliament were bought and sold by the political parties. Large donations to the party or individuals within a party were necessary in order to get a nomination. In an interview, Felix Kulov suggests that seats in parliament were sold to people who were willing to pay.

One major problem still faced the regime; the influence of organised crime on politics. Clamping down on crime could have detrimental effects on support for Bakiyev, as many of the crime bosses had supported the overthrow of Akayev, both financially and by mobilising their local support bases. For example,

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\textsuperscript{104} Harambee rallies are funding rallies for local development project. Politicians announce plans for investments to the public in local constituencies. During the 1990s Harambee rallies and funding of local projects increased during election years (Wrong, 2009; Cheeseman, 2006)
Bayaman Erkinbayev, a notorious crime boss and head of the Kyrgyz Olympic committee drove 15 busloads of wrestling students to provide muscle for the storming of the presidential palace during the protests (Graubner, 2005: 18). Several of Kyrgyzstan’s most notorious criminals entered parliament when Akayev left office, making them important political players. Attempting to control crime, rather than co-opt leaders of these networks could severely destabilise the government. Men like Erkinbayev had their own private armies of young men connected to sports clubs, which could easily be mobilised (Kupatadze, 2008: 291). Leaving criminal networks intact did nonetheless pose some risks. As the fall of the Akayev regime showed, independently wealthy local big men could easily dispose of unwanted leaders should they see fit. Resources from organised crime were a double-edged sword for the Bakiyev regime. On the one hand, attempting to control the situation would turn important players against them. On the other, leaving it unchecked could mean potential future challenges.

Immediately after the Tulip Revolution, presidential elections were called and a coalition was formed with Felix Kulov a northerner, who was released from prison. In terms of ideology or ideas, there was no difference between the Bakiyev and Akayev regime. One person, who was close to Bakiyev during his first years in office said:

We really had no great ideas; we were tired of that family corrupting and stealing everything. There was nothing left for anyone else, we needed a way of staying in power. We had to make sure everyone was happy. It would have been impossible to have an ideology if you have to include everyone who is someone. They would never agree.

This statement indicates that one of the main strategies was to create a broad and inclusive elite coalition. Another individual who was politically active at the time said that:

It is striking how little politics was discussed after the Tulips. It was basically only when people spoke to western media or people like you that it came up. Other than that, people were expected to keep the support of their communities on their own.

Because of the nature of the political landscape, there was little Bakiyev could do to sway public opinion away from local patrons and he never attempted to do so. In fact, ahead of the 2005 elections, foreign observers categorised Bakiyev as

105 Bayaman Erkinbayev was murdered in 2005 by unknown assailants.
“moderate”, indicating that he was not believed to be a threat to Akayev’s
government (Kartawich, 2005: 7). As Radnitz (2010b) suggests, local elites were
instrumental in mobilising mass actors against the regime. Bakiyev had succeeded
in creating an elite coalition with popular support contingent on the loyalty of his
coalition partners. Put simply, if local big men were included in governing the
country, they would be unlikely to mobilise their clients against the new regime.

Despite Akayev’s precedent, Bakiyev fell for some the same temptation. Only
a few months after coming to power Bakiyev lost the support of several key actors.
Roza Otunbayeva, who was a former Foreign Minister, Azimbek Beknazarov,
from Aksy province, party leaders Omurbek Tekebayev and Almazbek Atambayev
as well as Edil Baisalov all declared that they no longer stood by the president
(Marat, 2008: 231). Two years after the uprising, Bakiyev also broke his ties with
Felix Kulov, indicating that he no longer had any intention of remaining in power
through co-opting a broad group of elite actors (Marat, 2008). Bakiyev’s family,
in particular the president’s son Maksim Bakiyev became the new owners of a
number of enterprises, which were previously in the hands of the Akayev family
(Engvall, 2011: 98; Matveeva, 2009: 1115). A number of people verified the role
of Maksim Bakiyev in breaking the fragile coalition of elites and spurring public
discontent. Dosaly Esenaliyev, who at the time of the interview was the head of
the executive committee of the Respublika party106, said that: “People knew that
the privatisation and elevation of prices happened because of Maksim Bakiyev.”

There is virtual consensus that the Bakiyev family accumulated massive wealth
during these years during his final years in office. Collins (2011: 154) for example
states that:

Bakiyev’s allies reportedly demanded massive kickbacks and extortion from two
state joint ventures in the gold industry. Family connections allegedly pocketed
about half the annual profits of the Toktogul hydroelectric power plant and
profited from multimillion-dollar contracts to supply fuel to the U.S. military
transport centre at Manas. Bakiyev’s son Maksim used his seat on the State Council
and his post as development minister (a new portfolio that his father created after
the 2009 election) to build a massive economic empire spanning both the state
and private sectors.

A person interviewed in Bishkek said, “By the end, they were trying to control
everything. Everyone else was trying to hold on to their property for dear life, the
Bakiyev’s were eating up everything”. The public outcries were becoming a

106 The Respublika Party is not connected to Respublika newspaper.
common occurrence. In 2008, the chairman of the electoral commission, Klara Kabilova had enough. In a video, which was widely distributed, she exclaimed:

I am offended and intimidated by the son of the president – Maxim Bakiyev, but I consider that Maxim mistaken – the people of Kyrgyzstan are not cattle and did not elect a herd of rams, and Kyrgyzstan is not his inherited patrimony [...]. Neither I, nor the people of Kyrgyzstan elected Maxim as the president of the country (Kabilova quoted in Temirkulov, 2010: 596).

Furthermore, the White House (the presidential palace) and parliament soon became crowded with Bakiyev’s family members and close associates. In an interview, interim president Roza Otunbayeva spoke about this:

Today, there are five Bakiyev’s working in the ‘White House’ on the top echelons of the power. I do not speak about their numerous relatives who have captured all floors of the ‘White House’ (Otunbayeva quoted in Engvall, 2011: 212).

Both Bakiyev and Akayev initially opted to create a massive intra-elite network, funded from a variety of sources: the state, private enterprise, corruption and organised crime. This created wealthy elites, sometimes with powerful criminal gangs to back them up. Under both Kyrgyz presidents these networks rapidly fell apart as the cost of upholding them became too great. In Kenya on the other hand, Moi chose not to co-opt the opposition at all. Instead he used resources from privatisation and corruption to prevent opposition unity, rather than including individuals in opposition in KANU, he paid key politicians not to create viable coalitions that could challenge him.

In both Kyrgyzstan and Kenya, a shift in the type and source of resources distributed took place after the introduction of multi-party rule took place. During the Soviet years and the under Kenyatta and the early Moi years, it was possible for elites to gain access to resources from the state directly. In Kenya, a former politician said in an interview: “They could just steal, from the grain boards, from development, from the ministry, there was no audit at all”. Similarly, in Soviet Kyrgyzstan elite actors would distribute wealth directly from the state. In both states, the shift meant a privatisation of resources for intra-elite clientelism, where private companies, and in Kyrgyzstan, and to some extent in Kenya, organised crime played a greater part in funding the upholding of elite networks.

In both countries, political parties were of lesser importance to uphold elite networks. The networks were centred around powerful individuals.
Mass-elite Clientelism

With the advent of multi-party rule, both Kenya and Kyrgyzstan faced a new challenge of competitive elections. It would be reasonable to assume that mass-elite clientelism would become more important than during single-party rule.

This was certainly the case in Kenya. The KANU election campaign in 1992 was lavish, much more so than elections during the single-party era. Mwangi (2008: 272f) finds that 60% of the funding for local development projects during the 1990s was spent during election years. Hornsby (2012: 520) writes:

The party spent extraordinary sums of money on its campaign, much of which came from Goldenberg. KANU candidates received large sums from the centre and spared no expense in voter transport and rallies. [...] Many candidates drove new pajeros\(^{107}\) (courtesy of Pattni), while Moi and Saitoti used helicopters to move from rally to rally. Those attending its meetings received payment in cash or kind. Moi made large personal donations to projects in Western Province. [...] KANU ran a campaign in which money was near –unlimited (though bribery was still technically illegal).

Despite the efforts by KANU and massive sums of money spent on mass-elite clientelism during the election campaign, the 1992 election results were disappointing. It was clear that KANU dominance in Kenya was under threat. Moi won the presidential elections with a mere 36.4% of the vote. There were three major challengers: Kenneth Matiba of FORD-Asili, Oginga Odinga of Democratic Party, and Mwai Kibaki of Ford-Kenya. There is little doubt that Moi would have lost the presidential elections, had the opposition had united and fielded one major challenger to the presidency.

To a large extent, the 1997 elections were a repeat of 1992 in terms of mass-elite clientelism, with the incumbent and opposition attempting to outspend each other in the constituencies. Fred Jonyo, a Political scientist said that:

What we could see was that the relationships were being more and more personalised, the party meant less and less in the campaigns. After 1992, it became very important for politicians to show that they personally were the patron, not the party, not the state. [...] The reason? They were sure that KANU would fail.

\(^{107}\) 4-wheel drive cars.
A number of strategies were employed, ranging from vote-buying\(^{108}\) to long-term relationships, where politicians would provide social security and routes into education.

In Kyrgyzstan, the general population faced material hardship. Although poverty levels did not reach that of Kenya, poverty in Kyrgyzstan had a more significant influence on politics. In Kenya, standards of living were low but stable. In Kyrgyzstan, the situation was declining. People who had a decent standard of living during the Soviet years could scarcely afford to feed their families. In a situation where state institutions were deteriorating quickly, organised crime stepped in to fill the gap. They provided some form of security and justice for people when the justice system was at best failing and at its worst criminal. Criminal gangs became a kind of informal police (Sjöberg, 2011: 123). The social program of the crime lords did not end there. Former nomenklatura, who had become wealthy from newly privatised companies and crime lords throughout Kyrgyzstan were building support through clientelism. Individual elite actors became an insurance policy for a great number of people. Radnitz (2010b) states that the role played by independent elites sometimes filled the gap where state institutions had failed. Elites would donate to charity for clinics, schools and other social causes. They would assist families and individuals in need of personal donations for hospital bills or other unexpected costs. They would help with health care bills or other personal emergencies. As a young NGO activist interviewed in Bishkek stated: “I owe my education to the local boss. When I was in school, the teachers didn’t get paid by the state. Or by us. I’m not sure they would have stayed to teach us if our boss hadn’t helped them”. According to Radnitz (2010b) the personal accumulation of wealth was paramount for building mass-elite clientelism in Kyrgyzstan. This is underlined by Sjöberg’s (2011: 126) finding that independently wealthy candidates do well in elections in Kyrgyzstan.

Ahead of the 1995 general elections, mass-elite clientelist networks expanded. Each local “big man” contributed resources to their local communities. These local elites were not necessarily connected to the state or the president. Radnitz calls this “subversive clientelism”; through mass-elite clientelism, independent elites gained influence over ordinary people who could be mobilised for or against the incumbent government or at election time. This form of clientelism is under theorised; Stokes (2009), Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Greene (2010) and

others imply or maintain that resources linked to clientelism often originate from the state or incumbent party. The resources for clientelism, as described by Radnitz (2010b), most often emanate from private fortunes. Wealthy individuals, who often became well off during the years when state owned companies were privatised or have a stake in organised crime use their resources for mass-elite clientelism.

Around elections local patrons would attend and contribute to funerals and other community functions, in some cases they would sponsor local sporting events. These types of mass-elite relationships closely resemble those describes by Bratton and van de Walle (1997) as neo-patrimonial relationships in Africa.

Mass-elite clientelism in Kyrgyzstan was not directly connected to political parties or the state. Rather, it was based on the individual wealth of power seekers. State investment did not increase at election time, nor did Kyrgyzstan have strong political parties, which distributed clientelistic goods. This sets the two states apart; although KANU in Kenya was not an ideologically strong party, the party name and organisation were used for clientelism.

**Repression**

Both Kenya and Kyrgyzstan were considered to be on the road to democracy when multi-party rule was introduced. In Kenya, a large number of political prisoners were released from prison, indicating the country had turned away from the repressive measures of the past. Kyrgyzstan though never hailed a full democracy was viewed as a positive example in Central Asia, where other states quickly developed into full autocracies after independence. The media was relatively free, albeit in some cases incompetent and underfunded, there were few summary arrests and political parties were free to take part in parliamentary and presidential elections (Abazov, 1999; Engvall, 2011: 87f; Pryde, 1994).

The positive image of Kyrgyzstan quickly changed in 1995 when newspapers were closed, and a number of opposition leaders arrested. Unlike other Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan developed media, which was critical of the government shortly after independence. Res Publica newspaper was the most prominent and widely read. In a 1994 article (Pryde, 1994: 115), it is noted that “[Res Publica] is reputedly the only local newspaper that Akayev himself reads, despite its constant criticism of him.” The editor-in-chief of the newspaper, Zamira Sydykova, was arrested and prevented from working as a journalist. Felix Kulov was Vice President under Akayev, and later Minister of Internal Security. In 1999, Kulov resigned and formed an opposition party, after which he was arrested. In his open letter of resignation, he wrote: “I cannot work further under your leadership, because with your connivance things are taking place in Kyrgyzstan
which are incompatible with democracy and the rule of law” (Kulov quoted in Crosston, 2006: 62). In an interview Kulov talks about the state and the media in those years:

[…] when I was suggested as the minister of internal security during Akayev’s time, I had one condition: That I will not work with political persecution. The truth is that Akayev asked one thing. He said that: “let the mass media criticise me, but make sure that my wife and children are not criticised”. It was a joke! I also answered in a joking way, that I will do my best. At that time, there were two opposition newspapers that liked to publish some rumours about the president’s family. I invited them separately and told each newspaper: “I allow you to criticise the president officially. I allow you to criticise our ministers. […] Even if you would insult me, I would keep silent. Say anything. But at the same time, don’t criticise the president’s’ wife and family so that he can work.” We laughed it was like a joke. The only thing is don’t spread unconfirmed rumours. If its fact, write about it. And these newspapers understood us, and they didn’t publish anything without confirmation. That’s why I say that criticism is normal, but we have to be very strict. Rumours can lead to blood (Kulov 2010).

Considering that it has come to light that Akayev’s wife, son, daughter and son-in-law were involved in high level corruption (Collins, 2004; Engvall, 2011; Lewis, 2010), it is remarkable that Kulov speaks of silencing the media in such a casual manner. A local journalist, who was working in Bishkek at the time, explained the change in atmosphere after the elections:

Before, we knew that they [State House] would try to bribe us, our editors, our owners, or pay for us not to publish things on corruption. There was even some blackmail. Journalists would call up politicians and say that we would write about them, it was a way for people to get money. It was a dirty business. […] In 1995 it all changed; people were being arrested, they tried to close papers and did. We all thought we were going to the labour camps…. It all went downhill from there.

When reading the election observation reports from OSCE/ODIHR in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2005, it is clear that Akayev has ceased to promise improvements. In 1995, after the elections, Akayev declared that the outdated electoral law had given criminals and former communist elites an advantage (Anderson, 1996: 531). From the reports at the time, it is clear that Akayev was very critical of both the electoral law and how the elections were carried out (CSCE, 1995: 11). In the 2000 and 2005 elections, no such statements
were made. According to Collins (2004: 248) this shift was due to negotiations within the intra-elite clientelistic group closest related to the president:

By late 1995, upon the advice of his clan elites behind the pact, the president determined to stay in power to protect their interests. He thereby abandoned his weak democratic constituency of urban intelligentsia and mobilized voters through his own clan network, that of his wife and their closest clan allies.

Brill Olcott (2005: 130) similarly argues that the democratic development in Kyrgyzstan was comparable to states such as Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia prior to 1995, only to become more like other Central Asian states under pressure from clan, family and neighbouring states.

Parliamentary and presidential elections were held in 2000 and key opposition figures argued that Akayev running for president was unconstitutional (Lewis, 2010: 47). As one expert interviewed in 2011: “In 2000, we lost our hope for democracy and our hope for Akayev. Until then, we had thought that things might go back to how they were and get better”. According to Schatz (2009: 215), the crackdown on the media and opposition made Akayev seem hypocritical, spurring discontent rather than fear. The reforms that Akayev promised after the marred 1995 elections came to very little. There is no argument that the 2000 elections were the dirtiest elections ever seen in Kyrgyzstan. OSCE/ODIHR reported:

Both rounds of the 2000 parliamentary elections in the Kyrgyz Republic were characterised by a series of negative trends, that ultimately prevented a number of political parties and candidates from competing in the election on a fair and equal basis. The pre-election period was marred by a high degree of interference in the process by state officials, a lack of independence of the courts, resulting in a selective use of legal sanctions against candidates, and a bias in the state media (OSCE/ODIHR, 2000: 1).

A telling example is that students in some locations admitted to being pressured into voting for university heads that were running for parliament (ibid: 14). Despite the repressive measures used by Akayev before and after the elections, the states’ authoritarian apparatus was not strong enough for Akayev to be able to side-line challengers by brute force alone. A politician in Bishkek stated that:

At that time, there many people were arrested, Kulov went to jail…. And a few more. […]. But there were a lot of people who were too strong for Akayev to reach. There was no way he could order the security services, or police, in the south to go
out and just arrest this and that person. They were not loyal […] For me, and for many others there was no fear, he could not touch us no matter what.

The state could not provide Akayev with a repressive apparatus that would truly act as a deterrent for the opposition and media. The police, court system and security services were not firmly in the hands of the regime. Policemen, prosecutors and others within the legal system could easily be bribed (Asiya Sasykbaeva 2011). In addition, the institutions were weak and underfunded. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, little effort had been made to develop a strong legal system and law enforcement.

An example of Akayev’s failure to repress is the protests in Aksy, Jalalabad in 2002. The region is and was hard hit by poverty, with the highest unemployment rate in the country (Radnitz, 2005: 407). The MP for the region, Azimbek Beknazarov, had been arrested on abuse of power charges, although the real reason was arguably his concern over a land conflict with China, which would affect his home region (Lewis, 2010: 47). Local elites mobilised a protest supporting Beknazarov. The police force subsequently shot several people, killing five. Instead of calming the situation, the result was that the protests quickly spread to other parts of the country, lasting for months (Brill Olcott, 2005: 134f; Huskey and Iskakova, 2011: 5). In Aksy, news of the shootings mobilised thousands of protesters and several buildings were set on fire, and it was clear that the government was not firmly in control (Radnitz, 2005: 413f). Brill Olcott (2005: 135) sees the Aksy events as the first real challenge for the Akayev government. In the wake of the conflict, the Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev was dismissed and several failed attempts were made to appease the protesters. There was not a clear strategy: authoritarian measures, such as making it virtually impossible for the opposition to gain permission for public meetings, were used at the same time as an investigation into the shootings was called (Brill Olcott, 2005:134). The reaction to the Aksy protests is of interest because they show that the repressive strategy of Akayev failed. As a lawyer in Bishkek said:

There is no doubt that Akayev wanted to use the police to simply put the protests down [in Aksy], they were trying. But, they were not strong. […] You have to realise that the reason is that they did not have the capacity. […] As you can see now, the police in the south they are not always doing what the government says.

The Aksy events are important because they were a dry run before the Tulip revolution, when Akayev was ousted in 2005. Not only did they undermine the legitimacy of the regime, they illustrated that local leaders such as Beknazarov had
the ability and the will to mobilise masses against the government should they see fit. As Lewis (2008: 267) points out, the protests in Aksy did not come about through the activities of western oriented, democratically minded activists in Bishkek. Rather, the protesters were poor, rural people who were mobilised by local leaders.

In Kenya, Moi faced a similar situation ahead of the 1992 elections. A Nairobi human rights activist said that:

> After 1992, the police, they were simply not loyal to Moi [...]. In the highlands¹⁰⁹ and in some other places I don’t think they would have arrested people on his order. Even if he had wanted to repress, I don’t think that it would have been possible to just use the police and arrest… only in some places.

The state was not entirely powerless; a fair amount of gerrymandering took place. Constituencies where KANU was a clear winner were small, while FORD and DP constituencies were large. Ethnic voting was expected, so it was rather straightforward for KANU to evaluate which constituencies were likely to be a neck and neck race¹¹⁰. According to Fox (1996: 603), one of the most successful strategies employed by KANU was to influence the size of the constituencies. In the 1992 elections, the smallest constituency had 7908 voters, while the largest had 120705. The largest constituencies were in opposition strongholds. Despite this, Moi and KANU were aware that they could not be sure of victory in Kenya’s first multi-party elections.

For that reason, KANU and Moi chose to “privatise” repression, using actors other than the state. Laakso (2007: 231) argues, the KANU youth wing, called the YK’92, became an unofficial “security organ”. Starting more than a year before the elections, there were outbreaks of ethnic violence in Rift Valley province. The violence was concentrated in areas with a diverse ethnic makeup and KANU could expect strong challengers (Barkan, 1993). For example, in Kericho which was a mixed district, opposition supporters were warned that the district was a “KANU zone” and others campaigning in the area would live to regret it (Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 190). Nicholas Biwott, a cabinet minister and close Moi ally argued that it was unfair that Kikuyu people had been resettled into traditional Kalenjin and Maasai territories during a land resettlement scheme (Boone, 2011). During the pre-election violence in 1991 and 1992, many Kikuyu families were

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¹⁰⁹ She is referring to an area dominated by the Kikuyu ethnic group, where Moi faced a serious electoral challenge.

displaced, securing a KANU majority vote in the elections. In Uasin Gishu district for example, a full 44% of potential voters were displaced and unable to vote (Adar, 2000).

A trained militia as well as the YK’92 executed the violence (Rutten, 2001: 413). According to a report by the Judicial Commission published in 2002, people were paid 1000 Kenya Shillings (KSH) for every person killed, 500 KSH for the burning of a temporary house and 10 000 KSH for torching a permanent building. The report reveals that KANU cabinet ministers ordered the attacks. The most prominent individual involved was Nicholas Biwott who was a close associate of Moi (Laakso, 2007: 232f). Biwott was also one of the key individuals implicated in the Goldenberg scandal (Bosire, 2005). This implies that money from corruption was used to fund the attacks in Rift Valley. The attacks not only displaced people out of the designated KANU constituencies, they also intimidated the opposition (Klopp, 2001: 486).

During the violence in the Rift Valley, the KANU youth wing, intimidated potential opposition voters and took part in the violence and evictions. For example, in Enoosupukia in North Narok¹¹¹, young people in YK’92 uniforms attacked a Kikuyu settlement. YK’92 also attempted to intimidate and harass opposition candidates, sometime through media channels. Silas Ruteere Muriuki ran for a parliamentary seat in 1992 and lost. He states that:

> I didn’t know then ways to protect votes after people have voted […]. There was so much rigging, mudslinging, name-calling and negative portraying of your image that one was there in 1992. […] The government, the system, now protected the incumbency but then I met another obstacle. The FM radio station who on the polling day told people that I was arrested […] that am in police cells so voting for me was wasting their votes and of course, I lost because of that.

According to Klopp and Orina (2002: 55), YK’92 was well funded and the organisation also funnelled money to KANU candidates throughout the country. Outside the office of the leader of the organisation, Cyrus Jirongo, senior ministers were queuing for campaign money and support (Laakso, 2007: 231). The KANU youth organisation during the late single-party era had taken on a role of surveillance and reporting on both KANU members and possible dissent in the general public. Professors at Moi University in Nairobi recruited students into the organisation, and according to Klopp and Orina (2002 :56):

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¹¹¹ North Narok is primarily inhabited by Maasai.
University administrators supported YK’92 activities, using university resources to shuttle district student association members to State House dinners and events where they were entertained, received handouts, and made contacts that would land them plush jobs after graduation. At Moi University the administration diverted resources that previously had been used for students’ field trips and club outings to these State House "studytours."

In the run up to the 1997 elections, many voters were still displaced from the violence in the early 1990s and could not vote in their home constituencies. Kagwanja (2001: 80f) has found that many Kikuyu families permanently resettled in the run up to the 1997 elections outside of the contested zones. Klopp (2001: 501f) finds that because of the threat of violence, KANU candidates could run unopposed in many constituencies. Despite this, the elections on the national level were close. KANU won a mere 111 seats out of 210 in parliament. The end result shows that KANUs grip on power was weak and that victory in key provinces was still needed to secure victory. In the presidential race, Moi did better than in the 1992 elections, winning 40% of the vote (Hornby, 2001).

KANU and Moi opted for a slightly different strategy regarding youth involvement. Instead of forming an organisation like YK’92, which was formally connected to KANU, the party relied on semi-independent groups to perform the same tasks. Criminal groups and disadvantaged youths were employed. Some of these gangs had existed for a long time prior to the election simply as criminal groups. Office seekers formed others for the specific purpose of the elections. Politicians who wished to evict people from their constituencies, disrupt rallies, or intimidate voters or challengers hired the gangs (Anderson, 2002). One group, Jeshi la Mzee112 (Army of the Elder) is probably most well known. Some prominent KANU members founded and financed it (Laakso, 2007: 231f). Jeshi la Mzee was never a part of KANU, which is an important distinction to make (Kagwanja, 2001: 85). Hornsby (2012: 598) describes the group as “pro-KANU vigilantes”, while Anderson (2002: 549) portrays them as a rag tag army for hire. The phenomenon was not entirely new. Kagwanja (2001: 86) for example writes that the KANU general secretary Joseph Kamotho admitted to hiring a 3000-strong youth gang to “deal with” opposition supporters during the run up to the 1992 elections. What was new was that all these activities had become, as Njugu (2001: 399) puts it “privatised violence”. Politicians often casually discussed this type of violence. Wafule Buke, who had spent years in prison during the single-

112 Mzee may refer to any respectable elderly gentleman in Swahili. The word was used by KANU supporters to show respect for Moi.
party era, explains that he was close to becoming recruited into a vigilante gang when he was freed in 1992:

I came out and after a few days they came for me again, so I went to Uganda. I ran away. I tried to get a few things organised in Kenya. Trained as a guerrilla, well things didn’t fare well. There were some changes, so I ended up working for civil society as a programme officer human right. That kind of stuff.

On his release, Buke was in a difficult situation financially and socially. He had not been able to complete his university education as he was imprisoned, and he was unemployed. For men like Buke, training to be part of a gang hired by politicians is a viable option. It is possible to make a significant amount of money during a short time. When I met him in Nairobi, he was the personal assistant of William Ruto\(^\text{113}\), then a cabinet minister, now the vice president of Kenya.

In coastal Mombasa, Kenya’s second largest city a new political movement had formed. The Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) was unique in the Kenyan context, as no other parties based on religion existed (Maupeu, 2001: 66). IPK had been denied registration by the electoral authority, and KANU hoped that their supporters would vote for them (Kagwanja, 2001: 88). The coastal region had become increasingly ethnically heterogeneous. Because of the booming tourism industry and other employment opportunities, the coast had attracted a significant number of migrant labourers from other parts of the country (Steeves, 1999: 73). Most of these voters were thought to vote for FORD-Kenya and Odinga as their chosen presidential candidate. Unregistered IPK had entered an informal alliance with FORD-Kenya: if IPK delivered the presidential votes for Odinga, IPK would be able to field their candidates for the parliamentary elections on a FORD-Kenya ticket (Kagwanja, 2001: 88; Vyakweli, 2005: 349; Bogaards, 2007: 180). Because of this, KANU could not be sure of winning the parliamentary or presidential elections in the coastal region.

Vigilante groups were hired to prevent an opposition win. The violence started through a raid of a police station at Likoni, where a large number of weapons were stolen. The police station, some public buildings and small businesses in the surrounding area were burnt to the ground. After that, individuals and families who had migrated to the coastal province from upcountry were targeted (Ajulu, 1998: 276). According to Kagwanja (2001: 88ff), the attackers were well trained and well organised and were not ordinary street gangs. Swahili speaking young men, mainly from Rwanda were recruited, transported to the coast and trained by ex-servicemen. Laakso (2007: 234) also notes that some recruits were from the

\(^\text{113}\) William Ruto was a leading figure in YK’92 during the 1992 elections (Hornsby 2012: 626).
local area, many of them school dropouts, who felt marginalised due to the large influx of non-locals. During the course of the violence, about 100 people were killed and 100,000 forced to flee their homes. During training the recruits were told that they were part of the security arrangement for president Moi, though he publically refuted all involvement (Kagwanja, 2001: 88f). Notwithstanding, as Steeves (1999: 73) argues, the message to opposition candidates and people considering not voting for Moi and KANU was clear: the coastal province, Kwale and Mombasa were to be a “KANU zone”; dissent was not acceptable According to Mazrui (2001: 282) the violence started once the voter registration process had been concluded. From the lists, KANU officials could easily establish that the KANU victory was not a certainty, as a large number of up-country people had registered to vote. Although the violence in the coast province did not reach the same scale as the violence in the Rift Valley earlier during the 1990s, it had a similar effect on the elections. The end result was that people who would potentially vote for the opposition were displaced or did not vote, ensuring KANU victory in both the presidential and parliamentary race. The fact that outsiders performed the violence indicates that local people or the local KANU branch did not instigate it. Kagwanja (2001: 89) states that the it was the government, with presidents Moi’s approval who led the exercise. It is obvious that transporting, paying and training foreigners to displace people, conduct arson, rape and murder are costly exercises. Laakso (2007: 234) writes that there are indications that the attackers were paid per individual they killed. There is no proven connection between KANU campaign funds from the Anglo Leasing contracts and violence on the coast. It is however likely that such a connection exists, as much of the funding for the campaign in general came from that source. In Kyrgyzstan, during the Bakiyev years, voters were targeted to prevent voting. During the 2007 elections private owners were pressured to terminate rent agreements in Batken, Chui and Osh regions. Credible allegations of intimidation of party activists and candidates were received from Batken, Chui, Jalal-Abad and Osh regions (OSCE/ODIHR, 2007: 13).

The mobilisation of criminal gangs in Kenya bears similarities to Kyrgyzstan and what Radnitz (2010b) calls elite led mobilisation during the Akayev and Bakiyev years. There, mobilisation for protest or violence was not the sole prerogative of the government or the president. Rather, local big men could mobilise local supporter, often unemployed people. The connection to criminal organisations is also similar, as the political elites in Kyrgyzstan hired criminal gangs for various purposes. During the late Akayev years, organised crime was

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114 It is possible to predict the ethnic background of individuals based on their names.
allowed to flourish, and there is evidence to suggest that those close to Akayev benefited financially from drug trafficking and other criminal activity (Interviews 2011). A person who was close to Akayev said in an informal conversation that Akayev, his family and others were preparing to depart and that the goal was no longer to hold on to power, but to hoard resources ahead of the inevitable downfall (conversation 2011). A history professor at Kyrgyz State University said that Akayev’s connections with organised crime were weakening towards the end, and that he simply did not have the capacity to use informal means for repression. Although the reasons are unknown, Akayev only sporadically used vigilante gangs, sports clubs and criminal groups to curb dissent in the general population. This sets the Akayev era in Kyrgyzstan apart from Kenya during the 1992 and 1997 elections. A clear exception to this is the days leading up to Akayev’s ouster. A former student of the American University of Bishkek who took part in the riots outside the presidential palace reported that:

Akayev’s own people were standing with the police. They went into the crowd and started fights, calling for people to go home. At the same time, they were causing mayhem. I think they were sportsmen; they looked really big. They were hitting people – old people, young people, women…. Even after the police had kind of given up, they would not give up the fight (student 2011).

Mikosz (2005), who states that Akayev seemed to have “extra-legal security”, which provoked the demonstrators and threw stones, verifies the student’s account. For Akayev, the use of these groups was too little too late. Radnitz (2010a) describes the group as “several hundred plain-clothes mercenaries”. Only a few hours after the protest started on the 24th of March, the protestors had stormed the White House and Akayev had fled the country. Akayev’s sportsmen were outnumbered and according to several sources, the security forces did not use firearms, nor did they seek to actively defend the presidential palace, indicating that Akayev had lost control of the police (Mikosz, 2005; Radnitz, 2010a; Temirkulov, 2008).

The same cannot be said about Bakiyev’s time in office after Akayev was ousted in 2005. Several political prisoners were immediately released and the use of the state for repression decreased. The downfall of the Akayev regime had in no uncertain terms demonstrated that left unchecked, resources from organised crime could facilitate the creation of clientelistic networks independently from the state, as well as repressive power. For that reason, it became essential for Bakiyev to if

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115 It is unclear exactly who the Akayev supporters were, several sources state in interviews that they were part of criminal organisations.
not break, then at least limit the political influence of organised crime. A number of highly publicised murders of criminal leaders took place. The crime boss Bayman Erkinbayev, who had been instrumental in the Tulip revolution was murdered a few months after Bakiyev came to power. There is much debate regarding who killed Erkinbayev and why. Although no one has ever been charged with the murder, some claim adamantly that it was related to a power struggle in the world of organised crime. Others just as adamantly claim that the murder of Erkinbayev was the work of Bakiyev (Sjöberg, 2011: 124). One interviewee in Bishkek said: “Of course it was Bakiyev, lots of people had an interest, but who would have dared if it was against Bakiyev?”. Raatbek Sanatbayev, won a seat in parliament and for the chairmanship of the Olympic committee after Erkinbayev’s death was also murdered, as was Rysbek Akmatbayev and his brother Tynychbek who was a member of parliament. The Kyrgyz authorities have to date been unable to find those guilty of killing these men. It is impossible to state conclusively that these murders were politically motivated. It is possible that the murders, all of which took place during 2005 and 2006 were a part of a showdown in the underworld. What can be said conclusively is that it had an immense effect on political life in Kyrgyzstan. The death of Akmatbayev left a power vacuum. It was not immediately clear who would take on the role of “leading criminal”. There was a decided risk that that the situation would descend into chaos, as local crime lords battled for control. According to Marat (2008: 235) a new leader, Kamchy Kolbayev, was soon found simply because the government needed stability in the world of organised crime. This time however, Bakiyev had the upper hand and could more easily control the influence of crime lords on politics.

The use of murder indicates that Bakiyev was utilising informal actors in order to control potential challenges to the state. At the same time, the link between politics and crime was not broken, new relationships were quickly formed, with the knowledge that Bakiyev was able and ready to use illicit means to remain unchallenged. As Temirkulov (2008) points out, Kyrgyzstan was not a rentier state, as there were few natural resources. Income from organised crime was thus necessary to uphold both intra-elite and mass-elite clientelism.

As time went on, the Bakiyev regime became every bit as authoritarian as its predecessor, using a combination of the state and organised crime gangs. One of the main changes was that opposition parties were prevented from holding public meetings or even meet to discuss in private homes. Asiya Sasykbayeva who was the vice speaker of parliament in during the interim government and a leading figure within the Ata-Meken party explains:
[During the Bakiyev years] we didn’t have a chance. […] We could not rent a place or be anywhere, not even a private one. And in 2010, we were going to have a Kurultai [a big meeting], it was a private place, Atambayev’s, but we were not let in. There was a lot of police, prosecutors and so on. They didn’t care what was in the constitution.

One of the indications of this turn of events was the strategies used by the regime in the 2007 parliamentary elections. Aside from attempting to prevent the opposition from meeting, individual politicians and journalists were intimidated and, in some cases, killed. An illustrative example was the case of the former speaker of parliament and opposition leader Omurbek Tekebayev. He was arrested in Poland with a large quantity of heroin in his luggage. The Polish authorities soon released Tekebayev when CCTV camera footage showed that the drugs had been planted on him (Marat, 2008: 234).

