Social Neoliberalism through Urban Planning
Bureaucratic Formations and Contradictions in Malmö since 1985

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DOCTORAL DISSERTATION
by due permission of the Faculty of Humanities and Theology,
Lund University, Sweden.
To be defended at Lund University, Lux C:121 on 15th September 2017 13.15.

Faculty opponent
Mitchell Dean, Copenhagen Business School.
Abstract: This thesis studies the complicated relationship between postwar social governance and neoliberalism. It looks at urban planning in particular because this is a key field of postwar social regulation as well as a strategic site of neoliberal reforms. The thesis examines urban planning paperwork from the Swedish city Malmö dating from the mid-1980s until 2015 with a particular focus on Folkets park, a green space in central Malmö. The main argument is that social regulation is neoliberalized, rather than ‘rolled-back’. This process cannot, the thesis argues, be reduced to a rapid burst of neoliberal political decrees in response to an exceptional moment of economic crisis. Instead, Malmö’s social neoliberalism was created by a slow process of re-articulation rife with tensions where the contingent outcome of continually erupting contradictions profoundly shaped the bureaucratic formation that emerged. Social technologies of rule were in Malmö meticulously repurposed for new ends and neoliberal technologies painstakingly grafted onto established bureaucratic routines over the course of three decades. Neoliberal urban planning was in Malmö not only shaped by residual social regulation, but also by how neoliberalism provoked new contradictions and inherited remnants of the postwar city’s urban spaces. This study of Malmö invites asking further questions about the continuing role of social modes of governing in neoliberal formations and suggests that neoliberal governance might be less vulnerable to a return of social regulation than some argue.

Key words: Urban History, Neoliberalism, Social regulation, Social governance, Urban Planning, Social democracy, Malmö, Sweden
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I have never understood the tradition of listing a series of ‘acknowledgments’ at the beginning of academic books. The rhetorical understatement of simply acknowledging the contributions of others to one’s own work seems to profoundly undervalue the collective labor of scholarship. A book is the product of, quite literally, countless efforts. These efforts are perhaps assembled by the author, but his or her work is framed and sustained in a myriad ways by the labor of others. These are debts that can never be fully repaid, and I want to acknowledge them exactly as both unredeemable and exceeding any attempt to fully represent them.

The person that this thesis surely is most indebted to is Lars Edgren, who has been a superb main thesis advisor. His inhuman attention to detail and critical reading has kept me on my toes, often throwing my writing into crisis and forcing me to reconsider fundamental arguments. Our conversation began before this project, and I’m sure it will not end with it.

Guy Baeten, my second advisor throughout this project, has also helped me above and beyond any set of reasonable expectations. Since coming across his name at a guest lecture at Malmö University and unannounced knocking on his office door in 2009 asking him for advice about my Master’s dissertation about Malmö, he has enthusiastically been involved in this project. His great knowledge of all things related to urban scholarship, and the many geographer friends I’ve found through his generosity, has profoundly shaped both me and this thesis.

I would, however, probably never have written these lines if it wasn’t for dropping out of a depressing history class to instead discover Sharad Chari’s undergraduate seminar on London’s historical geographies as an exchange student at the LSE in 2006. A new theoretical world opened in the year that followed. Sharad, and fellow geographer Asher Ghertner, forced me to continue explore this world when I returned to London in 2010. Their kind, but sometimes firm, interventions not only forced me to reexamine how I understood my own intellectual labor. It set me on a theoretical course that I would never have been able to chart on my own.
Also my encounter with Patrick Joyce shaped this thesis in crucial ways. While we only talked for a few hours during his 2011 guest professorship in Lund, he pointed me towards crucial arguments and a literatures about the social history of state that have stayed with me ever since. Patrick graciously agreed to return to my project by acting as discussant at this thesis’ defense, but had to cancel due to illness. Still, imagining him as an engaged but critical reader has immensely helped my writing and editing for the past several months.

A person that Patrick’s advice led me to was James Vernon, historian at UC Berkeley. The way that James research combines theoretical sharpness and political rigor with flawless storytelling is truly inspiring. James generosity before, during, and after my time as a visiting scholar in California was beyond simple politeness at a moment when I really needed it to keep on going.

I’ve also benefited in significant ways from Henrik Gutzon Larsen engagement with my writing. Henrik acted as the reader of an early draft of this thesis at my final seminar, and he did so with enormous rigor that has helped me rethink aspects of my research. Similarly Lars Berggren was an initiated ‘third reader’ at the same phase, helping me to better ground my research in Malmö’s history and the literature about it. Also Andrés Brink Pinto read the thesis carefully at the same moment, and significant parts of it before and after, and helped me identify areas needing more work.

There are countless people at Lund who have been crucial for writing this thesis. Worth mentioning in particular are the people I have shared an office with for the last two years, Fredrik Egefur and and Björn Lundberg, and the people I shared office space with before the History Department’s move to the Lux building, Maria Karlsson, Hugo Nordland and Andreas Olsson. A constant source of inspiring discussions has been friends, colleagues, and critics like Bolette Frydendahl Larsen, Kristoffer Ekberg, Victor Pressfeldt, Karin Zackari as well as Pål Brunnström, Martin Ericsson, Magnus Olofsson, Emma Severinson, and Niklas Svensson. Many thanks also to all the people who have contributed to the department’s seminary series, particularly people who were doctoral candidates while I was writing, like, Johan Stenfeldt, Anna Nilsson, Emma Hilborn, Isak Hammar, David Larsson Heidenblad, Kajsa Brilkman, Sune Bechmann Pedersen, Erik Bodensten, Bonnie Clementsson, Marianne Sjöland, William Wickersham, Johannes Ljungberg, Helen Persson, Anna Palmgren, Gustaf Fryksén, Kristoffer Edelgaard Christensen, Fredrika Larsson, Malin Arvidsson, Andrea Karlsson, Emma Sundqvist, Frida Nilsson, and Ida Jansson.

Ståle Holgerson, Erik Jönsson, Eric Clark, and Anders Lund Hansen in Lund and Carin Listerbom and Maria Persdotter in Malmö have wholeheartedly welcomed me into their community of critical geographers. Historians Monica Edgren, Mats Greiff, Roger Johansson, Irene Andersson, Ulrika Holgersson, Hans Wallengren, Stefan Nyzell, Frida Wikström, Björn Horgby, and Holger Weiss have all commented on parts of the thesis at one time or another. There was a
whole host of graduate students who made my time in London worthwhile, but Ellora Derenoncourt’s enthusiasm for our *Grundrisse* reading group stands out. Wanda Katja Lieberman, Adin Skodo, John Elrick, Shannon Ikebe, Kristina Leganger Iversen, and Sam Wetherell kindly welcomed me and helped me settle in during my time in California. Gloria Dawson provided great help in copy-editing the final draft. Miriam Sahlström Negash generously helped me proofread the final typeset manuscript, as did Victor Pressfeldt.

This thesis would not have been possible without the help from countless archivists at the various archival institutions I have relied on. Of these, Cecilia Hemby deserves to be mentioned specifically for helping me locate material I would never otherwise have found. Similarly has the support of the Humanities Faculty’s wonderful librarians and the administrative staff at the History Department helped me navigate difficult bureaucratic waters. How Ingegerd Christiansson, Christine Malm, and Evelin Stetter have helped me since I joined the department must be noted in particular.

The thesis would have been impossible without the economic support of several different bodies, with the publically funded Lund University and its National Graduate School of History as the most important contributor. I have also received fiscal support from various other foundations, which have funded specific aspects my work on this thesis possible. These include Bokelunds resestipendiefond, Fil dr Uno Otterstedts fond, Johannes och Gulli Blidfors stiftelse, Malmö kultuhistoriska förening, the National Graduate School Mobility Grant, and Stockholms Arbetareinstitutsföreningens forskarstipendium.

Last, but in no way least, must I mention my friends, family, and dear comrades. Without you this entire endeavor would have been both impossible and pointless. Thanking you does not begin to cover what I owe you.
Chapter 1: Malmö’s social neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is seemingly nowhere and everywhere at the same time. The rise of neoliberalism has been discussed for decades, with all kinds of problems attributed to it. Yet neoliberal power is elusive. Attempts to contest it are seldom seen as even marginally successful. It is almost as if neoliberal transformations are part of a global process entirely untouched by human agency or geographical and historical contingency.¹

I will, in the pages that follow, tell a story about neoliberalism as something entirely constituted through human practice, and therefore possible to undo or remake. I will argue that neoliberalism is a mode of governing that might be both contested and transformed, if confronted or appropriated by alternative ways of governing. I will show that neoliberal formations are more than the local implementation of generic policies circulating globally, but that actual neoliberal rule is always also shaped by particular historical geographies of both governance and everyday life. Neoliberalism as a mode of governing is not only different in particular historical moments and geographical locations. It is itself permeated by difference. It articulates contradictions, and these contradictions are the key to the way in which neoliberal formations have changed over time as well as possible future ruptures and re-articulations.

The purpose of this inquiry is to present neoliberal power as a historical product that is made, and can be unmade. The particular problem I want to center this story around is the joining of fragments of social regulation of the postwar welfare state with neoliberal logics. My thesis is that this relationship is complex, with tensions

between these two modes of statecraft modified by more mundane contradictions in significant ways.

To study these issues I have turned to how urban planning has been transformed since the early 1980s in the Swedish city of Malmö. I will focus particularly on Folkets park, a centrally-located green space in Malmö permeated by social democratic legacies as well as being the object of numerous renewal schemes since the 1980s. Malmö, a city of about 300,000 residents in the country’s south, is often seen as typical of both social democratic urban policy and splintering neoliberal urbanism. I will not, however, argue that Malmö, or Folkets Park, are typical examples of a larger process. Rather, I will suggest that these cases unsettle a social-to-neoliberal narrative that claims of representativeness often are imbricated with. It is instead because Malmö and Folkets Park so powerfully illustrate how social and neoliberal governance might co-exist, and how tensions between these modes of governing are continually co-articulated with other contradictions, that I have chosen to study these cases.

Social democratic paradise lost?

Malmö plays a peculiar role in the founding myths of Swedish social democracy. It was in this port town that the country’s first Social democratic speech was held in 1881 when tailor and agitator August Palm returned from continental Europe, smitten with German ideas of socialism. The social democratic labor movement quickly found fertile ground in the rapidly-industrializing city. Not only did the social democrats graft themselves onto older traditions of labor organization by starting party-aligned union chapters in Malmö and founding the movement’s first significant newspaper. The labor movement again broke new ground in Malmö by building its first cooperatively-owned indoor meeting space in 1893. The city’s new Folkets hus (The People’s House) had continental precursors, but Malmö’s labor movement’s experiment with the cooperative ownership of meeting space would be the working model for many hundreds of similar venues across Sweden.

3 One should add that a Folkets hus then just had opened in the Danish capital on Rømersgade after Copenhagen’s previous experiments with ‘Workers assembly buildings’ and that a venue also operating as a ‘People’s house’ was rented in another South Swedish town, Kristianstad, three years before this. For more, see Margareta Ståhl, Mötet och människor i Folkets hus och Folkets park, (Stockholm: Atlas, 2005) p. 14-18, 49.
in the decades to come. Similarly, the labor movement’s first own outdoor meeting space, Folkets park (‘The People’s Park’), was also set up in the city in 1891. Malmö’s Folkets park, which the reader soon will get an opportunity to become rather familiar with, also became an experiment copied all over the country by the labor movement, with as many as 700 local People’s Parks in the postwar years.

However, Malmö’s symbolic connection to social democracy did not end with these early experiments. The city was, like much of Sweden, shaken by intense labor disputes during the first few decades of the twentieth century. It was in Malmö that a bitter strike escalated into the country’s only lethal attack on strikebreakers, with the 1908 Amalthea bombings. Serious unrest again erupted in Malmö during strikes in 1926, this time resulting in riots provoked by the death of a striking worker. Malmö in the 1920s was also a setting for fierce conflicts outside the workplace, with the labor movement’s left leading struggles for tenant’s rights.

These tumultuous years eventually gave way to decades of relative quiet, symptomatic of the historic compromise and consensus culture of the ‘Scandinavian model’, as labor shored up its position as the dominant force in the city during the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s.

The Social Democratic Labor Party (Socialdemokratiska arbetarpartiet, often referred to simply as Socialdemokraterna or the Social Democrats) first took control of Malmö City Council in 1919. A decade later it was becoming clear that the party was not going to be dislodged from this position within the foreseeable future. Indeed, the Social Democrats held a political majority in Malmö City

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4 Remarkably little has been written about this absolutely central institution in the social democrats’ fight for hegemony, with only one historical monograph focusing on the topic in recent decades. Lennart Karlsson, *Arbetarrörelsen, Folkets Hus och offentligheten i Bromölla 1905-1960*, (Växjö: Växjö University Press, 2009). Two more relatively recent accounts written in a popular style do, however, exist: Harald Brentsen, *100 år med Folkets Hus*, (Stockholm: Folkets Hus Landsförbund, 1987); Ståhl, *Möten och människor i Folkets hus och Folkets park*, p. 7


Council for 66 years without interruption.11 Combining the organizational power of cooperative societies and unions with a mass party membership, parliamentarian success, and friendly relations to key regional business leaders, the labor movement could shape life in the city over much of the 20th century in a truly astonishing manner.12

Signs of the Social Democrats attempt to remake the city are still visible throughout Malmö. While the party leadership never embraced modernist architecture as wholeheartedly as the culturally more radical social democrats in Stockholm, the city saw some key experiments in early Scandinavian ‘functionalism’ such as the 1937 Ribershus exhibition.13 In the postwar era the party oversaw a series of high-profile public development projects like the 1944 City Theatre (now Malmö Opera) and the large 1958 football arena Malmö stadion (‘Malmö Stadium’).14 Malmö was also one of the earliest Scandinavian cities to adopt British ideas about building urban space as ‘neighborhood units’, rather than city blocks. This pioneering experiment can still be seen in the, now renovated and partly redeveloped but still municipally owned, 1948 Augustenborg development.15

These early experiments were scaled up to meet the needs of the rapid urbanization of the 1960s, with new residential areas containing thousands of units. Meanwhile, the one-party municipal administration worked in tandem with the national government’s taxation model to increase employment opportunities in export-driven heavy manufacturing, most notably in the city’s massive Kockums shipyards and the equally large Limhamn cement works — the precursor to the global Skanska corporation.16 This well-rehearsed narrative of Malmö and the rise of social democratic power is however not the only way in which the city plays a key part in the story of the Scandinavian model.

More recently, Malmö has been used as a stage for dramatizing rather different historical changes. The city has been mobilized as one of the most symbolically salient sites for the story of North Atlantic deindustrialization and post-industrial development. Malmö lost a sizable part of its residential population to suburban commuter communities in the 1970s, its manufacturing base crumbled during the

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14 Tykesson and Diaz, Funkis i Malmö, p. 59; Billing and Stigendal, Hegemonins decennier: lärdomar från Malmö om den svenska modellen, p. 298.
1980s, and unemployment skyrocketed in the early 1990s. It is not only that levels of poverty seen as extreme in a Scandinavian context has returned to significant parts of the city. Malmö has increasingly become understood as being divided into distinct and segregated zones of affluence and poverty. The city is now among the most infamous examples of the splintering urbanism of post-welfarist Scandinavian cities, a historical change explored in detail by the municipality-appointed Commission for a Socially Sustainable Malmö. This image of a divided city is reinforced by aggressive place-marketing via spectacular brand name architecture and municipal real estate boosterism, sharply contrasting with the city’s increasingly deprived neighborhoods and early experiments in workfare. Worries about a splintering city are often expressed in ethnic terms, with the city’s large share of migrants garnering international attention. Malmö has thus both been celebrated as multicultural poster-child by leftists and liberals and evoked in right-wing panics about ethnic ghettoization by the likes of America’s Fox News and the Donald Trump administration.

Turning points and windows of opportunity

The manner that Malmö is taken as emblematic of both a lost history of welfarist, postwar urban world and present, post-industrial, neoliberal predicaments creates a set of distinctive before-and-after images. This notion of Malmö changing from being typical of one epoch to also being typical of the following epoch has been important to scholars seeking to make sense of the city’s history. Such narratives

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22 E.g. Hanna Carlsson, Den nya stadens bibliotek: Om teknik, förnuft och känsla i gestaltningen av kunskaps-och upplevelsestadiens folkbibliotek, (Lund: Lund Studies in Arts and Cultural Sciences 2013) p. 53; Dalia Mukhtar-Landgren, Planering för framsteg och gemenskap: om den kommunala
tend to frame Malmö as a kind of ‘comeback’ city that at a critical moment completely reinvented itself to overcome a long period of decline. The cultural resonances of these before-after images, and the way they are narratively bridged in a dramatic crisis-reinvention story, dominate the academic literature on the city’s recent history and help explain the disproportional amount of scholarly attention toward this modest town on Europe’s periphery.

The transformation of Malmö is narratively often centered on the early 1990s. This period was marked by a severe Swedish financial crisis, but also by explicitly neoliberal responses by the center-right administrations in power from 1991 to 1994 in both Malmö and in the Swedish parliament. With neoliberal reforms fuelled by economic crisis, a new trajectory of deregulation is understood to have been set in motion for the country and Malmö both, a course essentially maintained by the Social Democrats once they returned to power by the end of 1994. This moment of change is taken to have long-lasting effects, constituting a ‘systemic shift’ (systemskifte) away from the postwar welfare state. Malmö’s neoliberal trajectory is seen to have emerged from the same moment that Swedish politics began to be dominated by neoliberal ideas, a temporal resonance which reinforces notions of the city as typical of the decline of Scandinavian welfarist politics, and North Atlantic Keynesianism more generally.

23 Mukhtar-Landgren, Planering för framsteg och gemenskap: om den kommunala utvecklingsplaneringens idémässiga förutsättningar, (Lund: Lund University, 2016) p. 120; Møllerström, ‘Malmös omvandling: från arbetarstad till kunskapsstad. En diskursanalytisk studie av Malmös förnyelse’, p. 66. See also Holgersen, Staden och kapitalet: Malmö i krisernas tid, p. 131.


This early 1990s moment of economic and political crisis is identified in these narratives as a ‘window of opportunity’ seized by Malmö’s political and bureaucratic elites in a dramatic turn toward neoliberal governance.\(^{27}\) It thus provided a ‘turning point’ for a many decades-long history of decline where crumbling institutions are swiftly dismantled to make room for new and innovative ideas.\(^{28}\) The 1990s moment of crisis is in this way presented as permeated by potential, even for the most regulated of economies such as the staunchly social democratic Malmö.

The narrative of swift and sudden change is itself curated by Malmö municipality through comprehensive storytelling workshops where key bureaucrats are taught to narrate the municipality as successfully turning the lemons of deindustrialization into neoliberal lemonade by becoming a leading proponent of post-industrial urban development.\(^{29}\) The resolution of the crisis in these narratives is often taken to be the 1994 return of social democratic dominance, with the new mayor Ilmar Reepalu at the helm. The center-right 1991–1994 administration is understood as having put an end to the old social democratic model and staked out a new, neoliberal historical trajectory. Many of the policies put in place during this moment were left untouched after the 1994 election victory of the Social Democrats with a New Labour-like program. In this narrative, that not only has come to frame much of the academic literature on the city, but in fact emerged in close relation to key social democratically-aligned scholars working on Malmö, the mid 1990s is constructed as a moment of truly epochal change.\(^{30}\) Malmö’s municipal bureaucrats focused on a desperate, but ultimately successful, attempt to completely reinvent the welfarist bureaucracy inherited from the lost world of postwar social democracy.

This narrative is, at least, partly familiar for readers of recent academic debates concerning neoliberalism. Neoliberal reforms are often understood to be implemented in brief moments of emergency and crisis by small cliques of economic experts prescribing a cocktail of generic, market-friendly policies as the

\(^{27}\) Dannestam, ‘Stadspolitik i Malmö. Politikens meningsskapande och materialitet’, p. 119.


\(^{29}\) Möllerström, ‘Malmös omvandling: från arbetarstad till kunskapsstad. En diskursanalytisk studie av Malmös förnyelse’, p. 21, 68. For a similar analysis of the city’s narrative framing through its public relations office see Mukhtar-Landgren, Planering för framsteg och gemenskap: om den kommunala utvecklingsplaneringens idemässiga förutsättningar, p. 120-123; Holgersen, Staden och kapitalet: Malmö i krisernas tid, p. 71-75. See also Dannestam, ‘Stadspolitik i Malmö. Politikens meningsskapande och materialitet’, p. 118-120, 128-129; Mukhtar-Landgren, Planering för framsteg och gemenskap: om den kommunala utvecklingsplaneringens idemässiga förutsättningar, p. 82-85.
only possible response to predictions of what change global markets demand. New York’s 1975 fiscal crisis, the post-coup chaos in Chile, or the feeling of impending societal collapse framing the early Thatcher years have all been taken as emblematic of similarly historic moments of opportunity seized by neoliberal technocrats to mark the beginning of a new era.\textsuperscript{32}

Ideas of dramatic changes rapidly inaugurating a new era, recognizable in both Malmö municipality’s self-made narrative and academic writing about it, correspond to a broader temporal imaginary that sociologist Mike Savage has described in terms of ‘epochalism’.\textsuperscript{33} Savage argues that an important way that British sociologists have framed their work since the 1990s has been through constantly-repeated claims about describing an emerging and fundamentally new era, be it in terms of post-industrialization, globalization, risk society, or, more recently, neoliberalism.

Early scholarship on neoliberalism often connected epochal change to notions of rapidly receding state regulation of economic markets.\textsuperscript{34} More recent research tends to instead situate this shift within the state. At the core of this sense of epochal remaking of the state are variations of what sociologist John Clarke has described as the subordination of the social by economic logics of rule. Clarke charts nine different ways that this theme has been elaborated, arguing that the social, despite epochal framings, might still play an important role for the neoliberal state.\textsuperscript{35} This flexible trope of neoliberals ending an epoch dominated by the welfare state’s social regulation can be traced back to the 1980s, when the unusual pair of Margret Thatcher and Jean Baudrillard simultaneously, in the words of historian James Vernon, ‘proclaimed the death of the social’.\textsuperscript{36}

It is not difficult to see traces of an epochal narrative of economic logics displacing social regulation even in some of the most interesting critical studies of neoliberalism. Marxist geographer David Harvey, for instance, describes the remnants of Sweden’s welfare state’s universalist social policy as ‘circumscribed neoliberalism’, framing social regulation as a not fully circumvented obstacle to

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\textsuperscript{34} This tendency is perhaps most clearly exemplified by Gary Teeple, \textit{Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform: Into the Twenty-First Century}, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).


\textsuperscript{36} James Vernon, \textit{Hunger: A modern history}, (Harvard University Press, 2007) p. 14 A similar argument about the way neoliberal politics strangely are wrapped up with post-structuralist claims about the end of the social can be found in Mitchell Dean, \textit{Governing Societies: Political Perspectives on Domestic and International rule}, (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2007) p. 54.
neoliberal reform. Foucauldian Nikolas Rose discusses the innovations underpinning ‘advanced liberalism’ as having the effect of a social sphere bound to national space gradually collapsing. Neo-Polanyian economist Mark Blyth has argued that neoliberal reforms have undone decades of embedding economic markets socially by stripping away the regulations protecting society.

These accounts are, as Clarke argues more broadly, not necessarily claiming that neoliberal models for economic calculation have completely done away with the state’s social regulation. Rather, economic models displacing postwar social governing is taken as the key theme of neoliberalism, with remnants of social regulation framed as indicators of an incomplete epochal transformation. I want to take up John Clarke’s challenge to think about the social in neoliberalism, and untangle it from the many epochalist assumptions that see the progress of neoliberal reforms as bound to the retrenchment of social regulation.

Malmö provides an unusually suitable case for thinking about this problem because the officially-curated narrative of Malmö’s transformation is emblematic of epochal narratives of neoliberalism in all senses but one, which puts the entire narrative trope into question. Malmö’s narrative framing differs from the standard story by social regulation never unambiguously being jettisoned to make space for economic logics. In the story of Malmö’s transformation, neoliberal reforms are not held back, obstructed, or circumscribed by social regulation. Social governance instead coexists with neoliberalism in Malmö, with a new mode of social regulation being part of the neoliberal formation that replaces a postwar welfare state in crisis. This persistence of some of the key techniques of postwar social regulation is not limited to the narrative framing of Malmö’s recent history. Remnants of social democratic planning practices are, as geographer Guy Baeten has suggested and I will argue throughout this book, an important feature of how neoliberal governance is enacted in Malmö.

Not only was social regulation important in Malmö long after what was supposedly the swift and sweeping epochal shift of the mid 1990s, but neoliberal logics of rule were actually introduced during the decade preceding the center-right 1991–1994 administration. Neoliberalism was continually made and remade in tension with social governance, rather than neoliberal policy simply replacing the social statecraft that had dominated Malmö for six decades. This protracted process exemplifies what Stuart Hall has described as neoliberal reforms need to

do the ‘massive’ work of ‘dis-articulating and re-articulating’ preceding cultural modes of power to be effective. This cumulative and slow process provided plenty of opportunities for historically-specific conditions to contingently shape Malmö’s neoliberal trajectory. Neoliberalism in Malmö did not follow a given path which was impossible to stop or change once set in motion by neoliberal fixes being adopted to ameliorate the crisis of postwar, welfarist, social governance.

What makes Malmö interesting for examining neoliberal governance, then, is the tensions between how well writing about the city exemplifies the narrative of sudden, epochal change and the way that it plainly also deviates from the social-to-economic theme of this narrative. Malmö in this regard provokes questions about how neoliberalism and social regulation might interact beyond an epochal approach where one displaces the other as the dominant logic of rule. Studying Malmö’s recent past thus makes demands for us to experiment with other narratives of neoliberal transformation than the sudden, epochal, defeat of social regulation by economic logics of rule.

Malmö as an anomaly of the epochal narrative of a sudden neoliberal end to social regulation serves as a reminder for us to take care when historicizing recent changes. The particular relationship between social regulation and neoliberalism that I study in Malmö is however only one possible formation, and to what degree it is typical is a question I want to leave open. What I have come to think about as the social neoliberalism of Malmö might be a uniquely Scandinavian configuration, a strange fringe phenomenon that has remained undetected in an academic field dominated by Anglophone authors and cases because of the relative insignificance of this kind of formation.

There is also a possibility that Malmö’s social neoliberalism could be a more pronounced and visible example of a broader range of phenomena. There is research suggesting that there might be a whole range of different social neoliberalisms. Particularly deserving of mention are theoretical interventions like Michel Foucault’s, Thomas Lemke’s, and Werner Bonefeld’s respective work on social policy in, and inspired by, the early neoliberalists of the German ‘Freiburg School’. Other scholars pointing to this potential include Mitchell Dean’s discussion about the possibility of a ‘post-welfarist regime of the social’ and

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42 The term ‘social neoliberalism’ has been referenced in passing by economist Philip Cerny as a possible extension of his notion of embedded neoliberalism. I, as I hope is made clear shortly, instead want use this phrase to emphasize the neoliberalization of social statecraft, rather than social welfare systems embedding and propping up economic deregulation. See Philip G. Cerny, ‘Embedding neoliberalism: the evolution of a paradigm’, The Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy, 2/1 (2008), p. 40.
Yvonne Hartman’s claim that neoliberal policies tend to reshape, rather than abolish, the welfare state.  

Empirically, Brett Christophers seems to at least partially suggest that my argument for social neoliberalism as an emerging formation holds for how the Swedish housing market has developed. Stephen Collier’s findings that post-Soviet neoliberalism is shaped by a long legacy of social regulation via infrastructure, Ben Jackson’s close reading of how New Labour strategically combined neoliberal ideas with particular forms of socialist thinking, and James Ferguson’s exploration of how social politics have been repurposed by neoliberal reforms in South Africa point to resonances outside Sweden. Whether the social should be considered an important sphere of neoliberal reform more generally is in either case plainly beyond what claims can be made from one case study. The social neoliberalism of Malmö that I explore is not, then, necessarily typical of neoliberal urban transformations, even if different kinds of social governance broadly speaking constitute the common prehistory of neoliberalism. I do, however, want to argue that Malmö is a provocation that invites a critique of prevalent narratives of neoliberal reform that has broader implications for scholarship on neoliberal reforms.

Experimenting with alternative narratives of this history in turn places certain demands on how neoliberal reforms might be studied methodologically, which also has implications beyond Malmö. Malmö’s protracted process of transformation suggests that neoliberal formations are continually reworked, and their trajectory therefore is shifting, rather than settled in a brief and epoch-making moment. This implies that neoliberal reforms are continually exposed to the contingencies of being shaped by political and societal forces, rather than a monolith beyond human influence once it is in place. It also implies that neoliberal governance, not being a product of dramatic moments of crisis, is more

anonymous and more difficult to openly confront, stop, or reverse than oppositional movements sometimes suggest.

**Defining neoliberalism**

Untangling neoliberalism from epochal narratives of anti-social change requires precise definitions of neoliberalism as well as of social regulation. Academic debates have recently focused on neoliberalism as a proactive style of governing associated with state institutions, in contrast to earlier accounts that tended to understand neoliberal reform as fundamentally negative project of reigning in and rolling back the state’s regulation of markets.\(^{48}\) If neoliberalism is a mode of governing gradually gaining momentum rather than the sudden and swift retreat of the state, analyzing neoliberal reforms requires closely studying the concrete, everyday practices of bureaucratic institutions.

Early debates about neoliberalism, usually centered on post-Fordism and globalization, were often concerned with uncovering macroeconomic mechanisms and trends. Important contributions to this work tended to draw on the temporal logics of Marxian Regulation School theory by focusing on systemic shifts in capital investment patterns and the new formations of work and class relations.\(^{49}\) Economic perspectives still play an important role in debates about neoliberalism, but have, with the increasing attention to the state bureaucracy’s active role in neoliberalism, partly been displaced by research tracking neoliberalism as a style of governing.

Research on the cultural politics of neoliberalism can, as Wendy Larner argued some time ago, broadly be seen to spring from three theoretical currents.\(^{50}\) Larner sees the most common approach as tracking neoliberalism in terms of a fairly broad free market *policy framework* disseminated by an increasingly powerful

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\(^{50}\) Wendy Larner, ‘Neo-liberalism: policy, ideology, governmentality’, *Studies in political economy*, 63/1 (2000). The gist of Larner’s characterization seem to hold, although recently there has been some interesting theoretical cross-fertilization between these currents, especially between Gramscian Marxism and Foucauldian perspectives. See John Clarke, ‘After neo-liberalism? Markets, states and the reinvention of public welfare’, *Cultural studies*, 24/3 (2010)
network of institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, and large think tanks. Neoliberalism has also been approached as a *hegemonic ideology*, shaping how the state embeds itself and dominant interests in webs of legitimizing language and cultural formations. Finally, Foucauldians have sought to analyze neoliberalism as a mode of *governmental reason* that can be traced by turning to the practices of governing. All these approaches have touched on how the state’s bureaucratic institutions and practices have been reformed in recent decades.

Without downplaying important contributions from other currents, the Foucauldian tradition’s analytical concerns with the practices of governing is clearly useful for my concerns with tracing of how neoliberal formations slowly emerge in tension with other modes of power because it allow unpacking the many different kinds of governmental practices at work in the same situation. Scholars drawing on Foucault’s work on ‘governmentality’ have elaborated a precise vocabulary for studying the governmental practices on which dominant institutions rest, which can be used to analyze how different modes of power are combined. In particular, the rather descriptive research by Foucauldian scholars about how everyday governmental practice enacts political reason by charting the invention, diffusion, and re-articulating of different ‘techniques of power’ provide useful tools to analyze neoliberal government. It is this body of work I draw on when seeking to trace the history of Malmö’s neoliberal formation through closely studying changes in the techniques of power — or what I, to use a more mundane phrase, will call *bureaucratic practices* — enacting a municipal bureaucratic machinery increasingly expressing neoliberal political reason.

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55 The Foucauldian attention to the practices of governing have, since Foucault’s writings and lectures on the issue been attached to an ambition of escaping from a totalizing conceptions of the state as a clearly demarcated subject of history. By deploying the Foucauldian repertoire of analytical tools for mapping the practices of governing I want to emphasize the plural agencies and enacted forms of the state. But unlike Foucault’s, and many scholars’ following in his footsteps, project of completely dissolving the state into its practices, I’m using these analytical tools to focus on how practices of power are negotiated in the dominant bureaucracies located inside the, albeit, porous boundaries we associate with state-ness. For a discussion on the effects of Foucault’s ‘state-phobia’, see Mitchell Dean and Kaspar Villadsen, *State Phobia and Civil Society: the Political Legacy of Michel Foucault*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).
Approaching neoliberalism in terms of how a new political reason is performed by bureaucratic practices requires some analytical care. Certain kinds of practices certainly have distinctive family resemblances that make it possible to think about them as expressing a common political reason, like neoliberalism. But the study of neoliberalism as an historical phenomenon should not be reduced to the diffusion of a handful of bureaucratic techniques expressing neoliberal reason. As anthropologist Stephen Collier has argued, ‘global diagnoses of power’ about dominant political reason are often inferred from the mere presence of a certain bureaucratic practice. A specific bureaucratic practice might be deployed in very different ways depending on how it is joined with other practices in concrete situations. The ways in which political reason is enacted in bureaucratic practice thus needs to be carefully approached by studying the ‘multiple determinations’ shaping how practices are performed in a particular formation. Following on from this, the close excavation of how ‘techniques, technologies, material elements, and institutional forms’ are combined, Collier claims, is needed to determine what political reason might be seen at work.

Tracking neoliberal reason by studying how practices are deployed relationally thus seems like a useful method for writing the history of neoliberal transformations. One example of the rich empirical work this type of approach opens up is anthropologist Aihwa Ong’s studies of neoliberal ‘migratory technology’ being reworked in tension with East Asian traditions of governance. Another example is how fellow anthropologist James Fergusson describes neoliberal bureaucratic ‘moves’ being modified by legacies of popular politics in Southern African social welfare policy. Historian Timothy Mitchell’s detailed study of how neoliberal economic expertise was deployed in Lima with unexpected results since the 1990s serves as yet another model for how tracking minute changes in the practices of governing can provide an accurate understanding of neoliberal formations.

Studying how actual neoliberal statecraft is both shaped by global circuits of neoliberal policy diffusion and many other determinations enables writing a history of neoliberal governance that is protracted and conflict-ridden. A bureaucratic practice shaped by neoliberal reason might be deployed within a

58 Collier, ‘Topologies of power Foucault’s analysis of political government beyond ”governmentality”’, p. 89-90.
context where other kinds of practices are still predominant. The effects of neoliberal reforms might be either modest or powerful, depending on how new bureaucratic practices are linked to established practices. For instance, I will in Chapter 4 argue that neoliberal practices were introduced in Malmö’s key bureaucratic institutions during the mid-1980s and that this had instant, dramatic effects in some areas like real estate management, but almost no immediate consequences in certain other areas. This not only suggests that Malmö’s first neoliberal reforms are difficult to understand without a careful analysis of how neoliberal bureaucratic practices are linked to established practices of governing. It also implies that later neoliberal reforms, more overtly concerned with social regulation, are difficult to explain without taking into account the fallout of earlier reforms.

The same argument can be made from the opposite direction concerning postwar social regulation persisting in a situation where neoliberal practices have become dominant. Not only might remnants of postwar, welfarist bureaucratic practices remain active, or even be rediscovered, in a neoliberal formation. Also how welfarist and neoliberal practices are used together makes a difference. As I will later argue in some detail, in Malmö in the 2000s and 2010s some bureaucratic practices associated with postwar social concerns were linked to a range of neoliberal practices in ways that essentially extended and deepened neoliberal concerns. In other cases remnants of welfarist practices have remained active alongside neoliberal practices in ways that instead forced increasing interventions to secure the welfare of deprived communities. How particular new and old practices are deployed together is then crucial to understand any neoliberal formation.

That neoliberalism must be treated as a set of interrelated governmental hybrids is not a new argument. What I hope to bring to this discussion is to show, in detail, how a formation like Malmö’s social neoliberalism emerged over a period of decades in the mundane practice of municipal bureaucrats. Telling this story in terms of an uneven and cumbersome bureaucratic process permeated by tensions and without a given endpoint seems to me to suggest that neoliberal reforms always have historically-determined possibilities for both minor subversions and potentially much more comprehensive re-articulations. Hybridity, the linking of difference, and the internal tensions this entails is then not only key to understanding the making of neoliberal governance, but its continuous remaking and its potential future unmaking.

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The definition of neoliberalism I draw on is, in terms of form, concerned with political reason enacted in bureaucratic practice. What is then the content, the actual ‘political reason’, that can be analytically seen at work in neoliberal transformation of bureaucratic practices? There are several contending features taken as the basis for a definition in recent debates. Historian Philip Mirowski has, for instance, argued that the eleven interrelated positions associated with the neoliberal Mont Pèlerin Society’s broad group of thinkers should be used to pinpoint neoliberal policy as a kind of pro-market constructivism.\textsuperscript{61}

A more theoretically precise position is found in Wendy Brown’s analysis of neoliberalism. In \textit{Undoing the Demos} she argues, in a move echoing broader debates about neoliberalism as a post-political project, that the economization of political life is a fundamental effect of neoliberal reform.\textsuperscript{62} Brown’s meticulous study of neoliberal reason certainly helps pinpoint a core tendency of neoliberalism, but it seems to be simultaneously both too broad and too narrow to function as a definition in the kind of analysis I am concerned with. It is too broad in that there surely is a whole host of ‘economic’ ways of knowing and directing life, including both directly planned economies and ways to use markets against themselves, that would make little sense in relation to neoliberal thought.\textsuperscript{63} But it is also too narrow in focusing on the unmaking of the political sphere, where it risks omitting neoliberal reason at work in the mundane practices of governance that all along have been outside politics, for example the technical expertise that social regulation rests on.

Instead of departing from Brown’s ‘economization of Political Man’ thesis or Mirowski’s complex combination of constructivist pro-market policies, I want to suggest that many of the techniques of government developed from key neoliberal thinkers are concerned with \textit{using state bureaucracy to actively account for and}\textsuperscript{61}


\textsuperscript{63} Soviet-style central planning would be an example of the first type of economization, and the idea of tax-funded ‘wage earners’ funds’ slowly transferring ownership to workers, prominent in 1970s European social democratic debates over socialism is an example of the second form of economic logics of rule not corresponding to a neoliberal move.
order life to increase competition. From this point of view, governing by seeking to measure and increase competition can be seen as the political reason enacted by reforms deploying bureaucratic practices to neoliberal effects. This skeletal definition diverges in some aspects from the above-mentioned debates, but resonates with them in other ways. If economics is considered as regulation through markets and competition as an essential feature of markets, then Brown’s economization thesis seems to be a parallel, if somewhat different way, of phrasing the same historical tendency. Mirowski’s argument that neoliberalism is a constructivist project taking the state as a key arena and the market as its crucial metaphor, distinguishing it from the classical liberal approach to markets as organic and spontaneous, also suggest that the production of competition is a central problem of neoliberalism.

This definition also intersects with Foucault’s pioneering work on neoliberalism that situates the construction of competition at its core. A similar point is made from a different perspective in William Davies’ convincing The Limits of Neoliberalism, which argues that contemporary neoliberal theory poses competition as ‘an essential trait of individuals’ rather than taking it as feature of natural ‘markets’. Or as Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval recently put it:

As a general principle of government, ‘competitiveness’ precisely represents the extension of the neo-liberal norm to all countries, all sectors of public activity, all areas of social existence.

Defining neoliberal governance in terms of bureaucratic practices deployed to measure and foster competition — inside the state and across social, economic, political and cultural domains — is perhaps a provisional and crude definition. One can certainly find thinkers and policy-makers outside the neoliberal sphere of influence who have been preoccupied by the idea of competition, although few place it as the central tenet of governance in the manner key neoliberals do. Still, for the purposes of this thesis, this definition does analytically useful work. Taking neoliberalism as demands on state institutions to measure and increase competition certainly encompasses the demands on subjects to become competitive that many writers from the Foucauldian tradition have focused on. What this definition also does is to offer the opportunity to approach governance through competition outside the demands to adopt a neoliberal personality, with its unclear actual

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Competition is then not only a demand on our sense of self, but can operate as a process internal to bureaucratic institutions. Demands to know and increase competitiveness are in this way made on bureaucracies, both in and beyond its attention toward subjects, by treating government departments and the space it seeks to manage as competing against other administrative units.

In Malmö, as I will argue, such demands of competitiveness have become bound to discourses about attractive urban space, although in historically shifting ways. Moreover, taking bureaucratic practices concerned with measuring and fostering competition as the defining feature of neoliberal governance allows a clear distinction to be made in relation to the mid-century welfarist social regulation. This provides the opportunity to focus on charting the arduous and tension-ridden work of neoliberal reforms re-articulating bureaucratic practices made during, and even before, the welfarist postwar moment of welfarist social regulation.

Contradictions of governing

I have argued that neoliberalism in Malmö took shape more gradually than suggested by epochal narratives of a sudden and swift break with social governance. To study this protracted process of social regulation coming up against neoliberal logics, paying attention to the mundane negotiations of bureaucratic practices slowly shifting form seems like a more suitable approach than looking at the political drama played out in moments of crisis. How social regulation, despite its receding power, continued to shape neoliberal bureaucratic practice can be understood in terms of what Raymond Williams describes as the difference between archaic, residual, and emergent forces. Williams argues that unlike ‘the archaic’, wholly ‘an element of the past’, ‘residual’ forces were ‘effectively formed in the past’ but remain ‘an effective element of the present’. On the other hand, ‘emergent’ force, Williams writes, is the continuous creation of ‘new meanings and values, new practices, new relationships.’ Both emergent and residual forces play important roles in any cultural formation.68

Malmö’s history of social regulation is in this regard a residual force, shaping neoliberal governance long after it was the dominant reason. I want to argue that the way in which these two kinds of political reason is joined is not a straightforward process, worked out far from the tensions of life in the city. How residual postwar social governance shapes emergent neoliberal bureaucratic practices is complicated by the world outside bureaucratic practices.

Contradictions of built and lived urban space intruding on governing is in some
ways a question of tensions from the residual postwar city, but also emergent
forces set loose by neoliberal urban development. Neoliberal transformation is
then shaped by three conditions of instability that continually make themselves
known in the practices of government: residual bureaucratic practices, residual
tensions of urban life, and emerging tensions of urban life. Before delving deeper
into the historical geography of the specific Swedish modes of postwar social
regulation that shaped, and continues to shape, neoliberal reforms in Malmö, I
want to briefly discuss how to approach the relationship between bureaucratic
practice and tensions of urban life.

The most important theoretical challenge of drawing on a Foucauldian tradition —
with its usefully precise vocabulary of tracking neoliberalism as a political
reason enacted in bureaucratic practice — is how to relate the practices of
governing with the world being governed.\footnote{Barnett, ‘The consolations of “neoliberalism”’, p. 10.}
Foucauldian approaches to
governance notoriously tend to focus on how techniques of rule have internal
contradictions. This makes this set of analytical tools very well-suited to examine
the relationship between residual social and emergent neoliberal practices, but
requires more care when drawing on this tradition to study the relationship
between neoliberalism and tensions outside of the practices of governing.

The issue is not that Foucauldian scholarship on governance has been reluctant
to analyze contradictions, as some of its critics argue.\footnote{Margit Mayer and Jenny Künkel, ‘Introduction: Neoliberal urbanism and its contestations–
Crossing theoretical boundaries’, in Margit Mayer and Jenny Künkel (eds.), Neoliberal Urbanism
and its Contestations: Crossing Theoretical Boundaries (New York: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2012) p. 6-7.}
Foucauldians have rather, in Thomas Lemke’s words, framed contradictions as ‘always already part of the
programs themselves’ thus ‘contributing to “compromises”, “fissures” and
“incoherencies”’ internal to the practice of governing.\footnote{Thomas Lemke, ‘Foucault, governmentality, and critique’, Rethinking marxism, 14/3 (2002), p. 57.}
In this regard, Foucauldians tend to approach contradictions in terms of tensions between
‘rival programs’ of government, and largely consider tensions outside of the
practices of governing as illegible to their analytical methods.\footnote{Nikolas Rose, Pat O’malley, and Mariana Valverde, ‘Governmentality’, Annual Review of Law
and Social Science, 2 (2006), p. 100.}

Legibility to dominant discourse might be a precondition for tensions to have
effects on bureaucratic practices. Yet new facets of human life are continually
made legible to governance and ‘antagonisms’ not entirely internal to dominant
discourse serve as provocations for the ‘never-ending incitement to projects
of government’, as Foucauldians Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose writes.\footnote{Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose, ‘Governing cities: notes on the spatialisation of virtue’,
Environment and planning D: society and space, 17/6 (1999), p. 738.}
This not only indicates that governance continually is adapting to its outsides. But, as
anthropologist James C. Scott argues in *Seeing like a State*, dissonance in how the world is made legible to power, and its unexpected consequences, points to agency beyond governance that shape the practices of power.\(^{74}\)

Foucauldian studies of government have perhaps ‘never claimed’ to make the adoption, refusals, or failures beyond the discursive organizing of governing reason and technologies a central problem, as leading proponents of this approach Nikolas Rose, Pat O’Malley, and Mariana Valverde argued in a response to critics in 2006. This does not mean that ‘sociological’ — and, one might add, historical — research on the relationship between the practices of governing and its outside could not very well be ‘articulated with’ Foucauldian studies of governing, according to the three authors.\(^{75}\) The same troubled relationship between governmental formations and its outsides has been identified by a host of other scholars working with Foucault’s conceptual apparatus as an area demanding conceptual innovation. Summarizing the problem before writing a chapter on the role of resistance in shaping governance, historian Patrick Joyce points out that the literature on governmentality does ‘not say much on politics as a realm of the contingent and the conjunctural’.\(^{76}\) Critical theorist Wendy Brown has identified a similar issue in her writing on neoliberalism, in terms of ‘capitalism […having] drives that no discourse can deny’ and thus shaping the practices of governing, without ever operating ‘independently of discourse’.\(^{77}\) Similarly, what broadly might be understood as political antagonisms are, in urban planning scholar Asher Ghertner’s phrase, more than ‘effects of government’, but have important ‘effects on government.’\(^{78}\) Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt argue in their book *Commonwealth* that Foucault’s later work is marked by a tension between government as ‘the power over life’ and ‘the power of life to resist and determine an alternative production of subjectivity’ working within, but seeking to escape the confines of, dominant forms of governing.\(^{79}\) This interpretation is perhaps seizing on a minor theme in Foucault’s later writing, but not entirely unfounded, with


\(^{75}\) Rose, O’malley, and Valverde, ‘Governmentality’, p. 100.


\(^{77}\) Brown, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution*, p. 76.


Foucault in an 1982 interview even going so far as to claim that ‘resistance comes first’ and ‘power relations are obliged to change with resistance’.\textsuperscript{80}

This contradictory relationship between the practices of governing and that which it seeks to govern seems crucial to understanding how a particular formation, like Malmö’s social neoliberalism, has taken shape. Contingency is in this regard not simply a question of a particular history of social governance enduring or reemerging to shape neoliberal bureaucratic practices. How legacies of social regulation shape neoliberalism is itself related to the way forces beyond bureaucracies inject instability into governance and shape it.

I will return to this issue in Chapter 2’s discussion of articulation as an analytical category, but would provisionally like to underscore that there are a wide range of ways that the world beyond dominant discourse might shape bureaucratic practices. In particular are the complex ways that past modes of life endures to become obstacles provoking governmental responses anything but passive leftovers of previous epochs slowly fading in importance. Several kinds of uses of space from many different past moments might erupt in the present in multiple ways, for instance through the resilience of physical objects, demographic patterns, broken infrastructures or persisting everyday routines, cultural memories and legally encoded rights of usage.\textsuperscript{81} These sources of provocation are not, then, pristinely untouched by dominant discourse, but neither are they a mere reflection of techniques of government.

In conclusion, the story I want to tell about Malmö’s social neoliberalism is centered on the uneven, protracted, and cumbersome reworking of bureaucratic practices in ways that allow a political reason concerned with measuring and increasing competition to gain ground. To gauge the complex dynamic of this process it must be studied in the actual practices of governing, and as having many different kinds of determinations that each shape Malmö’s social neoliberalism. I have emphasized three ways that something beyond global circuits of generic neoliberal policy diffusion are at work in shaping this process.

Firstly, the deployment of bureaucratic practices associated with a neoliberal reason is troubled by residual bureaucratic practices of postwar social regulation. While no longer unquestionably dominant, social regulation might either obstruct or extend the range and depth of neoliberal governance depending on the specific


ways such practices are deployed together. Secondly, residual built and lived urban space shapes how neoliberal practices are deployed alongside social modes of governance. Thirdly, neoliberal bureaucratic practices have to respond and regulate emerging everyday built and lived spaces of the city.

**Origins and afterlives of postwar social regulation**

Neoliberalism is often framed as a break with the midcentury social state, but Malmö indicates that postwar social regulation might have a profound influence on neoliberal governance. To determine at what sites of bureaucratic practice this relationship best can be explored, I briefly want to return to history of social regulation in general and the kind of social democratic statecraft that for decades dominated cities like Malmö in particular. Understanding the social is important to determine in what strategic spheres of governance the relationship between postwar social regulation and neoliberalism might be explored.

The 19th century liberal ideal of a strict division between spheres of appropriate state regulation and spheres of personal freedom where power only could operate indirectly is the basis for a social mode of governance. The private sphere of the home, the political life of citizenship, and the market relations of property increasingly became understood as inappropriate for the liberal state’s regulation during the course of the 19th century. At the same time, a series of alarming social questions constituted a series of almost permanent exceptions to this order, legitimizing forceful state regulation even when it came to these spheres of liberal freedom.

How the social became constructed as a sphere of legitimate state intervention is related to how property, private, and political life, despite being sites of individual freedom, never were devoid of power relations. In these spheres a liberal ‘rule of freedom’ reigned, much more sophisticated than the direct disciplining of individuals. This freedom operated by subtly steering what became understood as complex and self-regulating systems by indirectly shaping the conditions that framed individuals’ activity, rather than directly steering each and every person in it. This indirect, liberal mode of regulation is what Michel Foucault famously discussed as ‘biopolitics’ — the power to ‘shape life’ formulated using models of complex ecological systems that preoccupied nineteenth century biologists.

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Liberal freedom was a sphere of power operating at a distance in two related ways. First, it prescribed respectable and self-regulating liberal subjects as its ideal, thus directing people through a shared, diffuse sense of personhood rather than directing individuals’ practices. The consequences for failing to embody this liberal subject were, however, often harsh. The consequences of not performing liberal subjectivity were in metropolitan areas illustrated by workhouses and in the famine-stricken colonial zones by work camps. Liberal freedom was also a site of power for new, abstract scientific and often statistical knowledge about collective life. This enabled technical interventions across entire populations by configuring material life-worlds, rather mapping and directing individual persons’ practices.

Governing from ‘the social point of view’ was deeply shaped by the bureaucratic practices that liberal freedom rested on, just as it signaled an important shift. A series of disparate ‘social questions’ rocked the second half of the nineteenth century, permitting exceptional and forceful state intrusions on personal freedom to secure liberal subjectivity among those unable or unwilling to voluntarily embrace these ideals. After many decades, these accumulated exceptional social questions eventually cohered around a more stable notion of a ‘social body, or simply ‘society’, mirroring the increasing epistemological isolation of social concerns from ‘the economy’. Society as a whole was seen as an intricate machinery that could be grasped through statistical data which scientifically laid bare its complex laws. Just as liberal freedom had regulated entire populations, quantitative social knowledge enabled the regulation of a population by indirectly targeting the milieu or ‘life conditions’ that shaped its internal processes. The social thus became an intensely productive site of new forms of governmental expertise.

Social regulation didn’t only operate at a distance through the technical fine-tuning of the social environment. It also re-articulated the idea of forcefully dealing with illiberal subjects as unsolved social questions that prompted...
acceptable exceptions to personal freedom. The imposition of liberal subjectivity was therefore still coupled with the disciplinary and exclusionary bureaucratic practices that had been at work in the harsh means used to re-educate the undeserving poor. The definition of social regulation, that I draw on throughout this thesis, is then concerned with a specific style of governing enacted by bureaucratic practices that have ‘biopolitical’ concerns with knowing and shaping abstractly defined populations. Social regulation often targets a particular demographic indirectly by regulating their environment, but at exceptional times also intervening more directly by interpreting and disciplining problematic groups to adopt particular subjectivities, or even excluding groups from environments where they are understood to be an unsuitable element.

Social problems were initially defined as a series of technical issues by experts largely outside state bureaucracies, for instance in philanthropic and social scientific organizations. This changed towards the end of the nineteenth century as pressure from below and increasingly well-organized liberal reform progressives, and later socialists, forced the state to respond. While this posed an existential threat to the laissez faire liberal tradition, the imagined distinction between social and economic regulation meant that core liberal free market tenets were ontologically quarantined as private issues, even as the state increasingly accommodated demands for redistribution within its social programs.

Social democratic welfare politics was one consequence to this leakage of liberal social bureaucratic practices into the state, accelerated by the proactive role state-planners took in most industrialized countries during the Second World War. Social democratic parties combined their own version of liberal social expertise with demands for a more planned, or at times even socialist, economy and, at the time, radically democratic politics. Social democratic statecraft was in this manner fundamentally shaped by liberal technocratic expertise, which in turn

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91 Here James Vernon’s argument that ‘forms of welfare [… in response to a] social problem were often adapted from the disciplinary methods of institutions like the workhouse’, where that social question first had been resolved, seems apt, see Vernon, Hunger: A Modern History, p. 274.
93 Vernon, Hunger: A modern history, p. 13; Dean, Governing Societies: Political Perspectives on Domestic and International Rule, p. 26-27. This demarcation was crucial for social reform liberals to maintain, even as they made inroads into the state, see Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age, p. 29.
set some of its limits. The political breakthrough of social democracy might have been animated by mass democracy and demands from below on economic reform. Still, the bureaucratic practices available for the Social Democrats to use after rapidly gaining parliamentarian influence was the top-down social regulation expertise left by the waning influence of reform liberals.

Swedish social democratic politicians and intellectuals were particularly skilled at appropriating liberal social politics as a sphere of expertise in a rapid sequence of reforms, a process that according historian Sten Karlsson was bound to British Fabianism displacing German Marxism as the party’s main intellectual influence. Just over a decade after the 1919 Swedish suffrage reforms, the idea of the social engineer had been appropriated by a generation of radical intellectuals linked to the early social democratic governments. This turn to social reform coincided with the Social Democrats de-emphasizing radical economics and public ownership of capital, as Sheri Berman has argued. In Sweden, social governance at the hands of technocratic intellectuals aligning themselves with the labor movement became tied to ideals of almost universal social rights, economic redistribution through taxes, and cross-class cohesion as the glue of the Scandinavian model. A counter-tendency can be seen in the largest unions’ active attempts to influence social policy. This was evident in how certain

Swedish social programs explicitly sought to integrate labor reserves of the poor and working class women into formal employment in order to reduce the number of casual, low-wage workers seen to be undermining the bargaining power of established unions as well as the productivity of capital.\footnote{Yvonne Hirdman, ‘Social engineering and the woman question: Sweden in the Thirties’, \textit{Studies in political economy}, 44/1 (1994). From early on, urban space became a fundamental technical concern for the Social democratic reformers. While the commanding heights of industry would mostly remain out of the state’s hands, sizable municipal land ownership, the left’s parliamentarian influence in urban areas, and a 1931 zoning code were leveraged as a way to embark on a municipal road to socialism without control over the national government using the method of re-articulating established social expertise.}

Both the social democrats’ universalist attention toward the entire population and its more strategic targeting of specific groups had antecedents in liberal social expertise. The universalist ambition of Swedish social democracy might in some ways have been radical, but it also built on the established tradition of quantitative social expertise as a way to address reforms to the nation’s entire population. The technocratic and non-political role of the social expert was in this way never fundamentally challenged, just as the far-reaching but subtle way that it shaped lives was amplified, and the power relations of property and economic life were largely left untouched.

