Institutional Theory in International Relations

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“Yes, we have no bananas!” Thus goes the paradoxical refrain of an old popular tune. In the same vein, international relations (IR) scholars could be imagined chanting: “Yes, we have no institutions!” The realist orthodoxy of IR posits an international system characterized by anarchy and thus devoid of effective institutions. Yet in recent decades growing numbers of IR scholars have come to apply institutional perspectives. And many prominent puzzles in today’s world can be framed in institutional terms. For example, why has NATO survived the end of the cold war, whereas the Warsaw Pact was dissolved? Why does the deepening and broadening of integration within the European Union continue despite periods of "Eurosclerosis" and dwindling popular support? Why do a host of practices based on state sovereignty remain in a world characterized by globalization and diminishing significance of territory and state borders?

Institutional factors would no doubt loom large in the answers given to these and several other current questions by some, but by no means by all, IR scholars. Even if realism-bashing has become a favorite pastime, especially among younger researchers in the field, prevalent middle-range theories (concerning, for instance, foreign policy, bargaining or conflict resolution) have inherited from realism the notion of individual actors operating in an institution-free environment.

In this chapter, we trace the emergence of institutional approaches in IR theory, outline three important areas of research on international institutions, and suggest promising directions for future research. The review demonstrates that rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and normative institutionalism, as developed in the study of domestic institutions, have constituted sources of inspiration in IR theory. At the same time, the relative absence of formal institutions in the international realm has encouraged IR scholars to theorize more subtle institutional forms and influences, with general implications for institutional analysis in political science.

**Institutionalism in political science and international relations**

To the extent that it is noted at all, “international institutionalism” is placed in a category of its own in overviews of institutional theory in political science (see, e.g., Peters, 1999: 126-40). However, as we will attempt to show in the following, institutionalist IR scholars have drawn inspiration from research on domestic institutions. They address similar questions, and fit into the same typologies of institutionalist theory, as the rest of political science, although the borderline between different types of institutionalism may not be as sharp in IR scholarship. Moreover, some of the most pertinent and promising research areas lie at the intersection of domestic and international politics.

The principal difference is that the study of international institutions does not rest on the same revival of a long tradition, or return to old roots, as the “new institutionalism” in other branches of political science. To be sure, IR scholarship during the interwar years—which saw the creation of the first
chairs in international politics—was characterized by the same legalism, focus on formal structures and normative bias as the “old institutionalism” in political science generally (cf. Peters, 1999: 6-11). The new global institution, the League of Nations, was a natural focus of attention, and scholars were driven by an ambition to contribute to the building of a strong institutional framework globally, based on international law. Although this tradition may be labeled “the first consensus” in the evolution of IR theory (Olson and Groom, 1991: 56-78), it did not lay a firm foundation for, or have any lasting impact on, later theorizing and research.

Similarly, students of international organization after World War II led a peripheral existence in the shadow of the predominant realist paradigm. Their work tended to be descriptive and practical rather than theory-driven or contributing to the development of institutional theory (cf. Rochester, 1986). The relationship between the study of international organization and general organization theory was largely one of mutual neglect. Textbooks on international organization made no references to organization theory, nor did textbooks on organization theory include any systematic treatment of international organizations (cf. Jönsson, 1986: 39). Its atheoretical nature notwithstanding, the early postwar literature on international organization yielded important insights. Yet there is little continuity with the “new institutionalism” that has emerged in recent decades (see Martin and Simmons, 1998). The journal *International Organization*, somewhat paradoxically, can be said to represent a continuity of sorts. It was founded in 1947 as a forum for students of the UN family and other international agencies, only to turn into a mouthpiece of international political economy (IPE) scholars in the 1970s. In recent years, it has thus become one of the principal arenas for the “institutionalist turn” in IR, which is closely associated with the IPE field.

In short, the “old institutionalism” in IR, represented by the interwar idealism and the postwar studies of international organization, failed to cumulate and does not figure prominently in the “new institutionalism” as a source of continuity or inspiration. For one thing, contemporary scholars take a broader view of “institutions” than did their predecessors. Take, for instance, Oran Young (1989: 32), who defines institutions as “social practices consisting of easily recognized roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles.” These institutions may or may not involve organizations, which are understood as “material entities possessing physical locations (or seats), offices, personnel, equipment, and budgets.” According to this distinction, the market is an institution, while the firm is an organization. Marriage is an institution, the family its organizational manifestation. By the same token, sovereignty is an institution and the state an organization. This distinction is not always upheld, and “institution” and “organization” are frequently used interchangeably. While Young’s conceptualization may not be universally shared, it serves to illustrate that contemporary institutional analyses are not restricted to formal international organizations. In the same vein, we will proceed from a broad rather than a narrow understanding of institutions in our overview.
For lack of anchorage within their own subfield, IR scholars have been “turning … to models of domestic politics to suggest new questions and approaches to the study of international institutions” (Martin and Simmons, 1998: 739). To be sure, developments and events on the international arena contributed to the “institutionalist turn” in the early 1970s. The repeated oil crises exposed the vulnerability of major powers and the apparent power of OPEC to disturb the world economy, at the same time as the Bretton Woods institutions, which had lent predictability to global monetary relations, were crumbling. Problems of interdependence, in brief, came to the fore, which in turn created a demand for, and interest in, institutions (cf. Keohane, 1982). But the theoretical inspiration came from outside the specialized IR field, from economics and political science.

This means, first, that one can identify a common core of questions asked by students of domestic and international institutions alike. These include questions concerning (1) the formation of institutions (why do sovereign, egoistic states agree to establish international institutions?), (2) the persistence and change of institutions (why do some international institutions remain, while others are transformed or cease to exist?), (3) the influence of institutions on individual behavior (is state behavior influenced by international institutions and, if so, how?), and (4) institutional design (is it best explained by functional needs or social processes of isomorphism? how can globalism, regionalism and sectoralism be reconciled? how do new institutions fit in with old ones?). It can be argued that international institutionalists, defending themselves from realist attacks, have concentrated too much on the third question at the expense of the others: “Since the 1980s, work on international institutions has been defined for the most part by the demand that scholars respond to a realist agenda: to prove that institutions have a significant effect on state behavior” (Martin and Simmons, 1998: 742). But as we shall see, all four sets of questions are addressed in the IR literature reviewed below.