According to Temirkulov (2010: 595: 10) politicians, an unknown number of journalists and other public figures were murdered. One example is the murder of Gennady Pavluk, a journalist who had accused the regime of corruption and criminal ties. He was thrown out of a window on the sixth floor of a building in Almaty in neighbouring Kazakhstan hands and feet bound (Collins, 2011: 154). The modus operandi was the same and many believed the killings to be the work of the special services or hired criminals. Scores of people, mostly journalists simply disappeared without a trace (Temirkulov, 2010: 595). It is important to note that the police and special services were firmly in the hands of the Bakiyev family. The president’s younger brother was head of an elite unit of army special forces called “the Lion”, his eldest son was the deputy head of the National Security Service (Engvall, 2011: 99). Another brother was put in charge of the presidential guard (Collins, 2011: 153). A leading figure with the Social democratic party said in an interview that:

After the 2009 elections I was completely sure that they [the special services] were going to kill me. Several people I knew had already died and they had tried and failed to kill Baisalov. Everyone was scared; there was no question who was doing it. It was them. Sometimes they used criminals, sometimes the police, but we all knew it was the Bakiyevs.

Several interviewees verify that the police, security services and sometimes military cooperated with criminal gangs in efforts to intimidate or murder oppositional politicians and journalists. Several high-profiled criminal bosses had been killed early on, that did not preclude that Bakiyev used his criminal connections in order
to remain in power. The greatest difference was that the independence of organised crime from the regime had diminished. In many cases, criminal gangs could no longer influence the regime, but Bakiyev paid and used criminals to collect clientelistic resources and intimidate the opposition.

In Kenya and in Kyrgyzstan under Akayev and Bakiyev, electoral fraud and vote-buying was used to win elections. During the 1997 Kenyan elections there were serious impediments to voter registration (Adar, 2000: 107). Steeves (1999: 77) also notes that a fair amount of rigging on election day took place. Hornsby (2001: 135f) argues that many of the perceived irregularities during the 1997 were due to incompetence, not intentional fraud. Ballot papers arrived late or not at all, polling stations opened late and the staff was not well educated on voting procedures. An anonymous interviewee who is from the Central Highlands116 but voted in Mombasa in 1997 said that:

There were groups of youths waiting outside the polling station. They weren’t waiting to vote. They were waiting for someone to come and give them money to vote. I waited and watched, and then someone from KANU came and gave them money, and they all went in and voted together. I am sure that the people who were working in there saw what happened.

It is difficult to say with certainty in vote buying similar to the observation in Mombasa was centrally instigated, or a local initiative. It is however clear that fraud, both on election day and leading up to the elections was prevalent. Adar (2000: 119f) also notes that repressive strategies were used against the media. It was common practice for journalists who were critical of KANU to be arrested and copies of newspapers and magazines containing “alarming material” or were a “threat to national security” were regularly impounded. On the other hand, Kahdi and Rutten (2001: 245f) find that the Kenyan media landscape had exploded since 1992. By 1997, many opposition newspapers and magazines were publishing material, which would not have been possible before the introduction of multi-party rule. However, most of these publications were funded by individual politicians and did not have a general readership. It was common that one or two issues were printed, and the publication discontinued due to lack of funding and readership. It could be argued that some of these newspapers and magazines should be viewed as campaign material, not news.

There is no argument that there was electoral fraud in the 2005 parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, shortly before the Tulip Revolution. Ironically, as Radnitz

116 The interviewee was a party activist for NDP in Mombasa in 1997. During the campaign, she received death threats from KANU activists. Despite this, she chose to vote on election day.
(2010b) notes: “[…] the first round of voting, which sparked the protests that eventually led to Akayev’s ouster, was probably the freest and fairest in Central Asia up to that point.” OSCE/ODIHR, who had an observation mission on site report that although there was widespread vote-buying and de-registration of candidates, there had been improvements since the 2000 elections (OSCE/ODIHR, 2005). There were clear signs during the elections that all attempts to create election cohesion had failed. Although the media coverage of the elections was not balanced, there were some serious attempts by Akayev to close down all independent media outlets, the campaign was openly competitive. Far from the majority of candidates were pro-Akayev. OSCE/ODIHR note that:

Many of the constituencies had competitive races, with voters in most constituencies having considerable choice going into the election campaign. […] While most candidates reported no systematic impediments to their campaigns, there were problems in specific constituencies, and claims of vote-buying and administrative interference on behalf of particular candidates were widespread (OSCE/ODIHR, 2005: 11).

In spite of there was an immediate surge of individuals, associations and parties who challenged the elections in court, claiming widespread irregularities and electoral fraud (Kartawich, 2005: 19f). The regime focused more on rigging the elections beforehand by controlling the media and vote-buying strategies than on outright fraud on Election Day and during counting and tabulation.

The repressive measures used by Bakiyev to remain in power became more evident in the 2007 parliamentary elections, when vote buying, and deregistration of candidates was rife. For example, Edil Baisalov, who was a candidate for the social democratic party was deregistered because he published an image of a ballot on his blog. These strategies were commonplace in Kyrgyz elections, yet OSCE/ODIHR (2007) concluded that the 2007 elections were a missed opportunity and fell short of the progress made in 2005.

Summary: Kenya and Kyrgyzstan

Although Kenya under the last decade of Moi’s rule and Kyrgyzstan under Bakiyev and Akayev must be categorised as dominant party states, they were not without political competition. It is clear that Bakiyev, Akayev and Moi alike struggled to uphold intra-elite networks. This can only in part be explained by lack of resources. There is a clear difference in the source of income.

In the case of Kyrgyzstan, both Akayev and Bakiyev’s strategy to build elite support seems somewhat erratic. Initially both leaders co-opted large sections of
the national elites, using resources from privatisation of public enterprises\textsuperscript{117}, organised crime, and the state. As resources ran dry, both leaders shut many elite actors out of the inner circle. Towards the end of Akayev’s and Bakiyev’s time in office, Kyrgyzstan turned into a kleptocracy, with a small group of family and close allies looting the state and gaining income from organised crime.

In broad strokes, the dominant party era in the two states was characterised by a shift in where resources for clientelism and repression stemmed from. It was no longer possible to rely on state resources, so private enterprise and organised crime became an important source of revenue. Simultaneously, individuals and other groupings became important agents in place of the state or party. The aim of clientelism became buying support for individuals or groups rather than the state or party. The state was no longer the sole tool of repression. Vigilante groups, criminal gangs and politically motivated murders took place to a much larger extent than during single-party rule in both states.

**Mass-Elite Clientelism**

Both Kyrgyzstan and Kenya were highly clientelistic states during the dominant party era. In terms of mass-elite clientelism, there were clear similarities. In both states, voters elected local big men, who had the potential to contribute from personal resources to their home communities. Access to government gave additional resources, which could then be distributed in the constituency. Many big men were independently wealthy and could uphold their networks irrespective of being in government. Local leaders would sometimes contribute on a personal level as well, providing funds for school fees, hospital bills and the like. In Kyrgyzstan, these links were sometimes related to clan, sometimes to region boundaries and sometimes to ethnicity. In Kenya, ethnicity was in most instances the deciding factor.

In terms of scale, there is no doubt that the introduction of multi-party rule spurred an increase in mass-elite clientelism in both states. One key difference from the previous era was that clientelism became personalised. In Soviet Kyrgyzstan and in single-party Kenya, the state and party distributed goods to local communities ahead of elections\textsuperscript{118}. After, it was individual big men who were the main providers of resources in return for support.

\textsuperscript{117} Shortly after the Tulip Revolution, a large number of enterprises were re-nationalised, only to be privatised again into the hands of the new elites.

\textsuperscript{118} There are of course cases of local big men during this time as well, though the majority of funds for mass-elite clientelism was provided by the state and party.
Electoral fraud also became a fractionalised. It was no longer the prerogative of the incumbent to influence elections through malpractice. In Kenya, vote buying at polling stations took place outside of polling stations in both the 1992 and the 1997 elections. KANU did not have the monopoly; some voters would simply wait for the best offer. It was also possible for candidates, regardless if they were running on a KANU ticket or for another party to influence the work of local electoral commissions. Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, candidates were known to pay, transport and organise parties for “their” voters, be they in opposition or not.

_Intra-elite Clientelism_

The major shifts, which took place, were related to the makeup and size of intra-elite networks. In both states, interplay between intra-elite clientelism and repression were important factors in regime breakdown and persistence.

During the initial years following independence, Akayev created large, inclusive intra-elite networks through dividing public enterprises to former nomenklatura and some new loyalists. Simultaneously, organised crime formed new elites with intimate links to the political elite. Both of these groups became wealthy and could sustain their prosperity without access to state resources. Controlling resources from organised crime proved especially difficult for the regime, as they for obvious reasons are difficult to regulate. Privatising state-owned enterprises is not a durable resource on which to build sustainable intra-elite networks. Without resources, the intra-elite network fractured, which significantly diminished the power of Akayev. The financial independence of non-aligned elite actors was a threat to the regime, as mass-elite clientelist networks of the individuals involved remained intact, which enabled disenfranchised elites to mobilise against the regime. A similar pattern can be observed regarding the Bakiyev regime. Initially, former state-owned companies were repossessed and distributed to elite actors. When these resources were no longer available to the regime, clientelistic networks inevitably shrank.

In a similar manner, a shrinking economy hampered Moi’s ability to uphold a large intra-elite network. The Moi regime after the introduction of multi-party rule can be summarized as defection from Moi’s closest circle and trouble co-opting elite actors. To add to Moi’s troubles, the IMF and the World Bank was interfering with usual forms of clientelism through interference with regional leaders and state marketing boards. Moi and his KANU allies chose to use clientelistic resources to prevent the formation of an opposition coalition, a strategy, which was to a large extent successful. The downfall of KANU came in 2002, after Moi had voluntarily stepped aside, paving the way for new intra-elite ties. The resources were largely gathered through large-scale corruption.
Repression

When intra-elite networks fracture, incumbents must rely on other methods to stay in power. In Kyrgyzstan, both Akayev and Bakiyev resorted to harassing the opposition, journalists and other when elite unity failed. A significant number of individuals were jailed, newspapers closed, and public gatherings banned. In spite of having these tools at his disposal, Bakiyev went further in his strategy to quell oppositional voices. Political murder became a tool to keep individual politicians from defecting. Murder is of course an effective tool for regime that wished to silence critics. In Kyrgyzstan, murder had a different of significance because of the scale. Criminals, politicians, political activists and financial elites risked their lives if they did not comply with Bakiyev. At least for some time, this was an effective way of keeping elite unity.

In Kenya, the main target of harassment was the general population in areas where KANU victory was conditional the eviction, or intimidation of large groups of voters. Violence: rape, murder, arson and forced evictions were prominent features of the 1992 and 1997 elections. Those who were expected to vote for the opposition were either too intimidated to vote or had become displaced in face of the violence. In Kenya, repressive measures were mainly directed at ordinary people, while in Kyrgyzstan the elites and active journalists, activists and criminals were the target. The mechanism is however similar, the incumbent regimes used violence to remedy fractured clientelistic networks.

There are several significant differences between the repressive strategies used during the single-party era in Kyrgyzstan and Kenya and during competitive authoritarianism. In the case of Kenya, KANU changed its strategy quite dramatically between the 1992 and 1997 elections. YK’92, a youth wing created for the 1992 elections, was tasked with harvesting the opposition, bring to pass violence and evictions and to distribute clientelist goods to KANU candidates throughout the country. By the 1997 elections actions in the form of violence and harassment had been completely privatised. Criminal gangs were tasked with the assignment previously performed by YK’92. The purchaser of these services was not the KANU party, but local big men who established contacts with gangs or groups of young men ready to commit violent acts for the right price. There is also evidence to suggest that people who were not loyal to Moi bought these services, suggesting that non-dominant actors could execute violence.

119 It should be noted that Moi loyalists in the 1992 elections used criminal gangs and groups of young people as well. The difference here is that all forms of harassment and violence had been privatised by 1997.
In Kyrgyzstan, elections during the Akayev and Bakiyev years were not as violent. Nonetheless, there are clear similarities between the two cases. In Kyrgyzstan, as in Kenya mobilisation was privatised. Local big men, not parties, mobilised mass actors in Aksy and during the Tulip Revolution. The looting, crime and disarray in Bishkek and other urban areas was committed by hired groups of sportsmen/criminal gangs. Both Kenya and Kyrgyzstan were thus showing signs what Radnitz calls subversive clientelism; mobilisation took place based on mass-elite clientelism. Local big men would recruit people to protest, cause disorder or violence. Most often, a direct exchange of cash for mobilisation was part of the agreement. In Kyrgyzstan, political murder was part of the power holder’s connection to organised crime. The same criminal leaders who were hired for the Tulip Revolution could be assigned more targeted tasks, such as disposing of unwanted competition. During the Bakiyev years, political murder became a common method of political intimidation. Neither state relied only on the state as a repressive apparatus. Repression was to a large extent privatised, especially in Kyrgyzstan under Bakiyev and in Kenya.

Dominant Party Rule in Kazakhstan and Tanzania

Like in Kyrgyzstan, independence in Kazakhstan did not come as a result of political struggle. Rather, independence was a fact that politicians and public had to relate to. Indeed, the general secretary of the CPSU, Nursultan Nazarbayev made several attempts to “save” the Soviet Union from collapse before accepting that Kazakhstan must become an independent state (Cummings, 2005: 17). During the following years Nazarbayev became one of the strongest proponents of cooperation and integration in the former Soviet states (Brill Olcott, 2010:26). According to Alexanderov (1999:155), it was Kazakhstan’s dependent position which prompted Nazarbayev to endorse a high degree of economic integration between the states within the CIS.

Kazakhstan never promoted itself as an island of democracy in the same manner as Kyrgyzstan. As early as in 1994, Kangas (1994) notes that Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were the only two Central Asian states where political parties had begun to develop. The former communist party split into two parties: The Communist Party and the Socialist Party (Babak, 2005). Other political parties and movements developed simultaneously. However, as Isaacs (2011: 113) points out:

Party development in Kazakhstan since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been a dynamic and fluid process of party creation and dissolution. […] Due to
extensive executive control on the part of Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, most commentators have concluded that parties are of appreciable value […].

Multi-party rule in Tanzania did not come about through political struggle, nor was the political elite enthusiastic about political competition. Amon Cheliga, a professor at the University of Dar-es-Salaam said:

After Nyerere said that he approved it, there was really no debate. It happened because it was happening around us, in other African countries. [...] Most people, I think, would say CCM was confident that they would win and stay in power. [...] Remaining a single-party state at that time would have been difficult, we would have lost foreign aid. Tanzania would not have survived economically.

Several scholars agree with Cheliga’s conclusion that multi-party competition came about as a result of international pressure rather than political struggle (see for example Ngasongwa, 1992; Van Cranenburgh, 1996; Chege, 1995; Hydén, 1999; Richey and Ponte, 1996). According to Barkan (1995: 32), consensus was instrumental to avoid a split in CCM. The party’s confidence in remaining in power despite the shift was not unfounded. In the 1995 elections, Benjamin Mkapa, who was the CCM candidate, won 61.8% of the vote and the party easily won a majority in parliament (Van Cranenburgh, 1996: 542). Most of the individuals who were in leading positions in the opposition parties had formerly been associated with CCM. The second runner up in the presidential race, John Mrema, was a former minister in Mwinyi’s government. An interviewee, who has now retired from political life, said that:

Mrema in 1995. Well, I think he got the support because many people in his constituency and where he was already popular thought, he was with CCM. They did not exactly fly the banner of NCCR\textsuperscript{120} when he went into the rural areas. And to many people, Mkapa was not well known, he had not been president before.

Kazakhstan and Tanzania thus share a number of similarities. In both states, multi-party politics did not come as a result of strong political movements. In this section the interaction of elite networks, mass-elite clientelism and repression in the two states is discussed.

\textsuperscript{120} National Convention for Construction and Reform – Mageuzi, Mema’s party
In Tanzania, a large, inclusive network of elites dominate political life, largely held together by the distribution of clientelistic resources. Public sector jobs were an important resource. In Kazakhstan on the other hand, elite networks were smaller, yet there are no open challengers to president Nursultan Nazarbayev’s power within the elite. This section identifies strategies used by the incumbent in both states in order to create elite stability and minimize challenges. Thus, in Hale’s (2014:64f) definition, both Kazakhstan and Tanzania have single-pyramid systems, in that elite networks are directly linked to the highest authority through clientelistic exchanges. They are however dissimilar, as the a much larger number of individuals are included in those networks in Tanzania.

In Kazakhstan, first president Nazarbayev moved to gradually reduce the size of his intra-elite network. The first multi-party elections were held in 1994. In 1995, the Constitutional Court dissolved parliament on the grounds that there were too many irregularities in the electoral process (Schatz, 2004: 87). There are reports of gerrymandering and tampering with the results by leaders who wished to increase the influence of their regions (Luong Jones, 2004: 245). Kubicek (1998:34) argues that the act by the constitutional court was a pretext for Nazarbayev to increase the power of the executive and put an end to disagreements with parliament. According to Luong Jones (2004: 219ff), the conflict between the president and the parliament was based on regional leaders wanting to hold on to power, despite independence and Nazarbayev’s will to instate a strong executive. Serikbolsyn Abdildin, the speaker of parliament and leader of the reformed communist party was at the centre of the conflict and said in an interview that his purpose was to avoid Nazarbayev becoming “all powerful” (Serikbolsyn Abdildin 2010). Isaacs (2010a) claims that Abdildin and others opposed the reforms proposed by Nazarbayev because they risked losing their stakes in state enterprises and other organisations, which may prove lucrative in the future. Dissolving the parliament gave Nazarbayev the power to side-line competition. The electoral law was rewritten. A bicameral system was introduced and Nazarbayev was granted power to rule by decree. The president appoints the government and dismisses parliament. Furthermore, the upper house, the senate, is dominated by the president’s appointees (Brill Olcott, 2010: 88). Isaacs (2010a) notes that the individuals who were involved in dissolving parliament were amply rewarded for their service. For example, Tatiana Kvyatkovskaya, a representative

121 Insiders who have challenged Nazarbayev have faced stark consequences, like the president’s former son in law Rakhat Aliyev, who was murdered in an Austrian prison in 2015 or former elite insider Altynbek Sarsenbayev who was assassinated in Almaty in 2006.
from Almaty constituency, filed the formal complaint to the Constitutional Court. She later became part of Nazarbayev’s inner circle and leader of the pro-presidential party Otan. This is an unusual achievement as only 4% of the elites in Kazakhstan were women (Murphy, 2006).

According to Kusainova and Gleason (1998: 533f), the 1995 parliamentary elections gave the president the opportunity to remove a number of individuals who were not loyal and did not agree with the reform programme he wish to put in place. A referendum was held, which increased Nazarbayev’s term in office until 2000 without the need for presidential elections (Kubicek, 1998: 34f). The two chambers in parliament were now filled with Nazarbayev supporters. Some previous members of the nomenklatura became political outsiders, including Abdildin, who had been an important figure during the Soviet years. He said in an interview:

The people who are in the elite now, they have taken all the land, all the companies, all the wealth. Everything is controlled by a small group. They are loyal to Nazarbayev. […] It is true, many of them were nomenklatura, in fact most. But everyone who was in the nomenklatura did not become wealthy or powerful. […] Many people who were there became nobody afterwards. All of the ordinary people, they also lost everything. All the wealth now belongs to Nazarbayev, not to the people.

In 1997 and 1998, what resembled a purge of the political elite and civil service took place. Nazarbayev stated that he wished to decrease the staff at ministries and departments by half. Thousands of people lost their jobs and access to power (Cummings, 2005). Emrich-Bakenova (2009) attributes the high turnover of staff in the civil service to the ongoing power struggle within the elite. The aim was to reduce elite competition and potential threats to the regime simply by leaving a large group of former elite actors powerless and without substantial wealth.

Nazarbayev had inherited a large intra-elite network from the Kunyayev years: many people, Russians and Kazakhs alike expected to receive clientelistic resources and access to the state after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Isaacs, 2010a). During the few years when Kolbin was general secretary of the communist party, many of those who were loyal to Kunayev had been left out in the cold. When Nazarbayev became general secretary in 1989, many of Kunayev’s supporters were reinstated. Several interviewees state that it was the support of this group, which made it possible for Nazarbayev to remain in power when Kazakhstan became an independent state (Anonymous 2010, Abdildin 2010, Svoik 2011). One member of the lower house of parliament said in an interview:
Without the support of so many in those early years, we would have been unstable like Kyrgyzstan. There was very careful handling going on, no one was left out [...]

I mean he [Nazarbayev] was very skilled in ensuring that there were no splits. Little by little, he became the only possible leader because he is what keeps stability. We don’t want to break down over and over like them [Kyrgyzstan]. [...] We have stability due to our leader, because he knows how to keep people happy.

In contrast to Kyrgyzstan the early years after independence, Nazarbayev distributed the spoils of the state to a small group of people. The main assets came from selling previously state-owned companies at low prices, or granting ownership to “workers associations”, which were in fact often covers for individuals to whom Nazarbayev wished to extend clientelism (interviews with Dosym Satpayev and Asylbek Isazarbayevich Kozhahmetov). Many of those who had been part of the nomenklatura did not benefit, leaving some groups of previously powerful individuals without resources. Isaacs (2011a) finds that a process of elite fragmentation has also occurred; many individuals who were in positions of power during the Soviet years are no longer part of the president’s inner circle. The individuals who remained in the elite were exclusively former nomenklatura. Murphy (2006) finds that 90% of the Kazakhstani elites were former Communist Party members in 1995. By 2001, that number had fallen only slightly to 86%.

Serikbolsyn Abdildin, who soon became ousted from Nazarbayev’s inner circle, said that:

Well, these are not only my views; many elders stated that there was no privatisation in Kazakhstan. There was a phenomenon called privatisation, which means snatching and stealing. The people who benefited the most are the president and persons who are close to the president, governors and certain groups of followers.

It is not by accident that, when listing multi-billionaires, there are relatives of Nazarbayev and certain foreigners. You might also know, that in Kazakhstan there are seven or eight, who were invited by Nazarbayev to become rich at the expense of Kazakhstan resources.

Abdildin’s mention of seven or eight may be an exaggeration, however it does indicate that the intra-elite network which is benefiting from Kazakhstan’s natural resources and privatisation is a quite small number of people. None the less, Nazarbayev had access to large resources from the newly privatised oil, gas and minerals industries, making the inner circle wealthy (Way, 2015:158).
The actions taken by Nazarbayev to reduce the size of the elite networks contrast with President Benjamin Mkapa's\textsuperscript{122} strategy after the introduction of multi-party rule. He chose instead to maintain and expand clientelism within the elites. Although the party’s chosen successor won the national elections with a clear majority, power struggles within the party preceded his nomination. A CCM MP said of that time:

When Mwinyi stepped down, it was not for certain who would take over. Mrema was popular, but he left over the Mohamed Enterprises\textsuperscript{123}. There were several others who were more popular than Mkapa, many people hardly knew Mkapa. […] He became chosen because of Nyerere, he was the one who he chose.

Edward Lowassa was another individual who was dismissed as a presidential candidate by Nyerere. He was immensely popular and well known by the public. Nyerere alleged corrupt practices, making it impossible for Lowassa to be nominated by the party (Werrema, 2012: 27). Mkapa, on the other hand was inaugurated with the nickname “Mr. Clean” (Heilman and Ndumbaro, 2002: 9). This shows that Nyerere had power and influence in the party long after he stepped down as president.

Corruption increased in Tanzania during the Mwinyi years (Heilman and Ndumbaro, 2002; Babeiya, 2011: 588; Cooksey, 2010). For example, Mohammed Enterprises, one of Tanzania’s largest private companies, was accused of distributing food which was not fit for human consumption. It was alleged that several MPs were involved in the scandal (Heilman and Ndumbaro, 2002). The image of Mwinyi, CCM and, to some extent Nyerere was tarnished. For this reason, it was essential for CCM to enter the multi-party era with a leadership untouched by corruption and of accusations of wealth accumulation.

Initially, Mkapa had weak support within the elites, an expectation that he would combat corruption and a strong challenger for the presidency in Augustine Mrema of NCCR-M. Mrema had been Minister of Home Affairs during the last years of the Mwinyi regime. When the Mohammed Enterprises scandal broke, he promised that those responsible for the scandal would be punished. Mrema was immediately demoted to Minister for Youth and Sport in an effort to silence the affair. He left CCM ahead of the 1995 elections to form NCCR-M and was fielded as the party’s presidential candidate. Very few CCM leaders followed suit and no other new party attracted CCM elites in large numbers. This sets the

\textsuperscript{122} Mkapa served as president between 1995 and 2005. He was the first president elected after the introduction of multi-party rule.

\textsuperscript{123} The MP is referring to a highly publicised corruption scandal.
Tanzanian case apart from Kenya, where many KANU politicians defected as soon as multi-party rule was introduced in 1993. For this reason, a rupture in CCM or defection of key players was seen as the main challenge to the dominant party regime. A CCM MP, Stella Manyanya, said:

I've been told, at that time people were afraid that others would go with Mrema. Or maybe that the party would split. That was the fear then, and it is always a risk with such a big party.

After his victory in the presidential elections, Mkapa was faced with a challenge. The public expected an end to corruption, while elite actors expected impunity and continued access to resources. If he could not provide clientelistic resources to the elite, there was a risk of defection to the opposition, or that another CCM politician would take over the leadership of the party. He chose not to reduce the size of the elite network. These expectations were without doubt inherited from the Mwinyi regime, which had much in common with what Bratton and van de Walle refer to as “big man rule” (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). Mkapa was expected by a large group of prominent party officials to distribute wealth in order to uphold the clientelistic network. A former CCM MP said:

It was difficult with Mkapa. Many people were involved with corruption. If they all had to go, it would destabilise [the party]. […] At the same time, there was a will to change it, at least so it looked like we were doing something.

The solution to Mkapa’s problem was to create an institution for controlling corruption, the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB)\textsuperscript{124} without granting it autonomy from State House (Babeiya, 2011). Mkapa personally appointed the individuals in top positions in the Bureau. In addition, a presidential commission was set up to investigate corruption during the Mwinyi era. Their investigation resulted in a detailed report on the state of corruption in Tanzania, the “Warioba Report”. Several high-ranking officials were implicated, and it is often regarded as an insightful view into corruption in Tanzania (Cooksey, 2010: 270). Despite the findings in the Warioba report, few individuals were brought to court. According to Aminzade (2013: 265) the reason for this unwillingness to act was great co-dependency within the political elite. Those who were mentioned in the Warioba Report were successful businessmen and politicians. It soon became clear that the judiciary was unable to take firm action against elite actors (Ewald, 2011:162ff).

\textsuperscript{124} PCB later changed its name to Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB)
According to Temu and Due (2000: 704f), the judiciary in Tanzania is highly selective in that only those who have fallen out with the CCM elite are charged. An example of selective justice is the dismissal of then Minister of Finance Simon Mbilinyi. He was accused of tax-exemption. The case was held up as an example in the local press as well as internationally as evidence of the new government’s efforts to combat corruption. According to Kelsall (2002:606), it soon became clear that Mbilinyi had been ousted because of an internal dispute within the party rather than evidence of effective anti-corruption measures. One interviewee and CCM member who wished to remain unnamed said:

Mkapa was barking very loudly about corruption, so everyone outside thought it was effective. Inside [the party], we knew that there was a new way to get rid of someone. […] There were already some serious rifts, every time there was a scandal it was about getting rid of someone.

The exclusion of Mbilinyi from the inner circle of power would set precedence for how internal conflict within the CCM were solved using anti-corruption mechanisms (Tsubura, 2014: 116).

The period between 1995-2005 saw no great purges of party members. On the mainland\textsuperscript{125}, few repressive measures were used to keep elite actors in line. John Cheyo, party leader of the United Democratic Party, which entered parliament in 1995 said in an interview:

In the CCM, most things were the same. There was no reshuffle [after Mwinyi], most people stayed. There was not much change, not many came to us and not many went with Mrema.

Anti-corruption charges were used as to get rid of potential challengers within Kazakhstan’s small political elite as well. An example of this is the ousting of Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, who was forced into exile on charges of tax evasion and corruption in 1998. Kazhegeldin had formed an opposition party, the Republican People’s’ Party of Kazakhstan (RPPK), and was planning to run for president (Schatz, 2004: 86). Nazarbayev perceived this as a threat, as several high-powered businessmen and other elite actors backed the new party. How and why Kazhegeldin was ousted from power is important, as it is a precursor to how powerful elite actors have been disposed of during the Nazarbayev regime. According to Olcott (2010:138), Kazhegeldin had been one of the driving forces

\textsuperscript{125} On Zanzibar on the other hand political violence and repression was common. This will be discussed further.
behind Kazakhstan’s rapid privatisation during the 1990s. The initial appointment of Kazhegeldin as Prime Minister can be seen as an attempt to unify and consolidated the elites. He was not a part of Nazarbayev’s inner circle during the Soviet years. As a former KGB-officer, it was his close relationship to Russia and his ability to attract foreign investments, which landed him the position (Isaacs, 2011b: 68). It soon became clear that Kazhegeldin could pose a challenge to Nazarbayev and his hold on power; there were open disagreements between him and the pro-presidential Minister for Oil and Gas Nurlan Balgimbayev (Ostrowski, 2010: 45).

Nazarbayev’s son in law, Rakhat Aliyev was the head of the tax service. Aliyev made grave accusations of tax evasion and corruption against Kazhegeldin. These accusations were then published in various newspapers owned by Nazarbayev’s daughter Dariga Nazarbayeva (Furman, 2005: 226). The real reason for his dismissal remained out of the public eye.

The investigation into Kazhegeldin’s alleged corruption would uncover Kazakhstan’s greatest corruption scandal to date, “Kazakhgate”127. James Giffen, an American businessman, acted as an intermediary when Kazakhstan was seeking foreign investments into the oil, gas and mineral sectors during the 1990s. There is evidence to suggest that Nazarbayev, Kazhegeldin and Balgimbayev received large kickbacks when western companies invested in these sectors. The money was then deposited in Swiss bank accounts (Brill Olcott, 2010: 148). In total, it is estimated that 84 million USD was paid in bribes to Kazakhstani officials (Yeager, 2012). In order to avoid further international scandal, Nazarbayev allowed the assets in Switzerland to be spent on charity (Peyrouse, 2012).

The reason why the scandal came to light is that the Kazakhstani authorities contacted the Swiss to investigate bank accounts in Kazhegeldins’ name. When the Swiss authorities discovered that several other Kazakhstani politicians, among them Balgimbayev and Nazarbayev himself, held assets, which were in all likelihood linked to Giffen. At that point, the U.S Department of Justice launched an investigation into the affair. In 2003, Giffen was arrested at JFK airport carrying a Kazakhstani diplomatic passport (Hug, 2010: 9). In the trial, which concluded in 2010, James Giffen was cleared of corruption charges and no

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126 Ironically, Rakhat Aliyev later became the victim of a similar campaign himself and forced into exile, and later died in an Austrian prison in 2015.

Kazakhstani official was charged\textsuperscript{128}. Giffen claimed that he was working for the CIA and that his close relationship to Nazarbayev and other Kazakhstani officials was strategic and aimed at gathering vital intelligence (Yeager, 2012). A Kazakhstani businessman in exile said in a Skype interview that:

Kazakhgate… Well… at that time it only proved what everyone already knew. That it is impossible to be at the very top and close to Nazarbayev without being involved, with the hand in the cookie jar. […] It works as an insurance, there is always a way they can get you. The thing is, with Kazhegeldin, I am sure that their allegations were true, or that there was some truth. It was early, so they didn’t really know how to do it yet, that’s why they got discovered too. It was almost a disaster! […] They have learned a lesson. They did the same to many others afterwards, they accuse people of corruption and they have to leave the stage. Most often, they are right about the corruption, everyone close to Nazarbayev is involved. Only now, they know how to do it: they can accuse someone without leaving a trail back to the president (2013).

Kazakhgate and its aftermath taught Nazarbayev and the Kazakhstani elites a lesson. Namely, to keep corruption and clientelism out of the public, or more importantly prosecutors’ eye. After Kazakhgate was revealed, insiders became better at concealing corruption and elite ties. A Nur Otan party activist in Almaty stated that:

Most people, they have no idea what is going on in the politics of the palace. When we find something out, it is because Nazarbayev lets us know, there are no leaks and they are very careful. […] For me, I think they are doing it to keep stability. There are good reasons for what happens at the top, but it might look bad if everyone would know (2011).

In Tanzania, Mkapa also failed to keep corruption in the inner circle out of the public eye. Several scandals during Mkapa’s presidency came to light after 2005, when Jakaya Kikwete became president. The most publicised case being a contract involving BAE systems\textsuperscript{129} and the sale of military radar equipment for Dar-es-Salaam International Airport in 1999. The company was found guilty in a UK court of bribing a Tanzanian advisor to win the contract (BBC, 2010). Tanzania purchased a 40 million USD radar system. Shailesh Vithlani, a British/Tanzanian businessman received 12 million USD, which was then used to convince Tanzania

\textsuperscript{128} Giffen was however found guilty of tax evasion and his company was fined

\textsuperscript{129} BAE systems is a British company, which sells advanced military and security equipment.
public officials to select BAE. Although there is little doubt that the money received by Vithlani was used to bribe politicians, no charges have been brought against Tanzanians. In 2012, the head of the head of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau, Edward Hosea claimed that no Tanzanians were involved in the scandal (Nkwame, 2012). In another publicised case president Mkapa along with former minister Daniel Yona have been accused of purchasing 85% of the Kiwira coal mine below market value in 2005. The purchase was made through TANPOWER, owned by Mkapa, Yona and a number of close family members. Although the Kiwira was re-appropriated by the state in 2009, no charges have been brought against any of the parties involved (Cooksey and Kelsall, 2011: 29). Numerous other scandals also came to light, including among others the state power company TANESCO, the gold mining company Mwananchi and the construction of a spectacular new headquarters for the Bank of Tanzania (Ewald, 2011: 150). These scandals bring to light that access to resources through corruption was a way of creating elite cohesion and was therefore clientelistic.

When asked about the connections between political and other elites in Tanzania, almost all the interviewees replied that they are often the same people and that it is difficult, if not impossible, to do business in Tanzania without the right connections and engaging in corruption. One CCM MP put it like this:

They [business people] don’t want to get in [to parliament] because of the salary. No, that is not enough for them. They are trying to influence things. They are looking for a space where people can hear them so that they can influence everything. Where they can make sure to influence legislation and get a chance to win very big contracts so that they can make very big deals. It is not good. Also, when they are sent by the government oversees on our expense, they make sure that they meet with the right people so that they, personally, can get contracts and make sure to get deals (Michael L. Lekule 2010).

Corruption itself does not however prove that elite networks exist and that funds procured through corruption are used to uphold and fund mass-elite clientelism. Mkapa was attempting to keep a very large elite network with a number of factions intact. Foreign direct investment in Tanzania increased six-fold from 1995-2000 (Aminzade, 2013:257). At the same time, a number of companies were privatised into the hands of the political elite, land was sold at low prices and no politicians were held responsible (Cooksey and Kelsall, 2011:29). With the end of single-party rule, CCM lost a great deal of its funding. The state’s coffers were no longer used with impunity; as one interviewee at Dodoma University put it:
Under Nyerere and to some extent Mwinyi, politicians could steal directly from the coffers. Now, things are more elaborate. Money come from business, the exchange is that businessmen get contracts, they by-pass the law. At the core of it all is still the state (2010)

Upholding elite clientelist networks is costly. A CCM MP said that:

There used to be more that held us together. There was a belief in Ujamaa and people had loyalty to Nyerere. Now, we have no strong leaders, and there is no ideology in the party. Also, the party itself has no money [...] It has all become very personal, it is about who is teaming up with who, and who is funding. These days, business people need politicians for contracts and politicians need business for money.