Also the more ethnographic attention to the particular demographics deemed to be at the core of various ‘social issues’ was re-articulated in the social democratic postwar order. This kind of strategic but more direct intervention rested on the tradition of detailed cultural knowledge about ‘problematic’ groups associated with various social issues. Not only was the ethnographic tradition of knowledge production more intimate, but interventions deployed to specific groups identified as problematic tended to be directly disciplinary in demanding that respectable, liberal subjectivity be embraced. In the social democratic postwar formation social regulation against problematic groups were often linked to ideals that by the early 20th century had come to dominate the workers’ movement concerning the imposition of a sense of collective respectability.\footnote{Mats Lindqvist, \textit{Klasskamrater: om industriellt arbete och kulturell formation, 1880-1920}, (Stockholm: Liber, 1987). For a more recent review on this topic see Andrés Brink Pinto, \textit{Med Lenin på byrån: normer kring klass, genus och sexualitet i den svenska kommunistiska rörelsen 1921-1939}, (Lund: Pluribus, 2008) p. 100-105.}

The long history of liberal social expertise was re-articulated as the foundations of postwar welfarism in general, as well as the social democratic variation of the welfare state that dominated in Sweden. This tradition imposed some limits that social democrats found difficult to overcome, but also provided a substantial toolkit of bureaucratic practices. When focusing on the relationship between neoliberalism and welfarist, postwar social regulation this deep history is an important context to keep in mind as it indicates that the resilience of social statecraft is anything but a new issue.
This history is also a sobering tonic for welfarist nostalgia that, in contrasting the postwar period to the present, sanitizes the past and reinforces epochalist claims that almost entirely sever neoliberalism from decades of social democratic governing in an unhelpful way. Furthermore, this deep history of social regulation helps identify the different practices of social regulation at work in the postwar period. Such differences, I will argue, are re-inscribed in Malmö’s social neoliberalism with important effects.

Urban planning and social regulation

I have argued that neoliberalism can be explored as the reworking of bureaucratic practices by a turn towards measuring and fostering competition. This process is contingently shaped by three kinds of instabilities that unsettles it and that in any given situation must be carefully studied in order to understand the particular shape of neoliberal formations. In particular, I have focused on how the deep history social regulation shape neoliberal government because social statecraft is often treated as belonging to the preceding epoch that the dominance of successful neoliberal reforms necessarily signals the end of. There are many potential types of institutions where this process could be traced. I have focused on what, in the broadest sense, can be understood as urban planning.

The main reason for following the neoliberal reworking of social regulation through urban planning is that urban space has been a strategic site of modern power for at least the past two centuries. Urban space is, as an abundant literature makes clear, a crucial target for neoliberal intervention. Since the nineteenth century, it has however also been a privileged site for liberal governance in both its metropolitan and colonial settings.

That the city is a strategic site of rule is particularly true when it comes to social governance. Projects like the state-driven remaking of nineteenth-century Paris at the hands of Georges-Eugène Haussmann have for some time been seen as important forerunners for imaging the remaking of built urban environment as an


indirect means to ‘alter social patterns’, as Richard Sennett has argued.\textsuperscript{107} The same impulse was worked out in a far more fine-grained manner as technical issues by a diverse group of reformers, lawyers, engineers, lawyers, doctors, and bureaucrats in metropolitan and colonial zones of experimentation, leading up to what we now think of as ‘urban planning’.\textsuperscript{108} Through everything from sewage pipes, pavements, street lighting, and slum clearance to home ventilation inspections, geographic studies of poverty, land use zoning, and new ways to map physical space in detail, urban space became a way to remake the habitat of everyday life with subtle cultural effects on a demographic scale. It was this coherence of historical expertise about urban space that eventually produced modern urban planning, what Robert Fishman describes a series of ‘complex statements’ resting on the idea that ‘reforming the physical environment can revolutionize the total life of society’.\textsuperscript{109} How urban space has been regulated to have effects for entire populations therefore seems like the perfect place to study the influence of postwar social regulation on neoliberal rule.

The strategic intersection of social questions and the remaking of urban space identified by liberals in the nineteenth century also became a crucial site for social democratic policy in many countries, including Sweden. It is then no coincidence that the most successful social democratic assault on the Swedish right’s dominance over national policymaking followed Alva and Gunnar Myrdal’s 1934 pamphlet \textit{Kris i befolkningsfrågan} (‘Crisis in the Population Question’), which almost immediately resulted in a new kind of subsidized housing for low-income families.\textsuperscript{110} Shaping the production of urban space, first mainly the domestic sphere of the home and the neighborhood by planning entire city blocks according to social principles, turned out to be a powerful way to regulate everyday life at a distance.\textsuperscript{111}

In this way avant-garde modernist architecture was married to a left-
wing appropriation of social issues in a rapid turn to urban planning as a makeshift way of building a Swedish welfare state long before major reforms like the 1948 and 1959 pension overhauls.112

The most internationally-renowned aspect of this was perhaps the radical ideas permeating the 1930 Stockholm Exhibition and the unofficial companion volume acceptera that explicitly provided architectural solutions to pressing social problems, and later were tested in practice in a steady stream of modernist developments during the 1930s.113 Less glamorous but of much more institutional importance was the 1933–1947 parliamentary committee on social housing (Bostadssociala utredningen) which laid the groundwork for Sweden’s post-war urban planning paradigm.114 Swedish municipalities were from this point onward responsible for providing adequate housing for residents and delegated to regulate space through the 1947 zoning code.115 This empowered state-sanctioned experts further, meanwhile foreclosing the very real possibility of a less centralized socialist solution to the housing issue based on a large number of existing cooperative experiments that had played a significant role in the pre-war period.116

As urbanization outpaced even the rapid house building which these early state interventions led to, a series of new measures were enacted, culminating in the industrial mass production of urban space. The most important mechanism for regulating space was strict building standards set by the state regarding the use of specific materials and building of modern amenities and connected to fast-tracked building permits and subsidized government loans.117 Emblematic of this combination of state planning and regulation of urban space was the one million

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residential units planned and built between 1965 and 1975, which not only provided low cost housing to a significant proportion of the population, but also changed the physical fabric of everyday life in the city according to intricate plans. Throughout this story the notion of indirectly achieving social effects across entire populations by remaking the built environment remained a powerful influence, but was also plainly linked to economic intervention by the state. Public ownership of land and the linking of state-subsidized loans to building standards were crucial economic tools to direct this process. The new neighborhoods combined suburban single-family homes with, often colossal, tower blocks in large green spaces and the obligatory central square with a school, community center, health care center, and other basic services. A completely new and rational life world was to be built in this manner as a common milieu for the different subgroups within the urban working class. In this way the more respectable strata were to mix with the most destitute through the social functions of everyday life, as the poor were forced out of demolished inner-city slums to subsidized modern apartments blocks. Despite their centrality to what became known as the ‘Scandinavian Model’, the kinds of urban landscapes built during these decades were by no means unique to Sweden. Rather they must be understood to share both historical determinations and architectural features with a host of other state-driven social projects seeking to remake urban space during the same timeframe.118

Social urban planning had been a foundation for the social democrats’ decades of dominance, but would also become a vulnerability in the latter part of the twentieth century. Everyday life in enormous mass-produced mid-century housing projects became one focal point for a wider critique of social engineering, with famous journalistic pieces concerning some of the largest estates like Tensta and Skärholmen in Stockholm and Rosengård in Malmö, casting these sites as failures marked by high modernist hubris.119 The early 1970s cultural critique of social planning mainly appears to have come from the radical left and liberal intellectuals. The largely defensive parliamentarian right, still dominated by traditional conservatism, instead tended to focus on economic issues like limiting

taxes or blocking the Social Democrats’ reluctant attempt to implement the so-called Workers’ Funds scheme for gradually collectivizing capital.120

I want to suggest that the critique of social planning was an unresolved source of vulnerability for the Social Democrats from the 1970s onwards, but never took an as explicitly anti-urban turn as in the Anglophone world.121 Unlike the 1970s American and British New Right’s forceful mobilization of an anti-urban climate of fear centered on ‘the urban crisis’ and ‘inner-city decay’, the Swedish counterpart to white flight was popularly framed in terms of a left-leaning ‘green’ trend of urban-rural migration.122 There are no famous Swedish 1970s and early 1980s examples of the urban landscape becoming neoliberal laboratories analogous to the US experiments in ‘revanchist urbanism’, which sought to boost entrepreneurial development strategies. Nor was there in Sweden a dynamic similar to how British cities were disciplined by the Thatcher administration’s attacks on the local government of unruly Labour-voting cities. In Sweden, as I will show, experiments in explicit neoliberal regulation of urban space did not begin in any serious way until the mid-1980s, and with a rather different dynamic than US and UK panics about inner-city decay.123 It was only once neoliberal reforms got underway that planned urban space proved a culturally-important target for neoliberal reconfiguration of bureaucratic practices.

In summary, shaping urban space has been identified as a crucial arena of social governing since the nineteenth century. In Sweden, the social sphere was aggressively appropriated from liberal philanthropists, in much the same way as in

120 See, for instance, discussion in Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century, p. 207-214.


a significant part of the North Atlantic sphere, where social democrats in the interwar period turned away from public ownership to social reform as a path to socialism. Just as the urban question reemerged in a dystopian register by the 1970s and became a key site for early neoliberal experiments across parts of the North Atlantic, the planned spaces of welfare state urbanism were, in both material and discursive ways, by the mid 1970s important vulnerabilities for the Swedish social democrats. The mid- and late-1980s neoliberal re-articulation of urban planning as social regulation is in this regard suitable for the kind of analysis I have pursued. Urban planning had for decades constituted a strategic site of social governance when it during the late 1980s became a beachhead for neoliberal reforms in Swedish cities like Malmö. If there is any one sphere of government where one could expect to most clearly be able to see neoliberalism coming up against and being forced to arduously re-articulate social regulation, it is surely urban planning.
Chapter 2: Analyzing planning as bureaucratic practice

In presenting Malmö I have so far argued against approaching neoliberalism as the swift replacement of social governance by economic logics in a brief moment of epochal change from which subsequent changes inevitably follow. Rather, I have approached neoliberal rule as the increasing reliance on bureaucratic practices measuring and seeking to impose competition in and beyond the economic sphere, state institutions, and subjectivity. Neoliberal bureaucratic practice always has many determinations, and is not simply the local translation of global flows of neoliberal policy. A neoliberal formation such as Malmö’s particular kind of social neoliberalism should therefore be studied by paying attention to the ways in which translocal circuits of neoliberal bureaucratic practices come up against local legacies of once-dominant social regulation, and residual as well as emergent tensions within the built and lived urban space. The specific form that neoliberal governance takes is, then, never given, but shaped by historical and geographical contingencies in an uneven and protracted process shot through with instabilities and contradictions.

Neoliberal reforms have been particularly intensely shaped by social regulation, I have argued, when concerning municipal planning of urban space because the deep historical ties between social statecraft and urban development. In the chapter that follows I will argue that this is not the only reason for investigating neoliberal reforms by turning to urban planning. The municipally planned production of urban space is also imbricated with mapping uses of space and its tensions, be they residual or emerging tendencies. Therefore, urban planning offers an opportunity to study how neoliberal bureaucratic practices are shaped by forces beyond the dominant discourse of state-sanctioned experts.
To study the ways in which planning as a sphere of bureaucratic practice is permeated by the tensions of built and lived urban space, I will first discuss common methodological approaches to urban planning. My point of departure is that historical research on planning to a large degree can fall into one of two categories, and that neither methodologically is suitable to study how urban planning as a sphere of bureaucratic practice is shaped by the space it seeks to order. Either such approaches emphasize planners as heroic actors struggling over the ideals that shape visions for the future and concrete interventions to make urban space, or they track how such interventions tragically fail to materialize the vision they prescribe. This means that the manner in which development plans propose visions and interventions is a fruitful approach to studying how residual social techniques shape neoliberal bureaucratic practices as a problem internal to governance, and that the failures of planning capture important aspects of the effects of governance. But neither of these approaches are suitable for studying how governance, and the way that it changes over time, is destabilized by the world beyond bureaucratic practice.

To bring the way that neoliberal planning reforms are troubled by the world beyond it, in the way I have argued it always is, into focus, I will suggest a third category for analyzing urban planning. Planning as expert visions and interventions are destabilized by built and lived urban space, whether by residual or emerging forces and forms, because urban plans also require representations of urban space to be effective. By representing space, and in particular by representing problems that provoke redevelopment, contradictions of everyday life seep into governance and silently shape what practices are deployed and to what end. Just as it then is possible to track how neoliberal planning is shaped by residual bureaucratic practice by studying visions and interventions, it is possible to study how neoliberal planning is shaped by the tensions of built and lived urban space by studying planning as representation. Before returning to Malmö and which questions about neoliberal urban planning I will examine, I will discuss which analytical concepts I draw on in conceptualizing the way in which urban planning as a sphere of governance is destabilized by everyday life in the city.

Heroic and tragic planning history

The complex relationship between urban planning and the built environment has been discussed among scholars for the past decades, a debate theoretically at first spearheaded by a generation of critical geographers inspired by Henri Lefebvre’s
**The Production of Space.** While something of a consensus has emerged among critical scholars concerning the urban landscape being ‘ideology made solid’, the particular way that such logics of power saturate space and how they are to be read is far from self-evident, as geographer Don Mitchell has argued. Studying the forces that produce the urban environment’s ossified ideology can be done in various ways. The two most important general approaches seem to be ethnographic work directly studying actors such as planners involved in producing urban space or archival research examining the paperwork left by the planning process. Both approaches tend to cast experts as the most important protagonists. With the activity of planners so central to this research it is not very surprising that most classics of planning history focus on tensions between different traditions and schools of urban development to show how these, to use prominent architectural historian Spiro Kostof’s phrase, ‘shape’ the built urban environment.

Urban planning is in this regard treated as having the peculiar kind of world-making power where plans shape built and lived urban space without itself being shaped by the city in any significant way. Plans describe visions for a future city that doesn’t exist and might never exist. Yet the judicial sanction of official planning documents that propose technical interventions to bring about its visions creates this particular future’s conditions of emergence. The vision codified in planning documents ceases to be one of an infinite number of possible future cities because these particular visions are formally codified through the technical and juridical language of planning.

Planning historians’ fascination with planners’ visions undergird a heroic trope of urban change where state-sanctioned experts essentially make cities, uncannily echoing the Great Men-history trope that for generations has been thoroughly

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125 Mitchell, ‘New Axioms for Reading the Landscape: Paying Attention to Political Economy and Social Justice’, p. 44.
criticized for its top-down perspective. This focus on planners as subjects reduces the urban development process to expressions of ‘individual oeuvres or cultural currents’, as architectural historians Swenarton, Avermaete, and Van den Heuvel lament in their study of postwar urban development. The protagonists of these heroic narratives are the architects, engineers, and politicians merely responding to, with prominent planning scholar Peter Hall’s emblematic phrase, the given ‘problems they confront in the world’. The city outside the meeting rooms and studios is here little more than a stage on which the real drama of intellectual thought happens, as if urban space was a completely malleable material and planning a sphere of activity isolated from the complex webs of power that constitute our world.

Critical scholars have tried to theoretically make sense of the framing of planners as heroic by adopting what one might call ‘tragic narratives’ to chronicle how the materialization of planners’ visions is modified or undone by the complex relations of built and lived urban space. Geographer Asher Ghertner in this manner describes planning as having a ‘prophetic temporality’ and then moves on to show how tensions of ordinary life undo the interventions that the materializing of such visions hinges on. Similarly, Simone Abram and Weszkalnys Gisa cast planning as a series of ‘illusive promises’ intended to be fulfilled in bricks and mortar, always threatened by unanticipated circumstances which disrupt the promised development process. Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim have famously described descriptions of society projected onto the future as ‘sociotechnical imaginaries’ that in turn are reliant on webs of unreliable social practices for their actualization. The most striking examples of the grandiose visions of urban planning dramatized as tragedy are perhaps accounts of the hubris of high modernist bureaucrats that lead to the kind of spectacular planning disasters chronicled by Peter Hall, James C. Scott, Lisa Peattie and most recently Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius and Werner Rothengatter.

130 Hall, Cities of tomorrow: an intellectual history of urban planning and design in the twentieth century, p. 4.
134 Peter Hall, Great planning disasters, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Scott, Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed; Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius, and Werner Rothengatter, Megaprojects and risk: an anatomy of ambition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
veritable wave of studies that explore the contentious and unruly politics actively seeking to undermine neoliberal urban development in particular.\textsuperscript{135}

Introducing conflict into the making of urban space by studying the uncertainties in the materialization of development plans is helpful to understanding the complex forces involved in the ways in which urban space changes. It is less useful when seeking to understand how built and lived space shape planning as governance. By focusing on how planning visions are disrupted by forces outside and against planning bureaucracy, a fundamentally reactive non-expert subject defined by resistance is evoked.\textsuperscript{136}

This reactiveness becomes all the more apparent when the tragic drama of everyday frictions and resistance undoing the visions of urban development is read against the mainstream heroic prose describing experts effortlessly shaping urban space. No matter how flawed the materialization of planning, the experts are the ones who provide the creative energies that give urban development its trajectory, and remain the thinking and doing actors driving history. Everyday unruliness or popular resistance might stop or limit a plan. Yet, these tensions are reactive forces responding to dominant expertise which they cannot shape.\textsuperscript{137} In this sense, studying how such reactive tensions make particular plans fail is not a suitable method for investigating how forces beyond governance shape neoliberal urban planning.

The two approaches to studying urban planning that I have described as heroic and tragic are, however, useful for tracking tensions between postwar social regulation and neoliberal governance. In particular, the difference between planning visions and interventions indicates the range of discursive planning practices where neoliberalism as political reason might be enacted. The tensions between the planning visions and interventions of neoliberal and postwar social regulation, however, remain internal to expert discourse. Everyday life in the city might make plans fail, but if one merely studies development plans in terms of visions and interventions, one cannot track the effect of lived and built urban space on bureaucratic practice. To study the active influences of forces beyond expert discourse shaping neoliberal planning requires examining urban planning as

\textsuperscript{135} For some of the key contributions within this field see; Helga Leitner, Jamie Peck, and Eric S Sheppard, Contesting neoliberalism: Urban frontiers, (Guilford Press, 2007)


something more than visions and interventions and how they invariably fail in delivering the future city they promise.

Articulation of difference in urban planning

The complex relationship between planning expertise and the reception of plans has not been lost on critical scholars. One early example of dealing with this issue is anthropologist James Holston’s classic study of Brasília, ultimately arguing that the paradoxes of Niemeyer’s Comprehensive Plan made possible the kinds of popular appropriation that subverted the city’s development from the plan’s strictly modernist form.\(^{138}\) Paul Rabinow makes a similar point in his masterful *French Modern* by placing late nineteenth-century radicalism within a longer history of the construction of the social by the first generation of urban development experts.\(^{139}\) Similarly Timothy Mitchell situates ‘colonial subjects and their modes of resistance’ within ‘the organizational terrain of the colonial state’ in his *Colonising Egypt* that, among a great deal of things, dwells on the remaking of Cairo by colonial urban planning.\(^{140}\)

More recently, urban planning scholar Ananya Roy has made a series of interesting arguments for rethinking the relationship between dominant expertise and subordinated groups in urban studies. Roy’s arguments follow an interesting trajectory and suggest a useful framework for conceptualizing the relationship between planning and lived urban space in less pessimistic terms. In a 2005 article Roy suggests that the ‘exceptions’ of ‘informal’ urban development — sometimes seen as a sphere of autonomous political practice of the most deprived urban dwellers of, in particular, the Global South — are in fact regulated by the state and cannot be understood as a project only emerging from below.\(^{141}\) Roy reformulated this argument somewhat in a 2011 article by suggesting that ‘subordinated social groups both oppose and take up the vision’ of contemporary ‘world class’ urban development projects, emphasizing subaltern activity as simultaneously reactive and an important force for understanding urban issues.\(^{142}\) Crucially, Roy in a 2015


\(^{139}\) Rabinow, *French modern: norms and forms of the social environment*.


text again adjusted the agenda she proposes by focusing on uncovering ‘the contradictory articulation of poor people’s movements and bureaucracies of poverty, between practices of dissent and ideologies of power’. 143

Roy’s reframing of similar problems in new terms over the course of a decade suggest how a slight shift in approaching the relationship between planning as a mode of bureaucratic practice and forces beyond this sphere have important implications. If Roy pessimistically began with informality as reactive politics from below substantially framed by the state, she somewhat more optimistically continued with informality as a crucially important but ultimately reactive force of urban development, and concluded with taking the friction between subaltern practices and state bureaucrats marking moments where contradictions are articulated. These two terms, ‘articulation’ and ‘contradiction’, suggest a relationship between planning expertise and built and lived urban space that emphasizes planning as a sphere of practice privileged in shaping the urban, but without framing tensions as completely given by dominant discourse. Rather than beginning with either planning expertise or reactive resistance of subordinated groups responding to plans, Roy takes contradictions at the ‘interstices of hegemony’ as her analytical starting point. 144 These contradictions are not only determined by dominant discourse, nor are they mere reflections of subordinated resistance, but rather they are shaped by, and potentially also shaping, both these worlds. Beginning with contradictions as moments marked by many kinds of forces appears as a crucial way of moving away from notions of resistance to urban planning as the way planning and everyday life interact.

Roy’s argument that contradictions articulate difference is explicitly drawn from Stuart Hall’s extensive engagement with these two concepts. 145 Before introducing the more specific categories that I deploy in the analysis of documents from Malmö’s planning archives I will briefly dwell on Hall’s work on articulation as an analytical term that might be used to, more broadly, conceptualize planning as more than heroically grand visions or tragically failing interventions. Stuart Hall uses articulation as an analytic term to emphasize the two distinct but interrelated


meanings of the word as both *expressing* and *joining* of difference. Dominant formations are for Hall a complex unity that always implies the ‘joining together of diverse elements’ at play in any historical situation. Any dominant cultural formation is in this manner always permeated by the tensions expressed by joining differences between discursive and material determinations, which themselves are rife with internal contradictions.

Writing on South Africa, Hall asked how a racist formation like apartheid could be understood as more than either a mere reflection of material divisions or an entirely discursive problem. Hall argued that apartheid articulated material determinations such as how work and livelihoods were divided along the racial lines — that orthodox Marxists analysis primarily had focused on — with discourse on racial difference, which produced an effective yet tension-ridden racist formation. Apartheid was in this sense grounded in both material life and discourse. Racial formations are thus immersed in contradictions, both contradictions within and between these two spheres, which in turn provide the historically-specific opportunities to contest racism.

Hall’s analytical model suggests that all formations are ‘always “over-determined” from many different directions’. This emphasis on the historically-specific articulations of material and discursive determinations undergirds his Marxism ‘without guarantees’. From this point of view both the immediate, material ‘sectional struggles’ of particular groups against the specific forms of subordination they experience and discursive struggles over ideas are important but limited moments of instability in a formation, that only if linked might lead to re-articulation and fundamental historical change. Hall’s reading of articulation is thus openly anti-economistic in seeking to find different kinds of determinations. Hall, however, also contrasts this position with fully

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147 Hall, ‘Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance’, p. 135.
148 Hall, ‘Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance’.
149 Slack, Jennifer Daryl, ‘The theory and method of articulation’, in Kuan-Hsing Chen and David Morley (eds.), *Stuart Hall: Critical dialogues in cultural studies* (London: Routledge, 2006) p. 124. Hall is, even in his earliest work on articulation, careful to underline that material determinations, which at this stage tend to be equated with the economy, should be understood as articulating difference and permeated by tension in the same manner as the formation that then takes it up. See Hall, ‘Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance’, p. 326.
poststructuralist theories of articulation strictly mapping discursive relations, and persistently returns to how language never can be entirely untangled from material determinations.¹⁵⁴

What makes Hall’s writing on articulation so appealing for thinking about the relationship between tensions of built and lived urban space and planning is that it suggests conceptualizing this contradiction as being present in planning practice before reactive resistance to plans. Contradictions are from this point of view not struggles outside the dominant formation limiting its control, but always culturally mediated in the dynamics of power with which dominance and control is secured. As Hall argues, there are important stakes to mapping the historically-specific ways that a formation, like the social neoliberalism of Malmö, articulates both material and discursive tensions into a complex unity. The contradictions articulated in a formation create historically specific vulnerabilities that explain what pressures this formation responds to in changing over time, as well as pinpointing the historically-specific possibilities for its political subversion and re-articulation.

The contradictions expressed in the negotiation of different modes of governance, such as residual postwar social planning practice coming up against emerging neoliberal planning, can also be understood as articulations. But this kind of discursive contradiction cannot, following Hall, be untangled from articulations between hegemonic planning discourse and material life and its tensions. Tensions in and with material life are always at play in the bureaucratic practices of governing, expressed by how differences are joined in discourse. Before presenting the archival sources that my study of Malmö builds on, I will discuss what methodological terms might be useful to study how planning bureaucracies articulate contradictions between hegemonic discourse and the tensions of urban space.

Planning as bureaucratic representation

Stuart Hall’s work on articulation suggests that all formations are permeated by contradictions in and between material and discursive practices. From this point of view, the deployment of neoliberal bureaucratic practices articulate not only with remnants of postwar bureaucratic practice, but also with both emergent and

residual tensions of built and lived urban space. However, the way that Hall describes how material determinations and discourse articulate tend, even in his most detailed descriptions, to be somewhat vague and speculative.\textsuperscript{155} What I now want to discuss is how one might, building on Roy’s brief engagement with Hall’s work, conceptualize articulation within urban planning, and in particular how bureaucratic practice articulates discourse with the contradictions of the urban world it is intended to regulate, in a more precise way.

I have so far suggested that urban planning scholarship tends to focus on the tensions between different visions of a future city and the technical interventions of materializing this envisioned space — what in Hall’s terminology would be articulations within discourse. To study how planning articulates contradictions between expert discourse and material determinations, I want to suggest that one needs to think of a third kind of discursive operation in urban planning practice. For development plans to be effective, the future city they envision must be grounded in built and lived space. Plans need to link visions and interventions with representations of the spatial conditions they seek to change. It is representations of existing problems that make a plan’s envisioned future desirable and constructs the untapped potential that its interventions seek to realize. Representation can then be seen as a third kind of discursive operation of planning, and I will argue that planning as representation is the basis for how plans articulate bureaucratic practice with the ‘material determinations’ of built and lived urban space.

That representations are a key aspect of expert knowledge is by no means a new proposition, and has been discussed from a range of different perspectives.\textsuperscript{156} The framework that I have found to present the most useful methodological approach to how urban planning represents space is anthropologist Tania Li’s research on international development agencies in Indonesia, incidentally also inspired by Stuart Hall’s work on articulation and Foucauldian perspectives on governance. Li’s argument about how aid agency bureaucrats represent the issues they intervene in as related, technical pairs of problems and solutions appears to be remarkably similar to how urban planners structure their work.

Li suggests that ‘problematization’, that is ‘identifying deficiencies that need to be rectified’, plays an important role in how development agencies operate by being ‘intimately linked to the availability of a solution’.\textsuperscript{157} She argues that

\textsuperscript{155} For example, Stuart Hall, ‘Marx’s notes on method: a ”reading” of the ”1857 introduction”‘, \textit{Cultural Studies}, 17/2 (2003), p. 132-133.
\textsuperscript{157} Li, \textit{The will to improve: governmentality, development, and the practice of politics}, p. 7.
bureaucratic representations of problems shape and ‘anticipate the kinds of interventions that experts have to offer’. In much the same way, certain kinds of tensions, usually pertaining to contested political issues, are precluded from bureaucratic representation because no matching means of technical intervention are readily available.\(^\text{158}\) The representation of problems and technical fixes are in this way mutually constitutive, each shaping the other.

Bureaucratic representations of problems and their fixes are in turn linked to, or articulated with, ‘a desire to make the world better’ as the ultimate goal of development.\(^\text{159}\) International development work is then composed of three distinct but linked and co-constitutive discursive operations that together identify a potential for improving the present.\(^\text{160}\) Problematization represents the present state of things, technical fixes suggest interventions to change the present, and utopian notions of the future suggest a potential improvement that this fix might achieve. Tensions between and within these three discursive operations make the development work that Li studies a complex process, with its own internal contradictions.

Li, however, suggests that technical problems, proposed solutions and improved outcomes are not merely linked in a closed, discursive system of expert knowledge. Rather, she argues that problematization always happens ‘in response to the practice of politics that shapes, challenges, and provokes it’ as a kind of everyday ‘limit’ on bureaucratic government.\(^\text{161}\) If Li’s notion of problematization being tied to available solutions echoes Rose’s and Miller’s Foucauldian argument, Li’s redeployment of this term pushes beyond the Foucauldian research program’s focus on dominant discourse to show that there are other tensions in this process than those between experts.\(^\text{162}\) Expertise shapes the representations of problems, and the technical solutions and improved futures they are linked to, in powerful ways. But so does contradictions outside the bureaucratic discourse that the construction of a problem is concerned with producing accurate knowledge about.

The bureaucratic representation of problems can in this regard be seen as the concrete moment where dominant discourse is articulated with, and can become permeated by, more mundane, material tensions. Because problems, fixes and improved futures emerge together — and problematization always is provoked by the tensions it seeks to represent as solvable issues — development discourse in its entirety is entangled with the contradictions it seeks to regulate. Problematization

\(^{158}\) Li, The will to improve: governmentality, development, and the practice of politics, p. 7. See also James Ferguson, The anti-politics machine: Development, depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) p. 270.

\(^{159}\) Li, The will to improve: governmentality, development, and the practice of politics, p. 5.

\(^{160}\) Li, The will to improve: governmentality, development, and the practice of politics, p. 4-6.

\(^{161}\) Li, The will to improve: governmentality, development, and the practice of politics, p. 12.

is in this sense the way that material determinations and their tensions articulate with dominant discourse.

Li’s model of development linking actual ‘problems’, proposed ‘solutions’ and ‘improved’ future partly maps onto urban planning scholarship. Her improved futures and solutions are very similar to what I have described as the visions and interventions that many scholars almost exclusively deal with when writing on urban planning. Li’s suggestion to look at how the tensions of everyday life provoke experts’ framing of solvable problems is the model I use for analyzing how contradictions of built and lived urban space are articulated in planning paperwork. I consequently argue that one can draw on Li by thinking about planning visions and interventions as co-emerging with planning as representation, and all three discursive operations of planning articulate contradictions with, and in, lived urban space. Urban planning as representation in this sense suggests a model for analyzing how planning articulates not only discursive, but also material determinations and their contradictions.

If planning represents built and lived space, critical legal scholar Mariana Valverde offers a compelling argument about how urban governance has historically represented space in two distinct ways. Municipal urban planning’s paradigmatic genre of spatial representation has, according to Valverde, been the ‘bird’s eye’ cartographic view of types of uses divided into distinct areas, like the zoning legislation that emerged around 1900 in many North Atlantic countries. Valverde contrasts this quantitative representation of spatial practices to the qualitative representation that is produced by how bureaucrats use ‘nuisance’ legislation. Nuisance complaints allow actors outside the municipal bureaucracy to plead for direct state intervention in very specific uses of space, thus allowing municipal authorities to map and micromanage ‘urban disorder’ according to a much finer grid of legibility than zoning regulations.

A key contribution, which I will draw heavily on, is how both these ways that planners represent life in the city are concerned with uses, whether they be human bodies in space or physical structures put in place by humans. When planners ‘see’ the city they seek to regulate and remake, it is this kind of material world of everyday uses and its contradictions that they seek to represent. The groups that use urban space are diverse and representations provoking planning include everything from the strict mapping of commercial forces building factories and residential blocks, demographic data on the regional dispersal of affluence and poverty, to closely ethnographic accounts of loud bars or which kind of family tend to take their kids to the local playground. Use might be described by close observations of a particular site or statistically quantified as numbers describing

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much more general patterns, but either way use appears as the key concern of planning as representation.

Both land-use and nuisance as representations are tied to the history of social regulation. Uses divided into zones tie into the quantitative tradition of urban sociology and its mapping of spatial causes of demographic patterns, whereas nuisance legislation is related to the kind of urban ethnography that powerfully scrutinized the way urban life was shaped by spatial conditions on a more personal level. Both these modes of representing space are also, as I will show, important for how the social neoliberalism in urban planning emerges in Malmö. These technologies of representation are in some ways reconfigured by neoliberal bureaucratic practice, but also exert influence as trusted means of mapping the city that make certain contradictions of lived space impossible to ignore for planners.

To summarize, this thesis seeks to study social neoliberalism in Malmö through urban planning as bureaucratic practice that represents, intervenes in, and envisions space. The visions and interventions of planning primarily articulate difference in discourse, while representations articulate differences between dominant discourse and lived urban space. In actual development plans, these three discursive operations of planning are always linked, which means that contradictions articulated by representations of urban space always are at work within the entire planning process. When studying urban planning documents, it is with these analytic tools I want to track how neoliberal bureaucratic practices are shaped by historical contingency beyond struggles between different kinds of neoliberal governance.
Chapter 3:
Archives and sources, cases and questions.

Swedish urban planning and its paperwork

Paperwork plays a crucial role in how urban planning works. One aspect of this is politically-approved and legally binding documents like Comprehensive Plans, Development Plans and Building Permits, but this kind of paperwork is merely the tip of the iceberg. Urban planning works through specific routines of producing series of linked documents, where the approved development plan is only the final product. Through political directives, memoranda, meeting minutes, consultancy reports, architectural sketches, permits, letters, maps, newspaper clippings, and all manners of notes representations how urban space is used are articulated with visions of a future city and interventions designed to materialize it. Rather than studying the production of this vast paper trail from the outside through interviews or other secondary sources, I want to explore it from within by turning to the deposits in municipal planning archives. By a close and qualitative reading of paperwork found in Malmö’s urban planning archives I will to explore how new bureaucratic practices emerge and articulate contradictions in the making of Malmö’s social neoliberalism. At certain points I will also draw on secondary material, primarily local newspapers, to fill in the archive’s empty spots — mostly in the first and last empirical chapters where there are considerable gaps in the municipal archives.

Much like the other Nordic countries, Sweden has an exceptionally strong national planning and building legislation that shapes which documents are
produced by planning in significant ways. The foundation of the present legislation is the 1947 building code and the 1948 municipality independence reforms, both partly shaped by the massive 1933–1947 ‘Social housing inquiry’ government commission. The present version of the Plan and Building Code in principal mandates all municipalities (kommuner) to regularly produce a Comprehensive Plan (överiktsplan) for the entire municipality, to which in turn all new Area Plans (detaljplan) for particular developments must adhere. These Area Plans are then used to decide if a proposed development is to get a Building Permit (bygglov) required for all newly-built structures — although houses smaller than 25m² have been exempt from this regulation since 2014. The planning process can thus be seen to, in principle, operate across three scales: comprehensive planning covering an entire municipality, area planning covering a smaller space like one or a few blocks, and building permits filed for individual constructions including houses, garages, fences and signs. Checks on municipal authority is upheld by the possibility of appealing against plans and permits to regional courts (Mark- och miljödomstol) and national courts (Svea Hovrätt), and by regional and national institutions sometimes intervening in the ongoing planning process by referencing non-planning legislation such as environmental protection codes or cultural heritage designations. The legal authority to grant, propose, and administrate the planning process rests entirely with the municipal authority, as long as it follows the procedure set out in the Plan and Building Code.

Each of these planning scales produces a similar kind of sequence of documents that can be exemplified by how an Area Plan is produced. First a plan is proposed, which requires that a short outline (sometimes called a Start-PM) is drafted by the municipal Urban Planning Department (in Malmö the Stadsbyggnadskontoret), usually in cooperation with the developer. The proposal must then be approved by a majority of the representatives in the Urban Planning Council (in Malmö the Stadsbyggnadsnämnden), that declares that it is in accordance with existing planning frameworks. Planning Programs (Planprogram or Program), a kind of non-binding draft, are then sometimes produced by the Planning Department. After more feedback from the Urban Planning Council, usually only brief and not

167 Riksdag, Plan- och bygglag (2010:900), p. c.3 §1, c.4 §2, c.9 §2.
in written form, a first complete draft of the plan is finalized.\textsuperscript{170} This draft is then the object of a mandatory stakeholder consultation (samråd) where in theory anyone, including for instance local residents or other municipal departments, have the right to formally voice their grievances and objections. All formal complaints are summarized with original letters attached to the draft that then again is presented to the Urban Planning Council for discussion and potential approval.\textsuperscript{171} If passed in the council, the Urban Planning Department then uses these comments to make a second, final draft, which must be approved by the Urban Planning Council and then the City Council (Kommunfullmäktige). Only after this long process, and then being displayed publicly (utställning) inviting stakeholders to file an appeal to a court, does a plan become legally binding. The production process of Comprehensive Plans and Building Permits also follow this model, with some modifications. Because Sweden has a very strong law constitutionally guaranteeing public access to public records (Offentlighetsprincipen) all these documents, including all correspondence regarding the plans, are public records that in theory are required to be archived by municipal authorities.\textsuperscript{172}

**Comprehensive planning**

and Folkets Park as a case study

My analysis of social neoliberal planning in Malmö builds to a large extent on the immense municipal collections of archival material that the formal planning procedure creates, especially when looking at comprehensive planning. A problem with exclusively drawing on this kind of source material is that it tends to produce paperwork about a specific site within a relatively short time cycle. A proposed Area Plan typically starts a cycle, requiring 3–5 years of intense attention before Building Permits are granted and redevelopment is considered complete for the entire area, with the planning department then focusing on a new part of the city. This makes it difficult to analyze the protracted making of Malmö’s social neoliberalism as shaped by the layering of tensions of lived space within the planning bureaucracy by only studying one or a few cases, since only a small part of the entire neoliberal transformation of planning plays out in any one place. To supplement the reading of more general planning documents concerning the entire city, I have mainly drawn on a case where the planned development largely took

\textsuperscript{172} See: Sveriges Riksdag, Tryckfrihetsförsöndring (1949:105), (1949) p. c. 2.
place outside the Planning Departments’ normal routines, although Area Plans of neighboring parts of the city also are used as sources.

To contrast the city-wide urban development documents with paperwork operating at a more detailed level, I have looked at how Folkets park, a green space in the southern part of central Malmö, and its immediate surrounding has been the object of planned development efforts. Folkets park, or The People’s Park, is in itself not typical of how urban planning functions, which entails both methodological challenges and opportunities. What makes this case uniquely useful in tracking the slow remaking of urban planning over three decades is that it has not gone through the normal Area Plan cycle for almost a century. Since the 1980s, Folkets park has continually been targeted by other kinds of unorthodox planning interventions trying new planning ideas on this centrally located and strategic site, but without the formal restraints of an Area Plan.

The formal development plan for the entire neighborhood was a 1929 product of Malmö’s first Director of Engineering and important urban planning pioneer, Erik Bülow Hübe. Since the area at this point was largely built-up, the Area Plan mostly endorsed ongoing developments and is rather vaguely formulated. This imprecise plan was drafted at a moment when modern urban planning was just taking shape, just before the much stricter 1933 and 1947 planning reforms. This vagueness made it more malleable for later changes in the development process. Some later renewal projects in the space covered by the 1929 plan led to new Area Plans, which have been useful for an examination of how the park entered this part of the formal planning process, as explored in Chapter 9. Building Permits in Folkets park itself are still today, at least formally, referencing the almost 80-year-old plan that in its vague pre-1947 legislation only mandated ‘no buildings but those that are for the People’s park’s purposes’ as the only limitation for future construction.

While the lack of a current Area Plan means that there is little material directly relating to the park in the usual planning archives, Area Plans for neighboring sites and Building Permits for the park excepted, there are a series of other kinds of planning documents that concern the park. These plans will be introduced in detail throughout this inquiry, but generally tend to be authored by the Streets Department (Gatukontoret) or temporary interdepartmental committees, and are scattered in a series of smaller municipal archives, rather than the official Urban Planning Archive (Stadbyggnadskontorets arkiv). Unlike most other areas of the city where development is concentrated over a few brief years,

these irregular plans for Folkets park allow one to follow how urban development itself is reconfigured by looking at one particular site and how previous plans for this particular site directly shape later plans.

The lack of an up-to-date Area Plan, the lack of constraints on renewal this meant, and Folkets park’s strategic location in the city center, has made the park something of a testing ground for new ideas. This steady stream of irregular, informal urban planning documents is related to the fact that from the early 1980s, the park came to be understood as an underdeveloped piece of real estate as its established historical geography of use came into crisis and provoked bureaucratic attention. The park is in this regard emblematic of how legacies of the lived spaces of social democratic planning in Sweden and Malmö came up against neoliberal bureaucratic practices in creating a piece of real estate that could be considered ‘deserted’ and for decades provoked the attention of municipal planners.

The history that leads up to this sense of underdevelopment is long, and could be said to begin with Malmö’s Social Democrats taking over the park as an outdoor meeting space in 1891. During Folkets park’s early and mid 20th century heydays it expanded rapidly by buying and incorporating surrounding lots and investing in infrastructure for new kinds of activities. In the postwar period the park gradually began to lose much of its cultural sway and came to rely on municipal subsidies from the 1970s. It was eventually bought by the municipality in 1991. Generations of accumulated uses of the park came into play in the later development projects. Occasionally the past was recalled in nostalgic attempts to reanimate the park’s golden age, while at other times it was the fears of reliving the park’s decline that provoked planning interventions. Everyday uses also persisted or were rediscovered to provoke planning, whether they were in the form of lease contracts with commercial forces negotiated at the park’s most desperate hour or quotidian patterns of visitors using the park as a public green space.

While I do not want to argue that the analysis of Folkets park is necessarily generalizable for the rest of Malmö, the detailed study of its particularly protracted development process provides a useful counterpoint to the broader brushstrokes that can be seen in Comprehensive Plans and similar city-wide documents. Many of the same kinds of problems at play in the city more broadly are worked out in plans for Folkets park, even if this process is shaped by the park’s particular history of use. It is probably the only site in the city where the entire process of remaking urban planning along neoliberal lines can be traced within one case. While there are other neighborhoods in Malmö that have continually provoked government interventions, notably the city’s so called ‘problem areas’, few of these have been the object of spatial planning for the exact same area for several decades in the way that Folkets park has. Because the park’s strategic location, lack of an up-to-date Area Plan, and its multilayered history of use provoking ceaseless bureaucratic attention, the paperwork on Folkets park I have found in the municipal archive provides a unique opportunity to study how urban planning in
Malmö became neoliberal as a cumulative process where the recent past matters for the history of the present. This inquiry, then, builds on two kinds of planning documents, through which I have tried to track the articulation of neoliberal bureaucratic practice with social regulation and the tensions of urban space represented by planning. The Folkets park case is used in order to understand how this process plays out in a specific site with the detailed visions, interventions, and representations this entails. Because at some points it has worked as a neoliberal testing ground, examples from Folkets park are also used in the story of how planning is reconfigured in Malmö more generally. This second scale of analysis is however mostly studied through other kinds of sources. Documents from the Urban Planning Department, particularly relating to the 1990, 2000, and 2014 Comprehensive Plans, and other city-wide policy documents from the City Council (Kommunfullmäktige) and its Executive Board (Kommunstyrelsen) have been used to analyze this scale. While the planning paperwork for Folkets park often is fragmentary but more candid about how built and lived space shapes plans, the formal plans for the city follow a more regular rhythm.

The formal plans analyzed have been identified through a complete scan of all materials presented to the Urban Planning Council, and a quicker but still comprehensive look at all cases debated at the City Council, from 1980 until 2015. Finding the informal plans for Folkets park has been less systematic, sometimes bordering on archival detective work. Some of the plans have been found in Urban Planning Council and City Council archives, and some by looking at the entire proceedings of the Technical Council (Tekniska nämnden, also called Gatu- och Trafiknämnden) from 1985 until 2015. Most have however been located by tracking down unofficial, unfiled, semi-formal documents in smaller archives scattered throughout Malmö’s municipality or by asking involved bureaucrats to share yet unarchived work. The less detailed but more complete collection of formal planning materials at the Malmö scale and more specific but fragmentary plans at the Folkets park scale are combined in a way that I hope will be convincing for answering the research questions I now want to pose.

Research questions

I have argued that neoliberalism must be understood as the product of a protracted process continually articulating historically contingent contradictions, and therefore always open for subversions and re-articulation. I want to study how such contradictions shape a particular formation, Malmö’s social neoliberalism, by studying urban planning. The paperwork of urban planning is not only particularly closely imbricated with the social regulation of the postwar period, as well as a
key site of neoliberal reform. Urban planning also articulates tensions within expert discourse with everyday life in the city in terms of different ways of envisioning and intervening in space being linked to representations of uses of space. Both what one might call residual and emergent tensions of built and lived space tend to be represented by urban planning paperwork, and articulated with visions of future space and interventions seeking to materialize these futures.

As I turn to urban planning in Malmö and the kinds of sources described above, I do so to analyze how social neoliberalism took shape within this sphere of bureaucratic practice. I want to show how the translocal flows of neoliberal policy coursing through urban planning in Malmö and Folkets park is articulated with the remains of social governance as well as both residual and emerging tensions of the built and lived environment. More specifically, I will track how such tensions shape neoliberal governance of the city in the way that plans propose visions, suggest interventions, and represent built and lived space.

If the principal purpose of this analysis is to describe how social neoliberalism emerged, its main characteristics, and how this formation changes over time, I want to suggest three more precise research questions that I hope will be answered by the end of the final chapter. First, I want to ask which residual bureaucratic practices of social statecraft and aspects of built and lived urban space are articulated in Malmö’s social neoliberalism. Second, I want to chart what different emerging tensions of built and lived space are articulated in this formation. Finally, I want to uncover which fault lines these articulated tensions introduce to Malmö’s social neoliberalism, in order to discuss what instabilities and potentials for re-articulation can be sensed in this formation.
Chapter 4
1985–1991: Letting crises go to waste?

Crisis unfolding

The breakdown of Malmö’s postwar welfarist formation was a protracted process related to the city’s faltering economic strength. Signs of economic decline began as early as the 1960s, as sociologist Mikael Stigendal and historian Peter Billing have explored in detail and historian Natascha Vall and geographer Ståle Holgersen have more recently argued. Many of the social bureaucratic practices of the postwar order would however remain in place throughout this drawn-out period of economic decomposition. It was not until the mid 1980s that an explicit neoliberal challenge was posed to welfarist social regulation. This challenge was only adopted partially, and for many years substantial remains of social democratic postwar welfarism existed side-by-side with newly-adopted neoliberal bureaucratic practices in Malmö. Initially, tensions ran deep between these two kinds of politics, before eventually being articulated in a more stable formation. In this chapter I will introduce the situation where neoliberal governance first emerged, how it was shaped by particular contradictions that appeared to be beyond the scope of the mechanisms of postwar social regulation, and the way that neoliberal bureaucratic practices first came to be taken up by municipal bureaucrats in Malmö.

The economic difficulties — that Billing, Stigendal, Vall and Holgersen’s accounts emphasize — were related with the gradual decline of the city’s

175 Billing and Stigendal, Hegemonins decennier: lärdomar från Malmö om den svenska modellen; Holgersen, Staden och kapitalet: Malmö i krisernas tid; Vall, Cities in decline?: A comparative history of Malmö and Newcastle after 1945.
industrial base in shipbuilding, the building trade, and the textile industry. The city’s vast Kockums shipyard, for instance, made 40% of its workforce redundant between 1975 and 1984 and completely halted its civilian shipbuilding in the Malmö docks by 1986.\textsuperscript{176} The result was a gradual decline in relatively well-paid and secure manufacturing jobs, breaking the productivity-wage increase deal that had been the economic basis of the Scandinavian model. Mass unemployment was staved off by a speculation-driven economic boom period beginning in the mid-1980s, national stimulus packages targeting the Malmö region, and large municipal investments in public sector jobs from the late 1970s responding to increasing public demand for high quality public services. Without a return of high-paying manufacturing jobs, and with a reform abolishing municipal corporate taxation, Malmö municipality’s tax revenues were slowly hollowed out, despite a steady stream of tax hikes.\textsuperscript{177} This financial difficulty was exacerbated by a general trend of urban depopulation and suburbanization for about a decade from the mid-1970s onwards.\textsuperscript{178}

Interestingly, the built environment, which had been a crucial sphere of intervention for postwar social governing, became a key cultural vulnerability for the city’s social democrats at this moment. Slum clearance and large-scale modernist rental blocks were increasingly understood as crude tools that no longer could solve the type of issues the city faced.\textsuperscript{179} A series of municipally-driven redevelopment schemes in central Malmö, most prominently the Triangeln mall in the city center’s southern periphery, turned out to be key issues of contention.\textsuperscript{180} The governing party’s fiscal and cultural recklessness in handling these sources of popular contention fuelled both leftist new social movements and, more importantly, the new right’s parliamentarian advances.\textsuperscript{181} The dramatic political fallout of large-scale inner city commercial redevelopment in Malmö was perhaps uncommon, but the same kind of conflict was negotiated in the shift towards new forms of urban governance across Sweden, Europe, and beyond with speculation-driven inner city renewals often overseen by old political elites steeped in


\textsuperscript{177} Holgersen, Staden och kapitalet: Malmö i krisernas tid, p. 83.


\textsuperscript{181} Billing and Stigendal, Hegemonins decennier: lärdomar från Malmö om den svenska modellen, p. 334, 328-340.
modernist ideals of urban space as a key area of social engineering. The 1980s was also a time when a new generation of Swedish social democratic economic policy-makers, inspired by monetarist fears of inflation, pushed through a series of de-regulations of credit markets. These reforms fed into a real estate boom with intense speculative investment driving the same kind of commercial inner city redevelopments in Sweden that could be seen across much of Europe.

Malmö’s increasingly fragile social democratic project was most forcefully challenged from the traditional right, led by the steadily growing liberal-conservative Moderaterna (‘the Moderates’, or officially Moderata samlingspartiet, ‘Moderate unity party’), and the new right populist regionalist Skånepartiet (‘the Scania Party’). Both parties selectively embraced new ideas entwined with Anglophone neoliberalism in the mid-1980s, but in rather different ways. The populists combined undercurrents of increasing xenophobia in its demands for regional autonomy with railings against a sense of ongoing cultural decline and the destruction of a small-scale market economy of family businesses at the hands of large corporations, powerful unions, and a de facto one-party state mediating between the two. A key symbol for the party’s well-known front figure Carl P. Herslow was the Swedish state monopoly on alcohol, challenged by him and his compatriots as perfectly encapsulating the ‘socialist’ Swedish nanny state’s culture of unfreedom.

This culturally conservative but economically libertarian program of small-scale market economy, personal freedom, and xenophobically-underwritten regional separatism might have been a problem for the long-standing left-leaning populist project of Malmö’s social democrats. The real challenge, however, came from the Moderates’ steady growth, which made them a concrete alternative to continued social democratic reign. Under Joakim Ollén, the charismatic local party chairman between 1982 and 1994, the Moderates wholeheartedly embraced an intricately-crafted neoliberal program drawing on radical Chicago School ideas.

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Unlike the vague anti-socialism of the regional populists, the Moderates could in the run-up to the 1985 elections present a detailed blueprint for a ‘different way of running’ Malmö drawing on a whole host of neoliberal ideas.\footnote{Joakim Ollén, \textit{Ny tid för Malmö: om ett annat sätt att sköta en stad}, (Malmö: Moderata Samlingspartiet i Malmö, 1985).}

It was this heterogeneous coalition of old conservatives and regional populists turning to neoliberal doctrines, cautiously backed by social liberals \textit{Folkpartiet Liberalerna} (officially ‘The Liberal People’s Party’, later renamed \textit{Liberalerna}, ‘the Liberals’) and the centrist old farmer’s party \textit{Centerpartiet}, that dethroned Malmö’s Social Democrats in the 1985 election. This early neoliberal experiment in municipal politics was perhaps in sync with the Reagan-Thatcher-Pinochet moment, but had by no means unrestrained power to reform the city’s bureaucratic machinery. While a neoliberally-inspired rightist faction was gaining ground within the Social Democrats at this point, most of the national state’s interventionist mechanisms remained in place throughout the 1980s with the Social Democrats leading all national governments between 1982 and 1991.\footnote{For a background on the social democrats 1980s deregulation, see Östberg, ‘Vad har hänt med den fordistiska välfärdstatens ingenjörer el är har socialdemokratin gjort av sina intellektuella?’, p. 148-159.}

Swedish experiments in neoliberalism during the 1980s were contained to the neoliberal right’s precarious sway over a handful of city and regional administrations, with Malmö being one of the earliest and most important examples.\footnote{Torbjörn Nilsson, ‘Nyliberalismens spöke och Moderaternas politik ’, in Anders Ivarsson Westerberg, Ylva Waldersson, and Kjell Östberg (eds.), \textit{Det långa 1990-talet: när Sverige förändrades} (Umeå: Boréa, 2014) p. 54-56.}

The coalition led by Ollén was in this manner obstructed by national policy, but also a strong social democratic opposition in Malmö. The attempts to reprogram the kind of social democratic bureaucracy that had been built in Malmö over more than half a century were perhaps pioneering experiments of governance, but actual results were far from the sweeping neoliberal revolution that its right-wing architects had hoped to unleash. Some of the neoliberal mechanisms and concepts introduced at this moment would powerfully reverberate for decades, but only fragments of Ollén’s wide-ranging plans could be pushed through the municipal bureaucracy in the three years before the Social Democrats returned to power in 1988.

The 1985 election, then, marks one of the first instances of an intellectually explicit neoliberal program going head-to-head against a disintegrating municipal welfarist bureaucratic machine in Sweden, but the historical conditions in which this battle was fought were far from ideal for Malmö’s neoliberal reformers. This meant that some of the crucial contradictions of the failing welfarist regime rather than being resolutely resolved or indefinitely deferred were forced into the open. Malmö’s Social Democrats improvised ways of containing crisis tendencies had,
since the mid 1970s, rested on two distinct mechanisms. Municipal public sector employment had rapidly increased, absorbing some of the labor surpluses produced by the first waves of deindustrialization, and the municipality had been actively buying real estate from fiscally-strained local businesses in return for promises of remaining in Malmö. To finance these policies the municipality had gradually raised income taxes and accumulated a mountain of debt owed to private creditors.

Both these mechanisms instantly came under attack in a controversial emergency budget rushed through by the new center-right majority in December 1985. With this budget all new municipal hiring was temporarily suspended, and the Real Estate Department directed to start selling off the, at this point, massive municipal real estate stock. This neoliberal ‘shock tactic’ did not, however, have the dramatic effects imagined by its supporters and critics alike. The growth of the municipal public sector slowed down and eventually shrank a little, decreasing by just over 500 employees (from 33,900 in 1985 to 33,398 in 1989). The effects of this rather gentle way of imposing fiscal austerity was however compensated by a speculative real estate boom sparked by national credit deregulation and heavy state investments in Malmö by the social democratic national government.