The pattern of theoretical diffusion also means that different varieties of institutionalism have found their way into IR research. Following Guy Peters’ introduction, we will distinguish between rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and normative institutionalism1—examples and combinations of which can be found in the study of international institutions as well. Before going on to explore prominent areas of application of institutional perspectives in IR, we will therefore sketch how these approaches translate into the study of international institutions.

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1 To the extent that it can be said to exist in IR, Peters’ “empirical institutionalism” is subsumed under rational choice institutionalism. The terminology may differ among authors. It should also be noted that other labels, such as “organization theory” (Immergut, 1998) and “sociological institutionalism” are used instead of normative institutionalism. Another approach that sometimes gets separate treatment, the new institutionalism in economics, has been a major source of inspiration for IR scholars and is subsumed under “rational choice institutionalism” (cf. Hall and Taylor, 1996: 936n).
Rational choice institutionalism. Institutional analysis, informed by rational choice theory, assumes that utility-maximizing individuals (or, at the international level, states), acting out of self-interest, are central actors in the political process, and that institutions emerge as a result of their interdependence, strategic interaction and collective action or contracting dilemmas. Institutions emerge and survive, because they fulfil important functions for the individual actors affected by these institutions.

Rational choice institutionalists in IR have been influenced by developments in the so-called new institutional economics in particular. Specifically, they have imported theories of transaction costs and agency. The fundamental idea behind the notion of transaction costs is that the execution of an economic transaction involves not only production costs, but also costs for arranging and enforcing a contract. The process of drafting, planning and negotiating a contract is costly, as is the process of solving contractual disputes. Institutions, then, fulfil the function of reducing transaction costs. While developed in relation to economic phenomena, the notion of transaction costs is neither by nature nor by definition restricted to the economic demand. Robert Keohane’s (1984: 85-109) functional theory of international regimes or institutions is perhaps the most influential attempt at employing the notion of transaction costs in the study of international politics.

One offshoot of the early work on transaction costs was agency theory, which focuses on the so-called agency relationship that arises whenever one actor (the principal) engages another actor to perform a task on its behalf (the agent). While used by economists to analyze relations between shareholders and corporate executives, between managers and employers and between retailers and suppliers, the principal-agent model found an early political-science application in the analysis of legislative-bureaucratic relations in the United States. Students of international institutions have drawn on this tradition, viewing states as principals, delegating functions to international institutions as agents. As in other applications of the theory, possible “shirking” by the agent—that is, pursuing its own rather than the principal’s interest—is a major consideration. Information asymmetry and conflicting interests are seen as the chief sources of shirking, monitoring and incentive mechanisms as its remedies. As we shall see later, principal-agent analysis has been applied in particular to the relations between member states and supranational institutions in the European Union.

Historical institutionalism. In contrast to the “calculus approach” of rational choice theory, both historical and normative institutionalism represent a “cultural approach,” according to which the behavior of individual actors is not fully strategic but bounded by their worldviews. Rather than being the result of self-interested strategic calculations, institutions “provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action” (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 939). The distinctive feature of historical institutionalism is that it allows for the contingencies of history, emphasizes path dependency, and thus tend to focus on the persistence of institutions.
The notion of “punctuated equilibrium,” borrowed from evolutionary theory, points to a pattern of long periods of stasis broken by short episodes of rapid speciation. It serves as a metaphor for institutional change in Stephen Krasner’s (1988) early analysis of the sovereignty institution, which can be viewed as an example of historical institutionalism. A number of studies of the historical roots of existing international organizations (see, e.g., Cox, 1996; Haas, 1990; Murphy, 1994) combine elements of historical and normative institutionalism.

Normative institutionalism. Originating in the subfield of organization theory, normative institutionalism redirects attention from rationality and means-ends efficiency to the role of norms and values. Against the “logic of instrumentality” or “logic of consequences” it posits the “logic of appropriateness.” The principal focus of normative institutionalism is on the ways institutions constrain individual choice. With its ideational slant, normative institutionalism conceives of institutional change in terms of learning (Peters, 1999: 33-34), while at the same time reminding us that existing institutions tend to structure the field of vision of those contemplating change (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 953).

Analyses based on normative institutionalism are relatively rare in IR. It has to do with the traditional understanding that in the international environment “a logic of consequences is likely to be more compelling than a logic of appropriateness because rules can be in conflict, hierarchical structures of authority are absent, power asymmetries are high, and the benefits derived from pursuing instrumental policies can be great” (Krasner, 1999b: 210).

Perhaps the best-known IR perspective that invokes a logic of appropriateness is the so-called English school, according to which international society is governed by the rules of state sovereignty and the individual participants in international politics—diplomats, statesmen, public officials—have internalized the same basic rules of the game (see, e.g., Bull, 1977; Watson, 1992). More recently, constructivists within IR have extended the basic logic of the English school and pointed to the importance of international norms for state behavior in the international as well as domestic arena (Finnemore, 1996; Checkel, 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Many international norms that set standards for the appropriate behavior of states originate as domestic norms and become international through the efforts of entrepreneurs of different kinds, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and transnational “advocacy networks” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The interplay between domestic and international norms works the other way as well, as states “are socialized to accept new norms, values and perceptions of interest” (Finnemore, 1996: 5). There is thus “a two-level norm game occurring in which the domestic and the international norms tables are increasingly linked” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 893).

Let us now turn to three areas of IR research, where these various types of institutionalism are reflected and the outlined set of questions are addressed. First, state sovereignty can be understood as a fundamental institution in the broader sense, guiding international relations. This may seem like accepting the premises of realism, but institutionalists conceive of sovereignty as a
“social construct” (Biersteker and Weber, 1996) rather than a structural
given. The second area, international regimes, shifts the focus to institutions
that are based on international values and facilitate interstate cooperation and
coordination. Third, in recent years the European Union has emerged as a
prominent and puzzling case, inviting institutionalist analysis.

Sovereignty as an institution

Sovereignty is often conceived of as an attribute of states; we speak of
“sovereign states.” Another understanding of sovereignty, with resonance in
contemporary IR scholarship, is in terms of an institution that defines and
empowers the state. Sovereignty can then be defined as “the
institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive
jurisdictional domains” (Ruggie, 1998: 147), or as “a set of institutionalized
authority claims” (Thomson, 1994: 14). The key words in these and other
definitions are institution and authority claims.