Ahead of the 2000 general elections, a number of businessmen entered politics as candidates for CCM or by funding the campaign for selected CCM politicians. Before the introduction of multi-party rule, there were few businessmen involved in politics and their entry into the political sphere caused some controversy (Aminzade, 2013: 339). According to a majority of my interviewees, primary elections in CCM are highly dependent on the candidate’s ability to fund their own campaigns (Zubeir Ali Maulid 2010, Ali Mzee 2010, Zainab Gama 2010). According to some, this has for the brought ethnic tension to the political elite. Wealthy members of the Asian community are often accused of engaging in corruption and tampering with party nominations and elections. A businessman of Asian descent in Dar-es-Salaam said, “Often, they think we are bribing everyone. The civil servant, hospitals, schools and the politicians. It has become difficult. It is what everyone expects.”

In both Kazakhstan and Tanzania, the civil service is closely linked to the political elite. Kazakhstan’s civil service is based on personal connections (Emrich-Bakenova, 2009). Some scholars argue that these ties are often based on clan (Schatz, 2004). Others argue that that clan ties are only one of many possible patronage ties (Isaacs, 2010a). With regard to public tenders and access to Kazakhstan’s immense oil wealth, connections are necessary. Sometimes clientelistic networks transcend borders, linking political elites and business people in several countries. As Rassul Rysambetov, a journalist and political analyst explains:

All of the Chinese business people who come here for the oil are relatives of officials in the communist party of China. That way, the Nur Otan thinks they are important and will allow them into the circle and they can do business. It is the
same with the Russian main guy: his wife is one of the most successful in the oil business. If you deal with oil, you need connections in politics, and they have them in both countries (Rassul Rysambetov 2010).

It is sometimes necessary for people who want to do business in Kazakhstan to have political connection in more than one state. Another sign that the intra-elite network in Kazakhstan is small is that many of Nazarbayev’s relatives are immensely wealthy. Examples of this include Nazarbayev’s son-in-law Timur Kulibayev and his daughter Dinara Kulibayeva, who are both on the Forbes list of the world’s wealthiest individuals.

During the privatisation phase of Kazakhstan’s state-owned enterprises, a number of groups completed for power and resources. In some cases, these interest groups were centred on Nazarbayev’s family or close relatives. Not all individuals with power and influence in Kazakhstan were related to Nazarbayev. There was a group around Mukhtar Ablyazov, who was minister of energy and later became the chairman of BTA Bank. Another group, led by Aleksandr Mashkevich, Patokh Chodiev and Alijan Ibragimov, made their fortunes in oil, gas and aluminium. Lastly, Nurzhan Subkhanberdin, a close friend of Nazarbayev’s was the leader of an interest group and owner of Kazakhstan’s biggest bank Kazkommertsbank (Isaacs, 2013:1068; Del Sordi, 2012: 28). These groups are significant, not only because they control much of Kazakhstan’s wealth, but because they wield political influence and have a close relationship to the president (Dosym Satpayev 2011, Rassul Rysambetov 2011).

Two of the initial groups have been completely side-lined because they were perceived to be a threat to Nazarbayev. In 2001, several elite actors formally withdrew their support for the president and formed an opposition party. The party, Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK) is widely regarded as the greatest challenge to Nazarbayev yet (Brill Olcott, 2010; Isaacs, 2013; Junisbai and Junisbai, 2005: 250; Peyrouse, 2012). Some of the notable founding members were Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, Mukhtar Ablyazov, Alikhan Baimenov, Bulat Abilov and Nurzhan Subkhanberdin. All of them were prominent politicians or businessmen, which set the DVK apart from other opposition parties. The formation of DVK was an elite cleavage. As Del Sordi (2012: 117) rightly notes, they were young oligarchs, eager for power, influence and resources. One of the founding members, Alikhan Baimenov (2011) said in an interview:

In November of 2001 we formed the DVK. At that time, the president’s son-in-law was doing things that were not good. He was exerting pressure on business… former son-in-law. In 2002 we formed Ak Zhol.
One of the other founders, Bulat Abilov (2011) was even more explicit:

Aliyev… he was trying to take over the Bank TuranAlem [note: BTA Bank]. That bank belonged to Ablyazov. I think that was his motivation. [...] For myself, it was more pragmatic. I wanted reform, democracy rule of law.

There is no contention that the individuals who formed DVK were unhappy with the increasing power and lawlessness of Rakhat Aliyev. An individual who was also involved in the founding of the party said:

What was going on was that Aliyev was impounding people’s assets. He was with the KNB (note: Security Services) and he was using that power to steal everything. For us, it was clear that something had to be done. […] We could not predict the outcome.

Rakhat Aliyev (2009: 76) denied any involvement in a book he published accusing the president of corruption and despotism. The reaction of Nazarbayev was immediate. All DVK members who held positions in government, or the civil service were dismissed by presidential decree. A number of businessmen quickly withdrew their support for DVK in order to remain in favour. Nurzhan Subkhanberdin, the founder and chairman of Kazkommertsbank, for example soon declared that he would no longer be involved in politics. Galymzhan Zhakiyanov and Mukhtar Ablyazov were immediately arrested and charged with tax evasion and misuse of office (Junisbai, 2010: 379f). Both men served time in prison. Baimenov and Abilov went on to form the Ak Zhol party130, which is no more than a quasi-opposition party (Franke et al., 2009). Bader (2011) argues that Baimenov and Abilov were co-opted and subsequently formed a much softer opposition party, which posed no real threat to the regime. Baimenov himself describes the position of the party as:

[…] we are different, the ruling party sees only achievements, and at the same time there were parties that only spoke of drawbacks. And we said that we have to see both. The achievements are not seen by the blind and the drawbacks are not seen by the indifferent people. We declared ourselves constructive opposition, we wanted competition not rivalry.

130 Ak Zhol later split into two factions, Ak Zhol and Nagyz Ak Zhol (real Ak Zhol). Nagyz Ak Zhol later joined forces with the Social Democratic party Azat.
One of the interviewees with connections within the elite said that the attitude of the president was a signal to the wealthy elites in Kazakhstan to get in line and support the president, making it impossible for them to act independently of political power (anonymous 2010).

Another outcome of the formation of DVK was that Mukhtar Albyazov, who was the leader of one of the initial elite groupings fell out of the president’s favour. He was released from prison after only serving 10 months of his six-year sentence following international pressure (Junisbai and Junisbai, 2005). The condition was that he refrained from political involvement in Kazakhstan. In 2005, he became the chairman of the board of the BTA bank. Rakhat Aliyev, President Nazarbayev’s former son-in-law, said in a Skype interview (2011) that giving Ablyazov control of BTA was an attempt to co-opt him.

President Nazarbayev, he want to solve all the problem with opposition, and he wants to get all the key persons who are active persons on his side, and he gave to Mr. Ablyazov this position to be president of Turan Alem bank (note: BTA). Utemuratov\(^{131}\) controlled some 15pc of Turen Alem [but in reality, it] belonged to Mr. Nazarbayev. Then it was a conflict between the president, and Utemuratov and Ablyazov, because Ablyazov postponed all the time to give control of the president 50pc of the bank.[…] It was very sensitive methods he played between all the key persons in Kazakhstan.

That same year, a new opposition party was formed: Alga!. The party has been unable to register or take part in elections. The leaders of the party were not part of the president’s inner circle, nor did they belong to the wealthy elite of Kazakhstan. The leader of Alga!, Vladimir Kozlov, was working with public relations for DVK when the party formed in 2001. Earlier on, Kozlov was working directly for Ablyazov. He explains:

During that time, I worked in Mr. Alblyazov’s team, we were helping him not to go bankrupt, so that his company could survive. At that time, Ablyazov was starting DVK so it made sense for me to join DVK. There was a process, it was quite flexible. With DVK I was a press specialist. And then as time went by I got more information on the government’s attitude and practices towards opposition parties. In Kazakhstan there is one rule with opposition; either its people who got kicked out or it is people who are getting stronger and stronger. Fortunately, the

\(^{131}\) Bulat Utemuratov is a businessman, who is close to Nazarbayev and one of Kazakhstan’s wealthiest individuals.
second thing happened to me. I became more and more informed and transformed from mass media specialist to politician.

An anonymous local journalist in Almaty said that it was well-established that Mukhtar Ablyazov funded Alga!

There was no way that Ablyazov could become a politician himself when he came out of prison. They would arrest him, and he would be tortured again. But there was also no way Nazarbayev could buy him. He was angry you know, so it became public secret number one that Ablyazov was funding Alga! and some newspapers.

Although Ablyazov refrained from making any political statements, he had broken his promise to Nazarbayev of staying out of politics. It was clear that he had ambitions to topple the government and bring down Nazarbayev. His return to Kazakhstan in 2005 was the start of a massive expansion of the BTA bank. During the global banking crisis, the bank was unable to meet the government’s requirements on reserves and was taken over by the state’s sovereign wealth fund Samruk-Kazyna (Hug, 2010). During the of BTAs downfall, Ablyazov was accused of embezzling an astronomical 6 billion dollars of the bank’s resources (Lillis 2001: 47). Ablyazov immediately went into exile in the UK, where he was later found guilty and sentenced to 22 months in prison, and as much of BTA Banks assets recovered as possible, including a number of luxury villas, private jets and yachts. He went underground, escaping British justice, but was arrested by French police in Canne in 2013. Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan demanded he be extradited. In 2016, after a drawn-out legal process, the France’s highest court for administrative justice ruled that Ablyazov could not be extradited and released him (Lillis 2019: 49).

Rakhat Aliyev’s fate was not as fortunate. Like Mukhtar Ablyazov, he was considered the leader of an elite grouping during the 1990s and early 2000s. Aliyev’s falling out with the president was a gradual process. Aidos Sarym, a political analyst said on the topic of Aliyev:

There were rumours already in 2001 that he was planning a coup […]. And then, Nazarbayev somehow accused him of DVK, that it all came about because Aliyev, he was in conflict with everyone. […] Because of that he was sent to Austria, just to keep him away from everything here.

In 2002, Aliyev was appointed Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Austria and OSCE in an attempt to keep him at arm’s length from the ongoing conflicts between the interest groups in Kazakhstan. He returned to Kazakhstan in 2005, only to be
sent back in 2007. According to an anonymous interviewee in Almaty, the reason for this is that Aliyev was involved in a conflict with Nurzhan Subkhanberdin, the powerful owner of Kazkommertsbank. Aside from controlling much of the media, the pair had registered a political party Asar, competing in the 1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections. Though the party was openly pro-presidential the pair often publicly criticised individual policies and the bureaucracy (Del Sordi, 2012: 117). During the late 2000s, who would succeed Nursultan Nazarbayev as president became a topic of contention. Even though Nazarbayev stepped down in 2019, this issue has not resolved. Serving president Tokayev has been touted as a possible successor for years, but now serves as interim president until elections are held. Nazarbayev will have great influence over this process. According to Aitolkyn Kourmanova, a political analyst in Almaty, there were clear signs that Nazarbayeva and Aliyev were using the Asar party to position Dariga Nazarbayeva as a potential heir to the presidency (interview 2011). This caused intense conflict between the interest groups. Consequently, Nazarbayev forced Asar and two other pro-presidential parties\(^\text{132}\) to merge with Otan to form the new presidential super-party Nur Otan (Peyrouse, 2012).

In 2007, Aliyev was stripped of his diplomatic immunity and accused of kidnapping two Nurbank officials, of money laundering and later of murdering an opposition politician\(^\text{133}\) and his two bodyguards in 2006 (Peyrouse, 2012). According to Aliyev, he was forced to divorce his wife (Aliyev 2011). This took place after Aliyev openly stated that he was planning to run against Nazarbayev in the next presidential elections. Aliyev was sentenced in absentia to a long prison term (Fedorov, 2011; Peyrouse, 2012) 354f. Aliyev remained at large until June 2014, when he was arrested in Austria. In February 2015 Rakhat Aliyev was found hanged in his prison cell, in what Austrian authorities have deemed a suicide\(^\text{134}\).

There is little doubt that the elite in Kazakhstan is small, hierarchical and held together by intra elite clientelism. As long as elite actors support the president, they can expect to remain business leaders, and act with impunity regarding corruption. Although there are a number of factions, there is a strict hierarchy within the system (for an overview of these groups see Mesquita 2016). The ruling party Nur Otan is increasingly important in institutionalising and formalising support for the president. In merging pro-presidential parties, represented by the

\(^{132}\text{The two parties were the Agrarian party and the Civic Party.}\)

\(^{133}\text{Aliyev was accused of ordering the murder of Altynbek Sarsenbayev and his two bodyguards in 2006. Sarsenbayev was part of the Naryg Ak Zhol party. The murder investigation was assisted by the FBI. Several KNB officials were found guilty of the crime.}\)

\(^{134}\text{There is much speculation as to the cause of death (Lillis 2019, 38).}\)
factions some of the power of those networks has been dissipated (Isaacs 2013). The trouble ahead for Kazakhstan is that Tokayev assuming the presidency in March 2019 is only a temporary solution to Kazakhstan’s problem of succession. In his resignation speech, Nazarbayev spoke of “the world changing, a new generation comes”, indicating that Tokayev, who is 65-years-old, will not remain president for long. At 78, Nazarbayev cannot remain behind the scenes indefinitely. With frequent reshuffles within the government, no individual stands out as Nazarbayev’s right hand man/woman, leaving observers wondering who will be next in line. Some candidates stand out, including Nazarbayev’s daughter Dariga, head of the secret service Karim Massimov, ambassador to Russia Imangali Tasmagambetov, and the president’s son in law Timur Kulibayev. Regardless of the outcome, Nazarbayev will be careful to select a candidate, who will protect the interests and assets of his family and the inner circle, while protecting the stability of the system.

Tanzania has also experienced trouble with succession. The nomination of Mkapa in 1995, Kikwete in 2005 and Magufuli in 2015 were all fraught with fierce competition within CCM. When Mkapa stepped down ahead of the 2005 elections, he did not attempt to extend his term135. Power struggles within the party preceded the nomination of the party’s presidential candidate. Although Jakaya Kikwete won the 2005 nomination with a large majority, it was clear that the party was not united. There were two camps. On one side were individuals who wanted to downplay the importance of CCM and continue the path of privatisation and increased influence of business in politics. This side favoured a candidate drawn from the ranks of the business community rather than someone from the party old guard. The other side favoured a CCM politician with experience, who was well entrenched in the clientelist network. Kikwete has had a long career, first in TANU in the 1970s and then in CCM, serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs for ten years under Mkapa. Aside from his connections within the party, Kikwete was well connected with the business elites. As Whitehead (2012: 1103) writes:

[…] President Kikwete’s commercial ties helped to finance an enormous personal feedback network that touched upon nearly every section of society and offered remuneration in exchange for information about campaign assets and the candidate’s vulnerabilities.

135 When leaving office, state owned Kiwira Coal Mine was sold to Mkapa and his Minister of Energy and Minerals Daniel Yona for a fraction of its value, indicating personal involvement in corruption (Lusekelo, 2009).
One of the common denominators in the interviews with politicians was that the influence of businessmen on politics had increased significantly (Willibrod Slaa, Suleiman Kumchaya, Michael Lekule, Hamad Masoud Hamad, Ali Mzee, John Mnyika). It was also clear that business elites primarily chose to support CCM politicians, rather than members of the opposition. One of the interviewees Willibrod Slaa of CHADEMA said:

For them [business people], it is an obvious choice. It is CCM that has the power. In most places, there is no reason for business people to support CHADEMA. […] For that reason, corruption is a big problem in CCM.

In the 2005 election campaign, Kikwete relied heavily on the support of two wealthy CCM politicians and businessmen, Rostam Aziz and Edward Lowassa. Aziz served in parliament from 1993 to 2011, when he stepped down. He is Tanzania’s wealthiest individuals and owns a large share in the country’s largest mobile phone provider as well as holding assets in mining and other industries. Lowassa is also wealthy, although it is not clear from where that wealth has been garnered. He went on to serve as Prime Minister under Kikwete. Both Aziz and Lowassa were later implicated in the Richmond corruption scandal, which forced Lowassa to resign from office. During 2006, there were severe power shortages in Tanzania. An American company, Richmond Development, was awarded a contract to supply emergency generators and they failed to deliver. Despite this, the company received payments as long as the contract to supply electricity lasted. According to a number of interviewees, the company paid kickbacks to several CCM politicians.

In another scandal in 2005 and 2006, 131 million USD was lost from the External Payment Arrears (EPA) account of the Bank of Tanzania (BoT). The EPA account was set up to facilitate payments between local importers and international service providers. During the 1980s and 90s, the account incurred a large amount of debt. The debt was reduced significantly through a debt buy-back scheme. Using one of the technicalities of the scheme, whereby creditors could endorse repayment to third parties, illegal payments were made to 22 Tanzanian companies (Cooksey and Kelsall, 2011: 27). In the wake of the scandal, the head of the BoT Daudi Balali was sacked. Although no politician has been charged with involvement, it is widely believed that funds were funnelled through one of the 22 companies, Deep Green, to fund the election campaigns of key CCM politicians.

[136 No charges were brought.]
Because of the exposure of several grand corruption scandals during Kikwete’s first term in office, raising funds for the 2010 elections became more difficult. That is not to say that corruption has been eradicated. In March 2014 “the Citizen” newspaper broke another major corruption scandal in the energy sector. An energy company had been in conflict with the state-owned power company TANESCO over another power generator. Funds had been deposited in an escrow account held by the Bank of Tanzania. The account was to be untouched until the conflict was resolved. In 2013, 122 million USD was withdrawn from the account, as IPTL shares were bought by PAP.

There is also some evidence to suggest that organised crime became a source of income for some CCM elites during this time. Since 2009, there has been a surge in the ivory trade, reducing the number of elephants in the country from 142,000 in 2005, when Kikwete took office to about 55,000 in 2015 (Environmental Investigation Agency, 2014: 9), making Tanzania the largest supplier of illegal ivory in the world. According to media sources, a list of 50 senior politicians, officials and business people involved in the trade was compiled by the intelligence service and handed over to Kikwete in 2012 (Fletcher, 2014). The individuals on the list have not been named publicly, nor have any charges been brought.

These scandals during Kikwete’s time in office indicate that corruption from state-owned enterprises, tenders and organised crime indicate that most resources used for clientelism came from these sources. A journalist interviewed in January 2019137 stated that:

At that time, the group of people involved in these things was just too big for them to keep it quiet, so of course there were leaks to the media. Almost no one was named! I think it’s clear, either Kikwete himself was deeply involved, or exposing everyone and arresting… that would mean the end for the party.

Ahead of the 2010 elections, the rift within CCM was growing and corruption scandals was being exposed in local media. Lowassa and Aziz remained in parliament despite clear evidence of involvement in the Richmond scandal. To add to the troubles, former president Mkapa’s involvement in the privatisation of the Kiwira coal mine had yet to be resolved. CCM and Kikwete thus faced the problem of dwindling popularity, a party where several strong factions competing for power were developing, and trouble raising the necessary resources for the elections. There were vivid rumours that the faction headed by the speaker of parliament Samuel Sitta would defect and form a new party (interviews). Edward

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137 I have chosen to anonymise this interview because of the current repressive climate in Tanzania. The interviewee did not make this choice.
Lowassa was arguably the leader of a faction, where several MPs had been accused of corruption. Sitta represented another faction, which allegedly attempted to change these practices and put an end to impunity.

The fate of Edward Lowassa clearly illustrates that government reshuffles and alleged corruption do not spell the end of a political career in Tanzania. Although he was sacked as Minister of Finance in 2008 over the Richmond scandal, he sought CCM’s nomination for president in the 2015 elections, and a fierce power struggle within the party ensued involving the same factions within the party as in the run up to the 2010 elections.

Kikwete supported Minister of Works John Magufuli, a relative unknown. Despite his popularity and wealth, Lowassa lost the party nomination, sparking a very public debate on the rift in CCM, which played out in the Tanzanian media. According to Morse (2019: 153), the nomination of Magufuli illustrated that CCM would be victorious, and that the party still mattered more than personalities for electoral success. Lowassa defected from CCM and ran for president for the opposition party CHADEMA. Although Magufuli defeated Lowassa in the presidential elections in 2015, the margin was slim, with 58.5 % for CCM and 40 % for CHADEMA. Several CCM politicians from Lowassa’s Arusha region defected to CHADEMA ahead of the elections (Morse 2019: 154). Wilbroad Slaa, the former party leader of CHADEMA had previously presented a list of shame, naming the most corrupt politicians within the government, with Lowassa at the top of the list. He left the party when Lowassa was nominated, stating that: “What has happened in my party is retrogressive, and since I do not agree with the move they have made, I have left Chadema and quit politics generally.” (Katundu, 2018: 81).

In elections prior to 2010, the nomination process within the CCM had been relatively hidden from the public view. Candidates with substantial wealth had been nominated, as they are able to provide financial resources for their own election campaign as well as contribute to the party. Several MPs, both from CCM and other parties agreed in interviews that was possible for wealthy individuals to “buy” a CCM nomination for the parliamentary elections in 1995, 2000 and 2005 (Willibrod Slaa, Michael Lekule, Mohamed Rished Abdallah, anonymous CCM). According to Babeiya (2011), the nomination process ahead of the 2010 elections was different. For the first time CCM allowed the PCCB some access to the internal processes within the party. Several individuals vying for a nomination were accused of corruption and were not selected. A Skype interview with a CCM politician in 2012, who wished to remain unnamed, said that the move did not have the desired effect:
In 2010, there is no doubt many, many people bought their nominations. I would say … I don’t know… maybe half… haha. The difference is, it was not as open. And there was for the first time a risk that they [authors’ note: PCCB] would catch you. […] Did it make a difference? Not for the bigwig, they are friends with the PCCB, but it was difficult for complete outsiders to pay their way into politics. But I’m not sure it even reduced.

The number of incumbent CCM MP’s, who defected ahead of the 2015 elections was somewhat limited, as CHADEMA had already nominated its candidates by the time Lowassa joined their ranks. This made it impossible for defecting CCM MP’s to run for parliament under the CHADEMA banner in 2015 (Tsubura 2018: 74). In practice, that meant that Lowassa’s faction in CCM choose to stay in the party, despite calling on their constituents to vote for CHADEMA and Lowassa in the presidential race.

Several analysts theorized that CCM would gradually lose its dominant position, since opposition parties are gaining more seats and influence in parliament. During 2017 and 2018, the trend of defections from CCM to the opposition has been reversed, with more than 70 councillors and MPs leaving opposition parties for CCM as of September 2018 (Taylor, 2018). A number of these individuals are returning to CCM, while others are joining the party for the first time. The modus so far has been that by-elections are held, without a nomination process within CCM, in almost all cases resulting in the politician retaining their seat but representing CCM. There are several possible reasons for this flow of elected officials from the opposition to CCM. Harassment of the opposition has increased during Magufuli’s time in office, with bans in place of public rallies, several politicians have been arrested and several individuals in opposition have been murdered. This of course increases the risk of being in opposition in Tanzania. There are also serious allegations that politicians are being bribed into joining CCM. A Chadema MP, Joshua Nassari, claimed to have evidence that politicians in the Arusha area were being offered bribes to join CCM (Mashalla and Ubwani, 2017). In October 2017, Nassari handed over secretly recorded video clips of these exchanges to the Tanzanian corruption bureau PCC, stating that, “We have evidence that they were bribed with cash, promises of bank loans, permanent jobs and sitting and other allowances over the next five years” (Ubwani, 2017).

The actions of Magufuli and CCM indicates that clientelistic strategies are being used to repair the rift within the party that resulted in the defection of Lowassa. During Kikwete’s time in office, accusations of corruption, power struggles within the elite and slander of political leaders have played out in local
media. Magufuli made a name for himself early on as an “anti-corruption” president, bringing charges against some low- and mid-ranking officials. One of the few high-ranking politicians to be accused, Minister of Minerals and Energy Sospeter Muhongo was forced to resign over a corruption scandal. Following the pattern of previous presidents, no charges were brought. Muhongo now holds a senior position in the ministry (Kabendera and Anderson 2014).

The actions taken by the Magufuli government shows that clientelistic practices are being used, and that there is an ambition to extend rather than reduce the broad clientelistic network. As discussed, repressive measures are being used to a much greater extent in Tanzania under Magufuli, indicating that both repressive and clientelistic practices are being used to retain stability. At the same time, Magufuli has created a smaller group of people, in a more hierarchical structure within CCM. The National Executive Council (NEC) had 388 members before 2015, and 158 today (Andreoni, 2017), many of them appointed by the president. The inner circle around the president has become smaller, while resources are provided in exchange for support to a broader cadre.

Aside from the grand corruption scandals, employment in the civil service is often not based on merit, but on family or other ties (interviews with John Mrema, Samuel Lazaro Nyalandu, Amon Cheliga, Ismail Jussa and Abdul Sheriff). Willibrod Slaa, party leader of the Chadema party insists that corruption is widespread:

> The majority of those who become MPs they do so to protect their interests because you have immunity when you are an MP. You have access to all levels of decision makers. You can import things without paying the taxes and things like that. I think most people here are in that category (Willibrod Slaa 2010).

There are thus indications that resources for intra elite-clientelism originate from state resources, as well as private enterprise. New developments in the ivory trade show that organised crime is becoming a source of revenue.

Changes in leadership set the Tanzanian political context apart from Kazakhstan, where Nazarbayev left office after more than three decades in power in 2019. Although the CCM party still dominates the political space in Tanzania, there are several factions of significance within the party. The 2015 elections show that mass defection from CCM may come in a not so distant future. There strong

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138 The Tegeta Escrow Scandal involved Tanesco and Independent Power Tanzania Ltd. Approximately 183M USD from an escrow account were transferred to offshore bank accounts held by businessmen and government officials.

139 So far, no president has served more than the stipulated two terms in office.

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challenges to party dominance. As stated earlier, there are groups within the elite in Kazakhstan as well. The main difference is that Nazarbayev could control and negotiate relationships between groups and individuals because of the hierarchical make-up, networks of elites compete between each other for the good grace of the president, but do not compete for the top spot. Nazarbayev still has the title “Father of the nation” see for example (Del Sordi, 2012; Isaacs, 2010c; Ó Beacháin and Kevlihan, 2014), which means he can continue to influence legislation indefinitely. Nazarbayev has had the power to exclude individuals from power entirely, and it is yet unclear how Tokayev’s ascent to power will change this. In Tanzania, no actor or group of actors has far-reaching power like Nazarbayev, which would allow for exclusion from the political elite of powerful and wealthy actors.

Mass-Elite Clientelism

Regarding mass-elite clientelism, there are several similarities between elections in Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev and during the Soviet years. During the 2011 presidential election, it was clear that material incentives were used to draw voters to the polling stations. In most polling stations visited in Astana, voters had access to a buffet serving inexpensive food. Festive music was played in many places and at some, election officials had organised lotteries, where first time voters could win household appliances such as hair dryers and sandwich grills. An election official explained that they wanted to “encourage the youth to support our president and our country”. The buffet, festive mood and lottery created an incentive to vote, however there is no evidence to suggest that they were exclusively targeted at Nazarbayev’s supporters. This strategy can be understood as a form of what Nitcher (2008) labels turnout buying, which targets supporters who otherwise would not have voted. Schatz (2009) notes that university students were paid in the run up to the 2005 elections to attend pro-Nazarbayev rallies and convince their peers to vote. Similarly, in 2010, I was made aware by students at the Kazakh National Agrarian University that they were being paid by party officials to collect signatures for a petition to hold a referendum to prolong Nazarbayev’s term in office without holding regular presidential elections.

140 I served as an observer for OSCE/ODIHR during election day.
141 Winners were drawn from first time voters as they were crossed off the voter list. The individuals did not choose take part.
142 The view that most political parties in Kazakhstan are not opposed to the president is reinforced by the actions taken by a number of them in January 2011, when it was announced that Kazakhstan was to hold a referendum in so that the president could stay in power until
There is evidence to suggest that government spending increases in Kazakhstan during presidential election years in order to secure popular support. Kendall-Taylor (2012) for example found a marked increase in fiscal deficit in Kazakhstan prior to the 2005 presidential elections. She also exemplifies the nature of the increased public spending:

[P]rior to the 2005 election, the state-owned railway company dispatched medical trains to provide health services to towns in several of the country’s remote rural regions. As part of the service, representatives from the president’s party, Otan, were allowed to occupy several of the train’s railway cars (ibid: 750).

Wright (2011) also finds an increase in government spending during the 2011 presidential elections. This indicates that mass-elite clientelism is based on the state providing goods in exchange for support, rather than relying on the networks of individual politicians. The increase in government spending suggests that mainly state resources are used for mass-elite clientelism.

Most literature on clientelism in Kazakhstan focuses on intra-elite rather than mass-elite relationships, see for example (Cummings, 2005; Del Sordi, 2012; Hug, 2010; Isaacs, 2010a; Isaacs, 2013; Junisbai, 2010; Mesquita 2016; Murphy, 2006; Ostrowski, 2010; Peyrouse, 2012). There is good reason for this. In Tanzania, Kenya and Kyrgyzstan personal relationships between members of the political elite and the electorate are intrinsic to the system. I have found little evidence to support that view that Kazakhstan shares these features. Nur Otan party candidates for the parliament do not always take an active part in election campaign (interview with Aidos Sarym 2011, Aigul Solovyeva 2011). There may be several reasons for this. OSCE/ODIHR speculates that the subdued campaign environment was due to: “Limited political competition coupled with a truncated choice among political alternatives.” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2012: 2). Another possible reason for the lack of campaign activities may be that deputies in both chambers are relatively powerless. Brill Olcott (2010: 112) insists that the Mazilis is a largely “consultative body”, while real power lies with the presidential administration (see 2020 without holding elections. Most political parties joined the congress of political parties in support of this initiative.

For reasons that are difficult to speculate on, the referendum was called off and snap presidential elections were called. With only two months to go before the elections, most of the serious opposition opted to not take part in the elections at all.

143 Wright (2011) finds that 50 % more was spent on “election personnel” in 2011 compared to 2005, suggesting that Nazarbayev boosted spending in order to counter possible instability inspired by the Arab spring.

144 Mass-elite clientelism takes different forms in the cases discussed.
also Del Sordi, 2012; Isaacs, 2010b). It should also be noted that Kazakhstan has a proportional representation rather than a first-past-the-post system, which is viewed as less conducive to clientelism, as the relationship between individual MPs and the electorate is weaker (see for example Kitschelt, 2001: 317).

The candidates are selected by Nur Otan, and some interviewees suggest directly be Nazarbayev. The lack of powerful individuals in parliament is illustrated by the Nur Otan party list ahead of the 2016 early parliamentary elections, where 60% of the candidates were new to parliament. Nazarbayev said at the 2016 party congress:

> From the party list, the provisional make-up of candidates to the Mazhilis has changed by 60 percent, and that is right. There are various reasons for this. Some have reached pension age, and there is a desire to bring in younger deputies and include those that are needed at this time (Eurasianet, 2017)

This massive change in the makeup of parliamentarians caused no protest or debate in Kazakhstan, indicating that the mazhilis has little political importance.

There is consensus that Akims are much more important players than MPs in the Kazakhstani political context (Isaacs, 2013). President Nazarbayev directly appoints the Akims. There is much dispute on the ability of Akims to build personal mass-elite clientelistic networks. Ostrowski (2010: 52) contends that the position of Akim is widely seen as an opportunity for self-enrichment, as it provides access to spoils from the oil, gas and mining industries. The role of the Akim is to distribute resources, positions and other privileges to those loyal to Nazarbayev on the regional level (Isaacs, 2013).

Since independence, most regions have had Akims, who have stayed in office for relatively short tenures (Junisbai, 2010; Schatz, 2004:104; Siegel 2018). According to Ostrowski (2010), there is a deliberate strategy to avoid mass-elite clientelism, as this may threaten the stability of the regime. The role of the Akim is facilitate intra-elite relationships, not to build a support base with the electorate. Isaacs (2013: 1065) exemplifies this with a case where a local Akim extorted money from local farmers for the right to lease land, which was then paid directly into the coffers of the Nur Otan party. Nazarbayev has avoided appointing local big-men, favouring instead loyalists, regardless of their ethnic, clan or regional background (Cummings, 2005:100). For these reasons, Akims have thus far been

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145 Regional governors

146 The process of appointing Akims changed in 2013 when a form of elections were held. Akims were selected by the mazhilikat, a local elected body. However, in the larger cities Akims are still appointed directly by Nazarbayev.
unable to build popular support through mass-elite clientelism. The modus operandi of rotating Akims is mirrored throughout the public administration and state-owned companies. An anonymous interviewee in the oil trade in Astana said:

Here, foreigners, they think too much of people changing positions here. There always rumours when someone moves from KazMunayGas to Samruk – Kazyna. Sometimes, there is no falling out, it is just dangerous for him [Nazarbayev] to keep people in the same place and they get too many friends and are too comfortable.

This may also explain frequent reshuffles in both houses of parliament, the government, the foreign services, and enterprises. Individuals moving from one position to another rarely has meaning, beyond preventing the formation of elite networks that may challenge leadership, or mass support. A notable exception to this rule is Kazakhstan’s current interim president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who has served as Chairman of the Senate for six years (2013-2019). This indicates that he is one of the people closest to Nazarbayev and can be expected to follow in his path as president.

There is no doubt that Nazarbayev and the presidential administration had devised a rather intricate strategy to avoid the rise of local and other elites into local big men with their own mass support base. However, this presents a dilemma, as it is difficult for leaders to stay in power without some mass support (as argued by Magaloni, 2006). Mass-elite clientelism is thus not unimportant, especially in the view that it often helps build legitimacy for the regime. In Kazakhstan, this form of clientelism bypasses a set of middlemen, and forges a direct relationship between mass actors and the president, party and state. A journalist with the newspaper Kazakhstan Pravda, Yanovna Yevgeniya (2011) said in an interview that:

To some extent, maybe the Akim, they will rely on him. But… really… no the support is not really based on that. […] In elections, it is Nazarbayev that they

\footnote{147 State-owned oil and gas company.}
\footnote{148 Sovereign wealth fund, which owns many state services as well as a number of companies in the oil and gas sector including KazMunayGas. It is likely that the interviewee is referring to the president’s son-in-law Timur Kulibayev, who is a potential heir to the presidency and one of Kazakhstan’s wealthiest individuals.}
\footnote{149 In Kyrgyzstan local leaders and MPs and in Tanzania and Kenya MPs.
support, because he is the one who builds the nation. [...] No, here support is not because of personal relationships, not with ordinary people.152

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This verifies that there are few individuals who have been successful in building relationships to voters, which could potentially present a challenge. Even after Nazarbayev stepped down, it is likely that his influence will be substantial from behind the scenes, since Tokayev is a loyalist and he will remain some important positions. In June 2018, Tokayev told BBC Hardtalk that Nazarbayev was unlikely to run for office in the 2020 elections, but would retain immense influence (BBC, 2018). It is probable that resources ahead of elections will continue to be distributed through the state, in the form of increased spending ahead of elections and at polling stations on election day in order to increase turnout. The

After the introduction of multi-party rule, mass-elite clientelism in Tanzania is based on personal ties between politicians and voters. MPs are expected to support their communities financially. According to Tsubura (2014) the MP visits their constituencies and provides support for individuals and groups during the entire term. Secondly, special provisions are used during election time. The practice of Takrima, of providing tangible goods in order to gain support was outlawed in 2006. However, there is little evidence to suggest that voters’ expectations during election time or politician’s willingness to provide has diminished during the 2010 general elections (ibid 120f). A CCM MP said in an interview:

In my constituency, I am expected to solve everyone’s problems. When I am there, people come if they are sick, if they need money for school, well, anything really. We are trying to formalise, to set up funds and have projects. But it doesn’t change the fact that people need assistance in their lives in the here and now.