If the short-term fallout for Malmö’s economy was rather undramatic, the center-right’s reforms did undermine the credibility of what had been Malmö’s social democrats’ key approaches to managing economic contradictions. Growing public sector employment and municipal real estate holdings leased cheaply to private firms had been confronted head-on as ways to regulate the city’s economy. These two bureaucratic practices that had shaped Malmö’s economic development for ten years were abandoned, and it would turn out to be difficult for Malmö’s

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190 Billing and Stigendal, Hegemonins decennier: lärdomar från Malmö om den svenska modellen, p. 321-323; Holgersen, Staden och kapitalet: Malmö i krisernas tid, p. 84.
194 The most visible of these programs during the first Ollén administration saw through was the move of a SAAB auto plant to Malmö’s recently-abandoned docks in 1986, which received an astounding 374,000,000 SEK from the state over a three-year period. Yet Ollén managed to give this venture a decisively neoliberal twist. Instead of using the social democratic tactic of subsidizing SAAB further by leasing the municipally-owned land below market price, the municipality sold the entire area for a symbolic price to SAAB as part of a short-term project of streamlining costs associated with real estate management. As the state subsidies ran out, the spectacularly robotized new factory promptly closed in 1991, leaving 1400 autoworkers unemployed. See Jon Pierre, ‘Public-private partnerships in industrial structural change’, Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, 92/3 (1989), p. 204 and Billing, Skilda världar?: Malmös 1990-tal i ett kort historiskt perspektiv, p. 6.
Social Democrats to return to these means once they had again seized the political majority. This meant that a bureaucratic vacuum was taking shape. New ways of combining remains of the old bureaucratic machinery, and other less-established technologies inspired by dynamic translocal neoliberal debates, not only seemed possible. A turn to new practices of rule seemed necessary to piece together a working municipal bureaucracy in the empty space left by this turn away from municipal stimulus politics concerned with real estate and public sector employment.

Asking neoliberal social questions

In the historical literature on Malmö, which tends to focus on the early 1990s as the city’s turning point, the 1985–1988 administration is often glossed over as enacting inefficient reforms that came before their time. It is tempting to approach the 1985 center-right coalition in terms of a failed neoliberal roll-back of the municipal state of little significance. The center-right coalition’s insistence on selling off municipal assets, most prominently real estate, and slimming the municipal public sector and subsidies to the remnants of heavy manufacturing, might all be filed under this heading. But these reforms were not, especially to Malmö’s most influential neoliberal figure Joakim Ollén, only a matter of reducing the size and scope of the state according to neoliberal principles. The abandonment of the improvised fixes which the Social Democrats had turned to in the 1970s were designed to make space for an almost utopian neoliberal program for Malmö steeped in the social logics of population politics. This neoliberal visions, rather than what few austerity reforms neoliberals managed to impose, was the lasting significance of Ollén’s administration for Malmö.

In the highly technical pamphlet that the Moderates’ election campaign revolved around, Joakim Ollén had already made sure that roll-back reforms were framed within this more proactive long-term plan.195 Privatization, austerity, and ending subsidized real estate deals with faltering firms were, in this formulation, not primarily a question about the size of the municipal bureaucracy, but rather its function. Ollén, in fact, understood decreasing public spending as a technical fix to a problem that was rooted in the region’s demographic trends. Austerity was taken as the crucial precondition for lowering taxes, which in turn was seen as necessary for reversing Malmö’s population decline and boosting the city’s income tax revenues.196

195 Ollén, Ny tid för Malmö: om ett annat sätt att sköta en stad, p. 100-106.
196 Ollén, Ny tid för Malmö: om ett annat sätt att sköta en stad, p. 36-38.
Social regulation was in this way reimagined along neoliberal lines rather than abandoned in its entirety. Malmö municipality’s social welfare mechanisms were likened to services sold as a commodity on a fiercely competitive regional market. The only way to become ‘attractive’, to compete with suburban and rural communities for desirable high- and middle-income demographics, was by dumping what amounted to the price Malmö was asking for providing social services. Malmö was asking too high a price — that is, excessive taxes — for what was understood in terms of a commodity that could be bought much more cheaply in the city’s commuter belt.\(^{197}\)

The neoliberal program at work attacked the social democratic state on its strongest point, seeking to introduce a completely new kind of logic to municipal bureaucracy steeped in a decisively welfarist kind of social politics since the 1920s. Seeking to remake social regulation along neoliberal lines was not an immediate success. It would lead to years of political conflict before a stable bureaucratic formation emerged. For just under a decade the regulation of Malmö’s demographic patterns was framed by this tension between different ways of conceiving social politics. Social democrats, and their allies in the municipal bureaucracy, sought to maintain their traditional understanding of social regulation in terms of almost universal social rights combined with interventions directed at groups demanding special care. On the other side were neoliberal social interventions as a commodity-like service for potential residents in a regional ‘market’. Competing with lower taxes, as the cheap ‘price’ for this service, was essential to make the city more demographically ‘attractive’.

The short-term articulation of this contradiction was a neoliberal administration trapped in the sphere of bureaucratic practice perhaps most intensely shaped by the decades of social democrat postwar influence. With few ready-made neoliberal bureaucratic practices concerned with social care to be deployed to replace this municipal machinery, the neoliberals focused on limiting anything that caused the price Malmö was asking on the regional market for social care to soar. The neoliberals’ social vision of a demographically competitive city were in this regard translated into economic interventions, where there were plenty of actually existing examples from Anglo-American neoliberal austerity measures to draw inspiration from. Lowering taxes to make the city’s social environment more competitive was the most fundamental principle of Ollén’s plan for Malmö.\(^{198}\)

Low taxes would attract new residents to the shrinking city, and in particular give Malmö a competitive advantage when it came to affluent suburban demographics that in absolute terms would make the largest gains from tax cuts.\(^{199}\)

Ollén and his administration in this way framed tax rates as an indicator of how ‘attractive’ Malmö was for desirable demographics. Taxes became a way to


\(^{198}\) Ollén, *Ny tid för Malmö: om ett annat sätt att sköta en stad*, p. 30, 37, 43.

\(^{199}\) Ollén, *Ny tid för Malmö: om ett annat sätt att sköta en stad*, p. 36-38, 103.
benchmark Malmö’s regional competitiveness, but at same time, it was also one of few means to change the city’s competitiveness. Since tax cuts were the explicit reason for freeing up municipal resources through austerity and privatization, tax rates then also became a way to measure the relative success of these mid-1980s neoliberal reforms. Looking at the fierce budgetary negotiations, and the strains that the Moderates’ relentless tax race to the bottom caused in the fragile center-right coalition, reforms were clearly not making the expected headway. Most of the reforms to free up public money were difficult to push through the municipal machinery, and what should have been straightforward decisions like raising bus fares were stalled for years by unwilling bureaucrats and seasoned social democratic politicians using every legal loophole available.200 Despite the Moderates’ best efforts, the center-right only managed to lower income tax from 30% to 29.25% between 1985 and 1988, rather than the promised 27%, and the Social Democrats quickly raised the level to 31% after winning the 1988 elections.201

The bureaucratic sphere in which this neoliberal program seems to have worked best in Malmö was the municipal Real Estate Department. This department was already steeped in economic practices and instantly began selling off its large property holdings at a remarkable pace, just as a national real estate speculation frenzy was gathering momentum. Even in the 1988 budget, after two years of selling off key real estate assets, the Real Estate Department banked on having a sizable 150m SEK revenue stream from sales.202

If the three years of center-right rule can be seen to have had a long-lasting impact on Malmö, it was not so much in terms of what effects austerity had on the everyday life of the city’s residents. Rather, the introduction of a neoliberal vision suggesting that the key responsibility for municipal bureaucrats was to make Malmö compete better regionally for desirable demographics would, as I will show, turn out to be the lasting influence of these early neoliberal experiments. The economic means of measuring and intervening socially used by the first center-right administration had been crude, did not produce the desired results, and were abruptly abandoned by Social Democrats after their 1988 election victory. It was only when, more than a decade later, ways of re-articulating the proactive practices of postwar social planning to make the social ‘product’, rather than its ‘price’, more attractive that a stable formation of social neoliberalism would take shape.

200 Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunfullmäktige 17th September 1987, §264 Godkännande av ML-taxor.
201 Planerings- och Statistiskavdelningen, Malmö Statistisk årsbok 1988, p. 121. See also Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunfullmäktige 26th November 1987 § 228; Malmö stadsarkiv Minutes of Malmö kommunfullmäktige 28th November 1988 § 447.
202 Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunfullmäktige 26th November 1987 § 228, bihang 800, p. 42.
This slow shift towards demographic attractiveness as a key theme in Malmö’s municipal bureaucracy would largely play out in urban planning. The new ideas might not have immediately found fertile ground in the framework set up by the *Comprehensive Plan for Malmö 1980*, largely written in the late 1970s and primarily concerned with the mid-century attention to providing better welfare service and creating cohesive communities. But much of the work on the following city-wide plan, the *Comprehensive Plan for Malmö 1990*, was done during the center-right administration. This was thus one way that the slow translation of Ollén’s ideas of demographic competition to urban planning began. The contradictions that Malmö’s early neoliberal social regulation through economic practices initially sparked with urban planning is aptly exemplified by the 1985–1990 development plans for Folkets park. This was one of the first, and certainly most disastrous, renewal projects overseen by the center-right administration.

**Spending money to save money**

By turning to Folkets park, it is possible study in some detail the problems entailed by the 1985–1988 center-right’s visions for cutting costs in order to make Malmö’s social services more economically attractive. Folkets park had a long and complex history of use that turned out to be difficult to ignore in the redevelopment overseen by the new administration, just as the new kinds of uses envisioned turned out to be fraught with contradictions. The park would also articulate contradictions between this early experiment in neoliberal renewal and the existing modes of regulating urban space it was seeking to replace.

Folkets park had been one of Malmö’s most important social democratic institutions for decades, but gradually lost much of its cultural sway during the 1960s and 1970s. For many decades after its founding in 1891, the park’s vibrant cultural activities had been a symbol of civil society fortifying the labor movement’s political claims on the municipal state in an almost Gramscian sense. By the 1950s, the park boasted a large cinema, several theatre stages, the largest dance halls and music venues in the city, a funfair with a large rollercoaster and a Ferris wheel. These forms of popular entertainment were combined with public meetings by social democrat-aligned groups, with the annual Mayday celebrations after the official International Workers’ Day demonstrations being the most

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important day in the park’s calendar year. The park’s management tried to adapt to the rapidly changing popular culture in the postwar period, most importantly by embracing jazz, with international celebrities like Louis Armstrong, Charlie Parker, Stan Getz, Dizzy Gillespie, and Dave Brubeck playing and even recording albums in the park, like the 1960 Charlie Parker in Sweden.® Malmö’s Folkets park increasingly seemed to lag behind in the furious pace of 1960s and 1970s pop culture, hollowing out Folkets park’s customer base among its key young demographics.® From a peak of more than 3.5 million yearly visitors in the late 1940s, by the 1960s the park had less than 1.5 million paid visits a year.®

By 1976 Malmö’s Social Democratic Association (Malmö socialdemokratiska förening) saw no other option but to beg the City Council, still comfortably controlled by the same party, to buy a majority of their shares in the company owning Folkets park.® The City Council agreed to cover the park’s maintenance and any economic losses in the future in return for a bargain price on this prime real estate, in the same way they had, according to a similar logic, bought industrial real estate from faltering private firms. Folkets park was no longer a civil society project economically and culturally propping up the social democrats’ political power. Instead it had become dependent on a flow of public funds costing more than money, as the Social Democrat’s critics mercilessly used the ruling party’s unflattering generosity with the taxpayer’s money to support its own cultural project.® The sums in questions were relatively modest during the first few years, but this began to change as Malmö City Council took responsibility over what in practice had become a public park and began to invest in the park’s aging but sizable real estate stock. A substantial 11m SEK renovation of Amiralen, still among Malmö’s largest dance venues, took place in the late 1970s and the first phase of a major upgrade of Moriskan (or Moriska paviljongen, ‘The Moorish Pavilion’) was approved just before the 1985 elections.® The very large 1902 wooden restaurant building with its characteristic ‘oriental’ dome and minarets was to be renovated for an estimated 17m SEK and be turned into a ‘multifunctional meeting space’. By the time it was finished in the spring of 1990 the cost had risen to about twice as much as projected, although some of it was subsidized by state funding.®

® Billing and Stigendal, Hegemonins decennier: lärdonom från Malmö om den svenska modellen.
® E.g. Ollén, Ny tid för Malmö: om ett annat sätt att sköta en stad, p. 34.
® About 7m of the 30m SEK come from the national Housing Board (botadsstyrelsen). See: Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunfullmäktige 29th March 1985 §71, bihang 42; Malmö
After Malmö municipality gained some influence over Folkets park in 1976 its concerns were largely over how the park could be used as a recreational green space and architectural heritage site. Everyday recreational activities and heritage preservation were not posed as mutually exclusive uses, but had rather become seen as reinforcing each other in public investments proposed by the Social Democrats in the pre-1985 period. The everyday use of the park as a recreational space by locals from the surrounding inner city neighborhood brought the cultural heritage site alive, just as the cultural heritage site could be seen as a resource which made the park more culturally interesting for locals. Folkets park’s function as a recreational green space and heritage site was understood to make possible kinds of uses which could not be valued in monetary terms, as one social democratic politician argued when in 1984 defending public investments in Folkets park.

As might be expected, the center-right political majority inaugurated after the 1985 election was eager to do something about Folkets park. That money was being spent on a social project that both Social Democrats and the center-right understood to have very local effects did not fit with the neoliberal social vision of making Malmö regionally competitive for desirable demographics. That municipal money for fifteen years had been used to prop up the this labor movement cultural heritage site undoubtedly added insult to injury and was by Joakim Ollén explicitly seen as a symptom of the complete lack of institutional limits on the Social Democrats’ power to use public funds for their own ends. Folkets park’s rushed redevelopment in the winter of 1985–1986 was, then, the first urban renewal project where neoliberal ideas championed by the center-right coalition were to be put into practice.

The new majority’s first move was an attempt to seize control over the park’s board of directors. This failed spectacularly as a proportionality clause legally only allowed the center-right majority on the City Council to pick two of the four board members the municipality selected. The two board members the Social Democrats chose as new leaders of Malmö’s political minority, and the additional ones it controlled through its ownership of the remaining 40% of Folkets park’s shares and union representatives, was just enough to allow it to cling on to a

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215 Ollén, Ny tid för Malmö: om ett annat sätt att sköta en stad, p. 34.

216 Sydsvenska dagbladet, 5th December 1985, ‘Moderater ilsknar till’.
precarious majority on the Folkets park board.\textsuperscript{217} The center-right majority did not, despite furious threats, have the nerve to simply take the expected austerity hardline, break the 1976 contract, end the municipal subsidies, and allow the park go bankrupt.\textsuperscript{218}

This meant that the conflicting visions of Folkets park moved away from the vocal drama of political debate. Instead, these tensions were worked out as technical planning problems within the park’s existing public-private bureaucracy. The development vision for Folkets park presented early in December 1985 by the park’s newly appointed Executive Director, and at an early phase endorsed by the new mayor Joakim Ollén, proposed injecting more public investment into the park and turning it into an amusement park.\textsuperscript{219}

This ambitious renewal plan might seem difficult to understand in that it completely went against massive fire sale on public land being overseen by Malmö’s Real Estate Department which was also happening at the time. No original documents of this planning effort remain in the appropriate municipal archives, since the plans were not formally made by municipal bureaucrats but by the public-private Folkets park’s board of directors. This makes it impossible to track the internal twists and turns that lead to this vision for the park. One thing that is clear is that the investments were considered a strictly commercial venture.\textsuperscript{220} The renewal effort aimed at cutting Malmö municipality’s spending on maintenance for Folkets park by competing on a commercial entertainment market. It was in order to increase the park’s revenues that public funds were invested in the renewal project. From newspaper reports on the process, it is however abundantly clear that the commercial potential that this plan was seen to exploit was shaped by the Folkets park’s past and present patterns of use.\textsuperscript{221} The amusement park plan was in this sense building on a long legacy of use that still marked the present in terms of a few rides and the Amiralen dance nights. But unlike the politically-infused use of the park’s as cultural heritage that the social

\textsuperscript{217} Sydsvenska dagbladet, 4th december 1985, ‘Majoritet i minoritet’.
\textsuperscript{218} Sydsvenska dagbladet, 8th december 1985, ‘Goda möjligheter att lösa frågan om Folkets park’; Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunfullmäktige 19th December 1985 §356 Val, bihang 252.
\textsuperscript{220} Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunfullmäktige 20th January 1984 §8 Anslag för upprustning och underhåll av Folkets Park; Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunfullmäktige 29th March 1985 §71 Anslag till fastighetsnämnden för projektering för ombyggnad av Moriska paviljongen i Folkets park i Malmö; Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunstyrelse 30th May 1988 §374 Upprustning av Moriska paviljongen.
democratic administrations had curated since 1976, it was Folkets park’s politically more neutral commercial past uses that were mobilized in the new visions for the park’s future.

If this almost century-long history of commercial uses of Folkets park exerted an influence in the development process, how selectively it was mobilized was evident by the time the park reopened on the 27th of April 1986, only six months after Ollén was inaugurated as Mayor. The otherwise somewhat desolate park was crowded by eight new rides, including a rollercoaster that according the new Executive Director was the second largest in Europe, and more new rides were to follow in the next two years.\(^{222}\) Even more radical was the Executive Director’s decision — to the utter dismay of the Social Democrats — to rebrand the soon-to-be-100-year-old institution. The sign above the main entrance no longer read Folkets park but Malmöparken, ‘The Park of Malmö’.\(^{223}\) No one would ‘wave red flags’, as the executive eagerly explained.\(^{224}\) Everyone was welcome in the new suitably commercial amusement park, regardless of party loyalty.

The newly renamed Malmöparken continued on this trajectory in the years that followed. Politically sensitive histories associated with the labor movement’s use of the park remained deemphasized both in marketing and in terms of less municipal money supporting the activities in the park’s politically-charged buildings. The management kept its focus on seeking to reanimate the park’s lost commercial history of being Malmö’s most important entertainment venue. The portion of the park taken up by commercial, ticketed, activities steadily increased in the mid-1980s as new rides increasingly infringed on the park’s use as quasi-public green space.\(^{225}\) The park as the de facto urban common it had become by the mid 1980s — after a long process of slipping from being a social movement space into an almost entirely publically-owned and managed space — was in this way slowly enclosed by commercial uses tactically deployed by the municipality.\(^{226}\)

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\(^{222}\) Sydsvenska dagbladet 25th April 1985, ‘Malmös nya nöjesfält’.

\(^{223}\) No formal political decision was made to change the name, and the first mention of this rebranding is with unveiling of the new plans in early December 1985. See: Arbetet 1st December 1985, ‘Lugn bara – snart är det sommar och hela parken i Malmö görs om’; Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunfullmäktige 26th January 1995 §14 Motion om ändring av Malmöparken till Folkets Park.

\(^{224}\) Arbetet 1st December 1985, ‘Lugn bara – snart är det sommar och hela parken i Malmö görs om’.


\(^{226}\) The park was until as of writing this fenced, but was at least from the early 1980s open to the public during the day time, see: Malmö Kommun, Stadsbyggnadskontoret, Möllevägen: förslag till områdesplan, (Malmö: Malmö kommun, 1984) p. 16.
This re-articulation of how space was used and represented in planning was, just like Malmö’s neoliberal vanguard reframing of the social question, not a stable formation managing the city’s deep contradictions. While Folkets park’s number of visitors and turnover increased after the 1986 makeover, so did the yearly losses that the municipality was expected to cover according to the 1976 contract. During the early 1980s Malmö municipality’s spending on maintenance of the park rarely added up to more than a 4m SEK subsidy, with about 3.5m budgeted yearly for taking care of what essentially was Folkets park’s public green space. The new Malmöparken venture lost the city 5.5m SEK in 1986, 7.5m SEK in 1987 and almost 10m SEK by the time the Social Democrats had won the 1988 election. Without an alternative plan for capping the flow of money into this failed strange public-private business fuelled by dreams of 1940s-style commercial mass entertainment, Malmö municipality spent close to 12m SEK yearly on Folkets park by 1989. The moment of acute crisis that had begun in 1985 still demanded new ways to represent and regulate the contradictions of how the park was used and envision a future less marked by them.

Making matters even worse, the Folkets park’s stock company was forced to take a 21.5m SEK loan to cover its share of the Moriskan renovation, completed in 1989, increasing the running costs of the amusement park substantially. The sense of a crisis for Folkets park that the Social Democrats inherited in 1988–1989 was much more severe than the economic situation they had left for the center-


228 Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv i Skåne, Folkets park i Malmö’s arkiv, A:v: Verksamhets/revisionsberättelser 1980-1990, Ab Folkets park i Malmö 1986, p. 3; Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv i Skåne, Folkets park i Malmö’s arkiv, A:v: Verksamhets/revisionsberättelser 1980-1989, Årsredovisning Malmöparken 1987, p. 4; Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv i Skåne, Folkets park i Malmö’s arkiv, A:v: Verksamhets/revisionsberättelser 1980-1990, Ab Folkets park i Malmö AB 1988, p.4. To what degree these figures are comparable is difficult to determine. Costs in the early 1980s are mostly in terms of ‘activity assistance’, while costs in the latter part of the decade tends to be deficits that the municipality had to pay in order to balance the budget. The concrete uses of this money remain, despite a breakdown in the annual reports into subcategories, largely opaque. See also Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Stadsträdgårdsmästarens ritningsarkiv, Binder marked ‘90-talets park’, ‘Malmö Parken: kommentar till resultatutveckling’, p. 1.

229 Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv i Skåne, Folkets park i Malmö’s arkiv, A:v: Verksamhets/revisionsberättelser 1980-1990, Ab Folkets park i Malmö 1986, p. 3; Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv i Skåne, Folkets park i Malmö’s arkiv, A:v: Verksamhets/revisionsberättelser 1980-1990, Årsredovisning Malmöparken 1987, p. 4; Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv i Skåne, Folkets park i Malmö’s arkiv, A:v: Verksamhets/revisionsberättelser 1980-1990, Ab Folkets park i Malmö AB 1988, p.4. To what degree these figures are comparable is difficult to determine. Costs in the early 1980s are mostly in terms of ‘activity assistance’, while costs in the latter part of the decade tends to be deficits that the municipality had to pay in order to balance the budget. The concrete uses of this money remain, despite a breakdown in the annual reports into subcategories, largely opaque. See also Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Stadsträdgårdsmästarens ritningsarkiv, Binder marked ‘90-talets park’, ‘Malmö Parken: kommentar till resultatutveckling’, p. 1.

230 Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunstyrelse 30th May 1988 §374 Upprustning av Moriska paviljongen.
right in 1985. The commercial renewal plan’s spatial interventions along strict economic logics had been rolled out with little considerations to Folkets park’s complex historical geography of uses, which created a chaotic and ungovernable situation. Disentangling these uses, and their representations as historically-important cultural heritage, from the commercial renewal plan that a neoliberal analysis of the park had suggested, required dramatic reconsiderations.

Uncommercial market solutions

The first signs that Folkets park’s future was again being radically reimagined came almost exactly a year after the Social Democrats had been re-elected in September 1988. The political forces dominating this moment were in many ways directly opposing the 1985–1988 neoliberal vision of demographic competition and social attractiveness through tax cuts. A younger cohort of social democrats, led by left-leaning social democrat Lars Engqvist, swiftly ended the city’s tax race to the bottom and sought to reanimate the party’s old welfarist social regulation. Investments in public services to ensure universal social rights in what was seen as a fragmenting city were the political cornerstones of Engqvist’s program, best exemplified by the defiant 1991 election manifesto Den Goda Staden (‘The Good City’). Such promises did, however, have little immediate effect on urban planning and development. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Folkets park’s inherited project of creating a commercial amusement park, and the way it came to rely on economic modes of representing the park’s use in terms of ticket sales.

To handle the park’s enormous deficit, a temporary committee was appointed by the park’s board of directors. This group consisted of experts from concerned municipal departments and the park’s administration, but was led by a representative of Quist AB, a small financial services consultancy. The mountains of debt uncovered and the group’s radical answers were to be treated with ‘absolute confidentiality regarding all non-members’ of the committee, so as to not ‘affect negatively’ their plans by the ‘economic situation […] being] made public at an inconvenient time’.

With the consultant leading the discussion and the park’s economic competitiveness institutionalized by the 1985 amusement park strategy, it is hardly surprising that renewal no longer primarily was concerned with Folkets park as a public space with social benefits for the local community or its politically-infused

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A financial audit was commissioned to a transnational accounting agency, detailed lists of all contracts with various leaseholders and subcontractors were compiled, estimates of profits from possible land sales by external real estate experts were made, prices for secondhand rides were asked of large European retailers, and discussions started about setting up a public-private partnership with a large corporation to run a restaurant in the Moriskan building. The park’s patterns of use, and these patterns contradictions, were in this sense represented in economic terms as costs and debts, with little regard to the park as a recreational, social space or its cultural heritage. Recklessly optimistic economic visions were understood to have led to irresponsible investments in too-competitive markets and a staggering flow of more public funds had to be kept up to maintain what little market share the park had. If the problem was overinvestment, then the solution was across-the-board disinvestment in commercial uses of the park in order to ‘decrease short-term losses’. The old development strategy, uneasily articulating municipal austerity with the park’s history as a faded entertainment hub in a long-term plan to create a public-private commercial venture, had not worked out. Economic concerns with a short-term spending reduction were instead framed by a program of public disinvestment in the park, echoing the main current of neoliberal austerity that had dominated Malmö, and so many other cities, in the mid-1980s.

In terms of planning interventions this meant closing down as many of the commercial functions that the municipality were involved in as possible, including the amusement park, which was identified as the main cause for the rapidly accumulating debts. This economic way of representing, envisioning, and intervening in the park’s geography of use had to navigate serious conflicts when it came to Amiralen and Moriskan. These buildings might have economic uses, but their past did not allow them to be represented as purely economic issues. The political decision to spend 30m SEK renovating Moriskan to maintain its function as a publically financed ‘meeting space’, which just was being completed in 1990, and the ‘strong connection for many Malmö residents’ to Amiralen made it impossible to approach these cases in strictly economic terms. The group’s early
plans for Amiralen’s demolition disappeared from its secret discussion, but not without it being noted as a ‘non-commercial’ decision deviating from the economic principles that the committee advocated.239 This contradiction between different ways of representing uses meant that the economically most rational choice of complete disinvestment was off the table. Functions that at least meant some kind of revenue stream to cover some of the costs of maintaining the buildings and paying mortgages had to be found. With no tenant willing to pay a ‘commercial rent’ for Moriskan — that is, rent high enough to recap the large investments that, when decided on in early 1985, had been conceived in terms of an investment in a venue steeped in cultural heritage that the municipality was to use as public ‘meeting space’ — the committee felt forced to resort to unorthodox measures. Discussions with hotel owners about setting up a conference center with municipal financial backing foundered, as did proposals for creating a municipal cultural center for the neighborhood’s young people.240 In the end the desperate group opted for an agreement with the Swedish foodstuff corporation Procordia for both Moriskan and Amiralen.241 The large corporation made clear that it would not sign a traditional contract with a fixed rent based on commercial rates for venues they could find no commercially viable business model for.242 Yet the logic of short-term loss minimization, where disinvestment through demolition was impossible, dictated that the park rent out these two buildings even at what risked being a monthly loss after mortgages on the renovations had been covered. This agreement, seen as temporary measure but becoming much more permanent with a 1991 renegotiation which meant that the tenants would only pay 8% of their turnover in these specific buildings, was to haunt the park for decades, as will be discussed in several chapters.243

The committee’s plan’s for minimizing ‘commercial’ activities to Moriskan and Amiralen was paired with another radical proposal showing that the neoliberal


241 Procordia had been fully owned by the Swedish state, but was just going through privatization at this point in time. This might explain the personal contacts that enabled this deal.


budgeting practices introduced in the 1985–1988 period were still on the table. In secret, the committee made plans to sell large parts of the park to private real estate companies. Early architectural sketches and reports from meetings with a developer suggest that plans included selling 67,355 m² of land for about 71m SEK. The planned mixed-used project included a twelve-story building in the park’s northernmost part. Both the neoliberal doctrine of balancing municipal budgets as if they were a commercial firm and its favored bureaucratic practice of privatizing public real estate assets were in this manner drawn on in the work on a renewal plan for Folkets park. While seriously limited by the ‘non-commercial’ decision to not demolish Amiralen, selling off public land as a tactic for intervening in space was not off the table for the planners, despite the social democratic majority in Malmö’s City Council.

The strict economic disinvestment in the park’s commercial functions, however, came up against and was articulated with other ways of representing Folkets park’s complex pattern of uses in the committee’s work. Mapping use as a landscape of negative economic potential requiring either disinvestment or a turn towards commercial real estate development by private capital left open the question of what actually was to be done with Folkets park after its best pieces of real estate had been sold and commercial functions minimized in the rest of the park. This created the opportunity for the young City Head Gardener (Stadsträdgårdsmästare) Gunnar Ericsson to draw on the established, although seriously circumscribed, notion of the park as a public space and social resource for Malmö’s inner city’s residents.

Ericsson’s proposal to convert the remaining parts of the park into a more accessible public green space primarily for the local community reverberated with economic logics by promising a relatively low level of long-term investment. It


was also informed by bureaucratic representations of the park’s use, drawing on a recently-commissioned survey concerning ‘Malmö residents’ attitudes’ to and uses of the park that suggested that the Folkets park could easily be converted into a fully public green space.\textsuperscript{249} Local parks, or ‘Community Parks’ (stadsdelsparker), had theoretically been established as important social resources for the city’s residents already in a 1984 plan for Malmö’s green spaces.\textsuperscript{250} The idea of Community Parks as a crucial social infrastructure for Malmö’s residents came to provide the theoretical framing for the proposal.

Ericsson also proposed a grander and more long-term vision. Folkets park could, as one of few sizeable green spaces in this central part of the city, be redeveloped to help the ongoing rebranding of Malmö as the ‘city of parks’.\textsuperscript{251} Ericsson painted a vivid picture of how the redeveloped park would be appropriated by a public of ‘environmentalists, musicians, chess players, flâneurs, children, gardeners, gourmets, and many others’.\textsuperscript{252} Tensions between radically different development visions were in this way articulated in a plan drawing on both social and economic ways of representing uses of space. Large scale roll-back of private-public commercial activities and the planning of a new and much more public space were pitched by the committee alongside commercial real estate development by private capital for parts of the park. Social uses were designated for the parts of the park represented as having no economic potential, and the rest of the park was reserved for economically-driven renewal. Economic and social planning logics were thus completely separated, yet used to prop each other up.

The drastic renewal scheme proposed by the committee to Folkets park’s board of directors in October 1989 was not met with the expected enthusiasm.\textsuperscript{253} But despite being rejected by the board of directors, the committee’s plan turned out to be far from a blind alley of history. Many of the plan’s proposals became blueprints for more modest renewal projects in the year that followed. Folkets park’s attempt to become a commercial amusement park was rapidly scaled back, Moriskan and Amiralen got the commercial tenants on ‘non-commercial’ conditions that the committee had suggested, and Malmö’s social democratic mayor in a later proposal picked up on the idea of focusing all resources on turning Folkets park into a recreational green space for the inner city neighborhood — all


within a year of the scrapped plan. The only one of the committee’s ideas that didn’t materialize in some fashion in the years that followed was selling parts of the park to real estate developers. This proposal, which the committee’s work revolved around to such a large degree, was not even mentioned in the group’s final report, that in fact did not propose anything that looked like an actual solution to Folkets park’s growing debts.

Privatizing a large part of Folkets park must have been a horrific scenario for the social democratic political majority that for years had argued for protecting this historic landmark of the labor movement. The social democrats’ political strength might, through their large 1988–1991 majority in the park’s board of directors, have been able to obstruct this kind of large-scale privatization. Still, that the rejected plan was dominated by neoliberal bureaucratic practices illustrated that a process that could not be reversed by an electoral victory was underway. Urban planning was beginning to articulate social concerns with an ethos of economic competitiveness, albeit in a very crude and highly unstable way.

Settled debts and unsolved crises

Despite following the secret committee’s disinvestment plan for the amusement park and its ‘non-commercial’ market fixes of Moriskan and Amiralen, the main fault line remained unresolved. Settling the already-accumulated debts coming out of the failed 1986–1990 amusement park venture by selling of the park’s land to private investors was off the table. The debt in question was too large to simply increase the already ballooning sums of public subsidies allocated in terms of heritage preservation or public access to the green space without coming up with a more permanent solution. The social democratic majority had to take an initiative before they lost the ability to act, with things looking bleak for them in the run-up to the 1991 elections.

The renewal effort that followed was led by the new social democratic mayor Lars Engqvist who personally sponsored a long-term plan for Folkets park. This plan followed the secret committee’s plan selectively. It suggested officially making Folkets park a recreational Community Park as way to reduce long-term costs. But instead of picking up on the suggestion to sell a sizable part of the park to cancel the large debt, Engqvist proposed that Malmö municipality buy the remaining 40% of the park’s shares for a token amount of less than 1m SEK.

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255 Only an early draft was archived. See Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Stadsträdgårdsstärens ritningsarkiv, Binder marked ‘90-talets park’, ‘AB Folkets Park i Malmö – 90-talets folkarkp: slutrapport från arbetsgruppens arbete’. 
Malmö municipality was in this manner to take full control of the site, end the disastrous 1976 deal demanding that all losses be covered by the municipality, and settle the accumulated debts with an injection of public funds.

This rather desperate move was certainly shaped by the Social Democrats’ fear of being humiliatingly forced to privatize part of this crucial labor movement heritage site if they lost the upcoming election. The plan relied on the once-trusted 1970s tactic of buying up strategically-located real estate from failing business. The general direction of this plan, presenting public space as a way to minimize costs, was, however lifted from the work of the of dissolved secret group. As the Real Estate and Streets Departments went to work on preparing memos for the City Council debate in April 1991, a more fine-grained grid representing how the park was used introduced new elements to the already-complex planning process.

These memos carefully mapped the park’s patterns of use through very different modes of representation that in turn were connected to new visions for its future. Most surprisingly was how the Real Estate Department, which had been one of few bureaucratic units seemingly able to rapidly readjust to the neoliberal 1985–1988 turn, articulated its quantifying economic calculation of land values with almost ethnographic representations of social uses. The bureaucrats penning their memo underscored that the high density of the area surrounding Folkets park was ‘historically’ premised on the ‘partly public’ character of the park as the only sizable green space in this neighborhood. The Real Estate Department economists made clear that if the land was to be commercially redeveloped one had to ‘expect demands of residents from the area of making some part of Folkets park available as public space’. 256

Even the estimates of land value that the Real Estate Department made for Folkets park were significantly lower than a comparable site without the same history of use — not more than two thirds of the property’s assessed value (taxeringsvärde).257 These estimates were explicitly not to be taken as an accurate indication of an actual price in ‘a possible future sale of parts or the whole tract of land for redevelopment’, figures the department flat out refused to try to calculate because the park’s pattern of use made economic modes of representation too unreliable.258 This ethnographic rendering of the park’s social function was posed in direct contradiction to a future envisioned by economic quantification, making economic representations and visions a futile effort.

The kind of everyday uses that the Real Estate Department understood to undermine all economic calculations were represented in a very different register

256 Malmö, Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 31st May 1991 §125 Förvärv av aktierna i AB Folkets park m.m, p. bilaga C, Bihang 1, 1991 p. 8-9.
257 Malmö, Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 31st May 1991 §125 Förvärv av aktierna i AB Folkets park m.m, p. 3.
258 Malmö, Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 31st May 1991 §125 Förvärv av aktierna i AB Folkets park m.m, bilaga C, Bihang 1, 1991 p. 10, 11.
by the Streets Department. This bureaucratic unit instead revived the early 1980s anxieties about decaying cultural heritage. Its more culturally attuned planners expressed worries that the ‘many interesting historical styles’ and the accumulated ‘values’ of the park’s natural landscape would not be given the ‘considerable space’ it deserved in a future renewal process. Unlike economic representations, where the park’s history was seen as an external limit, this entirely ethnographic approach identified urban space that — if curated with care — had limitless potential. This potential was reinforced, in The Streets Department’s memo, by the need for a ‘more open’ and accessible public park for the densely-populated inner-city community. To develop and safeguard the cultural heritage and social uses of the park, this department hoped that the Urban Planning Department (Stadsbyggnadskontoret) would start work on a new Area Plan for a public park as soon possible, replacing the 1929 plan that essentially left the entire area a blank canvas.

The need to deal with how historical sites were to be preserved also emerged in the long and bitter political debate in the City Council, a debate which otherwise mainly dealt with the size and causes of the park’s growing debts. While the regional populist party described the park as a symbol of ‘oppression’ and simply proposed erasing all physical ‘signs of the rampage of socialism’ the Liberals and the Moderates could agree with the Social Democrats that the park had specific architectural qualities that deserved to be safeguarded for future generations from unrelenting commercial development. A majority could thus informally agree that bureaucrats should investigate the practicalities of filing for cultural heritage status for the entire area to protect the park from future commercial redevelopment. Based on the Streets Department’s concerns over the social functions of the park’s uses, and the ‘Community Park’ idea that the City Head Gardner already had pitched to the secret committee a year before, a fragile political consensus about preserving the green space and limiting future development in the park to modernization of already existing buildings was forming. This was in turn regulated by the sales contract that severely restricted any future ‘dense developments’ and commercial sales.

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259 Malmö, Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 31st May 1991 §125 Förvärv av aktierna i AB Folkets park m.m, bilaga D, 1991 p. 12.
260 Malmö, Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 31st May 1991 §125 Förvärv av aktierna i AB Folkets park m.m, bilaga D, 1991 p. 12.
261 Malmö, Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 31st May 1991 §125 Förvärv av aktierna i AB Folkets park m.m, bilaga D, 1991 p. 12.
262 Malmö, Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 31st May 1991 §125 Förvärv av aktierna i AB Folkets park m.m, bilaga D, 1991 p. 12.
263 Malmö, Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 31st May 1991 §125 Förvärv av aktierna i AB Folkets park m.m, bilaga D, 1991 p. 12.
264 Malmö, Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 31st May 1991 §125 Förvärv av aktierna i AB Folkets park m.m, bilaga D, 1991 p. 12.
265 Malmö, Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 31st May 1991 §125 Förvärv av aktierna i AB Folkets park m.m, bilaga D, 1991 p. 12.
266 Malmö, Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 30th May 1991, p. 28-29, 33. 
267 Malmö, Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 30th May 1991, p. 27, 28, 29, 33; Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 31st May 1991 §125 Förvärv av aktierna i AB Folkets park m.m, p.3.
268 Malmö, Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 30th May 1991 §125, p. 28-33.
269 Malmö, Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 31st May 1991 §125 Förvärv av aktierna i AB Folkets park m.m, bilaga C, Bihang 1, 1991 p. 7.
This left the problem of what to do with Folkets park’s building stock unsolved. Economic and social representations of use converged on the idea of keeping market forces out of the park’s outdoor environments and creating a public park. But maintenance costs of the newly-renovated buildings would not decrease in the same way. The Real Estate Department agreed to assume responsibility for the park’s real estate stock, temporarily continue the cooperation with non-profit cultural associations, and in addition offered to organize a ‘limited booking of artists’ during the 1991 season for the Folkets park’s centenary celebrations. Their business plan, however, explicitly excluded this kind of support for future cultural activities. The park’s buildings were, according to the Real Estate Department ‘not designed’ to be ‘commercially interesting’, and the department made clear that any future public subsidies for cultural activities taking place in the park would not come from their budget. The Real Estate Department could not, just as the secret committee before them, find a way to manage the buildings in a strictly ‘commercial’ way, but were rather forced to rent the park’s buildings out with as little loss as possible. While the social democratic City Council majority asked the bureaucrats who were from this point on in charge of the Folkets park to investigate if it was possible to find funding for an ‘international peace and environment center’ in Moriskan, the Real Estate Department unceremoniously ignored this idea. The agreement with Procordia about running Moriskan and Amiralen on a ‘non-commercial’ basis was thus unenthusiastically renegotiated in 1991 as a formal contract for leasing the buildings for a token 8% of the firm’s turnover in the two venues.

The municipal buy-out of Folkets park was understood to be the end of an era, the settling of long overdue debt that would end the park as a site in which unmanageable contradictions kept emerging. An uneasy consensus had emerged among Malmö’s main political parties that all could agree on treating Folkets park as being a unique cultural heritage and it being too socially important for the inner city’s residents to unleash commercial development beyond the, little-discussed, private involvement in Moriskan and Amiralen. The political right might not have been happy about the municipality paying the Social Democrats for their shares in the park. Yet, the Moderates and Liberals had no concrete alternative to finalizing the sale and creating a new public park — the demagogic regional populists’ demand to bulldoze the entire site being the exception.

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266 Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 31st May 1991 §125 Förvärv av aktierna i AB Folkets park m.m, bilaga C, Bihang 1, 1991 p. 11.
267 Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 31st May 1991 §125 Förvärv av aktierna i AB Folkets park m.m, bilaga C, Bihang 1, 1991 p. 11.
268 Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 31st May 1991 §125 Förvärv av aktierna i AB Folkets park m.m, bilaga C, Bihang 1, 1991 p. 8.
269 Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunalfullmäktiges 31st May 1991 §125 Förvärv av aktierna i AB Folkets park m.m, bilaga A, Bihang 1, 1991 p. 3.
270 Malmö tingsrätts arkiv, Dom, Mål nr: T 1326-10, 2013, p. 5, 18.
The way that different modes of representation were articulated within this fragmentary plan for Folkets park shaped how contradictions articulated in planning during the years that followed. Social representations of use seen as outside of and opposed to both economic representations of use and economic visions for the park, first established in the late 1980s, would become the default position in Folkets park’s renewal. But this formation, pitting economic against social representations of space, would soon run into problems, its internal tensions pulling at the seams. In much the same way, Malmö’s Social Democrats would use ameliorative social policy as a way to limit the effects of neoliberal economic reforms during the mid 1990s, which eventually opened up a more complex articulation of social regulation with neoliberal practices. The peculiar austerity measure of disinvesting in Folkets park by making it a publically-owned and funded Community Park would soon come to an end, but with many of the forces set in motion during the late 1980s still at work.
Chapter 5
1991–1997:
The problem with people…

Social neoliberalism through urban planning?

Folkets park began its new life as a public park in quiet modesty. However, as a city, Malmö was going through a more dramatic time. The center-right coalition under the neoliberal leadership of the Moderates’ Joakim Ollén ousted the Social Democrats again in September 1991, the same election that led to a center-right coalition forming a national government, speeding up the pace of neoliberal financial reforms and eventually leading Sweden into the European Union. Ollén’s 1991–1994 administration was more experienced with the practicalities of municipal bureaucracy than it had been in 1985. Their three-year term coincided with both the late 1980s’ speculative boom period ending in financial crisis, and Malmö experiencing a series of factory closures resulting in unemployment doubling during 1991 and a general mood of political urgency.271

Despite sharp division within the party, Malmö’s Social Democrats had already begun a wave of privatization of municipal businesses to deal with budgetary deficits, such as the of selling the city’s electric utilities companies with its 740 employees for 2.3bn SEK in 1991. Privatization was sped up by Ollén’s administration, which in the 1991–1994 period focused on privatization of municipally-owned business, rather than real estate sales as in the 1980s. In the next three years, Malmö municipality privatized 21 companies and 25 retirement homes with the number of municipal employees shrinking by as many as 6000 people. Privatization and austerity was thus one kind of deeply economic

A neoliberal mode of governing, inspired by the Chicago School intellectuals that had gained prominence in the 1970s, coming to the fore in this period.272 It was, however, not the only way that neoliberal rationalities of competition was being enacted in Malmö’s municipal bureaucracy. Also the social neoliberal project that in the mid 1980s had emerged in Malmö was being reworked in this period, despite the turn to the economic mechanism of rule connected to fiscal austerity and privatization. This is evident in several separate issues, including urban planning.

One example, much discussed at the time, was how Ollén’s second administration aggressively invested public funds in high culture as part of their long-term urban development strategy. The neoliberal administration oversaw the creation of a new art museum (Rooseum), the municipality’s third theatrical stage (Hipp), and investments in and renovation of Malmö’s large municipal art exhibition hall (Malmö Konsthall).273 Politically, these investments can be understood both as a way to pick up the social democrats’ mantle of hegemony by drawing on their long legacy of being the party of public culture, as well as redirecting municipal funding streams from popular mass culture to a more distinctly elite cultural expressions.

This neoliberal attention to culture was also wrapped up with new technologies of urban regeneration emerging in Malmö at this moment. The neoliberal understanding of Malmö needing to be more ‘competitive’ for desirable residents, that is making Malmö demographically ‘attractive’, was during these years articulated with the municipal urban development bureaucracy, rather than only being connected to economic interventions. Work on the major development framework from this time, the 10-year Comprehensive Plan for Malmö 1990, had begun in 1986 and a first draft was finished shortly after the Social Democrats ousted the center-right administration in 1988.274 While the plan was then not surprisingly marked by the neoliberal ideas of Ollén’s 1985–1988 administration, its main thrust echoed Malmö’s social democrats’ late 1980s return to promises of almost universal social rights.

The plan’s social ambition was primarily concerned with using urban development as an ameliorative tool of redistribution, targeting the city’s most deprived neighborhoods. The 1990 Comprehensive Plan represented Malmö’s demographic composition as tied to ‘regional imbalances’ created by spatial ‘divisions’ between zones of ‘different living conditions.’275 This normative

framing of how Malmö’s deprived areas related to suburban affluence might have echoed radical postwar social engineering that had once remade the city, but did so without offering explanations of this problem that suggested redistribution as the plausible long-term solution. There were thus a repertoire of redistributive, and sometimes also disciplinary, proposals directed at the city’s most socially-exposed areas, but no actual proposal for how these limited interventions would change the demographic mechanisms that produced ‘divisions’ in the first place.276

The mechanics producing the region’s uneven social geography were instead described in ways which were remarkably similar to the dynamics set up in Ollén’s neoliberal New Times for Malmö pamphlet. The active choice of consumers was emphasized as a determining factor beyond any direct regulation, with a given tendency for middle-aged wage earners to move to suburban single-family houses being the primary mechanism for creating this unevenness.277 This neoliberal rendering of a social issue was however not yet connected to anything resembling a substantial repertoire of neoliberal bureaucratic practices for concrete planning interventions.

One hesitant answer was for Malmö municipality to plan for more of the kinds of residential units that this niche of consumers found lacking in the city after decades of focus on densely-built communities. This strategy was never explicitly defined as competing with the city’s suburban belt by mass-producing single-family units. However, that the majority of the areas singled out for development were on the city’s periphery and were scheduled for low-density development, this way of physically intervening in space to change the city’s demography was plainly one of the plan’s implicit concerns.278 A second response, phrased even more vaguely — but important in that it prefigured later and more concrete planning tactics — was to use the city’s ‘urban lifestyle’ to attract and keep residents that might leave for suburbia by adapting existing buildings for families, the demographic group that tended to leave the city.279 These modest proposals were the first attempt to approach the neoliberal idea that Malmö’s demographic composition could be reconfigured by competing for new groups of residents through urban planning, thus disentangling this model of social governance from Ollén’s tactic of tax-cuts as an economic quick fix.

Since the 1990 Comprehensive Plan had only just begun to articulate a neoliberal understanding of the social as a competitive sphere with urban planning, early 1990s neoliberal planning operated largely outside this framework. Most of the urban renewal projects sponsored by Malmö’s second center-right administration were concerned with making the city center more appealing. This is most evident in a series of early 1990s memos drafted by the Streets Department

276 Malmö stad, Stadsbyggnadskontoret, Översiktsplan för Malmö 1990, p. 79.
278 Malmö stad, Stadsbyggnadskontoret, Översiktsplan för Malmö 1990, p. 37, 72.
concerned with fine-tuning the urban environment’s ‘attractiveness’ to help Malmö’s retailers compete with businesses in other towns and cities. The memos envisioned, and sought to create, attractive urban space, but understood attraction in economic terms, and largely failed to connect these interventions to the city’s social competitiveness. This ambition was in stark contrast to the more technical work on inner city retail done by municipal planners in the early 1980s, that outside traffic infrastructure afforded the qualities of built space much less significance for the regional geography of shopping.

Economic competitiveness was also articulated with urban planning in proposals for expanding the size of the city’s commercial center. This scheme explicitly drew on the generic Euro-Atlantic neoliberal urban development concepts of the late 1980s and focused on waterfront regeneration of the then recently abandoned Kockums-Saab factories, not far north of the inner city. Malmö’s waterfront renewal projects — which accomplished little in terms of physical redevelopment but pre-figured late 1990s plans for the same area aggressively using architecture as place-marketing — explicitly referenced international examples of speculative regeneration projects like Baltimore’s Harborplace, London’s St. Catherine’s Docks and New York City’s Pier 17.

While still framed by economic logics, these schemes’ vivid visions of how urban space could be used contributed to rethinking how demographic ‘attractiveness’ could be imagined in social terms that were more than the appeal of economically-competitive tax rates.


281 In these somewhat crude plans of the early 1990s, much of the intellectual groundwork was laid for the later much more detailed planning of a coherent pedestrian inner-city commercial zone that architectural theorist Mattias Kärrholm has described as crucial in Malmö’s late 1990s and 00s re-emergence as an ambitious retail city: Mattias Kärrholm, Retailising space: architecture, retail and the territorialisation of public space, (Burlington: Ashgate, 2016) p. 38-39.


284 Only years later would interventions in the inner city’s commercial space become one of the ways in which a neoliberal understanding of the social become translated into the world of urban planning. See: Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Gatukontorets närarkiv för program, Malmö stadsmiljöprogram: Projektbeskrivning etapp stadskärnan, 1995-02-22, reviderad 1997-03-07, 1997, p. 3.
This idea of urban space as being ‘attractive’ indicates experiments with a more proactive neoliberal mode of governance. Visions of a city that maximized its competitiveness for consumers, businesses, and — still to a lesser degree — potential residents was emerging as a possible objective of urban planning. Spatial planning provided a more ethnographic mode of representing and intervening in the environment in which commercial forces, and also to some degree certain residents as economic subjects, operated without intervening directly in markets. This model of the social as a competitive sphere was gaining momentum, but was still far from dominant, in the 1990 Comprehensive Plan.

Perhaps most important were the new ways of imagining urban space as ‘attractive’, albeit mainly in an economic sense, which were being worked out in local renewal projects in the Malmö city center and along the waterfront. Echoes of the neoliberal vision of Malmö as an attractive city successfully competing for desirable demographics in a regional market could for the first time be detected in these urban planning projects. This proactive neoliberal program was worked out in parallel with a reactive, and much more pronounced, neoliberal policy of fiscal austerity and privatization of public utilities fueled by economic recession and monetarist models. It was this second tendency that came to the fore in municipal planners early 1990s work on Folkets park.

Public space as actually existing neoliberal austerity

Malmö City Council was by 1991 in the hands of a center-right majority ideologically dominated by a small group of outspoken neoliberals who had stepped up fiscal austerity, only interrupted by investments in elite cultural institutions and the renewal of the commercial city center. Folkets park, as a newly acquired public space in one of the city’s poorest areas and popular cultural institution aligned with the political majority’s enemies, could hardly expect more than a trickle of municipal funding. While the park’s new municipal management group kept a low profile, the remnants of Folkets park’s old civil society sector quickly set up a new non-profit group, Folkets Park Cultural Association (Kulturföreningen Folkets park). This group wanted to keep the park’s historical heritage alive, despite the fact that Folkets park was now a public space owned by the municipality. Some limited efforts to maintain and improve the park’s neglected buildings, in particular the Children’s Theatre Hall (Barnens scen), was made by the city’s Real Estate Department during the early 1990s, but essentially Folkets park was left to its own devices in the hopes that it would be appropriated
by locals as a modest Community Park, managed by the Streets Department at a minimal cost.\textsuperscript{285}

A list containing a ‘description of desired outcomes’ for the years 1992–1994—presumably from the winter of 1991–1992 but archived with a presentation from 2003—provides some insights into how the Streets Department’s Park Division (\textit{Gatukontorets Park- och stadsmiljöavdelning}) initially responded to this new public space under its authority.\textsuperscript{286} The first and most clearly defined objective was to make the park more accessible and increase the number of cultural ‘activities’ that ‘cater to the needs of children and youth’ of the city and the local community.\textsuperscript{287} Cultural heritage preservation and cooperation with non-profit cultural associations were also noted as important issues, but without any commitment to funding this kind of use.\textsuperscript{288} The park was, according to its now fully municipal managers, to be cared for at a ‘minimum of administration and at a low cost’.\textsuperscript{289} Some of the park’s empty real estate could, perhaps, be rented for ‘large events and parties to companies, organizations, and other groups of interests’—but no municipal funding was requested for capturing new potential sources of revenue.\textsuperscript{290} This discussion about increasing revenue streams through the market was instead peripheral to dominant planning visions of creating a functioning public space and keeping maintenance costs to a bare minimum.

A similar approach can also be found in the first official municipal budget for Folkets park that the City Head Gardener Gunnar Ericsson presented to the Streets Council (\textit{Gatunämnden}, after 1998 renamed \textit{Tekniska nämnden} or ‘the Technical Council’) in the spring of 1992. This modest renewal plan proposed a vision of Folkets park’s as a Community Park with very local, social uses—following the fragile political consensus established around the 1991 buy-out. The public investments the City Head Gardener requested were explicitly to make Folkets park a more green, tidy, and ‘open park’ for ‘locals’.\textsuperscript{291} Ericsson’s rudimentary renewal plan was careful to appear sensitive to ‘cultural history’ landmarks, but contained no proposal for using these politically-charged historical sites to create

\textsuperscript{285} As described in Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Gat- och trafiknämndens, 30th August 1994, §104a, Motion av Johny Örbäck (s): Ändring av namnet Malmöparken till Folkets Park, p 2.

\textsuperscript{286} Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Ritningsarkivet, Red, undated binder containing slides, ‘Folkets park 12:a’.

\textsuperscript{287} Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Ritningsarkivet, Red, undated binder containing slides, ‘Folkets park 12:a’.

\textsuperscript{288} Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Ritningsarkivet, Red, undated binder containing slides, ‘Folkets park 12:a’.

\textsuperscript{289} Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Ritningsarkivet, Red, undated binder containing slides, ‘Folkets park 12:a’.

\textsuperscript{290} Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Ritningsarkivet, Red, undated binder containing slides, ‘Folkets park 12:a’.

\textsuperscript{291} Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö gatunämnd, 13th April 1992, §71 ‘Program och budget för Folkets Park’.
attractions with — or without — commercial potential. Unlike the City Head Gardener’s enthusiastic vision for the park only a few years before, these uses were no longer represented as a resource for the making of public space used by ‘flâneurs’ and night-time consumers of cultural commodities.

Renewal efforts were thus modest in scope and mostly concerned basic repairs like fixing drainpipes, worn out asphalt, and urgent repairs to an old playground — a picture of slow and mundane redevelopment that is confirmed by the few building permits granted during the early 1990s. These interventions all seem to suggest that the renewal visions for the park was of public space used as a recreational site by locals and with modest social effects for this group. When commercial interactions were discussed — such as the proposals for new and more limited carousel leases and building a new stable for the small petting zoo, Arken — these were not framed as investments which were expected to have an economic return. The commercial activities were instead understood to potentially have a social effect in attracting local families to their new Community Park.