Sovereignty, as Krasner (1988) has pointed out, is firmly institutionalized in
terms of vertical depth and horizontal linkage. Vertical depth refers to the
extent to which an institution defines individual actors. Under sovereignty,
individuals are to a great extent defined through their citizenship, as inscribed
in their passports. Horizontal linkage refers to the number of links
institutional practices have with other practices, to the number of changes
that would have to be made if a particular institution were altered. Several
practices are inextricably linked with sovereignty, such as diplomacy, the
practice of levying duties on merchandise when it passes a borderline,
immigration control, or, for that matter, Olympic games. All would be
meaningless, or at least would have to be fundamentally altered, in the
absence of sovereignty. Sovereignty, to use a phrase in vogue, is located at
the apex of “nested institutions” (cf. Aggarwal, 1998: 1; March and Olsen,
1998: 955); diplomacy, international law, warfare, trade regimes and other
narrower institutions are integral parts of the broader institution of
sovereignty.

As for the second component of the cited definitions of sovereignty, the state
claims authority over its territory and its population. The territorial authority
claims underlying state sovereignty rest on notions of property rights. Vis-à-
vis citizens the institution of sovereignty imparts to the state “meta-political”
authority. That is, states claim and are recognized as having the authority to
define what is political in the first place and thus subject to state coercion.
“With sovereignty, states do not simply have ultimate authority over things
political; they have the authority to relegate activities, issues, and practices to
the economic, social, cultural, and scientific realms of authority or to the
state's own realm—the political” (Thomson, 1995: 214).

While sovereignty is usually understood as an absolute concept, an
institutional understanding of sovereignty reveals its multidimensional and
variable nature. One can, for instance, make a distinction between the
“constitutive” and “functional” dimensions of sovereignty (Thomson, 1994:
The state's claim to ultimate authority in a particular political space represents the constitutive dimension. Territorial segmentation and the monopolization of violence within the political space are central features of current authority claims. The functional dimension, on the other hand, delineates the range of activities over which the state can legitimately exercise its authority (extensiveness). Within this range, which may vary across issue-areas, between states and over time, the degree to which state authority penetrates society (intensiveness) may vary. For example, the authority claims of today's industrialized states are far more extensive and intensive than those of medieval or nineteenth-century states, as states have included more and more in the political realm and increasingly have intruded into formerly “private” aspects of people's lives.

Another basic distinction can be made between the internal and external aspects of the constitutive dimension of sovereignty. In addition to establishing the state's exclusive authority—and the non-intervention of other states—within its territory, sovereignty defines the international obligations and activities of states; what states are, or are not, allowed to do in the international arena. With sovereignty, political authority is inextricably linked with territory. Political authority is limited to the people and resources found within geographical boundaries. “Sovereignty delineates authority according not to functions but to geography” (Thomson, 1995: 227).

Analysts of sovereignty rarely refer explicitly to the various branches of institutionalism. The following should thus be seen as an impressionistic attempt at situating some prominent works in our threefold classification.

Rational choice institutionalism. Stephen Krasner's (1999a) monograph on sovereignty, with its realist foundation, can be characterized as a case of rational choice, or perhaps empirical, institutionalism. He makes a distinction between domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty. Domestic sovereignty refers to the structure of authority within a state and its effectiveness; interdependence sovereignty denotes the ability of a government to regulate movements of people, goods, money and ideas across its borders; international legal sovereignty concerns whether or not a state is recognized by other states; and Westphalian sovereignty has to do with the autonomy of domestic authority structures—specifically, the absence of external influences. By “unbundling” sovereignty, Krasner is able to show that its different components can exist independent of each other. For instance, the effectiveness of political authorities within their own borders (domestic sovereignty) or their ability to control transnational flows (interdependence sovereignty) may vary without influencing international legal or Westphalian sovereignty.

Krasner’s main point, however, is that these durable sovereignty principles and norms, Westphalian sovereignty in particular, have frequently been violated or compromised; they are characterized by “organized hypocrisy.” Logics of consequences have trumped logics of appropriateness, in his view. “Given the absence of any international authority structures, the asymmetries of power among states, and the diversity of norms espoused by rulers and
their constituents, it is impossible for any institutional arrangement at the international level to become embedded” (Krasner, 1999a: 220).

**Historical institutionalism.** Today’s sovereignty norms and practices are the result of an institutionalization process over more than three centuries, with salient elements of path dependency as well as historical contingency. Once the comparative advantages of the sovereign state—be it in warfare (Tilly, 1992), trade (Spruyt, 1994), or taxation (Hobson, 1997)—led to a new form of political organization in Europe, other possibilities were foreclosed. Yet such path-dependent patterns of development, in which initial choices preclude future options, do not exclude variations in the practices of sovereignty.

For instance, today we tend to take for granted that the military and the diplomatic corps are principal instruments of sovereign states. However, as Janice Thomson (1994) has demonstrated, it was only a little more than a century ago that states monopolized the exercise of coercion beyond their borders. For several centuries, mercenaries set the European standard of military performance. Similarly, European sea power long had a quasi-private character. Privateering, a sort of state-sponsored piracy, was a legitimate practice for nearly six centuries. And semi-sovereign mercantile companies, creations of sixteenth-century Europe, not only had vast economic privileges but could raise armies or navies, build forts, wage war, and make treaties. Moreover, diplomacy, like warfare, was “marketized and internationalized” well into the nineteenth century. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries diplomats could easily change from one monarchical employer to another; they were, by and large, “parts of a social order which transcended national boundaries” and felt themselves “part of an aristocratic international to which national feeling was hardly more than a vulgar plebeian prejudice” (Anderson, 1993: 121).

From a different vantage point, Jens Bartelson (1995) traces the intellectual genealogy of the concept of sovereignty, emphasizing the discontinuities over time and across space: “sovereignty does not merely mean different things during different periods, function differently within different epistemic arrangements, or that it is something altogether different from time to time; rather the topic of sovereignty—the concept of sovereignty as opened to definitional change across time—is so rigorously intertwined with the conditions of knowing, that we could inductively expect a change in the former to go hand in hand with a change in the latter even in the future, if indeed there is one” (Bartelson, 1995: 247).