Tsubura (2018) argues that the funds for support to constituencies often come from the private pockets of the MPs themselves. The wages and allowances

150 Schatz (2004), claims that politics as well as access to goods and services in Kazakhstan is based on lineage and Clan (Zhus) to a large extent. Although this may be true in some settings, my data contradicts this as many politicians, scholars and others interviewed for this study maintain that intra-elite clientelism is essential for upholding support for Nazarbayev, while ordinary people do not rely on elite connections.
provided by the state are often used to cover at least some of the costs involved in upholding support from communities. However, the means provided through serving in parliament are rarely enough to secure support. This necessitates large private fortunes, good relationships with the business elites or access to resources from other sources.

There is a public expectation of goods being distributed during election time and that loyal constituencies should receive benefits. Until 2006, it was legal and expected that political candidates distribute goods prior to elections. The practice, Takrima, entailed small gifts to people who visited campaign events and villages visited by candidates (Ewald, 2011:165. Croke (2017) finds that there has been an increase in distribution of clientelistic goods to voters, rather than a reduction. This indicates that the Takrima ban has had very little effect in practice.

There is also a reverse practice, namely, to pay groups of voters who are unlikely to support CCM to stay home and not vote, a form of turnout buying. My investigation shows that party members and party official are engaged in this practice in some cases. An anonymous journalist in Dodoma verifies this:

I was in Kondoa a few days before the last elections, I know some people there. There was Takrima at the rally, but also officials were going to houses of people who support CHADEMA asking them to stay at home […]. I think in Kondoa, they were successful.

In a skype interview in 2011 with a CCM candidate who lost his seat to a CHADEMA candidate, it was clear that the practice of paying people assumed to support the opposition to stay home was common practice:

In my constituency we decided not to do it [pay CHADEMA supporters to stay home]. I know, some people were discussing, because you know, when you spend money for the people who come to the rally…. They are the one who are your supporters. I think, for many it is nice to get a small gift, a T-shirt maybe, but they will vote for you anyway.

Takrima is a mass-elite clientelist strategy, designed to win support. In the 2010 and 2015 elections, and in previous elections, there seems to be a pattern of paying

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151 Takrima loosely translates to hospitality
152 He is referring to the 2005 elections.
153 Takrima refers to small gifts given to supporters prior to elections. The practice was legal in Tanzania until 2006 when it was outlawed.
for voter registration cards of presumed opposition supporters, thus preventing them from voting (TEMCO 2011). Simpser (2008: 22) argues that the practice of vote-buying may discourage potential opposition voters from voting, as the incumbent seems willing to win at all costs, thus decreasing turnout rates. This finding suggests that vote buying and turnout buying may affect electoral outcomes as it adds to political disillusionment and a feeling of futility on the part of the electorate. This may be the case, even if the reported instances turnout buying are few. In Tanzania, the CCM party seems to be the agent behind turnout buying, in the sense that party officials, not private agents or the state are engaged in the practice.

**Repression**

Kazakhstan and Tanzania share common features regarding elections and the political climate in general. Elections are generally peaceful affairs in both states, though violence and repression has increased in recent years in both states. For example, at least 17 people were killed in Zhanaozen in western Kazakhstan during a protest. In Tanzania, political violence is uncommon, yet the 2005 elections on Zanzibar were marred with political violence. The relative peacefulness of Tanzania and Kazakhstan sets them apart from Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, where political protest and violence are common occurrences.

Peaceful does not however entail without repression. There is a significant difference between Tanzania and Kazakhstan in this regard. In 2014 Freedom House gave Tanzania a political rights score of 3 and civil liberties 3. That places Tanzania firmly in the ‘partly free’ category. Kazakhstan on the other hand scores PL 6 and CL 5, which is not free. In the most recent report, 2018, from Freedom house Tanzania received a downward trend of PL 4, CL 4 due to repression of the opposition, social media users and the media (Freedomhouse, 2018) These differences aside, it is important to understand how repression contributed to upholding the regimes in the two states. As we have seen in Kyrgyzstan and Kenya, other actors besides the state may have the power to rig elections or intimidate voters and challengers by perpetrating violence. In order to understand how the two dominant party regimes are upheld, both levels of repression are of interest, and how repression has changed over time. It is also essential to understand who the actors are, and what tools are used. In Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, repression is often privatised. Criminal elements or other groups are tasked with intimidating voters and pacifying opposition.

Most scholars agree that the levels of repression in Tanzania were lower than in many other sub-Saharan states prior to the 2015 general elections. The notable
exception to this is the situation on Zanzibar. Whitehead (2012: 1087) for example wrote in 2012 that:

[…] overt repression appears to be less central to the CCM’s patterns of incumbency maintenance when compared with nearly every other sub-Saharan transition case with continued party dominance.

My interview data suggests that opposition candidates faced some overt repression and threats, even under Kikwete and Mkapa’s time in office. Ahead of the 2005 elections, many CHADEMA candidates were harassed by the police when attempting to hold political rallies. There were also allegations of electoral fraud (Mrema 2010, Tumbo 2010). John Mnyika ran for parliament on a CHADEMA ticket in the 2005 elections. He was a candidate in the urban Dar-es-Salaam constituency Ubungo. He stated that:

In 2005, there is no doubt that things were not right here. We can prove there was fraud there, the number of voters did not match up. For them Ubungo is important because it is here in Dar-es-Salaam (2010).

John Mnyika was elected into parliament in 2010, although the CCM candidate challenged the result in court. There are some high-profile cases of political intimidation and repression since the introduction of multi-party rule. For example, Augustine Mrema, the leader of the TLP party was arrested for allegedly insulting President Mkapa’s wife in 1999 (interview Mrema). In another incident, CUF leader Seif Hamad Sharif was arrested in 2001 for holding an illegal political meeting (interview Seif Hamad Sharif).

Prior to the 2015 elections, political murder was not a strategy of repression on mainland Tanzania, nor did political actors enlist the help of criminal elements or other groups to intimidate voters154. The method of repression tended to be state centred, using the police or the judiciary. The CCM had for many years had a

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154 A possible exception to this rule is an attack on a CHADEMA rally in Arusha in June 2013. A bomb or grenade was lobbed into the crowd, killing four people. According to the Daily News newspaper, the persons accused of the blast were the culprits behind a series of attacks in the Arusha region. Earlier in 2013, a bar was bombed, while the revelers were watching a Premier League match on a big screen. Fifteen people were injured. In another incident, a bomb went off as a newly built Catholic church was holding its first ever mass. Two people were killed. A series of other attacks have also taken place. The investigation has thus far shown that the same persons seem to be involved in these events, which have targeted large gatherings of people in the Arusha region. This suggests that the attack on the CHADEMA rally may be an act of domestic terrorism, rather than an attempt by CCM or the state to intimidate members of the party specifically.
militia, the Mgambo\textsuperscript{155}, which has mainly been used to ensure security at party events. They are known to work closely with police in a number of instances (Kweka, 2015). Faced with increasing opposition, Mgambo has been used to repress the opposition. In 2014, CCM party militia abducted a CHADEMA MP, Rose Kamili close to a polling station in the Iringa region. She was attending a party meeting ahead of by-elections in the constituency. Kamili was forced into a car, driven to the CCM party office, where she was beaten, sexually harassed, and tortured (Lugongo, 2015). There are also examples of other instances, where Mgambo and the Green Guard\textsuperscript{156} have been used to harass the opposition. The significance of this is that state actors such as the police and judiciary are not the sole agents of repression in Tanzania. Other actors are becoming agents as well.

There were a number of examples of intimidation of the media under Kikwete. One Dar-es-Salaam journalist, who decline to be named said that:

> Here, it is possible to be critical of almost anyone in the government. You can see, BAE was exposed… and many other corruptions. We can be critical. And we are. But there are certain limits. I don’t know if I would have a job if I exposed the president (laughs). You know, the ministers are OK, but not the top.

Although repression against the media and opposition candidates under Kikwete was most often executed through the police and judiciary, the same cannot be said about intimidation of voters. An illustrative example is the events, which took place during the Igunga by-election in 2011 in the Tabora region. The election was set to be close, as the CHADEMA candidate Joseph Mwandu Kashindye enjoyed significant popular support. A by-election was necessary as the CCM MP Rostam Aziz stepped down from politics and left the CCM party in 2011 after serving 14 years in parliament. In the end, the CCM candidate Dalaly Kafumu won the election with only 50.5\% of the vote. During the campaign, the Minister for Works (CCM) threatened to withdraw funding for a new bridge in the constituency if they elected CHADEMA. In another incident, a local CCM legislator waved a pistol in the air, while threatening the audience not to vote for Kashindye. The same man also falsely claimed that Kashindye had withdrawn from the race, to prevent voters from casting their votes in his favour. Other local power-holders also threatened people not to vote for CHADEMA. The head of a

\textsuperscript{155} According to an interviewee, the civilian CCM militia is trained by the military, police and by local party officials.

\textsuperscript{156} Another CCM militia, initially formed because of perceptions that Mgambo is too closely linked to the security forces.
local mosque for example said that no Muslims vote CHADEMA (Daily News, 2012). In a Skype interview in 2012 with a CHADEMA politician who took part in the campaign; it became apparent that state resources were used to intimidate voters. She said:

During our rallies, the police would drive past again and again, sirens blaring. They didn’t stop, because there was no incident. […] They were making a lot of noise, so that people would think there was something violent going on. […] People were scared, they didn’t come out for the rally… and they didn’t come to vote. To me, it was clear that they were trying to alarm everyone.

Several CHADEMA politicians interviewed suggest that the voters were too afraid to go to the polling stations in the Igunga by-elections, only about one third turned out to vote. The results were challenged in court by CHADEMA. The Tabora region High Court unseated Kafumu in 2012 on the grounds that the elections were neither free nor fair. Kafumu was later reinstated after the case reached the court of Appeals in Dar-es-Salaam (Kakwesi, Nyanje and Mugarula, 2013)

Both state and private repression existed in Tanzania before 2015, when Magufuli was elected, but there has been an escalation in recent years, both in the level of repression and the methods used. Shortly after the elections, a CHADEMA parliamentary candidate, who lost the election\textsuperscript{157} was beaten to death by unknown assailants (Matowo and Ubwani, 2016). In September 2017 a CHADEMA MP, Tundu Lissu, was shot 30 times in Dodoma. Lissu survived the assassination attempt but has not returned to parliament for health reasons. Lissu was elected in 2010 and had been a critical voice in parliament of both Kikwete’s and Magufuli’s governments. A month prior to the shooting, Lissu was arrested by the police, but released on bail, facing sedition charges. No one has been charged with the attack on Lissu. Other CHADEMA politicians have been murdered, including Godfrey Luena, a councillor in Morogoro and Daniel John a campaigner in Dar-es-Salaam, both killed in 2017. A witness to the killing of John said that the assailants asked why he was campaigning for CHADEMA during by-elections that were underway. These murders are a form of intimidation of the opposition, and clearly privatisation of repression.

There are also many examples where journalists have been the victims of violent crimes by unknown assailants. Azory Gwanda, a journalist with Mwananchi

\textsuperscript{157} Alphonce Mawazo competed for the Busanda constituency seat, but was defeated by incumbent CCM politician Lolesia Bukwimba.
newspaper disappeared in November 2017 and has not been seen or heard from since. Gwanda was reporting on a string of murders of local officials and police officers in his community of Kibiti (All East Africa, 2017). Another journalist, Ansbert Ngurumo got wind that there was a plan to murder him because of his critical reporting of the Magufuli presidency. He narrowly escaped and is now in exile (Ngurumo, 2018) Speaking to a Dar-es-Salaam based journalist in January 2019, it became clear that the journalistic community fear reprisals if they report on the Magufuli government:

There are only a few brave ones who are reporting [on Magufuli]. The new laws make it hard, there could be fines or even prison. But for me, I am more afraid of to disappear. [...] In custody, there is at least a chance that others will protest, that CPJ\textsuperscript{158} will notice, you will maybe get out.

Privatised repression has increased in Tanzania, so too has repression by state actors. During Magufuli’s time in office several laws have been passed that quell political debate and threaten human rights. In 2016, Magufuli declare that all political rallies are banned until 2020 (Mtulya, 2016). In 2015, a Cyber Crimes act was passed, that, aside from criminalising dissemination of child pornography also includes a clause about the “publication of false, deceptive, misleading or inaccurate information” (The Cyber Crimes Act, 2015). The law has been used to a to target online discussion forums, blogs and other content. A number of individuals have been arrested and convicted under the Cyber Crimes Act. One case involves Jamii Forum, Tanzania’s largest online discussion forum. In July 2016, founder Maxence Melo was arrested, after discussions about government corruptions had taken place on the forum. A court tried to force Melo to hand over data, which would reveal the identities of the individuals involved in the discussion. Jamii Forum, as well as, online news sites and blogs have periodically been shut down. There have been a large number of arrests of journalists and bloggers (McLellan, 2018). Tanzanian authorities have also arrested and harassed several members of human rights groups, including two employees of CPJ, who were in Tanzania to report on working conditions for journalists under the current government. The two were held in custody, interrogated and had their electronic devices confiscated (Quintal, 2018).

Another new law requires bloggers, podcasters and others who publish content on-line to apply for a licence and pay licencing fees as well as annual fees. The Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations 2018

\textsuperscript{158} Committee to Protect Journalists
requires bloggers to pay a fee of 900 USD annually, a number that comes in just shy of the GDP/capita of 936 USD (Mumbere, 2018).

At the same time, harassment and arrests of opposition leaders continuous. In 2018, eight CHADEMA politicians, including the party leader Freeman Mbowe, were arrested on charges of holding an illegal rally. The rally, which took place in Kinondoni Dar-es-Salaam were part of a by-election campaign. CHADEMA politicians and supporters held an election rally, despite the ban on public gatherings in place until 2020. Police and CHADEMA supporters clashed, and the police shot warning shots. A passer-by on a local bus was hit by a stray bullet and killed. The CHADEMA politicians on trial are being charged with sedition, incitement against the government, and unlawful assembly. To date, Mbowe remains in prison awaiting trial (The East African, 2019).

These instances show that Tanzania is using privatised repression, as well as the legal system to increase. This combination of strategies can be explained by a decentralised system in Tanzania. According to several interviewees, District Commissioners have received orders to clamp down on the opposition from the president and top CCM officials. The ban on public gatherings, and tighter regulation on press freedom and freedom of expression also give District Commissioners mandate to order the arrest of those deemed oppositional. According to several interviewees, the signals from the top do not include details about what methods are to be used to side-line the opposition. There are reports of CCM militias, extra-judicial killings, arrests and sentencing as well as mobs, not connected to the party used for repressive purposes.

In Kazakhstan, the legal system is sometimes used to get rid of potential challengers. There are several examples of individuals who are serving time in prison in Kazakhstan due to challenges against Nazarbayev. Most notable is the sentencing of Vladimir Kozlov, the party leader of the unregistered party Alga! On the 16 of December 2011, police in Zhanaozen in eastern Kazakhstan killed at least 17 people. Those killed were protesting oil workers who had been on strike for several months. Police opened fire on the protesters, and at least 64 were treated in hospital with gunshot wounds (Lillis 2019: 55). Vladimir Kozlov and two other individuals were charged with inciting the oil workers to conduct

159 The individuals arrested are the leadership of CHADEMA: party leader Freeman Mbowe, secretary-general Vincent Mashinji, deputy secretary-general for Zanzibar, Salum Mwalimu; his Mainland counterpart John Mnyika; Tarime Rural MP John Heche; Kawe MP Halima Mdee; MP for Bunda Esther Bulaya and Iringa Urban MP Rev Peter Msigwa.

160 Other opposition politicians arrested include opposition politician Zitto Kabwe who, was arrested for “having claimed that dozens of people were killed in recent clashes between herders and the security forces.” (AFP, 2018)
violent acts. He was subsequently sentenced to 7 years and 6 months in prison in what was internationally condemned as a politicised trial\(^{161}\). A large number of protesters were detained after and during the protests, and many alleged that they had been tortured in police custody. Several claim that police suffocated them by placing a plastic bag over their heads, others were beaten (ibid: 59). When Kozlov received his verdict, he was accused of collaborating with Mukhtar Ablyazov, a wealthy Kazakh businessman and politician who left the country in 2009 due to corruption charge. Kozlov was a presidential candidate in the 2011 election, but was excluded shortly before the elections because a new law was passed, demanding that candidates pass a Kazakh language test (Orange, 2011) a move that Kozlov, who is an ethnic Russian\(^{162}\) saw as a way of side-lining him. In an interview ahead of the election he said: “I can be honest. I had very little hope of winning. But with this, they are saying that no opposition can even compete” (Kozlov 2011).

Voters and the general population are also regularly subjected to harassment by the state. The most obvious recent example of this was the attack on the protests in Zhanaozen, when the police opened fire on striking workers in western Kazakhstan. There are serious legal hurdles to organising rallies or demonstrations in Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan, the local Akim\(^{163}\) needs to give permission for public gatherings. Often, the necessary permission is not obtainable. A common strategy is to only allow gatherings in inaccessible areas outside the city centres (Isaacs, 2010b). Meuret Makhmutova (2010), an Almaty-based political analyst said that:

> For the government, one of the most important things is that we are stable. Even if a demonstration isn’t really a threat to anyone, the fact that they are allowed to happen makes Nazarbayev look weak. The whole idea is for everything to look stable, to the people, to the outside world. That is how we set an example. Even if someone is only expressing a different point of view, it is seen as a problem.

Since the Zhanaozen protests in 2011, there have been protests against proposed land reform, which took place in many cities across the country in May 2016. Police did not open fire against protesters, yet hundreds of people were arrested, and many officers were deployed (Pannier, 2016). A similar pattern was observed in 2018. More than 100 people had gathered in Almaty to protest the current

\(^{161}\) Kozlov was released on parole in 2016.

\(^{162}\) About 25% of the population is ethnic Russian

\(^{163}\) Local governor
government, carrying banners that read “Freedom to political prisoners” and “Stop torture”. A Reuters correspondent at the scene observed as at least fifty people arrested by police (Reuters, 2018).

Human Rights Watch observe that repression has increased in Kazakhstan in recent years. There has been a crackdown on trade unions since the Zhanaozen protests, with a number of union leaders imprisoned. The government has also targeted journalists. There are several cases, where the government has used criminal charges, which have not been verified to convict (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

In terms of harassment and coercion during election time, the Kazakhstani population have strong incentives to vote, due to risks of repercussions if they do not. In a conversation with a student at a state university in Astana about the 2011 presidential elections it was clear that there was little choice:

If I am to receive my examination now, I have to be able to tell my teacher that I voted, and that I have voted for Nazarbayev. Most people take a picture to show of the voting, so then you can prove it. For me, I don’t mind so much. I think otherwise I would have stayed home.

During the election campaign, I was made aware that students are targeted for intimidation during election time. I met the vice chairman of the Almaty branch of Nur Otan, Aleksandr Ivanovich, at the state Academy of Arts in Almaty. The party had taken over several rooms at the school to set up a campaign headquarters and a museum in honour of president Nazarbayev. I asked Ivanovich why the party had access to the rooms and if they were paying rent:

No, they have given it in honour of the president. The museum, the young artists have made it. […]. The students here are very enthusiastic, they are helping in any way they can.

The example of the student who went to vote in order to receive exams and the presence of Nur Otan at the school of arts indicate two things. First, some voters were coerced into voting for Nazarbayev. This view is underlined by statements made by Alikhan Baimenov (2011) party leader of the Ak Zhol party who said that:

One of the reasons that they get so many votes is that people are encouraged to vote by their work. At hospitals, schools, the military, some factories… well there are more, everyone is voting and it is expected that you vote for Nazarbayev.
Secondly, it was clear that Nur Otan has a resource advantage in that they are able to use state resources in the election campaign. Kazakhstan also has a history of reported electoral fraud in every election since independence. None of the elections studied meet OSCE/ODIHR standards. There are serious indications of fraud (ballot stuffing), vote buying and faulty tabulation in all of the elections (OSCE/ODIHR, 1999a, b, 2004, 2005c, 2007b, 2011a, b, 2012, 2015, 2016).

For example, in the 2012 parliamentary election OSCE/ODIHR mention five political parties, which have not been able to take part in the election (OSCE/ODIHR, 2012). Vladimir Kozlov’s Alga! party had attempted to register since 2005 and failed to take part in any elections (interview Vladimir Kozlov 2010). One party was suspended and unable to take part, the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK)\(^{164}\). The alleged reason was that Gaziz Aldamzharov\(^{165}\), party leader of CPK had supported an unregistered political movement the People’s’ Front (PF), which had been branded extremist. Aldamzharov said that the reason for the suspension was that the authorities wanted to oust him as party leader. (Interfax, 2011c). A more likely explanation is that CPK had decided that their party list for the parliamentary election should be selected by the People’s’ Front, which was a coalition of a number of organisations supporting the striking workers in Zhanaozen. Among the member organisations in PF was Alga! fronted by Vladimir Kozlov (Interfax, 2011a). Because of this arrangement, it is likely that Kozlov would have been one of the names on the CPK list for the parliamentary elections. In this way, the actions of CPK is an attempt to circumvent the decision not to allow Alga! to register as a political party.

The early presidential elections held in 2015, and early parliamentary elections held in 2016 follow the same patterns as those held in 2011 and 2012, where the opposition was side-lined ahead of the elections and instances of electoral fraud, especially in the tabulation process (OSCE/ODIHR 2015, 2016).

Unlike in Kazakhstan and on mainland Tanzania, elections on Zanzibar are fiercely competitive. An opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF) has strong support. Zanzibar has its own legislative assembly and elects a president. Voters elect representatives to the union parliament as well as cast their votes for the national presidency. CCM has arrived victorious in all elections, winning a majority in the Zanzibari parliament and retaining the presidency, though the margin of victory has been slim. Killian (Killian, 2008) argues that political violence on Zanzibar is derailing democracy.

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\(^{164}\) There are two communist parties in Kazakhstan. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan is an opposition party, while the Communist Peoples’ Party of Kazakhstan largely supports Nazarbayev.

\(^{165}\) Gaziz Aldamzharov has replaced Serikbolsyn Abdildin as party leader.
During the first multi-party elections in 1995, observers reported serious irregularities (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 7). CUF rejected the results, and they refused to take up their seats in parliament. 18 members of the party, among them Seif Hamad Sharif, were detained, and held in custody, many of them until the next elections in 2000. The 2000 elections were also fraught by fraud and irregularities. CUF was prevented from holding meeting and rallies and party members faced serious harassment throughout the campaign. Hamad Masoud Hamad (2010), the leader of the party on Pemba said in an interview:

In 2000, we [CUF members] could scarcely walk out the door of our houses. The police, they were always there, we had a tail. […] They wanted to arrest me, but I got away. They were constantly harassing, not just me but everyone. It was people in general you know, they would carry weapons in the community, they were harassing everyone. Telling them to stay away from CUF.

There are clear indications that there is more electoral fraud on Zanzibar than on the mainland. (Laakso, 2007:240); Brown, 2010: 626). In 2000, a mass demonstration was organised by the CUF, which was attacked by security forces. According to Killian (2008 :100), 30 people were killed and around 2000 Zanzibaris fled to neighbouring Kenya for fear of violence and reprisals. Most of those killed were unarmed protesters on the island of Pemba. Police opened fire, killing at least 23 people on that island (Rawlence, 2005: 518). During the years between the 2000 and 2005 elections, attempts were made to negotiate peace and power sharing between the CCM and CUF.

The 2005 elections were also close with CCM winning by a small margin. CUF members claimed that the party was prevented from holding rallies, party activists were harassed, particularly on Pemba, where security forces from the mainland were deployed (Ewald, 2010: 249ff; Killian, 2008). There was widespread violence, although the number of casualties did not reach the numbers in 2000. Again, CUF refused to accept the results (Makulilo, 2011). Glassman (2011: 296) reports that the CCM used the threat of violence to intimidate the opposition. In reference to the 1964 revolution on Zanzibar, a CCM official said: “This country has been created through bloodshed using knives, pangas166 and stones. What about today when we have modern weapons like guns? We shall never let this country go.”

In addition to harassment and violence directed towards CUF members and voters, the media has also faced harsher conditions on Zanzibar compared to on

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166 A panga is a machete in Swahili
the mainland. In 2002, a new newspaper emerged in Zanzibar. Dira\(^{167}\), delivered political coverage and provided a new take on the island’s political history. The newspaper became an instant hit, increasing its circulation tenfold in less than a year (Fouéré, 2012). The Zanzibari Information Services (ZIS) banned it in 2003, whereby the newspaper started publishing on-line. A member of the editorial team, who wished to remain unnamed, said in an interview in 2010:

> There was no question that we were closed down because we were not explicitly supporting CCM. We were wanting to give a different view. At the time, there was no free media on Zanzibar, everything was run by the party, or it was plain entertainment. We showed that Zanzibaris are intellectuals; they want to read long articles about history and politics. Every issue we put out… I think it was read by ten people. […] We never had a violent message, there was never any discussion. We just did not agree with them.

Unlike Mwananchi and Mtanzania on the mainland, the ban on Dira has was never lifted. At least until 2015, repressions against media outlets are more severe on Zanzibar than on the mainland. Whitehead (2012) finds that more than half of Tanzania’s political interference with the media took place on Zanzibar, despite only 1.3 of Tanzania’s 45 Million people residing there.

The 2010 elections were much more peaceful, with fewer incidents of fraud were reported (Aminzade, 2013; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; Nassor and Jose, 2014). The voter registration process preceding the elections was however fraudulent. In 2009, a new law was passed, which required voters on Zanzibar to acquire an identity card if they wish to vote in the 2010 elections. CUF complained that the time allocated to obtain identity cards was too short. There is evidence to suggest that this was the case on Pemba, which is a CUF stronghold. In 2005, 156,716 voters were registered to vote on the island compared to only 63,327 in 2010. The number of registered voters on Unguja, where CCM is stronger, also dropped because of the identity card requirement. In 2010 208,049 were registered against 350,506 in 2005 (Bakari and Makulilo, 2012). It is likely that this impacted the results (Matheson, 2012). Several international and local observers reported the irregularities during the registration process ahead of the elections. The Government of Zanzibar as well as the Zanzibari Electoral Commission chose not to act, even though there was ample time to rectify the situation (Nassor and Jose, 2014).

\(^{167}\) Vision in Swahili
Despite the irregularities during the registration, CUF conceded defeat and did not challenge the election results. At that point, Zanzibar had never held a multi-party election where the losing party had accepted the results (Bakari and Makulilo, 2012: 197).

The 2015 elections on Zanzibar by contrast resulted in a re-election. Before all of the ballots had been counted, CUF candidate Seif Sharif Hamad declared that he had won the Zanzibari presidency. The Zanzibari electoral commission immediately annulled the elections, citing “violations of electoral law” (Aljazeera, 2015). Re-elections were boycotted by CUF, resulting in a 91.4% win for CCM incumbent Ali Mohamed Shein (Ng’wanakilala, 2016).

There is no discussion that repression historically is more severe on Zanzibar than on the mainland. However, how the CCM and state actors responds to challenger from the media and opposition is similar.

This sets Tanzania apart from Kazakhstan, the state that uses the most repressive force out of the four states studies. There, both state actors like the police and judiciary as well as informal actors harass, intimidate and abuse individuals in opposition and journalists. Bremmer and Welt (1995) write that nationalist activists were detained on charges of “hooliganism” and “insulting the honour and dignity of the president” soon after independence. Petr Svoik, the leader of an opposition party was badly beaten up by unknown individuals in 1997. He said of the attack in an interview in 2010:

I was not the only one, already at that time they were accusing people of all sorts of crimes and putting them away. […] Many people in Azamat were beaten, and in other movements too. They were doing it to set an example, they wanted to make sure we knew that we would have no part in power.

Svoik’s statement is a confirmation that those in opposition feared both detention and other forms of violence. In 2005 and 2006, a number of highly publicised murders took place. For example, Zamanbek Nurkadilov, a former mayor and minister who had gone into opposition, was killed in December 2005 (Brill Olcott, 2010: 249). The police ruled that his death was a suicide, even though he was shot twice in the chest and once in the head. The murder of Altynbek Sarsenbayev, which has already been discussed, also took place only three months later. A few more individuals were killed, harassed and imprisoned during the short space of a few months in 2005 and 2006. It is safe to say that the increased repression against these groups was related to the then ongoing orange revolution in Ukraine. Aitolkyn Kourmanova, the head of an Almaty based think tank said on the subject that:
With the events in Ukraine and the Arab spring, of course they have good reason to be nervous. Here, all we talk about is stability, growth, but mostly stability. It is the fundamentals… But I am not to say it can’t happen here or won’t happen here. That is why the harass, they are trying to stay in control.

There was fear that the opposition in Kazakhstan would follow suit and attempt to organise demonstrations to topple the government. A former leader of the Alga party said of that time:

Everyone was looking West, we wanted to know what was happening in Ukraine, what could we learn? What support were they getting? What should we be doing. At the same time, we were scared, even though we were talking in our office, not in the street, they were coming after people. I think they were very afraid.

Sometimes, acts of repression can have severe future consequences. Kazhegeldin’s public relations adviser Yelena Nikitenko was assaulted outside her apartment in in Almaty in 1999. She sustained injuries and suffered a broken nose. Earlier that same week, Nikitenko had been forced to resign from a faculty position at Al-Farabi University, Kazakhstan’s leading state university, for “unpatriotic” activities. The tax police had also interrogated her about her “political consulting business” (Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor, 1999). In 2011, several academics at Al Farabi University expressed reluctance and fear about discussing the case of Nikitenko. One student said:

For us, we don’t stick out here. You have seen that some students have been arrested? Also, many don’t get grades. I think Nikitenko was the first one to teach the lesson. I think, the ones who do well here, it’s not about doing good work, or even work. We have to give credit where it is due, to our teachers and to Nazarbayev.

The vice dean of Political Science Aliya Balapnova at the same university had an altogether more positive outlook:

Nursultan Nazarbayev is the Father of our Nation. There is no doubt, without him, we would be nowhere. He is the one who has kept the peace, he is the one

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168 Kazhegeldin had announced that he would run for the presidency, but was not yet out of the country.

169 In context, Kazakhstan passed a law granting Nazarbayev special status as ”Father of the Nation” in 2010.
who we can all confide in. […] Our work here is not to criticise, that is not constructive. We should build this nation together with our father, together.

Balapnova’s statement should be viewed in the light that Nazarbayev has been the only leader of Kazakhstan for 30 years and has special status after his resignation. As early as in the 1990s freedom of the press was seriously impinged. Arrests of journalists were becoming routine. An ethnic Russian journalist, Boris Suprunyuk, served two years in prison on charges of "stirring up ethnic discord and insulting Kazakh national honor and dignity.". He had published a series of articles on discrimination of Russians in Kazakhstan (Welt and Bremmer, 1995). A great number of reporters became the victims of random beatings by unknown individuals. As Brill Olcott (2005: 36) writes:

Reporters were beaten up in numbers sufficient to make official attributions to random street crime seem highly implausible, and editorial offices were destroyed in inexplicable fires.

Sergei Duvanov was a journalist in 2002 who had worked on several stories involving president Nazarbayev and corruption. He was due to travel to the US to raise awareness about corruption and human rights abuse in Kazakhstan. In an earlier incident, unknown assailants had beaten Duvanov. In 2003, he was sentenced to 3½ years in prison on charges of raping a 14-year-old girl. In 2011 he said that:

I was not so very special. There were journalists who were digging up things and exposing people at that time. Of course, they were not happy. Arresting me, that really was to set an example I think. To tell others to be careful.

The case of Sergei Duvanov shares many similarities with the imprisonment of Yevgeny Zhovtis in 2009. He was involved in a car accident, when a pedestrian was killed. Zhovtis was sentenced to 4 years in prison for manslaughter. There is wide consensus that the trial was highly politicised. He was eventually granted amnesty in 2012. Duvanov and Zhovtis were both accused of crimes which were unrelated to their professional lives.

Independent media has been all but abolished in Kazakhstan. Until 1997, the tabloid Karavan was the only independent paper to own its own printing press in

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170 On the cult of personality and nationalism in Kazakhstan, see (Orange and Petersson, 2017)

171 Duvanov was released early from prison due to good behaviour.
the country. The paper was taken over by the establishment. At the same time, private ownership of regional radio and TV was banned completely. Karavan and other previously independent TV and radio channels were taken over by the state media company Khabar run by the president’s daughter Dariga Nazarbayeva (Cummings, 2005: 27; Isaacs, 2013). Since then the crackdown on the media and individual journalists has continued. In recent years, repression of media actors has increased. The most telling example is the persecution of the media house Respublika, which until 2012 printed eight different newspapers. For years, the newspapers faced severe difficulty in reaching their audience. Starting in 2009, Respublika has faced libel charges regarding their coverage of BTA of the BTA bank scandal, its printing house was raided, and all assets seized. In a 2011 (Lillis, 2011) Eurasianet reported that Respublika was trying to keep up operations by printing a weekly with a run of 19,000 copies using office equipment. No printing house in Kazakhstan would print Respublika. They were finally shut down in 2012, following the Zhanaozen events (Lillis 2019:67). At the same time the Alga! Party was banned. When the newsroom was shut down, journalists who had previously been employed by Respublika decided to publish a newspaper online. There were incidents, where journalists were beaten and harassed by unknown assailants. The site was eventually closed in 2017, with journalists serving prison sentences on libel charges (Lillis 2019: 72). Tair Kadyrbayev, who was charged at the same time, was found guilty of paying to place false reporting on the site. He was later found hanged in his cell, and the death was declared a suicide.

In 2011, I asked Irina Savel, the editor of a state-owned newspaper Liter about the conditions for the media in Kazakhstan and Respublika in particular:

Respublika, they are not the free press. They are owned by Ablyazov, funded by the oligarch. They get their money from London. If there was no Ablyazov, there would be no Respublika. […]. It is not very good. Their only goal was to create discord. They do not have the best interest of the nation at heart.

Q: Are you free to publish, are there constraints?

No, we are a responsible newspaper. We do what we want. But we are not Respublika. We do not write slander […].

Savel expresses a similar sentiment to Nur Otan officials interviewed during the same time (Alexander Ivanovich 2011, Battalova Zauresh). In the space of a
month in 2012 two TV stations, 172 Respublika and another newspaper173 were shut down. The reason given was that the media outlets promoted “extremism”. According to Reports without Borders (2012) these outlets constituted Kazakhstan’s main opposition media.

Throughout its history as an independent state, the Kazakhstani state has used repressive measures to control the media, the opposition and academia. Repression has increased; there was a relatively liberal period when NGO’s, media outlets and opposition parties were allowed to grow during the 1990s. After 1997, the state has gradually intensified repressive measures taken to quell opposing views.

There is a strategy of banning or side-lining candidates and political parties before elections. Ahead of the 2011 presidential election, a number of candidates were prevented from running on the basis that they did not meet a number of formal requirements, including Alga!’s Vladimir Kozlov. The language requirement prevented The Communist People’s Party (CPPK) leader Vladislav Kosarev from running in the elections. Instead the party fielded a relative unknown figure, Zhambyl Akhmetbekov, who is ethnically Kazakh. Akhmetbekov received just 1.36% of the vote. CPPK is generally viewed as a party, which supported Nazarbayev, and they seldom criticise the regime. In an interview a few days after the 2011 election Kosarev said that:

It was clear from the beginning that Nazarbayev would win the election. We did not even try to challenge this. More or less, I think Nazarbayev is the best president for this country. The trouble for us was that the election came so quickly; we had no time to prepare. We could not raise any money, so we hardly had enough for our posters [...].

Q: Do you think it would have made a difference if you had been the candidate?

I don’t want to speculate. That decision was made for us. There is no chance that I would have passed the test.