The same logic framed the budgetary pleas for further funds in coming years, which were quite simply aimed at consolidating Folkets park’s role as a municipally-owned public space through minor technical tweaking like upgrading flower beds, planting trees, and increasing the playground’s use ‘value’ for Malmö’s inner-city children. Social, and primarily local, uses of Folkets park were represented as the dominant challenges requiring planned interventions to bring to fruition the envisioned new kinds of use during the three-year period of center-right rule. The vision of a social use of space as a mode of disinvestment, introduced in the 1989 secret committee and formalized in 1991 buy-out was thus consolidated in the fiercely neoliberal early 1990s.

Challenges to this vision for the park, articulating fiscal austerity with a local and social use of public space, began to emerge after the Social Democrats won the 1994 election, initiating the party’s renewed dominance of municipal politics. One of the new political majority’s first moves was to swiftly declare that there had been no formal, municipal decision to rename Folkets park to Malmöparken in 1986, also noting that the new name hadn’t caught on in everyday speech. In the first City Council with the new majority a motion to again name the green space...

292 Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö gatunämnd, 13th April 1992, §71 ‘Program och budget för Folkets Park’.
296 Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö gatunämnds 13th April 1992, §71 ‘Program och budget för Folkets Park’.
Folkets park was dismissed without a formal vote, with all parties agreeing to simply resume calling the park the officially designated name still used on municipal maps and by most residents. An informal decision was made to notify the Real Estate Department to ‘take down the sign’ saying Malmöparken and replace it with a new Folkets park sign, signaling a cross-party unity to depart from the park’s late 1980s debacle.297

Malmö’s Social Democrats, now lead by former architect mayor Ilmar Reepalu, did however not seek to reanimate their 1980s city-wide program of economic regulation and social welfare after their 1994 electoral surge. The mid- and late 1990s was a period where many earlier free market economic policies were left in place by the social democrats.298 Early experiments articulating a neoliberal model for representing the region’s social geography with urban planning instead began to bear fruit at this moment, even if it would take several years before social neoliberalism came to dominate planning.

A Park without People

Mid- and late 1990s renewal schemes for Folkets park gives us an illustration of how social neoliberalism through urban planning began to take shape in Malmö. Like the city in general, the park was marked by unsolved contradictions that had accumulated during a decade dominated by austerity. The socially-concerned renewal vision of Folkets park as a public space to be used by locals responded to the pressure of keeping municipal costs down to compensate for the financial mess left by the failed private-public venture of the late 1980s. The strange way in which public space had been leveraged to handle debts and impose austerity on municipal spending was paired with the continued letting of key venues in the park, like Amiralen and Moriskan, to commercial firms, with the ‘uncommercial’ and subsidized rents stipulated in the 1991 contracts. This way the park’s accumulated contradictions were articulated in urban planning paperwork regulating use began to be challenged in the mid-1990s. As the political dynamics changed with the 1994 election, the park’s patterns of use began to be represented as a problem, requiring both visions and interventions articulating concerns other than keeping public spending to a minimum. In doing so, more complex social visions, representations, and interventions appeared in plans for the park as public space. This trajectory set up bureaucratic practices that

297 Malmö stadsarkiv, Minutes of Malmö Gatu- och trafiknämnd 8th November 1994, §122 KF; Remiss, Motion av Johnny Örbäck om ändring av namnet Malmö Parken till Folkets Park, ‘Ändring av namnet Malmö Parken till Folkets Park’; Malmö stad, Malmö kommunfullmäktiges arkiv, 26 January 1995, §14; Motion om ändring av namnet Malmö Parken till Folkets park.
298 Holgersen, Staden och kapitalet: Malmö i krisernas tid, p. 132.
within a few years would seriously undermine the notion of public space as a local, social issue.

The shift began after a new temporary subcommittee, coordinating the different municipal authorities and civil society actors involved in the park, was formed again. This committee met for the first time in December 1995, a year after the Social Democrats retook control of the City Council, and included members from the Streets Department, the Real Estate Department, and the Folkets park Cultural Association. Scattered minutes, correspondence and various other types of document produced by this group can be found in a binder simply marked ‘Folkets park 1995 1996’ stacked among the unsorted files of Malmö’s City Head Gardener’s reference archive.\(^{299}\)

The ‘objectives of the investigation’ that this group undertook was initially defined by a short one-page document, typed on Real Estate Department stationery, dated 16th of June of 1995. Despite a five-year political consensus on treating Folkets park as public space and thus incurring costs for maintenance, the Real Estate Department explicitly re-articulated the neoliberal monetarist vision — the one driving the 1985 rebranding and reintroduced in the 1989 secret committee’s papers — on ‘balancing’ the park’s budget. This was to be done by partitioning the park and creating a public and a commercial zone, just as the secret committee had suggested when it proposed selling parts of the park and making the rest a public green space. The Real Estate Department proposed making Moriskan, Amiralen and Nya Teatern (‘The New Theatre’) — the park’s three largest buildings — the basis of this commercialization effort.\(^{300}\)

‘Balancing the park’s budget’ was a planning vision that articulated a contradiction between an economic and a social understanding of the park. However, this contradiction was not only between two different abstract perspectives on the park. Rather, these tensions also articulated contradictions of built and lived space being represented and provoking the need for envisioning the park’s future in new ways. Tensions of everyday use were represented in two ways in this renewal process.

First, the running costs associated with Moriskan and Amiralen — large buildings inherited from the park’s postwar heydays as the city’s most important entertainment venue — were plainly still causing a headache for the Real Estate Department’s economists. The makeshift 1991 Community Park plan might have solved the economic issues that the Folkets park stock company had accumulated by abandoning its catastrophic commercial amusement park venture and injecting public funds to settle its debts. It had, however, not put in place mechanisms for securing revenue streams even covering the maintenance costs and mortgages on


the recently-renovated Moriskan and Amiralen buildings, buildings at the time these renovations were decided had been envisioned to be used by the municipality for public purposes rather than leased on the market at commercial rates. The exceptionally poorly-designed 1991 leases were in fact costing the municipality huge sums, and this way of regulating the buildings’ use was a concrete problem that the Real Estate Department’s economists set out to solve by the renewal plans. The ‘uncommercial’ market use, inherited from the failed neoliberal renewal attempts in the 1980s and left in place during the early 1990s, was an unsolved contradiction in how the park was used. This issue was represented in economic terms, making sure the renewal agenda was initially also framed by economic expertise rather than by social concerns.

Second, the short Real Estate Department document was, just as in previous commercialization drives, unwilling to represent all uses of the park in strictly economic terms. Economic modes of representation were restricted to what was identified as the real estate which it seemed most urgent to redevelop, rearticulating the way that social uses had been posed as outside of and in opposition to economic development in the secret committee’s failed attempt to sell parts of the park in the late 1980s. The remaining parts of Folkets park were explicitly to be mapped by entirely different means that took stock of and sought to foster uses understood in social, rather than economic, terms. In this way, the proposed ‘outcomes’ articulated two contradictions. It was shaped by the tensions between the economic representations of problematic actual uses and envisioned economic future uses of Moriskan and Amiralen in particular. It was, however, also shaped by contradictions between which parts of the park could be represented as having economic potential and those that ought to remain public space with social functions.

Commercial development played a central role in the subcommittee’s first meeting, held on the 12th of December 1995. The Real Estate Department’s proposal to sell the northern part of the park, including the massive Amiralen, Nya Teatern, and Moriskan buildings, to private developers was framed as a way to balance an economic equation. Since any substantial renewal had been deferred throughout the fiscal crisis of the early 1990s, major investments in the park’s green space were plainly needed. The Real Estate Department offered to shoulder these costs if they were allowed to sell the buildings they could find no profitable leaseholders for. But in representing and envisioning the southern parts of the park as having important social uses, the equation that the Real Estate Department sought to balance ceased to be simply an economic matter.

The envisioned division between zones of either future economic or social uses invited other social representations into the planning process, which would

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undermine the Real Estate Department’s vision. As early as the subcommittee’s first meeting the Streets Department and Folkets Park Cultural Association presented visions that were radically different to the Real Estate Department’s commercial plan. As the subcommittee continued its work, the social-economic partition of the park was cluttered with representations of uses that could not be contained within this rigid framework that the plan hinged on. The most severe tensions between representations of social uses and the vision of the two zones of future use can be discerned when comparing Folkets Park Cultural Association’s proposals with the Real Estate Department’s plan.

The Cultural Association contributed with a memo permeated by both a nostalgic undercurrent and sense of detailed local and historical knowledge not found in the work of the group’s other participants. Their memo began by setting the scene in bleak terms. Folkets park had in recent years developed a ‘rather run down impression’. At the same time as some of the park’s more successful activities were confined in small, overcrowded facilities, other buildings were almost always completely empty, which reinforced the air of neglect. Part of the memo was concerned with what could be done with Folkets park’s worn down physical environment to make it more appealing as a public green space. This memo actually provided a detailed list of concrete tasks that would contribute to this physical upgrade.

The proposal to make the most of Folkets park as a little-used ‘centrally located resource’ by repairing its worn-down outdoor environment was supplemented by a second plan authored by the Cultural Association. This plan focused on Folkets park’s buildings and sharply contrasted with the Real Estate Department’s vision of commercialization. Crucial for their argument was how little Provobis, a subsidiary to the Procordia corporation that leased the buildings since 1991, actually used Moriskan and Amiralen. Because Provobis had refused to sign a contract with fixed rent and instead only paid 8% of their turnover in Moriskan and Amiralen as rent to the municipality, they had no economic incentives to maximize their use of this space. The Cultural Association, with their detailed

everyday knowledge of the park, forcefully argued that this commercial use was disastrous for Folkets park as a public space.\textsuperscript{308}

The evidence presented in the Cultural Association’s argument of how this carefree commercial firm contributed to the park’s sense of abandonment in the form of personal testimonies was supported by the Real Estate Department’s economic data. While Provobis was reported to be doing ‘very well’, the 1991 contract for Moriskan and Amiralen cost the municipality an astonishing sum of 2.7m SEK every year in the mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{309} With some variations in the corporate ownership structure, this lease would continue to provoke renewal plans until the late ‘00s, with the municipality still grudgingly subsidizing the private leaseholders yearly with as much as 700,000 SEK in 2001.\textsuperscript{310}

Folkets Park Cultural Association argued that leaving the buildings unused for the better part of the year by focusing on catering for prepaid events, like conference dinners, not only contributed to the park’s sense of neglect but was part of an explicit business strategy. The firm’s manager did not consider this cherry-picking of the most profitable ways to use the venue as in any way problematic, but instead described his own business as a victim of the indirect municipal support for non-profit associations in the park. In particular a group of social democratic seniors volunteering to serve cheap lunches in Far i hatten, the park’s oldest and smallest restaurant, angered the manager.\textsuperscript{311} Far i hatten’s homemade herring sandwiches and waffles with coffee were apparently upsetting the free market by competing in an ‘unsatisfactory’ way, which made commercially unsound any private investment in keeping the two venues, seating 2000 or so people, open on regular basis.\textsuperscript{312}

Provobis’ use of Moriskan and Amiralen provoked urban planning responses from both the Real Estate Department and Folkets Park Cultural Association, but

\textsuperscript{312} This was perhaps the first time this argument against the municipality’s attempts to support local activities as a means to attract people to Folkets park as social strategy was criticized for disrupting the economy as a self-regulating sphere, but it was certainly not the last time this tension unsettled plans. See: Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Stadsträdgårdsmästarens ritningsarkiv, Binder marked ‘Folkets park II’, \textit{Idépark 2020 – En inblick i Malmö Folkets Park vintern 1997}, Kulturföreningens Folkets park, 1997, p. 17.
the Cultural Association representing this use as a social issue enabled a solution which was less concerned with economic matters. The Cultural Association argued that renting important buildings to a ‘private restaurant business’ meant that the municipality lost any influence over these properties. From the perspective of the park as a public space and social resource, these ‘underused’ buildings had to be converted to actual ‘meeting spaces’ that stimulated a more active use of Folkets park’s outdoor space. The Cultural Association painted a vivid picture of the public space that Folkets park ‘could be’, but clearly was not, if the municipality took a more ‘active interest’ in these buildings. Only then would a ‘modern, living People’s park’ that was ‘worthy’ of a ‘cultural city’ like Malmö take shape.313

Interestingly, there were traces of the early 1990s neoliberal logic of public investment to increase the ‘force of attraction’ of space at work in this argument, but now concerned with attracting visitors to fix the perceived social deficiency of a deserted public space, rather than attracting customers to fix economic issues.314 Making Folkets park attractive was, unlike attracting more customers to the city’s shops, not understood to have any measurable short-term effects on the city’s economic wellbeing. Nor was this very localized attention to the attractiveness of space concerned with the social question that Malmö’s early neoliberalists had posed about competing for desirable demographics as residents by lowering Malmö’s municipal income taxes. The Cultural Association’s vision was primarily local and social, and concerned with getting more people to simply visit the park as a free, recreational public space. This vision was related to representations of market forces not using the park’s buildings effectively as the reason for why it had been difficult for Folkets park to function as a public space. Its proposed intervention was to get rid of market forces, increase municipal direct engagement, and more public funding for civil society groups. Yet, these three elements of their renewal plan were articulated in a way that not only echoed the neoliberal planning vision of attractive space, but in doing so was part of disentangling the idea of ‘competitive’ and ‘attractive’ space from a vision of short-term economic benefits.

The Cultural Association both illustrates how neoliberal conceptions of space were articulated with new problems and how the Real Estate Department’s crude commercialization scheme’s compartmentalization of social uses was instantly challenged. However, neither of these proposals were to become the basis for the finished redevelopment plan. The City Head Gardener Gunnar Ericsson, the third important bureaucratic player in the subcommittee, would instead provide much of the framework for the renewal that actually took place.

Ericsson had seen his ambitious, but never public, 1989 plan for a large investment in Folkets park filed away in the wake of the compromises stipulated in

the 1991 buy-out. For three years the center-right administration had officially backed Ericsson’s conversion of Folkets park into a Community Park, but provided almost no funds for this process. For the City Head Gardener, just as for the Cultural Association, this lack of municipal funding was the main cause of Folkets park having become a largely deserted public space. In a lengthy memo Ericsson mapped the everyday uses and non-uses of the park, but with very different tools than the anecdotal ethnography of the Cultural Association. The City Head Gardener’s memo instead mobilized statistical data based on a considerably-sized poll of 1700 residents and special interest focus groups such as the staff of nearby kindergartens.315

The City Head Gardener’s statistical representation of space made it clear that the local patterns of use that the park’s managers had been charged with creating since 1991 were not materializing as expected. Despite the fact that Folkets park was considered to at least some degree as ‘play-friendly’ and ‘scenic’, the park’s most common category of use was in fact ‘entertainment’. The few remaining rides, music performances, theatre shows, cafés, and rarely-open restaurant were not only perceived to be more important aspects of the existing park than playgrounds or flowerbeds. These kinds of functions were what a large majority of the people polled wanted redevelopment to focus on. The hundred-year history of Folkets park being a hub of Malmö’s nightlife was still, after decades of crisis and five years of active municipal disinvestment, represented as animating the park’s geography of use in a fundamental ways. This rather unexpected finding seemingly meant that the City Head Gardeners not only confirmed the Cultural Association’s diagnosis of how little the new public space was used, but also that popular culture and entertainment might be the key to changing patterns of use.316

The quantitative representation connected Folkets park’s existing functions to uses by different demographics in Malmö, with locals being more concerned with playgrounds and other city-dwellers more interested in entertainment. This meant that the social composition of the park’s future users could thus be shaped by producing spaces inviting the use associated with desirable demographics. While this idea of shaping the demography of use by urban planning played an insignificant part in these plans, it prefigured later renewal efforts and became a model that these could draw on. When other groups than those who Folkets park officially was to cater for — the locals — later became important target demographics, there already existed a development model for changing the park’s


demography of use by focusing renewal on a function associated with this desirable groups’ pattern of use.

The main problem identified by the City Head Gardener in 1996 was, however not the park’s demographics of use, but the quantitative lack of users. ‘The use of Folkets park’ was ‘not very encouraging’, commented the City Head Gardener in the memo’s summary. Only half of the city’s total population had visited the park during the previous year. Also the ‘frequency of use’ was dismal, with 75% of the park’s users only visiting the park once per year. Ericsson noted that local residents visited the park more often, but even for this group was the occasional visit to this substantial green space not much more common than other and much smaller parks in the area, and these people tended to see another green space as their primary ‘everyday park’.\(^\text{317}\)

The City Head Gardener’s plan centered on the marked difference between the 1991 vision of a low-cost Community Park and the statistical representations of how the park was used in 1996. In accord with the Cultural Association, one intervention the memo proposed was to focus on the physical aspects of public space. Things like more and better playgrounds, public toilets, outdoor lighting and benches were seen as important, as was replacing the wooden fence surrounding much of the park with cast iron, less visually distinctly enclosing the space. This was all in order to encourage the local community’s everyday, recreational use of Folkets park.\(^\text{318}\)

Focusing entirely on the outdoor landscape and its amenities ignored an untapped potential of social use uncovered by the memo’s statistical data. The persistence of notions and uses that constructed Folkets park as an entertainment site connecting to visitors across the entire city needed to be mobilized and amplified by future planning interventions if public space was to come alive. In this indirect way the park’s geography of use, plagued by being too little-used by too few people to function as a public space, could be invigorated by spatial redevelopment. By focusing renewal on increasing the numbers of visitors associated with cultural events and entertainment, the park’s sense of neglect would be broken and the recalcitrant locals would soon follow.

This plan did not resonate at all with the Real Estate Department’s division of the park into two parts — one with economic problems and the second with social problems, and how this department had posed the funds for solving the social issues reliant on selling off the economically problematic real estate. The City Head Gardener’s memo did however have both tensions and points of convergence with the Cultural Association’s approach. Both represented the primary problem as a local, social concern of too few people visiting the park, and both connected this


to lack of public funds for taking care of the park and how little the main entertainment venues Amiralen and Moriskan were used for cultural events.

But while the Cultural Association saw some kind of public or civil society actor taking over these buildings as the solution, The City Head Gardener was less hostile to commercial forces. The solution offered by the City Head Gardener was, however, not to allow the market to operate freely in these strategic sites, which so far had not been a successful approach. Rather, Ericsson proposed to actively find, and perhaps even financially support, a more ‘serious’ restaurateur, despite the potential for continued deficits. In this memo commercial forces were understood to be important planning interventions that could achieve desired social outcomes, if regulated rather than left to their own devices. Since according to the statistical data they were the most important force in attracting visitors to Folkets park, commercial uses of space were crucial for bringing this public space alive and creating the social, local use of space that the plan envisioned.  

The contradictions between the different plans’ representations of how the park was used, what interventions they proposed, and what visions they had were cumbersomely articulated in an actual renewal scheme. This plan had three main options for proceeding with the park’s development that were to be presented to the political bodies in charge of the park’s renewal. These options all bore traces of the different perspectives, but were primarily framed by the Cultural Association’s and the City Head Gardener’s plans. The park could either become a cultural and entertainment center, a green space for the local community, or a children’s park with large playgrounds.

The Real Estate Department was not at all satisfied with the fiscal problems associated with Folkets park being downplayed in this manner. This prompted a last-minute revision, with the local green space and playgrounds options combined under the heading ‘Community Park’, and with a new third option added. This last alternative was ‘real estate development’, that is the Real Estate Department’s original proposal for selling parts of the park to a private developer. After realizing that this plan was unlikely to be backed by the political majority, the Real Estate Department’s representatives themselves, however, asked the committee to ‘tone down’ the ‘real estate development’ option before finalizing the planning proposal. The group reframed this option in the final draft as ‘alternative real estate’ development strategies.

This last step away from arguing for selling parts of the park was in response to an idea that the deeply politically-connected Folkets Park Cultural Association had come across. Malmö municipality was looking for a site for a new public primary school in the area, and if Amiralen could be converted to a school this would entail a much more reliable source of revenue than the dysfunctional Provobis lease. The Real Estate Department acted swiftly when they realized that they might be able to tap into municipal funding streams instead of having to push forward with a risky redevelopment process relying on the uncertainties of the market — an option that must have been understood as unrealistic, considering the tensions it provoked when coming up against the other two plans. In less than a month from the idea surfacing, sketches for this ‘alternative’ use of Amiralen had been contracted and completed by an architecture firm as material for an ‘internal investigation’.322

Retrofitting Amiralen as a primary school not only matched the need for a reliable revenue stream that would solve the economic problems, or a ‘stable usage’ as the Real Estate Department’s representative phrased it in culturally-sensitive jargon in one of the group’s meetings. It could also be approached as a social intervention for the community’s use of the park, articulating the economic representation of the problem with a social vision of the future — something that the Head Gardener directly spun as ‘positive investment in youth’.323 By focusing all their energy on moving the school plan forward, the Real Estate Department radically limited its renewal plans in scope and gave up on its vision of a commercial solution to the economic problems they had inherited with the buy-out of Folkets park.

This consensus of Folkets park as a public space with a social function for the local community meant that the contradictions between economic and social representations of space receded. Neoliberal planning in Folkets park would no longer primarily be concerned with economic competitiveness. Rather, social conceptions of how space was used would increasingly resonate with neoliberal notions of competitiveness outside of economic markets. This would be tied to planning largely articulating contradictions between different ways of understanding the social, and different uses and users understood in social terms.

This development formally built on the 1991 buy-out that officially made Folkets park a public space. But the way that attractive cultural destinations became seen as an indirect way to change everyday patterns of use — in order to attract the people currently missing from the People’s Park — decisively shaped

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how this public space was understood by planners. Throughout this process, representations of actual uses, primarily missing locals and unenthusiastic entertainment entrepreneurs, had provoked contradictions with the planning visions proposed. The vision of Folkets park as a carefully calibrated urban commons that emerged was, then, not a return to a more social pre-neoliberal era. Rather, it was shaped by how social concerns about the site’s lack of competitiveness was addressed through planning, and how this concern was displacing economic anxieties. The same process would soon be put to work in a more strategic manner in the city-wide planning projects, which in turn would spark new sets of contradictions, some of which are prefigured by the tensions that the plan for a school in Amiralen faced in the same period.

Too cool for a new school?

In the years that followed, the City Head Gardener and the rest of the Streets Department, did their best to stick to plans for renovating and improving Folkets park’s outdoor space that they and the Cultural Association had drawn up in 1996. The proposal to evict the unenthusiastic Provobis from the little used Amiralen dance hall by turning it into a school did not, however, go according to plan. Amiralen, and the outdoor space of the park’s northernmost edge surrounding the building, was officially designated as a potential site for a new primary school by an ‘initiation memorandum’ (Start-PM). This paper was drafted in late 1996 by the Planning Department on the request of the municipal Service Council (Servicenämnden).

The main reason that the memo gave for building the school was securing a new and stable tenant, echoing the Real Estate Department’s worries about the difficulties of finding a commercially viable client to lease the building to. The neglected Amiralen building was also described as an eyesore that held back the park’s redevelopment process. A large-scale intervention, like building a new school, was designed to intervene in both how public space around the buildings and Amiralen itself was used.

The plan to convert Amiralen to a school also envisioned effects for Folkets park that were concerned with issues understood as primarily local and social. The proposed school would, for instance, safeguard access to what little ‘nature to live in and explore’ existed in this densely-built inner city neighborhood, fulfilling...

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324 Malmö stad, Malmö stadsbyggnadskontors arkiv, ‘Bygglov för Folkets park 2’.
325 Malmö stad, Malmö stadsbyggnadskontor, Minutes of Stadsbyggnadsnämnden18th March 1997 §121, ‘Start-PM’.
326 Malmö stad, Stadbyggnadskontorets arkiv, Minutes of Stadsbyggnadsnämnden18th March 1997 §121, ‘Start-PM’, no pagination (3-4).
what was seen as a fundamental social need. But the plan also represented several tensions between the social needs of the community’s children and the proposed plan. Converting the old music hall’s main dance floor to a school was technically possible, but would require a ‘very compact design’ for the classrooms, with little direct sunlight. Furthermore, noise and particle pollution from the busy Amiralsgatan street just outside was understood as a possible health issue, and there was also the problem of acquiring a large enough part of the park for a schoolyard that could be partitioned for separate age-groups. These conditions all put in question the beneficial social effect for potential pupils in redeveloping Amiralen for use as a school.

This fault line was reinforced by contradictions between the tensions this intervention might spark between different kinds of users of the park as a public space. Several hundred children playing in the park would ‘presumably be a detriment to flâneurs’ and could lead to risks of accidents around the park’s few remaining rides, as the memo noted. This worry of a ‘privatization’ of considerable parts of the park ‘less attractive to visitors’, was in the memo contrasted with alternative uses of Amiralen. What caused these specific notions of how public space might be used in ways that would undermine the desired patterns of use was not explicitly mentioned. One hint can be found in the paper noting that the prospective students lived in a community with ‘severe social strains’, indicating that differences between demographic groups were beginning to emerge as a contradiction of social planning visions.

The theory of space as competitive and attractive that had been articulated in social planning by the 1995–1996 Folkets park committee was plainly provoking new kinds of contradictions. The very group that the park as public space was to cater for, the local community in general and its youth and children in particular, was becoming understood as having severe internal contradictions. Notions of what the unruly children from an area with ‘social strains’ might do could not smoothly coexist with visions of Folkets park as a respectable public space.

The idea of tensions between two demographics competing for access to public space was reinforced by representations of Amiralen’s ‘historic heritage’ and ‘architectural qualities’ that were seen as having potentially better uses than the

327 Malmö stad, Stadbyggnadskontorets arkiv, Minutes of Stadsbyggnadsnämnden 18th March 1997 §121, ‘Start-PM’, no pagination (3).
328 Malmö stad, Stadbyggnadskontorets arkiv, Minutes of Stadsbyggnadsnämnden 18th March 1997 §121, ‘Start-PM’, no pagination (5).
329 Malmö stad, Stadbyggnadskontorets arkiv, Minutes of Stadsbyggnadsnämnden 18th March 1997 §121, ‘Start-PM’, no pagination (5-6).
330 Malmö stad, Stadbyggnadskontorets arkiv, Minutes of Stadsbyggnadsnämnden 18th March 1997 §121, ‘Start-PM’, no pagination (6).
331 Malmö stad, Stadbyggnadskontorets arkiv, Minutes of Stadsbyggnadsnämnden 18th March 1997 §121, ‘Start-PM’, no pagination (6).
proposed primary school. If Malmö municipality invested in Amiralen as a cultural venue steeped in heritage, this would contribute to a ‘focused redesign’ of Folkets park that would strengthen its ‘force of attraction as a place to walk and be in’. In posing these two plans against each other the social function of the park as a public green space was beginning to be reformulated into two separate issues. There was the social vision of local children going to school and playing in the park and there was the social vision of a respectable public using urban space, connecting to the park across a much wider space in response to a ‘force of attraction’, that was threatened by unruly youths. This tension was still only being discursively worked out in its simplest form, but less than ten years the same contradiction would come to dominate planning in Malmö. However, it was as representations and visions of use associated with the city’s most deprived youths who, it was feared, might deter a respectable public from assembling that this contradiction first was articulated.

This contradiction, barely visible in a few words in the Initiation memorandum, had become more precisely-phrased in the plans for a school that followed, echoing in turn the social being reconfigured in city-wide planning documents. By the autumn of 1998 a first draft of a Planning Program (Program), dealing with the ‘general questions’ about the future of the school and Folkets park, was completed. Two different versions of this document are archived in an unsorted folder stacked with the Streets Department’s chief of staff’s papers. The Planning Program drew on an earlier discussion in the Urban Planning Council that had proposed an ‘alternative location, in or outside the Folkets park’ to satisfy critics within the ruling social democratic majority who were skeptical about the heavy renovations, potentially destroying the landmark building, which would be needed to make the Amiralen building fit to become a primary school. Instead the new plans proposed constructing a new annex to Amiralen, and only renting a small portion of the old building for the school.

The bureaucrats working on the plan remained ambiguous about the patterns of use that a school in the park might lead to. A school would obviously attract more ‘locals’ — such as the prospective pupils’ parents — to after school activities, which could provide the customer base for new enterprises like restaurants and

332 Malmö stad, Stadbyggnadskontorets arkiv, Minutes of Stadsbyggnadsnämnden 18th March 1997 §121, ‘Start-PM’, no pagination (6).
335 Malmö stad, Stadbyggnadskontorets arkiv, Minutes of Stadsbyggnadsnämnden 18th March 1997 §12, ‘Detaljplan för del av fastigheten Folkets Park 2 (Amiralen) – ansökan om planändring för skolverksamhet’, no pagination.
caféns that in turn would entrench the park as a public space. The Planning Program returned in several instances to this desirable shift in social composition of visitors that the proposed school might provoke. There were in this regard some ‘reasons to assume that both the school and a renewal of the park’s design brought on by a school’ might ‘contribute to an active and well visited park’.

The pupils’ envisioned use of the park remained a problem in this more detailed plan. For instance, the plan assumed that the proposed school’s ‘older pupils’ would use the playgrounds in the park’s southern part, something that would lead to a ‘loss of attraction’ for all the ‘kindergartens already making use’ of the park. A more strategic concern was ‘social conflicts’ between the pupils and people walking on a much-used foot- and cycle path just outside the park’s fence. The Planning Program even went as far as suggesting that ‘clear rules for how pupils during school hours were to make use’ of public space had to be enforced if the school was to be built in the park.

This contradiction between a social vision of Folkets park attracting a respectable public from across the city and the much less optimistic social vision of unruly youngsters playing in the park after school was too deep to be bridged by planning. After years of work the planners silently shifted from the ‘alternative location’ outside Amiralen that had been discussed to an ‘alternative location’ outside Folkets park entirely. The school, that eventually was named Möllevångsskolan, was built just across the street from Folkets park.

During the early and mid-1990s social governance was reworked in Malmö. The neoliberal idea that Malmö needed to become demographically attractive was re-articulated by urban planners in a 1990 Comprehensive Plan torn between building to attract new demographic groups and ameliorating the effects of increasing poverty. Malmö’s planners also drew inspiration from the 1980s’ international trend of taking waterfronts and city centers as sites that could compete regionally for customers and, by extension, investments in retail. This entrenched the idea that space, the experience of being in a certain place, could have powerful effects on the regional patterns of use, which later would be mobilized in a more social neoliberal planning formation.

In Folkets park social practices of governing transformed along a somewhat different trajectory. The park had become a public space as a way to reduce costs during a period of cross-party austerity, but also to reduce the political potency of

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339 Malmö stad, Stadsbyggnadsnämndens arkiv Minutes of of Stadsbyggnadsnämnden, 29th August 2002 §144 ‘Detaljplan för södra delen av kv Oket (Möllevångsskolan) i Innerstaden i Malmö’.
the park as a labor movement heritage site feared by liberals, conservatives, and regional populists alike. It was unsolved economic contradictions, Provobis’ disastrous 1991 lease of Moriskan and Amiralen in particular, that provoked the planning bureaucrat’s renewed attention in 1995. The economic framing of this work, originally evolving around real estate sales, was articulated with social concerns of Folkets park as a neglected public green space needing public investments in order to be more widely used. These two different visions articulated contradictions, particularly in the way that representations of how commercial forces had contributed to the park’s air of neglect undermined the privatization plans for the park that initially were envisioned as the best fix to the economic predicaments.

The plan for selling the northern part of the park was scrapped, with the underlying concern about finding more stable revenue streams becoming the basis for the plans to turn Amiralen into a primary school. This renewal plan also came to articulate deep contradictions, but between different ways of conceptualizing social use rather than between social and economic visions. Visions of the park’s, and particular its buildings’, cultural heritage and memory cultures as something that could serve as a source of attraction in the making of respectable public space articulated unbridgeable conflicts with visions of hundreds of unruly pupils from the proposed school playing in the park. The local, social vision of public space — itself a product of a complicated history of neoliberal reform stretching out across more than a decade at this point — was being challenged by a scheme that envisioned Folkets park attracting visitors from across the city as its true social potential. This second social visions not only anticipated how public space would become a crucial resource for demographic competition. It also had clear resonances with the ways in which the logic of social neoliberalism and demographic competition through urban planning was emerging as a quantifiable problem across the municipal bureaucracy at precisely this moment, as I will illustrate in the next chapter.
Chapter 6
1996–2001: Envisioning competitive space

Attracting knowledge, accumulating human capital

The period after the Social Democrats regained a parliamentary majority at the national level and in Malmö municipality was initially marked by the same economic anxiety that had played such a key role for the center-right coalition of 1991–1994. Improvised, uneven, and largely unenthusiastic fiscal austerity became a way for the Social Democrats to regain some measure of control over the political mainstream and the state’s finances. Gradually, the economic anxieties of the early 1990s were replaced by a cautiously optimistic mood, tempering fiscal austerity. Staggering inflation and unemployment, which had been on everyone’s mind, gave way to the late 1990s dot-com boom, and in cities like Malmö a new way of approaching the stakes of post-industrial urbanism was slowly being pieced together. The temporary and defensive emergency measures taken by the right in 1991 and maintained in the years following the social democrats’ return in 1994 were in some cases made permanent. Yet by the 1998 elections, where the Social Democrats consolidated their power both in the national parliament and Malmö City Council, something resembling a new vision for public investment was forming.

The slow process of articulating the neoliberal vision of demographic competitiveness with urban planning had already begun in Malmö, with waterfront renewal allowing bureaucrats to draw on the planners’ trusted toolbox of bureaucratic practices to maximize the city’s competitiveness. This move also meant that the kind of person that the competitive measures were aimed at moved away from the 1980s notion of affluent suburbanites as vectors of income tax. A new idea of the coming ‘knowledge society’ that the Regional Chamber of
Commerce had actively been disseminating since the 1980s came to replace this concern with attracting affluent taxpayers. This re-articulation of who space was to compete for largely took place in a consultancy-led effort starting soon after the Social Democrats won the 1994 election and which eventually would form a series of reports called Vision 2015.\(^{340}\)

The Vision 2015 process included senior civil servants from across the municipal bureaucracy, but was led by financial services consultancy Kairos Future. In practice, the consultancy acted as a nodal point of 1990s translocal neoliberal policy debates about globally competitive cities and regional postindustrial specialization. This consultancy-led inflow of neoliberal policy was, according to political scientist Dalia Mukhtar-Landgren, completely unchecked by political representation. Indeed, while the Vision 2015 document was circulated in the city’s various politically elected councils for feedback, this never led to a formal adoption of the report as a policy that could be voted on in the normal fashion — despite the Vision 2015 document laying the groundwork for much of Malmö’s bureaucratic developments in the late 1990s.\(^{341}\)

The neoliberal ideas introduced in Vision 2015 articulated neoliberal policies with a municipal bureaucracy colored by decades of social democratic rule. In the report, dealing with unemployment and providing universal welfare to all residents are acknowledged as the crucial problems to be addressed by an interventionist municipal state.\(^{342}\) Moreover, a national 1996 tax reform that shifted incomes from more affluent suburban municipalities to fiscally-strained urban areas like Malmö was noted as a precondition for the plan’s optimism.\(^{343}\) Most important in this document was how demography, as had been the case many times since the 1930s, was singled out as a fundamental sphere of regulation. Economic growth was seen as intrinsically linked to demographic growth. In the best of all possible worlds, the memo’s authors speculated, ‘Malmö’s population would not grow, but just get wealthier’. This, the authors then conceded, was a completely unrealistic scenario.\(^{344}\) Instead, the memo then argued that the city had to attract new residents to break out of the cycle of its population becoming increasingly poorer.

The shaping of the city’s demographic patterns did not follow the classic ‘fewer, but better’ formula that social democrats had embraced since the Myrdal’s


powerful 1934 pamphlet *Crisis in the Population Question*. Instead, the answer to this social problem was getting both more and better-educated workers. The state providing access to high-quality education, and in particular the kind of higher education producing the highly-skilled workforce needed for a ‘knowledge city’ was not unimportant. Large-scale migration to Malmö that was, however, the crucial issue. In a prescient but crude manner this group of technocrats apprehended the kind of neoliberal human capital theory that ten years later would explode with Richard Florida’s ‘creative class’ hypothesis. For instance, the memo’s conclusion described ‘knowledge’ as ‘the new and most important capital’. This focus on new and better-educated residents driving a post-industrial economy was beginning to make urban planning in general, and the provision of ‘attractive dwellings and communications’ in particular, an urgent problem.

The Vision 2015 report’s conclusions articulated not only with a social democratic tradition of population politics, but also with Joakim Ollén’s 1985 neoliberal formula of selectively attracting suburban demographics. The vision of a post-industrial knowledge city was to be constructed by resuscitating Malmö’s 1980s neoliberal vision of regional demographic competition, but phrased in new terms. What had changed was the 1980s idea that attracting suburban demographics as an economic game that could be won by cutting taxes which could primarily be benchmarked by how many affluent people paid municipal income tax. Social democratic population politics and an implicit human capital theory, introducing a second strand of neoliberal theory to Malmö’s municipal government, re-imagined this process in far less economic terms by focusing on accumulating ‘knowledge’.

Because Vision 2015 both introduced new neoliberal analytical tools and drew on established practices of social government, the policy inspired by it created a more stable bureaucratic formation. Culturally and politically the idea of accumulating knowledge could be embedded in a narrative beginning with nineteenth century Scandinavian social democratic workers’ education circles and then mutating into a series of struggles for greater access to higher education, just

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345 See Hirdman, ‘Social engineering and the woman question: Sweden in the Thirties’.
350 Lemke, ‘‘The birth of bio-politics’: Michel Foucault’s lecture at the Collège de France on neoliberal governmentality’; Michel Feher, ‘Self-appreciation; or, the aspirations of human capital’, *Public Culture*, 21/1 (2009).
as it was seen as a break with the right’s traditional focus on tax cuts. In terms of bureaucratic practices, the idea of creating a city competing for knowledge allowed bureaucrats to draw on the long and complex tradition of interventionist urban planning as a mode of social regulation. The implicit human capital theory of competing for ‘knowledge’ as the ‘most important capital’ became a way to re-articulate neoliberal ideas of regional competition with established bureaucratic practices and political ideals of a municipal machinery still dominated by social democracy.

Neoliberal governance in Malmö had been colored by social concerns since Joakim Ollén first introduced the idea of competing for desirable demographics. With Vision 2015, the mid- and late 1990s neoliberal vision was dis-articulated from economic bureaucratic practices. Instead, social modes of representing and intervening were increasingly deployed to achieve neoliberal, social visions.

Planning demographic competitiveness

The postindustrial opportunity-narrative emerging from the Vision 2015 process would turn out to be crucial for articulating demographic competition with urban planning. Vision 2015’s fundamental ideas circulated widely within Malmö municipality, since such a large group of strategic bureaucrats had been handpicked for the group’s work. In the work of the two largest urban planning efforts taking place after the 1996 report was finished, Malmö’s new Comprehensive Plan and the Bo01 exhibition, one can clearly see demographic competition as a social question of built urban space being refined and reworked.

The city’s Planning Department began work on the 2000 Comprehensive Plan for Malmö in the Autumn of 1996 while the Vision 2015 discussions were still going on. A first draft of this massive undertaking, designed for the mandatory stakeholder consultation, was finished in May 1999. The intense work of responding to and incorporating the responses from dozens of stakeholders — including municipal authorities, commercial ventures, grassroots groups and NGOs — meant a heavy workload for the city’s planners before the Comprehensive Plan could finally be ratified by the City Council in December 2000.

352 E.g. Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Gatukontorets närarkiv för program, ‘Europeisk bostadsmässa & bostadsutställning B0 2000 på Limhamn, Malmö’.
The only other major renewal effort that Malmö’s planners fully committed to in the late 1980s, which also had a beginning of sorts in 1996, was the Bo01 (‘Dwell01’) living exhibition in the city’s Western Harbor district (Västra Hamnen). During the summer of 1996, Malmö’s Planning Department received the green light to begin work on a living exhibition endorsed and largely financed by the European Union and Swedish state agencies for the summer of 2000. The event was to take place in one of the city’s largest industrial sites, the Skanska corporations’ abandoned Skanska cement factory in Limhamn that had been one of the city’s largest employers for decades.\(^{355}\) After two years of planning, this renewal effort was scaled up considerably by moving it to a more central site.

The new location was also a huge abandoned industrial site that for decades had symbolized Malmö — the old Kockums ship yards in the Western Harbor. This site had been sold for a token 1 SEK to car manufacturer Saab in 1986 and then bought back by the social democratic city council in 1996, five years after Saab’s car factory closed.\(^{356}\) This shift in scale and location meant that the exhibition was delayed for a year, instead scheduled for the summer of 2001.\(^{357}\) The expo was seen as opening a new urban frontier for development by building a new mixed-use area from scratch. The rust belt legacy that Kockums represented was metaphorically banished by pitching Bo01 as a ‘city of the future’, thus intervening physically in space as well as in the narrative about Malmö’s industrial decline.\(^{358}\)

Through the planning of the Bo01 exhibition, a powerful neoliberal model of how a deserted post-industrial wasteland as a kind of spatial tabula rasa could be redeveloped with social effects took shape. Renewal plans could in this undisturbed, yet strategically central, location operate in a highly aesthetic and visionary fashion. Built space was designed for future residents untroubled by the city’s actual population and their social needs, rights, and claims to space. It was a site where visions of a future city, at least until they had been built, did not have to concern themselves with the difficult task of representing or adapting to a complex geography of everyday use. Few pre-existing users or uses disturbed this planning process, which could thus operate at a theoretically and abstract level. This led to future disappointments, as the new residents refused to behave as expected, but

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\(^{356}\) Holgersen, Staden och kapitalet: Malmö i krisernas tid, p. 137. See also Malmö kommunfullmäktiges arkiv, Minutes of Kommunfullmäktige 19 December 1996, §213 Bordlagt ärende, angående förköp av fastigheten Bilen 4 i Malmö.


was also important in that it allowed unfettered experiments central to theoretically recalibrating Malmö’s urban planning bureaucracy.

Previous development sketches for the Western Harbor area were, as mentioned in Chapter 5, little more than takes on generic commercial waterfront renewal. Implicit in the plans was an entirely economically neoliberal redevelopment vision concerned with attracting capital investments to Malmö. Both in form and content, these plans had mainly drawn on late 1980s examples from the US and UK, where investment capital played a crucial role.

The early 1990s renewal plans never got off the ground, but they informed the Bo01 development by staking out postindustrial waterfront renewal as a crucial strategy to remake the city. What was new with the Bo01 plans was the neoliberal vision of changing the city’s demography — rather than the early 1990s attempt to attract real estate speculators — articulating with municipal urban planning as a field of governance. The municipality was to strategically plan and subsidize this ‘attractive and vital’ part of a ‘city of the future’ (as the exhibition was subtitled) not simply to boost real estate prices, but to change Malmö’s demographic — and in the long run its economic — structure.

The critical literature on Malmö tends to explain Bo01, and the plans for the Western Harbor that followed, either as a place-marketing project or as municipal real estate speculation seeking to attract investments from the well-to-do homeowners and corporate investors.

The way that the project became a crucial experiment in changing physical space to induce social effects, measured statistically in terms of demographic change, has so far had little impact in these debates. Malmö’s municipality and its allied cohort of public, cooperative, and private developers was in fact building homes and communities for a new kind of resident, rather than only intervening in the public perception of Malmö or placing the city on the map of potential investors. I want to emphasize this new way of articulating neoliberal social visions for the city with the trusted bureaucratic

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practices of urban planning as the most important outcome of the Bo01 development.

The articulation of a neoliberal vision of competing regionally for human capital with urban planning in the Bo01 development only came together gradually. Faint traces of concerns over the social recomposition of Malmö can be found in the early Bo01 documents from the mid-1990s.362 Towards the period directly leading up to the 2001 exhibition, and in the finished plan, changing the city’s demography was beginning to come together as a more concrete planning vision.363 This issue was most bluntly phrased by Malmö’s social democratic mayor Ilmar Reepalu, a key actor who because of his architect background was personally involved in the planning process, according to geographers Ståle Holgersen and Guy Baeten.364 Mayor Reepalu defended the huge losses that the municipality was making in the Bo01 venture by writing that the Bo01 was designed to attract ‘high income earners’ who would ‘strengthen Malmö’ and the project of creating a ‘knowledge city’.365

Unlike Mayor Reepalu’s blunt defense of the project, the formal Bo01 plans were never concerned with attracting affluent residents to Malmö per se. The exhibition plans instead articulated Vision 2015’s notion of attracting groups with the appropriate skills as vectors of human capital together with the planners’ attention toward achieving social effects by designing physical space. Bo01 was thus understood as a large-scale social experiment in building residential areas with ‘an attractive environment’ constituting a technically ‘functioning information society’ for the workforce of the future, which in turn would meet the special labor needs of the future businesses.366 The 2001 exhibition thus established a direct link between aesthetic interventions in urban space and social

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362 E.g. Malmö stad, Stadsbyggnadskontorets arkiv, Minutes of Stadsbyggnadsnämnden 21th November 1996 §432, ‘Planerings och genomförande av B0 2000 Dnr 742/96’ B Angående planering och genomförande av BO 2000; Malmö stad, Gatukontorets närrarkiv, ‘Europeisk bostadsmöesa & bostadsutställning B0 2000 på Limhamn, Malmö’, Malmö, 1996. The ‘quality program’ co-written by developers, planners, and the Bo01 organization is interestingly also rather vague on this point: Malmö stad, Kvalitetsprogram: Bo01 framtidsstaden.


effects at the demographic level. Planners and private developers were instructed to try to pick up best practice from both Bo01’s new green technologies and, more importantly, how the architectural challenges of creating a city for new demographic groups were solved.367

The abstract idea of competing for the creative residents that would transform Malmö to a ‘knowledge city’ was in this way translated into concrete planning interventions as the Bo01 development neared completion.368 With a consensus around a general budgetary restraint and the costly failures of public funds propping up failing manufacturing companies in the 1970s and 1980s weighing heavily on the Social Democrats, a neoliberal program of public investments in ‘creative’ jobs were never on the table in a serious manner. There would be no more massive public subsidies to specific private sector ‘job creators’ that could leave the city as soon as this stream of funding ran out, as with the Saab debacle in 1991.369

The municipal bureaucracy’s role in the transition to a creative economy was instead understood to be through indirect interventions at the demographic level, with urban space as a crucial field of regulation of demographics at a distance. It was by physically producing urban space that the city’s population was to become more creative, which in turn meant disinvesting in the social system supporting increasingly superfluous impoverished groups of residents. Socially engineering a surplus of human capital meant creating a surplus of creative labor power, which in turn would attract high-tech firms to move to Malmö.

The same vision is evident in the Comprehensive Plan for Malmö 2000, drafted at the same time as the Bo01 plans. The Comprehensive Plan was grappling with how to make Malmö’s ‘urban environments’ more ‘attractive’ for people with ‘networks and specialist knowledge needed in the new economy’. One group that interested the planners in particular was students, with a large state-funded university established in Malmö in 1998. The planners noted that it was strategically important that the new university campuses were offered ‘the best location, along the waterfront and within walking distance of the Central Station’. Rather than seeing the new university simply as a resource for educating the city’s existing residents, the plan emphasized how it was an urban planning project that would contribute to an ‘influx of highly-educated people’. Building the university...

campus became a way of building the city for Malmö’s future creative residents, making Malmö more demographically competitive for human capital.370

The Comprehensive Plan also proposed to diversify the city’s residential real estate, so profoundly shaped by the mid-century housing stock mass-produced to a basic standard for Malmö’s then growing industrial working class. By the municipality building (and helping private developers get plans in order for) ‘exclusive housing developments along the seaside’ as well as through the municipality’s own ‘ambitious investments in student flats and smaller apartments’, the built city left by the past was to be remodeled to become more demographically competitive. Malmö would become ‘a beautiful and pleasant city to live in’, because the ‘high level of ambition in new constructions’. Particularly important was upgrading the city center and creating ‘environments with an urban vitality’ to be ‘particularly attractive for’ creative groups, who would tie the ‘complex networks of specialist knowledge necessary for the new economy’ to Malmö.371

What made the Comprehensive Plan different to the Bo01 project was that it didn’t have the luxury of envisioning a future city untroubled by the city’s actually existing residents. While both plans, then, explored the idea of making Malmö demographically competitive through urban renewal, the Comprehensive Plan also illustrated the flipside of this attention to the creative residents of the future. As municipal resources were pooled in a strategic bid to attract new residents as vectors of human capital, less creative demographics rendered superfluous by de-industrialization had to be freed from the municipality’s costly social welfare provisions.

This is the reason that what was nominally an urban planning document argued that Malmö’s municipal authority’s commitments to childcare, schools, and other social provisions for the ‘30% of the residents of Malmö living in 25 or so districts that were blighted by social and ethnic segregation’ were ‘so extensive that municipal services on a general level were undermined’. It was thus necessary, the Comprehensive Plan argued, to tactically target welfare services cuts to the very poorest parts of the city to increase ‘Malmö’s desirability as a place to live’ for more highly-educated demographics. This tough love certainly picked up on internationally-circulating neoliberal ideas about disciplining an underclass shying away from formal labor.372

I, however, want to emphasize that this shift cannot alone be explained by the diffusion of policy proposal for disciplining the poor suddenly reaching Malmö municipality’s bureaucrats. This specific way of representing and regulating poverty took place in a context of refocusing Malmö municipality’s social

concerns from one particular group to another, which is why it was mobilized in this strategic urban planning document. These efforts to strip certain groups of social care thus needs to be related to the socially neoliberal formation taking shape at this particular time and its preoccupation with investing public resources in projects that would induce the accumulation of human capital in terms of creative and cultural workers, rather than to be seen as a negative project of rolling back social protection for the poor. In this regard I agree with critical legal scholar Bernard Harcourt’s deployment of Foucault’s carefully phrased critique of neoliberal human capital theory.\(^{373}\) Strategically investing in certain demographics associated with human capital, in this case by funneling public funds to the building of urban space that was to attract creative residents to Malmö, is in the zero-sum game of budgeting limited public funds related to disinvesting in groups understood to yield less profitable ‘human capital’ results.

The protracted work with Bo01 and the 2000 Comprehensive Plan were the laboratories where the future city first imagined in Vision 2015, in turn re-articulating the 1980s neoliberal plan for a demographically attractive Malmö, was hammered out as actual neoliberal urban planning practices concerned with socially remaking the city’s residential composition. In particular Bo01’s abstract vision for a deserted and clearly demarcated post-industrial landscape, and the sheer number of work hours put into this massive effort, enabled a new theoretical agenda to take shape, untroubled by representations of lived and built space. By the time these plans were finished, a notion of the city as a competitive entity that, through urban renewal, could make its urban space ‘attractive’ for desirable suburban demographics as vectors of human capital, was beginning to dominate municipal planning concerns. The idea of building attractive space set up a neoliberal project with not only tools for envisioning a future city, but that also began to articulate with the trusted bureaucratic practices of mapping and intervening in space to achieve social ends.

Malmö’s planners had to work at a record pace to complete the prestigious project in the two-and-a-half years between a very undetailed Bo01 Development Plan being ratified and the time the project was to be realized in bricks and mortar. 260,000 m\(^2\) of the vast waterfront lot was to be planned and developed to give space for 1050 residential units and 70,000 m\(^2\) of commercial property, to be rented or sold as the expo ended in the fall of 2001.\(^{374}\) This Herculean task was made yet more complicated by the expo’s environmental marketing strategy,

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promising that state-of-the-art (and often untested) ‘green’ water, waste, and energy technologies were to be implemented throughout the project. This branding in effect externalized large slices of development costs by tapping into government funds reserved for sustainability experiments, but was also a way to rebrand Malmö’s tarnished post-industrial image by marketing Bo01 as ‘the world’s first ecologically sustainable welfare society’.375

Initially a problem with the notion of municipally-driven planning of attractive space reframing the neoliberal ethos of demographic competitiveness was how entangled it was with Bo01. The Bo01 plan’s vision of an attractive city competing for desirable demographics as vectors of human capital translated a complex social problem to an almost entirely aesthetic issue. Bo01’s site had few pre-existing uses and users, so this experiment in social neoliberalism as planning could not simply be applied as generic development model for other parts of Malmö with more complex patterns of everyday use.

As soon as the Bo01 exhibition ended, contradictions between planned and actual uses of space emerged. Initially most troubling was that Bo01’s public space, despite the public investment, were used either too little or too much. The site might have provided expo visitors with grand sea views and magnificent promenades, but these wind-whipped public spaces were largely deserted during the colder season. With warmer weather the luxury apartments’ vistas were instead appropriated by many thousands of residents from Malmö’s ‘other neighborhoods’ temporarily turning Bo01’s seaside park into an improvised beach.376

An official investigation also pointed to problems with selling the new flats as well as the largely negative media reception of the exhibition, related to the widespread political criticism of public money subsidizing developments for an affluent elite.377 Also, the remnants of Malmö’s old industrial infrastructure — such as a wind turbine manufacturer renting Kockums’ old warehouses with a


376 Bo Grönlund, ‘Stadsplanen för ett bra stadsliv’, in Bengt Persson (ed.), Bo01 hållbar framtidsstad: Lärdomar och erfarenheter (Stockholm: Formas, 2005). This pattern of use first provoked attempts police urban space, only to be integrated in the city’s public relations strategy and a designated beach was actually built just next to Bo01, see: Malmö stad, Stadsbyggnadskontorets arkiv, Minutes of Stadsbyggnadskommittén 10th August 2009, Detaljplan för del av Scaniaparken (Djuphavsbadet) i Hamnen, DP 5049.


contract expiring in 2015 and the nearby port’s grain silos still in operation — became a source of official concern. Such issues were represented as a limited and temporary nuisance in the Bo01 plan’s post-industrial vision, but would continue to provoke antagonisms between visions and represented uses in the area’s development for years after the exhibition.  

This aesthetic approach to envisioning a future city limited the drive to compete for human capital to sites that could be more or less completely redeveloped to cater to the tastes of supposedly ‘creative’ demographics. Large-scale renewal driven by brand-name public architecture was an expensive project and impossible without substantially externalizing costs to the government and EU investment funds, as Bo01 had done. Creating aesthetically attractive residential space was thus anything but a quick-fix. These two plans’ social vision of an attractive city would be taken up in other part of Malmö, but this required the cumbersome task of translating the Bo01 model to accommodate for representations of spatial conditions other than the city’s deserted waterfront.

Key to such moves was how to bring the lesson of Bo01 to bear on existing public spaces like parks, streets, squares, and what little undeveloped land existed inside the city, where the municipal planners could exert some measure of control. This meant that other kinds of contradictions than the relative lack of interest from affluent and supposedly ‘creative’ suburbanites, that Bo01 struggled with in its first years, would articulate with neoliberal planning practice. Folkets park would also in this process of translation serve as a site where neoliberal visions were articulated with bureaucratic representations and schemes for intervention that drove social neoliberalism through urban renewal forward.