Other authors identify milestones or turning-points in the evolution of sovereignty. One major transformation in the institutionalization of sovereignty occurred as the concept came to be identified with the territory of the state and state institutions, rather than the person of the monarch (Agnew, 1994: 61). In economist jargon, the state turned from a private to a public good.

With the advent of nineteenth-century nationalism, the link between sovereign authority and a defined population, rather than territory, came to
the fore. With nationalism, the state was reconceptualized as an entity providing identity and security. Thus, nationalism “fed directly into the sovereign territorial ideal, and at the same time it gave states that approximated the nation-state ideal a powerful new basis of legitimacy” (Murphy, 1996: 97).

In the twentieth century, and in particular after the end of the cold war, democracy has tended to replace nationalism as a legitimizing and institutionalizing force. The creation of the League of Nations after World War I represented an effort, led by US President Woodrow Wilson, to legitimate a system of sovereign states on the twin pillars of democracy and national self-determination. To Wilson, “national self-determination ranked as an essential corollary of democracy. Just as the people had the right to govern themselves within the national system, so the nations had a right to govern themselves within the global system” (Claude, 1964: 47). Sovereignty was thereby converted into “a symbol of liberty in international relations, comparable to democracy as a symbol of domestic freedom” (Claude, 1964: 48). Yet it is only after the end of the cold war that “democracy has become the fundamental standard of political legitimacy” worldwide (Held, 1997: 251).

**Normative institutionalism.** In contrast to Krasner’s realist account, constructivists argue along the lines of normative institutionalism that “the socially constructed practices of sovereignty—of recognition, of intervention, of the language of justification—contribute to the structures of international society that exist beyond the realm of neorealist analysis” (Bierstecker and Weber, 1996: 5). Sovereignty prescribes appropriate behavior among states; in fact, it is constitutive of the identity of entities as states. Constructivists “consider state, as an identity or agent, and sovereignty, as an institution or discourse, as mutually constitutive and constantly undergoing change and transformation” (Bierstecker and Weber, 1996: 11).

In the past two centuries one may discern tensions and oscillations between state sovereignty and national sovereignty as legitimizing principles, stressing the link between sovereign authority and either a defined territory or a defined population. Changes in the normative foundations of sovereignty usually occur in the wake of major wars or political upheavals.

During periods when international norms legitimize state rather than national sovereignty, the international community and its institutions will tend to defend the rights of established states against national claims of domestic ethnic groups. On the other hand, when the norms of the international order favor national over state sovereignty, the international community will be more sympathetic to pleas for national self-determination, often at the expense of established states. (Barkin and Cronin, 1994: 108).

In sum, contemporary institutional analyses of sovereignty reflect the different varieties of institutionalism, even if authors seldom refer to them explicitly. While ascribing different importance to sovereignty principles and norms and pointing to varying dimensions of change, all three perspectives
emphasize the institution’s persistence and adaptability to changing circumstances.

**International regimes**

Since the mid-1970s the analysis of international regimes has become a major focus of IR scholarship in both Europe and North America. It is also a research tradition that is well known outside the IR community; one that is generally associated with “international institutionalism” (Peters, 1999: 126-40). Regime theory has tackled the puzzles of international cooperation and institution-building in a world of sovereign states.

The oft-quoted definition of an international regime as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner, 1982: 185) reflects a consensus among participants in a conference convened to prepare a special issue of *International Organization*. As such, it strikes a balance between different scholarly traditions and is therefore open to varying interpretations and emphases. A common core is the view of regimes as “social institutions governing the actions of those involved in specifiable activities or sets of activities” (Young, 1989: 12). In fact, the evolution of regime theories has been described as the IR element of the “new institutionalism” (Young, 1994: 1-11).

The regime perspective has been applied to a variety of issue areas by scholars with different intellectual backgrounds. A recent overview of regime theories (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997) identifies three different branches of this research tradition, on the basis of the explanatory variables they highlight: power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based approaches. In trying to relate these approaches to our three varieties of institutionalism, we may first note differences in their degree of “institutionalism”—to what extent institutions matter. The significance of institutions has to do with effectiveness and robustness. A regime is effective (a) to the extent that its members abide by its norms and rules, and (b) to the extent it achieves its objectives. Regime robustness refers to the resilience of international institutions in the face of exogenous challenges. The three approaches can be placed on a scale from the limited significance ascribed to institutions by power-based approaches to the high degree of “institutionalism” characterizing knowledge-based approaches.

*Rational choice institutionalism.* Power-based (realist) and interest-based (neoliberal) theories share a commitment to rationalism, portraying states as self-interested, goal-seeking actors. Their “calculus approach” places them both in the camp of rational choice institutionalism. The basic difference between the two is that neoliberals see states as rational egoists, who are indifferent to how well others do, whereas realists see states as positionalists, concerned with their relative power position. Regime theory owes much of its early development to a dialogue between these two schools of thought.
The theory of *hegemonic stability*, which links the existence of effective international institutions to the existence of a predominant state—a hegemon—in the issue-area in question, was the initial realist formulation. The theory has its origin in economics. It was inspired by Charles Kindleberger’s (1973) study of the Great Depression, in which he argued that stabilization of the world economy required a stabilizer. Viewing stability as an international public (or collective) good, Kindleberger drew on Mancur Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action. In that sense, the theory of hegemonic stability can be—and is often—seen as a special case of Olson’s theory (cf. Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997: 88).

Applied to international regimes, hegemonic stability theory asserts that (1) regimes are established and maintained by states holding a preponderance of power resources (relevant to the issue-area in question), and (2) regimes decline when power becomes more equally distributed among their members (Keohane, 1980). Early empirical applications of this theory tended to associate the erosion in the 1970s of a number of postwar international regimes, especially the Bretton Woods institutions, which rested on US hegemony, with declining US power.