None of the presidential candidates in 2011 believed they had a chance. In an interview during the election campaign Gani Kasimov said that:

172 Stan TV and K+.
173 Vzglyad Newspaper
I am not naïve; I know that Nazarbayev will win this election. And I think it is a good thing. He has done a lot for this country and I think he will continue to be a great leader. [...] I am not taking part because I think that I will be president, I don’t want that. We [Party of Patriots] want to influence things, we want more language education, but we do not challenge.

In the end, the Central Election Committee reported that 95.5% of the voters has elected Nazarbayev with a turnout of almost 90%. The 2015 presidential elections had very similar results, and the same strategy of side-lining the opposition was used. As an OSCE/ODIHR observer, I witnessed suspected ballot stuffing in the capital Astana. There were reports of similar incidents across the country (OSCE/ODIHR, 2011b). In conversation with Kazakhstani acquaintances after the election, a pattern emerged. Those who attempted to vote in the late afternoon or in the evening found that they were unable to do so, as someone else had already voted in their name. There were also many reports of flawed counting and tabulation as well as people being taken to polling stations in busses with Nur Otan signs and flags in the rural areas.

Serikzhan Mambetalin, a former oil trader was planning to run for a seat in parliament in the 2012 election. He was vocal in his criticism of the Nazarbayev government:

The government looks very incapable. We are a very rich country still our external debt is exceeding our GDP. That is totally inappropriate for a country like Kazakhstan. We have all the symptoms of the debt disease where we rely simply on the oil and gas and the rest of the economy is underdeveloped.

After the 2007 elections, Kazakhstan had only one party represented in parliament, Nur Otan, which has been criticised both nationally and internationally. A decision was made ahead of the 2012 election to allow the second largest party seats in parliament regardless of their share of the votes. Yerlan Karin, the party secretary of Nur Otan hinted that the 2011 presidential elections were crucial in deciding the composition of the parliament:

Of course, they have very interesting campaigns for the elections. Gani Kasimov for example has some ideas about our constitution and the economy. All of them understand that their support is not so strong, but they use these presidential elections to take second place to win the next parliamentary elections.

Nazarbayev's advisor, Yertysbayev, discredited the exiting opposition and stated that the Atameken, which is an organisation for entrepreneurs spearheaded by the
president’s son-in-law Timur Kulibayev, should form a political party and take part in the elections in 2012. Yertysbayev told the Daily Telegraph:

We need to create a real institutional system, where Nur Otan would look like a Conservative party, and Ata Meken would look like a Liberal party. In my imagination, Nur Otan might be for increasing pensions and social payments, and Ata-Meken could support lower taxes. (Orange, 2011)

It is interesting that Yertysbayev says that the parties should “look like” parties with ideology. The statements made by Mr Yertysbayev are symptomatic of the state of affairs within the party system in Kazakhstan. The image of an opposition, albeit weak, afforded Nazarbayev legitimacy internally as well as internationally. The same can be said for holding elections in the first place. In Kazakhstan, there are no opportunities for political opposition parties to challenge Nur Otan. There are currently three parties in the Mazhilis, all of them pro-presidential174.

Like the other countries in this study, Kazakhstan has become more repressive in recent years. Aside from shutting down independent media, new laws on internet use “Spreading rumours” online is punishable by up to 10 years in prison. In 2016, a Kazakhstani Facebook user was sentenced to 3 years for insulting Russian president Vladimir Putin on his own Facebook page (Baidildayeva, 2018). Websites, both domestic and international are routinely blocked in Kazakhstan175. In 2018, YouTube, Twitter and Facebook were affected to quell the opposition party DVK, which had by that time been deemed an extremist organisation (Kumenov, 2018). Following Nazarbayev’s resignation on 19th of March, Facebook and Instagram were blocked, as diaspora opposition oligarch Mukhtar Abyazov started a live broadcast on the platforms (personal communication, Abyazov, 2019). Several news sites, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, were also closed. Tokayev starts his tenure as president following in the footsteps of Nazarbayev, signalling no break from the past regarding repression.

174 In 2010 and 2011 The party leaders of Aul Village Social Democrats, Ak Zhol, Party of Patriots of Kazakhstan and the Kazakhstan Communist People’s Party all said in interviews that they were supportive of Nazarbayev and most policies implemented by the government since independence (interviews with Gani Kaliyev 2011, Alikhan Baimenov 2011, Serikzhan Mambetalin 2010, Gani Kassimov 2011 and Vladislav Kosarev 2011).

175 During my fieldwork in Kazakhstan, social media, international news and academic websites were often temporarily blocked. For example, academic library JSTOR was blocked for most of my stay in 2011. At the time Reuters reported that 13 international websites had been shut down, but the experience of friends and colleagues in Kazakhstan was that many more sites were blocked (Gordeyeva, 2011).
The recent crackdowns on the opposition, union leaders, internet users and others\textsuperscript{176} shows that Kazakhstan is increasingly using the state, rather than private or party resources for repression. Unlike in the other three states studies, no clear link between organised crime and the political elite has been established.

\textit{Summary: Kazakhstan and Tanzania}

\textit{Mass-Elite Clientelism}

The incumbents in the two states have chosen different strategies for mass-elite clientelism. In Kazakhstan, there have been few changes since the Soviet years, the state (and more recently, the Nur Otan party) are the perceived patrons in the clientelistic exchange with voters, not individual politicians. Nazarbayev had a deliberate strategy to avoid that local big men create their own mass-elite support base. The exception to this is of course Nazarbayev himself, who is projecting an image of benefactor to his supporters. There are no signs that the amount of patronage received by voters has changed significantly in recent years.

Tanzania is more similar to Kenya and Kyrgyzstan in that individual local big men rely on their personal clientelistic relations with mass actors. Even though the CCM party remains important, relatively frequent floor-crossing indicates that loyalty lies more with the individual than the party. Edward Lowassa’s defection to the opposition ahead of the 2015 elections did not lose him his support base with the electorate.

The resources for mass-elite clientelism in both states came almost exclusively from the state before privatisation in the 1990s. A shift has taken place, where more resources are derived from private enterprise, corruption, and in the Tanzania case organised crime. Business elites in both states need political connections, and politicians need funds for mass-elite clientelism. In Tanzania, this had led to a business elite entering politics, while in Kazakhstan political and business elites have been difficult to distinguish from the advent of multi-party rule.

\textsuperscript{176} In an absurd turn of events, children and adults carrying blue balloons were arrested and harassed during the celebration of Nowruz (Kazakh New Year) in the capital Astana in 2018. Exiled businessman and opposition supporter Mukhtar Ablyazov had posted a video, calling for people to hold blue balloons in support of democracy. Many people bought blue balloons with the national emblem, as it is the colour of the flag of Kazakhstan, unaware that their purchases could be interpreted as political protest. (RFE/RL, 2018).
Intra-Elite Clientelism

In Kazakhstan, the political elite is small, and clientelistic resources are distributed to a limited number of individuals. There have been few attempts to co-opt potential challengers since independence. Relationships within the elite are hidden from public view, and there are strategies to prevent individuals from building alliances that could challenge the president.

In Tanzania on the other hand, the intra-elite clientelistic network is large, and there have been changes in strategy depending on who is president. The strategy is often to co-opt challengers, rather than to challenge and exclude. In recent months\(^\text{177}\), there have been reports of CCM bribing opposition politicians to defect and culture of impunity, where few elite actors are prosecuted on corruption charges. Although Magufuli has a very public anti-corruption agenda, those charged are mainly low and md ranking officials.

In Tanzania, privatisation during the 1990s meant that corruption shifted to elaborate schemes involving tenders and exports. Kazakhstan’s immense wealth in natural resources has to a large extent has been privatised into the hands of the inner circle, and it is clear that these resources uphold the networks. Elite circles in Kazakhstan are closed, with an official narrative of events, and very little local media to investigate.

Political actors in Tanzania have become involved in the ivory trade, indicating that a shift may be taking place, where resources from organised crime are used for clientelism. The East African coast is becoming a popular transit point for narcotics, and Kazakhstan is on the drug trafficking route from Afghanistan to Russia. Despite this, there is little evidence of major political involvement. The reason may be that elites feel secure that their access to other resources will not suddenly be cut off.

Repression

As there is a small network of elites in Kazakhstan, repression and the threat of repression is an important means of control and has been for many years. Both private and state repression has been used, although privatised repression has been less frequent in recent years. Several politically motivated murders have taken place during Nazarbayev’s time in office, both inside Kazakhstan and in other states. It is not unusual for activists, to be harassed and beaten by unknown individuals.

There are signs that state repression has increased in recent years in Kazakhstan. The closure of Res Publika newspaper and ensuing court battles against journalists

\(^{177}\) as of January 2019
illustrates that oppositional views rarely reach the public eye. The state often uses criminal charges, such as accusations of violent crimes, or traffic violation in order to target the opposition and media. There has been an increase in the number of arrests since the Zhanaozen protests in Western Kazakhstan. Union leaders, politicians and others are serving time in prison. The Kazakhstani police do not routinely fire live ammunition at protesters, however protests in 2016 and 2018 resulted in mass arrests.

Repression has increased in Tanzania after the 2015 elections. At the time of writing, a number of opposition politicians, including CHADEMA leader Freeman Mbowe are in police custody facing charges of illegal protest. Journalists and activists have been convicted on charges ranging from sedition to illegally protesting. A number of media new laws have led to the closure of a number of news outlets and blogs, and the ban on public gatherings

At the same time, privatised repression has increased as well, with many disappearances and murders of journalists taking place since 2015. The increase in repression in Tanzania fits the theory that unstable intra-elite networks and failing clientelism leads to more repression. In the case of Kazakhstan, increased repression ahead of Nazarbayev stepping down may have been a strategic move. As Kazakhstan stands now, there is an interim president temporarily at the helm, and elections scheduled to take place in December 2020 at the latest. Although most foreign journalists agree that Nazarbayev remains in the wings, this is a time of uncertainty. With that in mind, the eliminating all opposition ahead of succession may have been a strategy to ensure stability for the elite during a transition period.
Competitive Authoritarianism

Competitive Authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan and Kenya

Unlike Tanzania and Kazakhstan, the dominant regimes in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan have failed. Both states have a great number of parties in parliament and the outcome of elections cannot be predicted. Despite the end of party dominance in these two states, they are not democracies. Repression is still common, clientelism still inform patterns of political support and, repression is rife. Kyrgyzstan and Kenya also share a contemporary history of political violence connected to elections and intra-elite competition. In this chapter clientelism and repression after the end of dominance are explored

Intra-Elite Clientelism

There is little doubt that intra-elite clientelism was a feature of the Kyrgyz and Kenyan political systems before the end of dominance. In Kyrgyzstan, both the 2005 tulip revolution and the end of the Bakiyev regime in 2010 can in part be understood as the failure of intra-elite network cohesion. The Kenyan case is slightly different as president Moi, who had managed intra-elite conflict for many years, stepped down ahead of the 2002 elections and the opposition formed a coalition to challenge KANU. Instead of several presidential candidates, NARC united a number of parties and fielded Mwai Kibaki are their candidate. As Howard and Roessler (2006) point out, the opposition had won a large share of votes in the 1992 and 1997 elections but lost to the incumbent because of lack of unity.

NARC’s main message was that Moi and KANU had brought Kenya to the brink of ruin, where corruption, mismanagement and tribalism had reigned for too long (Steeves, 2006). The chairman of one of the parties (Ford-K), which was party of NARC explained that the message was somewhat watered down, so that all parties could agree:

The NARC movement was against the dictatorship… that KANU had been around for a very long time and impunity was on. At the time we thought
corruption was a big issue, and we united, and we said we must fight corruption and so on and so forth. That is what Kenyans have always stood for (Musikari Kombo 2010).

The strong anti-KANU message was somewhat ironic, as key players had only recently left KANU and joined forces with the opposition. There was a growing rift in KANU, as many felt that they were better qualified for the presidency than Moi’s chosen successor. George Saitoti, Moi’s Vice President left KANU in anger when it became clear that he was not the parties chosen candidate for the presidency. Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka, both cabinet ministers who had openly declared their interest in being nominated also left KANU (Närman, 2003). One of the founding members and subsequently chief whip of NARC said that:

Those that left KANU the likes of George Saitoti, Raila Odinga, Ruto, the works, all those that left KANU to join the opposition is because they did not see themselves as growing within KANU and taking over leadership. That’s how they came and joined with the ranks of the opposition headed by Mwai Kibaki at the time. They probably though he was going to be an easier person to get rid of after the first elections. We have been stuck in that position, that is the unfortunate situation in which we are. Bottom line, anyone who was in top leadership position in KANU and came into leadership in the opposition was not doing it for this country; he was doing it for himself. (Norman Nyagah 2010).

When asked about the reasons, none of the KANU floor-crossers interviewed expressed that they left the incumbent for reasons of dissatisfaction with the politics of KANU. David Ekwe Ethuro the, speaker of the Senate in 2010, had a fairly typical answer:

O: Which party did you run for the first time?

E: The ruling party KANU, then, the party of independence. That was in 1997. 2002 I joined NARC. The reason was that KANU had lost popularity, so I went to NARC. The last election I came through PNU, I came to parliament three times on different parties (David Ekwee Ethuro 2010).

KANU fielded the son of Kenya's first president Jomo Kenyatta, Uhuru Kenyatta. At the time, he was viewed as too young, too inexperienced and a virtual political
unknown\(^{178}\). The nomination of Kenyatta was seen by some as an attempt to make Kenya a dynasty. Moreover, it was thought that selecting a weak candidate was a way for Moi to remain in power from backstage (A singo, 2003). With a rift in KANU and major floor crossing to NARC, the stage was set for a turnover in Kenya.

Howard and Roessler (2006: 377f) argue that the strategy of the opposition to denounce corruption was instrumental to the turnover:

> The opposition coalition raised the costs of extralegal policies by the incumbent regime and increased doubts among the regime’s cohorts that corruption and fraud during the election could be carried out with impunity.

The legacy of Kibaki’s terms in office shows there was persistence of clientelism and corruption rather than a break with the past. A Kenyan journalist now residing in Europe said in an interview that:

> What happened was we took a step back. Now it was the families of those who had power during Jomo Kenyatta who had come back. [...] You know how Githongo said: “It’s our Turn to Eat”. Really, the pressure was on Kibaki to give those who had been without a change to eat the case, basically access to corruption. The truth is, the new government did not just inherit a culture of patronage and corruption, they inherited the very contracts with companies so they could “eat”. [...] They all needed money to win the elections, but you have to remember that buying the support of elites is even more expensive (anonymous 2011).

Lawson (2009: 80) describes dealings which were “carried over seamlessly into the Kibaki administration after the NARC victory. A number of the individuals who crossed the floor to join NARC were involved in corruption, initiated during the previous government. Taylor (2006: 294) writes that: “Allegations of corruption against officials severely undermines their credibility and hence their ability to prosecute their predecessors”. It is also clear that persons who had gained access to resources through graft in part funded Kibaki’s campaign. Moody Awori, who was a long time KANU cabinet member and George Saitoti, Moi’s vice president both joined NARC and financially supported Kibaki’s campaign (Bachelard, 2010). Both wealthy individuals and, rumoured to be involved in corruption. Even Moi was public about the corruption displayed by Saitoti. When Saitoti was reinstated as Vice President in 1999 he said: “I've given back Prof Saitoti the seat

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\(^{178}\) Kenyatta was eventually elected
of Vice-President, hopefully now your sufurias (pots) will be full of food”, implying that he had once again given Saitoti access to corruption. Awori was made vice president and George Saitoti became Minister of Education. A journalist with the Star newspaper said that:

It is the same for everyone [who wants to run for office]. They may want to root out corruption. The bottom line is that they need the money, without money you cannot win. And the ones who have the money, they are mostly corrupt. So, they have to give them something, so it becomes about positions, or at least, they cannot prosecute, and they have to make sure that they can continue with what they are doing, because they will need money for the next election again (Solomon Kirimi 2010).

Leaders have to consider that re-election may be difficult without access resources for both intra-elite and mass-elite clientelism. Like in Tanzania under Mkapa, Kenya was under a lot of pressure to curb clientelism and corruption. Not only had Kibaki promised to change the rules of the game during the election campaign, international donors and banks were also pressuring Kibaki.

In order to meet these demands, Kibaki pronounced a “zero tolerance” policy and new anti-corruption legislation was passed (Barkan, 2004). Further, avid anti-corruption campaigner John Githongo was appointed to head the new Department of Governance and Ethics. The new department was situated at the Office of the President, to send out the message that corruption control was taken seriously and that Githongo stood under presidential protection while carrying out his investigations (Lawson, 2009; Taylor, 2006). In 2003, Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) was formed, and entrusted with investigating current cases of corruption and setting up a task force to deal with past transgressions (Otieno, 2005). The expression of good will and creation of formal institutions was enough for the World Bank to resume lending to Kenya, and for aid, which had been frozen during the Moi years to be paid in full.

Despite these new institutions, the fight against corruption became secondary to upholding powerful intra-elite networks. The epilogue of the Anglo Leasing scandal clearly shows that bringing corrupt individuals to justice was a tall order. Bachelard (2010) notes that the individuals involved in the scandal did not face

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179 Githongo was the head of Transparency International’s Kenya office before he was appointed to lead Kibaki’s crusade against corruption. He went into exile in 2005, when it had become clear to him that he no longer had a mandate from the president. He says that he was fearful that he may be murdered if he stayed in Kenya after exposing corruption involving a number of cabinet ministers (Wrong 2009).
consequences despite damning evidence of their involvement. Kiraitu Murungi was Minister of Justice when the scandal broke was demoted to Energy Minister (Hassid and Brass, 2014). John Githongo leaked an audio recording to the BBC, where Murungi and Finance Minister David Mwiraria\textsuperscript{180} nervously asks Githongo to stop investigating (Keane, 2006). A number of other ministers were also accused of involvement. None were prosecuted, though the evidence presented by Githongo after he went into exile seems to be substantial\textsuperscript{181}. Vice president Moody Awori and cabinet minister George Saitoti were also implicated. According to Bachelard (2010), these individuals were not charged or ousted from power because Kibaki was experiencing a form of dual pressure: on the one hand, foreign donors and large groups in the electorate expected the new government to take decisive action to root out corruption. After all, most of the campaign of NARC was centred on that promise. On the other hand, it was and is a political reality that Kenyan politicians must rely on alliances between different elite networks in order to be elected into office and to remain there. Bachelard considers that the pressure felt by Kibaki from the elite groups was more important given the situation than pressure from the population in general or the donor community. This strategy was not entirely without risk, as the post-election violence in 2007 would show. Githongo (2010) writes of that time that:

The optimism of early 2003 was the result of big dreams, most notably the promise to fight corruption. However, within months of coming into office, the new government was embroiled in huge corruption scandals of its own. Public anger was fuelled not only by the succession of scandals but also by the atmosphere of total impunity in which the ruling elite operated. [...] Wrongdoing was excused by the political and business elite as "Africanized enterprise" and dismissed as something only Westerners, with their double standards, complained about.

Viewed from the poorest sections of Kenyan society, the line between graft and enterprise now seemed completely blurred. Within a year of the new administration’s coming to power, some of the most influential figures around

\textsuperscript{180} Mwiraria did not face any consequences for his alleged involvement in the scandal. He voluntarily stepped down from cabinet in 2006. He became Minister of Environment in Kibaki’s new cabinet following the 2007 elections.

\textsuperscript{181} After John Githongo went into exile he wrote a report, which he sent to Kibaki, outlining the details of the Anglo Leasing scandal an a number of other corruption cases in Kenya. The report can be found here: http://it.scribd.com/doc/18988443/The-Githongo-Dossier
Kibaki had transformed themselves into ostentatious millionaires. A seething resentment began to infect Kenyan politics.

Gitobu Imanyara, an MP and Human Rights lawyer corroborated that the pressure faced by politicians to engage in corruption has not reduced since 2002:

They abuse people’s trust […] In certain places e.g. if you go to places like the rift valley people who feared that Moi leaving was a subject of investigations. People who have been named in public account and other parliamentary institutions as champions in abuse or offence of corrupt deals use the process of corruption in order to buy their way into parliament.

Githongo goes further in his accusation of the Kibaki government, which came after 2002. During his time at the office of the president, he felt that ministers and other officials consistently foiled his efforts. His decision to resign from his post and go into exile came after ministers openly admitted that they were involved in corruption. As he puts it himself:

They told me it was them,’ he said, pacing the floor. ‘These ministers, my closest colleagues, sat there and told me to my face that they, they were the ones doing the stealing. Once they said that, I knew I had to go (Githongo in Wrong 2009: 20).

Goldenberg and Anglo Leasing are still the largest corruption scandals in terms of funds lost, which have come to public light. During the time of research in Kenya, a major scandal regarding the misuse of public funds intended for primary school education came to light. During the election campaign in 2002, Kibaki promised to introduce free primary school education for all young Kenyans. Overnight, government spending on primary education rocketed to about 20% of the government’s spending (Oduro, 2010). It is estimated that 55 million USD was embezzled from funds intended for free primary school education between 2005 and 2009. There is a significant difference between this scandal and Goldenberg and Anglo Leasing namely that the individuals who benefited was greater and at different levels in the system. The Ministry of Education reported inflated costs for conferences, which did not take place, schools, which were not built and vehicles, which were not bought. A system was also put in place where money was paid to schools and then remitted into the private accounts of senior officials with the Ministry of Education minus a cut for local head teachers. A reporter with the Kenyan newspaper Daily Nation investigated corruption, itemizing fraud in detail and found that the education system as a whole was seeping money into the
pockets of politicians, senior civil servants and teachers (Aduda, 2009). The results of my research show that some politicians in Kenya see the media and their exposure of power holders as the problem rather than corruption. Several explain that the media hounds them, and that this prevents the government from acting. In relation to the embezzlement of funds for primary education the MP Margaret Kamar said that:

The press in Kenya are one of the most open ones I have seen in the world. They would rather say that the son of the president messed up than not. Sometimes it is not clear whether there is evidence or not. I have personally not seen a situation where you can say yes, there was manipulation here. [...] The one on education… Surprisingly, we are discovering now that the minister and Ministry of Education may be extremely clean. And yet, the way it has been, all of us have been waiting for this. It has to be investigated. The press takes something very small, and highlights that and then leaves the real issues (Kamar 2010).

Kamar’s comment is quite a typical response from politicians who have not made anti-corruption their main focus. The “real issues” are considered to be local development, education and poverty eradication, not corruption. Many are reluctant to speak about the topic, and when prompted tend to emphasise that the media is exaggerating the problem.

It seems that the misappropriation of public funds started almost as soon as the Kibaki government was in office. For example, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) found that the government spent 12 million USD on vehicles, which were mostly for the personal use of senior officials in 2003 and 2004 (KNCHR, 2006). This shows that there were still ample opportunities for self-enrichment, even in the post-Moi era. Corruption is however not synonymous with clientelism. All resources, which are accessed through corruption are not used in order to gain political support. It is a real possibility that the reasons for corruption and how the funds are used has changed. A Nairobi journalist explained that:

During the Moi era, I think the big man he knew what most everyone in government were doing. You kind of had to have the blessing of Moi to steal… If you did not, maybe they were thinking that you would use that money to challenge in one way or another. Now…Well it is a completely different story. There is no way that Kibaki has control, with what is going on in each of the ministries. People are using the money they steal to get support, but these days there is no blessing from above. I think that now, there is no one really in control, but there is no one trying to stop it (anonymous 2010).
An employee at Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC)\textsuperscript{182} argued that:

The landscape has changed. Now, each one [authors note: politician] needs to get their hands on a ministry. The reason? That is where they can get resources. First, it is simple stealing like the Ministry of Education, but it come with power too. [...] They are the ones signing the contracts with businesses, they are the ones getting the aid. If they can gather money, then others are interested. They can form coalitions and they can climb to the top. It takes so much money to win in Kenya. The coalitions, well they are formed based on who has access to corruption and who does not (anonymous 2010).

Elite coalition building, based on clientelistic exchanges carried over into Uhuru Kenyatta’s presidency after 2013. By that time KANU was no longer an institutional party. An intricate form of coalition building, informed by ethnic politics determined the political landscape. The two main contenders for the presidency were Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta, both sons of prominent politicians. During the election campaign, Kenyatta stood accused of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court because of his alleged involvement in the post-election violence in 2007-2008. Several interviewees are convinced that the court case boosted Kenyatta’s popularity ahead of the election, he was perceived to be a “Strong man” who would stand up for his own Kikuyu ethnic group, and other related groups. This increased the likelihood that he would become Kenya’s next president, whereby a number of elite actors and MP\textsuperscript{183}s supported his bid. Kibaki found himself in difficult circumstances. In order to unite the opposition against KANU in 2002, he had promised to support George Saitoti’s bid for the presidency, something he was reluctant to do. Saitoti, along with his assistant and four others died in a helicopter crash before the nomination process had taken place\textsuperscript{184}. This made it possible for Kenyatta to unite several key individuals to support his candidacy.

During the campaign, Kenyatta argued that his wealth\textsuperscript{185} would make him immune to corruption. Because of these circumstances, Kenyatta had the means for intra-elite as well as mass elite clientelism to fund both the 2013 and 2017 election campaigns. In his statements about corruption, it is implied that a

\textsuperscript{182} KHRC is an NGO, Unlike KNCHR which was established by an act of parliament.

\textsuperscript{183} 40 MPs from Mount Kenya held a press conference, supporting Kenyatta (Ngotho, 2018)

\textsuperscript{184} More on Saitoti’s death in the section on repression.

\textsuperscript{185} The Kenyatta family is one of the wealthiest in Kenya.
clientelistic system exists, and that the problem facing Kenya is rather where resources emanate from (i.e. corruption and crime) than clientelism.

In Kyrgyzstan, the interim president Roza Otunbayeva faced similar challenges when she came to power after the ousting of president Bakiyev in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. Bakiyev’s government had been dominated by individuals from Southern Kyrgyzstan, whilst many Northern leaders were left out in the cold. Earlier, when Akayev was still in power, northern leaders had dominated. During the interim government, positions were reversed again, bringing many key individuals from the Akayev era back into power. Shairbek Juraev (2010), Director of the Central Asian Studies Institute and the American University of Central Asia said in an interview that: “The dominance of one elite over another continued, although that elite was a different one,”, alluding to the few systemic changes, which had taken place. A good example of this is the fate of Felix Kulov, born in the north. He served in many positions under Akayev, including as vice-president. Ahead of the 2000 elections, Akayev and Kulov fell out and Kulov went into opposition (Radnitz, 2010b). He was imprisoned in relation to the Aksy riots, and was released in 2005. Because of Kulov’s popularity and power in the north, he was made prime minister after the Tulip revolution, ad Bakiyev initially needed to appease northern elites to create stability (Pop-Eleches and Robertson, 2014: 14). As the Bakiyev family tightened their grip on power, they excluded most elite actors who were not part of their inner circle, including Kulov. Almost all individuals from the north, who had been part of Bakiyev’s circle in 2005 were political outsiders by the time protests started in 2010. The ousting of Bakiyev can thus be understood as a chance for northern elites to recapture power. Felix Kulov came in from the cold and became the leader of the ruling coalition of parties in parliament.

The period after Bakiyev’s ouster is characterized by political instability, but also as many analysts point out a return to meaningful elections. When Roza Otunbayeva came to power, it was determined that Kyrgyzstan would pass a new constitution and a constitutional referendum was held. This is not surprising or unusual, as the current one is the fourth since Kyrgyzstan became independent. Otunbayeva stated ambition was to reduce the chances of power being concentrated in the hands of one of the elite networks operating in Kyrgyzstan. This was achieved by creating a division of power between parliament and president. Previously, the president had been almost all-powerful. In order to avoid dominance by one group in parliament, a cap was put on the number of seats a single party could hold. The new parliament has 120 seats, while the winning party can hold no more than 65 seats, regardless of the outcome of elections. Further, a 5% threshold was introduced. The interim government
accepted that intra-elite clientelism is the driving force in Kyrgyz politics. Their solution was to create a system where elite groups share power.

The outcome of the new electoral legislation was that no party gained a majority in parliament. After the 2010 parliamentary elections, there are five parties in parliament: Ata Jurt, Ata-Meken, SDPK, Respublika and Ar-Namys. There were also a large number of parties, which did not enter parliament, but reached a significant percentage of the vote. This is because a very large number of parties registered to take part in the elections. Ata Jurt became the largest party in parliament with 8.9% of the vote. Otunbayeva said that this would force the parties to negotiate, thus creating stability. One of the strongest opponents of the new order is Felix Kulov (2011) who said in an interview that:

Every party has property and armed forces and if the parties start fighting for places it wouldn’t be good for the state as a whole, that’s why I support a presidential system. […]

I will say how it is dangerous for our country: It includes some mechanisms, which can lead to the collapse of the state. […] The new constitutions says that it can change several times a year. The Prime Minister can influence the whole vertical of power. It may lead to instability and collapse. We suggest that citizens elect on regional level and takes into account the local specifics. The worst example is the south; if you have to elect either Kirgiz or Uzbek it can lead to conflict. So maybe the best decision is to rotate power between north and south.

According to Kulov, the political parties in Kyrgyzstan have access to arms. Although the phrase “armed forces” may be an exaggeration, there is no doubt that many political leaders in Kyrgyzstan have the ability to mobilise. Some are disenfranchised youths, who can be paid to protest and cause civil disorder (Radnitz, 2010b). Others have connections to criminal gangs, with the ability to commit crimes such as extortion, physical abuse and in some cases murder (see for example De Danieli, 2014; Kupatadze, 2008, 2014b; Marat, 2006b). What Kulov is referring to is that Kyrgyzstan has seen political violence and instability in recent years because of the power of elite actors. Instead of reaching an agreement of sharing power, through a parliamentary system, Kulov believes that a strong executive and rotation of power through elections would create more stability in Kyrgyzstan.

This debate is similar to the discord in Kenya. We can note that access to state resources are contingent on belonging to an ethnic group in Kenya and to the north/south divide in Kyrgyzstan. During Moi’s time in office, people of Kalenjin
origin and from the Rift Valley were generally speaking favoured. When Kibaki won the elections in 2002, a shift took place; a number of people of Kikuyu origin were given access to the state. Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, under Akayev, northern elites were favoured. When Bakiyev took over, southerners were in the same position. This is of course a simplification; political leaders have sometimes tried to win the support of individuals from other groups, intra-elite networks have varied in size over time. There is however some truth to the expression “It’s our turn to eat”, i.e. it’s our turn to have access to state, power, and corruption. This is how a number of government officials under Kibaki expressed the situation to the anti-corruption officer John Githongo after Moi was ousted in 2003 (Wrong, 2009). The controversy, which is ongoing in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan alike within the elites, is how access to state resources and corruption should be negotiated.

As we have seen, many of the promises made by Kibaki and others during the 2002 election campaign had not checked out. The individuals who had been accused of corrupt practices had with few exceptions not been brought to justice. The same can be said for the anti-corruption efforts of the Kenyatta administration, where prosecutions have been rare (Chege, 2018: 163). The NARC coalition had broken up already in 2005 as a result of a constitutional referendum, which resulted in riots and violence throughout the country. During the election campaign in 2002, NARC and Kibaki had pledged to draft a new constitution for Kenya. By the time the draft was on the table and put to the vote, a number of individuals felt disappointed. A leading politician, who is now an MP for ODM said that:

In 2002, we put those [presidential] ambitions on the shelf, we backed him to get rid of Moi. […] At least I thought that there was a silent agreement, that he would share some of the power, that other groups would have access. He was only promoting himself! Giving positions to Kikuyu people… And then, with the constitution, he would have become all powerful. For me, that was the last drop. I could not support. That is why we formed ODM.

The elite unity, which was essential for an opposition win in 2002 was far away in 2007. Uhuru Kenyatta who had been the KANU candidate in 2002 now backed Mwai Kibaki’s re-election campaign. With the breakdown of NARC, two new electoral coalitions had formed. Kibaki headed PNU, a coalition of parties including KANU. His main opponent in the presidential race was Raila Odinga,
who headed another coalition, ODM\textsuperscript{186}. PNU was rather disorganised, as the coalition was formed only a few months prior to the elections, which were held in December. The PNU nomination process for parliamentary candidates was chaotic; in some constituencies, candidates representing different PNU associated party candidates stood against each other. In others candidates stood under the banner of the affiliated parties rather than under the common PNU logo. This caused great disorientation for voters throughout the country, as it was unclear which parties had joined in a coalition and which had not. To add to the confusion, many politicians campaigned on a KANU ticket, although KANU was officially a part of PNU at the time. Also, KANU was at first part of the ODM coalition and only later joined forces with PNU. Odinga’s ODM on the other hand was formed in 2005, ahead of the constitutional referendum. At that time, Odinga and Kibaki had parted ways. This state of affairs indicates that coalitions in

An anonymous MP, who was with NARC in 2002 and joined with PNU ahead of the 2007 elections said that:

For us, when we joined for NARC, no one really thought it was going to last. To be truthful, we didn’t even want it to last. Once we were rid of Moi, there was no point with a coalition anymore. [….] I have no illusions, it is not about democracy it is about making deals (anonymous 2010).

Another anonymous MP (ODM) said that:

For the voters, in most cases we can predict what they will do and what they think. [….] Every person [candidate] comes with, how shall I put it… a bag of votes. People know what is in that bag, how many. If you want to win, then you have to collect as many bags as possible.

The post-election violence after the 2007 elections was spurred by the fact that there was no clear winner in the elections. After some time of unrest, a power sharing deal was struck, allowing both ODM and PNU into government. In exchange for admitting defeat, Raila Odinga was given the newly instated position of Prime Minister. In order to cater to the demands of the two coalitions, a record number of ministers were appointed, with at least two assistant ministers at each ministry. This sudden surge in the size of the government was tailored to create elite unity, as access to government resources is key. This arrangement meant that

\textsuperscript{186} The name “Orange” refers to the ballots during the referendum, where an orange represented a “no” vote and a banana a “yes” vote to the new constitution.
corruption within the ministries was virtually unchecked. Until 2007, there had been an opposition in Kenya. Although a number of individuals who were in opposition during those years had a questionable track record with regards to corruption, it was certainly in their interest to expose their political opponents’ corruption. This was not least evident when the Goldenberg and Anglo-Leasing scandals were exposed. Essentially, it was no longer in the interest of any important political players to expose corruption. The perception of a number of interviews is that corruption within the government has increased since the 2007 elections, while reporting corruption has decreased. The intra-elite clientelistic network had expanded to include the opposition.

The power sharing agreement ended with the 2013 election, and two-party new coalitions were formed, Jubilee Coalition187 (Kenyatta/Ruto) and Cord Alliance188 (Odinga/Musyoka). Kenyatta won the elections by a slim victory. Although Raila Odinga protested the results in Kenya’s Supreme Court, he accepted the court’s ruling in Kenyatta’s favour, making way for a peaceful transfer of power. A very similar pattern can be observed in the 2017 elections, when the same candidates contested for the presidency. Kenyatta was declared the winner of the elections with 54% of the vote to Odinga’s 45%. Odinga again contested the results in the Supreme Court. This time, the court annulled the presidential elections due to irregularities. Odinga said the electoral commission was “rotten” while, Kenyatta said that the judges were “crooks” (BBC, 2017) Despite his court win, Odinga decided to withdraw his candidacy for the fresh presidential elections in 2017, stating that the electoral commission remained under Jubilee control, and that

187 The National Alliance, National Rainbow Coalition, United Republican Party, and the Republican Congress were members in 2013. In 2016, the parties merged to form the Jubilee Party, which stood for the 2017 general elections.