Attractive public space

In the late 1990s Folkets park became a laboratory for re-articulating the neoliberal vision of attractive space as an asset for demographic competition that had emerged in the work on the 2000 Comprehensive Plan and Bo01. The experience from these two major planning projects paved the way for a mode of urban development that had more traction in parts of the city that, unlike the Bo01

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379 See Malmö stad, Stadsbyggnadskontoret, Översiktsplan för Malmö 2000, p. 274.
waterfront redevelopment, already had intense and contradictory patterns of use. Ideas anticipating this process can been seen in the 1995–1996 renewal plans for Folkets park. The attention to the park’s lack of visitors and the visions for reanimating space through planning interventions in order to make the space attractive for people from far beyond the immediate community had distinct similarities with the Bo01 planners’ preoccupations with the social effects of aesthetically appealing space. The way that the social visions of the Amiralen renewal was splintering in two, and attaching to two imagined distinct demographics, resonated in particular with the 2000 Comprehensive Plan for Malmö and how it was beginning to articulate social regulation as having two distinct components concerned with different groups. Tensions between two groups using Folkets park as public space had at this point not been articulated with neoliberal human capital theory defining a need to attract creative residents to the city. Yet, the same type of contradictions between groups that were emerging through human capital theory in the Comprehensive Plan were visible in the renewal plans for Amiralen.

What provoked the planners’ renewed attention to Folkets park in the period after the foiled plans for a school in Amiralen was changing patterns of everyday use. The anxiety about a quantitative lack of people visiting Folkets park and representations of it as an ‘underused’ public space began to recede as the 1990s drew to a close. All these plans left for the next round of renewal was the idea of the privileging of certain demographics in seeking to attract the ‘respectable people’ envisioned to populate the future park’s public spaces.

In its annual report, Folkets park Cultural Association noted a dramatic change in use, with growing crowds of visitors for the first time in decades. According to their estimates about 400,000 people visited the park during the 1999 season. While the majority were estimated to be from the city, the association had ‘no doubt whatsoever that Folkets park is one of the most visited tourist establishments in Malmö.’ Years of desperately underfunded attempts to create an accessible resource addressing the social needs of the local community and city dwellers in general were finally having the desired effect. The park’s social function was no longer a distant vision, but was represented as an actual pattern of use. These representations of changing patterns of use sent ripples through the bureaucratic development machine and provoked new ways of representing and regulating the park through formal development schemes.

The 2000 Comprehensive Plan had, in a sweeping way which did not engage with local conditions, noted the strategic importance of Folkets park for the inner-city neighborhood around it. Although the Comprehensive Plan treated Folkets park with considerably less enthusiasm than the flagship Bo01 project which was

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380 Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Stadsträdgårdsnästarens ritningsarkiv, Binder marked ‘Folkets park I’, Ansökan om stöd för 2000, Folkets park – vår största mötesplats, 400 000 besökare per år efterlyser ledning, samordning och planering, no pagination [1].
built just when the plan was published, it was still one of a limited number of sites in the city discussed as strategic for Malmö’s transformation to a ‘knowledge city’. According to the Comprehensive Plan, the relatively deprived South Central District of Malmö, where the park was located, had to be made ‘more attractive to various kinds of households’. What kinds of households this vague phrase implied were missing was made clear in a call to prioritize plans for ‘large and exclusive flats’ in the area.\(^\text{381}\)

Shouldering large-scale, high-end renewal in the inner city was beyond the municipality’s financial means without the state and EU funding that had subsidized the Bo01 luxury flats. The Comprehensive Plan cited the center-right government’s 1992 abandonment of state subsidies for housing construction making rapid redevelopment impossible with the municipality as the sole actor. ‘Municipal construction of several hundred units at the time is a long lost epoch’, except in exceptional circumstance like the Bo01 area, the plan conceded. The ‘very limited means’ to directly remake residential space forced the municipality to instead intervene in the area’s social composition by focusing renewal on public spaces, like Folkets park.\(^\text{382}\)

Folkets park was, as the inner city’s only sizable green space, framed as a unique ‘asset’ that had to be mobilized and made ‘more accessible’ if Malmö’s attractiveness was to be boosted and the social composition of the area changed.\(^\text{383}\) The park was however already used by other groups than those the Comprehensive Plan was interested in competing for, and was since the early 1990s officially designated to serve the social needs of Malmö’s inner-city community. Making attractive space of areas’ already planned for this type of local, social use articulated a very different kind of contradiction than Bo01’s renewal of a deserted waterfront. Tensions between different groups using public space would from this moment on be the foundational, but not the only, contradiction articulated by Folkets park’s redevelopment plans. For instance, this vision of change at a demographic level would come up against planning visions of economically-competitive space. Also the notion that attractive public space might help change residential patterns would be called into question.

As the Planning Department’s capacity to take on new projects increased after the Bo01 and Comprehensive Plan were finished between December 2000 and the spring of 2001, municipal planners rediscovered a Folkets park that no longer was represented as lacking visitors. More people were visiting the park and the Folkets park Cultural Association was stepping up its program. New tenants were also changing the way that the park was used, most visibly the alternative cultural collective Inkonst, which since September 1999 had hosted all manners of music

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\(^{381}\) Malmö stad, Stadsbyggnadskontoret, Översiktsplan för Malmö 2000, p. 276.  
\(^{382}\) Malmö stad, Stadsbyggnadskontoret, Översiktsplan för Malmö 2000, p. 120-125.  
events several times a week.384 Locals taking their children to the park, voluntary associations holding theatre and music performances, some of the park’s smaller businesses, who were struggling, and modest grants to independent cultural groups using the park all contributed to a complex geography of use. Representations of such everyday uses were articulated with new kinds of visions for the park’s future, suggesting a potential to redevelop the park.

In 2001, Folkets park’s Cultural Association made a plea with the municipality for a more hands-on park management. This led to the park’s first renewal project for decades which was not explicitly provoked by fiscal emergencies. Once the municipal bureaucrats were put on the case, several departments echoed the Cultural Association’s desire to increase municipal involvement in the park.385 The Streets Department followed the standard procedure of setting up a temporary interdepartmental subcommittee to more closely investigate the situation and define intended outcomes.386 A sizable part of their informal working papers were filed in folders stacked in a cabinet just outside the City Head Gardeners’ office. This paperwork, together with the subcommittee’s final report first presented in February 2001 and amended and approved by November that same year, makes it possible to closely follow the group’s work.

The subcommittee’s premise was that the park was finally becoming a ‘relatively well-visited’ public green space, as a first draft of their report phrased it.387 Folkets park Cultural Association’s concern with drawing on this new pattern of use to make the park more accessible as a recreational public space and urban common would, as the subcommittee set to work, become a marginal theme in the visions the subcommittee proposed. This was due in no small part to the fact that the subcommittee, just like Folkets park’s 1988–1989 secret development committee and the Vision 2015 group, was led by a private consulting firm that came to act as a nodal point for translocal, neoliberal policy debates. The profile of the one-person consultancy operation that won the contract, Margareta Eriksson and her firm ME 2000 produktion, was however rather different from both Quist AB, that had overseen the park’s renewal process more than ten years before, and the mid 1990s visionary work led by Kairos Future. Quist had approached the problems in a strictly economic manner, and introduced ways to calculate the financial effects of privatization through real estate sales to settle the park’s debts, which then came up against and was derailed by social

385 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 13th november 2001 §184, ‘Förslag till omorganisation av verksamheten i Folkets park’, p. 2.
386 Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Stadsträdgårdsstäarens ritningsarkiv, Binder marked ‘Folkets park II’.
387 Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Stadsträdgårdsstäarens ritningsarkiv, Binder marked ‘Folkets park II’, A. Inledning, [3].
concerns, fundamentally putting an end to the suggested privatization of the park. Kairos instead seems to have focused on establishing a crisis narrative that suggested a post-industrial development vision and the urgent need to take concrete steps to build a utopian creative city.

Margareta Eriksson had a very different skillset than her counterparts at Kairos Future or Quist AB. Her background included both management positions in decisively social democratic institutions, for example having been in charge of renewal work in Helsingborg’s Folkets park, and a degree from the Disney University at Orlando. Margareta Eriksson must have appeared as an embodiment of the tensions that the Folkets park project had to navigate, being at home in both the global policy flows of market-driven renewal concerned with cultural industries and the dense political and cultural networks that had animated Malmö’s Folkets park and the South Central District of Malmö for a century.

Eriksson, who had no shared history with Malmö’s municipal planning machinery, however appeared unaware of the city bureaucrats’ turn away from economic competitiveness by embracing human capital theories concerned with competing for creative demographics. The report presented by the subcommittee, a detailed plan that seems to have been principally authored by Eriksson, was instead concerned with spatial interventions as a way to directly attract capital to Malmö’s modest entertainment industries. This was a return of sorts to the economic neoliberalism that had been dominant in the late 1980s and early 1990s, both in its vision and the way it framed its interventions as a ‘business strategy’ despite nominally being a renewal scheme for a public park. Municipal authorities were, according to the subcommittee’s report, to closely cooperate with and improve conditions for market actors by turning Folkets park into a public-private cultural industries partnership. Folkets park as an ‘experience center in an expanding region’, as the report was subtitled, would provide support for the inner city’s cultural industries that strategically fed into Malmö’s long-term ambitions in a global race towards the coming ‘knowledge and experience society’.

Public investment in renovating Folkets park’s outdoor environment and ‘commercially viable events’ would combine to ‘create attractive destinations and get a large share of tourists to stay and spend money in the municipality’. This group of consumers would boost the park’s commercial value as Malmö
municipality’s real estate, implicitly allowing for increasing revenue streams. Attracting consumers from afar would in this way make the park less financially ‘dependent on public support’, primarily associated with the disastrous 1991 contract for Moriskan and Amiralen, which was still incurring significant losses.392

The competitive spirit of commercial firms was seen as a crucial dynamic to mobilize in the development process. The subcommittee’s memo suggested that commercial forces were driven by a ‘burning interest in their activities’, implying an innate propensity of entrepreneurs to produce aesthetically attractive space to draw in new customers and maximize profits.393 This notion of commercial firms’ inherent drive to make the spaces in which they operated attractive was a different model for representing economic use when compared to the attempt to get rid of the market all together by repurposing Amiralen as a primary school just a few years before. It was this faith in market forces that led the inquiry to recommended privatization of parts of Folkets park, although the subcommittee’s report kept the question open as to which degree the proposed cultural industries cluster would be run as a private or public enterprise.394

The report articulated this vision with ample representations of the park’s past and present uses. During the summer and fall of 2000 Eriksson mapped how Folkets park was used, drawing on a combination of interviews, direct observation, photographic documentation, and archival work.395 Information was collected about the park’s ‘existing activities’, as well as an analysis made of the present uses of all ‘buildings and physical localities’ and ‘all rental contracts’ with the park’s eleven leaseholders. Folkets park’s long history of entertainment, its accessible location in the city center, and the park’s historic built environment were in this process identified as important features that made it suitable for the proposed renewal.396

Such bureaucratic representations of use were linked to the vision of Folkets park as a future entertainment center through interventions concerned with

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reorganizing the park’s management and giving it better funding, more authority, and a different mandate to redevelop the park. The subcommittee’s report, presented to the Technical Council in February 2001, proposed four options for reorganizing the park’s management which included different levels of commercial influence. The subcommittee’s optimistic vision of Folkets park’s future was clearly connected to the park’s ‘increasing numbers of visits’ and its newfound role as a functioning ‘Community Park’.

The report acknowledged that the main established ‘target group’ visiting the Folkets park were families from the immediately surrounding community and, to a lesser extent, other parts of Malmö.

It was however another ‘target group’ that the report represented as a strategic resource for developing a cultural industries cluster. Folkets park’s existing, but underdeveloped, cultural industries were instead supported by a steady stream of visitors of ‘adults and businesses from the entire region’ that approached the park as entertainment consumers rather than as local residents making recreational use of public space. Similar attention to attracting suburban residents to Malmö had begun to take shape around the neoliberal visions for the city of the mid-1980s and had been resuscitated as a planning problem with Bo01 and the 2000 Comprehensive Plan, albeit in less economistic terms. Planners had during the 1990s established that focusing on Folkets park’s commercial functions was connected to these regional patterns of use. This provoked tensions in the plans for a school in Amiralen between respectable uses of public space with a regional reach and local uses, and a kind of splintering of the park’s social function. The 2001 subcommittee’s report’s main theoretical achievement was connecting the local patterns of use with recreational functions of space and regional patterns of use with commercial functions to take these patterns of use as the basis for strategically develop commercial functions, although this clearly built on the work of previous planning efforts.

The report’s tension between Folkets park’s officially mandated focus as a local, recreational Community Park and the vision of attracting new consumers regionally was buried deep behind neoliberal buzzwords suggesting a win-win

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397 The option most reliant on market forces had been taken out before the final report, despite Eriksson’s endorsement, see: Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Ritningsarkivet, Binder marked ‘Folkets park II’, Printed copy of email with no topic, dated January 8th 2001 from Sten Svensson to Margareta Eriksson, 2001, no pagination [1].
The park was to become a ‘meeting place for people’, an ‘attractive destination’, and a ‘milieu rich in experiences’. Families from the relatively deprived inner city neighborhood were described as Folkets park’s main ‘target group’ and the city’s population as a ‘market’ of potential visitors, a reframing crucial to defer this contradiction. All were treated as active consumers of this social product on a fictitious market of possible destinations to visit, and attractiveness framed as a uniform quality not troubled by things like proximity.

Making Folkets park more attractive for the desirable suburban demographics as a regionally-competitive ‘entertainment center’ was conflated with the basic recreational function the park served for locals, as all visits indicated an attractiveness measured on the same scale.

To conclude, the 2001 subcommittee’s plan for Folkets park was important in a number of ways. It was an early articulation of the notion of planning competitive space with renderings of everyday use. In so doing it pioneered how specific demographics’ patterns of use could be modeled as market-like behavior, informing envisioned futures and suitable interventions in physical space. Compared to the Bo01 plans this vision of Folkets park was more embedded in detailed representations of actual uses of space, making its understanding of the park’s attractiveness more complex than the aesthetic approach coming out of the Western Harbor and Bo01 experiments.

The vision of an attractive park powerfully drew on a neoliberal discourse of regional competition for the attention of suburban groups, but also introduced a tension between a neoliberal agenda concerned with increasing economic competitiveness and the social neoliberalism of the Bo01 documents and the 2000 Comprehensive Plan. Making space attractive to compete for suburban demographics was, in the subcommittee’s approach, the means to an economic end. Regional attractiveness was concerned with creating a customer base for the future city’s cultural industries, not changing the city’s demographic composition and accumulating human capital.

Two main tensions can be seen in the subcommittee’s plan for Folkets park. First, the way that different groups of users were represented as responding to the park’s different functions introduced a tension between which of these groups the

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park was to be developed for. This contradiction was provisionally disarmed by representing all visits as active choices within a fictitious market and indicators of attractiveness, thus obscuring important differences between demographics. Second, the different ways of envisioning attractiveness might have seemed to be seamlessly articulated in the plan, but in fact, the plan’s vision of making space economically competitive for entrepreneurs was far from aligned with the dominant concerns of attracting new creative residents as vectors of human capital. Both these contradictions, barely noticeable in the first version of the subcommittee’s report, would have serious implications.

Target demographics articulating contradictions

The first of the contradictions articulated by the subcommittee’s plan to emerge was the way that the plan rested on distinctions between different kinds of visitors. The plan attracted an extraordinary amount of attention when it was circulated to stakeholders in the autumn of 2001. Much of this feedback was centered on how it connected a local-regional distinction of users to a recreation-entertainment distinction of functions.

28 responses written by local civil society groups, businesses and municipal authorities were registered with the City Council Executive Board’s clerk. The majority of these statements remarked on the plan’s distinction between local and regional demographics, many explicitly criticizing the lack of attention to the park as a recreational green space for locals. Important municipal stakeholders like the Service Council, the Planning Council, the Sports and Recreation Council, the Culture Council, and the South Central District’s Council all complained that the paper, with its emphasis on creating a competitive entertainment infrastructure for a regional market, glossed over risks of disrupting the existing everyday uses of Folkets park by the local community in particular and Malmö’s residents more broadly.  

In one of these statements, written by the South Central District Council, the park’s ‘importance for local residents’ was explicitly taken as the source of ‘the positive development of the park [and its usage] in general’. The park was understood as a crucial resource by being an accessible and free green space for the social needs of the dense inner-city community. Further, the District Council

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argued that the everyday recreational use that had so carefully been fostered by a decade-long renewal process concerned with anchoring the park to the surrounding community was what gave Folkets park this appeal. Redirecting planning towards new groups by adding commercial functions threatened this just-emerging pattern of recreational uses.

The most forceful attack on the subcommittee’s vision came from the Swedish Pensioners’ Association (Sveriges Pensionärerförbund). Their spokesperson argued against any kind of commercialization or enclosure of public space, and demanded that Folkets park should continue to be ‘an open park — available for all, free of charge, and with good accessibility.’406 The commercial-regional and recreational-local uses were, in this kind of critical response, far from mutually reinforcing, but rather articulated a serious contradiction between actual and future users and uses. This complaint, however, did not challenge the categories used by the subcommittee’s plan, but rather used them to deepen a tension that the plan already articulated. Mapping space by connecting specific demographics to certain functions was in this regard validated by arguments trying to hold back commercial functions and regional patterns of use by supporting public space as a recreational resource for locals.

As conflicts between the demographics and different kinds of uses were being articulated as a planning problem, the plan itself was also being questioned. What could well be considered the final straw in forcing a reorientation for Folkets park was, however, not the technical expertise of municipal bureaucrats expressing their concerns for the social wellbeing of the inner city’s residents. It was instead the intervention by the right-leaning parliamentarian minority, which forcefully resonated with tensions between different ways of representing actual space and envisioning future uses of space that settled the issue.

The Liberal and Moderates representatives on the municipal Technical Council refused to accept the preliminary approval of the memorandum’s first draft in February 2001, and filed no less than two formal complaints.407 These unlikely political opponents of a neoliberal plan for attracting suburbanites to the park by increasing the presence of commercial forces responded at this crucial moment by referring to the way that the social needs of locals had been an important argument in the 1991 buy-out debates. The political right underscored that the consensus after Malmö municipality had bought the park, and its mountain of debt, was disinvestment in the amusement park through the making of public green space for the recreational needs of the local community. This understanding of the past

406 Stadskontoret, Malmö stad, Kommunstyrelsen, Ank. 2001-11-21, Nr 931/01, Remissammanställning: Utredning angående ‘Malmö Folkets Park – ett upplevelsecentrum i en expanderande region’, Bilaga 2, no pagination [7].
407 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 13th November 2001 §184, ‘Reservation: omorganisation av verksamheten i Folkets park’; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden13th november 2001 §184, ‘Särskilt yttrande’.
framed a completely different understanding of the present and the park’s desirable futures. When the Technical Council eventually debated an amendment to the memo in November 2001, the Liberals and the Moderates objected again, despite a reduced emphasis on entertainment as a source of regional competition. One Moderate representative demanded that any public-private venture be stopped and, with reference to the debates before the 1991 buy-out, that the park’s new management group’s focus on making Folkets park an ‘open Community Park’. This care for the local community and ambition to limit market forces must be read alongside representatives of the same parties responding to the same plan in other municipal bodies who were less well-informed about the Folkets park case and its peculiar history. These politicians instead took the completely opposite position and on principle demanded more privatization and commercial focus for Folkets park.

While it is, then, certainly possible to question whether the social wellbeing of this solidly red-voting constituency was the center-right’s main concern, it is worth taking note of how the categories established as the planning process proceeded became the basis for this selective critique of neoliberalization from the right. The difference between Folkets park as a recreational resource for locals and mobilizing commercial forces to attract new visitors regionally as consumers was used also in the political right’s protest, but in order to indicate that these two functions were mutually exclusive and that the planners were obliged to focus on the park as a recreational public space for locals. This attention to local, recreational concerns was certainly fuelled by fears that the Social Democrats sought to work around the 1991 buy-out and use public funds to strengthen the political use of Folkets park as a cultural heritage site, but the critique explicitly re-articulated the tensions already existing in the subcommittee’s report.

The contradictions between demographics and functions permeating both technical and political debates of the renewal scheme did not completely derail the plans, unlike the way that for instance the Amiralen school had been cancelled after running into difficulties. The plan was instead amended by a shorter six-page document that the Technical Council approved, together with the subcommittee’s

408 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 13th November 2001 §184, ’Reservation: omorganisation av verksamheten i Folkets park’.
409 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 13th november 2001 §184, ’Förslag till omorganisation av verksamheten i Folkets park’, p. 1.
410 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 26th February 2001 §184.’Förslag till omorganisation av verksamheten i Folkets park’, ’Stadsbyggnadsnämnden 2001-05-03, Årendenummer 83. Särskilt yttrande (m): Tekniska nämnden, Malmö Folkets park, Ett upplevelsecentrum i en expanderande region, TN2001 02 26’; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämnden arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 26th February 2001 §184 ‘Förslag till omorganisation av verksamheten i Folkets park’, ’Reservation’.
411 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 13th november 2001 §184, ’Reservation: omorganisation av verksamheten i Folkets park’.

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plan in November 2001, despite the center-right’s protests. Distinctions between demographics and functions remained in this version, but their relations were reversed. A regional target audience connected to commercial entertainment figured in this version, but was in the amendment only mentioned in passing as one among many possible target demographics.

The ‘main target group’ had instead become defined in terms of ‘children, youth and families in Malmö’. Secondary target demographics were ‘all local residents of various [ethnic] cultures’ with their ‘great need of an attractive and green Community Park’, the ‘the city’s elderly’, ‘teachers and pupils’ and organizers of ‘conferences’ and ‘events’ as well as the abovementioned suburbanites. The park should, as one of the revised ‘visions’ for the park’s future phrased it, ‘thanks to its local rootedness and its positive effect, strengthen its regional role and [its share of the] market for entertainment, and conferences’. Increasing use of the park as a public space by locals, and local youths and children in particular, were in this way reimagined as the primary concern. It was these local groups that renewal was to be focused on. Any endeavor to help the park’s firms compete regionally for customers was be rooted in this local, recreational pattern of use.

Despite this reversal of prioritized target groups, several of the subcommittee’s suggestions were approved without revision. The very idea that investing in the park’s cultural industries could make space attractive was never challenged, despite being de-emphasized in the amendment. The framing of Folkets park as a business-like entity needing to ‘market’ itself and ‘find new target groups’ also remained in place. Commercialization and privatization might have been temporarily averted, yet the memo’s way of understanding planning left a powerful legacy. Its way of combining ideas of, on the one hand, the park’s renewal being driven by specific functions attracting particular target demographics, and on the other, the representation of local visitors as linked to recreational uses and regional visitors to entertainment, had created an entirely new model for producing attractive urban space.

The subcommittee’s emphasis on economic competitiveness meant that there were difficulties mobilizing Folkets park directly in the re-engineering of Malmö’s demographic composition, which was becoming the dominant planning issue at this moment. Folkets park’s renewal instead articulated the economic neoliberal model of early 1990s inner-city renewal with the narrative of the coming creative city with which social neoliberalism was so imbricated. For this second and more

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412 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 13th november 2001 §184 Förslag till omorganisation av verksamheten i Folkets park. Förslag till beslut.
413 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 13th november 2001 §184 Förslag till omorganisation av verksamheten i Folkets park. Förslag till beslut, p. 4.
414 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 13th november 2001 §184 Förslag till omorganisation av verksamheten i Folkets park. Förslag till beslut, p. 3.
social neoliberal approach the subcommittee’s work was still a breakthrough. The demographics of everyday uses of public space could from this point on be used to measure attractiveness of space. In addition, municipal planning could designate space for functions that, either ethnographically or statistically, were represented as attracting desirable demographics. The way that expanding ‘entertainment’ in Folkets park was understood as a way to make public space more attractive for regional visitors was the basis for a more general urban planning model for changing the demography of use through the functions of space.

This approach was much more advanced than earlier neoliberal planning ideas in that it was based on detailed representations of the demographics of everyday uses of public space, in contrast to earlier generic notions of building a beautiful inner city to attract shoppers. It suggested a working model for more modest renewal projects than the production of subsidized residential units that had come out of the work on Bo01. This also meant that these two planning models for making attractive urban space not only might reinforce each other, but also quietly expressed contradictions between social and economic modes of understanding competitiveness. Thus among Malmö’s planners in the first few years of the new millennium, two partly intersecting, partly competing, models for neoliberal urban planning were uneasily cohering around the idea of ‘attractive’ space.

Concretely, regulating the demography of Folkets park’s everyday use was entrusted to a temporary management group set up early 2002. The group consisted of representatives of the involved municipal departments and Folkets park Cultural Association. It was, just like the subcommittee’s recommendations for a business-like leadership, led by a Park Director. Projekt Folkets park, as this group came to be called, was scheduled to transition into a permanent management unit before January 2005. During these three years the group was asked to balance the curating of regional patterns of use, by carefully developing the park’s entertainment functions, with Folkets park’s position as a green urban common vital for the social wellbeing of the inner city’s residents. As I explore in Chapter 8, this would turn out to be easier said than done. As the physical redevelopment process proceeded and data on the park’s use was collected, the contradiction between these two tasks articulated with new bureaucratic representations as well as the tensions within Malmö’s planning visions, causing the plan’s development trajectory to shift decisively. Some of these visions and representations were however taking shape around another renewal scheme for Folkets park, also beginning in 2001, to which I will turn first.
Chapter 7
2001-2006:
Enacting demographic competitiveness

Springtime in Vinterland

In April 2002 the temporary management group, Projekt Folkets park, took control over the park’s maintenance and renewal. In the years that followed, this group of municipal bureaucrats was involved in a series of projects increasingly explicitly aimed at making Folkets park, and Malmö more generally, more demographically ‘attractive’. This group did neither, as the last chapter has shown, have a clear political mandate to focus on creating regionally attractive space nor increase of the influence of commercial forces in the park. Both ideas about commercialization and regional competition, however, soon came to the fore in the park’s renewal again. An important precursor to Folkets park’s mid-2000s turn back towards demographic competition, but to a much lesser extent the related issue of commercialization, was however led by a different group of bureaucrats.

This other project began taking shape in May 2001 — that is, before the consultant-led subcommittee’s ‘entertainment center’ renewal plan had been exposed to the criticism that would lead to its revision in November the same year. At the monthly meeting of the Technical Council, a group of planners proposed that Malmö’s municipality should engage itself further in celebrating the holiday season. The traditional Christmas markets and decorative lights lining the city’s main shopping streets were to be bolstered with a new way to attract shoppers and tourists to the city for the holidays, and Folkets park was suggested as the site for
this project. This idea of using Folkets park for municipal Christmas celebrations had two months before this been raised in the subcommittee’s discussions about attracting new groups to the park. The idea was then, from its inception shaped by notions of regional competitiveness, but became wrapped up in the social concerns with local matters that came to dominate the political debate about the ‘entertainment center’ plan.

Specifically, the Street and Parks Department suggested trying a new ‘concept’ that would stand out among the many other Christmas events hosted by the region’s municipalities and businesses. This rather vaguely defined concept solidified as *Vinterland* (‘Winterland’), an extensive outdoor performance arranged in Folkets park during the last two weeks of December 2001 and repeated in the five winters that followed. Vinterland was designed to have ‘beautiful, exciting lighting and decorations’ and dramatic shows with ‘winter characters’ making appearances in the park.

All venues and existing businesses were to be ‘developed’ alongside ‘outdoor events’ to enable ‘original experiences’ and ‘traditional’ Christmas activities. Since Vinterland was organized by a temporary group independent of the new management, its mandate was more open and the project could focus on regional competition in a moment when the management group had been explicitly asked to de-emphasize this issue. The park’s formal management’s gradual turn to regional competition was for these reasons largely informed by how representations of local uses articulated with more abstract planning visions of attractive space in the Vinterland project’s first few years.

The first Vinterland memo, presented in May 2001 for the Technical Council, echoed the approach to planning which permeated the Bo01 project and the 2000 Comprehensive Plan. This document focused on the physical, aesthetic properties of the park’s built environment. The memo argued that Folkets park’s ‘beautiful scenery’, ‘good venues’, and existing ‘technical infrastructure’ were the most important place-specific preconditions for locating Vinterland in Folkets park. As this attractiveness-through-aesthetics paradigm migrated across the city from the Bo01 expo it articulated with the park’s rich history of detailed representations, including the torrent of critical comments the 2001 subcommittee plan faced for its

419 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 29th May 2001 §109, ‘Förslag till vinteraktiviteter i Folkets park’, 2001, p. 2
420 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 29th May 2001 §109, ‘Förslag till vinteraktiviteter i Folkets park’, 2001, p. 2
proposed turn to commercial approaches. Folkets park was ‘visited by all kinds of Malmö residents with their different [ethnic] backgrounds’, the memo introducing the Vinterland project argued. Vinterland could thus make use of this established pattern of use that constituted the park as a transcultural ‘meeting place’, a term that just had begun to be used to understand patterns of use in Malmö’s urban planning documents. During this darkest and coldest part of the winter season, when ‘natural meeting places’ in public space were used to ‘a lesser degree’, the park still acted as a nodal point connecting different groups in the city through an intense and diverse culture of everyday use. Folkets park was, then described as more than a formally-designated public space, but was represented as an urban common constituted by everyday uses. The park was a rare kind of place in the city, where Malmö’s residents felt that they could ‘simply be’ without having to pay an entrance or feel forced to buy food or drinks. In sharp contrast to Bo01, this representation of intense and complex everyday uses was the main resource mobilized in the Vinterland project’s visions.

Folkets park’s everyday uses were represented as more than the kind of recreational visits by locals that the 1991 decision had designated the park for. The idea of everyday use by particular demographics being connected to different functions — a theme increasingly important in the park’s renewal from mid 1990s, culminating in the 2001 subcommittee’s ‘entertainment center’ plan — was again mobilized in the Vinterland project. Folkets park’s ‘long tradition of entertainment activities’ was thus described as more than a distant past that could be recalled in nostalgic marketing schemes for Vinterland. This history was represented as a residual pattern of use persisting in the present, with the memo noting that people were still travelling from beyond the immediate neighborhood to visit the park.

In the Vinterland project, as in the ‘regional entertainment center’ plan, the link between regional visitors and the park’s entertainment functions became a way to regulate patterns of use and users indirectly through spatial renewal. Vinterland’s temporary and modest tweaking of public space was in this sense understood to have potentially profound effects on mundane patterns of use, providing an alternative model for attractive space to Bo01’s subsidized residential units. The most important difference between how these issues were phrased in the subcommittee’s plan and the Vinterland project was that the latter introduced a vision of competing for visitors to Folkets park and Malmö from the city’s ‘hinterland’ that did not rely on market forces as sources of spatial

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421 Mukhtar-Landgren, Planering för framsteg och gemenskap: om den kommunala utvecklingsplaneringens idéäktsamma förutsättningar, p. 167
422 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 29th May 2001 §109, ‘Förslag till vinteraktiviteter i Folkets park’, p. 1,2.
423 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 29th May 2001 §109, ‘Förslag till vinteraktiviteter i Folkets park’, p. 2
attractiveness.\textsuperscript{424} The vision was then not, unlike the subcommittee’s plans, to support the city’s private entertainment firms as a resource for a coming post-industrial economy, and in the process boost municipal revenue rent streams from the park. Instead, the municipality’s direct intervention in space was to reinforce a regional pattern of use that was taken to strengthen Malmö’s ‘profile’, in the long run, making suburban residents more prone to visit the city ‘at all times of the year’.\textsuperscript{425}

By connecting this regional pattern of use to free public entertainment, rather than to the commercialization of the park, the contradiction that had undone the subcommittee’s ‘entertainment center’ plan was subtly framed in a less volatile way. The turn towards attracting regional visitors was thus set up as a technical problem of people in public space, rather than supporting commercial forces as a function linked to regional visitors. New groups of users were to be added through new functions in the park as a public space, rather than a commercial renewal that limited existing functions and risked undermining existing patterns of use, which created the very valuable sense of place to ‘simply be’ in.

Folkets park was, in this memo’s vision, primarily to remain a Community Park, with Vinterland temporarily adding a new layer of use and users to this fundamental function.\textsuperscript{426} This concern with treading gently is clearly visible in several aspects on the work on the project. For instance, there was next to no Christian mythology, like Santa Claus or nativity scenes, used in the Vinterland performances, in what must be understood as an attempt not to exclude residents from the ethnically diverse neighborhood’s religious minorities that planners understood was a substantial part the park’s everyday visitors. After some discussions, an entrance fee was ruled out in order to ensure that the park remained accessible to all, regardless of income.\textsuperscript{427} ‘The park should be perceived to be for the common people’ as the Vinterland group made clear in their memo, connecting their vision to the park’s history.\textsuperscript{428} Reframing demographic competition as a matter of competing for everyday users of public space defused the tensions between commercial-regional and recreational-local uses that had upended the subcommittee’s ‘entertainment center’ plan, and Vinterland was approved by the Technical Council in May 2001. Still, the underlying contradiction between how

\textsuperscript{424} Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 29th May 2001 §109, ‘Förslag till vinteraktiviteter i Folkets park’, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{425} P. 2; Malmö stad, Kommunfullmäktiges arkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunstyrelsen 6th September 2001, §324 ‘Förslag till vinteraktiviteter i Folkets Park’, no pagination. [2].
\textsuperscript{426} Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 29th May 2001 §109, ‘Förslag till vinteraktiviteter i Folkets park’, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{427} Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 29th May 2001 §109, ‘Förslag till vinteraktiviteter i Folkets park’ p. 4; Malmö stad, Kommunfullmäktiges arkiv, Minutes of Malmö kommunstyrelsen 6th September 2001, §324 ‘Förslag till vinteraktiviteter i Folkets Park’, no pagination. [2].
\textsuperscript{428} Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 29th May 2001 §109, ‘Förslag till vinteraktiviteter i Folkets park’, p 3.
the project was to focus its resources would resurface in new forms. Tension around who was to be included and excluded from the park would force itself into plain view, with disruptive effects, and Vinterland’s careful separation of commercial forces from attractive space would come to express contradictions in new ways.

Un-entrepreneurial entrepreneurs as a neoliberal problem

The collected papers of the Vinterland working group are, unlike several similar temporary projects, stored in a municipal archive. This means that the way in which the planners navigated the contradictions the project was entangled with can be investigated in more detail compared to similar renewal projects. Among these papers the formal evaluations of the project are particularly interesting. This paperwork includes detailed notes taken at a debriefing of the park’s various entrepreneurs, but also the crew of magicians, storytellers, fire-eaters, acrobats and actors playing characters such as ‘King Winter’, ‘The Snow Queen’, ‘The Ice Sisters’ and ‘The Winter Elf.’ These ethnographic representations are bolstered by surveys such as a statistical report on the 2001 Vinterland event showing the enthusiastic reception of the public, estimated as twice the expected 40,000 visitors.  

The contradiction that these early planning documents most clearly articulated was not between different groups of users. Few concerns over attracting suburban visitors can, in fact, be found among the 2001 Vinterland papers when compared to the ambition of the project’s first memo from May the same year. The most probable explanation for this turn to local users of the park is the fierce critique that the consultant-led subcommittee’s vision of regional competitiveness through commercialization had faced during the fall of 2001. To this one should add the public debate about the failure of drawing affluent residents to the Bo01 project, despite funneling millions from municipal, state, EU, and labor movement-aligned cooperative funds into the project, reaching a climax during the summer and fall of 2001.

Instead, it was Folkets park’s commercial interests that were the main cause for concern in the 2001 Vinterland evaluation. The subcommittee’s ‘entertainment center’ plan had assumed that the park’s entrepreneurs would seize any

opportunity to increase their customer base and play a crucial but indirect role in a common effort to attract new visitors. Vinterland’s focus on direct municipal intervention in public space did not cast the park’s commercial leaseholders in this important role. Still, the Vinterland team appeared to be taken by surprise when it turned out that these firms were fundamentally unconcerned with contributing to the municipality’s efforts to make more visitors, and potential customers, feel at home in the park during the winter of 2001.

Representations of mundane matters, like actors’ access to dressing rooms, toilets, and heated space for taking breaks, illustrated serious problems undermining the entire Vinterland project. While some activities — like theatre plays, circus acts, and open mic sessions — took place inside those of Folkets park’s otherwise rarely-used buildings controlled by Malmö municipality, the Vinterland performances were principally geared at creating outside scenes, with the winter characters moving around in the festively-decorated park and interacting with the public. This meant that actors — in their imaginative but not necessarily warm fairytale outfits — were exposed to the damp and cold Malmö winter for extended periods. Most of the almost a dozen ‘good venues’ that the municipality owned in Folkets park, mentioned in the 2001 May Vinterland memo, were in fact leased by private firms that could chose not to cooperate with the project. Particularly important was that Malmö’s Real Estate Department since 1991 had leased Moriskan and Amiralen, the park’s two biggest venues, at highly subsidized rates to private firms — by 2001 the Profirestauranger AB corporation that a few years before had bought the leases from the Provobis corporation. The Vinterland team could only find one tiny free space for the twenty or so actors to warm up in, go to the bathroom, or change into their work outfits. This changing room which the municipality temporarily borrowed was in Amiralen’s basement, a building the municipality had been leasing at substantial yearly losses to Profirestauranger for ten years. How un-eager Profirestauranger was to cooperate with Vinterland was not only illustrated by their unwillingness to lend a more substantial room to their landlords, but by the fact that they refused to give out more than one key to the basement changing room. The complicated instructions that explained how this single key was to be shared between the workers covered an entire typed A4 page.

431 Initially as Provobis, a Procordia subsidiary, which was reconstructed as the independent firm Profirestauranger in the fall of 2000 and a year later reported an astounding one bn SEK turnover. Patent och registreringsverket, Årsredovisning för profirestauranger AB, 2001.
Access to indoor space was represented as a serious problem for both the public and Vinterland employees throughout the debriefing reports. To preempt this problem, Vinterland had made a deal to borrow Moriskan’s large lobby, where guests could warm up while looking at a gingerbread house competition on display. The informal agreement to rent this small part of the much larger building to the Malmö municipality during the Vinterland project was cancelled for unknown reasons. The competition was at the last minute moved to a building the municipality was leasing to The Children’s Theatre Hall, a more cooperative non-profit theatre group, which in turn lead to actors’ complaints of overcrowding and interruptions.

Profilrestauranger was also disinterested in keeping their restaurants in Moriskan and Amiralen open for the large crowds that visited the park during Vinterland. The firm had a business model that focused on profitable pre-paid set dinners and shows, and their two venues were in fact closed to the public as Vinterland was going on just outside. This lack of interest in commercial opportunities can be explained in terms of a clause in the 1991 lease for Amiralen and Moriskan that Profilrestauranger’s precursor Provobis had signed with the desperate Real Estate Department, seemingly at the advice of the Quist AB consultancy. The 1991 contract stipulated that Profilrestauranger only pay 8% of its turnover from the two venues as rent. Any extension of Moriskan or Amiralen’s opening hours beyond set dinner and ticketed events meant guaranteed increases in staff and rent costs, which would have to be recapped with the very much less guaranteed revenue in order not to eat into Profilrestauranger’s comfortable profits. Ending the disastrous 1991 contract, which invited this kind of cherry-picking in the way Amiralen and Moriskan were used, had turned out to be difficult. The Real Estate Department’s attempt to find better tenants through the

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Amiralen school project in the late 1990s had failed, and an attempt to start a municipal art museum in the same building as a pretext to get rid of the leaseholders had been dismissed by politicians uneager to spend more public money on art.\footnote{Malmö stad, Kommunfullmäktiges arkiv, Malmö Kommunstyrelse 6th mars 2002 §95 ‘Reservation (M), Omorganisation av verksamheten i Folkets park’.

\textsuperscript{437} Also the 2001 evaluation documents for Vinterland represented Profilrestauranger’s business strategy as a serious obstacle for realizing their visions. This document explicitly stated that the park’s businesses in general, and Profilrestauranger in particular, showed little interest in cooperating with the Vinterland organizers. Rather than the development resource the market had been framed as in the subcommittee’s ‘entertainment center’ plan just months before, the actual market was turning out to be the biggest problem for the Vinterland project’s otherwise successful attempt to bring more people to the park during its cold winter season.

The same kind of tension — between uninterested leaseholders and frozen visitors — returned in 2002 as the project was renewed for a second season despite this one serious problem. The owners of Folkets park’s hotdog stands, candy stores and restaurants remained largely indifferent to this potential opportunity to reach more customers, and there was genuinely very little the Vinterland organizers could do about it, despite their best efforts to enthuse business owners. Mundane tensions between the Vinterland team and the park’s firms continued, with the unwillingness of market forces to provide visitors with food and shelter from the cold being a regular point of frustration in the management group. Vinterland’s project managers lamented that commercial ‘actors in the park aren’t using their space’ and that the selection of food provided by commercial forces was poor. Based on these representations of un-entrepreneurial entrepreneurs, the municipal bureaucrats argued that it was crucial to find and invite other food stall vendors with more exciting products than the standard fast food that the park’s businesses offered.\footnote{Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder marked Vinterland 2003, \textit{Arrangemangshetens interna utvärdering 2001}, Malmö stad, 2002, no pagination; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder marked Vinterland 2003, \textit{Muntlig utvärdering av Vinterland 2002 14/1-03}, Malmö stad, 2003, no pagination [2-3]; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder marked Vinterland 2003, \textit{Vinterland – utvärdering av Vinterland 19 dec – 6 jan 2003/2004}, Malmö stad, 2004, no pagination [2]; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder marked Vinterland 2005, \textit{Vinterland 04/05 i Malmö Folkets park (project description)}, Malmö stad, 2002, no pagination [2].}

The papers found in the Vinterland archives are somewhat unclear about whether Profilrestauranger’s restaurant in Moriskan were open to the public on some of the Vinterland evenings in 2002 or not. From the printed Vinterland programs for the following years it is however certain that none of
Profilrestauranger’s establishments in the park were included in the project’s scheduled entertainment, nor was the firm present at the meetings where other leaseholders coordinated their activities for the winter season.\footnote{Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder marked Vinterland 2002, Printed email dated 30th October 2002 headed ‘uppdatering arr’. Ditte Nielsen, Malmö stad, 2001, no pagination [1]; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder named Vinterland 2003, Utvärderingsmötet VL med parkentreprenörer 22/1-03, Malmö stad, 2003, no pagination [3]; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder marked Vinterland 2003, Muntlig utvärdering av Vinterland 2002 14/1-03, Malmö stad, 2003, no pagination [1].} Hostilities reached a peak in 2002 when six of the Vinterland actors complained of a sense of hostility and being treated ‘as intruders’ when they used a spare room in Moriskan to change into stage outfits.\footnote{Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder marked Vinterland 2002, Loger Vinterland, Malmö stad, 2002; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder marked Vinterland 2003, Muntlig utvärdering av Vinterland 2002 14/1-03, Malmö stad, 2003, no pagination [1].} These kinds of tensions continued for the five more years that Vinterland was held in Folkets park.

In the Vinterland experiment, the ‘entertainment’ market’s actors were becoming represented as obstacles to making space attractive. As planning ideas about regional competition again gained ground in the Vinterland project, after receding with 2001 controversy around the ‘entertainment center’ plan, representations of un-entrepreneurial entrepreneurs and visions of attractive space came to strongly articulate a contradiction. Folkets park’s Vinterland project would in this way become a crucial provocation, forcing neoliberal urban planning to adapt, deepening already-existing tensions between visions of demographically- and economically-competitive space.

Regional competition, local troublemakers

The Vinterland project’s attention to regional visitors, that had been toned down in the course of 2001, was all the more explicit the second time the municipal authorities organized this project. In 2002, the project group explicitly envisioned suburban demographics as their primary audience. One of Vinterland 2002’s ‘target outcomes’, however, remained concerned with Folkets park as a meeting place to ‘further integration and a sense of community among the city’s residents’. This envisioned outcome articulated a mounting sense of political urgency about ethnic segregation with the established bureaucratic representation of Folkets park as a ‘meeting place’ for the local neighborhood and its ethnic minorities. But attracting visitors from outside the city was no longer a vaguely-defined secondary objective. The 2002 Vinterland target outcomes clearly defined demographically-competitive space, in terms of ‘developing Malmö as a city for events with the goal of establishing the city as an attractive place to live and work in’, as more
important than addressing local visitors or the related idea of ethnic community-building.\footnote{Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder marked Vinterland 2002, ‘Projektbeskrivning Vinterland 2002’, Malmö stad, 2002, no pagination [1].}

After the 2001 friction between the Vinterland team and Profilrestauranger, this vision of attracting visitors regionally was not imagined as being driven by market forces. Competition for desirable suburban visitors, and implicitly desirable residents, was instead articulated using the older tradition of social bureaucratic practices directly intervening in urban space. How Folkets park was used as a public space, slowly splintering into representations of two kinds of uses and users since the late 1990s, thus separated fully into two distinct problems of governance in the Vinterland projects. The demographically-competitive public space attracting new groups through spectacular entertainment was being untangled from the public space used recreationally by locals. This was, remarkably, happening just as municipal bureaucrats were forced to turn away from the free reign of market forces as a model for making Folkets park a regionally-competitive space.

The return of demographic competition as a planning problem in the 2002 Vinterland project was in this regard radically different from the economic imperatives framing the late 1980s public investments in an amusement park to increase revenue, the 1990s approach of reducing public spending through the comparatively low maintenance costs of public space, or the 2001 subcommittee’s proposal to strategically pool public-private capital in the creation of a regional ‘entertainment center’. In 2002 Vinterland became a laboratory for experimenting with targeting new audiences using direct municipal interventions to change the social composition of visitors, and Vinterland’s project managers continued to be preoccupied with this issue until the last time the project was organized in 2006. In 2003 the project plan included ‘some’ marketing explicitly targeted to Malmö’s suburban region, and in the formal 2003 evaluation, the performers were questioned about how many families they estimated had travelled from the Swedish countryside and over the border from Copenhagen across the recently opened Öresund Bridge.\footnote{Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder marked Vinterland 2003, Projekbeskrivning Vinterland 2003, 2003-10-01, Malmö stad, 2003, no pagination [1]; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder marked Vinterland 2003, Vinterland – utvärdering av Vinterland 19 dec – 6 jan 2003/2004, Malmö stad, 2004, no pagination [3].} By 2004 ‘tourists’ had emerged as a separate target audience and ‘strengthening the [park’s] sense of place’ as well as ‘increasing knowledge about Vinterland among families outside Malmö’ were defined as intended outcomes in Vinterland’s public relations strategy, now explicitly shifting focus from Malmö to the entire urban region.\footnote{Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder marked Vinterland 2004, Malmö stads GK, Marknadsföringskampanj Vinterland 2004-2005, Malmö stad, 2004, no pagination [2]; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder marked Vinterland 2005, Genomförande av marknadsföringskampanj 2004-2005, Malmö stad, 2004, no pagination [1].}
during the last two Vinterland years is difficult to know, as comparatively little working material is archived, although it is clear that the 2006 marketing plan emphasized attracting regional visitors.\footnote{Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder marked Vinterland 2006, Vinterland, projektbeskrivning 06/07, Malmö stad, 2006, no pagination [1]; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder marked Vinterland 2006, Vinterland, samarbetsavtal Vinterland 06/07 mellan Sydsvenska Dagbladet AB org. Nr 55 6002-7608 och Malmö stad org. Nr 212000-1124, Malmö stad, 2006; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder named Vinterland 2003, Reflektioner Vinterland 2002, no pagination [3]; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder named Vinterland 2003, Artistutvärdering sammanställning Vinterland, no pagination [5]; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder named Vinterland Malmö stads GK 2004-2005, Raketskjutande ungdomar.}

Attracting suburban visitors required carefully deploying bureaucratic representations of use to benchmark how the project’s various components were performing within this demographic. To this end written and oral evaluations, incident reports, regular Gallup polls, and surprise inspections by project managers were made. Vinterland’s experiments developed precise ways to benchmark and enact regional competition for desirable demographics by measuring the effects of different practices as interventions in Folkets park’s patterns of use. The way that uses of public space had been linked to functions in the 2001 subcommittee report was thus rearticulated. No longer was there a crude division between public recreational and commercial entertainment mapped onto local and regional users — a way of linking use and users thrown into crisis by the political debates about the park’s future in the fall of 2001 and Vinterland’s discovery of un-entrepreneurial entrepreneurs later the same year. A much more complex and nuanced way to represent the demographic effects of interventions in public space was taking shape. The 2000 Comprehensive Plan’s abstract notion of the municipality strategically mobilizing public space, where planners could exert a decisive influence without large-scale publically-subsidized residential developments like the Bo01 exhibition, was in this way articulated with less visionary and more mundane practices of urban renewal in the Vinterland project.

Vinterland’s contradiction between targeting local and suburban demographics was mostly worked out in a silent drift of attention from local visitors to regional competition. This process was, however, interrupted by episodes where the underlying conflict between who the project was concerned with was forced into the open. This is most clearly illustrated by how ‘local youths’ had “caused mischief” by moving about in ‘gangs’, which periodically seemed to threaten the entire Vinterland project after regional competition returned as the predominant concern in 2002.\footnote{Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder named Vinterland 2003, Artistutvärdering sammanställning Vinterland, no pagination [5]; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder named Vinterland Malmö stads GK 2004-2005, Raketskjutande ungdomar.}

Local youths had been represented as an obstacle for renewal before, as shown in Chapter 5. The park was throughout the 1990s primarily considered a social resource for the local community which these youths were understood to belong
to. Planners had therefore been concerned with mediating between conflicting patterns of use and users within the neighborhood, and all locals had been understood as having rights to Folkets park as their public space. Unruly youths, kindergarten children, or cyclists going to and from work were, in the school-plans for Amiralen (to take the most obvious example), considered as users with potentially conflicting interests. Yet, no one denied that each group had legitimate claims to Folkets park as a public space and Community Park. When the plans for a school in Amiralen were scrapped, public space as a recreational resource was already fragmenting into a local and a regional issue. These differences opened for contradictions, like the idea of too many local children disrupting the park as an attractive public space with regional reach. Still, the deciding factor in this move had been worries that the park was unsuitable for potential pupils, because it would be difficult to set aside the space needed for a proper schoolyard.

With competition for suburban demographics becoming the dominant planning issue with the 2000 Comprehensive Plan, and this vision being articulated in the Vinterland plans from 2002 onwards, the 1990s’ understanding of ‘unruly youths’ demanding bureaucratic negotiation between different local, recreational uses of public space collapsed. Instead, fear of conflicts between disruptive youngsters and other visitors to the park brought the silent contradictions between different demographics the plan articulated into the open. Disciplining local ‘youths’ had become an issue of strategic importance. Failure to contain this issue risked undermining Vinterland’s vision of attractive public space. In this regard, the attention to this group and its uses of space mirror a broader social concern and the responses it provoked that erupted in Malmö during the early years of 2000’s.

Policing the attractive city

The way that worries about unruly youths in this period were transformed from a minor theme to a fundamental way that contradictions between different demographics were articulated in the Vinterland files was linked to a similar process taking place in other parts of the municipal bureaucracy. The vision of demographic renewal, making Malmö rich in ‘creative’ and ‘cultural’ human capital had made some uses and users of space strategically important for the limited municipal budget. In much the same way were other sites and groups, since the 2000 Comprehensive Plan, considered less likely to deliver substantial human capital returns on public investment and explicitly abandoned by the municipality. In the central city’s deprived southern periphery, where Folkets park is located, intense programs of investment to attract new residents and the stripping of social rights to welfare services for groups represented as less likely to accumulate human capital took place in the same location This made
contradictions between these kinds of social practices, and the demographics they sought to represent and target, extraordinarily explicit in urban renewal projects like Vinterland.

The key document in which this issue developed at the municipal scale was *Välfärd för alla* (‘Welfare for All’), an immense cross-departmental five-year plan concerned with the new ‘great challenges’ that Malmö was understood to face. Officially launched in 2004, this controversial plan was, unlike preceding documents, primarily concerned with the city’s peripheral zones. Welfare for All was mostly met with skepticism in terms of the ways in which the plan connected crime and unruly everyday culture with unemployment and poverty, and linked these issues to a long wave of immigration to the city. The focus on ‘problem areas’, and the contrast with the municipality’s concern of building and marketing luxury developments, has been interpreted as an example of the discursive and material co-emergence of a ‘divided city’ along intersecting class and ethnic lines.446

I, instead, want to emphasize how Welfare for All, like Vinterland’s preoccupation with ‘gangs’, was closely imbricated with the rise of demographic competitiveness and social neoliberalism. Welfare for All tried to deal with what one can divide into four related kinds of problems: the cultural remaking of the city’s peripheries, the disciplining of low wage labor, the policing of urban space, and limiting the migration to Malmö by residents understood to provoke this intense and direct form of regulation. These different bureaucratic problems were connected to the overarching neoliberal project by this plan in representing Malmö’s ‘demographic structure’ as both a problem and envisioning it as a potential. Welfare for All argued that Malmö’s disproportionally large inflow of refugees and other transnational migrants over two decades meant that the city was ‘well prepared to meet future demands of the labor market’. This preparedness was, however, premised on the idea that it would only happen if, and the ‘if’ was set in a bold typeface and underlined, Malmö’s young residents ‘were educated for work’ in a coming post-industrial, creative city.447 Municipal bureaucrats needed to steer such groups with a firm hand away from the pitfalls of ‘polarization, exclusion, and segregation’. Only this active engagement to shape the life-world and lives of the city’s most deprived demographics would make possible the ‘positive use of [the deprived as human] resources’ that a post-industrial future Malmö hinged on.448

Just like the 2000 Comprehensive Plan, Welfare for All was concerned with accumulating human capital. In both documents this was narratively framed as the only way that Malmö could become competitive in a coming post-industrial society. Where the gentle formation of attractive space was seen as key to competing for groups associated with high levels of human capital, more direct, disciplinary, intrusive, and even exclusionary practices were understood as being necessary in order to deal with the city’s deprived areas. The entire range of traditional social regulation was in this way becoming part of Malmö’s neoliberal transformation, with indirect welfare policies making attractive spaces mobilized to compete for human capital and the more direct and disciplinary measures of social regulation aimed at the city’s peripheries.

In this way, governmental legacies of the social democratic postwar system were strategically re-articulated to deal with a demographic structure also partly shaped by this post-industrial legacy. The homes mass-produced for the industrial working class decades before housed, by the early 00s, many thousands of first and second generation migrants that constituted the demographic precondition for the making of a racialized and casualized low-wage economy. Disciplining this labor reserve was the plan’s key to cheaply create the human ‘resources’ to prop up an emerging ‘creative’ economy of more highly skilled workers.

The 2000 Comprehensive Plan had essentially reduced the less human-capital-intense demographics at the city’s peripheries to a problem of strategic disinvestment. Social care was rolled back for groups with low human capital returns through strategically directed fiscal austerity, in order to pool the resources needed to produce attractive space. With Welfare for All a more proactive social regulation strategy for these groups was taking shape. Leaving social reproduction of the city’s fringes to the discipline of market relations was no longer seen as the ideal solution, considering the way that crime and informal economic activities rather than the formal low-wage sector was thriving. A whole range of direct interventions, drawing both on soft strategies wrapped up with education, civil society, and job training and direct discipline like early experiments in workfare, were instead used to address these troublesome groups to ensure that they became part of the ‘demographic structure’ needed for the future.449 The discipline and re-education seen as necessary to kick-start human capital accumulation in these groups focused on instilling a more competitive attitude within existing demographics, rather than competing for desirable demographics as vectors of human capital. The means activated in the regulation of these zones are far more similar to the subjectivating practice of government that Nikolas Rose and Mitchell Dean have associated with the rise of neoliberalism, although co-


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articulated with traditions of disciplinary social regulation, than with the indirect interventions of creating attractive space.\textsuperscript{450} A divided city was certainly produced in the sense that different demographics were addressed in radically different ways. Some were represented and carefully regulated at a distance as vectors of human capital. Others were defined with crude instruments of bureaucratic representation, often drawing on racial clichés, and singled out for intrusive social regulation. This division between how groups were represented and regulated rearticulated old preconceptions of class and ethnicity, but cannot be disentangled from the neoliberal vision of using the city’s social means of intervention to accumulate human capital in the most efficient way.