The realist, power-based theory of hegemonic stability has been exposed to much criticism, both on empirical and theoretical grounds. Several empirical studies have produced disappointing findings for its main tenets. Timothy McKeown (1983) has challenged the ability of the theory of hegemonic stability to account for observable patterns of trade policy in the nineteenth century. And two larger research projects with multiple case studies (Young and Osherenko, 1993; Rittberger and Zürn, 1991) have identified various regimes in the unambiguous absence of hegemony. Moreover, the notion of lost US hegemony has been challenged (see, e.g., Strange, 1987, 1994).

The main theoretical challenge came from neoliberalism. Robert Keohane’s (1984) functional or contractualist theory of international regimes has been particularly influential. The logic of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game, which highlights the “free-rider” problem, and economic theories of market failure, which point to transaction costs (including information costs) as barriers to effective cooperation, are important points of departure in Keohane’s theory. International regimes are seen as the means available to self-interested states to overcome these obstacles to mutually advantageous international cooperation.

International regimes perform the valuable functions of reducing the costs of legitimate transactions, while increasing the costs of illegitimate ones, and of reducing uncertainty. International regimes by no means substitute for bargaining; on the contrary, they authorize certain types of bargaining for certain purposes. Their most important function is to facilitate negotiations leading to mutually beneficial agreements among governments. (Keohane, 1984: 107)

In addition to accounting for the creation of regimes, these valuable functions explain why international regimes persist “after hegemony.” More generally, Keohane’s contractualism predicts that regimes will frequently remain even
after the conditions facilitating their creation have disappeared. Part of the explanation has to do with their reputational effects: “For reasons of reputation, as well as fear of retaliation and concern about the effects of precedents, egoistic governments may follow the rules and principles of international regimes even when myopic self-interest counsels them not to” (Keohane, 1984: 106). Another explanation to the persistence of regimes despite declining satisfaction among individual members is the very difficulty of creating regimes. The expected utility of maintaining a less satisfactory regime will be greater than a non-regime situation, and the transaction costs of rebuilding a regime outweigh the costs of adhering to a suboptimal regime. “The high costs of regime-building help existing regimes to persist” (Keohane, 1984: 103).

Other theorists have extended Keohane’s interest-based argument and further developed his game-theoretical interpretations of the collective action problem. While Keohane proceeded from the Prisoners’ Dilemma as a generic game model, proponents of a “situation-structural approach” point out that it represents only one type of collective action situation among several. Different kinds of regimes, in their view, can be seen as responses to the functional requirements of different kinds of collective action problems, as represented by different games (such as Battle of the Sexes, Stag Hunt or Rambo). Typologies of strategic situations, or “situation structures,” can explain the form of institutional arrangements as well as the varying likelihood of regime formation across issue-areas (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997: 45; cf. Miles et al., forthcoming).

The distinction between different types of games figures in realist, power-oriented rebuttals of Keohane’s functional theory as well. According to Keohane, regimes may help states to avoid suboptimal (Pareto-inefficient) results and move to the Pareto frontier. Stephen Krasner (1991; 1993) argues that the distributional effects of regimes are veiled by the reliance on Prisoners’ Dilemma with its single cooperative outcome. Gains for one actor mean losses for another. International regimes are created to promote the interests of particular actors. Regime creation and maintenance are a function of the distribution of power and interests among states. (Krasner, 1993: 140)

Joseph Grieco (1988, 1993), in his realist criticism of neoliberal theories, emphasizes that states not only fear being double-crossed, but also have a structurally induced intolerance for relative losses. Such concerns may preclude cooperative ventures, even when cheating is not a problem. In Grieco’s view, international institutions are no impossibility, but are less likely and much more difficult to achieve and maintain than neoliberal theorists suggest. “Indeed realists would argue that the problem with neoliberal institutionalism is not that it stresses the importance of institutions but that it understates the range of functions that institutions must perform to help states work together” (Grieco, 1990: 233).
**Historical institutionalism.** Whereas path dependence figures prominently in theories of regime creation, persistence and change, there are relatively few studies that trace the historical evolution of specific regimes. A study by one of the co-authors of this chapter (Jönsson, 1987) may serve as an example, insofar as it describes the efforts at creating and changing an institutional framework of international air transport from the introduction of the airplane in the early twentieth century and emphasizes historical contingency. An “unrestricted sovereignty” regime was established right after World War I, in which military aviation had proved its worth for the first time. This regime was revised in the wake of World War II; the ensuing “Chicago-Bermuda” regime diluted the principle of airspace sovereignty by combining it with the partially contradictory principle of international regulation and certain “freedoms of the air.” It was essentially a US-British compromise, reflecting the combination of colonial Britain’s geographic leverage and the state of aviation technology, which did not permit long-haul flights without intermediate refueling stops. This meant that the United States, despite its overwhelming lead in air transport, was unable to establish a regime based on its own interest in free competition. The interorganizational network with IATA as linking-pin, built up as a result of the Chicago-Bermuda regime, long thwarted efforts at challenging the regime.

A volume of focused case studies of the formation and evolution of environmental regimes in the Arctic area, which cover a time span from the end of the nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century (Young and Osherenko, 1993), can be seen as another example of historical institutionalism. Richard Price’s (1995) study of the genealogy of the chemical weapons taboo from World War II onwards as well as Judith Goldstein’s work on the historical institutionalization of trade norms and ideas (1989, 1993) may also be included in this category.

**Normative institutionalism.** Some of the knowledge-based approaches, identified by Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, approximate normative institutionalism. They criticize rationalist theories of international regimes, whether in neoliberal or realist guise. Instead of treating states’ identities and interests as exogenously given, they focus on the underlying normative and causal beliefs of decision-makers. Normative institutionalism is represented by “strong cognitivists” in particular, who posit institutions as basically cognitive entities, conferring identity on states and giving meaning to international relations.

Strong cognitivists argue that international regimes are embedded in broader normative structures, which defy rationalist theorizing. These include sovereignty, diplomacy and international law. Such institutions “constitute state actors as subjects of international life in the sense that they make meaningful interaction by the latter possible” (Wendt and Duvall, 1989: 53). Therefore, students of international regimes should try to uncover the norms and rules that constitute and empower the states in the first place.