Ahead of the 2017 elections, the Cord was dissolved, and the National Super Alliance (NASA) was formed. NASA includes Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), Wiper Democratic Movement (Wiper), Forum for the Restoration of Democracy - Kenya (FORD-Kenya), Amani National Congress (ANC), National Rainbow Coalition, Progressive Party of Kenya, Chama Cha Uzalendo (CCU), and the Muungano Party (MP).
reforms need to take place before free and fair elections can take place (Burke, 2017a).189

According to Chege (2018: 162), the stated policy of the government elected in 2013 was a fairer distribution of public positions and patronage, in order to improve interethnic relations, thus signalling that the intra-elite network would increase in size. The elite bargaining that took place, in order to form a coalition to win the 2013 presidential elections was not secured through policy compromise. Rather, informal deals between Ruto and Kenyatta secured the alliance, a form of buying loyalty (see for example Cheeseman, 2015). In an interview in 2016, anti-corruption scholar John Githongo claimed that “in the last four years, we have moved back fairly dramatically, as far as corruption is concerned. This is by far the most corrupt government in our history.” (quoted in Kiberenge, 2016). In an overview of the corruption scandals, which have come to light between 2013 and 2018, it is apparent that there has been a return to using state resources for corruption. In 2018 a scandal involving Kenya Youth Agency involved stealing funds directly from the agency (BBC, 2018). The Kenya Auditor-General reported in 2017 that 40 billion Kenya shillings had been looted directly from the state (Mwere, 2018), while Nairobi County cannot account for 20 billion Shilling. Other cases involve land grabbing, unaccounted funds from Kenya Power and payments from the National Cereals and Produce board (Burke, 2018). These latest scandals show that political elites as well as bureaucrats are to a large extent siphoning funds directly from the state, rather than through complex contracts with private enterprises, which was more common during the Kibaki years.

In terms of prosecutions, there are similarities between Kenya, Tanzania, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Very few top-level individuals are prosecuted on corruption charges, and in the few cases that do exist, there is often a suspicion that the case is brought for political reasons. In Kenya, Deputy Chief Justice Philomena Mwilu. She is facing charges of abuse of office, failure to pay stamp tax, improperly obtaining Sh12 million from the Imperial Bank and obtaining security by false pretence, among other counts. Mwilu apparently said that President Kenyatta a drunkard who should not be president at a private gathering at her home in 2017 (Interview, 2019). Regardless of the merits of the case, the prosecution of Mwilu draws suspicion that political opponents of Kenyatta are selectively prosecuted.

189 A journalist interviewed in January 2019 claimed that Odinga withdrew, as he and a group of NASA elites had been offered compensation by Kenyatta to withdraw. This information has not been verified by other sources.
Aside from corruption source of income for both mass-elite and intra-elite clientelism, which has been neglected by many scholars is drug trafficking and other organised crime. Kenya has become an international hub for the narcotics trade. According to a number of sources, this is especially true for heroin, as markets in Europe are becoming more profitable than North America for drug cartels (Africa Confidential, 2011; Savage and Shanker, 2012; Schuberth, 2014; UNODC, 2009). Drug trafficking in the region takes place mainly through the port cities along the Swahili coast, as the risk of detection is lower than using air travel. Schuberth (2014) finds that both trafficking and abuse of drugs is more prevalent in Mombasa and other coastal towns than in Nairobi. In recent years, politicians have become involved with criminal networks. Gastrow (2011) argues that criminals involved in the drug trade increasingly seek influence in Kenya by running for office. Mike Sonko, the Governor of Nairobi 190 is an example of such an individual. During his early years, Sonko was involved in organised crime.

Sonko’s past and present is shroud in rumours, and it is difficult to ascertain the validity of the information. Several individuals have conveyed that Sonko escaped a prison sentence while in hospital in Mombasa, never to return on account of bribing the police and prison officers. Others claim that Sonko was the leader of a gang, which mugged tourists in Mombasa and were engaged in car jackings and murder in Nairobi. Some of these rumours are unsubstantiated. Kenya is frequently abuzz with rumours regarding politicians, and it is common for political opponents to simply fabricate stories, which could prove damming. Booth (2011) for example argues that:

In Kenya the truth content of the rumour mill and the national media is not easy to determine. Fact, speculation, misunderstandings, lies and deliberate misinformation combine and flow into one another with ‘truth’ seeming to become relative and contextual.

Sonko made his fortune and became a wealthy man by owning a large number of Matatus191. The public transport business in Nairobi is dominated by vigilante groups and mafia. Even though some clean-up has occurred since the mid 2000s, the business is still used for money laundering and cartels are frequently formed

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190 Mike Sonko’s given name is Mike Mbuvi. He has now officially changed his name to Sonko, which means "rich person" or “boss” in Sheng. Sheng is slang version of Swahili mostly spoken by the urban youth (for a discussion on the status of Sheng see Githiora, 2002).

191 Matatus are busses and minivans, which are the main form of public transport in Nairobi. Private matatu companies own and run the vans, which service established routes at a fixed price.
(see for example Mutongi, 2006; Rasmussen, 2012). Most notably, the sector is controlled by the Mungiki\textsuperscript{192}, which operates several routes and imposes “taxes” on others (Anderson, 2002; Henningsen and Jones, 2013). Mungiki militia was hired during the post-election clashes in 2007-2008 to inflict violence on Lou ODM supporters in Nakuru and Naivasha (Mueller, 2014). A journalist in Nairobi said that:

> If you are successful and running matatus, there is no way that you are clean. You have to have connections, that is still the case. Mungiki and some other gangs are in control. [...] Maybe it is difficult to understand, it is very lucrative. They make a lot of money. These days, politicians and big business people are investing, there are no small guys left (Winnie Atieno 2010).

Sonko’s extrovert personality, bling image and cash handouts at rallies greatly contributed to his persona\textsuperscript{193}. In 2011, four members of parliament including former assistant minister of transport John Harun Mwau and Mike Sonko, were accused of involvement in drug trafficking. They were put on the US government’s narcotics kingpin list\textsuperscript{194}. The charges against the pair were eventually dropped.

It is difficult to determine with certainty that income from drug trafficking and other organised crime is used to uphold intra-elite networks and to win elections in Kenya. Former Prime Minister Raila Odinga made a statement to the Star newspaper, claiming that drug money was used in the 2007 election campaign. Gastrow (2011) also argues that funds from organised crime are increasingly being used to attain political positions, both in terms of building elite networks and winning elections.

Organised crime provides an alternative method of gaining income from politics aside from corruption. In essence, this means that individuals who are successful criminals have found a route to enter into politics without previous

\textsuperscript{192} Mungiki is an armed group, which has often been hired by Kikuyu politicians in order to incite violence.

\textsuperscript{193} Sonko is well known for his extravagance. The Nairobi newspaper the Star recently published photos of Sonko arriving at a funeral in a gold Land Cruiser. He is also pictured standing in front of a table full of cash, allegedly to hand out to voters Star, t., January 8, 2015. This Man Sonko: Five Images of the Flamboyant Nairobi Senator that 'Broke the Internet', the Star, Nairobi..

\textsuperscript{194} Mwau was listed in accordance with the U.S Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. His assets were
access to the state. There is a parallel to be drawn with the current and previous political situation in Kyrgyzstan, where organised crime and politics have long been intertwined.

The US narcotics kingpin list added seven names to its record in 2011. The list contains an exclusive club of individuals thought to be heavily engaged in international drug trafficking. Aside from the Kenyan MPs, a Kyrgyz citizen was added to the list. Kamchybek Kolbayev is widely held to be one of Kyrgyzstan's main drug lords and the heir to Rysbek Akmatbayev, who was murdered in 2006 (Lewis, 2012). Like a number of other important figures in organised crime in Kyrgyzstan, the fortune of Kolbayev has shifted depending on which government is in power. He supported the Tulip revolution in 2005. Kupatzde (2014a) finds evidence to support that Janysh Bakiyev, the brother of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, was collaborating with Kolbayev in drug trafficking operations. The fate of Kolbayev and another well-known crime lord, Aziz Batukayev clearly illustrates the direction that Atambayev took during his time in office. Kolbayev was briefly arrested in 2011 and then released after trial (Marat, 2011). The witnesses frequently changed their statements, which in the end lead to the release of Kolbayev195 (Rickleton, 2013).

Batukayev is a renowned crime boss of Chechen descent who grew up in northern Kyrgyzstan. Kupatzde (2012) argues that Batukayev and Kolbayev were the only two criminals regarded as vory v zakone, thieves-in-law, indicating that the two were the most important crime bosses in the country at the time. He was sentenced to 16 years in prison for the murder of an MP and a prison officer (Marat, 2014). He was able to contact the outside world freely and his sister Yaha Bukatayeva has taken over drug trafficking operations in the southern city of Osh (Kupatadze, 2014a).

Pictures in the Kyrgyz media show that Batukayev controlled an entire floor of the prison, living a life of luxury with access to food and vodka. Many were astonished when Batukayev was released from prison in 2013. He was escorted to the manas airport and flown to Grozny, Chechnya in a private jet (24.kg). The prison authorities claimed that Batukayev was released because he had been diagnosed with leukaemia and had less than one year to live. A parliamentary report later found the claim that Batukayev was suffering from cancer false. The release caused outrage and was seen as proof that Kyrgyz officials had close ties with the criminal underworld. According to Marat (2014), a large number of high-ranking officials contributed to his release including Deputy Prime Minister Shamir Atakhanov, Interior Minister Abdylda Suranchiev, Ombudsman

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195 Kolabayev currently resides in Dubai (RFE/RL, 2018)
Tursunbek Akun, and prison chief Zarylbek RysAliyev. It is also alleged that President Atambayev has ties to Batukaev and other criminals.

The significance of these two cases is that they show that the Atambayev government was not ready to take a hard line against organised crime. The same can be said about the current government under Jeenbekov. Several convicted crime bosses have been released from prison during 2018 (Djanibekova, 2018a).

There is little doubt that the security situation in Kyrgyzstan is tense at best. The violence in Osh and Jalalabad in June 2010 shows that the central government cannot execute authority over the entire country. It is also true that Osh is a major hub on the drug trafficking route. Cracking down on drug trafficking in the region many led to intensified conflict between the north and the south and further political violence. An official in the interim government explained that:

"I would say, almost all of the parties, they still have people who are part of organised crime. For sure I know that there are twelve in the Respublika party, there are many in the other parties as well [...]. Otunbayeva is not a criminal, Atambayev, he is not a criminal. Even Babanov, I think is not a criminal. He is an opportunist for sure, but not a criminal. [...] So maybe, even if half the parliament are criminals it will be better."

Paul Quinn-Judge of the International Crisis Group Kyrgyzstan corroborated this, while holding a more pessimistic view:

"There are at least 12 people only in the leadership of the Respublika party who are involved with organised crime. And it is true that the new initiative means very little, there has been a lot of dealing to get those who were imprisoned in the last wave out, and it’s not only about the money, it’s about positions in government and civil service (Paul Quinn-Judge 2010)."

A high proportion of legislators, both on the local and national level have connections in organised crime (similar statements were made by Edil Baisalov 2011, Dosaly Esenaliyev 2011, Asiya Sasykbaeva 2011). The same is true for the civil service, particularly the judiciary and the police (Kupatadze, 2014a). It is also so true that an initiative to attempt to curb organised crime in general and drug

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196 Omurbek Babanov is the party leader of Respublika. He was Prime Minister from 2010 to 2012. He was dismissed and there were allegations of corruption and inefficient economic policies. Babanov, a successful businessman, entered into politics after Bakiyev was ousted.
trafficking in particular has been launched in cooperation with Russia (Interfax, 2011b, 2014c).

Kyrgyzstan has had three presidents since 2010 - Rasa Otunbayeva, Almazbek Atambayev, and Sooronbay Jeenbekov. Few politicians have been prosecuted in drug related crimes regardless of which president has held office. The examples of Kolabayev and Batukayev show, the top players in the criminal underworld are not subject to the law. Some sources claim that there has been a shift in the criminal world in Kyrgyzstan. With a critical mass of criminals holding political office, not only is money from drug trafficking used for intra-elite clientelism, the entire black market is now highly connected to gangs, with representation in parliament and local assemblies (anonymus 2019, anonymous 2019 and Michel, 2017). Kolabayev may have contributed to Jeenbekov’s election. Ata-Jurt MP Ulan Cholponbayev was connected to Kolabayev, and could through this link contribute to the campaign. Although Cholponbayev did not belong to Jeenbekov’s party there’s evidence to suggest that he facilitated transactions.

In both Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, there is a clear link between the political elites and organised crime. Drug routes pass through Kazakhstan and Tanzania as well, yet there is little evidence to suggest that the political elites of those countries are as heavily involved (Gastrow, 2011). It could be argued that the reason for this is that Kyrgyzstan and Kenya lack other major income, which could contribute to upholding intra-elite and mass-elite networks. There is little doubt that resources from the mining, gas and oil sectors are being used in that manner in Kazakhstan. Tanzania however does not hold that same kind of wealth in natural resources, politicians siphon assets off the state. The biggest difference between the states is that Tanzanian and Kazakhstani politicians have access to the state- and state-owned enterprises. Kenyan and Kyrgyzstani politicians often only have temporary access to the state. Because those systems are highly competitive, individuals cannot be assured that they will gain entry. If they are incumbent, they cannot be

197 In 2014, Ata-Jurt and Respublika party joined to form Respublika-Ata-Jurt. In 2017, the party leader Babanov ran for the presidency and came in second after Jeenbekov. He left the country shortly after the elections, and now stands accused in absentia of "stoking ethnic, racial, and religious hatred" and "publicly calling for the violent change of the constitutional order." Since then, Babanov’s Bishkek based TV station has been ceased. Babanov is one of the wealthiest individuals in Kyrgyzstan, and during his time as Prime Minister (2011-2012) his Respublika party allowed a number of well known criminals into the party.

198 Cholponbayev passed away in November 2017, shortly before Jeenbekov took office. Cholponbayev’s friends list on Facebook reveals that he had connections in the criminal underworld.

199 There are several images online of the two together, celebrating and posing for group photos.
sure that resources from the state will continue to flow, as there is a significant risk that they will be ousted from power. Finding others revenue streams therefore becomes paramount. Politicians who engage in organised crime enjoy some advantages. In Kenya, a number of interviewees claim that politicians have impunity, almost regardless of what types of crimes they commit (Musikari Kombo 2010, Kabando wa Kabando 2010, Norman Nyagah 2010). In Kyrgyzstan, because of the sheer number of politicians involved in drug trafficking and other forms of organised crime, there is a kind of safety in numbers. A professor at Kyrgyzstan Nation University said in an interview that:

The criminals here, they are in every party. If you look at a gang, they are not all in the same as the party. They will make sure that they have people on every party list. In that way, if someone is in power or out of power, it doesn’t really matter because they are protecting each other (professor KNU, 2011).

The same professor went on to explain that the criminal gangs often bridge the north/south divide in Kyrgyzstan politics, cooperating over both clan and ethnic divisions. The gangs then infiltrate all political parties, which are likely to have a stake in power. Considering recent events in the Kyrgyz parliament, this strategy has proved successful.

No party gained a dominant position in parliament after the elections in October 2010. There was simply no clear winner; no obvious coalition partners held a parliamentary majority. The party leaders of all five parties in parliament expressed personal ambitions, demanding influential positions in government. For that reason, it took months to form a government. Kyrgyzstan stood without a government for more than two months. On December 15\textsuperscript{th}, a coalition was formed between the Social Democratic SDPK, Respublika and Ata Meken. From the start, the new governing coalitions main characteristic was its continuing squabbling and infighting. Since then, the government has been disbanded twice. In August 2012, the government fell after Ata Meken and Ar Namys withdrew their support. The main reason for this was lack of confidence in the Prime Minister, Omurbek Babanov of the Respublika party.

Since the ousting of Bakiyev in 2010, Kyrgyzstan has faced economic crisis. The country relies heavily on income from the Kumtor goldmine, and the production at the mine had diminished considerably in the last years. In addition,

\footnote{Although drug trafficking generates the most income, other forms of organised crime are also common in Kyrgyzstan. For example, racketeering and human trafficking are commonplace (Kupatadze, A., 2014b; Marat, 2006b).}
there were serious allegations of corruption made against Babanov and other politicians. The Kumtor mine, which opened in 1992, has continually sparked controversy in Kyrgyzstan. Corruption allegations have surfaced, both under Akayev and Bakiyev. In broad strokes, a Canadian company Centerra Gold owns and runs mining operations at Kumtor. The Kyrgyz government has throughout been criticized as the mine provides too little income for the Kyrgyz state compared to the profits made by Centerra. It has been alleged that top politicians during the Akayev year, under Bakiyev and after 2010 have taken bribes from Centerra, while the people of Kyrgyzstan gain little profit from the operations. In addition, it is alleged that mining operations are run with little or no environmental concern, and that the mine poses a risk to the country's main water supply. Kumtor is the only gold mine in the world, which is located on a glacier, which is Kyrgyzstan's main source of drinking water. With this in mind, it is no surprise that debate about Kumtor, licencing and environmental concerns often run high in the Kyrgyz parliament. The nationalist party Ata Jurt has called for the nationalisation of the mining operations, while others, including Babanov called for renegotiation of the terms for Centerra.

When the Kyrgyz government fell in 2012, a new coalition was formed, in which Respublika was not included. Ata Meken, SDPK and Ar Namys formed government. Jantoro Satybaldiyev, who does not belong to a political party, was appointed new Prime Minister. He was appointed directly by president Atambayev in order to try to quell the bickering within the government. Satybaldiyev was also a strategic choice as he is from Osh in South of Kyrgyzstan. During the years that followed Bakiyev’s ouster, tensions between Kyrgyz nationalist politicians from the south and northerners had increased. The appointment of Satybaldiyev was a compromise and a concession to southern sentiments that they wielded too little power since the ousting of Bakiyev. After all, Ata Jurt, which is a southern nationalist party is the largest party in parliament. Yet, Ata-Jurt does not have considerable influence over politics, they have not been in government and calls for nationalisation of Kumtor have not been approved. Satybaldiyev was widely considered a technocrat, he had previously headed the State Directorate for Reconstruction and Development of Osh and Jalal-Abad, which had been formed in order to reconstruct and rebuild property, which had been damaged in during the ethnic violence in June 2010. Despite violent clashes at the Kumtor mine in May and June 2013, where protesters were demanding nationalisation of the mine Satybaldiyev could remain in power. He made some concessions, promising to renegotiate with Centerra Gold.

Satybaldiyev’s term in office did not last until the scheduled elections in November 2015. He was ousted from power in March 2014 over corruption
allegations. He was accused of misappropriating funds from the government and international aid during the rebuilding of Osh and Jalalabad. The main elite conflict after the ousting of Bakiyev was centred on the status of the city of Osh.

Again, the Ata-Meken party withdrew their support for the governing coalition. Joormart Otorbayev became Kyrgyzstan’s new PM. Again; a technocrat without party affiliation was selected. Temporary coalitions, frequent changes in the PMs office, and accusations of corruption have continued after Jeenbekov became president in 2017. Initially, Jeenbekov was seen as a puppet of former president Atambayev, who had backed him in the presidential campaign. A number of politicians, close to Atambayev have been charged with corruption during his time in Office. Former PM Sapar Isakov for example was charged in relation to Kumtor, and a corruption scandal involving Bishkek’s main power plant (Eurasianet, 2018a). A number of other former top officials are also being charged. Eurasianet reports that “[...] Jeenbekov has moved quickly to root all of Atambayev’s leftover cronies from senior positions.” (Djanibekova, 2018b). All the while, Atambayev is seeking an alliance with his former adversary Babanov, and parliament is discussing whether to lift immunity from prosecution for former presidents (Eurasianet, 2018b).

The removal of those close to Atambayev from positions of power are a sign that Jeenbekov is reducing the size of the intra-elite clientelistic network. Fewer individuals remain in the inner circle, and repression against the opposition has increased.

Since the ousting of Bakiyev, Kyrgyzstan has faced serious economic problems, the state in close to bankruptcy. This has been compounded by the US leaving the Manas Air Base. The conflict with the Kumtor and Centerra has also led to reduced profit for the state. Both Kumtor and Manas have been sources of funds for intra-elite clientelism in the past. As state assets are shrinking, politicians in Kyrgyzstan need to find other ways to uphold their networks, both with other elites and with their supporters. As we have seen, there is little evidence to suggest that the connection between organised crime and political actors has been broken with Jeenbekov in office. With less income, and a parliament with a large presence of people connected to organised crime, the intra-elite network around Jeenbekov is shrinking.

In both Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, it is essential for power holders to have access to funds in order to uphold their networks. There are several possible sources for

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201 Babanov ran for president against Jeenbekov in 2017. Atambayev used state media to smear Babanov, on the grounds that he is part ethnically Turkish. A criminal case against Babanov was filed, claiming he was plotting a coup (Eurasianet, 2018c)
such funds. The most obvious route is skimming resources from the state or corruption through connections to business people. In both states however, a growing number of elite actors do not have access to the state, or there is little money to be had, as state finances dwindle. In Kyrgyzstan, this need has been filled by organised crime for a number of years, and there are few signs that it will subside. In Kenya, the trend of politicians gaining income from trafficking and other organised crime is on the rise.

Both states also follow patterns where the size of intra-elite networks expand and retract, depending on access to resources. When fewer individuals and groups are included, selective prosecution is a common way of upholding stability, as is increase repression.

**Mass-Elite Clientelism**

After the end of dominance in Kyrgyzstan, mass-elite clientelism became more personalised. Under Akayev and Bakiyev in Kyrgyzstan and Moi in Kenya, at least in some cases resources for mass-support emanated from the state or party. After 2002 in Kenya, voters required resources from their elected MP to be distributed in order to re-elect him or her. Joyce Laboso (2010), an MP for Sotik constituency explained what her voters expected of her:

> Most of the things that people talk about are private problems and projects in the constituency. The one that you get the most questions and requests about is the personal. I am trying to get the people to understand that it is not possible for one person, one MP to, you know they think it is a very big salary, to address the personal needs of everyone.

Similar sentiments were expressed by a large majority of the MPs interviewed (Peter Kenneth 2010, Kabando wa Kabando 2010, Margareth Kamar 2010, Musikari Kombo 2010). Norman Nyagah, a veteran in Kenyan politics having served three terms in parliament said that: “Whoever can afford to give more seems to be the one that people follow.”. Ahead of the 2007 elections a political scientist at Nairobi University expressed that there is competition in the Kenyan system, but not based on programmatic differences between parties.

> If you look at Kibaki’s government also, it is a government run by people who have property, Moi has property, Kibaki has property, and they are old. So, they are united in a class property ownership. So they will not want a system that will disturb this. And Moi would feel that it is better for Kibaki to come back again
because that way they are united in terms of protecting their property (Fred Jonyo 2006).

Jonyo’s understanding that politics in Kenya is more about protecting property, power and access to resources may be a credible explanation for the fact that a number of unlikely coalitions have formed since the end of dominance in 2002. The salaries of MPs in Kenya have increased substantially in recent years. According to the BBC, Kenyan lawmakers are among the best paid in the world. Given the necessity for MPs to contribute to their constituents on a personal level, this is not surprising.

Some measures had been put in place to avoid direct clientelistic relationships between voters and office holders. Constituency Development Funds (CDF) had been introduced in order to assist with local development projects and provide scholarships for education and healthcare. The process is that the MP for a constituency selects a committee, which is responsible for distributing means, which would lead to development in the local community. Most MPs interviewed mentioned CDF as a way of changing the relationship with voters and to avoid clientelism. However, the majority acknowledged that it was more common for voters to turn to them directly for support than to the CDF committee. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that CDF funds are a form of clientelism and distributed on the basis of the expectation for political support. A Nairobi journalist said:

The CDF is a problem. MPs, they will make sure that the people who apply think that the money is coming from them personally. In some areas, I don’t say all, I think that CDF has become a way for MPs to increase patronage resources, this will make him more popular (anonymous 2010).

Similarly, a number of reports point out that CDF money is sometimes embezzled and that it is a new source of corruption (Inyanji, 2018; Karanja, 2010). Tsubura (2014: 41) also finds that 16% of the total CDF funds between 2007 and 2009 are unaccounted for, indicating high levels of corruption and misuse of funds. There has been an exponential increase in the amount of money spent by government of CDF since its introduction in 2003. The main argument for the CDF fund is that MPs can contribute to their communities without having to resort to corruption. As this study has shown, relationships between power holders and the electorate are personalistic in Kenya. A number of MPs interviewed argue
that the root cause of grand corruption in Kenya is that voters expect direct benefits rather than political change\textsuperscript{202}.

One of the main problems with this argument is that it places the responsibility for clientelistic relationships and grand corruption with the electorate rather than those in power. In this world view, it is the voter’s unreasonable expectations that leads politicians to corruption for the simple reason that funds are necessary in order to uphold mass-elite clientelism. This analysis ignores intra-elite relationships and the cost of retaining political coalitions. As a Nairobi based journalist working for an international news agency said:

Yes, elections in Kenya are very expensive. People spend money in their constituencies and there are a number of expectations. […] Thinking of all of this, it is easy to forget that a lot, I would say most, of the money from grand corruption is used by the elite, for cars, private schools, for families. It is because of a lifestyle. Money changes hand most of the time because people are buying support from other elites, not because they are buying their constituents. It is much more expensive to buy a wabenzi than a wananchi\textsuperscript{203}

Voters are spoken about as followers, who will vote with their local leaders and representatives of their ethnic group. A Luhya\textsuperscript{204} politician explains how he thinks his support for Kibaki affected the outcome of the 2007 elections:

[I]f I did not do what I did, Kibaki would not be president today and that is definite. But at the same time, I think the violence and ruthlessness would have been worse, and I do not think that tribalism is the right thing to do. I need to legitimise Kibaki having been a minister a under his system, and say that it is not just tribalism. So, let me give him a section again and gave him the Luhyas and he got 400 000-500 000 votes because of me. I do not think it’s something I cannot brag about, and so he became president (Musikari Kombo 2010).

\textsuperscript{202} This problem is explored in depth by Persson et al. 2013

\textsuperscript{203} Wabenzi refers to corrupt government officials, literally people with mercedes-benz. Wananchi refers to ordinary people, literally child of the nation.

\textsuperscript{204} The Luhya ethnic group is considered important in Kenyan politics, as they represent a substantial portion of the population. Luhyas have a history of changing their political allegiance. Therefore, aspiring presidential candidates of all ethnic groups often strive to form coalitions with Luhya politicians. For this reason, there have been a large number of Luhya vice-presidents and other top officials. For Musikari Kombo, his service to Kibaki during the election campaign contributed to his nomination to parliament, despite losing the elections in his home constituency.
Like in Kenya, voting in Kyrgyzstan is based on mass-elite clientelist ties. Southerners vote for southerners and northerners for northerners. This can easily be verified by examining the results from the parliamentary elections in 2010. The Ata Jurt party, which is dominated by individuals from the south, achieve their best results in the southern city of Osh. Huskey and Hill (2013) write that the 90% of voters supported the interim government in northern Kyrgyzstan, compared to only 16% in Osh in the south. However, coalition building across this divide frequently takes place. This is not least visible in the process of building viable governing coalitions after the 2010 parliamentary elections. Before the elections a large number of parties registered to take part. As a political analyst in Bishkek put it:

In every village, there is someone who is popular, who can pull together some votes. What they do is, the start a part, announce how many votes they can get, and then “sell” those votes to another, larger party. In exchange, they might get a position, sometimes money, sometimes something else. That’s why there are so many parties. Everyone is an opportunist these days.

The leader of a youth organisation in Bishkek explained how this process takes place in practice. He said that:

They [LPP205] knew that he [Bakiyev] was corrupt and they wanted to protest against the politics in those years. Then, suddenly they changed their minds. They stopped existing, they stopped protesting and instead they all joined the Ak Zhol youth wing. [...] It is clear that they were bought. Bakiyev and Ak Zhol were tired of them protesting, so they offered money and political positions for the top LPP members for them to stop it and join the Ak Zhol youth instead. That is what happened then during Bakiyev, and it is what is still happening now.

Although the LPP is a fairly insignificant political player, this description of how organisations join and merge is telling, as it describes the constant negotiations going on in order to garner votes for the elections. As Radnitz (2010a) points out, the high poverty levels of the Kyrgyz population, as well as a relatively high proportion of young people means that it is easy to mobilise a large number of people to support political projects. Often, parties and power seekers pay youths taking part in demonstrations and other political activities. As discussed earlier,

205 The LPP is a small party with little influence. In 2007, the party organised a number of protests against Bakiyev. In a political U-turn party leader Maksat Kunakunov became an MP for the presidential party Ak Zhol.
that was the case during the Tulip Revolution as well as during the events, which led to the ousting of Bakiyev in 2010.

There are clear similarities between mass-elite clientelism in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan. In both states, voters expect and receive resources in return for support. There are also signs that these relationships are personal, in that local big men play a part in the exchange. In Kyrgyzstan, exchanges seem to have more involvement by intermediaries. Will mass-elite clientelism personalised, candidates vying for office need personal wealth. Because of the diminishing involvement of political parties and the state, candidates are left to uphold clientelistic relationships without institutional support. The difference between the states is influenced by the fact that Kyrgyzstan has proportional representation and Kenya a first-past-the-post system. Because of this personalised mass-elite clientelism becomes more complex than simply asking voters to elect a particular MP.

Repression

It would be reasonable to assume that the dynamics of repression would change as states move from dominance to competitive authoritarianism, as the incumbent can no longer monopolise the states police and judiciary. It is therefore essential to understand how the role of the state in repression has changed. The end of dominance in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan has not spelled the end of repression or intimidation. There were initial signs that repression was a thing of the past in Kenya in 2002 and in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. The 2002 general elections in Kenya were much freer and fairer than the multi-party elections held in 1992. The European Union observation mission for example noted that the 2002 elections “mark an important step forward in the process of democratic development in Kenya” (EU, 2003: 4). Others followed suit. The Commonwealth also commended Kenya: “[T]he electoral process was credible, the conditions existed for a free expression of will by the electors and the results reflected the wishes of the people” (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006: 27). The 2010 parliamentary elections Kyrgyzstan also gained international praise. OSCE/ODIHR, which sent the largest mission to Kyrgyzstan stated that the parliamentary elections were “a further consolidation of the democratic process” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2010). Their assessment of the 2011 was not as positive, OSCE/ODIHR found serious irregularities during Election Day as well as other shortcomings (OSCE/ODIHR, 2011a). It would be a mistake to state that the international community was wholly positive regarding the Kenyan and Kyrgyz elections. The EU, the commonwealth and OSCE/ODIHR were critical of some aspects, while
maintaining the position that Kyrgyzstan and Kenya were making moves towards democracy.

The most dramatic incidents of intimidation violence and repression, which have taken place since the end of dominance are the post 2007 election violence in Kenya and the 2010 Osh crisis in southern Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan, the aftermath of the violence has led to a debate about the respective strength of the parliament and president. In an interview with Felix Kulov, he repeatedly returns to a discussion of the ethnic violence in Osh in the summer of 2010 as proof that the interim government lacked control of the country. This was taken as an argument that a strong executive is needed in order to take charge of the entire country. Attacks took place in the southern city of Osh sparking violence, which left 400-600 people dead (Collins, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2010; Huskey and Hill, 2011; Rezvani, 2013; Wachtel, 2013). According to the UN refugee agency, 100000 people fled southern Kyrgyzstan for Uzbekistan, while 300 000 were internally displaced (UNHCR, 2010). The clashes were similar to the ones, which took place in the same area in 1990. According to Human Right Watch, and International Crisis Group, who have both published extensive reports on the Osh events, the attacks planned and the local authorities were involved. Their investigations also show that the vast majority of the victims were of Uzbek decent (Human Rights Watch, 2010; International Crisis Group, 2010). The international organisations and media tell the same story. On the 10th of June, riots took place in Osh, with a large number of mainly Uzbek people on the streets. During the following days, Kyrgyz people, mostly young men attacked Uzbek homes and people in Osh. The violence later spread to the city of Jalalabad, although to a lesser extent. In Osh, the Uzbek community attempted to protect their neighbourhoods by erecting roadblocks. For the most part, the same method was used during the attacks. The roadblocks were knocked down using armoured personnel carriers. Men in military uniform manned them. Once the access was ensured, men with weapons entered the Uzbek areas, burning down houses, looting, killing and raping (Hanks, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2010, 2012).

The Ferghana valley, where Osh is situated, is an area where a large number of ethnic groups reside. About half of the residents of Osh are ethnic Uzbeks, and the city dominated by Uzbeks prior to industrialisation when a large number of Kyrgyz moved to the south to seek employment. Generally speaking, trade and
industry is dominated by the Uzbek group, while the Kyrgyz enjoy much larger representation in the political sphere and public service\textsuperscript{206}.

The violence in Osh in June 2010 is relevant to understanding political cleavages and the ability of political leaders to mobilise. Felix Kulov’s statement that political elites have access to arms and the ability to mobilise seems correct. In analysing elite groups in Southern Kyrgyzstan, it becomes apparent that most, if not all groupings of political significance have access to militias, armed groups, criminal gangs and/or are connected to sports clubs\textsuperscript{207}. These armed groups remain a threat, both against individual political adversaries and groups, they are a form of privatised repression. There are serious conflicts within the Kyrgyz elite groups and that it is difficult for the central government to remain in control. An MP for the Kyrgyz nationalist party Ata-Jurt with a large following in the south said in an interview that:

> You have to understand that the Uzbek in this country, well they have freedom, to speak, to act… and wealth. It is true! They have nothing in their home country. […] They are making a fortune here, where many Kyrgyz have nothing. I think they should learn our culture, they should speak Kyrgyz, they are not respecting us. […] The government here [in Bishkek] they are not understanding this, because here, there are not so many Uzbeks (Borat Boriev 2010).

The Kyrgyz nationalist Mayor of Osh Melis Myrzakmatov\textsuperscript{208} proved to be a formidable opponent of the Bishkek government, during Otunbayeva’s time in office. There were several embarrassing incidents where Otunbayeva attempted to dismiss Myrzakmatov, as did Atambayev without success\textsuperscript{209}. Myrzakmatov was eventually dismissed in 2013. Unhappy with the conclusions of the HRW, ICG and an International independent inquiry into the June events, Myrzakmatov published his own 400-page report on the violence challenging the narrative presented by the international community. The sentiment was that the interim government was too influenced by the west and the international community, and

\textsuperscript{206} Traditionally, Uzbeks in the south tend to live in the urban areas, while the Kyrgyz dominate in the rural surroundings. Tishkov (1997) reports that 46% of Osh residents were Uzbek, 24% Kyrgyz and 20% Russian. In the countryside surrounding 86.9% were ethnic Kyrgyz. It is possible that these numbers have changed slightly since 1997, however it gives an insight into the urban/rural divide in southern Kyrgyzstan.

\textsuperscript{207} As mentioned, sports clubs often serve as private security for elite actors n Kyrgyzstan.

\textsuperscript{208} Myrzakmatov was one of the few open supporters of Bakiyev who remained in office.

\textsuperscript{209} Myrzakmatov eventually lost the 2014 mayoral elections to a candidate loyal to the government in Bishkek.
that the concerns of ordinary Kyrgyz were not on the agenda. The violence in Osh, and the aftermath shows that repression and political violence is privatised, militias and groups of youths are to a large extent used for repression. Since 2011, there have been no major ethnic violence in Osh. Jeenbekov, who is from the Osh region is close to many of the nationalist politicians of the south.