The discursive framing of many of the most intrusive interventions clearly drew on translocal neoliberal policy exchanges about workfare and public security emanating from the Anglo-American world.\textsuperscript{451} Perceived ‘security’ was, in particular, a key mode of bureaucratic representation in these documents, because security ‘directly affected people disposed to visit, remain in or move to’ Malmö and the city’s demographic composition.\textsuperscript{452} While the Welfare for All plan primarily focused on rolling out new regimes of social regulation in deprived peripheries where potential criminals were implicitly produced, the plan was also specifically concerned with the city center, the place where different demographics were most likely to meet and crimes cutting across groups such as muggings occur. One of the plan’s most dramatic proposal was for the municipality to mount an unprecedented number of CCTV cameras in the central parts of the city along a route known for its many muggings — a controversial proposal declared illegal by regional appeals court.\textsuperscript{453}

In Welfare for All, public safety was taken as crucial for the transforming city’s future ‘success’. The Welfare for All plan thus proposed a policing strategy combining civil society (föreningar), religious institutions, the business community, municipal authorities, and the police to quickly get to grips with, in particular, youth gangs. Decreasing the number of muggings, vandalism and other highly visible kinds of everyday crimes in the city center to make the city feel safer became the point where both municipal strategies for accumulating human capital intersected. Policing public space became a way to both discipline the unruly elements of demographic groups from the city’s peripheries towards formal


\textsuperscript{451} See, for example, Wacquant, Punishing the poor: The neoliberal government of social insecurity.

\textsuperscript{452} Malmö stad, Handlingsplan: ‘Välfärd för alla - det dubbla åtagandet’, p. 11.

employment and a way to safeguard investment in attractive urban space and make sure it remained demographically competitive.454

The main limit that the Welfare for All plan saw in its potentially unending disciplining and reprogramming of ‘exposed’ demographics and its quest to turn them into a human capital ‘resource’ was the strain this placed on the municipality’s finances. To guarantee that the city could afford both the creation of competitive urban space and disciplining the poor, it had to reduce the influx of groups requiring this direct, intense social regulation. With a crude relationship between migration and low human capital underpinning the entire report, the solution the Welfare for All plan opted for was petitioning the government to change the law so that Malmö could limit the number of recently-arrived refugees allowed to settle in the city. This kind of exclusionary regulation was the plan’s authors’ only imaginable solution for mustering enough public funds to both sustain Malmö’s ‘positive development’ and successfully transform the most ‘exposed’ demographics in Malmö’s ‘special areas’.455 The legacy of social statecraft re-deployed in Malmö’s shift to neoliberalism was then not only the indirect cares directed at desirable potential residents through attractive space posed against the discipline and direct reprogramming of existing problematic groups. Also the exclusion of problematic groups — a crucial issue around which Swedish social regulation formed, particularly in response to ‘Travellers’ (tattare), since the late 19th century — was re-articulated as a technical fix to the very new, and very neoliberal, problem of pooling the municipal resources needed to accumulate human capital.456

The Vinterland organizer’s sudden discovery of Folkets park’s ‘gang’ problem in 2002 was only one of several ways in which at this moment security became a strategic issue related to Malmö’s demographic competitiveness through urban renewal across different scales. The gradual differentiation of social regulation as two distinct problems concerning two demographics was crucial to this process. Also the representation of tensions between two distinct groups in public space appears as important precondition for this development.

The Vinterland group’s initial two proposals responding to this tension appear emblematic of the way this issue was represented and regulated, providing a more detailed account of Welfare for All’s visions. On the one hand were those that took seriously the idea of the park as a social resource for the neighborhood. Local youths were, according to this perspective, to be integrated in the project by offering more activities for them or even creating job opportunities for local youths on site, which would resolve the conflict without infringing on their access

to public space as a social resource. This kind of intervention re-articulated traditional social democratic social policy, despite the neoliberal concern with unruly youths undermining the attractiveness of urban space and provoking the problem that was to be solved. Disreputable groups within the working class identified as requiring discipline were singled out for disciplining in these proposals, as they had been for over a century. But the discipline was paired with inclusion in a respectable community that afforded these groups’ rights to public space.

The other kind of proposed solution was monetizing access to the park. When ideas about a small entrance fee to the Vinterland show had been discussed in 2001 — in a context where the local effects of the project had been more emphasized — it was understood to reduce access to the park and therefore scrapped. The exact same idea emerged a few years later, this time precisely because enclosure through monetization created a semi-permeable barrier that would keep out the demographic seen to be disrupting Vinterland’s work. By charging an entrance fee that was small enough to affect the deprived inner city youth’s ability to enter but make little difference to the more affluent suburban demographics with which Vinterland was now preoccupied, the problem could be solved in one swift stroke.

In the end the group settled for a third option. Public access remained free of charge, but no specific efforts were made to include the neighborhood’s youngsters in the project. Instead, Vinterland saw a dramatic increase of private security guards from 2002. From 2004 onwards, these security guards were given strict instructions to explicitly remove any group of youths who were in any way ‘being rowdy’ from what was the only substantial green space of the neighborhood. This move seems consistent with the increasing policing of public space needed to safeguard its function in a planning strategy concerned with regionally competition through attractive space, and prefiguring the disciplining of unruly groups that came to prominence with Welfare for All.

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457 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Blue folder named Malmö stad GK, Vinterland 2003, Artistutvärderingar sammanställning Vinterland.
The bureaucratic representation of ‘gangs’ in Folkets park was part of a larger process where social regulation through urban renewal was being separated into two distinct problems concerning different demographic groups. Compared to the Planning Department’s main document from this time, the rather thin 2005 ‘update and complement’ to the 2000 Comprehensive Plan, the urban renewal practices developed in Folkets park from 2002 onwards appear more refined. The 2005 update had few concrete suggestions to offer when it came to what had now become defined as ‘social sustainability’, and instead focused on the coming creative city’s ‘economic sustainability’ and increased emphasis on ‘attractiveness’ as a ‘short term goal’. One of this plan’s few concrete suggestions for dealing with ‘social sustainability’ was the idea of using ‘meeting places’ to steer pedestrian flows in public space to decrease ethnic segregation and create a sense of security in public space.\footnote{Malmö Stad Malmö stad, Stadsbyggnadskontoret, Malmö 2005: Aktualisering av Malmö översiktsplans, antagen februari 2006, (Malmö: Malmö stad, 2006) p. 18-21.} This deeply social bureaucratic practice for regulating use through space was also prefigured by how the Vinterland plans sought to mobilize the park as a meeting space to both increase the city’s competitiveness and intervene in how its existing residents interacted in public space.

For a variety of reasons, Vinterland ended after being hosted for a sixth time in 2006. Malmö municipality moved its holiday celebration to the medieval old town, remarking that Folkets park had ‘limits for future developability’; a series of problems that included both technical infrastructure, accessibility for tourists, as well as Folkets park’s ethnic and political connotations. The Lilla Torg Square in the city center, the location of the new project Malmövinter which replaced Vinterland, was represented as free from all of these issues. What is most remarkable when comparing Malmövinter’s intended outcomes with the first Vinterland projects from 2001 is how completely the attention had shifted away from local residents. ‘Malmö’s residents, visitors and tourists’ were the only target audience defined for the 2007 Malmövinter project, which consequently displayed no concerns for local or recreational uses.\footnote{Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 29th July 2007 §162, ‘Nytt vinterarrangemang istället för Vinterland i Folkets park’, p. 1-2.}

Initially Vinterland had articulated a tension between two social projects, mobilizing public space for two different demographics across two different scales. By the time Vinterland ended in 2006 it was entirely focused on changing the composition of the park’s visitors, and indirectly contributing to the larger project of remaking Malmö’s demography. For the most part, this change of target audience had been an elusive process of attention silently, slowly being redirected from local to regional visitors. At times, however, these tensions had erupted in open contradictions. Most important was the discussions provoked by ‘youth gangs’, aligning with concerns of disciplining, reeducating, or excluding
undesirable groups — which also was emerging as the flipside of Malmö’s increasing emphasis on making space demographically competitive in the 2004 ‘Welfare for All’ plan.

Vinterland was in this way important for testing new means of enacting demographically competitive space. Folkets park had been designated as a strategic site by the 2000 Comprehensive Plan, which allowed scarce municipal resources to be spent on an area used and inhabited by both the kinds of creative demographics urban planning was concerned with and groups it sought to disinvest in or discipline. Competitive space could in the Vinterland project be disentangled from both the impossibly expensive public subsidies to luxury real estate development and, because of the lack of interest shown by entrepreneurs, the 2001 subcommittee’s crudely economic neoliberal plan that assumed that commercial forces, if left to their own devices, would create attractive public space. Instead, demographic competitiveness became even more informed by the Malmö municipality’s influential legacies of social regulation. Direct municipal interventions in public space, like the Vinterland performances, were understood as crucial tools for attracting desirable demographics and human capital. The representations of unruly youngsters in the making of competitive space provoked more disciplinarian practices, which were also informed by the city’s long tradition of social regulation.

It was not only the vision of attracting more human capital that had begun to take shape in the mid-1990s which articulated postwar social and neoliberal practices of government. The means to achieve this future was also increasingly combining large swathes of the postwar social policy repertoire with neoliberal governmental practices. Shaping this process were tensions between emergent and residual techniques of rule, but also between the material space and demographic patterns left by the collapsing postwar city and the post-industrial visions for a creative and cultured Malmö of the future.

As contradictions between direct bureaucratic intervention and the unleashing of market forces as the best tools to make space demographically competitive were worked out in Vinterland, the same issues emerged in another bureaucratic body. The new management which took over the reins of Folkets park in April 2002 would also come up against tensions between different groups of users and kinds of uses, but unlike the Vinterland group it could not ignore the park’s commercial actors. The new Park Director would instead — in the same years that Vinterland was wrapped up in the reengineering of use along a regional-local tension — directly confront the contradiction between market forces and the social vision of demographically attractive space that Vinterland had sought to circumvent.
Chapter 8
2002–2010:
Regulated commercialization

Commercial uses, social effects

In April 2002, an interdepartmental group of municipal bureaucrats took charge of Folkets park’s renewal and management. This group was scheduled to pass on this task to a more permanent organization managed under the Streets Department by January 2005 and because of this provisional status it became known as Projekt Folkets park. Since the park’s renewal did not work as smoothly as had been imagined in 2001, Projekt Folkets park’s mandates were extended by two years to stretch up until January 2007. This means that the group’s activities almost entirely overlapped with the Vinterland project.463

Both Projekt Folkets park and Vinterland became increasingly enmeshed with the early 2000s preoccupation with regional competition for human capital through attractive space. The types of use these two bodies of bureaucrats were faced with representing and regulating were, however, very different. Therefore, the parallel cases illustrate the different ways that social neoliberalism was taking shape in the exact same time and place. Comparing them serves as a reminder that there might be fundamental tensions within a bureaucratic formation even as it is emerging.

Just as with Vinterland, Projekt Folkets park was deeply shaped by tensions between social ways of representing uses of public space as either local or regional and the way in which this distinction was linked to recreation and entertainment.

463 Because it operated outside and across the normal bureaucratic structures, only fragments of Projekt Folkets park’s paperwork are archived, but its work can be followed through the working papers collected in the personal files of one of its members.
These categories were, as shown in Chapter 6, crucial in the 2001 subcommittee memo on an ‘experience center for an expanding region’ that led up to the creation of Projekt Folkets park. The priority of regional competition for new visitors through commercial entertainment that the 2001 memo had built on was, however, tempered by the final political decision that amended the proposal and provided the new management groups with its formal mandate. This amendment clearly designated local-recreational uses as the most important ones for Projekt Folkets park. The new management was also asked to ‘strengthen’ the park’s ‘regional role and market [itself] in terms of entertainment, conferences, etc’, but only as long as this didn’t threaten Folkets park’s primary role as a local recreational green space.464

The most important difference between Projekt Folkets park and Vinterland was that the new management group was responsible for coordinating efforts among the park’s private leaseholders. A large proportion of the park’s cultural activities that the Projekt group was to coordinate were, by 2002, connected to commercial firms in one way or another. Projekt Folkets park was thus forced to draw on market forces in the park’s renewal, unlike Vinterland, which came to pursue this agenda outside, and to some degree against, the park’s commercial uses. Managing tensions between social and economic planning practices and uses — an issue which had undone so many earlier neoliberal renewal plans — thus became a crucial task for Projekt Folkets park.

The ‘entertainment center’ memo had understood the ‘burning interest’ of commercial firms as a powerful renewal dynamic that explained the relationship between regional visitors to Folkets park and commercial entertainment.465 Despite their mandate to focus on local uses and users, this understanding of commercial forces as powerful agents of renewal also shaped the Projekt Folkets park group’s work. The November 2001 amendment to the memo made any large-scale, rapid privatization of the park impossible, forcing any turn to commercial forces to be gradual. Folkets park’s new management had inherited a model for renewal that relied on commercial forces as a key driver of attractive space, but also a political situation that limited both the use of such economic means.

These preconditions made the park’s existing firms a strategic resource for making this public space attractive on a regional scale. Just a year after Bo01’s early setbacks, and months after the heated debate about Folkets park, the Projekt group had all but forgotten about their official mandate to tone down regional completion through commercialization. Instead, the newly appointed management

464 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 13th November 2001 §184, ‘Förslag till omorganisation av verksamheten i Folkets park’, p. 3-4, 6.
group immediately began to treat the park’s existing commercial entertainment firms as a strategic resource for urban development. While Vinterland from 2002 onwards had focused on attracting desirable demographics to Folkets park and abandoned any hope of using commercial forces to do so, Projekt Folkets park illustrated an alternative model that relied on economic practices to realize the same neoliberal social vision. Projekt Folkets park’s gradual turn to visions of attractive space through commercial entertainment would, in the years that followed, articulate deep contradictions with the group’s careful representations of what demographic effects commercial actors had on the park’s everyday use.

Tensions between Projekt Folkets park’s reliance on the economic self-activity of the private sector and the group’s visions of demographic changes in the park’s pattern of use can be tracked from the very first draft for a strategic renewal plan written by the new management group. This plan, written in the spring of 2002, divided the group’s work into three discrete categories. The first category was marked by the first Vinterland project — held a few months before — in that it was concerned with reinforcing the park’s municipally-sponsored cultural events program. A second category related to more strategic and better-funded public relations strategy for the park and its many stakeholders, including commercial firms. Finally, a third category of tasks defined by this group concerned the fact that the park’s outdoor environment was still run down and required physical renewal efforts.

All these tasks articulated tensions between visions of attractive space and the market as a tool to achieve this end. This can, for instance, be seen in Projekt Folkets park’s efforts to organize a cultural events program. Representations of the park’s actual commercial actors, even in these early drafts, clearly marked a difference with the model of market-driven attractive space. The underlying assumption when approaching the cultural events program was that commercial entertainment would attract new visitors to Folkets park, but that the rhythm with which the commercial forces operated was opportunistic and reinforced existing patterns of everyday use. To make sure that the park offered a ‘varied program throughout both the summer and winter season’, Projekt Folkets park had to compensate for the market’s cyclical consumption patterns. The project group thus had to focus on organizing free cultural events during the winter and on weekdays to counteract the market’s bias.

A similar tension marked the same plan’s discussions of the park’s public relations strategy. The drives and abilities of commercial actors to attract new demographics were represented in both suspicious and enthusiastic terms. Certain kinds of marketing tactics of the park’s commercial forces were to be encouraged

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466 Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, Malmö Folkets park – Organisation och projektbeskrivning, p. 6-9.
and others discouraged by leveraging the sizable park-wide public relations budget to promote certain kinds of market behaviors. The rather short public relations plan emphasized at three different points that all firms renting space in the park were going to be called to meetings on a regular basis, and that participation was mandatory for those wanting their events to be included in the municipal public relations efforts. While the park’s commercial actors were seen as crucial to attracting new visitors, only those willing to be disciplined and contribute to the new management group’s ideal mix of cultural events could expect to have their publicity paid by Projekt Folkets park.468 The common theme in all these discussions was a tension between market forces’ potential to attract new and desirable types of visitors, and the means that the planners felt was necessary to achieve this end. These tensions were, however, only minor glitches compared to massive contradictions articulated as Projekt Folkets park began to draw on commercial firms in the park’s physical renewal, the third task defined in the new management’s renewal strategy.

Contradictions of commercial entertainment

The Projekt Folkets park group’s first large-scale renewal project that came to rely on, and articulate contradictions with, commercial uses was inviting firms to make bids on setting up fairground rides in the park. The disastrous 1980s amusement park plan had caused the immense debts that forced the social democratic municipal majority to buy the park and turn it into an actual public green space, as discussed in Chapter 4. All the parks’ rides but one had been sold off in the early 1990s, but a private firm had leased space for a few smaller fairground rides and a Ferris Wheel during much of the 1990s.469 This rather modest amusement park was, according to a large phone poll conducted by Gallup on behalf of Projekt Folkets park during the summer of 2002, the ‘attraction’ that led to the highest number of visits to the park.470 Based on this dataset Projekt Folkets park envisioned a larger amusement park as an important step to attract more visitors. A plan was quickly drawn up to increase the number of rides to at least 20, and letters sent out to carousel operators in the hope of getting half a dozen bids.471 However, Projekt Folkets

468 Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, Malmö Folkets park – Organisation och projektbeskrivning, p. 5, 6, 8.
469 Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Stadsträdgårdsmästarens ritningsarkiv, Binder marked ‘Folkets park II’, Intresseanmälan, Tivoli- och Lotteriverksamhet, Malmö Folkets park, no pagination [1].
park only received two bids. One was from *Cederholms*, the local company that had leased space in the park for amusement rides since 1999, and one from the much larger company *Axels Tivoli*. The differences between the rides that the two companies suggested to place in the park were described as ‘minimal’, but one can detect a clear difference in tone of their cover letters.\(^{472}\) The international fun fair giant Axels emphasized that their company had the ‘biggest travelling amusement park’ in Scandinavia and the ‘knowledge of what was popular on the market’.\(^{473}\) Cederholms’ letter instead drew on the 1990s local planning discourse focused on inclusion of the immediate community, which they must have been well familiar with from their years in Folkets park. In their pitch, Cederholms stressed that they wanted the park to be ‘for the benefit of all’ and that they therefore wanted to ‘maintain low prices for the rides’.\(^{474}\)

These different perspectives on accessibility did not register in the discussions transcribed in the minutes of Projekt Folkets park, indicating that local uses were already being eclipsed by visions of increased demographic attractiveness. Neither was the popularity of Cederholms rides that the Gallup poll had identified mentioned in this discussion. What turned out to be the deciding factor was instead Axels Tivoli’s willingness to pay a lease almost four times that of Cederholms’. Axels Tivoli’s bid was unanimously accepted by the Projekt Folkets park group meeting in December 2002.\(^{475}\) This short term increase in revenue streams was entangled with the idea of the strictly commercial Axels’ having more incentives to make making Folkets park a more attractive place, which the park’s 2002 annual report made clear by emphasizing a larger amusement park as a makeover for the entire park rather than a boost to Projekt Folkets park’s budget.\(^{476}\)

The great expectations kept growing as the 2003 season crept closer. When in January Axels Tivoli announced that ‘Northern Europe’s largest Ferris wheel’, measuring a full 45 meters, was on its way to Folkets park, local tabloids rejoiced at the addition to Malmö’s skyline.\(^{477}\) The park again made headlines a few months later, this time in the largest regional newspaper *Sydsvenskan*, where Axels’ owners boasted that their rides would compete with the much larger amusement parks in Copenhagen.\(^{478}\) Some months later the park’s new tenants again made the

\(^{472}\) Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, *Styrgrupp Projekt Folkets Park, Extramöte den 5 december 2002 kl. 10.00-10.45*, no pagination [2].

\(^{473}\) Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Stadsträdgårdsmästarens ritningsarkiv, Binder marked ‘Folkets park II’, *Störst och festligast! Axels tivoli*, 2003, no pagination [3].

\(^{474}\) Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Stadsträdgårdsmästarens ritningsarkiv, Binder marked ‘Folkets park II’, *Mycket Nöje med Cederholms tivoli, Intresseanmälan arrendeavtal Tivoli & Lotteriverksamhet år 2002* [sic], 2003, no pagination [14].

\(^{475}\) Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, *Styrgrupp Projekt Folkets Park, Extramöte den 5 december 2002 kl. 10.00-10.45*, no pagination [2].


\(^{477}\) Högsta Pariserhjulet till Malmö i vår’, *Kvällsposten*, January 30th 2003, p. 31.

newspapers again. Axels’ blatant commercialism, with ‘airbrushed quasi-pornographic girls’ on its ticket booths and rides, became the hook for a longer Sydsvenskan story about ‘Sweden’s oldest People’s park coming to terms with a new identity’.\(^{479}\)

Looking at these, and other, mostly enthusiastic local press clippings, it would appear that opting for Axels not only had made economic sense. It also seemingly confirmed the hypothesis that commercial forces ‘burning interest’ in attracting more customers was indeed the powerful tool for making the park more attractive it had been made out to be.\(^{480}\) The same theory was developed in Projekt Folkets park’s 2003 annual report. This document identified the combination of the Projekt’s own efforts to beautify the park and Axels’ new rides as the main factors contributing to what, through phone polls, was identified as an amazing 50% increase in total visitors — almost half of which were from the increasingly sought-after suburban and tourist target audiences.\(^{481}\)

This initial enthusiasm soon warped into a more troubled relationship between commerce and attractive space. The first instance of Axels’ being represented as a planning problem demanding intervention was in the working papers of the architecture firm Svenska Landskap that had been commissioned to create a new informal plan for proceeding with the park’s physical renewal in 2002.\(^{482}\) A short file on Axels contained a map of how to place the rides for the coming season, and two pages with photographs of the different rides. Most of the photos focused on the recurring theme of airbrushed paintings of semi-nude women covering several of the rides that the Sydsvenskan story also had remarked on. The only comments made in this draft was a brief note: ‘proposal: do something about the somewhat tacky “decorations” of booths and attractions’.\(^{483}\) Whether the tacky paintings ever were discussed with Axels is uncertain. This type of ethnographic mode of representation would however continue to identify troublesome uses of space associated with the company’s attitude to doing business in a way that called into question the whole logic that the competitive drives of commercial forces were contributing to making public space attractive.

\(^{483}\) Malmö stad, Gatukontoret, Stadsträdgårdsmästarens ritningsarkiv, Binder marked ‘Folkets park – Svenska landskap’, Tivolit – äkattraktioner placering.
Traces of how Axels’ business practices forced itself on Projekt Folkets park’s renewal schemes can be noted again three years later. In a section with newspaper clippings in a Projekt Folkets park binder mostly concerned with public relations materials, the articles with smiling face of Axels’ CEO talking about the excellent prospects for their third season in Folkets park were interrupted by a different topic. A print-out from Swedish National Radio’s website with the headline ‘Romanian workers getting low wages’ quoted migrant workers talking about 80 hour workweeks with less than a tenth of the union-negotiated minimum wage, paid in cash to evade tax. After an unrelated clipping that coincidently also concerned bad business practices in Folkets park (albeit in the form of underage drinking and fist fights at Amiralen), there follows a handwritten list of negative TV and radio items covering Axels’ Malmö branch.

The last line of this note reads ‘LO + Axels Tivoli’, referring to the social democratic central union confederation Landsorganisationen, commonly abbreviated ‘LO’. While Landsorganisationen isn’t mentioned in any of the files’ other clippings, what the cryptic note referred to can easily be identified when looking outside Projekt Folkets park’s fragmentary archives. The powerful union confederation responded to allegations directed at Axels by releasing a statement saying that they had cancelled their 2005 annual ‘family days’ that were to take place in Folkets park. The movement that once had help found the park could ‘not with any credibility’ invite their members and families to a place that only days before had made national headlines with its blatant exploitation of unorganized labor, as their spokesperson explained in the Kvällsposten tabloid. Malmö City’s Head Gardener and member of the Projekt Folkets park management group, was reported to have called Axels’ CEO to discuss whether tax fraud — suggested by the allegation of Axel paying employees their meager salaries cash-in-hand — constituted a breach of contract with Folkets park that merited evicting the firm from the park. Pressure increased further as the security risks associated with overworked workers who couldn’t communicate with the amusement park’s customers in Swedish or English also became a topic for discussion in the press.

The park’s management had in the end no choice but to leave the contract in place with two thirds of the season to go, in order not to lose what they considered to be the park’s most popular attraction. They publicly demanded that Axels improve service toward customers, but dismissed allegations of tax fraud and lower-than-union-negotiated wages by saying that they took Axels’ CEO as a man

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484 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Green folder marked ‘Folkets park 2005’, Rumänska arbetare får dålig lön.
of his word when he declared that these accusations were nothing but rumors.\textsuperscript{487} Axels Tivoli thus managed to hang on to their Folkets park site, even if they had to take measures to appear less insensitive to the park’s historical labor movement heritage. That Axels’ 2005 commitments perhaps were less comprehensive than Projekt Folkets park wished can be seen in a letter dated 24 April 2006. In this brief note the park’s private security staff complained of an unlicensed and non-uniformed ‘night watch’ of untrained migrant workers guarding Axels’ fairground rides armed with illegal batons.\textsuperscript{488} Regular labor relations had clearly not been implemented, despite the company almost losing its best contract in the region because of the public relations catastrophe its employment strategy had caused.

The issue surfaced a few months later in a yearly poll through which the park’s management benchmarked its success rate in transforming the public’s opinions and experiences of the park. As noted in a debriefing meeting with the Projekt Folkets park group, 30% of the people polled that said that they had read or heard something negative about Folkets park mentioned ‘underpaid workers, untaxed wages, or a bad work environment’.\textsuperscript{389} This was indeed the only item identified by the poll that was brought up as an urban development problem by the meeting, but despite these representations of Axels’ less-than-ideal uses of the park, no concrete interventions were drawn up for the 2006 season. What had appeared as the best bid for including commercial forces in the park’s renewal in the winter of 2002 had within three years provoked bureaucratic representations demanding interventions if the renewal process was not to be derailed.

Those of Projekt Folkets park documents that have been archived from the mid 2000s contain few mentions of Axels Tivoli. Local newspapers are, however, dotted with articles illustrating how the company’s business practices continued to be a source of negative publicity for the park. Newspaper articles on the issue also give some insight into how the Projekt group responded to this — even if the actual process of representing this kind of use by planning bureaucrats cannot be discerned from this secondary source. The most serious issues reported concerned the safety of Axels’ customers, which continued to be a problem in years that followed. In July 2007 a municipal inspector found 40 different faults in Axels’ rides, including ‘electrical problems’ that could lead to ‘serious accidents’.\textsuperscript{490} A year later a serious accident in fact occurred when a 12-year-old child got stuck under a carousel car.\textsuperscript{491} The firm could not maintain the high level of safety they had promised, and despite renewed inspections two more accidents took place in

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\item[489] Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, Styrgrupsmöte 2005-12-16.
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In addition, also outside Folkets park was Axels’ approach of lowering costs by pushing its unskilled workforce beyond their limits in the companies many traveling fun fairs connected to a series of accidents. Most serious was one of the firm’s workers dying in a fire as he fell asleep exhausted inside a truck with a cigarette still burning. These articles were often connected to the company’s activities in the historically-charged Folkets park, even when such events took place far away from Malmö. Safety concerns were not the only way that the everyday business practices of Axels Tivoli became represented in local media as problems requiring municipal intervention. Oil leaks leading to ground pollution allegedly caused by the company ended up as a court case, when Axels’ refused to pay for the cleanup. The National Lottery Inspection threatened to close down Axels’ Folkets park branch after several warnings about underage gambling on site. Another disappointment came in the summer of 2007, when Axels’ rides were closed down and shipped to winter storage several weeks before the season ended because the firm didn’t find it to be ‘economically profitable’ to keep them going after the number of visitors had reached their yearly peak.

When the amusement park contract was up for renewal in 2007 and 2009, the park’s management was very open with the fact that they had tried, but failed, to get bids from other companies than Axel’s Tivoli. Activating the market not only lead to undermined safety, exploited migrant workers, legal proceedings over oil leakage, and rides closed down before the end of season generating the very opposite of attractive space as well as negative publicity. The way that the different commercial actors had divided the market between them meant that a competitive bidding process forced Projekt Folkets park to renew a contract with a business they had increasingly serious issues with. The park’s management signed a final one-year contract with Axels for the 2013 season, meanwhile making clear that the firm, after ten years of strained relations, were no longer included in the plans for the park’s future. Still not having found a better option for running the amusement park on the market, plans were announced to not replace Axels after their contract expired, despite the fact that an amusement park had been

495 Skånska dagbladet, 18th July 2008, ‘Axels hotas av indraget tillstånd’.
496 Kvällsposten, 30th August 2007, ‘Slutsnurrat i Folkets park’, p. 44.
understood as a necessary part of the vision for Folkets park only a few years earlier.\textsuperscript{497}

In a 2012 plan for the park the reasons for evicting Axels, only hinted at in Projekt Folkets park’s papers, are stated more explicitly. The plan confirmed that Axels Tivoli was ‘very well known among residents of Malmö and other’ visitors and was the park’s main attraction. But Axels’ effects on the demographic patterns of use were represented as undermined by the company itself. Axels’ rides were also the part of the park that most people had negative opinions about and Axels’ rides were considered ‘ugly, expensive, and outdated’. To this were added issues like ‘enduring problems around ground pollution, noise pollution for local residents, recurrent media attention as to how the carousel business is conducted in the park’. Finally, the ‘deserted and uncared-for park environment’ created by the boarded-up stands and empty carousel lots after the summer season, when it was commercially unviable to keep Axels’ open for business, was seen as a ‘great problem’ that could only be remedied by removing the amusement park altogether.\textsuperscript{498}

Axels’ activities in Folkets park had from the start been enmeshed with visions of attractive public space, and commercial forces as a necessary way to achieve this end. Giving the contract to this firm was never merely an economic question of maximizing revenue streams, with Projekt Folkets park’s activities largely financed by a hefty municipal budget. Projekt Folkets park’s use of commercial actors like Axels instead signaled a break with ideas about economic competitiveness which had been dominant in early 1990s and again had come to the fore in the 2001 committee. The 2003 contract with Axels illustrated that commercial actors were again being seen as a way of making public space attractive. No longer was direct municipal intervention drawing on traditional social planning practices, such as that which had emerged with Bo01 and the Comprehensive Plan and developed further in the Vinterland project, the only option.

It was bureaucratic representations of Axels’ ambiguous social effects on the everyday uses of space that provoked municipal interventions, regulation, and finally the firm’s expulsion from Folkets park. Planners identified Axels as clearly increasing the park’s regional competitiveness for visitors, but this was not enough. The market’s productive capacity also displayed disturbing side effects, ultimately represented as being so severe that municipal bureaucrats had no other option than to force Axels out of Folkets park. Using commercial forces to


\textsuperscript{498} Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 23th January 2013 §19 Utveckling av Folkets park — bordlagt ärende 2012-12-12.
produce attractive public space was a promising urban planning practice, but was also a renewal model that had turned out to be more difficult to implement than expected.

Physical framing of commercial uses

The contradictory social effects of market forces illustrated by the Axels Tivoli story is mirrored by how representations of firms as renewal resource in the park’s many buildings came to articulate contradictions in the same period. The long and complex history of commercial firms and quasi-commercial associations renting indoor space in the park had, since the 1980s, provoked planning interventions. Social representations of how these buildings were used had often come to clash with economically-inflected plans that primarily focused on maximizing rent streams, as has been shown in Chapters 4 and 5. Balancing budgets through increasing rents was, however, not a necessary renewal outcome after 2002 when the better funded Projekt Folkets park took over the park’s management. Pressure on the park’s management to maximize rent streams thus faded. Instead, the social effects that commercial entertainment had on the park’s uses was emerging as a problem that had to be known and regulated.

There were five relatively large buildings in the park being run as nightclubs, restaurants, or theatres when the new management began their work in April 2002, most of which have figured in previous chapters. In the middle of Folkets park was Far i hatten, a tiny restaurant dating from 1894 with an outdoor dance floor. For years, social democratic veterans had rented the space cheaply to host cultural events and dances for seniors and thus kept it from becoming totally dilapidated. Just next to Far i hatten was the mock Moorish 1903 music hall Moriskan with its minarets and a mosque-like dome. It contained three large dance floors, an outdoor stage, and a large and recently refurbished kitchen that was able to serve several hundred guests. The 1991 contract with Profilrestauranger, the company that leased Moriskan and Amiralen, stipulated that they would only pay 8% of their yearly turnover in the venues, as discussed in relation to the Vinterland festival in chapter 7. The 1939 yellow brick and glass Amiralen dance hall, on the park’s northern edge, was built in a modernist style and contained what for much of the 20th century had been Malmö’s largest dance floor.499

Wall to wall with Amiralen was Nya Teatern, originally a large cinema, also built in 1939. Nya Teatern had been rented as a theatre by Malmö’s City Theatre (Malmö stadsteater) from 1965 until the commercial firm Nöjesteatern took over

499 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Green folder marked ‘Folkets park II’, Underlag för dispositionsplan, preliminär version 2002-10-14, p. 3-6
the contract in 1992 to host musicals, revues, and comedy shows. These shows regularly sold out, but Nöjesteatern’s only entrance was facing the street rather than the park, so this daily rhythm of visitors only marginally effected Folkets park itself. Just on the other side of Folkets park’s main entrance from Amiralen was a smaller and somewhat rundown wooden building, Möllevångsgården, that since 1999 had been leased out cheaply to the alternative music association Inkonst. In the middle of the park was a disused indoor dance hall, Brändan, that for much of the 2000’s was used by Axels’ as a video game arcade. In addition Folkets park also hosted a small petting zoo, a tiny stable with a few ponies, a small ‘reptile house’, and two different fast food restaurants operating in small kiosk-like buildings — all of which were run by commercial firms — as well as a children’s theatre group that leased a building on the park’s southern edge.500

In the 2002 ‘Basis for a plan of disposition’ (Underlag för dispositionsplan), Projekt Folkets park’s very first spatial plan, leasing buildings to suitable firms was discussed as a strategy to intervene in the park’s patterns of use. Market forces figured in these discussions, with tension between visions of a market-driven making of attractive space and representations of actual market uses articulating contradictions in a way recognizable from the Axels debacle. The ‘Basis for a plan of disposition’ drew on the connection between users and uses suggested by the 2001 committee’s ‘entertainment center’ plan. Unlike the 2001 plan, the ‘Basis for a plan of disposition’ argued that one could discern five different kinds of functions in the park, with each having different geographic reach. Folkets park was used for everything from everyday recreational activities, which mainly attracted local residents, to hosting famous artists who attracted visitors from across the region. The ‘Basis for a plan of disposition’ suggested that the park’s ‘physical environment’ was to be designed to ‘support all’ these different uses, without mentioning that Projekt Folkets park had formally been tasked with focusing on local users and uses less than a year earlier. This slide back towards regional competition — and the large-scale entertainment focused on commercial artists it was anchored to — continued, in that the plan prioritized renewal of those venues expected to have the widest geographic reach.501

The manner in which the renewal plans connected desired demographic effects to commercial entertainment sparked tensions. Comparing two drafts of the ‘Basis for a plan of disposition’, one made in October 2002 and the other in March 2003, one change of phrasing concerning one of the buildings mentioned in it is striking. Just as in the Vinterland project and before that with Folkets park Cultural Association, this change was concerned with the ‘underuse’ of Moriskan. This

500 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Green folder marked ‘Folkets park II’, Underlag för dispositionsplan, preliminär version 2002-10-14, p. 3-6.
representation of actual commercial forces using the park did not live up to the vision of the commercially-driven making of attractive public space.

The first draft of the ‘Basis for a plan of disposition’ enthusiastically noted that the outdoor stage of Moriskan could accommodate an audience of 1500 people, the kind of figure needed for booking an artist with regional reach, and that a plan for improving the stage’s design just had been finished. While the Moriskan restaurant previously hadn’t had ‘any activities during the summer season’, the tenant was described as planning to be open seven days a week during the peak summer season of 2003. Only minor details about Projekt Folkets park’s plans for other buildings had changed in the second version of the same document, drafted a few months later. But among those few things was one crucial phrase concerning Moriskan. The second version sourly noted that ‘Previous plans for keeping the restaurant open during the summer will most probably not be realized’. 502

Whatever happened to the plan for a new stage and outdoor area is unclear, but no sketches or decisions are left in the archives, nor was a building permit application filed in the following years. The initial enthusiasm for helping this commercial firm to draw in new visitors to the park plainly vanished with the leaseholder’s unwillingness to make use of space along the lines envisioned in this plan. Even using Moriskan in the most basic way had not materialized, that is by serving drinks and food on a regular basis in an outdoor seating space that was to be renovated with public money specifically for the tenant’s needs. The disparity between represented and envisioned social effects of Folkets park’s commercial uses was striking.

Similar plans were also made for Amiralen, the massive but almost always empty dance hall leased by Profilrestauranger. Its long-abandoned outdoor dance floor was to be demolished and the wooden fence between it and the rest of Folkets park pulled down in order to create a more welcoming ‘entrance space’ for the entire park. Because planners also expected Amiralen to expand its restaurant service, plans were made to seize these ‘new opportunities for designing the space’ as an outdoor space with tables along the park’s main footpath. The architecture firm Svenska Landskap was commissioned to design this second outdoor seating space in the park, which was to be finished in early 2004. But in the very first of Projekt Folkets park’s archived meeting minutes, this plan was also unceremoniously scrapped. The unexpectedly unenthusiastic attitude of the unentrepreneurial entrepreneur leasing Folkets park’s two largest buildings toward attracting more customers had foiled these attempts to physically renew the park and allow the market to attract more desirable visitors. 503

502 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Green folder marked ‘Folkets park II’, Underlag för dispositionsplan, preliminär version 2002-10-14, p. 4; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Green folder marked ‘Folkets park II’, Underlag för dispositionsplan, steg 2 2003-03-25, p. 4.
503 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Green folder marked ‘Folkets park II’, Underlag för dispositionsplan, preliminär version 2002-10-14, p. 7; Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal
How Projekt Folkets park was forced to adapt to these tensions between represented and envisioned commercial uses, and their social effects on patterns of visitors, can be seen in the 2005 opening of a new restaurant and club. Just before the new Projekt Folkets park started their work in 2002 the Streets Department had decided to move a pavilion left over from the Bo01 exhibition to Folkets park as a way to cheaply mobilize a prize-winning architectural piece already owned by the municipality in the renewal process. The pavilion, an eight-meter tall, almost heart-shaped building with glass walls designed by Stockholm architects SandellSandberg, kept its exhibition name Orangeriet (‘The Conservatory’), and was relocated to the park’s main entrance, opposite Amiralen.

In 2004 one of the more ambitious municipal bureaucrats in Projekt Folkets park made a lengthy pitch about the potential of using the pavilion’s ‘Caribbean climate’ by opening, together with an independent entrepreneur, a ‘Hemingwayean’ bar. The park’s management realized it would not ‘be easy’ to pull this project off, but added that ‘a new contribution to the park’ was worth the risk and decided to move along with the somewhat outlandish idea. Cuba Café, as the bar came to be called once it opened in 2005, was from this first pitch envisioned as a ‘concept’ that would be controlled by the municipality. The venue should draw on ‘a jovial Cuban mood’ orchestrated through ‘an elaborate operational plan with qualitative and effective targets’ and the ‘restaurateur should follow this concept and not have control over the operations’. This addition to the park’s entertainment industry was clearly designed to primarily have a social effect, to produce a certain kind of experience through a highly-orchestrated type of business venture propped up by municipal support in order to change patterns of use. To these ends, the brand-new building was renovated using public money, and Projekt Folkets park even contemplated ‘cultural exchanges with Cuba’ to add authenticity to this highly-staged cultural experience.

Cuba Café was designed as a unique spatial container in which the appropriate commercial actors could be embedded, rather than relying on the creative

505 Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, Styrgruppssmöte projekt Folkets Park, den 11 juni 2004 kl. 10.00-12.00 (Flyttat från den 9 juni 2004 kl. §5.00-17.00, no pagination [2]; Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, ‘Styrgrupp Projekt Folkets Park’, den 3 februari 2005 kl. 08.30-10.30, Flyttat från den 26 januari kl. 13.00-15.00, no pagination [5]; Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, ‘Styrgrupp Projekt Folkets Park’, den 3 februari 2005 kl. 08.30-10.30, Flyttat från den 26 januari kl. 13.00-15.00, no pagination [5].

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capacities of private interests to create cultural forms that intervened in the park’s pattern of use. Even before the ‘intended restaurateur’ had been given the keys to the building, a decorator was contracted and a celebrity TV gardener employed by the municipality to create ‘a Cuban feeling’ in and around Orangeriet. This interventionist attitude appears to have worked well in this case. Cuba Café was given the highest approval ratings of all the park’s attractions in the yearly phone poll for 2005. In economic terms, Orangeriet was a blank slate. There were no businesses or any other specific groups that had legitimate claims that had to be deciphered, negotiated and integrated in the planning visions. With the generous municipal budget available the building was refurbished and a new kitchen built, as well as an outdoor makeover, creating seating space, giving the welcoming impression that the scrapped plans for Amiralen had originally intended.

The lessons Projekt Folkets park drew from their involvement in Cuba Café appeared to be similar to what their protracted dealings with Axels Tivoli and Profilrestauranger suggested. Commercial uses had proven to be effective economic means for social neoliberalism’s ends. Planners could leverage commercial firms to produce attractive space, but only by regulating and embedding firms into carefully-constructed situations. At the same time that Vinterland increasingly detached its social vision of demographic competition from commercial forces as a way of intervening in space, Projekt Folkets park was also becoming disenchanted with the free rule of market forces. After so many disappointments with commercial forces in the park’s renewal, Cuba Café had illustrated that there were alternative ways of using the market.

Making markets work

During the winter of 2004–2005 Möllevångsgården, a run-down 600m² building at the western edge of Folkets park, became empty. For some time relations had been strained between the municipal authorities and Inkonst, the non-profit cultural association which had hosted an eclectic mix of events in the rented space since 1999. A letter from Inkonst’s second year in the park mentions what appear to be serious ‘conflicts’ around the same time that the Streets Department filed

507 Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, Bilaga till punkt 4 GFK marknadsundersökning (Styrgrupper 2005-12-16), no pagination [2].
complaints about Inkonst’s drunken customers jumping the fence into the actual park after official opening hours.509 The association’s way of supplementing meager municipal grants for its commercially non-viable cultural program with a strategy that operated in the darker shades of a legal gray area become a source of much public debate by 2002. Inkonst had gradually turned its jazz sets, post-punk shows, and poetry slam sessions into an after-hours club without permits and sold alcohol to whoever agreed to pay a token membership fee. The public secret of the municipally-sponsored alternative culture scene selling alcohol without permits became a local media story that refused to go away. After a long struggle with surprise inspections, frozen municipal grants, falling behind on rent and the prospects of renovations causing a tripled rent, Inkonst decided to leave Folkets park in 2005 in search of a better venue. These renovation plans for Möllevångsgården tied into Projekt Folkets park’s larger strategy of using physical renewal as a means of changing how the park was used, rather than primarily being driven by economic desires to close a rent gap or boost rents on municipal real estate. The form this renewal took was, however, shaped by the municipality’s accumulating conflicts with Inkonst, again illustrating how the tensions of everyday uses of space were represented with important effects for urban renewal plans. 510

Inkonst was clearly a cultural resource, an important site making Malmö a node in several translocal alternative cultural networks that reinforced the notion of the park’s entertainment industry having a regional reach. The designs for the new Möllevångsgården were concerned with creating a material space that would reinforce this function, with more space for larger audiences in front of a larger and better designed stage. Projekt Folkets park’s discussions after Inkonst decided to move made absolutely clear that that improving the young, alternative music scene in the park was a key vision that the renovation was expected to realize. But Inkonst’s use of the venue was not only represented as a resource to be encoded in

the renewal process’ design of physical space. The association’s semi-illegal alcohol sales had encouraged the kind of disreputable uses of space that planners had been concerned with mapping and banishing from the park since the late 1990s. That this representation of disreputable use had been at work in the Inkonst renewal is hinted at by how the future leaseholder was discussed in terms of having a strong commitment to creating a ‘drug-free’ environment in contrast to Inkonst’s far more lax attitude.511

The planners did not only vaguely define this change of use as a desirable outcome, but physically intervened in space, just like with Cuba Café, to achieve this end. The building’s larger stage was to allow for larger acts to play in Möllevångsgården and enable a more commercial business less prone to relying on the informal economy of beer sold without a license. Renovating the building’s kitchen and building a separate dining area were also seen as physical preconditions for more respectable patterns of alcohol consumption. The substantial rent increase the municipality demanded after its renovation to compensate for their investment, and the higher running costs that keeping a kitchen staff appropriate to the size of the kitchen and dining area, almost physically precluded the after-hours business model that Inkonst had relied upon.512

There were however several other strictly commercial cultural actors that saw an economic opportunity in taking over the newly renovated Möllevångsgården after Inkonst.513 As with the Cuba Café, selecting the right bid for the building was considered a renewal issue with profound social effects on the park’s pattern of use, rather than a strictly economic issue of maximizing municipal rent streams. To avoid alternative and youth culture again becoming a gateway to undesirable business practices, the large Stockholm-based indie music ‘franchise’ Debaser was selected to rent Möllevångsgården in the spring of 2006.514 Debaser did not only embody cultural networks similar to Inkonst that catered to the ‘young


513 Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, Till styrgruppen för projektet Folkets park, Angående verksamhet i Möllevångsgården, no pagination [1].

Malmö’, a visitor demographic at risk after Inkonst’s departure. The park’s managers argued that Debaser’s ‘high-quality food concept’ and the club’s explicit demand to rent the whole building and parts of the park for a large outdoor serving space revealed the firm’s strong economic commitment to a Folkets park branch. With Debaser, Projekt Folkets park would get the kind of commercial firm envisioned in earlier planning documents that was understood to invest private capital in competing for customers, thus making the park attractive beyond the local scale.

Debaser’s strictly commercial plan was thus understood as one in which a physical intervention, the renovation, interacted with a strategic embedding of commercial forces to shape Folkets park as a competitive public space. The significant part of the park included in the Debaser contract to increase the Möllevångsgården outdoor seating capacity to 700 was framed as an achieved development target in the final report on Projekt Folkets park’s activities, rather than as an enclosure of public space by private interests. Having found a leaseholder ‘that is decisively directed inwards to the park’, thus making the park’s public space more attractive, was underlined in this paper. What was not highlighted was that the park was increasing rent streams by leasing a larger space.

With Debaser opening just next to Cuba Café, the vision of commercial firms as a means to create attractive space, that is lively patterns of everyday use by visitors from beyond the neighborhood, seemed to be confirmed. The careful regulation of commercial forces by orchestrating their physical and institutional conditions had been crucial in this work, rather than the free market-approach that had been suggested in the 2001 committee’s ‘entertainment center’ memo. Meanwhile, Profilrestauranger was proving as uncooperative as ever in Projekt Folkets park’s efforts to push through similar changes for Amiralen and Moriskan.

I would suggest that this specific way that planners deployed market actors to compete for visitors must be understood as regulated commercialization. This approach was profoundly shaped by the contradictions that were articulated in the park’s renewal. Only the incessant failure of commercial forces to live up to Chicagorean neoliberal expectations of the magic of markets had forced planners to rethink what had been an assumed relationship between the market’s competitiveness and the production of attractive space. Furthermore, the way in which social uses of space had splintered into two different issues over several

515 Malmö stad, Arrangemangsheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, Till styrgruppen för projektet Folkets park, Angående verksamhet i Möllevångsgården, no pagination [1].
years informed the visions of attractive public space that Cuba Café and Debaser were seen as more precise and powerful tools for creating.

The regulated commercialization of Cuba Café and Debaser articulated a contradiction between the vision of markets creating attractive space and the representation of market forces like Inkonst, Profilrestauranger, and Axels Tivoli that had been undermining this kind of development. This contradiction increasingly became a core problem of urban planning, not only in Folkets park where regulated commercialization was pioneered, but in Malmö more generally, with the Welfare for All plan conceding that the discipline of the housing and labor market plainly was insufficient to drive a post-industrial urban renewal process. Social planning interventions were no longer posed against economic interventions, for instance, privatizing access to space. Markets were instead activated in a regulated manner to achieve the social vision of remaking the city’s demographic profile. Market performances were becoming a technical area of representation and intervention, one of many technical problems that had to be solved to create attractive urban space enshrined as social neoliberalism’s primary vision.518

Attractive space, regulated markets

Regulated commercialization reached its zenith in Folkets park during the last years of the 2000s. This can be seen in the paperwork produced by an audit of the Projekt Folkets park group that was conducted before a permanent management group assumed responsibility for the park in 2007. The audit was written almost as a development plan, formulating a series of alternatives for how the temporary management group would be integrated in the normal routines of municipal administration and visions for its continued urban renewal work.519

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518 An early but crudely similar idea was how retail in the city center was being refigured as a means to attract visitors and make urban space ‘attractive’, see: Malmö Stad Stadsbyggnadskontor, Dialog-PM 2004:10: Mer och bättre innerstad, (Malmö: Malmö stad, 2004c) p. 12, 16; Malmö Stad Stadsbyggnadskontor, Dialog-PM 2004:5: Bättre förutsättningar för näringslivet, (Malmö: Malmö stad, 2004b); Malmö Stad Stadsbyggnadskontor, Dialog-PM 2004:7: Regional strategi för Malmö, (Malmö: Malmö stad, 2004a). Commercial firms were even more firmly integrated in the planned production of ‘attractive urban space’ in the 2014 Comprehensive Plan, although the relationship between attractive space and the city’s demographic remaking had changed by this time, see: Malmö Stad Stadsbyggnadskontor, Översiktsplan för Malmö, Planstrategi, utställningsförslag, (Malmö: Malmö stad, 2014) p. 33.

Unlike the 2001 ‘entertainment center’ memo, the 2006 audit never suggested a total commercialization of Folkets park by completely severing it from the municipal administration and making it an economically-independent unit. The audit instead recommended that the municipality should maintain its position as owner of the park, continue public renewal efforts, and increase the park’s funding. This did however not mean that Projekt Folkets park’s increasing emphasis on creating competitive space was dismissed. Instead, the audit suggested that the park’s cafés, restaurants, and clubs could be used as ‘strategically important’ tools in ‘strengthening Malmö as an attractive ‘summer city’ competing for visitors, comparing the park to the way in which one of the city’s medieval squares had been redeveloped by municipal planners to make space for a downtown restaurant area. The audit took commercial interests to inherently possess the ‘driving forces and ability to take initiatives’, which meant that they would take ‘a responsibility for the positive development of the entire park’.

The plan’s suggestion of strengthening the role of the municipal bureaucracy was partly seen as a way to regulate this roll-out of commercial forces along the lines of Projekt Folkets park’s experiments with Cuba Café and Debaser. The recommendation to increase the role of the municipality was also motivated in terms of safeguarding the local, recreational uses of public space by protecting Folkets park’s function as an ‘open Community Park’. Regulated commercialization was thus becoming entangled with a social vision of regionally-attractive space and a very different social vision of local recreational uses, which invited longstanding contradictions between uses and users back into the park’s renewal.

Two kinds of interventions were taken to be necessary if commercial forces were to make the park, and the surrounding inner-city working class community, ‘an attractive area’ with ‘an exciting offering of entertainment and culture’. First, the business models of individual firms had to be regulated by the kind of physical and institutional embedding that had worked so well with Cuba Café, including the design of space and meticulously-phrased leases prescribing certain kinds of practices. A particularly pressing problem that the new management had to solve was how the customer base of some of the park’s businesses, ‘especially Nöjesteatern and Profilrestauranger with Nya Teatern, Amiralen and Moriskan’, were not used in a way connected to how the park was visited as public space and

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that these firms ‘led their own life independent of the park’. Pressures therefore had to be increased on the businesses that, unlike Cuba Café and Debaser, ‘turned away’ from the park and didn’t connect to park visitors as customers. Realizing the vision of commercially-driven regional attractiveness required that ‘the activities in “Amiralen” and, in particular, “Moriskan” with its outdoor stage [have to] work in harmony with, and connect to, the on-going process of enhancing the force of attraction for the entire park’.522

The second approach was for municipal planners to directly intervene to increase the number of visitors in the park. By renovating the still run-down parts of the park, sponsoring more free cultural events, and allowing for increasing the number of commercial ticketed outdoor concerts seen to be drawing a regional demographic, the park’s businesses potential customer base would increase radically. This would create greater incentives for the park’s firms to compete for these customers, and create the ‘high levels of ambition and quality’ the audit associated with commercial forces. As more people from outside the local community used the park, reluctant firms would be enticed into investing in their businesses, sustaining a virtuous circle of space-making and boosting the park’s ‘forces of attraction’.523

Despite the center-left political majority revising it, this plan largely became the basis for a newly-appointed management group. As this new group of bureaucrats began their work in early 2007, they had every reason to be optimistic. Official statistics showed that more and more people were visiting the park, with its definitive breakthrough as a ‘summertime meeting place’ in 2005.524 The new indie club Debaser was an instant hit with its designated young customer base.525

Just before the new managers got started in 2007, Folkets park was listed as one of four development projects contributing to Malmö’s ‘attractive meeting places’ that had earned the city a prestigious prize from the National Board of Housing, Building, and Planning.526 The following year Malmö was also awarded the Swedish Association of Architects’ prize for the planners’ use of public places in

525 Entreprenör, 8 2015, p. 25, ‘Rockentrepreneuren som vägar vara vrålkommersiell’.
its transition to ‘an attractive, green, knowledge-based city.’

Not much later, both local and national media picked up on the state Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (Tillväxtverket) listing of Folkets park as the second most visited outdoor tourist destination in Sweden. The park management’s way of using its increasing resources to redevelop public space, host and market cultural events, and regulate commercial forces were by all accounts hitting the metrics ‘attractive space’ was measured in.

The newly-appointed Park Director reporting directly to the Streets Department proceeded according to the plan suggested by the 2006 audit when he set to work early in 2007. The first few years of the new park management unsurprisingly continued the set framework of regulating, sponsoring, and carefully embedding commercial uses of space to develop the park’s ‘forces of attraction.’ With Cuba Café and Debaser running at full speed by the time the Park Director began his work, the unenthusiastic Profilrestauranger group leasing Moriskan and Amiralen instantly became a source of worry requiring planning representation and regulation, as the 2006 audit had suggested.

Since the mid-1990s, the way in which Profilrestauranger made use of these two buildings had continually been represented as a problem demanding planning interventions. The sparse use of Moriskan and Amiralen meant that the Malmö municipality was essentially paying a private firm to house sit these two venues without it even contributing to the production of attractive space envisioned in plans for the park. Municipal bureaucrats had made several attempts to force Profilrestauranger to drop their claims to these two buildings, like the plans for converting Amiralen to a primary school or an art gallery. Just before Projekt Folkets park had been set up in 2002 the Real Estate Department simply refused to renew the Moriskan and Amiralen leases, but quickly backed down when served with a 20m SEK lawsuit.