Within this tradition, we find scholars who emphasize legitimacy and a “sense of obligation”; states comply with individual regime norms and rules to the extent that they correspond with the underlying broader normative
structure (see, e.g., Franck, 1990). Some authors, drawing on Jürgen Habermas, stress the importance of communicative action and discourse in regime dynamics, as opposed to the systematic focus on strategic action in rationalist approaches (see, e.g., Kratochwil, 1989). Others yet argue that regime analysis needs to integrate the evolution and internalization of new identities and interests that comes with habitual observance of agreed-upon norms and rules (see, e.g., Wendt, 1994).

Knowledge-based approaches to regime dynamics, especially those of strong cognitivists, accept the logic of appropriateness and conceptualize regimes as “principled and shared understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of social behavior” (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986: 764), and see regimes as structures of meaning. At the same time, strong cognitivism has largely functioned as critical theory, and empirical applications are scarce (cf. Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997: 161).

In sum, the study of international regimes is an arena characterized by lively scholarly debates, which hark back to different branches of institutionalism. The connection has not always been explicit. Nor does the division of the field into power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based approaches adequately catch the numerous examples of overlap and eclecticism. It is perhaps symptomatic that one of the scholars, who is most emphatic and consistent in conceptualizing regimes in terms of institutions and in referring explicitly to “new institutionalism,” Oran Young, is difficult to place squarely within this typology.2 Focusing on “institutional bargaining,” Young (1989; 1991; 1994; 1997) has investigated a broad set of variables, ranging from “veils of uncertainty” to individual leadership in explaining regime formation and change. Moreover, he has launched systematic studies of regime effectiveness and regime linkages. He may thus serve as a symbol of the breadth and creativity of regime theory.

The enigmatic European Union

The European Union represents a puzzle to political scientists. There is broad agreement that the EU is more than an international organization but less than a federal state, yet little common understanding of the “nature of the beast” (Risse-Kappen, 1996). Jacques Delors once characterized the EU as “un objet politique non-identifié” (Schmitter, 1996: 1).

Institutionalism represents one attempt to get a handle on the development and the functioning of the enigmatic European Union. Even if the EU might be understood as a process rather than a frozen institution—“the EU is still an unsettled constitutional order, in terms of geographical reach, institutional

2 Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (1997: 72-82) place Young in the neoliberal, interest-based category, but circumscribe this designation with several reservations.
balance, decision rules, and functional scope” (March and Olsen, 1998: 967)—it still lends itself to institutional analysis.

The EU has become the most highly institutionalized international organization in history, in terms of depth as well as breadth, yet without becoming a federal state. Participation in the EU has, indeed, altered the nation-state itself. For example, EU citizens and corporations can, and do, invoke EU law against other individuals and their national governments. (March and Olsen, 1998: 967-68)

Historically, the main dividing line in EU scholarship has been drawn between intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists. For intergovernmentalists, governments are the ultimate decision-makers in the EU, defining the process of integration and setting its limits. Neofunctionalists, on the other hand, focus on the integration process and its spillover effects, and assign a more independent role to supranational institutions. In recent years, institutional analysis in its various forms has come to be presented as a third, alternative approach, allowing EU studies to move beyond the intergovernmentalist-neofunctionalist deadlock (see, e.g., Pollack, 1997; Tsebelis, 1999; Tallberg, 2000; Tsebelis and Garrett, forthcoming). Yet it is obvious that rational choice institutionalism shares basic premises with intergovernmentalism, while drawing somewhat different conclusions; and neofunctionalism resonates with historical and normative institutionalism in several respects.

EU studies is the field in IR where the three different branches of institutional analysis are most explicitly referred to and built on. A recent illustration is the exchange of views on institutionalism in *ECSA Review*, the forum of the European Community Studies Association (Schmidt, 1999; Tsebelis, 1999; Risse, 1999; Scharpf, 1999).

*Rational choice institutionalism* has entered EU studies primarily in the form of transaction cost and principal-agent (P-A) analysis. Inspired by the use of these tools in the study of American politics and international regimes, intergovernmentalists were the first to introduce P-A analysis, for purposes of explaining why member governments (principals) had come to allow the supranational institutions (agents) some room for independent action in strictly defined areas. The unique role of Community law in general, and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in particular, represents a puzzle to intergovernmentalists. P-A analysis is used to demonstrate that the legal system is in fact consistent with member-state interests, as the ECJ actually helps solving monitoring and incomplete contracting problems confronting member governments (Garrett, 1992; Garrett and Weingast, 1993). Andrew Moravcsik’s (1993, 1995, 1998) noted theory of “liberal intergovernmentalism” is partially formulated in principal-agent terms. Drawing on the central propositions of P-A theory, Moravcsik suggests that member states’ control over the supranational agents depends on the incentives of governments to limit supranational autonomy, and on the ability of governments to monitor and sanction the supranational agents.
Given the centrality of the problem of shirking in the generic P-A model, it is somewhat ironic that intergovernmentalists have taken the agency relationship to mean that the institutions only perform functions desired by national governments. Other theorists, who do not share their state-centric outlook, have used P-A theory to show why member states cannot control the Commission and the ECJ. Because of information asymmetry and other barriers to proper member state control, it is understandable, in their view, that the supranational institutions have succeeded in pushing European integration further and in other directions than desired by national governments.

For instance, certain aspects of the multi-level governance approach, suggested by Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank (1996), draws on P-A theory: “In the EU, the ability of principals, i.e. member state executives, to control supranational agents is constrained by the multiplicity of principals, the mistrust that exists among them, impediments to coherent political action, information asymmetries between principals and agents and by the unintended consequences of institutional change” (Marks et al., 1996: 19). Karen Alter (1998) as well as Alec Stone Sweet and James Caporaso (1998) interpret the integrative role played by the ECJ in principal-agent terms. Alter describes how national governments, mainly concerned with the short-term material impact of the ECJ’s decisions, were unable to regain control once the long-term doctrinal effects of the ECJ’s actions became clear, because of the high institutional barriers involved in reversing court judgments. Stone Sweet and Caporaso propose a theory of legal integration with close affinities to the neofunctionalist image of the supranational institutions, and employ the P-A framework as an effective instrument for challenging intergovernmentalist conceptions of the ECJ. While differing in emphasis, all these authors point to the limits of member states’ control mechanisms in a historical perspective.