In recent years, the Islamic State (IS) has been on the rise, recruiting mainly relatively affluent people between 25 and 25 in age. Most hail from the south, and many of Uzbek decent\(^{210}\) (Matveeva 2018: 33). In June 2018, it was reported that a total of 150 Kyrgyz citizens had died, fighting for IS in Syria (RFE/RL, 2018c). In 2015, the government reported that they had prevented two attacks by IS militants in Bishkek, and there are several examples of individuals who have been arrested and charged on terrorism charges. Matveeva (2018) argues that radicalised Islamists in Southern Kyrgyzstan are not connected to the main criminal gangs\(^{211}\) or politicians in office. Though IS in Kyrgyzstan see the state as an enemy, they have few political affiliations and cannot for example be mobilised to support one candidate over another.

Osh is a major hub for drug trafficking. Before 2010, it is alleged that most of this trade was monopolised by Uzbek criminal gangs. A few days prior to the outbreak of violence in June, one of the most notorious drug traffickers of southern Kyrgyzstan, Aibek Mirsidikov, was murdered. Mirsidikov lead a gang comprised of mostly Uzbeks, which was widely believed to cooperate with president Kurmanbek Bakiyev, as well as Myrzakmatov. It is unclear why he was killed and how was behind his murder. After the violence, it is said that the drug trade has largely been taken over by Kyrgyz gangs, with political ties.

On some level, the violence in Osh in 2010 share some commonalities with the post-election violence in Kenya after the 2007 general elections. When Moi and NARC lost power in 2002, there was very little political violence. After the 2007 elections, more than 1000 persons were killed and violence raged throughout the country. Both in Kyrgyzstan and Kenya, the ethnic violence is a clear sign of the lack of state control and a weak central government.

There have been several investigations conducted on the post-election violence in Kenya. Most notably, the Government launched a full-scale investigation into the crisis, which encompassed all regions where post-election violence took place.

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\(^{210}\) It is not clear whether Uzbeks are being arrested on charges of terrorism to a larger extent than others because there are more radicalised individuals in that group, or if the state is using IS and terrorism to clamp down on the Uzbek minority.

\(^{211}\) Though crime is sometimes used to fund Jihadi activities, and some of the recruits have previously been convicted of petty crimes.
The commission, headed by Justice Philip Waki\textsuperscript{212}, conducted a large number of interviews in order to reveal the course of events and whom should be held responsible\textsuperscript{213}. A number of independent inquiries were also published (Human Rights Watch, 2008; International Crisis Group, 2008; KNCHR, 2008). The findings in these reports are similar. All point to a political culture of impunity, where high ranking politicians who have incited political violence in the past have not faced consequences. There is also agreement that they violence was not spontaneous. One interviewee in the HRW report, who took part in perpetrating violence said that:

This was not done by ordinary citizens, it was arranged by people with money, they bought the jobless like me. [...] People at the [bus] stage, the ones who run the matatu [minibus] business, they called us [the jobless who hang around there] to a meeting around 2 p.m. [...] They said we should be ready on Saturday. I recognised the leaders, they are the owners of businesses in town, they did not hide their faces. We were paid 200 shillings for going to the meeting, and we were told we would get the rest after the job, it was like a business. (quoted in Human Rights Watch, 2008: 45f).

It is clear that politicians were the main instigators. KNCHR report that ”violence was largely instigated by politicians” (2008: 8). The individuals who perpetrated the violence were often jobless youths or groups involved in organised crime. All reports mention the participation of Mungiki\textsuperscript{214} and other or criminal gangs such as the Taliban\textsuperscript{215}. It seems that while young jobless youths were hired to loot, riot, burn houses, rape and beat opponents, the crimes of Mungiki, the Taliban and other groups were well organised and geared at systematic murder and abuse. For example, it is reported that members of the Mungiki publically humiliated ad mutilated Lou men by systematically circumcising\textsuperscript{216} them using pangas\textsuperscript{217} and broken bottles (KNCHR, 2008: 80). HRW describe a scene in Nakuru, where

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{212} The Waki commission did not publish the names of accused top politicians. Instead, a list was handed over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague.
\item \textsuperscript{213} Most member of Mungiki are Kikuyu. The gang is known to be hired by Kikuyu politicians on occasion.
\item \textsuperscript{214} The Taliban are a Luo organised crime group. Despite the name, there is no connection to the Taliban of Afghanistan.
\item \textsuperscript{215} The Luo people do not have a tradition of circumcising boys, unlike many other Kenyan ethnic groups.
\item \textsuperscript{216} A type of machete or large knife, usually used in agriculture.
\end{itemize}
about 50 men of Luo and Luhya origin were rounded up and forcefully circumcised, some of them were killed (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 50). On a similar note, ICG report that the police in Karsani, a Nairobi suburb, picked up 38 bodies in one day of Luo men who had been forcibly circumcised and left to bleed to death (International Crisis Group, 2008: 9). Later developments show that top politicians were likely to be involved. Kenya’s current president and vice president were accused of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal court in The Hague. The case against president Kenyatta has since been dropped. It is also evident that the Kenyan police was responsible for hundreds of deaths during the crisis. It is reported that the police fired indiscriminately during demonstrations, riots and looting (KNCHR, 2008). ICG report that “the police had taken sides and used terror tactics against slum dwellers” (International Crisis Group, 2008: 9). HRW report that the majority of the people killed by the police were shot in the head or chest, indicating that the police had a shoot to kill policy. There is no doubt that the police used excessive force in many instances, for example using live rounds against individuals who were protesting or looting and no violence against any individual persons was taking place. The reports however paint a more sinister picture. KNCHR write that security forces sometimes opted to protect individuals from their own ethnic group, while targeting others (KNCHR, 2008: 9).

In a number of ways, the Kenyan crisis in 2007 closely resembles the violence in Osh and surrounding areas in June 2010. In both cases, criminal gangs and disenfranchised youths were mobilised by politicians and business people to carry out ethnic violence. The police and security forces did not respond adequately to protect lives, but were rather drawn into the conflict – in both Kenya and Kyrgyzstan police was seen actively taking part in the violence. The conclusion we can draw from this is that violence and repression has been privatised to a large extent in the two states. Individual politicians have the ability to mobilise and execute violence against their perceived opponents without access to or involvement of the state. The police and security forces were also involved in committing violence in both cases. It would be false to say that they were acting on the orders of the central authority or on government orders.

Witnesses, who were to give evidence against Kenyatta in the Hague withdrew their testimony, and in some cases disappeared. There is evidence that these individuals were harassed, and in some cases killed. Many of those witnesses were perpetrators of violence and involved in criminal gangs. They alleged that they received orders from Kenyatta and other prominent politicians during the post-election violence. (BBC, 2013).
Police in Southern Kyrgyzstan were acting in direct conflict to orders given by the government in the capital. There are a number of examples of Kyrgyz police tirelessly supporting criminal gangs and youths in their persecution of the Uzbek population. The picture of the role of police in Kenya is more ambiguous. Although there are some reports of police protecting civilians, in other cases police were overwhelmed and unable to act, yet in some cases police were engaged in extra-judicial killings. The complex picture is largely due to the intricacies of the Kenyan crisis. Different ethnic groups were targeted in the different regions; as a rule, minority populations, which were perceived to support the political opponent, were the targets for attacks. Oftentimes, the police would support the majority in the particular region as well. The action of police and security forces in both countries shows that the central government is not in control. It would be simplistic to argue that the incumbent has the states security apparatus at its disposal as a means of control.

A number of reports point out that Kyrgyzstan’s human rights record has not improved since the overthrow of Bakiyev. There have been major crackdowns on the media, with a number of journalists arrested on charges of “insulting the president” (Reporters Without Borders, 2018). Two opposition leaders, Omurbek Tekebayev and Omurbek Babanov have both been targeted by the authorities. Tekebayev, who was the leader of one of the main opposition parties Ata-Meken was sentenced to 8 years in prison on charges of corruption and fraud in August 2017 (Kabar, 2017). The same month, a TV station linked to Tekebayev was shut down for promoting “extremist” views. Babanov, who won 33% of the vote in the 2017 presidential elections, went into exile immediately after the elections, as he faced charges of “inciting ethnic hatred during the campaign. A number of individuals, who held positions under Atambayev have been charged, and in some cases sentenced on corruption charges (Djanibekova, 2018)

One of the reasons for this is that there is a greater reliance on Russia rather than on Western partners. In a move, which resembles Russia’s human rights record there is a bill pending in parliament, which would ban homosexual propaganda, or more specifically outlaw “forming a positive attitude to non-traditional sexual relationships.” (Verbenko, 2014). As Atambayev has shown no signs of protesting the proposed bills it is likely that they will pass. In 2012, Russia introduced a “foreign agents” law, which compels NGOs with any foreign funding to register with the authorities. The NGOs are required to fill in lengthy and time-consuming audits at regular intervals. In Russia, a large number of both national and international rights groups have been raided for non-compliance. These include offices of Human Rights Watch, Transparency International and
Amnesty International. Russia’s only independent election monitoring organisation, GOLOS has been fined 10,000 USD for failing to register, as they receive some foreign funding. At the time of writing, the Kyrgyz parliament is debating the introduction of a similar law. President Atambayev supports the law, stating that NGOs are “Hidden Political Structures” he added that “We have some NGOs actually undercover engaged in political activity, their financial capacity is much greater than even the individual parliamentary parties” (Atambayev cited in KCHR, 2014). This points to a will to limit the influence of NGOs in politics. Compared to other Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan has a great many NGOs, many of them partly funded by foreign organisations. As a prelude to the “foreign agent” law, Advocacy Center for Human Rights, a Kyrgyz NGO, now stands accused in court for carrying out an opinion survey on minority rights in southern Kyrgyzstan. The organisation receives funding from US based Freedom House. The Kyrgyz security service filed the case in order “to prevent intelligence and subversive activities by foreign special services and organisations” (Burke, 2014). There is little doubt that the topic of the research is controversial in Kyrgyzstan. Since the violence in Osh in June 2010, the Uzbek minority population has faced increasingly oppressive measures. Paul Quinn-Judge of ICG said that:

It seems that discrimination [of Uzbeks] has increased everywhere in society. The police in the south is almost completely dominated by Kyrgyz now, although there are some Russians as well. All of the Uzbeks are being excluded from the police and from all other public sector jobs (Paul Quinn-Judge 2011).

Uzbeks in the south are subject to arbitrary arrests, torture, discrimination and extortion. It is commonplace that Uzbeks are detained by the police and the family forced to pay for their release (International Crisis Group, 2012:10f). ICG also report that people in the Aravan district, an Uzbek majority community of about 105,000 people, were coerced into voting for the Kyrgyz nationalist party Ata-Jurt during the 2010 parliamentary elections. Organised crime figures appeared in the town, threatening community leaders that the houses of people who did not vote for Ata-Jurt would be burned to the ground and that there would be reprisals against the relatives of leaders who refused or failed to mobilise the vote. Ata-Jurt won the election in Aravan, where a distraught resident told ICG “We voted Ata-Jurt because no one protected us” (ibid 12).

Ethnicity has become a touchy subject in Kyrgyzstan, as Kyrgyz nationalism surges. In a case, which has gained much national and international attention, an Uzbek human rights activist and journalist, Azimjon Askarov, has been sentenced
to life imprisonment for allegedly inciting ethnic hatred and taking part in the murder of a Kyrgyz police officer during the violent events in Osh in June. There is no evidence linking him to the crimes. Askarov is one of the few individuals who provided footage for international news agencies of the violence, showing Kyrgyz armed men and police officers taking part in the burning of Uzbek neighbourhoods in Osh (Freedman, 2013). There are a number of other cases where journalists have been prosecuted for inciting ethnic hatred. A Russian new site, Fergana, which opposed the narrative that the Ethnic violence in Osh was incited by Uzbeks was blocked through a vote in parliament and a number of foreign nationals have been expelled from the country for placing the blame on Kyrgyz nationalists (Trilling, 2011). Fergana is a major new site, which has extensive coverage of Kyrgyzstan. Freedman (2013) finds that journalists in the south face a much harsher media climate, a large number of journalists report that they self-censor in order to avoid prosecution for inciting ethnic tension. Two Kyrgyz language newspapers have closed and most ethnic Uzbek journalists in the south have moved into exile or to Bishkek for fear of reprisals.

Since 2010, a number of organisations report that arbitrary attacks on journalists still take place, and since Jeenbekov took office in 2017, harassment of the media has increased. Defamation lawsuits against journalists and media outlets, as well as deporting foreign journalists219 have become commonplace (Media Policy Institute, 2018).

Journalists, and in some cases media networks, in Kyrgyzstan are often connected to individual political leaders or groups. A journalist with Kyrgyzstan’s 24.kg news website claimed in an interview that salaries for journalists in Kyrgyzstan are low. Further, politicians and others often approach journalists working for established channels either to prompt them to write stories on particular topics, or to refrain from writing certain stories. The journalist went on to claim that it would be difficult for many to survive financially without this:

The reporting becomes inaccurate. For the journalists, sometimes it is not so important if they are writing the truth. They are exaggerating some corruption, while the really big ones who have money, many times, they are not reported. In the end, people need to put food on the table (journalist, 2011).

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219 In 2017, AFPs Central Asia correspondent Chris Rickleton was deported from Kyrgyzstan. At the time Rickleton, who is a UK citizen, had lived in Kyrgyzstan for 8 years with his Kyrgyz wife and child. As of January 2019, he has not been allowed back into Kyrgyzstan.
In Kenya, overall harassment of journalists has increased dramatically in recent years. In 2013, a survey was carried out on the safety of journalism in Kenya. Out of the 282 respondents 70% claimed that they did not feel safe in their professional lives. 41% said that the main threat was politicians, while 34% said the main threat was organised crime. 9.7% of Kenyan journalists claimed to have been physically assaulted in their line of work (Hivos, 2013). Before the introduction of multi-party rule, journalists were routinely detained in Kenya. Between 1992 and 2002, these practices continued to some degree, although threats, violence and harassment by non-state actors became more common.

There are several examples in recent years of politicians and other public officials trying to silence the press. In 2009, Francis Kainda Nyaruri, a newspaper journalist, had been writing about corruption in the local authorities. He was found decapitated and bound in in the Kodera Forest close to his home (CPJ, 2009). Perhaps the most damming of the attacks in recent years is that there are a large number of cases where journalists have been attacked because of their reporting on the case against president Uhuru Kenyatta and vice president William Ruto in The Hague. In one case, a freelancer for the Star newspaper received death threats after reporting on the trail. Later on, some individuals visited the Star’s offices, threatening to bomb the premises. When the editor of the newspaper reported the crime at a local police station, no action was taken (Hivos, 2013: 45).

There is no doubt that harassment of journalists in Kenya has increased in recent years. During Kibaki’s time in office, fewer journalists were arrested or harassed by the police. Politicians harassed journalists through private actors, such as groups involved in organised crime, youth groups or other individuals. Threats against journalists had thus largely been privatised in the same manner that other forms of political violence have been privatised in Kenya in recent years.

Nine days before the August presidential elections in 2017, a senior official with Kenya’s Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) was found tortured and murdered in a Nairobi outskirt.²²⁰ Chris Msando had a key role in developing a new electronic ballot and voter registration system, and had featured frequently in the news, reassuring voters that the voting procedure would be free from tampering (Burke, 2017b). A few days later, a Canadian election advisor along with a US colleague sent to help the Odinga campaign verify the vote count were arrested and deported from Kenya at gunpoint, and the vote counting office was ransacked (Epstein, 2017). During election day the new

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²²⁰ 21 year old student Carol Ngumba was also found dead and tortured, in what some considered a love triangle, but most a coverup (interview journalist 2018)
electronic voting system broke down, and election results came in through text message, rather than through the official system. Results from a number of polling stations showed a 100% turnout rate and no votes for candidates besides Kenyatta (ibid). International observers from the Carter Center found that the results were seriously flawed, and that at least half a million more votes had been counted in the presidential elections than in the parliamentary elections that took place on the same day (Carter Report, 2017:51). After Odinga protested the results in the Supreme Court, the results were annulled and new elections called. Odinga boycotted the new elections held in October, and Kenyatta won with 98.3% of the vote\textsuperscript{221}.

After the flawed August elections, Raila Odinga held an event in Nairobi’s Uhuru Park. He held a speech denouncing the election results as flawed, and a mock swearing in ceremony took place. Ahead of the event, four TV stations that were planning to air the rally were shut down\textsuperscript{222}. The two persons standing next to Odinga on the podium were arrested and detained\textsuperscript{223}.

The Msando murder is seemingly an example of privatised repression\textsuperscript{224}. State repression was also used. The electoral fraud, deportations and arrests were carried out by the police, which shows that both forms of repression were used in order to win the 2017 elections.

At first glance, the media landscape in Kenya seems independent and free. National newspapers such as the Nation, the Star and the Standard routinely publish investigative features, exposing corruption and other abuse of power. Since 2013, the media climate has become more repressive, using the legal system to silence those who criticise the current government (DW, 2018).

\textsuperscript{221} The short campaign period and opposition boycott contributed to a 38.8% compared to 79.5% in the August elections.

\textsuperscript{222} The TV stations included NTV, KTN and Citizen TV, together they have about 70% of the viewership.

\textsuperscript{223} Miguna Miguna, one of the persons is a dual Canadian/Kenyan national. He was deported after his detention. 14 Odinga supporters, who attended the rally had their passports revoked (Madowo, 2018).

\textsuperscript{224} During the years 2016–2018 the number of extrajudicial killings increased significantly in Kenya, according to Human Rights Watch. Most of the people killed were either killed by police in land and grazing conflicts, killed in disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods, or killed without trial on suspicion of terrorism. After the August polls in 2017, police went house to house to identify people involved in protests against Uhuru Kenyatta. At least 67 people were killed by police in their homes during these raids. These killings show that the Kenyan police force is used as a tool of repression, favouring the incumbent president (Human Rights Watch, 2018)
In 2010, journalists stated in interviews that there is some self-censorship, based on the ownership of the media group, ethnic concerns and fear of reprisals (newspaper journalist 2010, Winnie Atieno 2010, Salomon Kirimi 2010). Their accounts imply that there are fairly close relations between politicians, businessmen and journalists. Other sources show that these relationships sometimes have mutual benefits. Kipkemboi, a sub editor with the Standard said that:

Kipkemboi (2011) [...] reveals that most Kenyan journalists normally will meet politicians from their tribes after work, and subsequently get paid to ensure continued positive coverage for the big man, thus compromising the basic responsibilities to their media institutions and society in general Kipkemboi, cited in (Ugangu, 2011).

This account shows that there are similarities between the media landscapes in Kyrgyzstan and Kenya. In both states, journalists face the risk of harassment, violence or even murder for their reporting. Many journalists have formed close-knit ties with politicians, where a large portion of their income comes from businessmen and politicians with vested interests. In both Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, the media has had a role in ethnic violence. A number of scholars write of the inflammatory rhetoric in Kenyan media during the post-election violence in 2007, inciting violence and ethnic hatred. Likewise, in Kyrgyzstan, a number of radio stations played a similar role of fuelling the fire of anti-Uzbek sentiments in southern Kyrgyzstan. In both countries, the current presidents (Jeenbekov and Kenyatta) have shifted to using the legal system to get rid of critical voices.

There are other examples of privatised repression in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan since the end of dominant party rule. First and foremost, the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007 and the June 2010 events in Kyrgyzstan point to individual politicians primarily using private actors rather than the state itself to carry out violence. There is evidence to suggest that the police and other authorities were accomplices in some cases, and did not take action to stop the violence.

Both privatised and state repression exist in both states. However, since the election of Kenyatta in 2013 and Jeenbekov in 2017, the legal system has been used more frequently to sideline challengers. Patterns of selective prosecutions are evident in both states, as individuals who face charges or have been convicted have criticised the incumbent or belong to other elite networks.
Summary: Kyrgyzstan and Kenya

Politics in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan is a highly competitive venture, the outcome of elections is not a given. Intra-elite networks not cohesive; in order to win elections, temporary alliances are often formed. Ahead of elections, a fair amount of maneuvering takes place to attract popular candidates to particular parties or alliances in order to secure victory. There is not a single powerful elite network, rather a number of groups compete for power, forming alliances when needed. Intra-elite clientelism has not decreased in the two states since the dominant party failed. It is evident that the size of the elite networks vary over time depending on resources available to the incumbent. When elite networks reduce in size, more repression is used.

Mass-elite clientelism has become more important since 2002 in Kenya and 2010 in Kyrgyzstan. Voters expect goods in return for support. In Kenya, clientelism is personalised, the relationship is between voter and candidate, not voter and party or the state. A similar pattern can be observed in Kyrgyzstan, where the support of local big men is instrumental to garnering political support.

There is no evidence that corruption has ended, as a result of a competitive system. Although the state is still important for securing funds for clientelism in the two states, a gradual shift to other sources of funding has taken place. Income from organised crime has been and is an important source of income for the political elite in Kyrgyzstan. There is little doubt that this reliance on crime has come about as access to the state has not been secure for incumbents or the opposition. A similar pattern is emerging in Kenya, where crime lords are making their entry into politics and providing resources for clientelism. In recent years, with Kenyatta consolidating power over the state, there are signs that more corruption simply involves siphoning funds off state enterprises or from public funds.

There are signs that Kyrgyzstan is taking steps towards authoritarianism with new legislation to hamper the influence of NGOs and a law against homosexual propaganda. These measures are following Russia’s lead. At the same time, there has been a clear increase in state harassment of the Uzbek minority and of activists and journalists championing minority rights. Since Jeenbekov became president, there have been a number of arrests and convictions of journalists, indicating that the state is now an important actor in repression.

When it comes to execution of repression, politicians have turned to organised crime and other groups in a number of instances since the end of dominance. The violence in Osh in 2010 shows that there are a number of big men who have the ability to mobilise armed groups. The violence in Kenya after the 2007 elections
shows a similar pattern, where political elites have the ability and will to mobilise ethnic violence. There are also signs that journalists and others face harassment by private actors hired by politicians to insight fear.

The general conclusion is that repression and clientelism has not decreased as a result of political competition. The change is instead that they have been in some cases been privatised, politicians turn to private fortunes and organised crime to fund clientelism. Repression is carried out by police, security services and the judiciary, as well as private actors such as criminal gangs, militias or individuals who are connected to political actors. When incumbents gain access to state resources, these are used for both repression and clientelism. Yet, even incumbent who have access with command over the police and judiciary use privatised repression as a form of intimidation.
Conclusions

Summary of the Empirical Findings

**Kyrgyzstan**

There are clear similarities between the dynamics of elite interactions in the time periods studied here. A number of intra-elite networks compete for power, co-opt one another, either to support or oust the incumbent regime. Elite actors are easily co-opted through clientelism (for example access to jobs, political positions, ownership of previously state-owned companies or legal leniency). For example, during the initial years of his rule, Askar Akayev managed to co-opt the majority of significant elite actors in Kyrgyzstan by liberally granting access to newly privatised companies. Successful co-optation does not indicate that the underlying structure of power relations has changed, merely that the support of elite actors can be bought for a price. Elite co-optation takes place when there are potential challengers (most often independent intra-elite clientelistic groups rather than individuals) to the regime, who are powerful and could unite. This should not be confused with elite cohesion, in which power emanates from the top and there is in essence a single important elite clientelistic network. States with elite cohesion may also be competitive, in that elite individuals may challenge the big man at the top.

During the Soviet years, especially during the Brezhnev era, Kyrgyzstan’s intra-elite networks contained competing factions, it was not a simple hierarchical elite. Usabaliyev, the General Secretary of the republic, co-opted elite actors from various competing intra-elite The Communist Party played an important role in institutionalising support for Usabaliyev; as long as he was the one chosen by Moscow, there was little sense in challenging him. In order to be an elite actor, a party card and official allegiance to the regime and party was mandatory.

When Gorbachev became the new Soviet leader, saw the independent intra-elite networks as a challenge to central authority. Usabaliyev was ousted and a major purge of party officials in Kyrgyzstan ensued. The new General Secretary Absamat Masaliyev was a Moscow loyalist, without a significant intra-elite network in Kyrgyzstan and lacking in ability to create one. For this reason,
Masaliyev and the Communist party had to rely on repressive measures alone to stay in power. Competing elite networks were still important in terms of power in Kyrgyzstan, and there was growing resistance to Masaliyev.

As the USSR became less repressive, and it became evident that liberalisation of politics was underway, Masaliyev could no longer remain in control. This is a model example of how both failures to repress and failure to co-opt lead to the incumbent losing power. It should also be noted that the Communist Party had lost much of its stabilising power by this time, as the party as an institution was crumbling, with falling membership, less adherence to the ideology and weaker institutional structures as the breakup of the Soviet Union drew closer.

Askar Akayev, who became the first president after independence, belonged to a powerful intra-elite network. Initially he attempted and succeeded in co-opting potential challengers by awarding newly privatised companies and land to individuals and groups who could challenge him. As a result, as a number of elite actors who were not directly affiliated with Akayev became independently wealthy. It soon became clear that Akayev did not have the economic clout to co-opt challenging elite networks indefinitely, as the government’s coffers were virtually empty, and few resources remained to be privatised. Akayev obtained some means through corruption; the Seabaco gold scandal and the earnings from the Manas air base are examples of how Akayev attempted to increase his revenue. In this situation, Akayev changed strategy, only enriching those closest to him, rather than attempting to co-opt a larger group of elites. Instead, Akayev attempted to stay in power using repressive means. Journalists, oppositional people and people belonging to competing elite networks were harassed, imprisoned or in some cases physically abused. For the most part, Akayev used the justice system and police to harass challengers this way.

Kyrgyzstan’s reputation as an island of democracy in Central Asia was severely tarnished, as the electoral fraud, harassment and arrests became frequent features of politics. Using formal institutions like the police and judicial system to keep challengers under wraps was no easy feat for the regime, as these institutions were not fully under state control. There were signs that repression was failing already in 2002, when protesters rioted for several days and took command of public buildings in Aksy region.

In 2005, Akayev was ousted through the Tulip Revolution, elite challengers were able to mobilise supporters to overthrow the regime. Many of these groups had acquired wealth either by success in the private sector\textsuperscript{225} or through organised

\textsuperscript{225} In many cases, elite challengers ran companies that they acquired during the first few years after independence.
crime. Prior to the revolt, it was clear that the president could no longer use repression as an effective tool. He simply did not have control over the police and justice system. Remarkably, the 2005 elections were according to international analysts the most democratic Kyrgyzstan had seen thus far.

Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who became the next president of Kyrgyzstan initially attempted to co-opt many competing elite actors and groups. His main strategy was to offer positions in government or parliament to avoid challenges from competitors. At first, this plan seemed successful. Felix Kulov, who was a prominent leader of a different faction, joined Bakiyev, which meant he was virtually unchallenged. Bakiyev faced many of the same problems as Akayev had failed to solve earlier. There were insufficient funds to co-opt challengers.

In terms of clientelism, Bakiyev soon chose the same strategy as Akayev. The spoils from the Manas air base (which had increased significantly), price hikes on electricity and other public goods and corruption were distributed to his relatives and close allies rather than a large group. This led to massive protests in 2006 and 2007, and the regime was very close to falling. Bakiyev used two strategies to counter the lack of clientelistic goods to competitors. First, he used repression. Unlike his predecessor, Bakiyev did not rely solely on state institutions like the police and judiciary. Instead, he “privatised” repression, using political murder and intimidation to terrify or dispose of those who could prove dangerous to the regime. Using criminal gangs to terrify elite actors was relatively successful, in that Bakiyev averted the immediate crisis. Second, Bakiyev created a presidential party, Ak Zhol. This occurred at the same time as Kyrgyzstan moved from a first past the post to a party list system. Elite actors, who had mobilised their supporters against Bakiyev in 2006, joined Ak Zhol in 2007. The reason for this is that Bakiyev could institutionalise clientelism through the party. In offering challengers their name on the party list, defection from Bakiyev’s camp became more difficult. During this time an increasing number of individuals involved in organised crime entered parliament, which provided virtual impunity from prosecution.

In 2010, the Bakiyev regime fell. The turn of events was in many ways like the Tulip Revolution. During the years 2007-2010, Bakiyev had further angered competing elite actors by reserving clientelistic goods for a small group. Felix Kulov had created his own party, and his supporters crossed the floor from Ak Zhol. Attempts to repress the opposition in large part failed because so many actors had access to arms, the threat of violence from actors was not easily reconciled.

When Bakiyev was ousted, Roza Otunbayeva became interim president. During her short time in office, ethnic violence in the southern city of Osh took
place. The next president, Atambayev was elected with 63% of the vote, and no party dominated politics. During Atambayev years, leaders of organised criminal gangs remained in parliament, and clientelistic resources were distributed to a relatively large group of individuals. During the years following the overthrow in 2010, there was less repression for a time. Starting in 2015, harassment of the opposition, closure of a number of media outlets and the arrest of journalists has become more common.

In 2017, Atambayev stepped down after serving a six-year term. His selected successor Sooronbay Jeenbekov won the elections. Leading up to the elections, several media outlets were closed, journalists arrested and a ban on all public demonstrations was put in place. By 2018, many people close to Atambayev, including the former PM had been arrested on corruption charges, indicating a rift between Jeenbekov and Atambayev.

What all eras, including the current one has in common is the dynamics of mass-elite clientelism. Local big men can, independently of central authority mobilise political support. Mass actors can be used either to protest (and it two cases topple) the incumbent, or to support the same at the ballot box. These actions are to a large extent determined by elite co-optation and which temporary, or in some cases permanent allegiances are forged within the elite. With the advent of competitive authoritarianism, there are signs that political elites rely less on the state for resources for clientelism, and that repression has also to some extent been privatised.

Kenya

Kenya, like Kyrgyzstan has many elite networks; power does not emanate from a single source, rather local big men are important actors with their own individual power bases. The two Kenyan presidents who lead Kenya during the single-party era, Kenyatta and Moi, chose different strategies to remain in power and dominant. Kenyatta chose to use clientelism to co-opt elite actors, thus avoiding opposition to his leadership. This was a successful strategy, where the main resource used to co-opt elites were patronage, positions in government or the public service. These positions in turn generated spoils, which could be used by elite actors to uphold mass support. Although repression of both elite and mass actors existed under Kenyatta, the main strategy used to stay in power was clientelism.

When Moi came to power, the size of intra-elite networks was reduced dramatically. This was in part since Moi came from a much smaller ethnic group than Kenyatta, making it more difficult for him to forged lasting alliances. The main reason was however the decision made to decrease resources used to co-opt
potential challengers. In 1982, this failure to co-opt elite actors lead to an attempted coup, instigated by the military. Although Moi survived the coup, it had far reaching consequences for the regime.

Moi relied heavily on repression. Two instruments were used: state institutions and the KANU party. The presidential party took on a strong role in surveillance of member and of the general population. With this combination of repressive measures, Moi could remain in power despite protests. At the same time, the party became more institutionalised. Party congresses were held, and the structure of the party became more formalised. To some degree, these measures prevented defection from the party.

In 1992, Kenya introduced multi-party rule. One of the most important changes was that outright repression became more difficult; arresting the major opposition players was no longer possible. Repression and violence were instead carried out by the KANU youth wing YK‘92, which provided paths for upward mobility for young well-educated people, who would otherwise have remained political outsiders. In order to ensure victory, individual politicians within KANU used money from the Goldenberg scandal to pay key actors in the opposition not to cooperate or create a coalition. The elections were won through a combination of clientelism and repression.

By 2002, Moi was forced to resign; he had served his stipulated two terms in office after the introduction of multi-party rule. KANU had all but lost its institutional function, a large number of key figures had defected to various opposition parties. The party had failed to co-opt elites, which traditionally stood behind the party. This time, the opposition had united in an electoral coalition behind Mwai Kibaki, who had come in second in the 1997 elections. With the absence of Moi as a candidate, the opposition felt that their chances of winning were greater, given that they coalesced. Moi’s chosen successor, Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta is a Kikuyu. Kibaki, who would soon become Kenya’s third president, is also a Kikuyu, which meant that the Kikuyu vote was split.

The NARC coalition soon ruptured and the situation in Kenyan politics was very similar to Kyrgyzstan after Bakiyev was ousted from office in 2010. Mass-elite clientelism was still rife, while there was no dominant power. The old guard, those who had been loyal to Moi to a large extent remained in positions of power. Very few individuals were charged with crimes committed during that regime. In addition, party affiliation did not inform loyalty in parliament. As most parties have a very weak institutional structure, it is common for MPs to vote independently of their parties in parliament. The 2005 constitutional referendum and the 2007 general elections are examples of non-dominant actors’ access to
these tools, which were previously primarily the privilege of the incumbent. Violence as a tool to intimidate the general population was widespread, and it was no longer exclusively used as a form of gerrymandering by incumbent. It is widely accepted that the 2007 elections were marred with fraud. There is however no evidence to suggest that the Kibaki camp were alone in resorting to these practices. Local electoral commissions seem to be influenced by the local big man, not exclusively by the government. The power sharing deal, which was negotiated in order to stop the violence did not reflect the votes cast by the electorate.

Although there was little violence during the 2013 election, there were serious allegations of electoral fraud. Uhuru Kenyatta, who was once the chosen successor of Moi won the presidential election, although it is unclear if this reflects how Kenyans voted. It is likely that Kenyatta bypassed the power of local big men in the electoral process by tampering with the vote at the central electoral commission in Nairobi. Both Kenyatta and vice-president Ruto were close to Moi, Ruto as the organising secretary of the infamous YK’92. Both were accused by the ICC of hiring criminal gangs to incite violence in the wake of the 2007 elections. The election of Kenyatta and Ruto can thus be understood as the return of Moi loyalists into the centre stage of Kenyan politics, they are two individuals who are previously known not to shy away from using repressive measure in order to achieve electoral success. The return of old Moi loyalists to power will not entail elite cohesion; it is clear that there are several competing groups of elites, which temporarily or sometimes on a more permanent basis co-opt one another. It does however firmly place Kenya in the category of competitive authoritarian states. Kenyatta and Ruto remained in power after the 2017 elections, with few real changes in the makeup of the elites, while both state repression, politically motivated murders and other forms of violence remained commonplace.

**Tanzania**

Tanzania has not had clearly defined elite groups competing for power in the past. A hierarchical elite structure does not mean that the incumbent lacks challengers. As the succession after Nyerere’s decision to step down in 1985 shows, there were several serious contenders for the presidency and the matter was not entirely devoid of conflict. A clear distinction has to be made between where individuals compete for power within a cohesive elite, and competition where elite groups compete against each other. Shortly after independence, colonial intra-elite
networks were consciously broken down through the villagisation process and through exclusion of traditional chiefs from the formal realm of power\textsuperscript{226}.

Power in Tanzania thus became a matter of rather strict hierarchies, with few challenging groups with aspirations of power. Sought after clientelistic goods were often jobs in the public sector, access to higher education and imported goods (and sometimes basic goods as well) was contingent on personal connections. Nepotism and petty corruption were hallmarks of the bureaucracy during Nyerere’s time in office, though there are few reports of grand corruption or embezzlement scandals during this time. There are several possible reasons for this, the most plausible is that Tanzania was by far the poorest of the four cases studies. There were simply no large amounts of money to embezzle from the state, as the Tanzania economy was highly dependent of foreign aid to cover its national budget. For that reason, expectations for spoils from the state where rather low.

In terms of the nature of clientelism, Tanzania had more in common with Soviet Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan than neighbouring Kenya. It was a shortage economy, where clientelism was important in place of a welfare state.

Like in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan privatisation of state-owned enterprises and liberalisation of the economy gave rise to new forms of clientelism and corruption. In Tanzania, corruption increased exponentially during Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s time in office. The ruling elite soon became the new owners of parastatal companies, often at prices well below market value. Although much of industry was privatised, doing business in Tanzania remained a highly bureaucratic procedure involving a number of permits from an array of government institutions. As foreign and local investors sought to enter the newly liberalised Tanzanian economy, this gave rise to unprecedented spoils for public servants and individuals in government. Elites remained hierarchical, as the trickle of clientelistic resources increased as a result of structural adjustment. The privatisations also gave way to several corruption scandals, where officials have abused the office to access government contracts.