With the new Park Director not seeing any changes in Profilrestauranger’s business strategy by 2008, and with Cuba Café and Debaser being actually existing models for how a more regulated commercial use could be implemented, the call was made not to renew the leases. The primary reason for the eviction

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530 Sydsvenska dagbladet, 4th June 2008, ‘Restauranger tvingas bort från nöjespalats’, p. C14; Sydsvenska dagbladet, 3rd September 2008, ‘Malmö stad vill ha mer koll på Folkets park’, p. B2. It is worth noting that the success with ‘Cuba Café’ and Debaser were publically cited as a reason for
cited in the press perfectly lines up with the dominant development logic of the 2006 audit. A spokesperson for the municipality was quoted saying that the buildings now would become ‘more integrated in the park’. This echoed the 2006 audit’s notion that more active business strategies for Amiralen and, in particular, Moriskan were crucial ‘to the ongoing process of enhancing the force of attraction’ of the park.531 This framing of the eviction as a question of making public space more attractive, rather than an economic issue, was reinforced by the Park Director proclaiming to local newspaper Sydsvenskan that it was ‘a problem that the park’s two largest buildings often are empty.’532 Regulated commercialization had become the main mode for shaping space, and it was undermined by Profilrestauranger’s unenthusiastic attitude. This left the director with no option but to recruit firms that would be more prone to respond in the expected way to the opportunities the park’s management was busy creating.

Profilrestauranger did not, however, take no for an answer. In the summer of 2009 it sued the Malmö municipality for refusing to renew the contract without ‘proper cause’ — demanding 35m SEK in compensation.533 The firm also stalled moving out for more than a month after their contract expired in January 2010 and then, in a vengeful gesture, removed every single piece of furniture and decoration from Moriskan, including the original 1903 chandeliers, early twentieth century paintings, custom-made monogrammed china and other historic artifacts from the park’s first decades which were so intimately connected to social democratic history.534 The municipal bureaucracy made this conflict even more of a public affair by posting security guards to oversee the move, and after inspecting the premises openly accusing Profilrestauranger of theft.535

Furious municipal bureaucrats rapidly prepared their own lawsuit, demanding that the city’s irreplaceable antiques be returned. The more dramatic episodes of the lengthy legal proceedings would for years to come regularly surface in the press, until the courts in May 2013 dismissed the municipality’s case due to a technical detail. The latest renewal of the contract had not included the same detailed lists of what property was rented with the building as the earlier versions

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had, so Profilrestauranger could claim that it had been impossible to distinguish between their and the municipality’s property.\textsuperscript{536}

A year later the second case was settled, with Malmö municipality being humiliated by conceding to pay a 7m SEK settlement to Profilrestauranger.\textsuperscript{537} Getting rid of Profilrestauranger had been motivated by the idea of shifting towards a more regulated commercialization of space, but the price for opening up these two buildings for this development strategy was significant. It had turned out to have been economically costly, as well as a public relations disaster with the 1991 lease haunting the park’s development twenty years later. Planners, as well as the public, were regularly reminded between 2009 and 2014 of the difficulties of harnessing market forces as a planning tool by the eager reporting from these court cases sprinkled with details of how the municipality had been swindled, threatened, and finally sued by the type of actors that were supposed to have an inherent disposition toward creating attractive space.

Tensions between visions and representations of commercial actors’ use of the park did not end once Profilrestauranger moved out. Since deploying market forces in a more regulated manner had been the motive for evicting Profilrestauranger, potential leaseholders that could be used to achieve this effect had to be located. Like so many times before, a temporary subcommittee was called together to plan this process.\textsuperscript{538} The subcommittee had to respond to several developments, not at least that the auditor’s plan’s focus on markets had provoked formal criticism which in turn made the political majority bring the waning role of civil society (föreningslivet) back on the planners’ agenda.\textsuperscript{539} This tension between regulated commercialization and civil society was most evident in the way in which the subcommittee selected a tenant for Moriskan that they understood both possessed entrepreneurial traits and the gentler sensibilities of civil society, discussed at length in Chapter 9.

The way that the subcommittee approached Amiralen more clearly illustrates how the regulation of commercial forces was used to make public space more attractive. The subcommittee made clear that it was important that Amiralen was not rented out to private parties and one-off events because this option didn’t ‘contribute to attracting more visitors to the park’. Neither was simply using the old dance hall as a concert venue for larger music events seen as a satisfactory

538 Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, SUMMERING – Mötten i arbetsgruppen ‘Amiralen/Moriskan 2010’.
option. This would also risk leaving the building ‘empty for much of the year’, and could set up ‘a competitive relationship with other leaseholders like Debaser’.540

An entrepreneur thus had to be found that operated in a different market niche from Debaser but that also had a business model that rested on hosting large and regular cultural events that would draw new visitors to the park. The option favored by the subcommittee was to identify and try to secure a contract with an established entertainment company catering to a more middle-aged audience than Debaser’s indie scenesters. The municipality’s ‘experiences of high service standards and professionalism of commercial actors’ that focused on the combination of musicals, standup comedy, and danceable nostalgic hits made the few firms in this market niche the primary lead for the subcommittee.541 Commercial forces were in this manner to be deployed in Amiralen accordingly to a carefully-planned strategy to achieve specific effects according to a well-established formula.

This was, it would turn out, easier planned than done. Negotiations with Wallmans salonger, the unnamed firm the subcommittee had in mind, ran aground, and the local press drew the public’s attention to the problems associated with using market forces as a planning tool.542 The large and empty Amiralen building continued to loom right next to the park’s main entrance, with the market not responding in the envisioned way. The way that a new tenant finally was found for Amiralen shows how commercial forces not only had to be carefully embedded and regulated to work as planning interventions, but that profit-driven forces also had to be convinced and cajoled to invest in the way planners envisioned. Local entertainment giant Etage agreed to rent Amiralen in 2010, but only if the lease had the same kind of percent-turnover clause as Profilrestauranger’s previous contract.543 While a separate contract specifying that the tenant was to host regular ‘activities in the venue’ was drawn up to avoid some of the problems that had come up with Profilrestauranger, the rent itself invited the same kind of patterns of use that had caused the painfully protracted eviction of Profilrestauranger.544

Despite the management’s active shaping of commercial uses, actual entrepreneurs did not behave as envisioned in development plans. This contradiction between visions and representation of commercial uses accelerated when Etage opened its Amiralen branch in 2012. The firm decided to sell their contract in October 2014, with a program of only at ‘about 70–80’ nights per year booked for its second season hardly living up the subcommittee’s high hopes for

regular, if not daily, cultural activities being hosted in Amiralen.545 A Los Angeles-based concert promoter took over the lease in April 2015, but this instantly became a cause for concern.546 Not only was the new leaseholder open about only using the venue for one-off private or ticketed events like weddings and concerts, the very thing the subcommittee had sought to avoid by replacing Profilrestauranger with another business.547 But things turned out even worse than might have been expected when the first event hosted by the new firm, a concert with a Syrian artist rumored to have ties to the Assad regime, became the target of an anonymous arson attack on the venue the night before the concert.548

No matter how closely-regulated, commercial actors proved difficult to mobilize as a way to create attractive space. The same tension between the social visions of demographic competitiveness and the economic means of commercial uses that had been fundamental to regulated commercialization emerging in the first place continued to undermine this urban planning formation. Regulated commercialization as a social approach to neoliberal planning by mobilizing market forces in a specific way was rapidly approaching its end in Folkets park. To understand what would come to replace it, one must turn to what visions, interventions, and representations of space were at play in the renewal of Moriskan, once it, like Amiralen, had been vacated by Profilrestauranger.

545 Kvällsposten, 28th October 2014, ‘Nöjespalatset säljs på Blocket’, p. 31.
Chapter 9
2008–2015:
Governing through commons?

The intense debates around Folkets park had served as an important laboratory for some of the city’s most influential urban planners during the 2000s. It was one of few pieces of municipally-owned land in the city center that was represented as underdeveloped. This made Folkets park an important test site for articulating Bo01 and the 2000 Comprehensive Plan’s visions of attractive space with the already-built urban environment. But the patterns of intense use represented by various bureaucratic and political actors forced planners to continually readjust their approach. Eventually a regulated roll-out of commercial forces as a way to create ‘attractive space’ for potential customers and users of public space came to stand in for the more difficult task of competing for new residents to change the city’s social composition — although these two social visions often implicitly were linked.

As I have shown, the paperwork of urban planning makes it possible to track the contradictions that shaped this model for redeveloping Folkets park and how it was tied to shifts at municipal scale and influences from broader neoliberal debates. Representations of the park’s uses articulated with visions of attractive space, but not in a frictionless way. As commercial and regional uses came to the fore during the 2000s, both these understandings of use sparked tensions. Representations of the park’s past — most importantly how the 1991 buy-out was framed in terms of creating a Community Park to be used by locals, but also its connection to the politically-dominant Social Democrats’ history — continually provoked tension between local and regional patterns of use throughout this process.

The way that commercial uses were mobilized in this turn from local and recreational patterns also had its internal tensions. This contradiction primarily
articulated differences between planners’ visions for commercially-driven making of attractive space and representations of how firms used the park. The bureaucratic interventions this provoked resulted in two models for creating attractive space emerging, both shaped by this tension. In Projekt Folkets park commercial uses became subordinated to the greater goal of attracting desirable suburbanites to the park, in what I have called ‘regulated commercialization’. In the Vinterland group, commercial uses as economic means were completely detached from the municipality’s social vision of attracting suburbanites. Instead, planners developed a strategy of minimizing market forces as far as possible and intervened directly to make public space attractive. In the Vinterland project the demographic visions of social neoliberalism were posed as a task best addressed outside, and indeed in part opposed to, commercial uses of space.

In this chapter I will show that these tensions between commercial and recreational functions in the early 2010s — interwoven with a distinction between regional and local uses — were reinforced until they reached a breaking point. One contributing factor was how these tensions increasingly came to be phrased in terms of commercial functions and civil society as two distinct and opposing strategies for creating attractive space. This precarious situation was made even more volatile by the park management’s careless, and very public, experiments with using market models to represent and intervene in local, recreational uses. This recklessness delegitimized the municipality’s roll-out of commercial forces at an already vulnerable moment.

The pressures on this formation increased further when social movements used the increasingly dominant tensions between commercial and civil society uses to attack both attractive space and regulated commercialization. This move rearticulated existing notions of local, recreational, and non-commercial use of space by civil society as what one might call an urban commons. While the grassroots movements’ visions of an urban commons never came to supplant attractive space through regulated commercialization, this challenge precipitated a series of events that eventually would lead to the collapse of this formation as well as shape what came after it.

The formation that emerged was shaped by this history of mounting contradictions. It rearticulated elements from the rich repertoire of bureaucratic practices that had been concerned with creating attractive urban space. Yet these practices had, after decades in the making, been dislodged from the idea of attractive space as their primary end. Instead they were, as I will show, increasingly redeployed to make space sustain existing patterns of use rather than compete for new users. A neoliberal vision of accumulating human capital was clearly a dominant concern also in this mode of urban planning, but how it was deployed differs remarkably from how attractive space for regional demographics as vectors of human capital had been tied to spaces of discipline and exclusion for local demographics seen to lack desirable skills. One can then think of this
formation, and perhaps also parts of Malmö’s two most important bureaucratic documents from the early 2010s, the 2014 ‘Comprehensive Plan for Malmö’ and the massive ‘Commission for a socially sustainable Malmö’ from 2013, as (to borrow a term from Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore) a mode of governance at the very threshold of neoliberal urban development.  

Civil society, attractive space

One way that contradictions undermining regulated commercialization were intensified was in response to complaints by voluntary groups about being sidelined in the 2006 audit of Projekt Folkets park. The responses this intervention from below provoked would lead to non-commercial uses becoming more entrenched, and in the long run non-commercial uses as a way to increase the attractiveness of public space became more clearly defined. The immediate reaction to protests from the city’s grassroots groups was the social democratic majority of the City Council amending the original 2006 plan for the park’s permanent management, which focused on regional competition, by deciding on a separate investigation of the ‘role of civil society’ in Folkets park.

This tension between commercial and non-commercial uses of the park, for many years deeply entangled with the relationship between local-recreational and regional-entertainment functions of public space, was primarily forced on the planners’ agenda by the social democratic movement’s own grassroots and in particular Folkets park Cultural Association. This non-profit cultural association, formed from what remained of the park’s old voluntary forces after the 1991 buyout, had during the austere 1990s shouldered a heavy burden. It had been the most important intermediary between municipal planners and a broad network of independent cultural actors. With the mid-2000s turn to the regulated commercialization of cultural production, the Folkets park Cultural Association was forced to defend its claim to the park. The City Council’s 2006 decision to commission a separate memorandum on how to safeguard the role of ‘civil society’ in the park was then a response to the complaints of the civil society groups led by the Cultural Association on being sidelined by regulated commercialization. The deep labor movement history of the park still had important, albeit residual, effects on municipal planning.


550 Malmö stad, Minutes of Malmö Kommunstyrelse 22nd September 2006, §266 Tekniska nämnden, Huvudmannaskap för verksamheten i Folkets park i Malmö, ’Tjänsteutlåtande 2006-08-18. See also the description in: Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 29th May 2008, §117 Utredning angående föreningslivets delaktighet o verksamheten i Folkets park
The official response to this challenge from below was a 2008 memo on ‘civil society’s participation in the activities of Malmö Folkets park’, written by the same municipal bureaucrat who was in charge of the park’s 2006 audit that had been the cause of open contestation. The memo argued for making sure that voluntary forces were guaranteed a place in the park’s future. Even if this document had been commissioned in response to civil society groups arguing that they were being sidelined, it actually suggested breaking the municipality’s ties with two of the most prominent such groups in the park. The memo unsentimentally argued for renovating and finding a commercial operator for Far i hatten — a café in the building that had been the park’s first restaurant, but since the 1980s was run on a voluntary basis and one of the few unbroken links to the park’s early labor movement history — as well as severing all connections to Folkets park Cultural Association.

This memo then confirmed the established view that civil society and commercial forces could be clearly separated, and seemed to point to a never quite explicitly-named tension in the short term tactic of prioritizing the park’s commercial uses. To bridge the rift that the memo opened, it radically redefined the role of civil society in the park’s renewal process. ‘Civil society and cultural and social movements’ — in particular those associated with different forms of minority and ethnic culture — could and should be used as tools to redevelop space. Voluntary groups were according to this model — just like commercial firms — little more than means to the ends defined by the dominant planning visions. The ‘basic purpose of all activities’ in the park, ‘also civil society participation’, was to ‘increase the park’s attractiveness for visitors’, the memo concluded. It was to achieve this vision that voluntary forces were to be mapped and regulated by a separate ‘civil society coordinator’, that the memo suggested be supported by increased municipal funding.

A self-regulating sphere of voluntary associations concerned with reaching out to a small circle of members and sympathizers was of little use for this plan. Exerting more executive control, in order to make sure that voluntary activities were deployed as ‘public events [that are…] a part of the park’s collected offering of events and attractions for park visitors’, was the primary reason for ending the collaboration with Folkets park Cultural Association and getting a more

(i enlighet med LS – KOM 2006-00705), Förslag till beslut, ‘PM angående föreningslivets delaktighet i verksamheten i Malmö Folkets park’.

551 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Mintues of Tekniska nämnden 29th May 2008, §117
Utredning angående föreningslivets delaktighet o verksamheten i Folkets park (i enlighet med LS – KOM 2006-00705), Förslag till beslut, ‘PM angående föreningslivets delaktighet i verksamheten i Malmö Folkets park’, p. 4-9.

552 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 29th May 2008, §117
Utredning angående föreningslivets delaktighet o verksamheten i Folkets park (i enlighet med LS – KOM 2006-00705), Förslag till beslut, ‘PM angående föreningslivets delaktighet i verksamheten i Malmö Folkets park’, p. 9-10.

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commercial tenant for Far i hatten. The memo, officially approved by the Technical Council in May 2008, thus accomplished much more than simply representing bottom-up claims that placed social limits on commercially-driven urban renewal. Folkets park Cultural Association’s intervention led to non-commercial uses being designated a legitimate field of renewal outside economic markets. But, by defining civil society’s use of space as a way of developing urban space, the memo extended some of the bureaucratic practices of regulated commercialization to a new sphere. From this moment on civil society was directly imbricated with the urban planning practices of social neoliberalism, articulating yet another important postwar technology of social governing with new ends.

This reorientation had important effects. It gave more legitimacy to the Vinterland project’s model of directly shaping public space, which had undermined ideas of commercial firms’ desire to compete for customers as a driving force in the making of attracting urban space. It was not the entrepreneurial spirit’s drive to attract customers — the ‘burning interests’ or ‘ability to take initiatives’ as the 2000 ‘entertainment center’ plan and the 2006 audit put it respectively — that made space attractive. Uncommercial civil society actors suddenly appeared as potentially equally powerful tools for making space attractive.

The impact of civil society and commercial actors could in this sense be benchmarked in the same way. Representations of their success or failure to create uses indicating the envisioned ‘attractive’ space was the key to their planned reintroduction in the park, not political pronouncements of the inherent virtue of the market or voluntary work. Civil society had been almost fully integrated as a planning intervention of social neoliberalism. The difference between civil society and commercial firms, and their effects on uses of space, thus became a way for planning to express contradictions that before had been framed in terms of local against regional users or recreational against entertainment functions. This way of expressing tensions in planning would be reinforced in the years that followed.

No such thing as a free concert?

How municipal planners approached Moriskan once Profilrestauranger had left, in early 2010, provides the best example of how this new model for putting civil society to work unleashed new contradictions. Moriskan had, with Amiralen, been

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553 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 29th May 2008, §117 Utredning angående föreningslivets delaktighet o verksamheten i Folkets park (i enlighet med LS – KOM 2006-00705), Förslag till beslut, ‘PM angående föreningslivets delaktighet i verksamheten i Malmö Folkets park’, p. 8.
singed out as the perfect site for testing new ideas in the 2008 memo on civil society, before Profilrestauranger had even officially been given notice.\footnote{Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 29th May 2008, §117 Utredning angående föreninglivets delaktighet o verksamhet i Folkets park (i enlighet med LS – KOM 2006-00705), Förslag till beslut, ‘PM angående föreninglivets delaktighet i verksamheten i Malmö Folkets park’, p. 4-5.} This vision framed the temporary committee set up in 2009 by the Park Director to investigate how Moriskan and Amiralen were to be used after the municipality had regained control over these buildings. The summary of the committee’s work makes clear that it was looking at all ‘sound economic’ possibilities where the buildings were ‘used for as large a part of the day and year as possible’, including by non-profit cultural associations.\footnote{Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, SUMMERING – Möten i arbetsgruppen ‘Amiralen’Moriskan 2010’, no pagination [5].} Civil society was however brought into this picture strictly along the lines of the 2008 memo.

The same committee that set Amiralen on the difficult path of regulated commercialization, provoking the stream of complications discussed at the end of Chapter 8, designated Moriskan as a place to experiment with using civil society to create attractive space. One of the options discussed by the committee was creating a cultural center for the kind of alternative, community, political, and ethnic minority associations that traditionally had used the park and that the Cultural Association had represented. This notion would have been a direct concession to the grassroots groups that forced civil society back on the park’s planning agenda in 2006, but in precisely the bottom-up way that 2008 memo had dismissed.\footnote{Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, SUMMERING – Möten i arbetsgruppen ‘Amiralen’Moriskan 2010’, no pagination [5].}

The voluntary sector was instead to be brought to Moriskan in a manner ‘directed at public events that provides a larger force of attraction for the park’.\footnote{Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, SUMMERING – Möten i arbetsgruppen ‘Amiralen’Moriskan 2010’, no pagination [1,2,7].} This would strengthen Folkets park’s and Moriskan’s ‘position as an entertainment and meeting place’. The only kind of civil society actors capable of regularly organizing cultural events on this large scale were to be found outside Malmö’s small and local cultural associations. A Stockholm-based organization could, just like in Debaser’s commercial takeover of Möllevångsgården a few years before, be found to fit that very bill. The committee came to focus on Re:Orient, a cultural association that had begun as Middle Eastern culture festival in 1993. This group had by 2010 a steady flow of public and foundation grants and a substantial experience of organizing cultural events with artists from all over the world.\footnote{Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, SUMMERING – Möten i arbetsgruppen ‘Amiralen’Moriskan 2010’, no pagination [1].}

In Re:Orient the committee saw a ‘great potential to succeed’ and ensure that Moriskan ‘was used both day and night’. The association’s multicultural image
would also go down well with ‘city hall, the media, and civil society’, the committee speculated. The subcommittee’s dry bureaucratic prose slipped into a much more enthusiastic register when listing the potential uses they envisioned Re:Orient might find for Moriskan. This internal memo, not intended to be read outside a handful of planners, went on to outline concerts, clubs, seminars, poetry readings, theatre groups, dance classes, oriental cinema, and a restaurant serving Middle Eastern food with newspapers from all around the world being read by visitors to the soft sound of Arabic music.559

This Orientalist vision of Moriskan as a semi-public multicultural space projected on Re:Orient was only one of the things the planners found appealing. More important was the professionalism indicated by the organization’s substantial résumé of large multicultural events. Behind this capacity was a very specific organizational set-up that had enabled Re:Orient to skillfully carve out a niche between the voluntary and commercial sectors. The non-profit’s two founders had also set up a small stock company called Hörnell & Sunar AB specializing in ‘lectures on and analysis of culture, integration and media’, that in turn had a steady revenue stream coming from consulting for the massive foundation-funded non-profit Re:Orient association.560 This entrepreneurial approach was pushed even further with a second stock company, fully owned by Hörnell & Sunar AB, Re:Orient Restauranger AB. This stock company was registered just as it was becoming clear that Stockholm-based organization would be contracted to run Moriskan. It was the second company — that within in a few years had a turnover of around 20m SEK — that leased Moriskan from the municipality and ran the venue’s two newly-renovated bars and kitchen. This second firm in turn sublet Moriskan to the Re:Orient non-profit association in charge of cultural events, which could apply for public funds for its cultural program.561

The entrepreneurial approach that Re:Orient embodied perfectly fitted with the notion of strengthening the park’s competition for visitors by professionally-organized — but not strictly speaking entirely commercial — cultural events that competed for visitors across the region. This semi-commercial approach to cultural production can further be seen in the budget Re:Orient proposed for their Moriskan venture. It included nine fulltime employees for administrating, marketing and managing the venue, and Re:Orient made binding promises to run a

559 Malmö stad, Arrangemangsenheten, Personal files of Sverker Haraldsson, SUMMERING – Mötens i arbetsgruppen ‘Amiralen Moriskan 2010’, no pagination [6].
560 Bolagsverket, Hörnell & Sunar AB, årsredovisning 2010.
restaurant open on a daily basis and within the first year host public activities on average seven out of ten days.\footnote{562} By the end of 2009, Re:Orient had, just as planned, officially signed on for the project. The cultural association-stock company’s business plan was presented to the Technical Council, backed by key planners, as a formal ‘Directive’ in an unusual bureaucratic move to secure the municipal funding needed from a separate municipal body, the Cultural Council.\footnote{563} This plan proposed using 2.5m SEK annually from the municipal budget and backing Re:Orient’s applications for double that amount from the national and regional authorities, in a project designed to ‘strengthen the international and intercultural initiatives, contexts and arenas’ in Malmö.\footnote{564}

One of the hoped-for outcomes from this highly professionalized multicultural effort was to ‘include’ the city’s different ethnic communities in the park, in an explicit response to an inquiry that had found certain migrant demographics statistically less likely to make use of the Malmö’s publically-funded cultural program.\footnote{565} The ‘multitude of collaborations and participants’ was, however, also to create a ‘new attractive magnet in Malmö’s cultural life’.\footnote{566} This public funding would enable Folkets park to compete for tourists and visitors beyond the regional scale by turning Moriskan into an ‘important part’ in the ‘national cultural life’ as a countrywide flagship project for ethnic ‘culture and integration’.\footnote{567} This way of externalizing funding to other public bodies for projects that could be branded as daring experiments in dealing with a serious problem — in this case segregation — as a way to funnel money into efforts to increase the city’s attractiveness is strangely reminiscent to how Malmö ten years before managed to brand Bo01’s...

\footnote{562} Malmö stad, Kulturnämndens arkiv, Minutes if Kulturnämnden 23rd September 2010, ‘Moriska paviljorgen årsbudgetkalkyl /100915’, no pagination [1]; Malmö stad, Kulturnämndens arkiv, Minutes of Kulturnämnden 23rd September 2010; Malmö stad, Kulturnämndens arkiv, Minutes of Kulturnämnden 23rd September 2010, ‘Moriska paviljongen: verksamhetsbeskrivning’, p. 6.\footnote{563} Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 9th December 2009 §254, ‘Förslag till ny verksamhet i Moriska paviljonern, Folkets park – Nationell mötesplats för kultur och integration’.\footnote{564} Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 9th December 2009 §254, ‘Förslag till ny verksamhet i Moriska paviljonern, Folkets park – Nationell mötesplats för kultur och integration’, p. 3; The notion of making Moriskan a cultural magnet can also be found in: Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 9th December 2009 §254, ‘Förslag till ny verksamhet i Moriska paviljonern, Folkets park – Nationell mötesplats för kultur och integration’, p. 3.\footnote{565} Malmö stad, Kulturnämndens arkiv, Minutes Kulturnämden 23rd September 2010, Förslag till ny verksamhet i Moriska paviljongen – återremiss, p. 3.\footnote{566} Malmö stad, Kulturnämndens arkiv, Minutes of Kulturnämnden 23rd September 2010, Förslag till ny verksamhet i Moriska paviljongen – återremiss, p. 3; The notion of making Moriskan a cultural magnet can also be found in: Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 9th December 2009 §254, ‘Förslag till ny verksamhet i Moriska paviljonern, Folkets park – Nationell mötesplats för kultur och integration’, p. 3.\footnote{567} Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 9th December 2009 §254, ‘Förslag till ny verksamhet i Moriska paviljonern, Folkets park – Nationell mötesplats för kultur och integration’, p. 1, 3.
luxury development as ‘green’ in order to tap into state and EU funds.\textsuperscript{568} The robust economic structure externalizing Re:Orient’s costs would enable a cultural program strong enough to markedly increase ‘the park’s development as an attractive and engaging meeting place’ across the urban, regional and national scales.\textsuperscript{569}

In the long run, Re:Orient’s presence in Moriskan was envisioned as a boost to an emerging ‘attractive cluster’ of entertainment venues spanning across the southern part of central Malmö, an important building block in the cultural industries which Malmö’s planners had since the late 1990s imagined as key to facing a post-industrial future.\textsuperscript{570} With Re:Orient’s plan first being approved in the Technical Council and then getting funding from the Cultural Council the vision suggested in the 2008 memo on civil society began to stabilize as an actual planning practice. Non-profit culture could apparently be rolled out and be regulated to produce the same kind of effect as actual commercial forces.

Re:Orient’s takeover of Moriskan in June 2011 was initially greeted with overwhelming enthusiasm. The first yearly report estimated 80,000 people had visited one of Moriskan’s four separate stages in its first six months.\textsuperscript{571} The efficiency of a non-profit cultural producer outside regulated commercial culture would, however soon come to sharpen existing tensions between these two ways of planning for attractive space.

That the tremendously popular new Moriskan was taken to create exactly the kind of cultural space that the planners had envisioned, without the unreliability of commercial forces in need of the planners’ constant vigilance not to cut corners in search of easy profits, put the entire notion of regulated commercialization into question. In the early 2010s the difference between the cultural productiveness of this publically-funded professionalized ‘civil society’ actor and the never-ending friction of commercial forces forcing municipal interventions came to articulate deep contradictions of urban space.

This tension can be seen as early as the 2010 Malmö Municipality’s Culture Council meeting that approved the 2.5m SEK yearly grant to Re:Orient. Liberal, Moderate and far-right Nationalist (Sverigedemokraterna, the ‘Sweden Democrats’) representatives in the Council all fiercely opposed this decision. The Liberal Party’s representative in particular complained in local media about how

\textsuperscript{568} See Holgersen and Malm, “‘Green fix’ as crisis management. or, in which world is malmö the world’s greenest city?”.
\textsuperscript{569} Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 9th December 2009 §254, ‘Malmö stad, Förslag till ny verksamhet i Moriska paviljongen, Folkets park – Nationell mötesplats för kultur och integration’, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{570} Malmö stad, Kulturnämndens arkiv, Minutes of Kulturnämnden 23rd September 2010, Förslag till ny verksamhet i Moriska paviljongen – återremiss, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{571} E.g. Malmö stad, Kulturnämndens arkiv, Minutes of Kulturnämnden 15th November 2012, Beviljande av verksamhetsstöd till Re:Orient i Moriska Paviljongen 2013, Moriska Paviljongen 2011 veksamhetsberättelse för Re:Orient Malmö 2011, p. 10.
publicly-funded culture was disrupting the fragile market mechanisms of the entertainment industry, which implicitly undermined Folkets park’s renewal model.572

Key to this argument were the aspects of Re:Orient’s features that made the association-stock company so appealing for planners, rather than a generic right-wing critique against any form of publicly-backed cultural policy. It was the professionalized quasi-commercial organization’s capacity to host a large number of events that in size could measure up to those of commercial actors, and therefore also attract visitors regionally, which made Re:Orient able to ‘compete unfairly’ by taking market shares from commercial firms.573 Moriskan continued to provoke this kind of political criticism, expressing tensions about how hefty municipal subsidies to voluntary groups was unfair competition to the cultural industries’ commercial actors when given to groups that could barely be framed as civil society groups.574 These tensions reached a peak with a 2013 audit which found large inaccuracies in Re:Orient’s bookkeeping practices, making the whole project a serious political liability for Malmö’s new Social Democrat-Green-Left party coalition that had the majority on the City Council at this time because of the risk of Re:Orient being seen as too entrepreneurial.575

This insistence that there were tensions between commercial and civil society uses, and that they needed to be separated into appropriate spheres, was difficult to translate to an un-dogmatically opportunist planning strategy primarily concerned with making urban space more attractive. Still, pressure on the planners to revise this strategy increased as political protectors of what was understood to be — but of course was not — a free entertainment market opened up a second front in 2012. The same Moderates politician that had attacked Re:Orient’s unfair competitive advantage in 2010 two years later found a new ally in the CEO of Folkets park’s favorite indie club Debaser. The pair argued in a Sydsvenskan opinion piece that city’s spending on public culture was ‘impossible to compete with’ for local businesses.576

572 Malmö stad, Kulturnämndens arkiv, Minutes of Kulturnämnden 23rd September 2010, Förslag till ny verksamhet i Moriska paviljongen – återremiss.
574 Malmö stad, Kulturnämndens arkiv, Minutes of Kulturnämnden 23rd February 2012 §28, Stöd till kulturverksamheten i Moriska Paviljongen, Folkets Park, Kulturnämnden 2012-02-23, Ärende nr 12, Stöd till kulturverksamheten i Moriska Paviljongen, Folkets Park’, no pagination [1]. See also Malmö stad, Malmö kommunfullmäktiges arkiv, Minutes of Malmö Kommunfullmäktige 24th May 2011, §82 Enkel fråga angående kommunala medel till Moriska paviljongen i Folkets Park.

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The slowly mounting contradiction between entertainment as a commercial sphere and as a publically-subsidized activity mainly organized by voluntary forces creating a sort of urban commons quickly escalated to become an emergency in the fall of 2013. This time Debaser was also at the center of events. The company first announced that they, after a public falling-out with the Park’s Director in a bidding war over who was to get to host the pop act Glasvegas’ visit to Malmö, would temporarily close their Malmö branch during the winter. Then the firm’s CEO — just weeks before the first short draft for what was to become a new plan for the park was to be presented to politicians and the public — announced that Debaser would sell their Folkets park branch and leave the city altogether.

With Debaser’s dramatic exit one of the most important examples used to theorize the carefully regulated roll-out of commercial actors as a way to create attractive space had become a planning problem. What had been a political debate, far away from the technical concerns of planners, became an issue that urgently required rethinking established bureaucratic practices. This contradiction between culture as a commons and as commerce, with civil society and market forces posed directly against each other, resonated forcefully with the planners when they again sat down to piece together what was left of this bureaucratic formation. But before something new could take shape the final blows had to be dealt to the notion that harnessing the entrepreneurial spirits of commercial entertainment, by closely regulated extension of market actors, was the best way to make Folkets park more attractive for desirable demographics.

Social sustainability, market models

At the same time that the internal tensions of regulated commercial entertainment were reaching a peak and its contradictions with civil society culture was taking shape, a series of experiments in using market models to represent use outside strictly economic transaction took place in Folkets park. The most prominent example was the first Park Director’s attempt, just as he was leaving his position in 2011, to test ways to benchmark the ‘social sustainability’ of the park’s renewal process. The Director wanted to use Folkets park for a trial run of the American ‘Social Return On Investment’ toolkit that analyzed the ratio between economic costs and social benefits of bureaucratic interventions, making it the first use of the method in Malmö and the first measuring of Social Return on Investment in a public space in Sweden.

An internal 50-page report, that does not seem to have made itself into any political council or formal archive, shows the incredible efforts put into this experiment and the problems that it encountered. During the spring and summer of 2012, 1800 visitors and 700 local residents were interviewed by a phone polling company. The Social Return on Investment project in Folkets park connected with increasingly powerful neoliberal planning practices concerned with precisely measuring social values in ‘financial proxy terms’ circulating translocally. This experiment was also connected to Malmö Municipality’s increasing interest in measuring and improving the city’s ‘social sustainability’ by offering to translate this vague term to very specific benchmarks.580

This mode of representing use faced severe technical difficulties. The first problem was that asking users to value their experience of public space in precise monetary terms to many of the polled people seemed provocative, which skewed responses in unpredictable ways. ‘Outer extremes’ — including large groups of interviewees refusing to assign any price at all or, instead, proposing hugely exaggerated sums — was a recurring problem for statistically interpreting the data. An astounding 59% of the polled ‘spontaneous visitors’ responded, for instance, to being asked what a reasonable price for a one day entrance to the park would be by either ticking the ‘should be free’, ‘0 SEK’, ‘don’t know’ or a sum higher than the maximum 100 SEK option. The report also noted a large group of defiant remarks, including the likes of ‘parks should be free’ and ‘beyond value’. The objects of this elaborate mode of representation were revolting in ways that clearly undermined the authority of the polls’ results.581

Together with these small acts of subversion, the many unknown factors about the different kinds of uses and users in the park — approximated from earlier polls — was also a major problem. The Social Return on Investment value for more or less equally popular activities ranged from ‘completely unrealistic’ values like 190:1 for the park’s weekly flea market to a negative social ‘return on investment’ for the enormous crowds watching free screenings of the Men’s 2012 European Football Championship. When factoring in all the dimensions, including appreciations of the sizeable boost to local real estate prices that the park’s green space implied, the total ratio ended up as 21.8:1. This number was ‘difficult to compare’ with other trial runs, and the report concluded that ‘all ratios above 4:1 or 5:1’ were ‘considered unrealistic’. Ascribing fictitious monetary proxies to public space with this mode of representation was plainly not an effective way to represent the park’s multitude of uses as a diverse urban commons.582

It is hardly surprising, considering all the surfacing issues in the Folkets park test-run, that Social Return on Investment never gained ground in the municipal bureaucracy. Just as social sustainability was becoming one of the most important planning concerns, with the final report of the city-wide ‘Commission for Socially Sustainable Malmö’ published in 2013, the radically neoliberal Social Return on Investment approach had provided data of very poor quality. The Commission, discussed in greater detail below, instead rearticulated the trusted statistical quantification and ethnographic observations from the city’s heydays of postwar social engineering.

The Social Return on Investment experiment failed in more ways than merely representing uses of the park in a useful way or introducing a new mode for mapping space. Just as important was the unintended excess data that pointed to a strong perceived tension between the park being enclosed by commercialization and the park as an accessible urban commons for large groups of polled visitors. Just as the contradiction between commercial uses and that of civil society of Folkets park was taking form, this fault line was widened and tensions increasingly posed in terms of the park as either an urban commons or a commercial zone. Regulated commercialization was looking increasingly fragile.

**Urban commons against demographic competitiveness?**

Civil society as an alternative to commercial entertainment was bolstered by how public space as a freely accessible and non-commercial urban commons was posed against any enclosure through market actors in the data produced by the Social Return on Investment project. In addition, political movements, deeply entangled with the park’s history as an important place for the labor movement since its founding in 1891, intervened in ways that pitched commons against commerce. The already-discussed 2006 demands of non-profit cultural associations led by the Folkets park Cultural Association to retain their historic claims on the park is one example of movements contributing to creating or sharpening the commons-commerce distinction within formal planning, but it is not the only one.

The unsentimental dismissal of Folkets park Cultural Association after the 2008 memo and the way the less locally-rooted Re:Orient focused on large-scale semi-commercial cultural events, rather than more mundane civil society activities, left a vacuum for movements to act in. A new generation of more radical movements, at this point beginning to constitute themselves across the city in opposition to particular aspects of Malmö’s social neoliberalism, seized this moment, which had important consequences. At the center of many of the struggles that followed was the independent community association Möllevångsgruppen (‘The Möllevången Group’). The group had been set up in 1994 in response to ‘social problems’ like
'unprofessional landlords', ‘substantial criminality’ and ‘an outdoor environment unsuitable for children’. While officially being unaligned with the social democrats, Möllevångsgruppen had until the late 2000s cooperated with the municipality and had often been involved in Folkets park through the Cultural Association’s work.

The organization’s approach to making their neighborhood better had been practical, drawing on the area’s diversity to host a series of cultural events to bring residents together. Since 1999 the group hosted an annual carnival together with the city’s often left-leaning Latin American cultural associations. The carnival grew to a point where it in 2006 morphed into a free outdoor festival, *Möllevångsfestivalen* (‘The Möllevången Festival’), that for a weekend every July took over several streets and public spaces in the area. The community group encouraged local shops to move their shelves out into the streets, it hosted flea markets, food stalls, theatre performances, poetry readings, sound systems, and art shows in the area’s sidewalks, streets and parks in a remarkably un-organized fashion that invited people to extend ‘their living room into the city’. The group also built several stages where primarily local bands and artists volunteered to perform free shows.583

The 2010 festival turned out to be a somewhat different story. After a conflict between Folkets park’s newly-appointed Park Director in 2009 and Möllevångsgruppen — that ended with the group being evicted from their offices in the park — the association rapidly shifted emphasis away from a cultural politics of inclusion, integration, and environmentalism. Most importantly, perhaps, was how the festival became permeated by a political critique of the municipality’s use of the market to reengineer the city’s demographic composition. In 2010 the festival organizers handed out leaflets about living conditions in the area, asked visitors to share their grievances with the municipality and landlords by putting post-it notes on massive notice boards, and hung political banners across one the streets outside Folkets park.584

Folkets park played an important role in a process Möllevångsgruppen saw as the municipality actively planning for gentrification, or, in municipal bureaucratic jargon, the making of ‘attractive’ space. One of the large banners just outside the park read ‘Stop the commercialization of Folkets park’. Another quoted the Park Director on his ambition to make the park a ‘meeting place’ comparable to the commercial downtown *Lilla Torg* square, known for its upmarket restaurants and bars. Möllevångsgruppen was homing in on the very same idea of increased commercial uses of space as a way to make urban space attractive for new groups of residents that had been articulated by formal planning for years. But the group

reversed the issue by asking what they, as a civil society actor concerned with free cultural events, could do to obstruct this process rather than how civil society could reinforce the city’s demographic re-engineering. Their timing could not have been better, with the difference between commercial uses and public space as a commons already taking shape within planning in response to a series of tensions. The group’s intervention thus drew on the same kind of distinction and tensions as the political right’s attempt to safeguard the market from the unfair competition of publically-funded cultural production of civil society, but reversing the terms by seeking to mobilize civil society culture against the market to disrupt the social effects of commercial uses of space.585

If the festival explicitly drew on the same tensions that planning articulated but outside this sphere of formal expertise, it in fact also directly intervened in this field of bureaucratic practice in at least one way. The City Head Gardener and the Park Director had for some time advocated designating a 90-meter stretch of the park’s remaining wooden fence as a public graffiti zone. This argument was explicitly understood as a response to the city’s lively graffiti scene’s very active use of this space, envisioning that this compromise solution would dampen illegal ‘tagging’ in the area. It was also part of a more general trend in Malmö municipality linked to ideas about mapping and regulating this dispersed cultural production as a space-making tool that could be deployed towards the city’s strategic planning vision of attractive space.586

The project would after several evaluations be branded a success, but it got off to a rocky start in terms of showing how other forces could mobilize non-profit culture for alternative ends. Just a month before the grand opening of this wall, Möllevångsgruppen used the cover of thousands of festivalgoers to organize an illegal alternative opening without the park management’s permission. Prominent, local graffiti writers defiantly painted a huge mural in the form of giant map of the festival’s different areas, aligning with the project of commons against regulated commercialization. The very organization that had been evicted from the park for refusing to integrate in the management’s turn to attractive space, and that in a whole range of other ways was mobilizing civil society against attractive space through the festival, turned out to be the force that could leverage graffiti as a dispersed use of urban space for its ends. The municipal planners seemed unable, at least at this strategic moment of public visibility, to do the same thing.587

Despite these contentious uses of space interfering with uses of space at the core of the municipality’s planning strategy, Möllevångsgruppen reached a conclusion similar to Folkets park’s management. Civil society’s cultural practices tended, even in its more politically rebellious forms, to be the kind of uses that made space attractive. It was perhaps a threat to commercial culture, but it also propelled what they saw as the area’s gentrification. In a dramatic gesture, the community group announced that the indisputably successful 2010 festival would be the last. Instead, the group would use the ‘connections’ forged in the previous years’ cultural events for more direct struggles against gentrification. 588

This important local civil society actor was thus experimenting with uses of public space to disrupt, rather than contribute to, the planned production of attractive public space. These interventions drew on emerging distinctions in urban planning between commercial uses and space as an urban commons. They also helped sharpen this difference and make tensions between local and regional uses, recreational and entertainment uses, as well as commercial and municipal interventions in space cohere around notions of commons and commerce. But just as Möllevångsgruppen feared, their mobilization of urban commons against attractive space did not have the effect they desired.

Attractive or sustainable public space?

The first major struggle the activists around Möllevångsgruppen engaged in was a 2011 protest against plans for a block of five-story buildings with upscale condominiums just across the street from Folkets park’s main entrance. In 2002 the large Solidar cooperative bakery — incidentally built a century earlier with loans taken out with Folkets park’s profits as security — was demolished on this site, partly to make space for a primary school (Möllevångsskolan) after the plans to convert nearby Amiralen to a school were upended. The Area Plan for the redevelopment of the land remaining after the school had been built was completed in 2007. It was only in late 2010, after Möllevångsgruppen’s turn to anti-gentrification, that the final Building Permit was negotiated. The community group forcefully intervened in this process, which they saw as driven by a corporate gentrification agenda. This in turn brought back contradictions already articulated in the Area Plan. Despite the activists’ best efforts to pose the urban commons against the commercialization and gentrification of the inner city, their

cause was eventually taken up by other forces that leveraged the idea of urban commons as a means to extend the notion of competitive space to new spheres. This radical re-articulation of Möllevångsgruppen’s protests had important effects on Folkets park, but was also wrapped up in bigger shifts in the municipality’s modes of governing.

The community activists used the Building Permit’s stakeholder consultation for the redevelopment to intervene, but the group refused to be contained to this limited terrain of bureaucratic representation. Most notably activists squatted the land planned for redevelopment as the negotiations for a permit dragged out. If these actions on the streets increased pressure on the politicians discussing the permit, it was this bureaucratic debate that would have profound consequences. In their contribution to the Building Permit stakeholder consultation Möllevångsgruppen quoted all manner of urban planning documents in a statement that looked more like an architecture brochure than a community group expressing dissent. Möllevångsgruppen conveniently neglected to mention that the 2000 Comprehensive Plan, still the city’s main guide for renewal, had singled out this part of the city specifically for renewal plans for ‘large and exclusive flats’ to provide the material conditions for changing the neighborhood’s demographic composition. Instead, they focused on quotes emphasizing how planners had described ‘making use of public space’, ‘meeting across the borders marking public space’ and ‘making the city’s common spaces more beautiful’.

Most important was however that Möllevångsgruppen’s public protest and bureaucratic intervention forced the Green and Left Party representatives on the Urban Planning Council to act. As they looked for formal reasons to stall or stop the project, they stumbled on arguments from the 2007 stakeholder consultation for the redevelopment’s Area Plan. Two important bureaucratic actors, The Environmental Department (Miljöförvaltningen) and the City Head Gardener, had been critical of this new residential development so close to Folkets park. They argued that the architects needed to make adjustments in the plans for the fact that they were building only 20 meters from the park’s most busy sections. At the very least new houses should contain no bedrooms facing the park, to avoid unnecessary risks of noise disturbing future residents and pre-empt tensions between the social needs of residential space and commercial activities that public space required to make it competitive. These arguments were squarely ignored in the 2007 Area Plan consultation, and would probably have been ignored again

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590 Malmö stad, Stadsbyggnadsarkivet, Bygglov Dnr. 10-3565, ’Hej igen kära politiker!’.
in the pure formality of approving a building permit in 2011 if Möllevångsgruppen’s interventions hadn’t pressured the Urban Planning Council.

While activists still squatted the land in question, the Environmental Department explained in their response to the 2011 Building Permit’s stakeholder consultation that it already was being bombarded with complaints from locals about the increasing noise levels from the park, and demanded that the plan be changed to compensate for this. If the houses were built according to the permit being negotiated, the municipality’s ‘supervision of the activities’ in Folkets park had to become stricter, which ‘risked killing an important meeting place’.592

The Greens’ representative drew on the dominant representations and visions for Folkets park, and argued that in the five years since the Area Plan had been passed the park had ‘regained its function as an active entertainment park’. She further claimed that neither the social needs of future residents nor the threat to the park as a strategically-important, and regionally attractive, entertainment destination were taken seriously.593 The redevelopment plan’s critics referred to the Environmental Department’s data, based on residents who themselves had filed complaints about noise pollution from the park’s new commercial uses. The squatters’ actions and the Green Party politicians’ formal objections sharpened the mounting tensions between commons and commerce, but did not stop the Urban Planning Council granting a Building Permit for the redevelopment. Their protest, however, forced the Urban Planning Council to officially demand that The Park Director conduct a new survey on the commercial uses of the park and what adverse effects it had on local residents’ social environment.594

The conflict could have ended there, with plans approved despite protests, the contentious issue buried for years in a technical inquiry, and with no effect but the sharpening of tensions between commerce and commons that remained too weak to have any significant consequences. But because the tensions between residential and commercial uses of urban space had been both designated as serious enough to a merit a technical representation and public enough to provoke political debates, they could be sized by forces outside the Urban Planning Department. The person who took the opportunity to rearticulate this tension in a new context was the chairperson of the South Central District Board (Södra Innerstadens stadsdelsnämnd), incidentally also a Green Party representative. Both Folkets park’s day-to-day management and the approved Building Permit was officially out of her jurisdiction. The social environment of residents in her district was,

592 Malmö stad, Stadsbyggnadsarkivet, Bygglov Dnr. 10-3565, ’Yttrande över ansökan om bygglov för nybyggnad av flerbostadshus samt sophus på fastigheten OKET 22. SBK dnr 10-3565, Miljöförvaltningen, 2011’.
however, her direct responsibility. Noise pollution from Folkets park in this way shifted from articulating a contradiction within the redevelopment plans for a block to the future of the Southern part of central Malmö.

In a long interview in the *Sydsvenskan* daily, the influential Green Party politician lamented the increasing number of nightclubs in the area she represented, and the recent burst of late night activity in Folkets park in particular. Her argument, which both provoked a public debate and bureaucratic responses, had two main parts. She began by acknowledging that the South Central District might exert a remarkable centripetal force on young adults, and had become what bureaucrats for more than ten years had discussed as attractive space competing for the region’s young as vectors of human capital. But, this area had little to offer beyond the ‘mating years’ except clubs with loud concerts, exhaust fumes of streets crowded with cars and busses, and hordes of loud youngsters partying every weekend. Families with small children and — though never explicitly mentioned — the necessary financial means to be able to choose where in the region to live, left the area at the same rate that new youngsters arrived. The hippest parts of the city both attracted visitors to a booming entertainment industry and the kind of residents associated with human capital. Yet this area had a child poverty rate just shy of 50%. 595

This distinction between desirable young people moving to the area and the same kind of people choosing to leave when starting families is crucial to understanding the neoliberal logics informing the Chairperson’s argument. It was not that no families with children lived in the area. Rather, the demographically undesirable families remained in the neighborhood while the demographically desirable families tended to move away. This argument only makes sense read against the idea, increasingly entrenched in Malmö since the mid-1980s, that affluent residents choosing to live in a place was an indicator of competitive space. That it was mainly deprived families with few other options that chose to stay in the area was taken as an implicit, but important, indicator of this neighborhood’s lack of demographic attractiveness.

Attracting more affluent residents, as vectors of human capital, to the deprived inner city’s South Central District had been a priority since the 2000 Comprehensive Plan and its visions of a creative future city. But this envisioned outcome of planning had a decade later become more refined. Affluent potential suburbanites had become divided into two distinct kinds of desirable demographics. With the anxieties about commercial forces disturbing the social environment in ways that particularly disturbed affluent families, Malmö’s demographic ambitions became tied making space attractive for this already

existing demographic that was so strategic, and so difficult to retain, for social neoliberalism’s vision of a future city.

The vision of a city accumulating desirable residents was in this way beginning to be extended to a new social problem. No longer was the competition for new desirable residents through attractive space only modified by more disciplinary bureaucratic practices concerned with remaking undesirable existing residents. The indirect tactics associated with attractive space were now also being refigured to address how life conditions could be tweaked to give Malmö a competitive advantage for already existing desirable demographics prone to move away from the city.

It was not, then, Möllevångsgruppen’s argument of unsolvable contradictions between the urban commons and commercial redevelopment — suggesting that defending urban commons would undermine attempts to remake the city’s demographic composition — that was to be expressed in urban planning. Rather, the tension between commercial entertainment and the social environment of residents was taken up as a bureaucratic issue directly related to the neoliberal vision of changing the city’s composition. A new facet of social neoliberalism, the capacity to sustain demographic changes, came into focus as something distinct from attracting new residents and it did so by attaching itself to ideas about the urban commons.

Making Folkets park attractive by regulated commercialization was no longer just a project shot through with its internal tensions and disturbed by the increasingly powerful demands to limit commerce and protect public space as an urban commons from outside the municipal bureaucracy. It was challenged by attention to social sustainability as an alternative project within the municipal bureaucracy, but this project was also shaped by neoliberal visions of accumulating human capital. Representations of commercial uses undermining the municipal planners’ efforts to remake the demographic composition of this specific inner-city area provoked new ways of planning for competitive space. The idea of aiding private and public cultural institutions to attract visitors to the city, that for years had become the generic supplement to building subsidized luxury developments like Bo01, could at this detailed level of planning no longer stand in for attracting and sustaining desirable demographics.

This local tension echoed broader debates about ‘social sustainability’ gathering momentum in the municipal bureaucracy at this very moment. The term had been introduced into municipal urban planning in the 2005 revision of the 2000 Comprehensive Plan for Malmö that had made ‘attractiveness and sustainability’ the twin values all planning was subsumed to.596 Economic and ecological sustainability were concept that generously had been used by the city’s planners

since the mid 2000s, but ‘social sustainability’ remained a more diagnostic term attached to few concrete renewal plans. The way that social sustainability came to be taken up more actively was deeply shaped by the 2004–2008 Welfare for all plan that had made Malmö’s increasingly deprived peripheral areas a key problem in its disciplinarian attempt to jumpstart the accumulation of ‘human resources’ in these same areas.

Just as retaining demographic resources was raised in response to Möllevångsgruppen’s actions, the same issue was being discussed in a specially appointed ‘Commission for a Socially Sustainable Malmö’ (Kommission för ett socialt hållbart Malmö). The visions of a socially sustainable city that this group of experts debated was in part a response to Malmö’s residents’ growing inequalities in living conditions, but also became tied up with how to ‘calculate the economic consequences of inequality’ to strategically guide investments in social interventions. Welfare for all’s proposition that human capital accumulation required more intrusive interventions for existing demographics, compared to making the city attracting potential residents, was re-articulated in this way.

The Commission was a prestigious project understood to be on the cutting edge of social governance internationally, but before it could present even its relatively short preliminary findings in March 2012, events in Folkets park forced planners to anticipate these results. The Social Return on Investment experiment certainly was related to the Commission’s work, but it is difficult to find any resonances in its strictly monetizing mode of measurement with the Commission that instead drew on more traditional forms of social expertise. To envision public space as a resource that could be used to locally sustain desirable demographic changes through urban planning, as the South Central District Chairperson suggested, was a different matter. Not only did it correspond to a series of high-profile ‘Area Programs’ for socially ‘exposed’ neighborhoods in Malmö that explicitly framed urban planning and social sustainability as intimately linked. The South Central District Chairperson’s way of posing sustainable against attractive space was completely compatible with the Commission’s first presentation of its work.

In the preliminary 2012 report the Commission noted that it needed to define ‘possible ways to “build in” social capital in residential areas’ by strategically remaking the ‘milieu of habitation’ to this end. By emphasizing the production of human capital as the goal of social sustainability the Commission differed from the postwar welfarist ideas of public green spaces, such as Folkets park, providing

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598 This notion emerged through the work on these projects, but is most explicit in the final report, Stadskontoret, Malmö stad, Slutrapport: Områdesprogram för ett socialt hållbart Malmö, (Malmö: Malmö stad, 2015) p. 5 See also Holgersen, Staden och kapitalet: Malmö i krismernas tid, p. 179-181.

for universal social needs and rights. But it was also different from the way that public space had been figured socially as having the potential to compete for visitors that could help attract new residents from the suburban belt and increase Malmö’s accumulated human capital. A model was emerging for how the municipal bureaucracy could directly intervene in public space to influence complex patterns of use in ways that made the city’s accumulated human capital sustainable in the long-term.

The Commission’s attention to the life conditions for the ‘socially exposed’ by ‘building in’ human capital also revised the more intrusive and disciplinary bureaucratic practices with which a similar issue were handled in the Welfare for All plan. In this regard the Commission was more attuned with the liberal promise of governing ‘at a distance’ by regulating space rather than targeting individuals. What the 2011 debates around Folkets park, and the redevelopment just outside it, illustrate is that the argument for ‘social sustainability’ from a very early phase became tied to a vision of retaining already-accumulated human capital in terms of protecting the social environment of a residential area marketed to more affluent residents. The anxiety about an outflow of young families from the city center, a city center that had been meticulously regulated in order to attract new residents, became important in dividing the neoliberal understandings of competitive space into two problems. Attracting desirable demographics from Malmö’s suburban hinterland was something different, and potentially in tension with, sustaining desirable demographics already living in the city.

Families with desirable levels of human capital could be, just as young adults already were, treated as mobile neoliberal economic subjects that had to be carefully addressed by shaping urban space if they were to contribute to Malmö municipality’s demographic project. Younger people, as proxies of university students, were to be attracted to Malmö regionally. Families were to be sustained locally. Both these types of regulation were necessary to sustain a long-term demographic reengineering of the city which had become the ultimate goal of social neoliberalism. As the continued commercial expansion, however well planned and regulated, was represented as a threat to the social sustainability of the neoliberal demographic reengineering of the Southern parts of Malmö’s inner city, the final blow was dealt to regulated commercialization as a means to achieving attractive space in Folkets park.

