Can I be an instantaneous stage and yet persist through time?

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Bibtex

@article{8c66fe3ce2a04ff6b1c4d8ce6490f42a,
title = "Can I be an instantaneous stage and yet persist through time?",
abstract = "An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Hawley, K. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz{\textquoteright}s Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e., give up their central thesis) or hold that stages are both instantaneous and continuants. I subsequently show that, although stage theory is flexible enough to accommodate the latter claim, the cost for accommodating it is an excessive proliferation of persistence concepts.",
keywords = "Persistence - Stage theory - Temporal counterparts - Predication - Leibniz{\textquoteright}s Law",
author = "{Hansson Wahlberg}, Tobias",
year = "2008",
doi = "10.1007/s12133-008-0036-9",
language = "English",
volume = "9",
pages = "235--239",
journal = "Metaphysica",
issn = "1437-2053",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "2",

}