Buck-Passing Personal Values

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Abstract

Abstract in Undetermined
So-called fitting-attitude analyses or buck-passing accounts of value have lately received much attention among philosophers of value. These analyses set out from the idea that values must be understood in terms of attitudinal responses that we have reason to or that it is fitting or that we ought to have regarding the valuable object. This work examines to what extent this kind of analysis also can be applied to so-called personal values - value-for, rather than to the impersonal value period which has been the standard analysandum. The shift from impersonal to personal values can, it is argued, be taken without any major change to the pattern. It is not the normative element that needs to be changed in the analysis but rather the kind of attitude - what is required is that the attitudes all have to be so called 'for someone's sake' attitudes.

Detaljer

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Forskningsområden

Ämnesklassifikation (UKÄ) – OBLIGATORISK

  • Filosofi

Nyckelord

Originalspråkengelska
Titel på värdpublikationValues, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology
RedaktörerDavid Chan
FörlagSpringer
Sidor37-51
ISBN (tryckt)978-1-4020-6871-3
StatusPublished - 2008
PublikationskategoriForskning
Peer review utfördJa