Contradictions of the neoliberal commons

Social sustainability as something separate from, and potentially in conflict with, attractive space developed to encompass much more complex ways of governing in the early 2010s. This happened both in plans for Folkets park and in the more
theoretical work done by the Commission for a Socially Sustainable Malmö and by the Urban Planning Department with the 2014 Comprehensive Plan for Malmö. In Folkets park, where the making of attractive space through regulated commercialization was already in crisis, the changes that social sustainability lead to were the most dramatic. In this regard Folkets park foregrounds interesting possibilities of this neoliberal mode of governing through space.

One reason for this was certainly the worries about out-migration of affluent families from the inner city, but also a longer local history of planning shaped this process. The way that accumulated histories of uses for decades had been represented, and shaped development plans, appears to have pushed social sustainability to its most radical formulation in the plans for Folkets park. The city-wide plans authored by the Commission and the Urban Planning Department operated in a more abstract fashion, with less room for close representations of everyday use and instead drew on statistics when describing the problems they set out fix. This seems to have shaped the way that social sustainability and urban commons function in these more general documents, by articulating more abstract demographic concerns rather than the local Folkets park plan’s ethnographic representations of mundane uses.

The formal representation of tensions between residential and commercial uses, that Möllevångsgruppen’s protests had provoked, led to a new round of renewal plans for Folkets park, just as had been promised by the Green Party when demanding that the area’s social environment be protected against the entertainment industry’s disturbances. This work was delegated to what became called ‘the Strategy Group’, yet another temporary subcommittee on Folkets park’s future.600 A first and short preliminary report focusing on the park’s southernmost parts was finished in August 2012. It proposed changes that indicated that a shift away from the regulated roll-out of commercial forces was underway.601 This document’s proposals were then developed in a lengthier and much more detailed plan finished in May 2014.

Even in the 2012 report one can note a stark shift in emphasis in the kind of visitor the park was to be redeveloped for. The plan responded to the mounting pressures on regulated commercialization, and the claim that it was creating a socially-unsustainable residential area, by simply underlining that the park’s main target audience was the city’s ‘children and their families’. While this envisioned audience had been around for more than a decade, it had been downplayed in most planning projects since Projekt Folkets park had begun its work in 2002. In this most basic way, planning visions for the park were detached from both competition on regional scales and the regulated rolling out of commercial uses.

601 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 23th January 2013 §19 Utveckling av Folkets park — bordlagt ärende 2012-12-12, ‘Program för utveckling av Folkets parks södra delar, Gatukontoret, 2012-08-12’.
The key focus instead became ‘an increasing need of open, accessible, and green meeting places’. The way that commons had been posed against commerce in a series of tensions was in this way taken up in the central planning vision for the park. The 2012 report in practice reversed a fifteen-year trend, but the vision it proposed was more than the early 1990s idea of Folkets park as a local, recreational Community Park. Newer ways of understanding the role of public space also shaped this reframing of visions for the park. Folkets park was to be made an ‘urban environment benefitting growth and social sustainability’, the report argued. The debates about the neighborhood’s difficulties in retaining desirable demographics were in this way linked with the increasingly important notion of social sustainability.

The Strategy Group’s report even insisted that what had been seen as a crucially-important commercial use of space was to be entirely rolled back in one case. Axels Tivoli, which had been emblematic of the way regulated commercialization of the park to boost regional attractiveness had overcome all kinds of internal frictions generated by unwanted commercial uses of space, was abruptly singled out as ugly, noise-polluting, and a constant source of bad press coverage. This use was remarkably described as a ‘commercial competition to free alternatives like playgrounds […] making some families reluctant to visit Folkets park’. The shameless commercialism that had been celebrated by planners as the amusement park’s strength suddenly became its defeating weakness and the political right’s criticism of cultural commons as disrupting market performance was inverted, with commercial firms described as undermining the use of public space unmediated by markets. Several of the plan’s other proposals also focused on opening up public space to everyday uses, without connecting this to a desire to attract visitors on a regional scale through commercial actors. It suggested building a new entrance to improve access, creating more green spaces and playgrounds, and finally making the large investments needed to bring the old outdoor stage area up to a modern standard after a number of failed starts.

This sudden about-turn was followed up by a second subcommittee that included four architect-consultants, key bureaucrats from The Streets Department and Folkets park’s newly appointed second Park Director. Their work, endorsed in its preface by the also newly-appointed, City Head Gardener, was presented in the

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602 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 23th January 2013 §19 Utveckling av Folkets park — bordlagt ärende 2012-12-12, ‘Program för utveckling av Folkets parks södra delar, Gatukontoret, 2012-08-12’, p. 2.
603 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 23th January 2013 §19 Utveckling av Folkets park — bordlagt ärende 2012-12-12, ‘Program för utveckling av Folkets parks södra delar, Gatukontoret, 2012-08-12’, p. 6.
604 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 23th January 2013 §19 Utveckling av Folkets park — bordlagt ärende 2012-12-12, ‘Program för utveckling av Folkets parks södra delar, Gatukontoret, 2012-08-12’, p. 8-10.

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spring of 2014 in what must surely be the most comprehensive planning document in Folkets park’s history. The modestly-titled ‘Program for the development of Folkets park’ was a hefty 91-page document closely charting how all parts of the park were used, its history since the 19th century, and proposing possible ways to improve close to all of the 28 public spaces it identified existing in the park in hundreds of architectural sketches and maps. While this was not an Area Plan, the document was still presented to the Technical Council with a formally binding ‘Description’ which calculated it would stretch over eight years, be subdivided into six phases, and cost an astounding 92.5m SEK.605

The 2014 Folkets park plan lacked any reference to the entertainment industry and commercial firms as forces to be harnessed to intervene in the park in order to create a regionally-attractive public space. While neither of the words ‘entrepreneur’ or ‘business’ are mentioned at all, ‘attractiveness’ makes a brief reappearance in referencing the attraction of Folkets park’s ‘main’ target demographic, ‘children and their families’, and in a vague formulation about making the park’s existing areas more ‘inviting’. Regional visitors had completely disappeared as an issue benchmarking attractive space or a target audience in this document. Notions of Folkets park as a space for ‘entertainment’ is briefly mentioned in terms of one existing function among many that future plans should ‘strengthen’, but not translated into any specific interventions concerned with drawing on commercial actors or being part of a regional strategy in the way that had been so fundamental for more than a decade.606

Public space was in the 2014 Folkets park plan almost completely reimagined by the idea of attractive space through regulated commercialization being supplanted by visions of the park as an urban commons. Looking at the plan’s concrete proposals for upgrading public space, most of these were directly concerned with providing space for the local community in general, and its families in particular, and emphasized having free and unhindered access to the park. The plan’s first phase was renovating the existing playground, building a second playground and connecting them with more open green space. After this, the park’s worn-down central square was to be renovated and an experimental structure of platforms and walkways, what planners provisionally called a ‘parkoid’, be built among the treetops. This strange, and hugely expensive, idea had come from an architectural competition and was, together with newly-planted trees, to take over much of the empty space left after Axels Tivoli moved out in

605 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 26th February 2015 §64 Utveckling av Folkets Park, ‘Program för utveckling av folkets park’; Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 26th February 2015 §64 Utveckling av Folkets Park, ‘Program för utveckling av folkets park, 2014.05.09’.
606 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 26th February 2015 §64 Utveckling av Folkets Park, ‘Program för utveckling av folkets park, 2014.05.09’, p. 8-10.
the fall of 2013, and was to turn this empty gravel lot into accommodating public green space.607

Another major effort was to pave all the park’s footpaths with yellow bricks, making the park more accessible for pedestrians. Finally two new and more inviting entrances were to be built, and a ‘snack spot’ where ‘large groups of visitors’ like kindergartens or groups of parents and children could sit together with their picnic baskets within view of the playgrounds was to be constructed. The only way that remnants of the regional competition for visitors through entertainment can be seen in these plans was how the outdoor stage was to be renovated. This space was now more clearly described as public, framed on two corners by open spaces specifically designated for picnics. Rather than the drive to temporarily enclose the park by using the stage for ticketed events hosted by the park’s commercial operators as the 2006 audit had suggested, the 2014 plan’s ‘character keyword’ for this part of the park was, symptomatically, ‘the commons’ (allmäning).608

Taken out of context this dramatic reorientation might both appear to be difficult to explain and more innocent than its ties to neoliberal demographic recomposition in fact was. This undoing of regulated commercialization as the way to make space regionally competitive by a turn towards space as urban commons was framed by a long history of contradictions represented in urban planning. For years tensions had accumulated, making it evident that it was difficult for planners to create attractive space by relying on market actors. Debaser closing down, the high-profile court cases with Profilrestauranger, Amiralen not being used as had been hoped for, and Axels Tivoli misbehaving to a point where the park’s management repeatedly threatened the firm with eviction all played into this shift.

Solving these issues required new ways of envisioning the future. The notion of publically-subsidized civil society actors creating more attractive space than commercial forces, which Möllevångsgruppen’s demands in this turn towards commons were situated within, provided a model for testing new planning visions. All tensions at this moment seemed to align around a contradiction between commerce and commons. Something had to give, and when it did urban commons were what became the model for redevelopment concerns with the kind of social problems that planners were finding difficult to regulate within the existing formation. Experiments in representing and regulating social sustainability by

607 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 26th February 2015 §64 Utveckling av Folkets Park, ‘Program för utveckling av folkets park, 2014.05.09’, p. 70-87. See also Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 26th February 2015 §64 Utveckling av Folkets Park, ‘Program för utveckling av folkets park’, p. 2, 4.

608 Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 26th February 2015 §64 Utveckling av Folkets Park, ‘Program för utveckling av folkets park, 2014.05.09’, p. 49, 64-79. See also Malmö stad, Tekniska nämndens arkiv, Minutes of Tekniska nämnden 26th February 2015 §64 Utveckling av Folkets Park, ‘Program för utveckling av folkets park’, p. 3.
market models, which had failed so spectacularly in the park, provided few functioning tools for this task.

Instead, the treating of the park as a local, recreational space animated by uses outside of the market was the only alternative blueprint that existed for a new approach. This new formation re-articulated patterns of use and visions from the park’s long history as a space animated by movements and used by the local community. But this turn could also draw on the immense development of bureaucratic practices concerned with measuring and making attractive space that planners had deployed in order to use the park to compete for visitors, as was evident in the plan’s detailed description of the park’s present state and the vivid visions for its future.

This makes Folkets park useful for thinking about how governing through the commons emerges within neoliberal planning. Political theorists like Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt, David Harvey, Stavros Stavrides, and Massimo de Angelis have all suggested that the commons play a crucial role in contemporary capitalism. These theories have often been specifically concerned with how contradictions between the commons and market relations might open up a political space for radical transformation.609

Urban commons in Malmö’s Folkets park, and the city more broadly, certainly emerged in tension with commercial activity as it was represented as a source of instability by urban planning. But these commons were, despite tensions, institutionalized as a way to fix contradictions, just as they were fundamentally shaped by Malmö’s social neoliberalism’s repertoire of bureaucratic practices. This certainly allows for questions about what specific tensions might emerge around urban commons as a neoliberal technology of government, as well as how they could be rearticulated and redeployed for other regimes of governing. It does not however support notions of commons and markets necessarily articulating a dominant contradiction of neoliberal capitalism, but rather suggests that this is one of many tensions at work around urban commons.

This question seems particularly pertinent because the development plan for Folkets park from its inception was connected to neoliberal concerns about producing space that could sustain changes in the city’s demographic composition and retain human capital locally. Worries about competing for the desirable demographic most prone to leave Malmö had become a more urgent issue than regulated commercialization’s concerns with attracting new human capital, at least in the Southern part of the city center. The turn to urban commons as a way to represent, intervene, and envision planned urban space was perhaps pushing at the limits of neoliberalism. But it was also fundamentally tied to social neoliberalism

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through the idea of retaining and sustaining accumulated human capital. It was then not beyond, but at the threshold of, the urban planning regime of Malmö’s social neoliberalism.

If Folkets park’s new planning formation articulated ideas of ‘social sustainability’ with a tension between commons and commerce, the same idea was simultaneously developing along other trajectories. The 2014 plan for Folkets park joined social sustainability with a particularly rich history of planning tensions. This history of mundane tensions did not play the same role in the more general ways that social sustainability was forming as a bureaucratic problem at this moment. The Commission for a Socially Sustainable Malmö’s March 2013 final report and the ‘Comprehensive plan for Malmö’ (Översiktsplan för Malmö ÖP2012), published in May 2014, only partially mirrored the 2014 Folkets park plan’s turn to the commons.610

Both documents are sizable and have many facets, but their common theme is clearly an attempt to mobilize Malmö’s bureaucracy, and allied intellectuals, in an effort to translate theoretical formulations about ‘social sustainability’ into applicable expert knowledge that could be taken up as bureaucratic practices throughout Malmö municipality. This worry was shaped by years of accumulated expertise and local experiments, like the ideas coming out of Welfare for All’s 2009 final report or the ‘Area Programs’ for five of the city’s socially ‘exposed’ areas.611 These experiments were articulated with different strands of neoliberal policy increasingly circulating globally at this moment. One can in particular see in the Commission’s work fragments of the 2008 Sarkozy-sponsored Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission’s progressive rendering of neoliberal ‘human capital’ theory and the kind of health-centered bio-social engineering approach pioneered in the 2008 World Health Organization’s ‘Closing the Gap’ report led by Richard Wilkinson and Michael Marmot.612

The work that ‘social sustainability’ is doing in these collectively-authored documents is difficult to precisely pin down. One way that it came to be mobilized is by theorizing how competition for desirable demographics needed to be balanced against destructive effect of splintering life-worlds. In the words of the Commission’s final report, ‘increased crime, riots, and eventually a breakdown of society [was…] the end point’ of ‘increasing social inequality’, making Malmö’s accumulation of human capital, and thus progress in the transformation to a knowledge economy, extraordinarily vulnerable without the foundation of a more

socially cohesive city.\footnote{Malmö stad, Malmös väg mot en hållbar framtid. Hälsa, välfärd och rättvisa. Reviderad upplaga 3, p. 20. See also Malmö, Malmös väg mot en hållbar framtid. Hälsa, välfärd och rättvisa. Reviderad upplaga 3, p. 5, 32.} Focusing too much public money on creating competitive islands in a sea of poverty was damaging the very attractiveness of these sites because spill-over effects from surrounding urban space. Proximity to poverty was making space unattractive, undermining costly efforts to create attractive social milieus competing for human capital. Fighting extreme levels of inequality was thus not only a matter of ‘equity and social cohesion’, but the basic premise for Malmö’s ability to ‘assert itself in the international competition.’\footnote{Malmö stad, Malmös väg mot en hållbar framtid. Hälsa, välfärd och rättvisa. Reviderad upplaga 3, p. 23.} Moreover, while the economic transformation to a post-industrial city was still envisioned as driven by the inflow of demographic resources that ‘attractiveness’ signaled, this accumulation of human capital was, since the Welfare for All program, also understood to be engineered at the city’s peripheries. This would both help maintain social ‘balance’ and make social attractiveness sustainable and help the city accumulate the human capital it needed to face the future, or ‘invest in the human Malmö’, as the city’s new social democratic mayor Katrin Stjernfeldt Jammeh expressed it in her introduction to the 2014 Comprehensive Plan for Malmö.\footnote{Malmö stad, Malmös väg mot en hållbar framtid. Hälsa, välfärd och rättvisa. Reviderad upplaga 3, p. 5. See also Malmö, Malmös väg mot en hållbar framtid. Hälsa, välfärd och rättvisa. Reviderad upplaga 3, p. 6, 15.} Social sustainability was here extending the project drawn up by Welfare for All that designated the city’s peripheries as exceptional spaces meriting exceptional means of social regulation, rather than increasingly being left to the discipline of the labor and housing market. Yet compared to Welfare for All’s focus on exclusions and disciplining, this was a social strategy relying more on indirect bureaucratic practices associated with calibrating the urban environment rather than it was on making demands on individual people. There were certainly some of the workfarist formulations, that had dominated Welfare for All, about making targeted groups more self-sufficient — particularly in the Commission’s work.\footnote{Malmö stad, Malmös väg mot en hållbar framtid. Hälsa, välfärd och rättvisa. Reviderad upplaga 3, p. 109-111.} But these tactics were softened by ideas about bridging the city’s divisions by ‘social investments’, often by intervening in space rather than disciplining, excluding, or reprogramming individuals.\footnote{Malmö stad, Malmös väg mot en hållbar framtid. Hälsa, välfärd och rättvisa. Reviderad upplaga 3, p. 22, 109.}

To this one must add that there were elements of redistributive justice in these documents, which is remarkable considering that any notion of redistribution to achieve more equality had steadily been decreasing in urban planning’s social ambitions for more than two decades. One example was how the Commission’s final report discussed ways to disentangle the city from the low-wage sector, a
stark contrast to Welfare for All and the 2000 Comprehensive Plan’s implicit strategy to compete on this field. This redistribution was directly connected to a “new” social policy for a ‘post-industrial’ society explicitly concerned with accumulating ‘human capital’, thus extending neoliberal reason through social regulation rather returning to an idea of social rights, but it is still important to note the return of an ameliorative ethos in the Commission’s work.\textsuperscript{618}

In these documents, as in the plans for Folkets park, the productive power of commercial actors was called into question by a turn to civil society. Just as the focus on large and commercial cultural events in Folkets park was challenged by what was represented as a complex assemblage of municipal bureaucrats, voluntary forces, everyday uses of space, the strategic deployment of civil society was emerging as a key problem connected to social sustainability in Malmö more broadly. The Commission’s report discussed civil society both in terms of cultural production and the accumulation of knowledge from below, touching on two of the key phrases that neoliberal human capital theory had operated around for more than a decade.\textsuperscript{619} The 2014 Comprehensive Plan was somewhat less precise in its formulation, but also emphasized culture outside commercial entertainment as well as the making of democratic public spaces — separated from established dominant concerns like attracting investments from retail firms — as key strategies for the future.

The Commission’s report and the 2014 Comprehensive Plan thus display some similarities with how everyday uses of urban space were beginning to be understood as a commons in Folkets park. But, in both these documents dealing with the entire city, the commons were never posed as standing clearly against commercial forces in the way it took shape in Folkets park. Urban space as a commons, and civil society as a way to represent such uses, was in these documents identified as a problem only partly connected with accumulating human capital by attracting desirable demographics. Making space attractive for demographics associated with human capital, and in the long term corporate investors, continued to be understood as the main precondition for Malmö’s transition to a post-industrial economy.\textsuperscript{620}

In much the same way, social sustainability was understood more as a complement than an alternative to attractive space in these two documents. The Commission’s report on its very first page linked sustainability with “economic

\textsuperscript{618} Malmö stad, Malmö vägs mot en hållbar framtid. Hälsa, välfärd och rättvisa. Reviderad upplaga 3, p. 102, 109-110.


\textsuperscript{620} Malmö stad, Stadsbyggnadskontoret, Översiktsplan för Malmö, Planstrategi, utställningsförslag, p. 20-21, 33.

\textsuperscript{621} Malmö stad, Stadsbyggnadskontoret, Översiktsplan för Malmö, Planstrategi, utställningsförslag, p. 7, 30; Malmö stad, Malmö vägs mot en hållbar framtid. Hälsa, välfärd och rättvisa. Reviderad upplaga 3, p. 46.
growth and attractiveness’ while the Comprehensive plan’s emphasized the need for ‘continuing building of attractive space’. That the same tension which came to the fore in Folkets park, with its specific history of sharp contradictions in planning, can be sensed in these documents is worth noting because this points to a social neoliberalism concerned with sustaining human capital resting on different bureaucratic practices, and articulating different contradictions, than the formation before it which only was concerned with attractive space. The urban commons was in this regard never an alternative posed against attractive space and competition for commercial actors at the municipal scale. Both social sustainability and the urban commons were in these documents marking differences with attractive space and commercially-driven urban renewal, allowing for future fault lines centering around such a difference, without articulating contradictions powerful enough for social neoliberalism to re-orientate itself.

In this contradictory move towards social sustainability through planned space Folkets park once again appears as a laboratory for Malmö’s planners. Fragments of the tensions that had brought down regulated commercialization as the dominant form of development logic played a part in this. These tensions in turn articulated with the mid-1990s idea of Folkets park as a local Community Park and lingering memories of the park’s early 20th century glory days as the labor movement’s popular meeting place, in crafting a new development vision. Some of the market forces were still there, like a profoundly regulated Cuba Café and with no plans to change the way Amiralen, or indeed Debaser’s old haunt Möllevångsgården, functioned as commercial clubs. The vision for Folkets park emerging around 2012–2014 articulated all these elements with the notion of sustaining the city’s accumulated human capital by focusing on the social qualities of public space as an urban common and assigning civil society a key role in this process.

Urban commons in Folkets park were the not a direct challenge of neoliberal governance. Rather, the experiments with civil society in the park were forcing a reorientation of the means to achieve social neoliberalism’s visions of accumulating human capital. This certainly brought new contradictions into play, just as it seems like a case rife with possibilities for thinking about the conditions for redeploying the rich repertoire of bureaucratic practices concerned with creating and caring for the urban commons as a mode of governance.

How such experiments in neoliberal governance through the commons articulated contradictions in relation to its own internal tensions and with the world it sought to map and regulate, and along what trajectories it changed in response to this, is impossible to study in the archives I have looked at. Others might someday find that this reliance on urban commons created conflicts that

Malmö’s social neoliberalism could not navigate without profoundly transforming itself. Similarly, potentials for pushing these governmental concerns with urban commons beyond social neoliberalism’s vision of accumulating human capital might be foreclosed. This moment, marked by an experiment with results too early to fully grasp, seems like a point as good as any to take a step back from Malmö and Folkets park, and let the treacherous currents of history flow as they may.
Chapter 10
Conclusions:
The contradictions and possibilities of social neoliberalism

Malmö is only one of many cities that has experienced dramatic change in recent decades. During the postwar years it was a symbol of a social democratic modernist urban development project, a laboratory where planners eagerly tested the bureaucratic practices that we now think of as the municipal welfare state. By the early years of the new millennium the city had instead come to attract attention as a peculiar but successful neoliberal model of urban governance. Much research on Malmö has emphasized a tension between far-reaching neoliberal policy and what often are cast as anachronistic remnants of the once-strong postwar formation’s ameliorative social regulation.

I have argued that Malmö can be a useful case to study neoliberalism, but not in terms of an ideal type of neoliberal post-industrial urban renewal strategy tempered by the persistence of municipal social regulation. Malmö is instead useful in terms of a provocation for rethinking the narratives that frame neoliberal urbanism. An epochal story of a swift, neoliberal transformation from social to economic governance, often entangled with ideas of a political to economic shift, does not capture Malmö’s dynamic. The increasing attention of governmental practices with measuring and fostering competition within as well as outside state institutions, that I have defined as neoliberal governance, in Malmö essentially emerged through the reconfiguring of social regulation. For this reason I have come to understand the formation that emerged in Malmö as one example of social neoliberalism.

I have embraced this anomaly, and used Malmö as a provocation for rethinking the stories told about neoliberalism. The narrative frame I suggest seeks to explore
how neoliberalism rather than undoing social governance transforms it. It posits this change as one that can best be understood as a slow, silent, cumbersome, tension-ridden process transforming the bureaucratic practices of governing, akin to the neoliberal ‘stealth revolution’ suggested by Wendy Brown. To focus on this creeping neoliberal transformation of governance I have chosen to study archives that can lay bare the everyday bureaucratic practices of governing, but that perhaps display less traces of the economic crises or the political responses to such dramatic moments that often come to the fore in the literature on neoliberalism. In particular I have focused on urban planning as a field of bureaucratic practice strategic for both welfarist postwar social governance and neoliberal formations. My story about planning in Malmö suggests that there are important aspects of neoliberal transformation occluded by narratives of epochal crisis resolved by a determined political elite mobilizing generic modes of expertise circulating translocally to roll back the social state, and that this framing must be deployed with care.

I have used a fairly inclusive approach to which governmental practices empirically can be considered as part of urban planning, studying the many different forms of municipal regulation of urban space that I have found traces of in a range of different archives. The way that I theoretically have conceptualized planning is however much more precise, suggesting that it consists of three different but always related types of bureaucratic practice. The story of Malmö’s social neoliberalism emerging within urban planning is then shaped by how planners have linked representations of space to visions of a future city via interventions in the urban fabric. I have in particular been paying close attention to how each of these types of practices, and the relations between them, are permeated by tensions. The story of neoliberal urban planning is thus shaped by negotiations between different bureaucratic practices within the municipality, but always also linked to the task of knowing and remaking actual urban space with its many layers of everyday use and the contradictions these differences articulate.

My story of Malmö’s social neoliberalism might be of a slow transformation of bureaucratic practices, where the contradictions that critical urban studies scholars have identified in actually existing neoliberal economics and politics remain obscure, but it is not a story without tensions. Urban planning documents articulate contradictions by linking practices of decomposing social statecraft and neoliberal bureaucratic practices taken up from translocal policy debates, often through financial services consultancies. The urban spaces of the postwar city have also shaped Malmö’s planning, as residual ways of using space were represented in the making of development plans seeking to graft neoliberal visions onto these representations. Similarly, modes of using urban space provoked by neoliberal governance were at times also represented as problems that shaped specific plans.

623 Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution.
and articulated contradictions. It is along these three fault lines — residual governance and everyday uses of space as well as emerging uses of space — that I have studied the making of Malmö’s social neoliberalism. It is in relation to how these instabilities shaped actually existing neoliberal urbanism in Malmö that I have argued that it is impossible to reduce neoliberalism to the diffusion of new bureaucratic practices from global centers of power with only a minor reconfiguration of generic policies in adoption to local circumstances.

I have studied the formation of Malmö’s neoliberal planning at two scales. First, I have followed changes in urban planning and development by reading Comprehensive Plans and other documents with a citywide ambition. Second, I have studied Folkets park, one of the few local cases that regularly resurfaced as a planning problem through this period. In this manner I have tried to capture the many unexpected ways that contradictions have shaped Malmö’s neoliberal urban planning formation.

The persistence of social governance

The most robust finding of this study is the prominent role of social governance in Malmö’s neoliberal formation, where social regulation was reconfigured rather than abandoned by neoliberal reforms. This process cannot be reduced to what had been a strong municipal state refusing to be ‘rolled back’. Specific practices of governing that for decades had been important to social regulation in Malmö were strategically repurposed for neoliberal ends.

Social concerns with mapping and intervening across populations were a fundamental governmental problem for neoliberal urban planning in Malmö as early as 1985. This neoliberal re-articulation of social regulation, approaching regional demography as a competitive game, introduced the idea of making Malmö demographically ‘attractive’ as a strategic planning problem. This early neoliberal move set up a new way of constructing social problems at a regional scale and envisioning a social future for the city. It did not initially introduce new social technologies for representing urban space, and relied on the political right’s established economic forms of interventions to reach this future, primarily by drawing on Chicago School-neoliberal bureaucratic practices and embarking on a tax race to the bottom after the 1985 electoral success of the Moderates-led center-right coalition.

The attempt to remake Folkets park in the middle of the 1980s was clearly marked by this logic. Not only was the general fiscal pressure on municipal spending important for the 1986 rebranding of the park, but also the introduction of economic models from the corporate sphere to the municipal bureaucracy. The Folkets park rebranding project was envisioned as investing municipal funds to
compete on a regional entertainment market to reduce the municipality’s running costs for the park by increasing its revenue stream. Reducing public spending by projects such as this was in turn seen as the precondition for lowering income taxes that would make Malmö more demographically competitive and change the city’s social composition.

The 1985–1988 austerity budgets ran up against serious obstacles, with actually making tax cuts proving to be difficult. This was related to a series of very particular problems of governing. For instance, the attempt to rebrand Folkets park as a politically neutral entertainment destination disentangled from its deeply political history, turned out to be easier said than done with long-established uses of space refusing to disappear. The park’s failed renewal project further provoked neoliberal responses according to a strictly economic logic in terms of attempting to sell parts of Folkets park. This development intervention, typical of the economic approach associated with Malmö’s early neoliberal formation, articulated serious tensions with social representations of space when translated to actual plans. These tensions led to this plan being abandoned.

Folkets park’s spiraling debts, escalated by the spectacularly failing late-1980s commercialization effort, led to the park being bought by Malmö municipality, despite protests from the parliamentarian right, and turned into a Community Park. At the very moment that much of the scholarship on Malmö marks as the social democrats’ deepest crisis and the turn to neoliberalism, Folkets park was actually made a public space with a specifically social function for a deprived inner-city neighborhood. The park’s commercial function receded from urban planning documents, just as the notion of leveraging these buildings in an entrepreneurial vision of the city concerned with restricting public spending and cutting taxes was scrapped. This seemingly anachronistic tension between developments at the local and municipal scale illustrates how profoundly shaped by particular historical geographies of use and governing the effects of neoliberal reforms were in Malmö.

Social representations of Folkets park’s past and present uses had obstructed redevelopments framed by economic expertise that a neoliberal social vision of a demographically-competitive Malmö suggested for the park. These tensions between economic interventions and social representation of space can be seen as typical of Malmö’s early social neoliberalism. Addressing neoliberal social ends with economic means articulated contradictions with the predominantly social modes of mapping space which planning bureaucrats had inherited from the postwar period, creating a vulnerable bureaucratic formation.

These tensions were, however, reworked to articulate with the idea of making space competitive. By reframing this neoliberal social problem in terms of proactive urban planning, bureaucrats moved away from a strictly economic understanding of regional competition for desirable demographics. By the early 2000s bureaucratic practices represented conditions of life and patterns of use as a complicated social system which could be mapped and regulated by interventions
in the built environment to achieve the vision of a demographically more attractive, a more competitive, city. Malmö’s long history of social regulation did not only articulate with neoliberal bureaucratic practices in the abstract notion of demographic competition being translated to care for particularly desirable demographics. In addition, the way in which this issue was framed as a problem of urban planning, as creating an attractive habitat for this demographic, was marked by decades of social regulation.

Initially this formation operated in an aesthetic fashion on what had been relatively empty postindustrial brownfield sites like the Bo01 project in the Western Harbor. It was not long before the same vision was taken up in other parts of the city. Folkets park, with a vague and outdated area plan and plenty of land understood as ‘underdeveloped’, at this moment became a crucial laboratory for figuring out how to make public green space attractive and a resource for the city’s bid to compete for desirable demographics.

The economic methods of intervention that dominated the early neoliberal project, often casting social concerns as external obstacles to economic fixes, from this point on worked more smoothly with social ways of representing the use of the space. This shift became from the mid-1990s increasingly imbricated with transnationally-circulating neoliberal human capital theories expressed in terms of cultural industries and creative classes. Key to this shift was financial services consultants, that both in the municipal administration and in Folkets park’s management served as important mediators of new bureaucratic practices.

This attention to human capital became tied to a desire to leverage Malmö municipality’s substantial land ownership, also an important remnant of Malmö’s postwar period, in speculative redevelopment projects. These projects, most prominently exemplified by the Bo01 development, tend to be explicitly motivated by visions of demographic gains and the inflow of human capital. This marks an interesting difference to the entrepreneurial desire for making economic profits on land speculation that prominent researchers like David Harvey have associated with neoliberal urbanism. Malmö’s neoliberal speculation was demographic, in its ‘biopolitical’ sense, investing municipal resources in real estate development to realize a future rich in human capital rather than primarily seeking to gain fiscal resources.

Notions of a demographically-competitive city proved much less difficult to connect to Malmö’s urban planning tradition, re-articulating deep histories of concerns with popular culture and public education both at the urban scale and in Folkets park. Linked to these notions of a transition to a coming creative and cultural economy, the mid-1980s vision of Folkets park as a competitive entertainment venue resurfaced in 2001. This plan was shaped by both economic and social visions of competitive space, as well as social representations of how the park was used by locals and other visitors. Political interventions drawing on these representations of the park limited some the economic ambitions of the plan,
but it also helped create a template for future renewal work concerned with attractive public space less reliant on commercial actors. Different strands of neoliberalism were in this way at play in municipal planning, with competition for human capital and competition through commercialization at times articulating differences, but with the drive to accumulate human capital becoming the clearly dominant vision.

Commercial forces became increasingly seen as having powerful but highly unpredictable social effects during the 2000s. Strictly economic calculations risked undermining the production of demographically-attractive urban space. Similarly, the discipline of the racialized labor and housing market was by the middle of the decade no longer understood as effective enough to force residents in deprived, peripheral areas to accumulate the levels of human capital planners envisioned. More direct and disciplinary social intervention instead resurfaced as a proactive strategy to remake the city’s demographic patterns, as the 2004–2008 ‘Welfare for All’ plan signaled. Neoliberal urban planning was in this manner not only concerned with the minute knowledge and regulation of space needed to attract desirable demographics. The same kind of detail became mobilized in programs targeting existing residents that were seen to require reprogramming, drawing on a different, and more authoritarian, legacy of postwar social regulation. Malmö municipality’s neoliberal social vision of accumulating human capital was thus supported by a broad repertoire of social bureaucratic practices as well as economic practices. Both the strategic renewal of space to make it attractive for desirable residents and ways to intervene in areas inhabited by demographics seen to require discipline and reprogramming were shaped by Malmö’s strong social tradition, deployed to materialize neoliberal visions of the future city. Worth noting is also that it was as bureaucratic visions, rather than representations or interventions, that neoliberal reason first became entrenched in Malmö’s urban planning bureaucracy.

The foundational role that residual postwar social governance played in Malmö’s neoliberal transformation suggests the need to politically rethink the present moment. Rather than understanding the social as a mode of governance mobilized as resistance, or a past to return to and revive in visions for the future, it has at least in Malmö become a productive field of neoliberal governance with very troublesome effects. Neither Malmö’s peripheries nor its islands of affluence are the product of the free market’s lack of social regulation. Rather, these two urban conditions of an increasingly ‘divided city’ were produced by an active social policy that addressed the accumulation of human capital as two distinct tasks concerning different demographics and sites.

It thus seems futile to evoke pre-neoliberal social governance against a neoliberal present imagined as inherently anti-social without confronting the particular way that actually existing neoliberal formations articulate social bureaucratic practices. The degree to which social technologies of rule are active
components of other contemporary neoliberal formations might be debated, and Malmö is by no account a typical case. Malmö however, amply illustrates the extent to which social technologies of rule could potentially be deployed in and be repurposed for neoliberal projects. This study should, then, act as a cautionary example suggesting that those posing social policies against neoliberal reform might need to reconsider what assumptions such a stance rests on.

The social neoliberalism dominating urban planning in Malmö in recent decades suggests its advanced regimes of care for desirable demographics, and its combination of abandonment and exceptional interventions for transforming undesirables into demographic resources, must be coolly considered in its complexities because it is a terrain of future political thinking and acting. I would argue that there are no shortcuts for those that find the effects of this governmental formation intolerable. The planned production of the urban landscape operating around the distinction between groups needing to be enticed by attractive space and those needing to remade through intrusive interventions actively constructs two radically different subjects inhabiting two meticulously designed, radically different material life-worlds.

The sharpest forms of discipline and exclusion in Malmö were modified by a turn to ‘social sustainability’ during the 2010s, with the Commission for a Socially Sustainable Malmö and the 2014 Comprehensive Plan. Yet the same division of human capital into two bureaucratic problems — attractive space to compete for demographics prone to generate human capital and the disciplinary remaking of groups seen as lacking such potentials — remained within these plans. It is then not surprising that the planning project tied up with ‘social sustainability’ that most radically redeployed planning practices concerned with attractive space, and most departed from both discipline and competing for new demographics — the 2014 plan for Folkets park — was from the start concerned with sustaining accumulated human capital, not producing it for marginal groups. As long as this division between spaces attracting or sustaining demographics rich in human capital and spaces of exception for demographics targeted as lacking human capital, any ameliorative efforts or experiments with softer tactics risk hiding this underlying contradiction of social neoliberalism’s urban planning formation.

Postwar urban space in neoliberal times

Just as Malmö’s strong traditions of social regulation were far from abandoned in the turn to neoliberalism, the story of social neoliberalism is also profoundly shaped by the built and lived spaces of the mid-century city remaining at play in this transformation. Regional demographic patterns, imbricated with Malmö’s mass-produced built environment and its large council estates in particular, was a
foundational issue around which the neoliberal center-right coalition ascended to power in 1985, and the idea of demographic competition they championed, was formed. While a lot of municipal assets, including real estate, was privatized in the mid-1980s, the city’s land ownership remained substantial. This material legacy of the postwar city, and in particular how the Social Democrats response to Malmö’s industrial decline by increased municipal real estate ownership, became a strategic resource for reorganizing urban space along neoliberal lines. For instance the Bo01 project, which both drew on and departed from the generic finance-driven waterfront renewal model, would not have been possible without Malmö municipality’s substantial real estate ownership. This also meant that conflicts about whether to leverage this resource in municipal urban development projects seeking to build the city for a desirable demographic of the future or privatize the land continually erupted, as can be seen in the several foiled privatization schemes for Folkets park.

The neoliberal visions of a postindustrial city driven by a desire for surplus human capital attracting corporate investments that gained increasing sway during the 1990s was continually disturbed by lingering uses and users of space represented in urban planning paperwork. Affluent prospective residents did, at least initially, not want to live in the Bo01 flats located in the old docks, as planners had expected. This publically-subsidized development was not only separated from central Malmö by an as-yet undeveloped postindustrial landscape, but also by the still-living industrial heritage of active manufacturing industries. Young people from the city’s less affluent areas were however much more keen on taking over the carefully-crafted public spaces as beaches, to the dismay of those who had moved into the expensive seaside flats, and were at first met with exclusionary responses. This incident not only shows how Malmö’s residents’ unanticipated patterns of use shaped the development process. Bo01’s early failure indicated that maintaining distinctions between desirable and undesirable demographics uses of urban space was a key vulnerability for the municipality’s new planning strategy. From the early 2000s onwards the same tensions between what planners represented as distinctly different groups of visitors also became a recurrent anxiety in the efforts to make Folkets park a more intensely-used public space.

Renewed bureaucratic attention to Folkets park was however first provoked by the simple, and low maintenance, community green space envisioned in 1991 being found not to be used by locals in the expected way. When exploring strategies for redeveloping this site, older patterns of use stretching back to Folkets park’s golden age were discovered to persist. Representations of these historical geographies of use were initially a problem for planners, but eventually became a crucial part in refiguring the park as a space with the increasingly sought-after regional reach. But also this, more proactive, neoliberal vision was troubled by how planning represented historically made patterns of use. Most important was
how representations of ‘unruly youths’ of the deprived inner-city neighborhood disrupted these plans. With plans for Folkets park during the mid-2000s articulating visions of attractive public space that attracted the right kinds of visitors, policing unruly users and uses of public space to safeguard its attractiveness for the right demographics became an strategic problem.

Patterns of use persisting from the pre-neoliberal era were not dramatically left behind and cut off from new modes of planning, nor were they an external obstacle outside and against neoliberal planning. Rather, these geographies endured, internalized by neoliberal urban planning representations and provoking contradictions as the planned development of urban space unfolded. To return to Raymond Williams’ salient terms, everyday uses of space lived on as active, residual — rather than archaic — elements of neoliberal urban development.

The contradictory articulation of residual, social regulation with emerging neoliberal bureaucratic practices invites us to consider both how neoliberal urban planning actively produces inequality and the terrain on which it might be challenged. The articulation of the material, historical geographies of urban space with neoliberal statecraft instead point to the fragile foundations that neoliberal urban formations rest on. While the epochal shifts indicated by glittering high-rise redevelopments suggest that neoliberalism has fundamentally remade its world, the houses, streets, parks and people populating this world are products of many different historical moments and not always as neoliberal as we sometimes imagine. In this foundational way neoliberal urban planning is, in Malmö at least, marked by how the tensions provoked by how built and lived urban spaces from the past resurface within planning to articulate contradictions across time. How space is used — whether it is everyday uses in terms of consumers, tourists, residents or person going for a stroll or physical structures persisting — is a historically-produced pattern, and it profoundly shapes planning by continually being mapped with both quantitative and qualitative social tools of representation.

This presence of the past might, on the one hand, suggest that whatever might come after neoliberalism might in turn be marked by similar residual remains made by neoliberal formations. On the other hand, it also suggests that neoliberal logics are, even if one was to ignore residual modes of governance, enacted in a world it hasn’t fully shaped. This always infuses neoliberal formations with everyday tensions and instabilities persisting from past formations by being acted out as patterns of everyday life. These tensions are not limits or obstacles that can be overcome and safely displaced to the past, but re-emerge in surprising ways through urban planning representations and have distinct effects of the practices of governing.
Emerging fault lines of neoliberal planning

Malmö’s social neoliberal project was not only marked by the different ways in which the past erupted into the present. Neoliberal urban governance also unleashed new contradictions which shaped the way that the ethos of competition became entrenched in Malmö’s municipal bureaucracy. This tension can most clearly be seen in the later chapters, when bureaucratic practices enacting neoliberal reason had become dominant. There are, however, examples of the same process from as early as the 1980s. One such early example is how visions of a demographically competitive low-tax city justifying fiscal austerity clashed with the actual costs provoked by entrepreneurial public-private development projects, like the failed attempt to make Folkets park a commercial amusement park in the late 1980s.

The way that this kind of contradiction was expressed most clearly in urban planning can be seen in the continually-emerging difference between visions and representations of how commercial forces made use of space. In Folkets park this issue surfaced regularly from the late 1990s onwards, with private capital’s ability to attract new visitors always producing adverse side-effects. This tension was often impossible to detach from contradictions between different strands of neoliberal theory, with the social effects relating to visions of the accumulation of human capital coming up against theories of a competitive market tending to create the optimal use of space.

The model that eventually emerged sought to mobilize commercial actors to create regionally-competitive urban space by simultaneously rolling out commercial interests and regulating them. Regional uses mapped onto commercial entertainment tended — and was understood to — contribute to the inflow of desirable suburbanite residents. Local uses were instead connected to recreational functions of public space.

This provoked tensions between what groups, and by which means, space was to be developed for. Development through what I have called ‘regulated commercialization’ was in this regard intimately linked to re-engineering the city’s demographic composition and accumulating human capital, with commercial forces seen as the unpredictable means to achieve this end. This approach deferred some tensions, but could in the end not contain them and has in the last few years been marked by a deep crisis. In particular, planning representations were suggesting that not only commercial forces, but even the organization of public space to attract visitors from afar, in the long run undermined rather than bolstered the accumulation of human capital resources. This contradiction proved difficult to contain.

Contradictions between both actual and envisioned commercial practice and between entertainment and recreation became linked to understandings of where
markets ended and civil society began. Experiments with using civil society emerged as a more malleable alternative for creating the conditions for the accumulation of human capital to the regulated unleashing of commercial forces, and was in Folkets park posed against commercial forces. Using the voluntary sector, rather than commercial forces, to make space attractive in this way opened yet another fault line of neoliberal urban planning articulated by the difference between the measured effects of commercial and non-commercial uses of space. This shift was linked to the notion of space as a commons that could be understood as consisting of complex patterns in need of being mapped and regulated in order to govern urban life. This development was, however, never entirely detached from the overarching neoliberal visions of human capital accumulation.

The planners’ concerns with the unwanted side-effects of market forces, their interest using civil society, and incessant pressure from groups dissatisfied with the vision of disembedding public space from local patterns of use all informed the rise of ‘social sustainability’ in Folkets park. This idea was pushing against the limits of neoliberal urban planning, while at the same time also extended the logics of social neoliberalism. As the prehistory of the 2014 Folkets park plan illustrates, the preoccupation with creating urban commons was from its inception related to an idea of sustaining strategic demographics tending to move away from the city by limiting commercial uses of public space and making the city more socially sustainable. In other parts of the city the waning power of ameliorative social policy was re-articulated around the notion of social sustainability, but still within the framework of addressing certain parts of city as in need of authoritarian intervention to produce the human resources needed for the future city. The razor-sharp division at the core of Malmö’s social neoliberalism between indirect interventions in certain spaces to gently incite certain patterns of use among desirable demographics and intrusive direct regulation of subjects in spaces of exception to remake undesirable uses of space remained largely in place.

**After social neoliberalism?**

In conclusion, the story of Malmö’s neoliberal transformation I have sought to piece together from a reading of municipal planners attention to Folkets park and more general urban planning documents suggests a protracted and cumbersome process of change. Malmö’s social neoliberalism connected translocally circulating neoliberal practices of rule with remnants of previously-dominant modes of governing, residual uses from the postwar city, and the forces unleashed by neoliberal reforms. This uneasy fusing of difference articulated contradictions as a complex formation with internal, antagonistic tendencies, unevenly but continually adapting to changing conditions.
Malmö’s neoliberal transformation lasted decades, was shaped in profound ways by how it internalized contradictions, and required ceaseless bureaucratic labor to not come undone. A lesson one might take away from this study is that the outcomes of neoliberal reforms are less given and solid than they might appear. There was no one moment of epochal crisis where a neoliberal trajectory was set in motion. A neoliberal course was rather plotted time and again on a sea never entirely calm. While competition was clearly enacted as the dominant political reason by the early 2000s, this was only the result of the ceaselessly recalibrating of Malmö’s municipal bureaucracy. The outcome of these reforms was never inevitable, but rests on contingent circumstances permeated by contradictions that the practices of governing never fully escape.

My story of protracted bureaucratic reconfiguration might radically de-emphasize some themes dominant in the scholarship on neoliberal urban transformations, like the agency of political elites and the effect of technological and structural changes. Bureaucrats are, however, not the sole actors of this story. By being represented as a provocation requiring attention, the city itself — how it was used and lived in and how this process is deeply historical — was an influence impossible to escape which shaped bureaucratic tensions between residual and emerging statecraft.

After summarizing these findings, I would like to tease out a somewhat more speculative conclusion about the political possibilities that this narrative suggests. The anthropologist of welfare bureaucracies James Ferguson has for some years argued against a tendency to approach neoliberalism in terms of a politics of denunciation.624 There are many effects of actually existing neoliberalism that certainly are deplorable, as Malmö clearly exemplifies. But decades of listing these adverse effects in academic journals have not, Ferguson argues, proven to be an effective way to end them. Ferguson instead argues for searching for what practices of government are at play in the present that might be redeployed to new ends, in particular focusing on the neoliberal interest in experiments with Basic Income Grants in Southern Africa. Ferguson thus suggests that we look for existing or potential ‘uses’ of neoliberal governance that might be taken up by progressive political projects with hopes to make the world less hostile for its most vulnerable people. This critical uncovering of political potentials can be posed in sharp distinction to clinging to a position to ‘the left of the possible’, where ceaseless denunciations mean turning away from a changing world rather than critically engaging with the forces that might change it new directions — a

624 Ferguson, ‘The Uses of Neoliberalism’; Ferguson, Give a Man a Fish: Reflections on the New Politics of Distribution.
position political theorist Wendy Brown, drawing on Walter Benjamin, has analyzed as a kind of ‘left melancholia’. 625

Critical analysis should certainly not be tailored to meet immediate political needs. The task of critical scholars is rather, in Stuart Hall’s words, ‘making meaning slide’, unlike the political activist who seeks to mobilize fixed meanings in bids for power. 626 This project has been driven by a desire to understand neoliberal urban planning in Malmö as an unsettled and unfixed project with multiple meanings in motion. As a final indulgence to myself I want to fix this multiplicity in a humble bid for power. I specifically want to do this by taking up and thinking against Ferguson’s provocation of how the forces and practices at play in a neoliberal formation might be deployed in new ways, and articulate with new determinations, rather than in denunciating Malmö’s social neoliberalism and its powerful way of actively producing inequalities.

My argument is not that Malmö’s social neoliberalism has produced governmental practices that without any effort can be used to alternative ends, or indeed already are put to these uses by the city’s social democratic majority. I, then, do not argue that Malmö’s social neoliberalism in itself is a suitable model to emulate. Instead, I want to suggest that what urban planning in Malmö exemplifies is already emerging practices of governing and subjects that could be important building blocks for imagining and creating life after neoliberalism.

Those of us deeply concerned with the effects of neoliberal capitalism do not need to draft utopian futures from scratch. Just as social neoliberalism, at least in Malmö, was forged by the demanding re-articulation of practices and uses of space of a preceding mode of governing, this process might be repeated. It will surely be a slow, cumbersome task shaped by very mundane tensions inherited from the past as well as those unleashed by any such project, and thus demands much more than theoretically reassembling existing fragments of rule. But in Malmö one can certainly gauge both tensions and ways of governing that might be drawn on in such a project.

Urban planning in Malmö illustrates how recently tested social bureaucratic practices might both extend a neoliberal project and hint at something beyond neoliberalism. One example would be the attention to the mundane geographies of use through which public space is made. Both the plans for making space ‘attractive’ and ‘sustainable’ are deeply wrapped up in neoliberal concerns of accumulating human capital by making space demographically competitive. Yet, Malmö’s urban planning paperwork also bears witness to the immense productivity of neoliberal practices of governing. The complex way that uses of urban space are represented, envisioned, and intervened in to attract and sustain

626 Cited in Brown, Politics out of History, p. 41.
human capital is nothing short of a revolution of statecraft. Intricate webs of
desires are today systematically mapped, enticed, and satiated through space in
ways that were unthinkable only a decade or two ago. If these ways of creating
and calibrating space were detached from the need to prioritize uses that maximize
returns in human capital, many could be deployed to very different ends with only
minor adjustments. Just as the social expertise that developed in diffuse networks
dominated by philanthropic elites were appropriated and redirected to build the
welfare state, social neoliberalism’s practices of government might be taken up
and redeployed for new ends today.

The case in point is the urban commons as a mode of governing. In the form
that the urban commons re-emerged as a strategic issue in Malmö, the commons
were directly connected to social neoliberalism’s concern with accumulating
human capital by sustaining certain demographic patterns represented as
vulnerable to the tensions provoked by commercial forces’ space-making. But it
does not, however, take much imagination to see how lessons from these
experiments might provide actually existing models for governing in a different
context, and thus to have very different effects.

If all the expertise emerging around the problem of sustaining certain
demographics’ foothold in a specific area were redeployed to instead sustain other
groups or linked to universal rights-claims, this repertoire of powerful bureaucratic
practices could not only aid and nurture new communities. The neoliberal reason
of competition in urban planning is, as I have illustrated empirically, enacted by
selectively deploying technologies of demographically attractive and sustainable
space in particular sites to have effects limited to particular groups of residents.
Removing this selective limitation as to where and who these technologies extend
to would, in itself, pose a challenge to social neoliberalism’s core planning
concern with competing for human resources by optimizing investments to yield
the highest demographic returns. Neoliberal human capital theory’s fundamental
distinction between demographics that require investments to be attracted and
those that require disinvestment — or active exclusion, discipline and
reprogramming in the case of Malmö’s peripheries — could in this way be
decoupled from the means developed by municipal bureaucrats to achieve this
end.

This would require experimenting with new rationalities to replace the
neoliberal ethos of competition, and new ways to organize how planning practices
are deployed. While suggestions for such alternative rationalities are far beyond
the implications I am comfortable drawing from Malmö, my analysis does suggest
this way of conceptualizing the undoing of social neoliberalism. Malmö’s
neoliberal formation, and its model of competing for desirable residents, is
premised on constantly making distinctions between those interventions
contributing to visions of a demographically ‘attractive city’ and those
interventions that do not. If this distinction cannot be made, enacting demographic
competition through urban planning, indeed Malmö’s entire social mode of neoliberal planning, becomes impossible.

Detaching neoliberal social concerns from the selective deployment prescribed by human capital optimization does not address the fundamentally anti-democratic tendencies of state-sanctioned experts regulating demographics by subtly shaping urban environments. This deeply historical democratic deficiency has perhaps been reinforced by the neoliberalization of social regulation, but must be traced back to governing elites’ responses to the demands for mass democracy and equality more than a century ago. Therefore the question remains if de-articulating social neoliberalism’s planning practices from human capital optimizations’ distinctions could lead to not only more equal, but also more democratic, modes of governing through social regulation. If a future process of de-articulation and re-articulation is driven by demands for not only expanded access to social care, but more radical claims to rights of democratic control over such bureaucratic practices, I cannot see why this would not be a possible outcome. Such re-articulations would not be smooth or without damaging debts to neoliberalism, and there are certainly risks in seeking to adopt such technologies for new ends. It is however a strategy that I would argue needs to be tested before being discarded.

Finally, I would like to argue that some of the forces needed to create this different context, where neoliberal bureaucratic practices might have different effects, can already be seen to be at work when looking at Malmö’s social neoliberalism. The deep fault line between demographics addressed as desirable vectors of human capital and demographics addressed as unsatisfactory producers of human capital creates a divided city. This difference informs how physical space is made, how technologies of social care and discipline are deployed, and how subjects are addressed. In some ways it articulates with older class distinctions and ethnic interpellations — although by no means simply reproducing their logics — in actively dividing the city into two distinct kinds of spaces populated by groups continually addressed as radically different.

Looking at this distinction between both spaces and subjects, and the tensions it seems to provoke, one can sense an emerging dynamic of everyday contradictions. This tension between desirable and undesirable demographics might force urban planning in new directions. Such contradictions might even be instrumental to the abandonment of social neoliberalism’s necessary distinction between high and low human capital returns on investment.

Moreover, this deep contradiction seems to demand a political project doing more than ameliorating the effects of actually existing neoliberalism. Instead it demands rethinking what political reason might be deployed in the practices of governing to stop reproducing social neoliberalisms distinction of desirable and undesirable demographics. Neoliberalism is in this regard already being
challenged from within its own logics, as Michel Feher has argued in regards to human capital becoming the primary field of societal contradiction.627

Imagining a better future makes more pressing demands than simply noting internal tensions or finding new theoretical ‘uses’ for the governmental practices of neoliberalism. I have focused my analysis on planning as a sphere of social regulation in order to map how contradictions have shaped the making of Malmö’s social neoliberalism. The rise of neoliberalism can, however, as the ample critical literature makes clear, productively be understood also in other terms. Two key aspects of this literature is scholarship that emphasizes structural, economic, and technological changes and research that deals with neoliberalism as a hegemonic, political project. Despite the contradictions of neoliberal urban planning I have charted, hinting at this formation’s vulnerability, it seems improbable that a departure from neoliberalism would not be linked to a competing hegemonic project connecting to the tensions and division of what could be considered structural changes. Just as Malmö’s social neoliberalism, beyond the questions I have posed, certainly contained elements of politically made hegemonic relations between class fractions and deep material shifts in the technologies of labor and life, any future formation would certainly also be shaped by such processes beyond the scope of the analysis I offer.

One might perhaps sense elements of the future city in places like Malmö, not in terms of a more social and better neoliberal system, but through emerging practices of governing and lines of contradiction that the city’s social neoliberalism reveals. These fault lines and bureaucratic practices are perhaps unique to Malmö as a city in so many ways shaped by its particular postwar heritage. They might however also have similarities to features also recognizable in other neoliberal formations that articulate the same kind of tensions in similar ways.

The bureaucratic practices and contradictions of Malmö’s social neoliberalism discernable in urban planning paperwork are in either case only some of the elements needed to make a future different from this recent past. Other elements, other ways of grasping fundamental tensions and re-deployable practices of governing, must be gleaned from other cases in all their particularity. And political imaginaries and systemic tensions beyond what I have studied must infuse and link these, and other, contradictions and experiments in statecraft. But perhaps something, although by no means everything we need, can be learnt from Malmö to help us imagine and bring about a world after neoliberalism.

627 Feher, ‘Self-Appreciation; or, the Aspirations of Human Capital.’
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