Moving beyond the competing interpretations of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, a third strand of theorists have employed P-A theory to explain variation in the scope for supranational influence. In his pioneering work, Mark Pollack (1997, 1998) demonstrates how the functional theory of delegation yields accurate predictions about the powers delegated to the EU’s supranational institutions, and then attempts to isolate the factors determining varying member-state control and supranational autonomy across issue-areas and over time. Pollack points to the following four: the distribution of preferences among member state principals, the institutional rules governing the sanctioning of the supranational agents, the distribution of information among institutions and member states, and the existence of transnational constituencies supporting the institutions’ efforts to exert influence. With the same ambition of establishing sources and patterns of variation, one of the co-authors of this chapter (Tallberg, 1999; 2000; forthcoming) employs the P-A model to explain why the autonomy of the supranational institutions differs across the phases of the policy cycle, why some supranational institutions are less constrained than others, and how delegation to supranational institutions generates dynamic effects that feed back into new rounds of interaction.
From its initial use in the study of the EU’s supranational institutions, P-A theory has recently been increasingly adopted to address other forms of delegation in the European Union. The independent regulatory agencies set up by the EU is the prime example (Majone, 1996; 1999; Egan, 1998). But, this tendency is best illustrated by a special issue of the journal *West European Politics* (forthcoming) on the politics of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions in Europe, which features articles on supranational institutions, central banks, competition agencies, regulatory agencies, constitutional courts, and courts engaged in judicial review.

*Historical institutionalism* agrees that member-state principals may be in a strong initial position and may seek to maximize their interests, but does not share the rational-choice assumption that actors fully understand the consequences of their actions. Rather, gaps in member-state control are seen as results of their consent to institutional and policy reforms that in the longer run fundamentally transform their own positions in unanticipated and/or undesired ways. The common agricultural policy (CAP) of the European Union is an example of path-dependency resulting in a policy that outlives its usefulness (cf. Bulmer, 1998: 372).

In one explicit application of historical institutionalism, Paul Pierson (1996) analyzes European integration as a path-dependent process. He identifies four factors that have contributed to considerable gaps in member-state control in the EU. First, the supranational actors, especially the Commission and the ECJ, are not simply passive tools of the member states, but have political resources of their own and enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy. The Commission acts as agenda setter and process manager, and the ECJ is in the process of “constitutionalizing” the emerging European polity. Second, the restricted time horizons of political decision-makers—due mainly to the logic of electoral politics—create a gap between short-term interests, which guide decisions, and long-term consequences, which are discounted. Third, unanticipated consequences are likely to be widespread in the EU because of high “issue density”: the sheer scope of EU issues and decisions, with actions in one realm having unintended consequences in another, limits the ability of member states to control policy development. Fourth, shifts in the policy preferences of member states, due to shifts in government or learning processes among leaders, result in arrangements that diverge from the intentions of the original designers.

At the same time, Pierson points to institutional barriers to EU reforms. Like other political institutions, those of the European Union are “sticky.” In effect, he argues, “the barriers in most national political systems pale in comparison to the obstacles present in the EC. … the rules of the game within the Community were designed to inhibit even modest changes of course” (Pierson, 1996: 143). Treaty revision is extremely difficult, involving unanimous member-state agreement, ratification by national parliaments, and in some cases referendums. In addition, sunk costs and the high price of exit create lock-in effects. In conclusion, Pierson (1996: 147) claims that “historical institutionalist analysis can incorporate key aspects of neo-functionalism while offering a stronger and expanded analytical foundation for an account of member-state constraint.”
In a similar vein, Kenneth Armstrong and Simon Bulmer (1998) examine the development of the Single European Market and the Single European Act in the period 1985-96 in terms of historical institutionalism. They argue that this approach offers a number of insights into the dynamics of the EU policy process. First, it rejects the notion that politics can be separated from public administration. The implementation of a policy may start a new cycle of policy development, and iterative processes are encapsuled in “governance regimes.” Second, historical institutionalism forges a link between the jurisprudence of the European Court and the legislative process. For example, the Commission seized upon mutual recognition as a regulatory strategy for market integration in the wake of the Cassis de Dijon judgment. Third, historical institutionalism illustrates ways in which institutions structure the policy process, (a) through the mobilization of bias (for instance, the pivotal position of the Council of Ministers privileges member-state governments and their civil servants in the policy process; consumer interests are generally weakly represented), (b) by being key players in their own right, and (c) by having their own distinctive configurations predisposing them to certain types of activity (for instance, the distinctive configuration of the EC pillar is its regulatory character).

Normative institutionalism has not yet generated as much empirical research on European integration as the other two approaches. The meta-theoretical commitment of most scholars has been “soft rational choice,” and the primary focus has been on explaining European integration as such, rather than understanding the effects of European integration for member states (cf. Risse, 1999: 7).

The Norwegian ARENA (Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation-state) program is unique in its focus on precisely the type of overarching question that would loom large on the normative institutionalist research agenda. It is no coincidence that Johan P. Olsen is directing this broad research effort. Even if it encompasses a broad variety of approaches and perspectives, much ARENA research—organized around the question of how significant process of European integration and cooperation are for the development of nation-states as loci of political power and legitimacy (Olsen, 1996: 245)—is inspired by the branch of normative institutionalism he and James March have formulated. The European Union, in this perspective, encourages Europeans “to remember some identities and common ties, and to forget identities that tend to create cleavages and conflicts” (March and Olsen, 1998: 961). The process of engrenage in the numerous arenas for interaction exposes bureaucrats, lobbyists, experts and politicians to new perspectives and new identities (March and Olsen, 1998: 967). The EC/EU has spawned institutional cooperation between France and Germany (Sverdrup, 1997) and has contributed to a domestic democratic political identity in countries such as Greece and Spain (March and Olsen, 1998: 962). Participation in the EU has also changed bureaucratic routines and role perceptions in member countries (Egeberg, 1999).

One argument against the application of an approach highlighting cultural norms and values is that we cannot identify a European culture. Yet, as pointed out by Bulmer (1998: 375-76), norms and values accumulate and
create a kind of institutional culture within the EU as an organization. To mention but a few examples, the norm of *juste retour* gives small states more influence than their size would indicate; attempts are routinely made in the Council of Ministers to reach a consensus and not overrule “significant minorities,” even where qualified majority voting applies; the pro-integration mission of the Commission is partly rule-based, partly a result of its institutional culture; the practice of “confession,” used by the Presidency, is unique to the EU. In a broader sense, it is possible to speak of a negotiation and network culture, governing appropriate behavior in the EU political process (Jönnson et al., 1998; Elgström and Jönsson, 1999).

