Accounting for Context: Separating Monetary and (Uncertain) Social Incentives

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift

Abstract

This paper proposes a simple framework to model social preferences in a way that explicitly separates economic incentives from social (context) effects and allows for uncertainty also about the latter. Moreover, it allows non-economic cost associated with the deviation from some norm to be more discriminatory than just “right” or “wrong.” We refer to existing evidence on dictator game giving to demonstrate how intermediate behaviours (giving some) as well as payments to change the context (e.g. exiting the game) can be accounted for. Furthermore, the framework is used to exemplify both theoretically and empirically how contextual variables such as social norms can worsen a social dilemma or possibly make it disappear. The empirical results of a classroom experiment suggest that women are more responsive to such contextual effects.

Detaljer

Författare
Enheter & grupper
Externa organisationer
  • University of Rostock
  • CESifo Munich
Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Nationalekonomi

Nyckelord

Originalspråkengelska
Sidor (från-till)61-66
TidskriftJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Volym72
StatusPublished - 2018
PublikationskategoriForskning
Peer review utfördJa

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