On the islands of Zanzibar, where there were clear signs of dissent and signs of competing elites, the police force clamped down on political challengers in order to quell opposition to the dominant role of CCM. Repression was however not the general strategy used to remain dominant. Instead, Nyerere and later Mwinyi used the institutional function of the party to establish absolute dominance over the population.

Practically all educated individuals in Tanzania were members of the party. In addition, due to widespread intra-elite clientelism, most students at higher

\textsuperscript{226} There are examples of traditional chiefs, who became important political figures within TANU and later on CCM. These individuals are however exceptions to the rule.
education institutions already had family ties into the top of the party. This made the party a vital component to furthering the careers of young ambitious individuals.

When multi-party rule was introduced, 80% of Tanzanians opposed the transition. For many Tanzanians, the state and CCM remained synonymous, the 10-household structure of the party remained in place. As the party continued to fulfil most of its institutional functions, and both intra-elite and mass-elite clientelistic networks remained largely intact, the party could maintain its dominant position for years to come. In fact, CCM increased its electoral dominance without resorting to repressive means in each election held until 2010. The only region where there was any real contest was on Zanzibar, where CUF challenged CCM, and came close to winning a majority in the 2005 elections. When faced with a challenge, CCM resorted to electoral fraud and repression\textsuperscript{227} in order to secure victory on the islands.

Tanzania remains a dominant party state, but CCMs dominant position is no longer completely unchallenged. In the 2010 elections, Kikwete garnered 63% of the vote, and in 2015 CCMs John Magufuli won by 58% of the vote. The opposition candidate, Edward Lowassa crossed the floor from CCM ahead of the elections, when CCM refused to select him as their candidate. Lowassa was forced to resign his position as PM in 2008 on corruption charges.

Since 2015, repression has become rife in Tanzania. Several politicians in opposition have been murdered, and many others arrested. It is clear that there has been a split in the political elite, and that Magufuli is using repression (both state and privatised) in order to remain dominant, while the institutional structure of the CCM party is slowly deteriorating.

This study has shown that intra-elite clientelism has been institutionalised and facilitated by the party in Tanzania. It has been formal positions with the party, which gives access to clientelistic resources such as corruption and government jobs. The gradual weakening of the party, and the decreased dominance shows that these functions may be interlinked. When this is failing as a method of remaining dominant, repression has increased.

\textit{Kazakhstan}

Like Tanzania, Kazakhstan has cohesive rather than co-opted intra-elite networks. During the Soviet era, traditional clientelistic networks broke down almost completely. This has several reasons, and the similarities with the Tanzanian case are striking. When agriculture was collectivised during the Stalin era, mass

\textsuperscript{227} The police are the main tools of political violence on Zanzibar.
starvation ensued. Traditional leaders starved to death, were sent to prison camps or were executed as Kulaks, enemies of the state. This process was much more thorough and had more far reaching consequences than collectivisation in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, Russians filled most positions of power within the communist party in Kazakhstan during the Khrushchev era, giving little room for former clientelistic leaders to re-establish themselves as nomenklatura. This was due to massive migration from Russia and other Slavic areas of the Soviet Union. The virgin lands project, when millions of hectares of pastoral land was cultivated, increased Slavic migration and further disenfranchised former elites, as Slavs took on the roles as experts in a project, which produced low yields of poor-quality wheat at enormous costs in terms of irrigation and other infrastructure. Although kinship was still important in Kazakh culture, few Kazakhs reached positions within the political elite.

When this changed and a policy of Kazakhisation took shape, old elites were not included. Under Brezhnev, the Soviet policy changed, promoting new leaders of the titular people of the Soviet republics. Kunayev, the new ethnic Kazakh general secretary of the Kazakh SSR could rule through a strict hierarchy, without need to co-opt potential challengers. Despite the lack of political challengers, Kazakhstan became clientelistic; positions were filled with individuals who were close to Kunayev and corruption was rife. This set the situation in Kazakhstan under soviet rule apart from Usabaliyev’s Kyrgyzstan, where elite factions needed to be co-opted through clientelism in order not to threaten the regime.

There were some similarities with neighbouring Kyrgyzstan. The role of the communist party in society and in politics was much the same. Party membership was mandatory for most professions. Almost all individuals had some connection to the party either through direct membership, through membership in associated organisations or other activities. In that way the communist ideology permeated all spheres of society.

Like in Kyrgyzstan, Gorbachev’s changed regime lead to purges within the political elites. Elites in the Central Asian republics were seen as too independent, corrupt and nepotistic. Gorbachev believed, perhaps with some accuracy, that many of Brezhnev’s old loyalists in Central Asia would resist the reforms he felt were necessary for the future of the USSR.

Although Kunayev managed to stay in power until 1986, he inevitably resigned from office. The local intra-elite network did not accept his replacement, an ethnic Russian with no connection to Kazakhstan. In December, thousands of people took to the streets of Alma-ata to protest his appointment as general secretary in a demonstration of mass elite clientelism. It has been established that the people protesting were encouraged to do so through the exchange of patronage goods,
and that it is likely that Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had expected to be appointed general secretary was behind the protests. This shows that cohesive elite networks have the capacity to mobilise mass actors through the exchange of clientelistic goods. After three years of sporadic protests, outbreaks of violence with ethnic connotations and massive elite discontent, Nazarbayev was appointed general secretary. Violence and instability immediately ceased, and order was restored. Nazarbayev, who had an extensive intra-elite network took over where Kunayev left off. Elite actors in Kazakhstan were once again organised in a strict hierarchical order, where few challengers existed.

Like Kyrgyzstan, independence arrived without struggle, it was granted rather than sought after. The period immediately after was a time of turmoil; industries were privatised rapidly, oil concessions sold, and individuals close to the president became partners in partly state-owned companies. Unlike in Kyrgyzstan, Nazarbayev made few pretences of democratic leadership. Although a multi-party constitution had been adopted, there was little room for free media, political opposition or other forms of dissent. The Communist party was immediately disbanded. Initially, there was some resistance to these practices. The single chamber parliament did not immediately approve the reforms, which Nazarbayev thought were necessary for the future of the country. This is a clear sign that some individuals within the political elite felt that openness, political discussion and a more important role for parliament than rubber-stamping presidential decrees should be a part of the new Kazakhstan. In response to this, Nazarbayev dismissed parliament and introduced a bicameral system with very little political clout. A number of individuals who protested this move were detained or became political outsiders never to return to the political elite again. Instead of attempting to co-opt elite actors, they were immediately ousted from the intra-elite network. In this way, Nazarbayev could retain a relatively cohesive elite, with little need for negotiation and co-optation.

One of the main differences between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan at that time was the amount of resources for clientelism available. There were two reasons for this. First, there were industries like steel mills and refineries in the north, which were much more valuable assets than the industries in Kyrgyzstan. Secondly, Kazakhstan has a lot of natural resources; oil, gas and minerals. The spoils from industries and natural resources were more than enough to keep elite actors happy. Although organised crime existed (and exists) in Kazakhstan, these groups did not become as important in politics, as the potential gains from those activities were small in comparison to mining, oil and gas. These are contributing factors to why the elite networks are still hierarchical in Kazakhstan.
The power of Nazarbayev was strong from the start, though not completely without challengers. Individuals like Rakhat Aliyev, the son in law of the president, who expressed disagreement with the president, soon became political outcasts. In Aliyev’s case, he was charged with murder and became an exile in Austria. Although political murder occurred in some instances, Nazarbayev preferred to use the state as an oppressive machine rather than informal actors.

In 2007, repressive measures increased dramatically. Nazarbayev declared himself president for life and a few small pro-presidential parties merged to create Nur Otan. The party soon won all seats in parliament, indicating that the president had now established complete dominance. The party fulfills almost all functions of dominant parties in electoral authoritarian regimes. Elite actors pay allegiance to the president at party events, making it a tool to prevent dissent. It has a vibrant youth wing, where young educated people find inroads into the elite. Nur Otan is growing in size and can now be considered a mass party, where membership is a prerequisite for advancement for employees in the public sector. The party also has a role in surveillance and detecting dissent, at least at higher education institutions. The party is however not programmatic although there is a party programme and policy documents are sporadically produced. There is consensus that Nur Otan is the president’s party, which will do his bidding regardless of programmatic identity.

The current situation in Kazakhstan point to continued regime stability based on cohesive intra-elite clientelistic networks, repression of signs of dissent using state institutions and a dominant party, which is fulfilling its role a stabilising factor. Tokayev taking over as president does not signify a change in the strategy of the elite. Nazarbayev has vowed to be an important player behind the scenes and retains a special legal status as “Leader of the Nation”.

In the 2011 elections, Nazarbayev won 95.5 % of the vote after out manoeuvring all credible opposition candidates from the race. When oil workers went on strike demanding higher wages in Zhanaozen that same year, the police killed dozens of protesters. The events also triggered the regime to arrest remaining opposition politicians. Most notably, Vladimir Kozlov was sentenced to seven years in prison. Surprisingly, two opposition parties won seats in parliament in the 2012 election. Ak Zhol and Party of Communists are however pro-presidential parties, and it is likely that the parties could enter parliament because of international ridicule of Kazakhstan’s one-party parliament.

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228 Although he chose to step down voluntarily in March 2019.
Theoretical Conclusions

This study has focused on changes in clientelism and repression in four electoral authoritarian states. In the introductory section, several rather broad theoretical questions were asked: If clientelism is seen as a cause of dominant party persistence, does clientelism disappear or diminish after the dominant parties have lost? If not, what are the new dynamics of clientelism in competitive authoritarian states? Similarly, if repression is seen to uphold dominance, what does it mean if repression remains in a competitive authoritarian setting? How does repression change? These questions have informed the empirical work, as well as providing data for developing concepts and theories, that will prove useful in the study of states, which either remain dominant party regimes, or have transitioned into competitive authoritarian regimes.

The empirical conclusions indicate that the absence or existence of clientelism and repression cannot explain regime persistence or breakdown. There is no indication in the data that the degree of clientelism was affected by the dominant party being ousted. Speaking generally, the level of clientelism was not affected by the degree of dominance. Both mass-elite clientelism and intra-elite clientelism existed in competitive authoritarian settings as well as dominant party states. Clientelism is of course a concept difficult to measure in terms of degrees or levels. There are no global indices for clientelism, for good reason. Stokes (2009) definition, the exchange of goods for support, includes many possible transactions both within elites and between elites and mass actors, some of them easier to observe than others. It is also important to understand that clientelistic exchanges need to be conceptualised depending on expectations of those involved. Political decisions may be based on clientelism even when the resources distributed are small, depending on what resources are available. Accordingly, it is more pertinent to study changes in clientelism than the amount of resources spent.

Empirical data also suggests that the use of repression is not contingent on regime type in these cases. Competitive authoritarian states use repressive measures, sometimes to a greater extent than dominant party states. This is clearly exemplified by the Kenyan case in the 2007 elections, which were marred with fraud and violence. In comparison, the Tanzanian elections of 2010, although there were reports of some irregularities, come closer to democratic standards.

With these two basic assumptions established, the theoretical focal point shifts to understanding how the dynamics of clientelism and repression changes. Both means of control rely on resources and a portion of these conclusions will be dedicated to this, and the theoretical implications
In this concluding section, I will also discuss the theoretical implications of changes in clientelism and repression over time, and if regime change has informed these variations.

**Resources**

Clientelism and repression demands resources, many times in the form of money. An important finding is thus that resources for clientelism and repression can originate from the state or private sources of income. The amount of resources that stem from sources other than the state has increased in the countries where the incumbent party has become less dominant. This is of course to be expected, dominant parties are more likely to have access to state resources than opposition parties or parties in competitive systems. Privatisation during the 1990s in the cases studied here, meant that resources were made available to individuals and groups. Initially, most were part of the political elite.

In the two competitive authoritarian states Kenya and Kyrgyzstan there is a clear pattern of resources from private enterprises, organised crime and other forms of personal wealth being used for clientelism and repression to a greater extent. There is also evidence that non-state resources are used for clientelism in the two dominant states as well. That means that elites in Tanzania and Kazakhstan have resources from several different sources – the state and private industry, which is largely concentrated into the hands of the elite.

There are several ways in which the state can be used as a resource for clientelism. The state and/or state-owned companies may simply be used as coffers for clientelism, provide paid employment or other resources in return for political support. For example, in the Tanzanian case during single party rule and later, public sector employment granted access to corruption, personal wealth and goods. State land and private and state resources may be used for intra-elite clientelism, though the use of private fortunes is more common when challenging elites are attempting to form bonds to win elections or dispose of a leader. For example, there is evidence to suggest that leading figures in the NARC coalition shared spoils from the Anglo Leasing corruption scandal with their coalition partners. In other cases, incumbents use state resources to co-opt challengers. Another strategy used both to co-opt and avoid dissent is, offering positions in the bureaucracy, other resources could also be distributed directly to uphold clientelistic networks, as was the case with land in post-independence Kenya. It is also common that government contracts are granted in exchange for political support.

Resources that are not derived from the state come from a number of different sources, ranging from private wealth, recently (or in some cases not so recently)
privatised companies, and not least organised crime. Gaining access to resources from clientelism is an incentive for politicians to form close bonds with both businessmen and criminal gangs. In all four cases members of the business community hold political office. In Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, there are also several examples of people connected to organised crime in parliament. Political office can be an asset, as it guarantees impunity for certain crimes, as well as easy access to corruption.

It is impossible to quantify in exact numbers resources used for clientelism and repression in each of the states studied, as there is no record of these transactions. It is possible to observe through studies and interviews what types of resources are used for clientelism in a case during a given time. In all four cases, privatisation during the 1990s reduced the amount of resources available within the state for clientelism. In Kyrgyzstan for example, companies were given to elite actors who could potentially challenge the regime, effectively co-opting them.

The consequences of privatising resources for repression and clientelism is that business people and in some cases members of criminal gang’s demand access to power or impunity in exchange. If the office seeker does not have a private fortune of his or her own, resources needed to get elected come with a price. Raising funds without the state is also more challenging, as access to funds can be more unpredictable, and elite bargaining may play a greater part.

The assumption that access to state resources is necessary informed Greene (2010) to believe that privatisation as such can contribute to reducing clientelism and lead to dominant party break down. This study has shown that resources for clientelism come from a variety of sources, and in some cases such resources have increased as a result of privatisation. This presents a challenge for incumbents, who can no longer cut certain groups off from clientelism. Rather than reduce clientelism on the whole, privatisation of resources has made the picture more complex and unpredictable. Changes within the elites take place more rapidly because of access to resources or lack thereof. Unless incumbents are to a largely in control of private, as well as state resources (as is the case in Kazakhstan), authoritarian governments have become more difficult to control. This may present a threat to leaders, but not to authoritarianism.

**Clientelism**

There is no doubt that Susan Stokes (2009) definition of clientelism as material good in exchange for support is useful; it elegantly summarises the smallest common denominator for all forms of clientelism. They are related; surely there are commonalities between elite actors negotiating coalitions by offering access to corruption, government jobs or a newly privatised company on the one hand and
the relationship between a candidate and voter based on an exchange of goods for votes. There are also clear similarities between clientelistic resources being used to co-opt challenging elite groups, and clientelism used to avoid palace coups, in states where elites are more cohesive.

It is a misconception is that incumbents use clientelism, while these strategies are not available to challengers. In Tanzania, before structural adjustment very few resources were available to anyone who did not have a direct connection to the party or the state. This is also true is the case of the Soviet Union, where state resources were used for both mass-elite and intra-elite clientelism. Individuals, parties and state now often use other types of resources for mass-elite clientelism.

In states like Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, where elites are in competition (before and after the end of dominant party rule) the purpose of intra-elite clientelism is usually to co-opt other elite groups to create a winning coalition. Most often, incumbents who fear losing power, as challenging intra-elite networks become stronger, use these strategies. In other cases, co-optation using clientelistic resources is a way to unite the opposition. Schedler (2013: 47) discusses states with these patterns as elite divisions, as opposed to cohesive elites, which are hierarchical. This classification of elites is similar to Hale’s (2015) pyramids of power, where elite are to a varying degree organised in a vertical or horizontal order.

Where competitive intra-elite networks exist, several factions compete for power, either within a political party, through several parties or in some cases without parties. Although it is more common with hierarchical intra-elite structures in single-party states, both types of elite relationships can occur, regardless of regime type. Elites in Kenya during all eras were to some extent competitive, in that those competing for power represented factions with power with mass support and access to resources. Making the distinction between these two types of intra-elite clientelism is useful, in that it makes us analyse reasons behind political events. Tanzania has moved from a unified hierarchical elite, to a system with several competing elite factions in recent years. Factions are forming, and there are several elite networks competing the top position, where actors not connected to the dominant party have access to resources. Intra-elite clientelism is diversifying, giving way for new forms of competition.

At the same time, individual politicians are more important in mass-elite clientelistic relationships. In previous years, the CCM party was the perceived “sender” when goods were distributed at election time, or community projects executed in exchange for support. Since the introduction of multi-party rule, politicians have taken on a more active role as patron. This shift makes it possible
for politicians to cross the floor to other political parties, as they themselves, rather
than the party is the perceived benefactor in the community.

Often, leaders in states with competitive elites come with mass support
connected to their person, not party or other organisations. Even in authoritarian
states, support is a valuable asset not least in terms of legitimacy. Elite negotiation
is thus structured depending on the amount of votes each person within the elite
networks can provide. The buying and selling of groups of voters is a form of
intra-elite negotiation. In some cases, groups of voters are bound together through
ethnicity, clan or kinship. Personal support is thus a resource, sold as a part of
negotiations for power. The larger the group of voters an individual can, whose
support an individual can rely upon, the higher the price.

States with hierarchical elite structures, where the threat is not from groups of
elites, but from individuals, also use intra-elite clientelism. In these cases, political
insiders, who seemingly are close to the president challenge through attempting
to turn political insiders against the leader. To clarify intra-elite clientelism has a
co-opting function, when those receiving clientelistic resources in exchange for
support are powerful political outsiders, which could challenge the regime. In
cohesive regimes, where there are no powerful outsiders, clientelism is used to
appease individuals on the inside who may plan to dispose of the leader. In
hierarchical elite structures, power is centred around a leader at the top of the
pyramid, there are not competing networks of elites vying for the top spot.
Groupings may exist, but they are not powerful enough to challenge power. That
is not to say that hierarchical systems lack conflict, especially regarding the pecking
order. The best illustration of this is Kazakhstan, with an undisputed leader at the
top, intra-elite clientelism to subdue challengers and occasional disciplinary acts,
when individuals are ousted from the network through selective prosecutions,
expulsion from the country and in some cases murder. In the cases studied here,
there is a relationship between the presence of a hierarchical elite, and the state or
party carrying out mass-elite clientelism. As elites become less hierarchical,
personal relationships between political elites and the electorate grow stronger.

Co-optation is less complex in states with hierarchical elites than in states with
competitive elites. This did not make party dominance impossible in Kenya and
Kyrgyzstan. Empirically, we can observe that they were dominant party regimes
for a great many years. When the regimes finally broke down, it was because intra-
elite clientelism and repressive strategies failed, while no strong dominant party
existed to stabilize support. This shows that competitive elite structures in
dominant party states may make transitions more likely, yet it does not determine
regime breakdown. In hierarchical elite structures, power is centred around a
leader at the top of the pyramid, there are not competing networks of elites vying
for the top spot. Groupings may exist, but they are not powerful enough to challenge power. That is not to say that hierarchical systems lack conflict, especially regarding the pecking order. The best illustration of this is Kazakhstan, with an undisputed leader at the top, intra-elite clientelism to subdue challengers and occasional disciplinary acts, when individuals are ousted from the network through selective prosecutions, expulsion from the country and in some cases murder. In the cases studied here, there is a relationship between the presence of a hierarchical elite, and the state or party carrying out mass-elite clientelism. As elites become less hierarchical, personal relationships between political elites and the electorate grow stronger.

Mass-elite clientelism describes how political elites garner support from their voters through the distribution of clientelist goods. Intra-elite clientelism is the buying and selling of support among elite actors. There is a wide array of mass-elite strategies ranging from outright vote buying to more subtle forms of clientelism such as promoting development projects in one's own constituency. This study has shown that strategies of mass-elite clientelism change slower than intra-elite clientelism. Although not unchanging the relationship the elites and voters is not as volatile as the makeup of elites, how they interact and intra-elite clientelism. Aside from the amount of mass-elite clientelism, there are differences regarding how clientelism is carried out and by whom. Empirically, we can see that it matters a great deal who the perceived patron is in terms of paying for support. In Soviet Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the provider of clientelistic goods to mass actors was the state and/or party. The same was the case in single-party Tanzania, but that state of affairs has changed in recent years, giving way for a more personalised distribution of clientelism, where elected officials and power seekers forge individual relationships with the electorate. The only state in this study, where the perceived provider of mass-elite clientelism remains the state is Kazakhstan, where strategies have been put in place to avoid the rise of local “big men”, through a system of frequently moving elite actors between positions, both on a local and national level.

It is significant whether the electorate perceives mass-elite clientelism to be provided by an individual power holder (or office seeker) or the state/party in terms of loyalty and legitimacy. Loyalty to a leader means that that person has created a following that is valuable to other elites, and inclusion in intra-elite networks can be negotiated. Put simply, if an individual comes with mass-support, that is useful to other elite actors seeking power. Personalised mass-elite clientelism is also a tool for mobilisation. In some cases, this simply means that politicians have well attended political rallies at election time, or many volunteers. As political violence in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan illustrate, the ability to mobilise
large groups through clientelism can also be used as a tool of repression. Similar mechanisms are used to mobilise for violence as for simple political support.

How mass-elite clientelism is structured also informs intra-elite clientelism. There are two main forms of intra-elite clientelism, hierarchical and competitive, with degrees between.

A more complex view of clientelism, the relationships within elites and between elites and voters thus affords tools for asking questions in many political contexts. In identifying that patterns in clientelistic relationships, we can gain a deeper understanding of why politicians form alliances, why certain mass actors mobilise and not others, as well as analyse current events through the lens of how relationships are structured. These tools and concepts help to increase our understanding of connections between and within elites, and to map events and relationships.

**Repression**

This study has shown that repressive measures are often used when clientelism fails to provide regime stability. In fact, in all cases were clientelistic strategies showed signs of failing, the incumbent attempted to increase repression to remain in control. These strategies were not always successful, but it is empirically demonstrated in this study that when intra-elite network size was reduced, repression increased. Similarly, when incumbents had the strategy to co-opt larger elite groups, repression reduced. This indicates that repression can be an effective tool to counteract the risk of small elite networks in states with competitive elites.

A broad definition of repression has been used: any type of restriction of political or civil liberties. This includes electoral fraud, exclusion of candidates from electoral completion and intimidation of voters, the media and political candidates. Schedler’s (2002) categorisation of strategies has proved useful.

All four regimes have displayed repressive qualities during the timeframe studies, yet there are significant differences regarding the degree and type of repression used. One of the most striking differences between the cases is whether or not state institutions or private actors execute repressive acts. The Kenyan and Kyrgyz examples illustrate that private actors often carry out intimidation of political candidates and voters. These private actors range from hired militia groups, criminal gangs to poverty-stricken youths who are paid to create disorder and violence. In Kyrgyzstan, criminal gangs were involved in toppling the Akayev regime and in a range of political murders during Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s time in office. In Kenya, hired Rwandese militiamen were used to rape, murder and displace voters from their homes ahead of the 1997 elections. During the post-election violence in 2007 and 2008, similar strategies were used.
In contrast, repression before the introduction of multi-party rule in the two states was often carried out by the state, including the police and judiciary. The use of private actors for repression is not isolated to the two states with competitive elites, yet it is privatised repression became more common in competitive systems. This indicates that state institutions are not necessarily at the disposal of the regime or too weak to fulfil the task at hand, when elites compete for power. Simply stated, the use of the state for repression requires institutions, which are possible to control. In states where clientelism is a mode of government the police will not members of the opposition, electoral commissions will not commit fraud and the justice system will not sentence political challengers without co-optation and access to clientelistic resources. When elite networks are small, individuals in leading positions in state institutions have not necessarily been co-opted. In these instances, using private actors for repression is an option close at hand.

Privatising repression carries risks as well as benefits. The privatisation of repression makes some repressive tools available to a large number of actors, as access to the state is not a precondition for intimidating voters or political opponents. In the cases studied here, there are examples of opposition parties intimidating voters, murdering opponents or intimidating candidates. Not all repressive tools are available without state access. As we have seen, a variety of tools have been used in the regimes studied in order to limit competition. In Kazakhstan for example, language tests are used in order to exclude candidates from competition. This is an illustration, which shows how only certain forms of repression can be privatised.

Curiously, Kazakhstan, which has the most hierarchical intra-elite network of all the states studied, is also the most repressive. Electoral fraud, arbitrary arrests of opposition and journalists, censorship of print media and the Internet on top of restricting access to the resources for the opposition are used. In addition, repressive measures often target political insiders, who are suspected of challenging the president. Defection or challenging Nazarbayev came at a price. The case of Rakhat Aliyev, Nazarbayev’s former son in law, shows that when insiders become difficult to control repression is closer at hand than co-optation. During the initial days of Tokayev’s presidency, repressive strategies have not changed. Protesters who are opposed to the capital city of Astana changing its name to Nursultan after the former president have been arrested. There are examples in Kazakhstan of the regime using privatised repression against former regime insiders, people in opposition and journalists. On close examination, privatised repression has existed to some degree in all state’s studies, however in Kazakhstan and other states with hierarchical elites, the state is the most important actor.
There is a wide array of repressive measures used by electoral authoritarian regimes, most of which have been illustrated in this dissertation. Repression can be aimed at either member of the elite or at mass actors. It can be executed either by private or state actors. Repression is most often instigated by incumbents, but there are examples where other political actors use similar tools to win elections. Most importantly, repression is often used to counteract regime failure when intra-elite networks have reduced in size and elites are competitive.

Repression and clientelism follow quite similar patterns. There is a need for resources, an actor, and means to execute. As illustrated in table 2, political actors have an array of options in repressive strategies. In terms of execution, not all actors have access to the same tools. In would for example be unusual for opposition elites to have access to state tools of execution, unless a military coup was underway. This thesis has shown that incumbent actors generally have access to all modes of enactment, while this is more restricted when it is the opposition. There are subtypes, which are not illustrated. Private execution may include mass-actors (mobilised groups), militias (hired by an actor), as well as individuals, who can be hired to harass, murder, attack or otherwise hinder political activity. There is also some overlap between the categories, for example, it is not always easy to differentiate between resources from private or criminal enterprises. Nonetheless, this illustration sketches out some of the possibilities for actors and contributes to empirical study of other cases by clarifying some possibilities for political actors.

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As discussed, political elites often use a combination of repressive measures. These strategies can be more or less effective and are also a way of signalling to political challengers. In the case of Kazakhstan, we can see that the state has become increasingly important in executing repression, while private/criminal/party execution has become less common. Arrests of protesters, opposition leaders, journalists, as well as lawsuits shows the people of Kazakhstan that any form of opposition will have dire consequences. The involvement of private actors often raises questions, as the purpose and what actors are involved can be unclear. For
example, no actor has claimed responsibility for the attempted murder of Tanzanian opposition MP Tundu Lissu in 2017. The investigation into the crime has not revealed those guilty. The CCM and the government can thus deny responsibility, while the act not only eliminated Lissu from the political stage, but also causes fear among others.

In the two dominant party states, opposition has little or no access to repressive tools. As the hierarchical structure of elites is changing in Tanzania, this may change in coming years. Both private, state and party repression is used in Tanzania and Kazakhstan, but Kazakhstan seems to be shifting towards more state repression, and Tanzania towards more private. The main difference however lies in how well planned and executed these strategies are and have been. There is a chaotic element to repression in Tanzania under Magufuli. State, party and private actors execute repression against journalists, opposition politicians, activists and other without a clear pattern, other than that repression has increased substantially under the current government. In contrast, repression in Kazakhstan under both Nazarbayev and the initial week of the Tokayev presidency is predictable. Any political protest will lead to arrest, any publication that is critical of the regime shut down, and any political party standing for elections without the good will of Nur Otan persecuted. This gives the impression that there is a clearly planned and executed strategy in Kazakhstan, while elite networks in Tanzania are scrambling to increase repression by the means at their disposal to counter failing intra-elite clientelistic strategies.

Non-incumbents in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan can and do execute repression, though they do not have access to the state. Elite groups, other than the incumbent, can mobilise groups of people, including criminal groups, to execute violence against political challengers, and prevent voters from reaching polling stations. This presents a challenge to those in power, as it balances which tools are available to which political actors. The incumbents’ repressive strategies are adjusted to counter this, meaning that elites in power use mass-mobilisation, private militias and criminal gangs to counter this. Aside from these strategies, incumbents follow the same patterns in competitive authoritarian states as they do in dominant party. They use state as well as private resources, the actor may be the state, parties, or an individual, and repression may be executed by private actors, as well as the state.
Summary

In conclusion, the main difference between competitive authoritarian regimes and dominant party systems is not to what extent they are clientelistic or repressive. In the same way that dominant parties attempt to co-opt elite actors in dominant regimes, parties in systems attempt the same. In competitive systems, incumbents and challengers many have access to resources for clientelism from both state and private sources. Individual local strong men sometimes have the power to rig elections, even without an incumbent position. Some differences remain; incumbents tend to have a degree of control over state institutions and resources. What sets plural systems apart is the makeup of intra elite networks; in plural authoritarian regimes intra-elite networks are fractured and small. There is no strong incumbent, which attempts to co-opt others. Rather, individual elite actors, as well as groups of actors attempt to co-opt each other to achieve victory, either through the ballot box or through other means. Privatisation of repression as well as enterprises potentially gives tools, which can be used to gain access to power to a broader spectrum of elites.

So, what dynamics do change? And can we discern any clear patterns? As discussed earlier in these conclusions, some characteristics of clientelism and repression change, mainly due to privatisation and a different distribution of resources. The interplay between clientelism and repression change. There is a consistent and easily observable pattern; when intra-elite clientelism fails, either though the lack of resources on the part of the incumbent or because the size of the elite network is reduced for a different reason, repression increases. When incumbents are successful in co-opting elites, repression reduces. These tactics are not always successful, despite increasing repression, both the Bakiyev and Akayev regimes failed when clientelistic goods were no longer distributed to a large group of elite actors.

These conclusions, that dynamics, not scale change when regime change takes place is the main theoretical contribution in this dissertation. The more diversified the elites, the more competitive the system and the more personalised politics are, the more complex the patterns. This holds true for both clientelism and repression. I repeat my contention that political competition is a prerequisite for democracy, yet competitive systems can remain stable authoritarian regimes, despite changes in incumbency.

The problems of studying internal attributes of clientelism and repression is that data is very difficult to quantify. There are democracy indices, which provide some data on the degree of repression in particular settings, but not where resources emanate from, if the actors are incumbent or not, and who executes repression. There is no quantitative cross-national data at all on clientelism. A
corruption index does not measure clientelism. It is likely that clientelism is more common in states with high corruption. Corruption is a means of acquiring resources through illicit means, using public office. Clientelism is using resources from any source in return for political support. The lack of quantitative data is not easily solved, as this study has shown contextualising clientelistic relationships is a task that requires careful empirical study and analysis. I therefore call scholars to collaborate, and use mixed methods, thereby qualifying results from large-N studies.

Finally, through the changes in clientelism and repression have sometimes, but not always been connected to incumbents losing power or regime change. In thinking about causality, there are empirical indications that point in two directions; regime change affects outcomes in clientelism and repression as well as vice versa. This observation challenges how we ask research questions, and challenges researchers to reverse questions on cause versus outcome.
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Appendixes

A Note on Transliteration

As a rule, I have transliterated Russian names using BGN/PCGN (United Stated Board on Geographic Names/Permanent Committee on Geographic Names for British Official Use). When a name of an individual is generally transliterated using a different system in the media and academic literature, I chose familiarity over consistency.

Individuals, who have been interviewed for this study have often provided a business card, or I have been in correspondence with them via e-mail or text message. In those cases, I have chosen to use the transliteration preferred by the interviewee.

When referencing, I use the transliteration chosen by the author if the work is in English. In other cases, I use BGN/PCGN.

A Note on Interviewees

This dissertation was submitted during the second week of Jassym-Jomart Tokayev’s presidency in Kazakhstan. During these first days, a large number of people, including some of the people interviewed for this project have been arrested. I have been in contact with a few individuals who have expressed considerable fear, claiming that Tokayev will try to retain stability and dominance by increasing repression and harassment. I spoke to one person over the phone about the ongoing events, and she asked that her name be removed from an interview she did several years ago. For this reason, I have anonymised several more of the interviewees, who in some way expressed discontent with the dominant party regime in Kazakhstan. I have been in touch with a few, who have either agreed to their name being published or asked to be anonymised.

In a similar development, the Tanzanian regime is becoming ever more repressive under Magufuli. I have anonymised a number of interviewees from that context as well.
For me, these new developments have caused some uncertainty regarding the risks involved, and I have therefore chosen to not publish a list of interviewees in this print version of the dissertation. Before the defence when developments in Kazakhstan, a list will be published at this link:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/13oOZLSrcUOJQHKDsNexrty58KtDydN6SB6PRb9BdO54/edit?usp=sharing

List of Abbreviations

ASP-Afro Shiraz Party
CCM-Chama cha Mapinduzi
CDP-Constituency Development Funds
CPK-Communist Party of Kazakhstan
CPPK-The Communist Peoples’ Front
CUF-Civic United Front
DP- Democratic Party
DVK-Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan
EPA-External Payment Arrears
FORD-Forum for the Restoration of Democracy
ICC- International Criminal Court
IEBC-Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IPK-Islamic Party of Kenya
IS-Islamic State
KACC- Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission
KANU-Kenya African National Union
KNCHR- Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
KPU-Kenya People’s Union
MIS-Manas International Services
NARC- National Rainbow Coalition
NDP-National Development Party
NEC- The National Executive Council
ODM-Orange Democratic Movement
PCB-Prevention of Corruption Bureau
PF-Peoples’ Front
PRI-Institutional Revolutionary Party
TAATanzanyika African Association
TANU-Tanzania African National Union
TYL-TANU youth League
ZIS-Zanzibari Information Service


140. Strömvik, Maria. To Act as a Union. Explaining the Development of the EU’s Collective Foreign Policy. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005.


Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan and Tanzania share a past and present as authoritarian states. Dominant parties are in power in Tanzania and Kazakhstan, while elections are competitive but not democratic in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan. Returns for political support (clientelism), and persecution of political adversaries and the electorate (repression), are key components in all four states. This dissertation provides an account of these features, and how and when dynamics of clientelism and repression have changed.

Clientelism and repression are widely used to explain why states transition to a different regime type, suggesting that their presence or absence, degree or form, informs seminal changes.

This dissertation turns such arguments around, instead investigating how changes in regime affect clientelism and repression, allowing an investigation of change within elites, society and the state. It looks at changes in clientelism and repression that did not lead to regime change, and at cases when clientelism and repression continue despite turnovers.

Patterns where a more diverse set of actors than the incumbent are involved in repressive and clientelistic practices are investigated, and sub-concepts are developed in order to speak of these changes in more specific terms.

This is investigated through careful empirical study and field work carried out in all four states. More than 300 people were interviewed during the course of several years. The perspective is historical, from the late Soviet era in Central Asia, and independence in East Africa. It tracks clientelism both within the elites (intra-elite clientelism), and aimed towards the general public (mass-elite clientelism). Changes in repression are also investigated, using an actor-centered approach regarding resources and operation.