In sum, many aspects of the European Union lend themselves to normative institutionalist analysis. Although to date there are few consummate studies applying this perspective, there is reason to share Thomas Risse’s (1999: 7) prediction that in the future “scholars will be more open-minded toward sociological institutionalism which offers theoretical insights in processes of institutional adaptation.” A recent issue of the *Journal of European Public Policy* (1999), devoted to “the social construction of Europe,” seems to support his prophecy.

All in all, EU studies provide a fertile ground for institutionalist analysis. Scholars are informed by, and make explicit references to, the different branches of institutionalism to a greater degree than in other fields of IR. And it is an area, which promises further advances of institutionalist theory.

**Conclusions**

Our brief review shows that theories derived from the study of domestic institutions have been obvious sources of inspiration for institutional analysis in various fields of IR. Of the three branches of institutional theory, rational institutionalism stands strongest in the IR community, with the two other making promising inroads. Students of international institutions have been guided by a similar set of questions. Questions concerning the formation of institutions have been addressed by students of regimes and the EU, but to a lesser extent by students of sovereignty. To a greater or lesser degree, institutional persistence and change have preoccupied all the three research areas outlined above. Questions about institutional effects on individual behavior are addressed with increasing frequency in regime and EU studies alike, but are less prominent in analyses of sovereignty.

Certain exceptions notwithstanding (Haas, 1990; Aggarwal, 1998), institutional design has not been a major preoccupation. However, the question of whether institutional design is mainly driven by functional concerns or social processes of emulation is receiving growing attention, as IR theorists are becoming increasingly concerned with the delegation of powers to international organizations (cf. *International Organization*, 2000; *West European Politics*, forthcoming). Over the years, the EU has become a less unique case of international delegation, as new regional integration initiatives in North America, Latin America and elsewhere have involved the
creation of international structures, for instance, in the areas of dispute settlement. This pattern raises questions about the extent to which the EU has figured as an institutional role model, or whether regional institutions simply constitute the most effective response to the functional demands of an integrated, international economy (cf. Mansfield and Milner, 1997).

What future research agenda emerges from this review of scholarship on international institutions? Let us briefly suggest four areas which, in our opinion, have a potential of advancing “international institutionalism.”

Comparative institutions. Many studies of international institutions have the character of single case studies, and most comparative research on international institutions to date has focused on the effectiveness of international environmental regimes (cf. Haas, Keohane, and Levy, 1993; Brown Weiss and Jacobson, 1998; Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff, 1998; Young, 1999; Miles et al., forthcoming). Not only is there a need for more comparative efforts across issue-areas in the regime and EU fields, but comparisons of institutions based on sovereignty and those based on international values are extremely rare. Yet the discussion among international lawyers and practitioners after NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 is framed in just these terms: Can practices based on sovereignty be combined with practices based on human rights, or which trumps the other? In the world of today and tomorrow there are, and will be, many situations, in which the relative effectiveness of sovereignty-based and international institutions may be compared.

Processes of institutionalization. The formation and effectiveness of regimes seem to be better understood than processes of institutionalization. We have testable hypotheses as to why states enter into international institutions, and why these are adhered to in a longer perspective. But how do initial agreements jell into institutions prescribing appropriate behavior? Recently, processes of legalization in world politics have received increasing attention (International Organization, 2000). Another interesting suggestion is that institutions over time develop general assets—such as consultation practices, infrastructure—in addition to the specific assets associated with their original task. This might explain, for example, why NATO has survived despite radically changing circumstances (Wallander, 2000). The European Union would seem to be a particularly pertinent study object in this regard, since it is obviously in the midst of an institutionalization process (Stone Sweet, Sandholtz, and Fligstein, forthcoming). As Gary Marks (1993: 403) has put it: “Beyond and beneath the highly visible politics of member-state bargaining lies a dimly lit process of institutional formation.”

International institutions and domestic politics. “In allowing their agenda to be defined by responding to the realist challenge, institutionalists have generally neglected the role of domestic politics” (Martin and Simmons, 1998: 747). The interrelations of domestic politics and state behavior have not been scrutinized either in forming or in complying with international institutions. Do certain types of states, such as democracies, behave differently than others, such as autocracies? The problem of “two-level games” (Putnam, 1988) seems to apply to institutional dynamics as well.
Most researchers have been preoccupied by the convergence effects of international institutions, but they may have divergence effects as well—that is, they may lead to divergences in state practices, magnifying preexisting differences rather than overriding them (Martin and Simmons, 1998: 754).

**Institutional interplay.** With the steady growth of formal and informal institutions at the international level, issues of institutional nesting, interplay, interconnectedness become new concerns on both the political agenda and the research agenda (Aggarwal, 1998; Young, 2000; Stokke, 2001). As Young notes in a pioneering work on the theme: “Although it is tempting to treat institutions as self-contained arrangements, most institutions interact with other institutions both vertically or across levels of social organization and horizontally or at the same level of social organization” (Young, 2000: 31). Perhaps the most visible expressions of institutional interplay at the international level today are the tensions between regional and global trade regimes, as well as between rule systems governing trade, environment, and social affairs.

In these four areas, the traditional call for further research is in order. In that future exercise, IR scholars may be well advised to continue drawing on institutional theories generated in the study of domestic institutions. But the learning process need not be unidirectional. As institutionalist analysis in IR theory has advanced, it has developed theoretical tools and concepts which may provide insights into the nature of institutions and institutionalization generally. Paradoxically, the comparative advantage of the “international institutionalism” has been the relative absence of formal institutions in the international realm, which has encouraged IR theorists to search for more subtle institutional forms and influences in their attempts to explain what is evidently patterned behavior. The forced preoccupation of IR scholars with weak institutions and the gradual institutionalization of the anarchic international system has taught us something about institutions and institutionalization generally, that students of hierarchical and institutionally-dense national political systems, for obvious reasons, have been less able to convey. Future research on institutions has a rich and variegated foundation to build on, with ample scope for fruitful cross-fertilization.

**References**


